dann wären sie ja insider und dürften überhaupt nicht :o
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>Danke.
>
>Puuh, da können sie sich ja selbst raufkaufen, noch bis 40
>oder so,
>und ohne den Vecernicek :)
>
>7,4 Mio Aktien noch ... aber könnte durchaus eine Frage auf
>der HV sein,
>warum man zu solchen Preisen noch kauft,
>wenn es nicht mehr wirklich günstig ist.

Weil DIE mehr wissen 😳
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Danke.
Hab mich in die obere URL reingeklickt
und werd da regelmäßig vorbeischauen,
schaut brauchbar aus.

Die untere schaut ja - trotz abschreckendem Namen -
noch gefälliger aus :)
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zerlegt und neuwertig ... weil Wels erzeugt die Fernwärme aus Müll
(im Gegensatz zu Wien)

https://ooe.orf.at/stories/3191582/
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Kremlin insiders reportedly told Bloomberg that Russian President Vladimir Putin is preparing a new offensive to regain the initiative that may begin as early as February or March 2023. Russian officials, Kremlin advisors, and other unspecified knowledgeable figures who spoke on condition of anonymity reportedly told Bloomberg that Putin seeks to conduct a new major offensive and that he believes that Russia's tolerance to accept causalities will allow Russia to win the war in the long run despite Russian failures so far. This report is consistent with ISW's current assessment and forecast that the Kremlin is likely preparing to conduct a decisive strategic action—most likely in Luhansk Oblast—in the next six months intended to regain the initiative and end Ukraine's current string of operational successes. ISW previously assessed that the decisive strategic action in Luhansk Oblast could be either a major offensive or a Russian defensive operation to defeat and exploit a Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Recent limited Russian ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast may be intended to disperse Ukrainian forces and set conditions for an offensive in Luhansk. Russia is redeploying elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division from Belarus to Luhansk Oblast. This recent development suggests that the planned Russian offensive referenced in the Bloomberg report is most likely aimed at Luhansk Oblast though it could also occur in the Vuhledar area in western Donetsk. This new offensive is extremely unlikely to target northern Ukraine from Belarus. There continues to be no indication that Russian forces are forming strike groups in Belarus; Russian elements in Belarus are largely using Belarusian infrastructure and training capacity for training rotations. Russian milbloggers are also increasingly writing off the notion of a second attack against Kyiv as an information operation and are suggesting that the most likely target for a Russian offensive would be in eastern Ukraine or neighboring Kharkiv Oblast.

Key Takeaways
• Kremlin insiders reportedly told Bloomberg that Russian President Vladimir Putin is preparing a new offensive to regain the initiative that may begin as early as February or March 2023.
• The Kremlin confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin is issuing preemptive pardons for convicts who serve in Russian operations in Ukraine.
• A visual investigation by a Russian opposition outlet confirmed that Russian authorities are deporting children from occupied Kherson Oblast to occupied Crimea.
• Russian officials denied reported explosions near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on January 26.
• The Russian military command is likely attempting to restrict mibloggers' frontline coverage to regain control over the Russian information space ahead of the new offensive. These restrictions—if planned—are likely a part of the Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov's efforts to professionalize the Russian Armed Forces.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Kreminna on January 26 and January 27.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut, on the western outskirts of Donetsk City, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian sources did not report that Russian forces continued localized offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast on January 27.
• Russian officials claimed that the conscription age will not change in the upcoming 2023 spring conscription cycle.
• Russian occupation authorities are continuing to intensify efforts to integrate occupied territories into the Russian legal and administrative structures.

Institute for the Study of War
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