High-ranking Kremlin statements, including from Russian President Vladimir Putin, continue to demonstrate
Russia's wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has
illegally annexed. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting on June 30 on the socioeconomic
development of occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts during which he frequently
referred to occupied Ukraine as “Donbas and Novorossiya.” Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on
June 30 to a June 27 statement by Odesa City Mayor Gennadiy Trukhanov that Odesa City is not a “Russian”
city and has its own history, claiming that the history of Odesa City is "inextricably linked" with
Russia. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky claimed on June 30 that Russians and Ukrainians are
"one people" with a "historical homeland" and referenced the "ancient Russian lands on both sides of the
Dnipro (River), Novorossiya, and Crimea."
Putin's, Peskov's, and Medinsky's June 30 statements
are only the latest statements from high-ranking Kremlin officials indicating the extent of Russia's
territorial ambitions. Putin reiterated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on
June 20 that he considers the Russian and Ukrainian people to be "one people in reality" and that
"Ukraine is ." Kremlin officials have routinely labelled Odesa City as a "Russian" city,
including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov most recently on June 9. Kremlin officials have also
repeatedly referenced "Novorossiya," which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern
Ukraine. Medinsky's reference to the "ancient Russian" lands on "both sides of the Dnipro" also coheres
with Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo's April 2025 call for Russia to completely control the
areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Ukrainian
Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa stated in early June 2025 that Russia intends to
occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and seize Odesa Oblast by the
end of 2026. Putin and other Kremlin officials have consistently indicated that they do not believe that
Ukraine is an independent state with its own history, identity, and culture separate from Russia. Russian
officials' ongoing commitment to these narratives demonstrates the Kremlin's continued objective of
destroying the Ukrainian state and subjugating the Ukrainian people.
Key Takeaways:
• High-ranking Kremlin statements, including from Russian President Vladimir Putin, continue to
demonstrate Russia's wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Crimea and the four oblasts that
Russia has illegally annexed.
• The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (UN OHCHR) issued its December 2024-May 2025 report detailing Ukrainian civilian casualties,
systemic Russian mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), and limited Ukrainian mistreatment of
Russian POWs.
• The Kremlin is poised to launch a new "national messenger" application
affiliated with Kremlin-controlled social media site VKontakte (VK) as part of ongoing efforts to censor
Russian citizens and isolate them from the global internet.
• Azerbaijani authorities raided
the offices of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet Sputnik in Baku as Russian-Azerbaijani relations
have deteriorated recently after a raid against ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia.
• Russian
forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The Russian federal Unified Institute for Spatial Planning (EIPP) announced plans on June 30 to develop
the “tourist potential” of occupied Ukraine. The EIPP, a subordinate entity to the Russian Ministry of
Construction, Housing, and Utilities, stated that it identified opportunities for the development of
“health and wellness tourism” in occupied Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts and “cultural and
educational, sports, military-patriotic, industrial, and pilgrimage tourism” in occupied Luhansk Oblast.
The EIPP project includes plans for the development of transportation infrastructure to facilitate the
movement of tourists to occupied areas of Ukraine. The EIPP stressed that the development of tourism in
occupied Ukraine is “a strategic direction” for Russia. The EIPP also created a plan for the development
of several cities and districts in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, largely intended to link transportation
logistics to tourism projects. ISW has previously reported on EIPP’s role in creating and implementing
infrastructure projects throughout occupied Ukraine, and continues to assess that such projects allow
Russia to simultaneously integrate occupied Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence while also
setting conditions to generate revenue off of the occupation. Russia’s insistence on treating occupied
Ukraine as a viable tourist destination is notable: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has turned these areas
into active combat zones, and continued Russian plans to attract tourists to occupied areas is both
irresponsible and a potential violation of international law.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian occupation administrators continue efforts to incentivize Russians and loyalists to relocate
to occupied Ukraine.
• The Russian federal Unified Institute for Spatial Planning (EIPP)
announced plans on June 30 to develop the “tourist potential” of occupied Ukraine. Russia’s insistence on
treating occupied Ukraine as a viable tourist destination is a potential violation of international
law.
• Russia is likely to leverage the new occupation head of Mariupol to deepen links
between the occupied city and Russian federal subjects and to pursue the proliferation of profitable
development projects.
• The Russian youth military-patriotic activism group “Movement of the
First” is expanding its influence in occupied Ukraine.
• Russia continues sending Ukrainian
children to summer camps and military-patriotic programs across the Russian Federation.
A Russian occupation official claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Luhansk Oblast for the
second time during Russia's full-scale invasion, but Russian milbloggers denied this claim. Luhansk
People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on June 30 that Russian forces seized all of
Luhansk Oblast. Russian milbloggers denied Pasechnik's claim, however, stating that Russian forces have
not cleared Nadiya and Novoyehorivka (both east of Borova). One milblogger claimed that some border areas
are still contested "gray zones." Then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed on July 3, 2022,
that Russian forces captured all of Luhansk Oblast, but Ukrainian forces were subsequently able to regain
positions in Luhansk Oblast during the Fall 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive. Ukrainian forces made advances
in Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts during the Fall 2022 counteroffensive and disrupted Russian
plans to resume efforts to drive on the northern edge of the "fortress belt" in Donetsk Oblast. Russian
forces have since failed to retake significant swathes of territory that Ukrainian forces liberated in
the Kharkiv counteroffensive, including Kupyansk, Borova, Izyum, and Lyman. Russian forces intensified
offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions in early 2024 and have continued
attempts to advance toward these three settlements over the last one and a half years. ISW assessed in
late November 2024 that Russian forces had seized roughly 99 percent of Luhansk Oblast, and Russian
forces have struggled in the seven months to seize the last one percent.
The Russian military
command is modernizing Russian training grounds to include motorcycle tracks and reportedly intends to
purchase up to 200,000 Chinese-made motorcycles for the Russian military. The Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD) published footage on June 27 and 28 showing Russian officials visiting the Novosibirsk Higher
Military Command School and a new military training ground in Krasnodar Krai and highlighted that Russia
is creating motorcycle training programs at these facilities. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov
and Russian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev discussed improving Russia's
ability to train forces and generate new officers at the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School, and
Belousov ordered Mordvichev to equip the school with motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to help
train cadets in modern tactics. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov stated that the
Krasnodar Krai training ground has a modern driving range for motorcycles, ATVs, and quad bikes and noted
that Russia has modernized over 200 training centers to account for the new tactics that Russian forces
are using in Ukraine. The Russian military command has been working to formalize motorcycle tactics and
training throughout the Russian military in recent months.
Key Takeaways:
• A
Russian occupation official claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Luhansk Oblast for the
second time during Russia's full-scale invasion, but Russian milbloggers denied this claim.
• The Russian military command is modernizing Russian training grounds to include motorcycle tracks and
reportedly intends to purchase up to 200,000 Chinese-made motorcycles for the Russian military.
• Ukrainian forces continue to strike defense industrial enterprises in Russia's rear.
• The
Ukrainian military command continues to transition to a corps structure and improve its training
system.
• Russian-Azerbaijani relations continue to deteriorate over a number of smaller-scale
incidents in recent days, inflaming unresolved disputes over the December 2024 Russian shoot down of an
Azerbaijan Airlines plane.
• An investigation by the Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict
found that Russian forces were responsible for a 2022 strike that killed Ukrainian prisoners of war
(POWs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast, as ISW assessed at the time.
• Ukrainian forces advanced
near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced near Toretsk and Novopavlivka.
Cognitive warfare is Russia’s way of war, governance,
and occupation. The goals, means, and effects of Russian cognitive warfare are far greater than
disinformation at the tactical level. Russian cognitive warfare is:
• The way of war: The
Russian way of war is centered on the notion that wars can be won and lost in the opponent’s mind. The
Kremlin’s main effort is shaping its opponents' decisions to achieve aims unattainable through Russia’s
physical capabilities alone. The Russian strategy that matters most is not its warfighting strategy, but
rather the Kremlin’s strategy to cause us to see the world as Moscow wishes us to see it and make
decisions in that Kremlin-generated perception of reality.
• The way of governance: The
Kremlin has been waging an information war inside Russia and on territories that Russia illegally
occupies in order to maintain the regime's control and stability. Russia’s internal and external
information operations, while distinct from one another, interact and cannot be understood in siloes. The
Kremlin's domestic information control helps it generate resources for Russia’s military efforts abroad.
• Born out of need: Russia is not weak, but it is weak relative to its goals. The Kremlin
uses cognitive warfare to close gaps between its goals and its means. The main purpose of Russia’s
cognitive warfare is to generate a perception of reality that allows Russia to win more in the real world
than it could through the force it can actually generate and at a lower cost.
• Targets
reasoning: The primary objective of Russian cognitive warfare is to shape its adversaries’
decision-making and erode our will to act. The Kremlin aims to decrease US and allied will and capability
to resist Russia to lower the barrier to achieving its aims. Russia needs its opponents to do less so
that Moscow can achieve more of its goals. The Kremlin uses cognitive warfare to create a world that
would simply accept, and not fight, Russian premises and actions.
• Beyond media: Russia uses
all platforms that transmit narratives - media, conferences, international frameworks, diplomatic
channels, individuals ¬¬— as tools of its cognitive warfare.
• Beyond information means:
Russian cognitive warfare is supported by physical activities. These physical tools include military
exercises; sabotage; cyber-attacks; combat operations, and exaggerations of Russia’s military
capabilities and battlefield progress.
• Cross-theater and multigenerational: Russian
information operations span decades and geographies. The effects of Russian cognitive warfare may occur
years after Russia launches information operations. Russia selectively activates and deactivates a set of
narratives over decades to adapt them to the Kremlin’s evolving requirements.
• Effective,
but only to a point: Cognitive warfare allowed Russia to make some gains that would have been impossible
with conventional forces alone. Russian cognitive warfare is not always effective, however, as Russian
information operations regularly succeed only partially, fail, and even backfire.
• A
constant pursuit: Russia is always fighting for the initiative in the information space. The initiative
is not permanent and can be contested.
• A vulnerability: The Kremlin is overly dependent on
cognitive warfare. The Kremlin’s ability to achieve its objectives abroad critically depends on the
West’s acceptance of Russia’s assertions about reality. Putin’s presidency also depends in part on his
ability to maintain a perception that an alternative to his rule is either worse or too costly to fight
for.
• Predictable, hence targetable: Russian cognitive warfare supports the Kremlin’s
strategic aims, which have not changed in years. This fact presents opportunities for defense and
offense. The Kremlin also relies on a set of predetermined messages, making it hard for the Kremlin to
rapidly pivot to new information operations.
The United States should not counter Russian
cognitive warfare symmetrically. The key to defending against Russian cognitive warfare is doing so at
the level of strategic reasoning while resisting the urge to chase Russia's tactical disinformation
efforts. Debunking individual false narratives only grapples with the tactical level of Russian cognitive
warfare and is insufficient for countering Russian cognitive warfare. The United States and its allies
should understand what premises the Kremlin wants us to believe at any given time and over generations,
which decisions of ours it is trying to shape, and in support of which aims. The United States and its
allies can then defend against Russian cognitive warfare by rejecting the very premises the Kremlin is
trying to establish in its effort to have us reason from those premises to conclusions that benefit
Russia.
The United States paused weapons supplies to Ukraine, including critical air defense interceptors,
artillery shells, missiles, and rockets. Western media outlets reported that sources stated on July 2
that the US pause on weapons supplies to Ukraine will affect dozens of PAC-3 interceptors for Patriot air
defense systems, dozens of Stinger man-portable air defense systems, thousands of 155mm high explosive
howitzer munitions, over 100 Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, over 250 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket
System (GMLRS) rockets, dozens of grenade launchers, and dozens of AIM air-to-air missiles. Familiar
sources told Politico on July 1 that the United States decided in early June 2025 to withhold some of the
aid that the United States promised Ukraine under the Biden administration but that the decision is only
now taking effect. Politico reported that the halted weapons come from two different streams of Biden
administration-era support — weapons from drawdowns of current US stockpiles that the US Department of
Defense (DoD) received money to replenish, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, in which the
United States funds the purchase of weapons for Ukraine from US defense firms. White House Deputy Press
Secretary Anna Kelly stated on July 1 that US authorities made the decision following a DoD review of US
military support to states around the world. Six defense officials, congressional officials, and other
sources told NBC that the Pentagon ordered the pause after a review of US munitions stockpiles. NBC's
defense and congressional sources stated that the United States could hold up the weapons flow to Ukraine
until the assessment of US stockpiles is complete but that the United States could extend the pause of
military assistance to Ukraine even longer if the weapons are in short supply or if the United States
needs to supply them to other parts of the world.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) stated on July 2 that continued deliveries of previously allocated US defense packages are
critically important, particularly in order to strengthen Ukraine's air defense. The Ukrainian MFA
emphasized that any delay in supporting Ukraine's defense capabilities will encourage Russia to continue
its war — and not seek peace. The Ukrainian MFA stated that US-Ukrainian consultations about defense
supplies are ongoing at all levels and that Ukraine will speak with the United States about finding
mutually beneficial solutions to strengthen Ukraine's defense capabilities.
The decision to
suspend military aid to Ukraine will likely force Ukrainian forces to continue to husband materiel,
although the exact timing of the planned deliveries that the United States paused remains unclear at this
time. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Ukraine had not received any official
notifications about any suspension or revision to the delivery schedules of the agreed US military aid
prior to the US announcement. The New York Times (NYT) reported that US officials stated that the United
States had not scheduled to ship the affected munitions to Ukraine for several months, but the Wall
Street Journal (WSJ) reported that US weapons shipments already in Poland were halted as of July 1. A
Trump administration official told Politico that the administration had not requested any further aid but
that there is enough aid left over from the Biden administration to last Ukraine "several more months."
The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion told the Washington Post in an article published on July 2,
however, that Ukrainian forces already have to concentrate on holding positions and conserving resources
rather than advancing. Ukrainian forces have had to husband critical materiel, including air defense
interceptors, GMLRS rockets, and artillery shells, during previous suspensions of US aid. Ukraine's
European partners are increasing their efforts to provide Ukraine with military assistance and the
Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues its efforts to become self-sufficient, but only the
United States can provide certain weapons systems at scale and quickly. Ukrainian forces very likely will
have to conserve materiel again should the United States continue to suspend weapons deliveries.
The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will likely accelerate Russian gains on the battlefield, as
previous US aid suspensions have in the past. Delays in US military aid in Fall 2023 and Winter-Spring
2024 set conditions for Russian forces to make more accelerated battlefield gains than Russian forces had
previously been able to make. Russian forces significantly intensified offensive operations near
Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast in mid-January 2024 and concentrated significant manpower and materiel to their
effort to seize the settlement in mid-February 2024 amid the protracted debate in the US (from October
2023 until April 2024) about passing supplemental aid for Ukraine. Ukrainian forces also faced
significant artillery constraints during the Russian offensive against Avdiivka, allowing Russian forces
to attack under less pressure from Ukrainian counterbattery fire. Russian forces sustained a high tempo
of offensive operations after seizing Avdiivka in order to push as far west as possible, and Russian
forces subsequently launched offensive operations in Spring 2024 intended to seize Pokrovsk when the
suspension of US assistance was still greatly constraining Ukrainian materiel supplies. ISW assesses that
Russian forces advanced roughly three kilometers per day between the suspension of US aid to Ukraine on
December 6, 2023 and the resumption of aid on April 24, 2024, much of which was in Donetsk Oblast — as
compared to the six months prior to the December 2023 aid suspension when Russian forces actually lost a
total of roughly 203 square kilometers at a rate of 1.1 square kilometers lost per day (due to Ukraine’s
gains during the 2023 counteroffensive, which was enabled by the US and other allies surging military aid
to Ukraine).
Russian forces also notably intensified offensive operations in Kursk Oblast
following the suspension of US intelligence sharing in early March 2025. Russian forces, augmented by
North Korean forces, had been trying to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast through slow, grinding
advances since the start of Ukraine's incursion in August 2024. The Trump administration suspended US
intelligence sharing with Ukraine on March 5, and Russian forces intensified offensive operations to
expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast on March 6 and 7. Ukrainian sources reportedly stated at the
time that Russian forces started making more rapid advances in Kursk Oblast on March 5 and that the
suspension of US intelligence sharing impacted Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast the most. Kremlin
officials at the time announced their intention to take advantage of the suspension of US military aid
and intelligence sharing to "inflict maximum damage" to Ukrainian forces "on the ground." Russian forces
very likely exploited the US suspension of aid and intelligence sharing in March 2025 to accelerate
Russia’s ongoing counteroffensive operation in Kursk Oblast. ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced at
a rate of about 31 square kilometers per day in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast between the suspension of US
intelligence sharing with Ukraine on March 3, 2025 and the resumption of intelligence sharing on March
11, 2025 — as opposed to a rate of advance of about 19 square kilometers per day in the six months prior
to the intelligence sharing suspension.
Key Takeaways:
• The United States paused
weapons supplies to Ukraine, including critical air defense interceptors, artillery shells, missiles, and
rockets.
• The decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will likely force Ukrainian forces
to continue to husband materiel, although the exact timing of the planned deliveries that the United
States paused remains unclear at this time.
• The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will likely
accelerate Russian gains on the battlefield, as previous US aid suspensions have in the past.
• The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will reinforce Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of
victory that posits that Russia can win the war of attrition by making slow, creeping advances and
outlasting Western support for Ukraine.
• Kremlin officials are responding to the US military
aid suspension by publicly flouting Putin's theory of military victory as successful, in direct
opposition to US President Donald Trump's stated goal of bringing Russia to the negotiating table and
achieving a lasting and just peace.
• The Kremlin is also using the US aid suspension as a
basis to continue rhetorical attacks against European defensive efforts that are in line with Trump's
initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden for collective defense.
• The US decision
to suspend military aid to Ukraine will particularly degrade Ukraine's ability to defend against Russia's
enhanced long-range missile and drone strike capabilities that have inflicted significant civilian
casualties — in sharp contrast to President Trump's stated objective of stopping civilian casualties in
Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced in
northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Toretsk and Novopavlivka.
Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected US President Donald Trump's call for a quick peace in Ukraine
during a phone call with Trump on July 3. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed on July 3 that
Trump once again raised the issue of a quick end to Russia's war in Ukraine and that Putin claimed that
Russia continues its efforts for a negotiated end to the war. Ushakov claimed, however, that Putin
reiterated that Russia "will achieve its goals" and "eliminat the root causes" that led to the war and
that "Russia will not back down from these goals," essentially emphasizing that Russia will continue its
war on its own terms. Ushakov claimed that Putin and Trump discussed the possibility of a third round of
Ukrainian–Russian negotiations in Istanbul and agreed that peace negotiations will continue in a
bilateral format at an unspecified date. Ushakov claimed that Putin and Trump did not discuss the recent
US decision to halt military aid shipments to Ukraine but discussed bilateral economic projects,
including in the energy and space spheres.
Putin's stated commitment to his goals in Ukraine,
including eliminating the so-called "root causes" of the war directly contradicts his claim that Russia
supports meaningful negotiations to end the war. Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly
referred to the need for any future peace settlement to eliminate the alleged "root causes" of the war to
allude to Russia's unwavering demands for regime change in Ukraine, Ukrainian neutrality, and changes to
NATO's foundational open-door policy. ISW continues to assess that Russia remains uninterested in
good-faith peace negotiations to end the war. Putin's statement that Russia will not back down from its
goals further demonstrates Putin's willingness to prolong the war in Ukraine and achieve his goals
through military means should Russia be unable to force Ukraine to capitulate through diplomatic means —
in direct contrast to Trump's calls for a speedy end to the war. The Kremlin has continually indicated in
recent weeks that there are no plans yet for a third round of bilateral negotiations in Istanbul, so it
is unclear if or when bilateral Ukrainian–Russian negotiations will resume. ISW continues to assess that
Russia will likely leverage any future negotiations to try to extract concessions from Ukraine and the
United States while Russian forces continue efforts to secure additional gains on the battlefield through
creeping and highly attritional advances. Russia previously exploited peace talks with Ukraine in
Istanbul to obfuscate its own uninterest in meaningful negotiations, and any future Ukrainian–Russian
negotiations on anyone's terms but Kyiv's are very unlikely to bring about Trump's desired expeditious
end to the war and just and lasting peace.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President
Vladimir Putin rejected US President Donald Trump's call for a quick peace in Ukraine during a phone call
with Trump on July 3.
• Putin's stated commitment to his goals in Ukraine, including
eliminating the so-called "root causes" of the war directly contradicts his claim that Russia supports
meaningful negotiations to end the war.
• Details about the recent US suspension of aid to
Ukraine remain unclear.
• A Ukrainian strike killed the deputy commander-in-chief of the
Russian Navy in Kursk Oblast, and an unknown actor may have assassinated a high-ranking Russian Federal
Security Service (FSB) official in Moscow City.
• Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reportedly
assassinated the former occupation mayor of Luhansk City.
• Ukraine’s Western allies continue
to provide military aid to Ukraine, but the United States remains the only Ukrainian partner that can
provide certain critical weapons systems – especially air defenses -- at scale and quickly.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Siversk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian
forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russia is training Ukrainian children to become drone operators for future service in the Russian
military or employment in the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). Occupied Luhansk Oblast-based media
reported on June 30 that 20 children from occupied Luhansk Oblast took part in the regional stage of the
“Pilots of the Future-2025” drone operation competition. The Russian “Movement of the First” youth
activism organization, the Russian Drone Racing Federation, and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR)
Sports Ministry organized the “Pilots of the Future-2025” competition. Participants of the competition,
who range from seven to 18 years old, learn how to assemble, program, and control drones and compete
against each other in drone obstacle races. Competition winners will take part in the “Pilot of the
Future-2025” final in Sochi, Krasnodar Krai, in the coming month.
Russia has been gradually
increasing the integration of Ukrainian children into its wider drone development, production, and
operation ecosystem. The Ukrainian Eastern Human Rights Group (EHRG) and Institute for Strategic Research
and Security (ISRS) released a report in April 2025 that found that Russia has instituted drone training
curricula for over 10,000 teenagers in schools throughout occupied Ukraine. The report noted that Russia
is trying to incentivize youth participation in drone operator training programs by “gamifying” the
process and holding drone racing competitions—an effort which “Pilots of the Future-2025” clearly
supports. Drone operation has become a critical part of Russia’s military concept of operations in
Ukraine, and Russian officials clearly understand that drone warfare will only grow in importance in
future conflicts. Russia’s training of Ukrainian children to become drone developers and operators will
prepare these children for future service in the Russian military and augment the Russian DIB’s drone
production capabilities.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia is training Ukrainian children to
become drone operators for future service in the Russian military or employment in the Russian defense
industrial base (DIB).
• Russian occupation officials are using the threat of disconnecting
residents of occupied Ukraine from mobile communications networks in order to coerce passportization.
• The Kremlin is introducing a “war risks” insurance program to encourage Russian construction
and development in occupied Ukraine. Russian development projects are a core part of Russia’s efforts to
permanently and irreversibly subsume Ukraine and complicate any future Ukrainian reintegration
efforts.
• Russia continues efforts to steal Ukraine’s agricultural output for its own
profit.
Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine since the start of
Russia's full-scale invasion on the night of July 3 to 4, primarily targeting Kyiv City. Russian forces
have conducted 10 of the largest strikes in the war since January 2025. The Ukrainian Air Force reported
that Russian forces launched 330 Shahed drones and 209 Shahed-type and other decoy drones from the
directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and
Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched
one Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal" aeroballistic missile from the airspace over Lipetsk Oblast, six Iskander-M/KN-23
ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast, and four Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk and Voronezh
oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed two Iskander-K cruise missiles and
268 drones, and that 208 drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW)
interference. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that nine missiles and 63 drones struck eight locations
throughout Ukraine and that Kyiv City was the primary target of the strikes. The Ukrainian General Staff
and the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that the
Russian strikes injured at least 20 people in Kyiv City. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated
that the Russian strikes injured at least 23 people in total. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian
forces struck residential and civilian infrastructure in Kirovohrad, Poltava, Odesa, and Kyiv oblasts.
Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski confirmed that the Russian strike against Kyiv City
damaged a consular building at the Polish Embassy. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha reported that
the Russian strike against Odesa City damaged the People's Republic of China (PRC) consulate. Ukraine's
Security Service (SBU) reported on July 4 that Ukrainian investigators discovered components manufactured
at the Chinese Suzhou Ecod Precision Manufacturing Company in Russian Geran-type drones (Russian analogue
of the Iranian Shahed drone) recovered in Kyiv City.
US Patriot air defense systems remain
critical to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes. ISW continues to
assess that US aid to Ukraine, particularly Patriot air defense systems and interceptors, is critical to
Ukraine's ability to protect its defense industrial base (DIB), safeguard the capabilities it obtains
from its partners in the face of long-range Russian strikes, and defend its civilian population.
US-provided air defense systems are vital to Ukraine's DIB and will support Ukraine's efforts to increase
self-sufficiency and protect civilian lives.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces
conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine since the start of Russia's
full-scale invasion on the night of July 3 to 4, primarily targeting Kyiv City. Russian forces have
conducted 10 of the largest strikes in the war since January 2025.
• US Patriot air defense
systems remain critical to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes.
• US President Donald Trump acknowledged Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to end
the war in Ukraine on July 3 as Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate a critical lack of interest in
good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US
President Donald Trump discussed diplomatic efforts and joint work supporting Ukraine's defense
industrial base (DIB) during a phone call on July 4.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted the eighth
prisoner of war (POW) exchange since Ukrainian and Russian officials met in Istanbul and agreed to a
series of exchanges on June 2.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk. Russian
forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Pokrovsk and may attempt to advance further toward
Dobropillya as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to envelop Pokrovsk and bypass Ukraine's fortress
belt in Donetsk Oblast from the west in the coming months. Geolocated footage published on July 4
indicates that Russian forces recently seized Koptieve and Shevchenko Pershe and advanced to southeastern
Razine (all northeast of Pokrovsk). Russian forces have recently seized on opportunistic advances
northeast of Pokrovsk, following their focus on advances along the Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka T-0504 highway
since early 2025. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on June 28 that Russian
forces appear to be attacking in the “Dobropillya direction” (northwest of Toretsk and Pokrovsk) and that
elements of the Russian 68th Army Corps (AC) (Eastern Military District ) and 20th and 150th
motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th Combined Arms Army , Southern Military District )
are attacking in the area. ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command may intend to
leverage the Russian salient between Pokrovsk and Toretsk to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast and
north or to bypass Ukrainian defenses in Kostyantynivka from the southwest and west.
The
Russian units conducting these assaults have been engaged in combat since they redeployed to reinforce
the Russian force grouping operating east of Pokrovsk in February and March 2025. Ukrainian military
observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 3 that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle
Brigade (68th AC) and 150th Motorized Rifle Division have been operating near Novotoretske (north of
Razine) and Novoekonomichne (south of Razine) after seizing Malynivka in mid-June 2025 and recently
seizing Koptieve (all northeast of Pokrovsk). Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 110th
Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic AC, SMD) are also operating
northeast of Pokrovsk. Ukrainian forces have been degrading these Russian units, and it is unclear
whether the Russian military command intends to leverage the same units to push further north and west of
Razine or if Russia may attempt to reinforce these units with additional redeployments. These Russian
units will have to cross the Kazenyi Torets River to advance west of Razine, which may present another
obstacle to the Russian advance depending on the river’s water level.
Russian advances west
and northwest of Razine most immediately support the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad — an
operational objective that Russian forces have been pursuing over the last 18 months. ISW forecasted in
December 2024 that Russian forces would need to make significant advances in the direction of Rodynske
(west of Razine) to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast, and the Russian forces' recent advances near
Razine cohere with this assessment. The commander of a Ukrainian National Guard artillery reconnaissance
battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on July 5 that Russian forces are focusing their
attacks between Malynivka, Novoolenivka, and Popiv Yar (all northeast of Pokrovsk) in an effort to
interdict Ukrainian logistics into Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian commander
noted that Russian forces are constantly conducting assaults with motorcycles and buggies. Russian
milbloggers claimed on July 4 and 5 that Russian forces are trying to complicate Ukrainian logistics in
the area by damaging a bridge near Shakhove (east of Dobropillya), interdicting Ukrainian forces' ground
lines of communication (GLOCs) near Udachne, and along the railway line near Kotlyne.
Russian
forces have largely struggled to advance southeast, south, and southwest of Pokrovsk in the face of
Ukrainian drones since late 2024 and have essentially held close to the same positions in these areas
since January 2025. The Russian military command may be prioritizing advances northeast of Pokrovsk in an
effort to establish a stronghold in Rodynske, which could enable Russian forces to either attack Pokrovsk
directly or advance toward Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Pokrovsk) with the aim of interdicting the
Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad M-30 highway and forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Pokrovsk under the threat
of envelopment Russian forces could also advance north of Udachne or Kotlyne (both southwest of Pokrovsk)
in order to interdict the M-30 highway if they can overcome Ukrainian defensive positions in the area,
which currently seems uncertain.
Further Russian advances toward Dobropillya would indicate
that Russian forces are placing a tactical prioritization on advancing west of Ukraine's fortress belt —
a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions — and forcing
Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the fortress belt under pressure of envelopment rather than conduct a
head-on assault against the fortress belt. Russian forces have thus far struggled to break out of Toretsk
and make significant advances from Chasiv Yar or north of the Kleban Byk Reservoir (northwest of
Toretsk), which has likely complicated the Russian military command's original plan for an operation
against Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk) and the wider fortress belt. The Russian military command
may be adjusting its plan, and Russian forces may attempt to create a salient in the fields and small
settlements between Dobropillya and Kostyantynivka in order to bypass the fortress belt from the west.
Russian forces would likely have to cross the Kazenyi Torets River in several places and would have to be
able to sufficiently supply troops on the west (right) bank in order to maintain such a salient. Russian
forces would likely also have to seize the settlements along the Pokrovsk-Oleksandrivka (north of
Dobropillya) line in order to fully interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the
fortress belt. It is unclear whether the Russian Central Grouping of Forces, which is currently in charge
of activity in the Pokrovsk direction, is capable of conducting such an operation with the degraded
forces currently at its disposal. Russian forces are likely reaching higher levels of exhaustion and
degradation after well over a year of intensified offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction. Such an
operation would likely be a multi-year effort with significant personnel losses and hard-fought gains,
although Russian forces have proven willing to undertake such long-term operations.
Key
Takeaways:
• Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Pokrovsk and may attempt to
advance further toward Dobropillya as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to envelop Pokrovsk and
bypass Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast from the west in the coming months.
• Russian
advances west and northwest of Razine most immediately support the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad
— an operational objective that Russian forces have been pursuing over the last 18 months.
• Further Russian advances toward Dobropillya would indicate that Russian forces are placing a tactical
prioritization on advancing west of Ukraine's fortress belt - a series of fortified cities that form the
backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions - and forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the fortress
belt under pressure of envelopment rather than conduct a head-on assault against the fortress belt.
• Such an operation would be consistent with Russia's recent tactics and operational concepts
designed to advance by leveraging smaller partial envelopments to seize territory instead of attempting
rapid, deep operational-level penetrations of Ukraine's defense, which Russian forces currently do not
have the means to conduct.
• Ukrainian forces continue to demonstrate their ability to conduct
long-range strikes that target Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukraine's Western
partners to continue to allocate aid to Ukraine and collaborate with the Ukrainian defense industrial
base (DIB).
• European intelligence services continue to report that Russia is intensifying
its deployment of chemical agents in Ukraine in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to
which Russia is a signatory.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Siversk. Russian forces
recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, and Pokrovsk.
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 5 to
6, including a "double-tap strike" against emergency responders. Recent adaptations to Russian long-range
drone technologies and strike tactics suggests that Russian strikes against civilian targets are very
likely intentional. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 6 that Russian forces launched 157 Shahed
and decoy drones from the directions of Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast;
Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, and four S-300 air defense missiles
from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 177 drones and that
19 were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported
that Russian drones struck civilian, energy, and military infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv,
Poltava, and Zaporizhia oblasts. Ukraine’s Ground Forces reported that Russian forces targeted a
Ukrainian military registration and enlistment office in Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast - the third such
strike since June 30. Russian strikes against Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices
likely aim to disrupt Ukrainian recruitment efforts.
Ukraine’s State Emergency Service
reported on July 6 that Russian forces conducted two double-tap strikes targeting Ukrainian emergency
responders during overnight drone strikes against Kharkiv City and after shelling against Kherson City on
the morning of July 6. Russia’s recent drone technological adaptations and strike tactics, such as
accumulating drones near a target before simultaneously striking, have increased Russia's ability to
precisely coordinate strikes and hit intended targets. Russia's recent overnight strikes series have
increasingly resulted in civilian casualties, and Russia is very likely intentionally targeting Ukrainian
civilians, including with "double tap" strikes likely meant to kill first responders and strikes against
military registration and enlistment offices.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President
Vladimir Putin appears to be trying to increase volunteer recruitment among the Russian population,
likely due to waning domestic support for the Kremlin's crypto-mobilization efforts.
• Russian
forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 5 to 6,
including a "double-tap strike" against emergency responders. Recent adaptations to Russian long-range
drone technologies and strike tactics suggests that Russian strikes against civilian targets are very
likely intentional.
• Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) has stopped reporting
on the number of deaths in Russia, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to conceal Russia's losses from the
war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova. Russian forces recently
advanced near Novopavlivka.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated the Kremlin's rejection of a ceasefire and unchanged
demands, including demilitarization and regime change in Ukraine. Lavrov gave an interview to Hungarian
outlet Magyar Nemzet published on July 7 and claimed that a settlement to the war must eliminate the
"root causes" of the war, which Lavrov again defined as NATO's expansion and Ukraine's alleged
discrimination against Russian-speakers. Lavrov claimed that Russia is against a ceasefire as Ukraine and
its allies would use the pause to regroup and reconstitute Ukraine's military. Lavrov explicitly
highlighted Russia's demands for Ukraine's demilitarization and "denazification" (a phrase Russia uses to
demand regime change in Ukraine), and these demands are notably Russia's original war goals. Lavrov also
demanded international recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and
Kherson oblasts and Crimea – including the areas of these four oblasts that Russian forces do not
currently occupy – and called for a future settlement to include sanctions relief and the return of
frozen Russian assets. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin remains uninterested in good-faith peace
negotiations and any settlement to the war that does not acquiesce to its demands.
Key
Takeaways:
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated the Kremlin's rejection of a
ceasefire and unchanged demands, including demilitarization and regime change in Ukraine.
• Russia is leveraging its "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to improve its
theater-wide drone capabilities, including in priority frontline areas in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian forces have yet to reach parity with Ukraine's innovative and deeply integrated drone
program, however.
• Russian forces appear to be reprioritizing offensive operations in the
Pokrovsk direction over the Kostyantynivka direction after several weeks of unsuccessful activity aimed
at advancing toward Kostyantynivka.
• Russian Minister of Transport and former Kursk Oblast
Governor Roman Starovoit reportedly recently committed suicide after Russian President Vladimir Putin
removed Starovoit from his position, likely due in part to the Ministry of Transport's role in Russian
failures that enabled Ukraine's Operation Spider Web in June 2025.
• Putin may have planned
to punish Starovoit by arresting him on charges related to his time as the governor of Kursk Oblast in
order to avoid acknowledging the Kremlin's failure to prevent Operation Spider Web.
• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct long-range strikes against Russia's defense industrial base
(DIB).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently
advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.
US President Donald Trump announced on July 7 that the United States would resume weapons deliveries to
Ukraine as discussions about provisions of additional air defense systems and interceptors are reportedly
ongoing. Trump stated on July 7 that the United States will send more weapons to Ukraine to help Ukraine
defend itself. Trump stated that the United States is "going to see if can make some available." Politico reported that two sources stated that shipments of US military aid to
Ukraine could resume over the "coming weeks." Chief Pentagon Spokesperson Sean Parnell stated on July 7
that Trump directed the US Department of Defense (DoD) to send additional defensive weapons to Ukraine to
ensure that Ukraine can defend itself while the United States works to secure a "lasting peace." Axios
reported on July 8 that sources stated that Trump told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that he
wants to help Ukraine's air defenses and promised to immediately send 10 Patriot interceptors and help to
find other means of supply. Axios' sources reportedly stated that Trump suggested that Germany should
sell one of its Patriot batteries to Ukraine and that the United States and Europe would split the costs
of the purchase. Axios reported that US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has identified Patriot batteries
in Germany and Greece that the US could finance and send to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that
US-provided Patriot systems and interceptors are critical for Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian
long-range overnight strikes, particularly against Russian ballistic missiles.
Ukrainian
forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast amidst a series of ongoing counterattacks. Geolocated
footage published on July 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern and
northeastern Kindrativka (north of Sumy City). Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported
on July 7 that Ukrainian forces advanced between Kindrativka and Kostyantynivka (north of Kindrativka)
and east of Oleksiivka (east of Kindrativka) and entered Novomykolaivka (northeast of Oleksiivka). A
Russian milblogger claimed on July 8 that Ukrainian forces entered Kindrativka from the northwest and
Oleksiivka from the northeast. The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized central and northern
Kindrativka and have cut off Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) along the C-191502
Novomykolaivka-Volodymyrivka road. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command deployed
elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) to Kindrativka to support Russian
personnel retreating from the settlement. The milblogger claimed that the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade
(Pacific Fleet) is fighting to establish a foothold south of Oleksiivka, but that recent Ukrainian
advances are complicating this effort.
Russian advances in northern Sumy Oblast slowed between
late May and early June 2025, and Ukrainian forces began counterattacking and regaining territory in
mid-June. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 14 that Ukrainian forces retook Andriivka
(southeast of Kindrativka), and Ukrainian forces advanced in other areas of northern Sumy Oblast
throughout late June 2025. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on July 8 that
fighting remains intense in the North Slobozhansk (Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts) direction and that
Ukrainian forces are restoring positions in this direction and maintaining positions in Kursk and
Belgorod oblasts. The Russian military command redeployed some drone and elite naval infantry units from
the Kursk and Sumy directions to other higher-priority sectors of the frontline in Donetsk Oblast in May
and June 2025, and the command may further deprioritize the offensive in northern Sumy Oblast if
Ukrainian forces continue to complicate further Russian advances. Russia could also reinforce its
frontline units in northern Sumy Oblast in the near future in order to continue advancing toward Sumy
City, however.
Key Takeaways:
• US President Donald Trump announced on July 7 that
the United States would resume weapons deliveries to Ukraine as discussions about provisions of
additional air defense systems and interceptors are reportedly ongoing.
• The Kremlin
continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's aggressive rhetoric
to undermine support for US military aid to Ukraine, likely as part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin
informational effort.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast amidst a
series of ongoing counterattacks.
• Russia continues to expand its domestic drone production
capacity amid the ever-growing role of tactical drones in frontline combat operations and Russia's
increasingly large nightly long-range strike packages against Ukraine.
• Ongoing Russian
cooperation with Chinese companies is facilitating Russia's increasing domestic drone production.
• Russian milblogger complaints suggest that the Russian military command is struggling to supply
frontline units with drones despite increased drone production, possibly indicating how Russia's
centralization and bureaucracy are degrading the effectiveness of Russian drone operations and slowing
the Russian innovation cycle.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast, and Russian
forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.
Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike of the war so far on the night of
July 8 to 9 with 741 total drones and missiles — an about 34 percent increase from the previous record
high of 550 Russian drones and missiles launched on the night of July 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Force
reported that Russian forces launched 728 Shahed-type strike and decoy drones from the directions of
Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The
Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles from
Engels Raion, Saratov Oblast and from Kursk Oblast, and six Kh-47M2 Khinzhal aeroballistic missiles from
Lipetsk Oblast airspace. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 718 of the drones
and missiles, including seven Kh-101/Iskander-K missiles shot down, 296 Shahed-type drones shot down, and
415 drones “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force
reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Lutsk, Volyn Oblast, and Ukrainian officials reported
that the strikes damaged a warehouse, private enterprise, and civilian areas in Lutsk. Ukrainian
officials reported that the strikes also hit residential areas, an enterprise, and civilian
infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy,
Chernihiv, and Zhytomyr oblasts. Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that
the July 8 to 9 Russian strike was one of the largest strikes targeting Kyiv Oblast and that the strikes
lasted for over seven hours. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces used
interceptor drones to repel the strike and downed "tens" of drones.
The New York Times
reported on July 9 that military analysts estimate that Russia will be able to routinely launch over
1,000 drones per strike package by Fall 2025, echoing a recent warning from Ukrainian Unmanned Systems
Forces Commander Major Robert Brovdi that Russia could escalate its strike packages to include over 1,000
Shahed-type drones per day. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov
estimated on June 20 that Russia has increased Shahed production sevenfold and forecasted that Russian
strike packages may soon incorporate up to 800 Shaheds — a forecast that is in line with the July 8 to 9
Russian strike package. ISW previously reported that Russia is significantly expanding its long-range
drone production capabilities for modified Geran-2 drones (the Russian-made analogue of the
Iranian-origin Shahed-136 drones), including by opening production lines with companies in the People's
Republic of China (PRC).
The continued increase in the size of strike packages is likely
intended to support Russian efforts to degrade Ukrainian morale in the face of constant Russian
aggression. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that Russian forces used over
400 decoy drones in this strike package in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense. Russian forces have
equipped their decoy long-range drones with warheads and have also modified their strike drones with
warheads designed to inflict a wide spread of damage, indicating that Russian forces aim to maximize
damage against areas in Ukraine writ large — which disproportionately affects civilian areas. Ukrainian
Ground Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev stated in an interview with the Washington Post on
July 9 that recent Russian strikes against Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices seek to
disrupt Ukrainian force generation efforts. Sarantsev stated that Russia aims to sow fear among
Ukrainians and create the perception that it is dangerous to go to recruitment and enlistment offices.
ISW assessed in previous years that Russia has used strike packages targeting civilian areas to generate
a morale effect in Ukraine, as seems to be the case with the most recent strikes.
Key
Takeaways:
• Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike of the
war so far on the night of July 8 to 9 with 741 total drones and missiles — an about 34 percent increase
from the previous record high of 550 Russian drones and missiles launched on the night of July 3 to 4.
• The continued increase in the size of strike packages is likely intended to support Russian
efforts to degrade Ukrainian morale in the face of constant Russian aggression.
• The European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found that Russian forces and pro-Russian separatists engaged in illegal
military activity in Ukraine between 2014 and 2022.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near
Borova and Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka
Novosilka.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed frustration following a June 10 meeting with Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov about Russia's lack of progress towards ending the war in Ukraine. Rubio stated
after the meeting with Lavrov that he conveyed US President Donald Trump's frustration with Russia's
insufficient "flexibility" to end the war. Rubio stated that he and Lavrov shared ideas about "a new or
different approach" from Russia and that there must be a "roadmap moving forward" about how the war can
end. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that Rubio and Lavrov discussed their "mutual
intention" to find a solution to the war. Kremlin officials' public statements continue to demonstrate
that Russia remains committed to achieving its original war goals in Ukraine and is not interested in
good faith negotiations to end the war, however. Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reiterated on
July 9 Russia's original war demands for Ukrainian regime change and "demilitarization." Kremlin
Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 10 that Russia prefers to achieve its war goals through
peaceful and diplomatic means but that the war continues and the "realities on the ground" are changing
every day. Kremlin officials often call for Ukraine to recognize the "realities on the ground" (a
reference to the frontline in Ukraine) to allude to the idea that Russia is in a stronger negotiating
position given the battlefield situation and to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia's unwavering
demands amounting to complete capitulation to Russia.
The Kremlin continues efforts to use its
diplomatic engagements with the United States in an effort to divert attention from the war in Ukraine
and toward the potential restoration of US-Russian relations. The Russian MFA readout of the Rubio-Lavrov
meeting heavily emphasized Rubio and Lavrov's reported discussions about bilateral US-Russian issues
unrelated to the war in Ukraine, including the restoration of US-Russian contacts, economic and
humanitarian cooperation, direct air traffic, and diplomatic missions. The Russian MFA's readout
concluded that the United States and Russia will continue dialogue about a "growing range of issues of
mutual interest." Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on July 10 there has been no
"slowdown in progress" in developing US-Russian relations. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin
attempted to use economic incentives unrelated to the war in Ukraine and the prospect of US-Russian arms
control talks to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine. ISW also recently
assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin unsuccessfully attempted to use Iranian nuclear
negotiations and offers to mediate the Israel-Iran war to pose himself to Trump as an effective
negotiator as part of efforts to secure concessions on the war in Ukraine. The Kremlin is likely
attempting to push the United States to suspend its diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine in
exchange for developing US-Russian bilateral relations and economic opportunities.
Key
Takeaways:
• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed frustration following a June 10
meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov about Russia's lack of progress towards ending the
war in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to use its diplomatic engagements with the
United States in an effort to divert attention from the war in Ukraine and toward the potential
restoration of US-Russian relations.
• The Economist assessed that it would take Russia about
89 years to seize all of Ukraine at its current relatively accelerated rate of advance, which has
fluctuated throughout the war and is unlikely to remain constant.
• Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg in Rome on July 9.
• The United States reportedly resumed some military aid shipments to Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s
Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.
• Russia launched another
large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 9 to 10 that heavily targeted
Kyiv City, resulting in civilian casualties and significant damage to civilian infrastructure.
• Russia's strike tactics, coupled with the increased scale and concentrated targeting of Russia's
recent strike packages, aim to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and are resulting in significant
damage.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Deputy Foreign Minister and Presidential
Special Representative to the Middle East and Africa Mikhail Bogdanov on July 9.
• Russian
forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.
US President Donald Trump announced on July 10 that the United States will sell NATO weapons, including
air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO can then give to Ukraine. Trump stated in an interview
with NBC News that the United States will sell NATO an unspecified number and type of American-made
weapons, including Patriot air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO will then give to Ukraine.
Axios reported on July 11 that sources stated that NATO allies discussed the possibility of the United
States using NATO as an intermediary to sell weapons to Ukraine at the most recent NATO Summit on June 24
to 25, and that these weapons could include both air defense support as well as offensive weaponry.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on July 10 that Ukraine requested 10 Patriot air defense
systems and additional interceptors, and that Germany is ready to purchase two Patriot systems from the
United States for Ukraine, and that Norway is willing to purchase another one. It remains unclear how
many Patriot air defense systems or other weapons the United States will sell to NATO. ISW continues to
assess that US-provided Patriot systems and interceptors are critical for Ukraine’s ability to defend
against Russian long-range overnight strikes and protect its civilian population, particularly against
Russian ballistic missiles.
Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide additional aid and
pursue joint production initiatives with Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB). The Ukrainian Ministry
of Finance announced on July 11 that the United Kingdom (UK) approved a 1.7-billion-pound (roughly $2.3
billion) loan to finance improving Ukraine’s air defense capabilities. The European Commission and
Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation announced that Europe and Ukraine will partner in the
BraveTech EU Initiative, which will work to accelerate the European DIB’s innovation cycle. The European
Commission reported that the BraveTech EU Initiative will expand on existing European Defense Fund (EDF)
projects and will expand relationships between Ukrainian and European defense companies beginning in Fall
2025. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on July 10 that Ukraine signed an agreement with
NATO Command Transformation allowing Ukrainian personnel to attend the Joint NATO-Ukraine Analysis,
Training, and Education Center (JATEC).
Ukraine continues to expand its production and
innovation of interceptor drones for use against Shahed-type drones. Kyiv City Military Administration
Head Timur Tkachenko announced on July 11 that Kyiv City will allocate 260 million hryvnia ($6.2 million)
to Ukraine’s Clean Sky program aimed at using interceptor drones to defend Kyiv against nightly Russian
long-range drone strikes. Tkachenko stated that the program will fund additional equipment, the creation
of an interceptor drone training center, and several mobile interceptor drone units. Tkachenko stated
that the project has downed 550 Russian drones over Kyiv City in the last four months. Kyiv Oblast
Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk estimated that the project has downed almost 650 drones
over Kyiv Oblast more broadly. Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov stated that
interceptor drones are downing dozens of Russian long-range drones each night. Ukraine’s interceptor
drones will play a critical role in lowering the cost of defense against nightly Russian drone and
missile strikes, although US-provided Patriot air defense systems remain the only system capable of
downing Russian ballistic missiles.
Key Takeaways:
• US President Donald Trump
announced on July 10 that the United States will sell NATO weapons, including air defense systems and
interceptors, that NATO can then give to Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s European allies continue to
provide additional aid and pursue joint production initiatives with Ukraine’s defense industrial base
(DIB).
• Ukraine continues to expand its production and innovation of interceptor drones for
use against Shahed-type drones.
• Ukrainian intelligence assesses that Russian forces are
unlikely to realize the Kremlin's goal of seizing the entirety of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2025,
which is consistent with ISW's ongoing assessment of Russia's offensive capabilities.
• Kremlin officials continue to justify the Kremlin's ongoing censorship efforts and appear to be
seizing on Russia's hypercontrolled information space to push the Kremlin's informal state ideology.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced in
northern Sumy and western Zaporizhia oblasts, and near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.
Russia launched another large-scale drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of July 11 to
12 — the third combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles in July alone. The Ukrainian Air Force
reported that Russian forces launched 339 Shahed-type drones and 258 decoy drones (597 drones total) from
the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Millerovo,
Rostov Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 26 Kh-101 cruise
missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces
downed 319 Shahed-type drones and 25 Kh-101 cruise missiles and that 258 drones were “lost” or suppressed
by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged
critical electrical networks and administrative and civilian infrastructure in Chernivtsi, Cherkasy,
Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, Sumy, and Volyn oblasts. Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported that Russian
strikes killed two civilians in Chernivtsi City and injured 14. Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head
Mykola Kalashnyk reported that Ukraine’s Clean Sky program, which uses interceptor drones to defend Kyiv
Oblast against nightly Russian long-range drone strikes, downed over 50 drones during Russia’s overnight
strike. ISW continues to assess that Russia's ongoing large-scale strikes are intended to degrade
Ukrainian and Western morale and underscore Ukraine's need for continued Western support for Ukraine's
interceptor drone program and for the continued supply of Western air defense systems, especially
US-provided Patriot systems.
Russian forces recently advanced from the international border
toward Velykyi Burluk in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast — likely in an effort to connect Russian operations
near Vovchansk with those near Dvorichna, possibly to facilitate Russian efforts to establish a buffer
zone along the international border. Geolocated footage published on July 12 indicates that Russian
forces recently advanced southwest of Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk). Elements of the Russian 83rd
Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army , Leningrad Military
District ) and the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th Army Corps , LMD) first advanced into
central Milove in early July 2025. Elements of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment defended against limited
Ukrainian attacks into northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast in March and April 2025, and elements of the 72nd
Motorized Rifle Division participated in retaking Kursk Oblast and attacking into northern Sumy Oblast in
Spring and early Summer 2025. Some elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly
continuing to operate in northern Sumy Oblast, although the Russian military command appears to have
recently redeployed other elements of the division and the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment to the Velykyi
Burluk direction.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia launched another large-scale drone and
missile strike against Ukraine on the night of July 11 to 12 — the third combined strike with over 500
drones and missiles in July alone.
• Russian forces recently advanced from the international
border toward Velykyi Burluk in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast — likely in an effort to connect Russian
operations near Vovchansk with those near Dvorichna, possibly to facilitate Russian efforts to establish
a buffer zone along the international border.
• Ukraine signed several strategic agreements
with Western defense companies to bolster Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) during the Ukraine
Recovery Conference in Rome.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian
forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.
Recent satellite imagery suggests that Russia is constructing protective structures at some of its air
bases following Ukraine's Operation Spider Web on June 1. Ukraine-based open-source intelligence
organization Frontelligence Insight reported that satellite imagery collected on July 7 shows that
Russian forces have constructed roughly 10 reinforced bunkers with soil coverings, 12 concrete
bunker-type structures without soil coverings, and eight hangar-style buildings on the aprons at Khalino
Air Base in Kursk Oblast. Planet Labs satellite imagery collected on June 27 of Khalino Air Base also
shows reinforced hangars, supporting Frontelligence's assessment. Frontelligence reported that satellite
imagery collected on July 9 shows that Russian forces have constructed two concrete bunker-style
structures at Saky Air Base in occupied Crimea, and Planet Labs satellite imagery collected on July 7
also shows concrete aircraft shelters. Frontelligence reported that satellite imagery collected on July 9
shows no construction efforts at Dzhankoi Air Base in occupied Crimea, however. Frontelligence reported
that recent satellite imagery shows bomber wreckage still present at Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast
and Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast – two of the air bases that Ukrainian forces struck during
Operation Spider Web. Russian officials and milbloggers have blamed Russian leadership for failing to
defend Russian military infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes throughout Russia's full-scale
invasion. Russia may be starting to construct protective structures at its air bases after three years of
war in response to Operation Spider Web.
Key Takeaways:
• A German official
confirmed that Germany is interested in purchasing Patriot air defense systems from the United States on
behalf of Ukraine.
• Recent satellite imagery suggests that Russia is constructing protective
structures at some of its air bases following Ukraine's Operation Spider Web on June 1.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka.
US President Donald Trump announced large-scale and rapid military aid supplies to Ukraine via the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and possible future secondary tariffs against Russia. Trump stated on
July 14 during a meeting with NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte that the United States will impose
"severe" 100 percent secondary tariffs on Russia's trade partners if there is no peace settlement to end
Russia's war in Ukraine within 50 days. Trump also announced that the United States will send "billions
of dollars' worth" of military equipment and weapons to NATO, that NATO will pay for the US weapons, and
that NATO will "quickly distribute" these weapons to Ukrainian forces. Rutte stated that NATO will supply
Ukraine with "massive" amounts of military equipment, including air defenses, missiles, and ammunition.
Trump answered a question about whether the United States was providing Patriot air defense batteries or
just missiles, stating that the United States will send "everything…a full complement with the
batteries." Trump stated that some Patriot systems will arrive in Ukraine "within days" as unspecified
NATO states give Ukraine their own Patriot systems, after which the United States will replace those
systems. Trump stated that an unspecified state has "17 Patriots ready to be shipped" and that a "big
portion of the 17 will go to the war zone" in Ukraine "very quickly." It is unclear if Trump was
referring to 17 Patriot launchers or batteries.
Trump is acting upon the reality that
successful US efforts to bring Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table require that
economic instruments be coupled with Western military support to allow Ukraine to increase pressure on
Russia on the battlefield. Trump stated that the Russian economy is doing "very poorly" and that Russia
is using its assets for war, not trade. Trump stated that Russia is wasting money and people on its war.
Rutte stated that Russian forces have suffered 100,000 deaths since January 1, 2025. ISW continues to
assess that Russia's battlefield losses are the key driver of Russia's economic woes as Russia suffers
from the consequences of increased and unsustainable war spending, growing inflation, significant labor
shortages, and reductions in Russia's sovereign wealth fund. Increased pressure on Russian forces on the
battlefield would risk Putin's efforts to balance butter and guns and could force Putin to face hard
choices sooner than he would like. Forcing Putin either to make unpopular decisions or to face a scenario
in which Russia cannot continue the war at the current tempo could bring Putin to the negotiating table,
ready to offer concessions to end the war on terms acceptable to Ukraine and the United States.
Timely and reliable Western military assistance to Ukraine coupled with increased economic pressure is
necessary to bring about an end of the war on terms satisfactory for the United States, Europe, and
Ukraine. Well-provisioned Ukrainian forces have previously demonstrated their ability to prevent Russian
forces from making even marginal gains and to retake significant territory despite Russian manpower and
materiel advantages. Western military aid to Ukraine will enable Ukrainian forces to maintain, if not
increase, their ability to inflict the significant materiel and personnel losses on the battlefield that
are straining Russia's economy. Western provisions of air defense systems to Ukraine will protect
Ukraine's people and enable Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) to flourish and increasingly meet
Ukraine's long-term national security needs. Ukraine's DIB has proven critical for maintaining Ukraine's
drone-based defenses that are limiting Russian forces to creeping advances at high costs, and the West
will continue to benefit from Ukrainian innovations and industrial capacity in the long-term. Economic
pressure, in the form of both Western sanctions and enduring labor shortages and demographic issues
brought on by losses in Ukraine, will further strain the Russian economy and reduce the funds available
to Moscow for its protracted war effort.
Key Takeaways:
• Trump noted that
Russia has been delaying negotiations to end the war and that the recent intensification of Russia's
overnight drone and missile strikes demonstrates that Russia is not interested in peace – in line with
ISW's longstanding assessment of Kremlin intentions.
• Trump said that European security
benefits US interests and noted that Europe is committed to helping Ukraine defend itself.
• Additional US military aid to Ukrainian forces will arrive at a dynamic, not static, frontline
characterized by ongoing Russian offensive operations aimed at achieving slow maneuver and by Ukrainian
counterattacks in key frontline areas.
• Russian forces' ability to advance deep enough into
Ukraine's defenses to establish these salients indicates that the Russian military command has improved
its ability to seize on opportunities to advance, but the rate of Russian advances has not increased
beyond foot pace.
• Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast near
Hulyaipole – the first tactically significant activity in this area of the frontline since the Summer
2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive.
• The Russian military command likely intends to seize on
recent advances in western Donetsk Oblast in order to advance westward into Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia
oblasts.
• Russian forces may leverage advances in western Donetsk Oblast to launch an
offensive operation toward Pokrovske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, in pursuit of Russia's long-standing desire
to seize Zaporizhzhia City.
• Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in key areas of the front
to slow Russian advances and are inflicting significant costs on the Russian military, however.
• Forcing Putin to abandon his current theory of victory and agree to end the war on reasonable terms
requires Ukrainian forces to stop Russian advances and begin to retake operationally significant areas.
Western aid provided in support of this effort is essential to hastening an end to the war.
• Timely and reliable Western military assistance to Ukraine coupled with increased economic pressure
is necessary to bring about an end of the war on terms satisfactory for the United States, Europe, and
Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Novopavlivka and in western
Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Zaporizhia oblasts and near Toretsk,
Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.
Kremlin officials dismissed US President Donald Trump's demand that Russia agree to a ceasefire agreement
in Ukraine within 50 days while promoting claims that Russia can withstand economic pressure and remains
committed to achieving its war aims. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Kremlin newswire
TASS on July 15 that Russia views any attempt to make demands of Russia, "especially ultimatums," as
"unacceptable." Ryabkov noted that Russia is ready to negotiate and prefers a diplomatic solution to its
war in Ukraine, but will continue to pursue its war aims militarily if the United States and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) do not take Russia's demands seriously. Ryabkov stated that Russia's
position is "unshakable." Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov echoed Ryabkov's statements, claiming that
Russia is ready to participate in a third round of Ukraine-Russia bilateral negotiations but blamed
Ukraine for the lack of progress towards the next round of talks. Russian Security Council Deputy
Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev posted on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account, claiming that
"Russia didn't care" about Trump's "ultimatum." Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed
confidence that Russia will be able to cope with US tariffs, as Russia is already "coping" with prior
sanctions. A Just Russia Party Leader and Duma Deputy, Sergei Mironov, claimed that potential tariffs
will not affect the course or goals of Russia's war in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin has yet
to officially respond to Trump and is likely attempting to identify which narratives could convince Trump
not to follow through with secondary tariffs in early September 2025.
Key Takeaways:
• Kremlin officials dismissed US President Donald Trump's demand that Russia agree to a ceasefire
agreement in Ukraine within 50 days while promoting claims that Russia can withstand economic pressure
and remains committed to achieving its war aims.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory
of victory continues to drive his unwillingness to compromise on his pre-war demand for Ukraine's
capitulation.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced new appointments within the
Ukrainian government.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian
forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Borova, and Toretsk.
Russia may be coordinating the deployment of a Laotian military unit for demining operations in Kursk
Oblast, which would make Laos the second foreign country after North Korea to directly send military
personnel to aid Russia in a combat zone. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported
on July 5 that Russia has recruited a 50-person engineering unit of the Laotian People’s Army to conduct
demining operations in Russia’s Kursk Oblast under the pretext of providing humanitarian aid. GUR
reported that Laos agreed to support Russia due to its heavy dependence on foreign aid. Laotian officials
denied the GUR report on July 10 and claimed that Laos has no policy of sending military personnel to
intervene in foreign conflicts. Russia may be interested in using the alleged Laotian deployment to
symbolize growing international support for its invasion of Ukraine, as 50 personnel are unlikely to make
a significant difference to the war effort. Russia and North Korea previously denied North Korea’s
military deployments to Kursk until April 2025, but now speak openly about North Korean troops’ role in
the defense of Kursk Oblast. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov publicly thanked Laos on June 26 for
its assistance in “resolving humanitarian issues,” including providing medical care to wounded Russian
soldiers on Laotian territory. This is a service that Russia also publicly acknowledged North Korea was
providing in February 2025, two months before admitting North Korean participation in military operations
in Kursk. Russia and Laos have previously cooperated on military demining operations within Laos under
the label of humanitarian aid. Laos may be seeking greater economic cooperation with Russia to diversify
its international partnerships away from the PRC, which owns half of Laos’s debt after financing a series
of expensive infrastructure projects in the country. Laotian president Thongloun Sisoulith said in 2022
that Laos was trying to diversify its partners because “relying on only one country’s
resources is not enough.”
Key takeaways:
• Russia may use the deployment of 50
Laotian military engineers to Kursk Oblast to symbolize growing international support for its war in
Ukraine.
• The United States sanctioned 18 Hong Kong-based companies that facilitate the sale
of Iranian oil to entities abroad, including private PRC-based refineries that are the largest buyers of
Iranian oil.
• Russia is encouraging Iran to concede its uranium enrichment in US-Iranian
nuclear talks, likely because Russia recognizes that zero Iranian enrichment can serve Russian
interests.
• Russia is offering to mediate potential future North Korean–South Korean talks in
order to repair its reputation with Indo-Pacific partners, but such talks are unlikely in the
near-to-medium term.
• Russia is discussing media cooperation with the PRC in a continuing
effort to coordinate messaging on key interest areas and to increase the reach of Russia’s propaganda.
The Kremlin is recycling several longstanding informational narratives, including nuclear threats, in a
renewed effort to break the United States away from Ukraine and the NATO alliance. Kremlin Spokesperson
Dmitry Peskov reaffirmed on July 16 that all provisions of Russia's nuclear doctrine, including the
responsibility of nuclear countries to not "incite" non-nuclear states, remain in effect and that nuclear
states must "answer" for "inciting" non-nuclear states. Russia updated its nuclear doctrine in Fall 2024
to include a clause stipulating that Russia will consider aggression against it by a non-nuclear state
with the support or participation of a nuclear power as a joint attack on Russia, likely in an effort to
deter Western support for Ukraine during critical Western policy discussions in late 2024. Peskov claimed
that "Europeans maintain a rabid militaristic attitude towards Moscow" in response to a question
regarding the US President Donald Trump-led effort to provide increased military aid to Ukraine via NATO
member states. Peskov also called on the international community to pressure Ukraine into bilateral
negotiations with Russia ¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬— a reversal of Western calls to pressure Russia into meaningful
bilateral negotiations to end the war — likely to falsely portray Russia as willing to negotiate while
undermining Ukraine's credibility. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on July 15 that
Russia's war in Ukraine is aimed at eliminating "the threats that NATO has created" on Russia's borders.
The Kremlin is employing the same rhetorical lines that it has continuously used throughout the war to
deter Western support for Ukraine, but has shifted its objective from preventing new support for Ukraine
to reversing recent support and breaking the United States away from its transatlantic allies, likely in
response to President Trump‘s recent demonstration of the United States' reinvigorated commitment to
arming Ukraine and supporting NATO. Trump reaffirmed in late June 2025 that the United States will uphold
NATO's Article 5 collective defense clause and recently demanded that Russia agree to a ceasefire
agreement by September 2 or risk stringent US secondary tariffs. The Kremlin is prioritizing
informational campaigns aimed at undermining NATO unity and stoking discontent between the United States
and its European allies in order to degrade Ukraine's defense capabilities and achieve its longstanding
war aims that amount to Ukraine's capitulation.
Key Takeaways:
• The Kremlin is
recycling several longstanding informational narratives, including nuclear threats, in a renewed effort
to break the United States away from Ukraine and the NATO alliance.
• Western officials
provided additional details about the new US-led effort to arm Ukraine.
• Russian forces
conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 15 to 16, heavily
targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
• The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament)
accepted the resignation of Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal on July 16, dissolving the current
Ukrainian government.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian
forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Borova, Lyman, and Novopavlivka.
Russia’s Central Bank continues efforts to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability by pursuing
economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia’s economic instability. Bloomberg reported on July
17, citing the Russian Central Bank's June 2025 monthly report, that Russia’s seasonally adjusted annual
rate (SAAR) of inflation decreased to four percent in June 2025, in line with Russia’s four percent
target inflation rate. Bloomberg assessed the decrease in the SAAR of inflation as the first indicator
that the Central Bank’s efforts to lower the inflation rate have been successful. The Russian Central
Bank report cautioned that the official annual inflation rate remains at nine percent, but assessed that
if the current trajectory continues, the inflation rate could hit the target of four percent sometime in
2026. The SAAR is a short-term measurement, however, and its decrease is unlikely to positively impact
the Russian economy in the long term. The Russian Central Bank reported that the cost of interest-bearing
instruments — financial assets that generate interest — significantly decreased in June 2025, and that
investors expect an average key interest rate below 18 percent between August 2025 and October 2025. The
Russian Central Bank's report claimed that a strong Russian ruble significantly contributed to the SAAR
decrease. A strong ruble increases Russia’s purchasing power on the global market, which in turn
decreases the ruble cost of imported goods such as machinery and technology, lowering input costs
(expenses to produce goods or services) and inflationary pressure (that increases the price of goods and
services over time) on firms that rely on imported components. A strengthened ruble softens the blow of
Western sanctions as it makes parallel imports cheaper and keeps substitutes affordable. ISW assesses
that secondary sanctions will likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting Russian oil
revenues and cheaper imports using the strengthened ruble, both of which are essential for the Kremlin's
financing of its war against Ukraine. The Russian Central Bank reported two potential complicating
factors in lowering the interest rate: the eventual waning of effects from earlier bouts of ruble
strengthening that helped slow price growth in June 2025, and the ongoing rise in the cost of services,
despite a stabilization of the exchange rate and cost of goods sensitive to credit.
Key
Takeaways:
• Russia’s Central Bank continues to posture Russian economic stability and growth
to maintain the facade of economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate
Russia’s economic instability.
• Russia's unsustainably high payments to soldiers and impacts
of the resulting domestic labor shortage will likely further destabilize the Russian economy, regardless
of the Kremlin's efforts to posture stability.
• Russian bankers are reportedly privately
expressing concerns over a growing number of non-performing loans despite the Russian Central Bank's
claims of economic stability.
• Reports that Ukrainian forces targeted Moscow City and St.
Petersburg overnight on July 16 and 17 are likely overreacting to standard Russian statements about
Ukraine's longstanding deep strike campaign aimed at degrading Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA)
on July 17, in accordance with agreements reached during negotiations in Istanbul on June 2.
• The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada approved the appointment of former Ukrainian Minister of Economy Yulia
Svyrydenko as Ukraine's new prime minister, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former
Justice Minister Olha Stefanishyna as a special representative to the United States.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Borova.
The European Council of the European Union (EU) approved its 18th sanctions package on July 19, mainly
targeting Russian oil revenues and sanctions evasion schemes. The EU announced a landmark oil cap to
contain Russian oil prices at 15 percent of the average market price that will automatically adjust
semi-annually, and noted that the current price cap is set at $47.60 per barrel – well below the previous
$60 per barrel cap. The EU imposed a full transaction ban on any transactions related to the Nord Stream
1 and 2 pipelines, which will prevent the completion, maintenance, and operation of the pipelines. The EU
also ended Czechia's exemptions for Russian oil imports. The EU sanctioned an additional 105 vessels of
the Russian shadow fleet, increasing the overall number of sanctioned tankers to 444. The EU sanctioned
Russian and international companies managing the shadow fleet, an oil refinery in India in which the
Russian state oil company Rosneft is a main shareholder, the captain of a shadow fleet vessel, a private
operator of an international flag registry, and one entity in the Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG)
sector. The EU also imposed an import ban on refined petroleum products made from Russian crude oil and
imported from any third country, with the exception of Canada, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. The Russian government reportedly accounted for some decrease in oil and gas
revenue as part of Russia's upcoming national budget, although the EU oil cap and shadow fleet sanctions
will likely further degrade Russian oil revenues beyond what the Kremlin previously expected. The EU
measures target both Russia’s current ability to sell oil at advantageous pricing and undermines Russia's
long-term ability to sell oil to Europe. The EU noted that oil revenues constitute one-third of Russia’s
overall revenue, and that recent declines in Russia’s oil revenues in combination with a decrease in
market earning potential poses a risk to the Russian federal budget.
The EU's new sanctions
target Russia’s ability to engage with international markets. The EU fully banned EU-based specialized
financial messaging services from conducting transactions with 22 Russian banks, in addition to the 23
previously sanctioned Russian banks already subject to the ban. The European Union lowered the threshold
for sanctioning third-country financial, credit, and crypto-asset service providers that are connected to
the Russian Central Bank’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) or generally supporting
Russian sanctions evasion schemes. The EU banned any transaction with the Russian Direct Investment Fund
(RDIF), its sub-funds and companies, and any companies investing in or owned by the RDIF. The EU also
banned the sale, supply, transfer, and export of software management systems and banking and financial
sector software to Russia. The EU sanctions target an existing vulnerability within the Russian banking
and financial sector, decreasing Russia’s ability to maintain a strong presence in international trade
and diversify its economy.
The EU's new sanctions package also targets actors directly
supporting Russian military capabilities. The EU sanctioned three entities based in the People's Republic
of China (PRC) and eight companies operating in Belarus that sell goods to the Russian military. The EU
also imposed a full transaction ban on Belarusian specialized financial messaging services and embargoed
arms imports from Belarus. The EU tightened export restrictions on 26 entities involved in dual-use goods
and technologies, including 11 entities in third countries other than Russia. The EU approved over 2.5
billion euros worth of other export bans on items that could support Russia's war effort, including
computer numerical control machines and chemicals for propellants. The EU also sanctioned several
individuals involved in indoctrinating Ukrainian children, crimes in occupied Ukraine, and spreading
Russian propaganda.
Key Takeaways:
• The European Council of the European Union
(EU) approved its 18th sanctions package on July 19, mainly targeting Russian oil revenues and sanctions
evasion schemes.
• Russian officials continued to falsely claim that sanctions do not have an
impact on the Russian economy in response to the EU's new sanctions package.
• Select Russian
officials are acknowledging the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy despite the Kremlin's efforts
to disguise and dismiss such impacts.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed
former Defense Minister Rustem Umerov as Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council on July
18.
• The Kremlin continues to advance its long-term censorship efforts to assert greater
control over the Russian online information space.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near
Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Pokrovsk.
Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 18
to 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 12 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic
missiles from Voronezh, Kursk, and Rostov oblasts and occupied Crimea; eight Iskander-K cruise missiles
from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and 15 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast. The
Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched around 200 Shahed-type drones and 144
decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast;
and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasondar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 208
total projectiles, including 185 Shahed-type drones, seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, seven
Iskander-K cruise missiles, and nine Kh-101 cruise missiles; and that seven cruise missiles and 129 decoy
drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force
reported that five missiles and 30 drones struck 12 unspecified locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky reported that the Russian strikes damaged critical infrastructure in Sumy Oblast and left
thousands without power, and that Russian drones and missiles struck Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast,
and damaged vital infrastructure. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak
reported that Russia’s overnight strike was the largest combined strike package against Pavlohrad since
Russia's initial push into Ukraine in February 2022. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces
struck industrial, educational, and civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Sumy
oblasts.
Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated on July 18 that US President Donald
Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky agreed on future US investment in Ukrainian drone
production and US purchases of Ukrainian drones. Svyrydenko stated that Ukrainian Defense Minister Denis
Shmyhal will continue technical agreements with US counterparts and that Ukraine and the United States
plan to sign a "drone deal" and are discussing US production of Ukrainian drones. Zelensky told the New
York Post in an article published on July 17 that he discussed a "mega-deal" with Trump that would see
the United States purchase Ukrainian drones alongside Ukrainian purchases of US-made weapons. Ukrainian
drone companies have developed a weeks-long innovation cycle over the last three and a half years of war
that quickly responds to Russian drone adaptations, and Ukraine's Western allies will significantly
benefit from partnering with Ukrainian innovators who are familiar with the modern realities of
conventional warfare.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces conducted a large series of
missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 18 to 19.
• Ukrainian Prime
Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated on July 18 that US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky agreed on future US investment in Ukrainian drone production and US purchases of
Ukrainian drones.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently
advanced near Novopavlivka.
Russian officials continue to publicly reiterate that Russia is uninterested in a near-term solution to
ending the war in Ukraine that does not acquiesce to Moscow’s demands. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov
claimed on July 20 that Russia is ready to "move quickly" with peace negotiations to end the war in
Ukraine but that Russia must achieve its goals, which Peskov claimed are “obvious” and “do not change.”
Kremlin officials have consistently claimed that any peace settlement must eliminate the alleged "root
causes" of the war and repeated Russia's original war aims to "denazify" and "demilitarize" Ukraine –
terms the Kremlin has used throughout the war to call for regime change in Ukraine, Ukrainian neutrality,
changes to NATO's open-door policy, and the removal of Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future
Russian aggression. Peskov’s July 20 statements underline the Kremlin's continued uninterest in
good-faith negotiations with Ukraine and efforts rather to prolong the war — as ISW continues to
assess.
German and Ukrainian officials assessed that Russia continues to expand its production
of Shahed-type drones in order to launch even larger long-range drone strike packages that include up to
2,000 drones in a single night. Russian forces may be able to strike Ukraine with up to 2,000 drones in a
single night by November 2025 should the current pattern of growth in nightly Russian drone usage
continue. The head of the German Ministry of Defense's Planning and Command Staff, Major General
Christian Freuding, assessed on July 19 that Russia plans to further increase its drone production
capacity with the goal of launching 2,000 drones in one overnight strike package against Ukraine.
Freuding stated that Ukraine and its international partners must consider cost-effective ways of
countering Russia's large strike packages, as traditional air defense methods, such as those that use
expensive Patriot interceptors, are not well-suited as an anti-drone air defense strategy. Commander of
the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Major Robert Brovdi stated on July 4 that Russia could launch 1,000
drones in a single strike package due to increased production and stockpiles. Ukraine's Main Military
Intelligence Directorate (GUR) assessed on June 9 that Russian can produce roughly 170 Shahed-type drones
per day and that Russia plans to increase production capacity to 190 drones per day by the end of 2025.
Russia has been rapidly increasing the number of Shahed-type strike drones and decoy drones in its
overnight strike packages in recent weeks, with Russia's largest drone strike package thus far including
728 drones on the night of July 8 to 9. Russia's increased production capacities in recent months have
allowed Russia to dramatically increase its strike packages in a relatively short period of time. Russia
rarely launched more than 200 drones per night between January and May 2025 but then increased the peak
number of drones launched in one night from 250 in late May 2025 to over 700 in early July 2025. Russia’s
use of one-way attack drones in nightly strike packages grew at an average monthly rate of 31 percent in
both June and July 2025. ISW assesses that Russia may be able to launch up to 2,000 drones in one night
by November 2025, should this current growth trend in drone usage continue. This forecast will be
invalidated if the monthly Russian drone usage growth rate either increases or decreases from 31 percent.
Russian forces will likely not be able to sustain such large strike packages every night but will likely
launch large strike packages followed by days of smaller packages as they are now. Western investment in
Ukraine's interceptor drone development and production remains critical for Ukraine's ability to counter
large-scale Russian strike packages and protect its civilian population.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian officials continue to publicly reiterate that Russia is uninterested in a near-term
solution to ending the war in Ukraine that does not acquiesce to Moscow’s demands.
• German
and Ukrainian officials assessed that Russia continues to expand its production of Shahed-type drones in
order to launch even larger long-range drone strike packages that include up to 2,000 drones in a single
night. Russian forces may be able to strike Ukraine with up to 2,000 drones in a single night by November
2025 should the current pattern of growth in nightly Russian drone usage continue.
• Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reiterated demands for Russia to take responsibility for the
December 2024 downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane, an incident that continues to create tension in
the Russian-Azerbaijani relationship.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Sumy and
Zaporizhia oblasts and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near
Lyman and Novopavlivka.
Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night
of July 20 to 21 that included over 400 drones as Russia continues to launch significantly larger strike
packages in June and July 2025 than in January to May 2025. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian
forces launched 426 Shahed-type strike drones and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol
cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The
Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched five Kh-46 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles
from the airspace over Tambov Oblast; four Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea; one Iskander-K
cruise missile from Millerovo; and 14 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast. The
Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down and suppressed 200 Shahed-type drones and
203 decoy drones that Ukrainian air defense fire and electronic warfare (EW) downed all the missiles. The
Ukrainian Air Force reported that 23 strike drones hit three locations and that drone debris fell in 12
locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian and critical infrastructure
in Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, and Kharkiv oblasts. Kyiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko
reported that the Russian strike damaged the entrance to a metro station in the city. Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Russian strikes injured 15 civilians and killed two. Russia rarely
launched over 200 drones per night between January and May 2025, and an overnight strike package
consisting of over 400 drones — even if far below Russia's latest record high of 728 drones in one strike
package — demonstrates the dramatic shift in Russia's ability to repeatedly launch larger-scale drone
strikes in recent weeks since May 2025.
Ukraine's Western partners pledged additional military
and financial assistance to Ukraine during a virtual meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the
Ramstein format) on July 21. Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal announced that Germany will
transfer five Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine in the near future and that Germany will also send
200,000 Gepard shells to Ukraine. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius also confirmed that Germany
will send five Patriot air defense systems and necessary interceptors to Ukraine. Shmyhal stated that
Canada will contribute an unspecified amount toward financing Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) via
the "Danish model" (in which Ukraine's partners buy Ukrainian-manufactured weapons for the Ukrainian
military) and allocated 20 million CAD ($14.6 million) to Ukrainian tank maintenance. Shmyhal stated that
the Netherlands allocated 200 million euros (roughly $234 million) to fund Ukrainian production of
interceptor drones to counter Russian Shahed-type drones and 125 million euros (roughly $146 million) for
F-16 fighter jet maintenance. Shmyhal stated that Norway also allocated one billion euros (roughly $1.67
billion) to fund Ukrainian drone purchases in 2025, including 400 million euros (roughly $468 million)
specifically to purchase drones from Ukraine's DIB.
British Defense Secretary John Healey
announced during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting on July 21 a "50-day drive" to arm Ukraine on
the battlefield and help push Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table. Healey noted
that the group needs to seize on US President Donald Trump's threat to impose "severe" 100 percent
secondary tariffs on Russia's trade partners if there is no peace settlement to end Russia's war in
Ukraine within 50 days from July 14. ISW has consistently assessed that only significant Russian
battlefield setbacks, enabled by timely and sufficient Western military assistance to Ukrainian forces,
will force Putin to reconsider Russia's ability to militarily defeat Ukraine and bring him to the
negotiating table. Such setbacks will not happen in a matter of weeks and will likely require several
months or campaign seasons, assuming that the West commits to properly equipping and aiding Ukrainian
forces to the point that Ukraine could successfully conduct such operations.
Ukrainian
officials discussed Ukraine's increasing defense industrial capacity amid ongoing European aid
announcements. Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that Ukraine's defense industrial base
(DIB) can accommodate an additional $6 billion in investments and that Ukraine could use these funds to
produce more first-person view (FPV) and interceptor drones and long-range weapons. Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine intends to increase domestic defense production over the next six
months. Ukrainian Defense Procurement Agency Head Arzen Zhumadilov told Ukrainian television channel
Kanal 24 that Ukraine has contracted with three companies, including one Ukrainian and one American
company, to produce interceptor drones to counter Russian Shahed-type drones. Zhumadilov stated that
Ukraine's DIB currently has the capacity to produce eight to 10 million FPV drones per year but that the
Ukrainian government will only be able to fund the procurement of four to 4.5 million drones in 2025 due
to budgetary constraints.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces conducted a large-scale
series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 20 to 21 that included over 400
drones as Russia continues to launch significantly larger strike packages in June and July 2025 than in
January to May 2025.
• Ukraine's Western partners pledged additional military and financial
assistance to Ukraine during a virtual meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format)
on July 21.
• British Defense Secretary John Healey announced during the Ukraine Defense
Contact Group meeting on July 21 a "50-day drive" to arm Ukraine on the battlefield and help push Russian
President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table.
• Ukrainian officials discussed Ukraine's
increasing defense industrial capacity amid ongoing European aid announcements.
• Ukraine
officially proposed a third round of negotiations with Russia amid speculation in the Ukrainian and
Russian informational spaces. Russian officials continue to feign interest in good-faith negotiations,
despite failing to propose or agree to a third round of negotiations.
• Ukrainian forces
recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and
near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups reportedly recently advanced into southern Pokrovsk as Russian
forces continue to pursue their operational objective of enveloping the town. Geolocated footage
published on July 21 reportedly shows Russian forces engaging Ukrainian forces driving along the E50
Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway in southern Pokrovsk.<1> A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian
military intelligence stated on July 21 that Russian sabotage groups of unspecified size advanced into
Pokrovsk through Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk) "a couple days ago" and that Ukrainian forces are still
searching for and destroying these Russian groups.<2> Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported on July
22 that Ukrainian military personnel operating in Pokrovsk confirmed that Russian sabotage elements
entered the town on July 17 and that Ukrainian forces are conducting clearing operations.<3> Ukrainian
Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on July 18 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian
sabotage and reconnaissance group trying to penetrate Pokrovsk.<4> Geolocated evidence indicates that
Russian forces are advancing close to Pokrovsk from the southwest. Geolocated footage published on July
21 indicates that Russian forces also recently marginally advanced east of Zvirove (southwest of
Pokrovsk) after recently intensifying assaults south of Pokrovsk.<5> A Russian milblogger claimed that
Russian forces advanced further northeast of Zvirove.<6> Another Russian milblogger claimed that Zvirove
is a contested "gray zone."<7>
Key Takeaways: • Russian sabotage and reconnaissance
groups reportedly recently advanced into southern Pokrovsk as Russian forces continue to pursue their
operational objective of enveloping the town. • Ukrainian and Russian delegations will meet on July
23 in Istanbul for the third round of bilateral negotiations, but Kremlin officials are already
dismissing and undermining the upcoming talks. • Russia’s reported long-term rearmament plans
further indicate that the Kremlin is preparing for a potential future conflict with NATO. • Russian
authorities recently detained Bryansk Oblast Vice Governor Nikolai Simonenko and former Belgorod Oblast
Vice Governor Rustem Zainullin, likely as part of the Kremlin’s continued efforts to scapegoat local
officials for larger Russian border security failures following Ukraine's August 2024 Kursk Oblast
incursion. • Russian authorities targeted a Telegram channel that revealed Russia’s role in the late
December 2024 downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane as part of a wider campaign to censor Telegram
channels that are critical of the Kremlin. • Russian forces recently executed a civilian in the
Lyman direction. • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces
recently advanced in Sumy and Zaporizhia oblasts and near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
Russia is weaponizing ongoing domestic protests in Ukraine to intensify rhetoric designed to undermine
Ukraine's legitimacy and discourage Western support. The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) passed
Draft Law No. 12414 on July 22, which subordinates Ukraine's two main anti-corruption agencies – the
National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAP) – to the
Ukrainian Prosecutor General. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed the draft bill into law later
in the evening on July 22. The bill's passage comes after the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and
Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office conducted a raid against NABU offices on July 21 as part of
investigations into employees allegedly suspected of collaborating with Russia after the NABU opened
investigations into SBU personnel for extortion. Ukrainians began protesting the law on June 22 in
multiple large cities and continued protesting on June 23, citing concerns about the NABU's and SAP's
ability to operate independent of government influence. Zelensky stated that law No. 12414 is necessary
to ensure that Ukraine's anti-corruption bodies can operate without Russian influence and that he will
soon propose bills to the Verkhovna Rada to support the NABU's and SAP's independent operations.
Key Takeaways: • Russia is weaponizing ongoing domestic protests in Ukraine to intensify rhetoric
designed to undermine Ukraine's legitimacy and discourage Western support.
• The ongoing
Ukrainian protests are notably not anti-war demonstrations, but Russian commentators are trying to paint
them as protests against Zelensky and Ukraine's war effort in order to accomplish informational effects
that will generate benefits for Russian forces on the battlefield.
• Ukrainian and Russian
delegations met on July 23 in Istanbul for the third round of bilateral negotiations.
• Kremlin officials continue to undermine the negotiation process while reiterating Russia's commitment
to achieving its original war aims.
• Russia continues to diversify and bolster its security
apparatus in an effort to centralize state power in a way that will worsen the already systematic abuse
of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians in Russia and occupied Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy
and in western Zaporizhia oblasts and near Borova
Russia will likely implement new policies to augment Russia’s military administrative capacity to
significantly expand the rate at which Russia can call up a larger volume of conscripts and reservists.
Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov introduced a bill to the Russian State
Duma on July 22 that would change the Russian military conscription administrative process to a
year-round cycle, as opposed to the current system, which only processes conscripts during Russia’s
semi-annual spring and fall cycles. Kartapolov claimed that this change would streamline the work of
military registration and enlistment offices, which would work year-round, and relieve emergency workload
pressure that military registration and enlistment offices currently experience during the traditional
semi-annual conscription selection periods in the spring and fall. This new system proposed in the bill
does not institute new conscription cycles beyond Russia’s traditional spring and fall conscription cycle
periods. Kartapolov added that the new model would ensure a uniform load on military registration and
enlistment offices and make the process more convenient for Russian citizens, as conscripts would be able
to undergo their medical examination, obtain military occupational specialty (MOS) assignments, and
complete other necessary procedures throughout the year without rushing during the traditional
three-month conscription periods. Kartapolov claimed that the new model would not make the Russian
military increase its conscription quotas, although the Kremlin has been increasing conscription classes
over the past three years.
The bill would likely mitigate bureaucratic bottlenecks that
complicate Russia's force generation efforts during large-scale involuntary call-ups. Russia’s military
conscription registration and enlistment centers that process mobilized and conscripted personnel
currently only operate for six months of the year in spring and fall to support Russia’s semi-annual
conscription cycles. These offices and administrative personnel rush to call up, evaluate, and process a
large number of military-aged men within the six months, reducing Russia’s ability to facilitate
large-scale call-ups of reservists and conscripts outside of spring and fall. The law’s proposal to have
these processing centers operate year-round would institute a permanent military administrative
bureaucracy able to facilitate Russian reserve call-ups year-round to permanently augment Russia’s
ability to process large numbers of mobilized personnel, regardless of the time of year. Keeping military
processing centers and their staff working all year presents significant implications for the rate at
which Russia can conduct mobilization, as the Russian military administration will have fewer constraints
holding back the rate at which mobilized personnel can be processed and assigned to units.
The Kremlin is setting other legal conditions to facilitate the streamlining of future larger
conscriptions. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on April 21 that simplified conscription
procedures for military-aged men who were selected for semi-annual conscription but did not dispatch for
compulsory military service. The law specifies that conscripts who underwent conscription processes, such
as medical commissions, but were not assigned to military service, could be called up to military service
within one year without needing to repeat the conscription procedures. The Russian military's transition
to a year-round conscription structure coheres with Russia's broader strategic effort to augment and
streamline its force generation capabilities – a move that will have far-reaching implications for its
war in Ukraine and a possible broader confrontation with NATO.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia will likely implement new policies to augment Russia’s military administrative capacity to
significantly expand the rate at which Russia can call up a larger volume of conscripts and
reservists.
• Russia has planned the gradual expansion of the Russian military since 2022, and
the proposed changes to Russia’s personnel processing system are likely intended to support ongoing
efforts to increase the size of the Russian military.
• The expansion of Russia’s
administrative capacity to process conscripts and mobilized personnel would allow Russia to mobilize
forces faster and more efficiently both during a protracted war in Ukraine and a possible future war
against NATO.
• Reductions in the bottlenecks in the Russian conscription process would also
impact Russia's ability to wage future wars.
• Kremlin officials continued to signal Russia's
unwillingness to engage substantively in efforts to establish a lasting peace in Ukraine during the third
round of bilateral talks in Istanbul.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky submitted a
draft bill to the Ukrainian parliament on July 24 aimed at bolstering the independence of Ukraine's
anti-corruption agencies in response to public backlash against the controversial bill that Zelensky
signed on July 22.
• The US State Department approved two Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to
Ukraine totaling $322 million.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted their ninth prisoner of war
(POW) exchange on July 23, in accordance with agreements reached during the June 2 bilateral negotiations
in Istanbul.
• Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk,
Borova, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.
Russian officials continue to delay high-level negotiations between Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin amid US calls for a meeting. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry
Peskov claimed on July 25 that a meeting between Zelensky and Putin remains highly unlikely and stated
that Russia and Ukraine must first develop agreements "through expert work.” US President Donald Trump
told reporters on July 25 that a meeting between Putin and Zelensky is “going to happen” and that the
meeting should have “happened three months ago.” Russian officials have repeatedly postponed high-level
meetings between Ukrainian and Russian leaders and refused to engage in constructive negotiations that
seek concrete steps to end the war. ISW continues to assess that Russia is feigning interest in
negotiations in order to buy time to make gains on the battlefield and extract concessions from Ukraine
and the West — in stark contrast to Ukraine’s continued willingness to engage in negotiations to end the
war.
Russian forces likely seized Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) and appear to be
conducting limited sabotage and reconnaissance missions into Pokrovsk amid ongoing Russian efforts to
envelop the town. Geolocated footage published on July 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced
into central Novoekonomichne and likely seized the settlement. One Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed
that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near the Kapitalna Mine just west of Novoekonomichne and just
south of the mine. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced further northeast of
Pokrovsk near Nykanorivka, Boikivka, and Zatyshok and south of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Novoukrainka.
Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central
Military District ) recently participated in the seizure of Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk).
Additional Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian infantry units and sabotage and reconnaissance groups
advanced into and throughout Pokrovsk and into the outskirts of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), and one
Russian milblogger claimed that several Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups temporarily advanced
into central Pokrovsk. The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that reports that Russian units are in
Pokrovsk are premature, however, and ISW has not observed any indication that Russian forces maintain
enduring positions in Pokrovsk. Ukrainian forces are conducting limited counterattacks in the area, and
additional geolocated footage published on July 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently retook
positions west of Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk).
Key Takeaways:
• Russian
officials continue to delay high-level negotiations between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and
Russian President Vladimir Putin amid US calls for a meeting.
• Russian forces likely seized
Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) and appear to be conducting limited sabotage and reconnaissance
missions into Pokrovsk amid ongoing Russian efforts to envelop the town.
• Russian forces
recently advanced into and northwest of Kupyansk.
• The Russian military command could pursue
at least three courses of action (COAs) following a future seizure of Kupyansk.
• The Russian
Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the second time in two months, likely in an attempt to
increase capital available to the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
• The Kremlin
dismissed First Deputy Director-General of the Kremlin newswire TASS Mikhail Gusman, likely in a
continued effort to increase control over domestic media sources affecting Russian-Azerbaijani
relations.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently
advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
The Kremlin launched several programs aimed at introducing Russian schoolchildren to Russian combat drone
production and operations, setting conditions to incorporate these children as experienced military drone
manufacturers or operators in the future. Russian opposition outlet The Insider reported that the Russian
Agency for Strategic Initiatives (ASI) created a network of clubs and training platforms to introduce
schoolchildren to drone technology and operations, setting conditions to train these students to design,
manufacture, and operate Russian drones. Russian President Vladimir Putin approved the Berloga training
program, which describes itself as a "cyber-physical gaming program," for Russian schoolchildren in July
2022, and the Russian government has supported the program by providing funding and incentives for
children to participate in the program. The Insider reported that the Berloga program teaches children to
operate virtual drones for logistics support and defend against virtual aerial targets — exposing young
children to logistics operations and counter-drone warfare that Russian forces currently employ on the
battlefield, long before these children could start formal military training. Berloga’s developers
claimed that the program aims to ensure that participants, of whom the program claims there are over
600,000, will eventually transition into programming and assembling real drones. The Insider reported
that Berloga program participants move on to the Kremlin-linked Sirius Educational Center, which
incentivizes student participation with scholarships and job opportunities. The Insider reported that the
participants' work directly contributes to solving actual problems of the Sirius Center's partners, over
80 percent of which have direct links to the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and many of which are
drone and space-oriented. The Insider reported that the children involved at the Sirius Center are likely
aware of their efforts supporting military applications, but that the center has likely forbidden the
students from discussing the military affiliations.
The Insider reported that the actors
affiliated with the Berloga program also modified the Archipelago intensive program in 2023 to focus on
teaching participants — including students over the age of 14 years — drone operations, including racing
and launching drones, striking enemy targets, and conducting reconnaissance. The Insider reported that
Berloga also cooperates with the Yunarmia-run youth military-patriotic game Zarnitsa 2.0 and created a
special drone course for Zarnitsa 2.0 participants aged seven to 21 to learn basic quadcopter piloting
skills. Zarnitsa 2.0's organizers claimed in April 2025 that over 240,000 students completed the drone
program that Berloga developed for Zarnitsa 2.0.
Key Takeaways:
Russian Defense
Industrial Base
• The Kremlin launched several programs aimed at introducing Russian
schoolchildren to Russian combat drone production and operations, setting conditions to incorporate these
children as experienced military drone manufacturers or operators in the future.
• Russia
continues to use child and youth labor to produce drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in
the Republic of Tatarstan.
• Russia continues to scale up its drone production amid Russia's
increasingly large nightly long-range strike packages against Ukraine.
• Russia may abolish
taxes for some Russian drone manufacturers to incentivize drone production at scale.
Russian
Technological Adaptations
• The Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) are continuing to introduce new
optical navigation systems and machine learning (ML) capabilities to the Chernika-2 drone.
• Russian developers recently modernized the Russian Lancet loitering munition and Z-16 reconnaissance
drones by integrating ML capabilities and increased flight range, but have yet to scale Lancet use on the
battlefield.
• Russian forces reportedly tested a new Posokh laser air defense system against
drone targets as part of Russia's efforts to develop new countermeasures against drones that are not
susceptible to EW interference.
• Russian forces have reportedly been employing a new cluster
warhead variant for the Kh-101 cruise missiles to strike Ukrainian cities since June 2024.
• Russian developers introduced a new unmanned surface vehicle (USV) for naval logistics named Briz.
Russian forces conducted a combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 25 to
26 and appear to be increasingly integrating missiles into overnight strike packages after mainly relying
on drones in Spring and early Summer 2025. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 26 that Russian
forces launched 12 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh, Kursk, and Rostov oblasts, Yeysk,
Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Crimea; eight Iskander-K cruise missiles from Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai and
Voronezh and Rostov oblasts; and seven Kh-59/69 guided missiles from the airspace over Belgorod Oblast
and occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 208
Shahed-type and decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo,
Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air
Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed and suppressed 183 unspecified drones and 17 unspecified
missiles and that 25 drones and 10 drones struck nine unspecified locations in Ukraine.
The
Russian military has used a denser concentration of missiles in recent strikes, and ISW has observed
various reports indicating that the Russian defense industry is increasing its missile and drone
production capabilities. Russia's increasing missile and drone production will likely allow Russia to
continue conducting increasingly larger strikes against Ukraine during Fall 2025, and ISW previously
assessed that Russian forces may be able to strike Ukraine with up to 2,000 drones in a single night by
November 2025 should the current pattern of growth in nightly Russian drone usage continue. Increasingly
large Russian strike packages highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering
Ukraine's air defense capabilities, particularly with US-made Patriot air defense systems that can
effectively counter Russian ballistic missile threats.
Russia is increasingly targeting
densely populated cities as part of a cognitive warfare effort to weaken Ukrainian resolve and to
undermine Ukraine's long-term defense capacity. Kharkiv Oblast and City officials reported on July 26
that Russia targeted the city with four guided glide bombs (KABs), two ballistic missiles, and 15
Shahed-type drones, injuring civilians and first responders. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and Dnipro City
officials reported on July 26 that Russian forces conducted a combined missile and drone strike against
Dnipro City, killing and injuring civilians and damaging multi-story residential buildings and industrial
enterprises. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 26 that Russian forces launched 100 Shahed-136
(Geran-2) drones and up to 15 Iskander missiles against Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and 40 Shahed-136 (Geran-2)
drones against Kharkiv City. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces targeted the Dnipropetrovsk
Electromechanical Plant in Yelyzavetivka (northwest of Dnipro City) and the HARTRON-ARKOS research and
production enterprise in Kharkiv City, suggesting that Russian forces used over half of their 208 drones
and 27 missiles to target two specific areas.
Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide
critical air defense and military assistance to Ukraine. Lithuanian Defense Minister Dovilė
Šakalienė announced on July 26 that Lithuania plans to allocate up to 30 million euros (roughly $35
million) to purchase Patriot air defense systems for Ukraine. Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany Oleksii
Makeiev stated on July 25 that Germany is preparing to send an additional IRIS-T air defense system to
Ukraine. Germany is also prepared to work with Ukrainian manufacturers to produce additional air defense
systems. German defense company HENSOLDT announced on July 24 that it received an order worth over 340
million euros (roughly $399 million) to provide Ukraine with TRML-4D and SPEXER radar systems for air
defense needs. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) announced on July 24 that the US State
Department approved a Foreign Military Sale (FMS) of $150 million to Ukraine to enhance Ukrainian
capabilities for maintenance, repair, and overhaul of the M109 155mm self-propelled howitzer.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces conducted a combined missile and drone strike against
Ukraine on the night of July 25 to 26 and appear to be increasingly integrating missiles into overnight
strike packages after mainly relying on drones in Spring and early Summer 2025.
• Russia is
increasingly targeting densely populated cities as part of a cognitive warfare effort to weaken Ukrainian
resolve and to undermine Ukraine's long-term defense capacity.
• Ukraine’s Western partners
continue to provide critical air defense and military assistance to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian
forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Velykyi Burluk and Lyman. Russian forces
recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Siversk during a reinforced company-sized mechanized
assault. Geolocated footage published on July 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced
northeast of Siversk during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault. The Ukrainian brigade that
repelled the assault reported that Russian forces used six tanks, three armored personnel carriers
(APCs), six MT-LB armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), an armored recovery vehicle, 12 civilian vehicles,
two buggies, and 41 motorcycles. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on July 26 that Ukrainian
forces repelled a Russian motorized assault comprised of up to 80 unspecified pieces of armored and
motorized vehicles northeast of Siversk, and the July 27 geolocated footage likely shows one wave of the
July 26 assault. Russian forces have long attempted to seize Siversk and have consistently attacked along
the front line in the Siversk direction since at least Summer 2024. Russian forces conducted a series of
battalion-sized mechanized assaults in the Siversk direction in November and December 2024 but have
otherwise largely conducted slow, grinding infantry assaults in this direction. Russian forces
re-intensified offensive operations in the Siversk direction in early Summer 2025, and Russian
milbloggers began claiming in late June 2025 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are
operating in the eastern outskirts of Siversk.Recent Russian advances northeast of Siversk indicate that
Russian forces are within several kilometers of Siversk, and Russian forces may begin to launch more
concerted attacks into the town in the near future.
Russian forces appear to be using armored
vehicles more frequently in some tactical attacks after a decrease in the use of armor since Winter
2024-2025. Publicly available combat footage indicates that Russian forces have not conducted a
company-sized or larger mechanized assault in Ukraine since April 2025 and have largely leveraged
motorcycles and buggies to attack throughout Summer 2025. Russian forces have recently marginally
increased their use of armored vehicles against Ukrainian positions and have conducted a series of
smaller platoon-sized mechanized assaults in Donetsk and Zaporizhia Oblast since early July 2025. ISW has
recently observed indications that Russia temporarily decreased its consumption of tanks and armored
vehicles over the last six months, and that Russia appears to be slowly increasing its ability to
refurbish Soviet-era armored vehicles while also replenishing armored vehicle supplies by not committing
armored vehicles to highly attritional attacks. Russian forces may be temporarily increasing their use of
armor to test for weaknesses in Ukraine's drone-based defense in different frontline areas, or the
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be able to sufficiently repair damaged frontline armor or resupply
frontline Russian units with armor. Russian forces may have also recently increased their risk tolerance
to use and lose armored vehicles, possibly as part of testing a new tactic or concept of operations,
although it is unclear why Russian forces would recalculate this risk. ISW will continue to study the
evolution of combat in Ukraine and provide an updated assessment of Russian armor usage.
The
Kremlin reasserted its unchanged commitment to achieving its long-standing war aims in Ukraine that
amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full capitulation, undermining Russia's diplomatic posturing.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on July 27 that Russia must first fulfill the tasks of its war
in Ukraine before renewing bilateral relations with Ukraine. Peskov claimed that Ukraine and the West
have rejected Russia's proposals for dialogue. Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir
Putin, have continually rejected US, Ukrainian, and European overtures to progress the peace imitative
through dialogue and comprehensive ceasefire agreements. Russia unilaterally imposed short-term
ceasefires in Spring 2025 that disproportionately benefited Russia during prominent political events that
the Kremlin then weaponized to accuse Ukraine of ceasefire violations. Russia has repeatedly articulated
that it seeks regime change in Ukraine, a fundamental restructuring of NATO's open-door policy, and the
reduction of Ukraine's military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself in the future. ISW continues to
assess that Russia aims to continue delaying the negotiation process so as to make additional gains on
the battlefield and extract concessions from Ukraine and the West.
Ukrainian forces recently
killed a Russian commander in the Velykyi Burluk direction. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported
on July 26 that Ukrainian forces killed Russian Colonel Lebedev (first name not reported), commander of
the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army , Leningrad
Military District ) operating in the Velykyi Burluk direction. ISW recently observed reports of the
83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment redeploying likely from northwestern Belgorod Oblast to the Velykyi Burluk
area.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Siversk during
a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault.
• Russian forces appear to be using armored
vehicles more frequently in some tactical attacks after a decrease in the use of armor since Winter
2024-2025.
• The Kremlin reasserted its unchanged commitment to achieving its long-standing
war aims in Ukraine that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full capitulation, undermining Russia's
diplomatic posturing.
• Ukrainian forces recently killed a Russian commander in the Velykyi
Burluk direction.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka
and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
US President Donald Trump announced a new deadline for Russian President Vladimir Putin to negotiate an
end to Russia’s war against Ukraine no later than August 9. Trump stated on July 28 that he is “very
disappointed” with Putin and will “reduce” his previously articulated 50-day deadline by which Putin must
agree to peace negotiations. Trump stated that he will make a new deadline of roughly “10 to 12 days from
today " as Putin’s ongoing disinterest in peace negotiations leaves “no reason” for the United
States to delay its response. Trump insinuated that he will more formally announce the new deadline on
the evening of July 28 or on July 29. Trump's new deadline would expire between August 7 and 9. Trump
previously stated on July 14 that Putin had 50 days (September 2) to conclude a peace agreement with
Ukraine or face "severe” 100 percent secondary tariffs on its trade partners.
Kremlin
officials continue to frame Russia as in direct geopolitical confrontation with the West in order to
generate domestic support for the war in Ukraine and future Russian aggression against NATO. Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed at a Russian youth forum on July 28 that “Russia is fighting alone
against the entire West... for the first time in history” and that Russia “must rely on .” Lavrov
claimed that Russia has "no allies on the battlefield," unlike during the first and second World Wars.
Lavrov’s claim that Russia is operating alone in its war in Ukraine ignores the current support that
Russia receives from North Korea, Iran, and the People's Republic of China (PRC). North Korea has sent
ballistic missiles, artillery shells, and North Korean troops to support Russia's war effort against
Ukraine, and there are economic and political signs of a growing rapprochement between Russia and North
Korea. Iranian Shahed drones have played a key role in Russia‘s air campaigns against Ukrainian cities
throughout the war, and Iran's assistance has allowed Russia to become self-sufficient in producing the
Shahed-variants that Russian forces are increasingly leveraging in frontline strikes. Russia largely
depends on the PRC for support in Russia's ongoing sanctions evasion schemes, and Chinese companies
provide critical dual-use components and microelectronics for Russian military technology. Strengthening
relationships between Russia, Iran, North Korea, and the PRC constitute a growing threat to Western
security, and Russia is actively pursuing a global anti-Western alliance. Lavrov's statements also
underscore the Kremlin's efforts to install an informal state ideology that perpetuates the idea that the
West is in an existential conflict with Russia in order to foster unquestioning support of the Russian
government.
Lavrov additionally claimed that Russia had “no alternative” to launching its war
in Ukraine as Russia needed to protect Russian-language speakers in Ukraine, a routine narrative that
Russian officials use to justify Russian aggression against Ukraine. Lavrov claimed that Russia must
insist on its “legitimate” demand: “no drawing Ukraine into NATO, no expansion of NATO at all," and
recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and
Crimea. Lavrov's statements reinforce the Kremlin's commitment to its war goals in Ukraine to the Russian
public, and specifically Russian youth. The Kremlin has devoted a significant amount of time and energy
to generating domestic support for the war, and Russian state and independent polling suggest that most
Russians support continuing the war in Ukraine until Russia achieves its war aims of Ukrainian
"denazification," demilitarization, and neutrality. Russian society's commitment to achieving Russia's
war aims, which the Kremlin has worked hard to foster, will make it much harder for Russian President
Vladimir Putin to present any peace agreement that falls far short of his stated aims as a victory to his
domestic audience. Putin is unlikely to make any concessions in his war aims unless he is forced to do so
by significant Ukrainian battlefield victories, as any negotiated end to the war that does not achieve
all of Putin's objectives would call into question the success, and, potentially, wisdom of Russia's
military campaign in Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
• US President Donald Trump announced
a new deadline for Russian President Vladimir Putin to negotiate an end to Russia’s war against Ukraine
no later than August 9.
• Kremlin officials continue to frame Russia as in direct geopolitical
confrontation with the West in order to generate domestic support for the war in Ukraine and future
Russian aggression against NATO.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman, Toretsk,
Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka directions.
Kremlin officials decisively rejected US President Donald Trump's new deadline for Russia to negotiate an
end to its war against Ukraine and reiterated Moscow's interest in continuing the war. Russian Security
Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account
that Trump cannot dictate the timing of peace negotiations and that negotiations will end when Russia has
achieved all of its war objectives — likely referring to Russia's original war aims, including regime
change in Ukraine, changes to NATO’s open-door policy, and the reduction of Ukraine's military such that
it cannot defend itself. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly claimed that Russia will continue
its war against Ukraine in order to protect Russia's interests, despite Trump's July 28 announcement of
the new 10- or 12-day deadline. Peskov claimed that there is currently a slowdown in the process to
normalize Russian-American relations, that the Kremlin remains interested in normalization, and that
progress will require "impulses" from both sides. Peskov claimed that the current state of
Russian-American relations is hindering the process of negotiating an extension of the New START Treaty.
The Kremlin previously dangled the prospect of incentives that were unrelated to the war in Ukraine, such
as bilateral arms control talks and economic projects, in order to extract concessions from the United
States about the war in Ukraine. Peskov's statements about the deterioration of Russian-American
relations and New START are likely part of efforts to compel Trump to renounce his deadline for the sake
of normalizing bilateral relations and pursuing increased cooperation. ISW continues to assess that the
Kremlin is uninterested in negotiations to end the war and is instead trying to protract the war in
Ukraine in order to make additional gains on the battlefield.
Key Takeaways:
• Kremlin officials decisively rejected US President Donald Trump's new deadline for Russia to
negotiate an end to its war against Ukraine and reiterated Moscow's interest in continuing the war.
• Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against civilian targets near
the frontline and in the Ukrainian rear on July 28 and 29 that resulted in high casualties.
• Ukrainian forces appear to be intensifying a long-range strike campaign against Russian military
industrial facilities and transport networks.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near
Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka, and in
eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.
US President Donald Trump specified a deadline of no later than August 8 for Russian President Vladimir
Putin to engage in meaningful negotiations for an end to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Trump stated on
July 29 that he is “disappointed” in Putin and clarified that his previous deadline for Russia to
meaningfully engage in negotiations to end the war by August 7 to 9 will now fall 10 days from July 29,
on August 8. Trump stated that he has not received “any response” from Putin regarding Trump’s previously
articulated 50-day and August 7 to 9 deadlines and assessed that Putin aims to seize “the whole” of
Ukraine and “probably” wants to “keep the war going.” Trump stated that he will impose tariffs and
secondary sanctions against Russia’s economic partners on August 8 to pressure Russia into negotiations
if Putin again fails to agree to negotiations. US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on
July 29 that Trump may choose to levy tariffs and secondary sanctions sooner than the August 8 deadline,
as Trump “pretty much what the situation .”
Trump announced on July 30 that the
United States will impose a 25 percent tariff and unspecified additional economic penalties on India due
to India’s continued purchases of Russian military equipment and energy since the start of Russia’s
full-scale war against Ukraine. ISW previously noted that India continues to pursue military cooperation
and a strategic economic relationship with Russia while it simultaneously deepens ties with Western
states. India has benefitted from cheap Russian energy since February 2022 and has become one of the
largest importers of Russian oil, signing a 10-year energy deal in December 2024 to receive roughly
500,000 barrels of Russian oil daily. India also continued to procure and commission Russian-built
military equipment until late 2024 and likely seeks to reduce but not eliminate its reliance on Russia
for military equipment. India notably purchased five S-400 air defense systems from Russia in September
2018, but Russia reportedly delayed the delivery of these systems in March 2024 until 2026 to support
Russia's own war effort. Russia also leverages its relationship with India to access critical electronic
components and machinery for the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
Kremlin officials
continued to posture economic strength in response to US President Donald Trump's proposed economic
measures targeting Russia and rejected Trump's efforts to end the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson
Dmitry Peskov claimed in response to Trump's July 29 statements that the Russian economy has been
operating under sanctions for "quite some time" and has developed "immunity" to further sanctions —
effectively dismissing Trump." Peskov's and other Kremlin officials' claims that Russia's economy is
resilient and has been able to withstand sanctions and other economic measures throughout the war largely
ignore Russia's reliance on its allies and partners, including the People's Republic of China (PRC),
Iran, and North Korea, to support the Russian economy and defense industrial base (DIB). Trump emphasized
on July 30, for example, that the PRC is one of the largest buyers of Russian energy exports. Russian
Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matviyenko claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine can only end
after the elimination of the war's "root causes" — a common Kremlin reference to NATO expansion and
Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers. Russian State Duma Deputy from occupied Crimea
Mikhail Sheremet claimed that the United States must engage with Russia "on equal terms" as Russia is a
great power and that Russia is strong thanks to Russian President Vladimir Putin and the unity of
Russia's population. Sheremet claimed that Russia is not "servile" and will not betray its national
interests. Sheremet claimed that Trump's economic measures will not have the results that Trump expects
but will instead hurt the global economy. Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Zhuravlev
claimed that Trump's threats will not work with Russia and called on Russia to continue its "methodic"
combat operations in Ukraine and not allow the United States to distract Russia from its war. Duma
International Affairs Committee Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed that Russia has consistently supported a
ceasefire but that a ceasefire is only possible after establishing the "main conditions" of a peace
agreement. Chepa stated that Ukraine and the West are trying to secure a ceasefire in order to allow
Ukraine to rearm, redeploy, and mobilize its forces to continue the war. Russia notably violated several
Russian-imposed short-term frontline and strikes ceasefires in recent months, while accusing Ukraine of
violating ceasefires to which both sides did not formally agree. ISW continues to assess that Russia's
previous attempts to manipulate ceasefires are an indicator of how Russia will likely exploit any future
agreements.
Key Takeaways:
• US President Donald Trump specified a deadline of no
later than August 8 for Russian President Vladimir Putin to engage in meaningful negotiations for an end
to Russia’s war against Ukraine.
• Kremlin officials continued to posture economic strength in
response to US President Donald Trump's proposed economic measures targeting Russia and rejected Trump's
efforts to end the war in Ukraine.
• The Russian Presidential Administration reportedly issued
guidance to Russian state and pro-Kremlin media outlets and commentators to promote narratives aimed at
weakening the United States–European Union (EU) alliance.
• Russian officials are already
amplifying the Russian Presidential Administration's talking points about the US–EU trade deal and likely
intend to hinder US–European cooperation in support of Ukraine and collective European defense.
• The Kremlin continues to promote an informal state ideology centered on Russian nationalism that
Russia may intend to use in justification of a protracted war in Ukraine and a future conflict against
NATO.
• Russian forces continue to systematically violate the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), to which it is a signatory.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and
Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 31 that Russian forces completed the seizure of
Chasiv Yar, although available geolocated footage does not support claims that Russian forces have yet
advanced to the western administrative boundary of the town. Geolocated footage published on July 31
shows that Russian forces recently raised flags in western and southern Chasiv Yar and indicates that
Russian forces have likely seized most of the settlement. The Russian MoD and numerous Russian
milbloggers credited elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 299th VDV Regiment, with
the seizure of Chasiv Yar. Tactical Russian advances westward in Chasiv Yar do not constitute an
operationally significant development in this area, however, as Russian forces have held most of northern
and central Chasiv Yar since late January 2025 and began advancing in southwestern Chasiv Yar in mid-June
2025. Russian forces have been within tube artillery range of Ukraine's main logistics route through the
fortress belt since late January 2025 and have held positions along the T-0504 Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka
highway for several months, and have yet to significantly threaten Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka.
ISW has yet to observe geolocated footage showing Russian forces operating in the westernmost outskirts
of Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces will have to push Ukrainian forces from positions in these outskirts in
order to complete the seizure of the town.
Russian forces have taken 26 months to advance 11
kilometers from the western boundary of Bakhmut, which Russian forces seized in May 2023, to western
Chasiv Yar. Russian forces began an intensified effort to seize Chasiv Yar in April 2024 after slowly
advancing to the settlement's eastern outskirts and seizing Ivanivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) between
May 2023 and March 2024. A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence
estimated in February 2025 that Russia sustained roughly 4,880 casualties in Chasiv Yar itself between
April 2024 and February 2025, although the total number of Russian casualties sustained remains unclear,
and the tempo of Russian attacks in this area has varied significantly over the last 26 months. Russian
forces advanced into Chasiv Yar in early April 2024 during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault,
but have rarely used armored vehicles while fighting in the urban areas of the settlement. Russian forces
have significantly leveraged air strikes and infantry infiltration tactics to make gains in Chasiv Yar,
and as a result have suffered significant personnel losses for disproportionately small territorial gains
in the ruins of Chasiv Yar. ISW currently assesses that Russian forces have seized roughly 7.81 square
kilometers of the roughly 10 square kilometers within Chasiv Yar's administrative boundaries.
Russia has launched a simultaneous kinetic and cognitive response to US President Donald Trump's
efforts to end Russia's war in Ukraine. Russia has used strikes largely affecting civilian areas in Kyiv
City as well as threats and other rhetorical efforts in order to Trump that Russia continues rejecting
Trump's demand that the Kremlin meaningfully engage in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. The
Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched eight Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk
City and 309 Shahed-type and decoy drones from Bryansk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo,
Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of July 30 to 31. This strike
package is significantly larger than the average Russian strike prior to May 2025. The Ukrainian Air
Force reported that Russian forces mainly targeted Kyiv City and that Ukrainian forces downed three
Iskander-K cruise missiles and 288 drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that five cruise missiles and
21 drones struck 12 locations and that missile and drone debris struck 19 locations, primarily in Kyiv
City. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike killed at least 11 people, injured at least
135 people in Kyiv City alone, and extensively damaged residential and civilian infrastructure in Kyiv
City and Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv oblasts. Russia's ever-growing nightly
strikes against Ukraine have been and remain a clear Russian rejection of Trump's calls for peace in
Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 31
that Russian forces completed the seizure of Chasiv Yar, although available geolocated footage does not
support claims that Russian forces have yet advanced to the western administrative boundary of the
town.
• Russian forces have taken 26 months to advance 11 kilometers from the western boundary
of Bakhmut, which Russian forces seized in May 2023, to western Chasiv Yar.
• Russian forces
will likely complete the seizure of Chasiv Yar in the coming days, which will open several possible
avenues for Russian forces to attack Ukraine's fortress belt — a series of fortified cities that form the
backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russia has launched a
simultaneous kinetic and cognitive response to US President Donald Trump's efforts to end Russia's war in
Ukraine.
• The Kremlin's nuclear threats and rhetorical efforts to delay peace negotiations
are part of a broader cognitive campaign to undermine US-led efforts to end Russia's war in Ukraine.
• The People's Republic of China (PRC) is a decisive enabler of devastating long-range Russian
strikes against the Ukrainian rear.
• European and US sanctions appear to be degrading Russian
revenues from third-country importers of Russian oil.
• Russia continues to look to its small
coalition of international partners to lend legitimacy to its illegal occupation and annexation of
Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces continue to innovate technical solutions to offset Russian strike
adaptations.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law on July 31 designed to
safeguard the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption
Prosecutor's Office (SAP).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast
and near Lyman and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk,
and Pokrovsk.
US President Donald Trump ordered the deployment of two US nuclear submarines closer to Russia presumably
in response to Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's July 31 nuclear threats
against the United States. Trump stated on August 1 that he ordered American military authorities to
position two US nuclear submarines "in the appropriate regions" following Medvedev's "highly provocative
statements." Trump stated that he gave the order "just in case foolish and inflammatory statements
are more than just that." Trump previously stated on July 31 that Medvedev should "watch
his words" and is "entering very dangerous territory." Medvedev responded to Trump on July 31 on both his
English- and Russian-language Telegram accounts and threatened that Russia is "doing everything right"
and will continue along its own path. Medvedev also alluded to Russia's automatic or semi-automatic
nuclear weapons control system, referred to as the "Dead Hand" or the "Perimeter," in response to Trump.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio answered a journalist's question on July 31 about Medvedev's nuclear
threat, stating that one cannot ignore Medvedev's statement. Rubio stated that Medvedev is not a
"relevant decision maker," but he still has a role in the Russian government, so "his words are going to
have impact" as a "provocateur."
The Kremlin continued its nuclear threats against the United
States prior to the ordered deployment of US nuclear submarines on August 1 – demonstrating that
Medvedev's threats are part of a wider Kremlin nuclear saber-rattling campaign. Russian President
Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko spoke to journalists on August 1 in a likely
staged event to publicly promote the Kremlin's narratives and stances about its war in Ukraine.
Lukashenko criticized Trump's recent efforts to bring Russia to the negotiating table and find a way to
end the war. Lukashenko claimed that Trump must act "carefully" and that it is not possible for Trump to
"dictate the rules" during the ongoing military clash, "especially to a nuclear power" like Russia.
Kremlin officials and their affiliates often use nuclear saber-rattling as part of their reflexive
control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia. The Kremlin had also
repeatedly used staged interactions with Lukashenko to deliver indirect nuclear threats. Medvedev's July
31 nuclear threats are also part of these reflexive control efforts, as Putin often leverages Medvedev to
amplify inflammatory rhetoric designed to stoke panic and fear among Western decision-makers and
discourage aid to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Medvedev's provocative and threatening statements
are very likely part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational strategy. Putin would be able to
censor Medvedev's statements should Putin choose to do so, especially considering that the Kremlin
coordinates official statements and controls the Russian information space, internet, and media.
Key Takeaways:
• US President Donald Trump ordered the deployment of two US nuclear
submarines closer to Russia presumably in response to Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry
Medvedev's July 31 nuclear threats against the United States.
• The Kremlin continued its
nuclear threats against the United States before the ordered deployment of US nuclear submarines on
August 1 – demonstrating that Medvedev's threats are part of a wider Kremlin nuclear saber-rattling
campaign.
• Putin reiterated on August 1 the same demands that he first laid out in June 2024
– further demonstrating Russia's uncompromising position and disinterest in negotiating to end its war
against Ukraine.
• Putin attempted to frame peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine as
making progress while blaming Ukraine for slowing the speed of negotiations.
• Putin's and
Lukashenko's August 1 statements underscore Putin's continued commitment to his theory of victory, which
assumes that Russia can outlast Western support for Ukraine and will be able to seize the entirety of
Ukraine through slow and costly advances.
• Putin and Lukashenko highlighted recent Russian
advances in Donetsk Oblast and articulated Russia's desire to seize Ukraine's fortress belt, which ISW
continues to assess as a multi-year effort.
• Putin and Lukashenko projected military strength
and economic stability as part of Putin's ongoing effort to convince Trump that sanctions and military
support to Ukraine will not alter the outcome of the war in Ukraine and that Trump should abandon his
efforts to resolve the war.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be transforming
Russia into a Soviet-style police state, likely in preparation for expected anti-war sentiment in the
Russian population as the Kremlin prolongs the war in Ukraine and prepares for a future war with NATO.
• Russia continues to field long-range drone innovations to facilitate its ongoing long-range
strike campaign and impose greater civilian casualties on Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently
advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Borova and Lyman. Russian forces recently advanced near
Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
Ukraine conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against energy infrastructure in Russia on the
night of August 1 to 2. Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported on August 2 that it conducted a
drone strike against the Rosneft Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan City, one of the four largest refineries
in Russia. The USF reported that the drone strike started a large-scale fire at the refinery and caused
significant damage to its production facilities. The USF reported that the facility produces about
840,000 tons of TS-1 aviation kerosene per year — about 8.4 percent of Russia's total TS-1 production —
and produces up to 17 million tons of oil per year, or 6.1 percent of Russia's total oil refining. Ryazan
Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov claimed on August 2 that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare (EW)
systems downed drones over the oblast and that drone debris fell on an unspecified enterprise. The USF
stated that it also conducted a drone strike against the Annanefteproduct oil depot in Anna, Voronezh
Oblast, which can receive petroleum products from up to 50 railway tanks and handle up to 160,000 tons of
light petroleum products per year. Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that falling drone
debris started a fire at an unspecified building in the oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on
August 2 that Ukrainian forces struck Rosneft's Novokuybyshevsk Oil Refinery near Samara City. Geolocated
footage published on August 2 shows a drone strike and subsequent explosion at the Novokuybyshevsk oil
refinery. Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev claimed that falling drone debris killed one
person in Kuybyshevsky Raion. Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi reported on August 2 that Ukrainian drones
struck the Likhaya-Zamchalovo traction power substation at a Russian rear supply base near Uglerodovsky,
Rostov Oblast. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies in the
area. Rostov Oblast Acting Governor Yury Slyusar claimed that an unspecified enterprise caught fire in
Uglerodovsky.
Ukrainian outlet Kyiv Post reported that its sources within Ukraine's Main
Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that an explosion disabled a section of Gazprom's Central
Asia-Center pipeline in Volgograd Oblast that transports natural gas from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan into Russia. The GUR sources did not specify the cause of the explosion. The pipeline
reportedly supplies several Russian defense industrial enterprises.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukraine conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against energy infrastructure in Russia on the
night of August 1 to 2.
• Ukraine also conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against
Russia's defense industrial base (DIB), drone launch sites, and air defense systems on the night of
August 1 to 2.
• The Kremlin has yet to employ a coordinated response to US President Donald
Trump’s August 1 announcement that he ordered the deployment of two US nuclear submarines closer to
Russia.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov parroted many of the same talking points that
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko made during a press event
on August 1 that blamed Ukraine for the lack of progress in negotiations and signaled Russia's unyielding
commitment to its longstanding demands.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka
and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.
Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on August 3. Geolocated imagery shows a fire at
the Rosneft Kubannefteprodukt Oil Depot in Adler, Krasnodar Krai. Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin
Kondratyev acknowledged that a Ukrainian drone strike caused the fire and that the fire engulfed several
fuel tanks at the depot. A Ukrainian Telegram channel also published a photo on August 3 purportedly
showing an oil refinery on fire in Kstovo, Nizhnyi Novgorod. Nizhnyi Novgorod Oblast Governor claimed
that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike on the night of August 2 to 3.
Russia is
reportedly preparing to expand its use of occupied Ukraine to launch Shahed-type drone strikes against
Ukraine. A Ukrainian Telegram channel reported on August 2 that satellite imagery of the airport in
northern occupied Donetsk City from July 2025 shows that Russian authorities have partially cleared the
fortifications on the runway and started construction work at the parking lots, possibly in preparation
for the installation of fuel tanks. Ukrainian open-source intelligence group CyberBoroshno reported that
the satellite imagery suggests that Russian occupation authorities are building closed storage areas near
the destroyed airport terminal and are preparing manual drone control points, warhead unloading areas,
air surveillance posts, and a runway. CyberBoroshno assessed that Russian occupation authorities are
developing infrastructure at the airport to launch Shahed-type strike drones, Gerbera-type decoy drones,
and possibly Geran (Shahed) jet-powered drones. Long-range drone launch sites closer to the frontline
will reduce the reaction time for Ukrainian air defenses. Russian forces have been launching long-range
strike drones from occupied Ukraine, and Russia's continued use of occupied Ukraine for such strikes will
increasingly threaten Ukraine and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states if Russia continues to
occupy Ukrainian territory.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot
in Krasnodar Krai on August 3.
• Russia is reportedly preparing to expand its use of occupied
Ukraine to launch Shahed-type drone strikes against Ukraine.
• Russia appears to be trying to
better protect its air bases after multiple years of Ukrainian strikes against the Russian rear.
• Russian intelligence services appear to be reassessing and possibly innovating their sabotage
operations in Europe.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Lieutenant General
Anatoliy Kryvonozhko as the Commander of the Ukrainian Air Force on August 3.
• Ukrainian
forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman,
Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions.
Kremlin officials are slowly organizing a coordinated response to US President Donald Trump's August 1
statement that the United States would redeploy two nuclear submarines closer to Russia.
Key
Takeaways:
Kremlin officials are slowly organizing a coordinated response to US President
Donald Trump's August 1 statement that the United States would redeploy two nuclear submarines closer to
Russia. The Kremlin also responded to Trump's August 1 announcement by trying to downplay Medvedev's
role in Russian decision-making in order to obfuscate the role Medvedev plays in Putin's information
efforts targeting the West. Russian authorities continue to intensify the use of bribery charges,
including to scapegoat regional government officials responsible for Russia's border defense and target
defense industry officials and critical information space actors. Ukrainian forces recently advanced
near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and
Velykomykhailivka.
Private and public Kremlin statements indicate that Russian President Vladimir
Putin continues to demand the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before he
will initiate a peace agreement. Helping Ukraine inflict battlefield setbacks on Russian forces
remains essential to efforts to persuade Putin to reevaluate his position on the war and negotiations. The Kremlin insider sources likely leaked this information in an attempt to obfuscate Putin's actual,
more extreme war aims. The Kremlin also likely intends for these leaks to Western media to advance
its ongoing effort to break Ukrainian and Western morale. Putin has intentionally put himself in a
position where he cannot present any peace settlement that falls short of his original war aims as a
victory to the Russian military or people. Russia announced on August 4 that it will withdraw from
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, likely as a rhetorical response to US President
Donald Trump's August 1 announcement about the redeployment of US nuclear submarines toward Russia.
Russia's INF Treaty withdrawal does not portend a shift in Russia's use of shorter- and
intermediate-range missiles, however. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar. Russian
forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, and Toretsk.
Putin met with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Moscow on August 6, but concrete
results from the meeting remain unclear
Key Takeaways:
Russian President Vladimir
Putin met with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Moscow on August 6, but concrete
results from the meeting remain unclear. Trump may meet with Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky in the coming weeks. Certain Russian commentators are attempting to stoke schisms within
the Trump administration, likely as part of a wider effort to avoid US sanctions ahead of Trump's stated
August 8 deadline for peace efforts in Ukraine. Russian officials and media continue to project an
image of a strong and resilient Russian economy in anticipation of further US sanctions. US
President Donald Trump formally imposed an additional 25 percent tariff on India’s exports to the United
States due to India’s ongoing economic cooperation with Russia. Russian forces likely advanced to
the western outskirts of Kupyansk and secured positions from which they can threaten Ukrainian ground
lines of communication (GLOCs) into the town. The US State Department approved a $104 million
Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to Ukraine. A Russian servicemember recently executed a Ukrainian
civilian in occupied Donetsk Oblast in clear violation of international law. Ukrainian forces
advanced near Chasiv Yar. Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv and western Zaporizhia oblasts and
near Kupyansk, Lyman, Siversk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
Russian forces are actively achieving some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) of Ukrainian
ground lines of communication (GLOCs) with tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), enabling Russian
advances in eastern Ukraine.
Russian forces are actively achieving some effects of
battlefield air interdiction (BAI) of Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) with tactical
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), enabling Russian advances in eastern Ukraine. BAI is the use of air
power to strike targets in the near rear of the frontline to impact battlefield operations in the near
term.<3> These operationally significant targets include roads, railways, and bridges (infrastructure
that supports GLOCs); command posts; ammunition depots; assembly areas; and training grounds. In simple
terms, BAI aims to deny the adversary the use of crucial logistics lines and facilities necessary to
sustain battlefield operations.
US and Russian officials continue to provide updates about a possible meeting between US President Donald
Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in the near future, but exact details remain uncertain.
Key Takeaways:
US and Russian officials continue to provide updates about a possible
meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in the near future, but
exact details remain uncertain. Putin may have used his meeting with Witkoff to propose a long-range
strikes moratorium, which would allow Russia to stockpile long-range drones and missiles and renew
devastating large-scale strikes against Ukraine after the moratorium expires. A strikes moratorium will
also handicap Ukraine's ability to continue its long-range strike campaign aimed at attriting the Russian
defense industrial base and wartime economy. Russia has significantly scaled up its drone and
missile production in 2025, allowing Russia to rapidly increase the size of its strike packages that it
launches against Ukraine. Putin likely claimed to Witkoff that Russia's territorial ambitions are
limited to the seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Putin is likely attempting
to frame Russia's seizure of the four oblasts as inevitable in order to push Ukraine and the West to
capitulate to Kremlin demands. Russia's occupation of the four oblasts is neither inevitable nor
imminent, as Russian forces will face serious operational obstacles in what are likely to be multi-year
endeavors. Russian objectives are not limited to the occupation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and
Kherson oblasts, however, despite Kremlin attempts to frame Russia's war aims as such in an effort to
make its demands seem more reasonable. Russia has not abandoned its more extensive, original war aims. Putin's war aims are also not limited to territory. The Kremlin is engaged in a delicate balancing
act between feigning interest in negotiations to Trump and conditioning Russian society to accept nothing
short of Putin's desired full victory in Ukraine, no matter how long it takes. Russian forces
advanced in the Toretsk direction and likely completed the seizure of Toretsk.
Kremlin officials are reportedly demanding that Ukraine cede to Russia
strategically vital unoccupied territory in Donetsk Oblast and freeze the frontline in other areas as
part of a ceasefire agreement. The surrender of the rest of Donetsk Oblast as the prerequisite of a
ceasefire with no commitment to a final peace settlement ending the war would position Russian forces
extremely well to renew their attacks on much more favorable terms, having avoided a long and bloody
struggle for the ground. Conceding such a demand would force Ukraine to abandon its "fortress belt," the
main fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014 — with no guarantee that fighting will not
resume. Russia's failure to seize Slovyansk in 2022 and ongoing struggles to envelop the fortress
belt underscore the success of Ukraine's long-term efforts to reinforce the fortress belt cities. Russian forces are currently still attempting to envelop the fortress belt from the southwest and are
engaged in an effort to seize it that would likely take several years to complete. Ceding
Ukrainian-held parts of Donetsk Oblast will place Russian forces on the borders of Donetsk Oblast, a
position that is significantly less defensible than the current line. Russian positions along the
Donetsk-Kharkiv and Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border areas would provide a more advantageous
launching point for a future Russian offensive into nearby areas of Kharkiv or Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.
ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will almost certainly violate any future ceasefire or peace
agreement and renew military aggression against Ukraine in the future unless a peace agreement includes
robust monitoring mechanisms and security guarantees for Ukraine. Putin's reported proposal once
again underscores that he maintains his uncompromising demands for Ukraine's capitulation and remains
disinterested in good-faith negotiations. The Kremlin does not appear to be setting the domestic
information conditions necessary for the Russian people to accept a settlement short of full victory in
Ukraine. Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk and Toretsk. Russian forces advanced near Lyman,
Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
The Trump Administration has described Russian President Vladimir Putin's reported demands for a
ceasefire in Ukraine in four different ways since August 6. The exact details of Putin's position remain
unclear.
German outlet BILD reported on August 9 that US Special Envoy for the Middle East
Steve Witkoff misunderstood Putin's demand for Ukraine to withdraw from the remainder of Zaporizhia and
Kherson oblasts, in addition to the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, as an offer for Russia to withdraw from
occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts during the August 6 Putin-Witkoff meeting.<1> BILD reported that
Witkoff also misunderstood Putin's proposal for an energy infrastructure and long-range strikes
ceasefire, and that Witkoff interpreted Putin's offer as a general ceasefire that would curtail frontline
military activity.
Key Takeaways:
The Trump Administration has described Russian
President Vladimir Putin's reported demands for a ceasefire in Ukraine in four different ways since
August 6. The exact details of Putin's position remain unclear. The only element of Putin's reported
position common to all reports is Putin's continued demand for Ukraine to withdraw from unoccupied areas
of Donetsk Oblast — a major Ukrainian concession. Ukrainian and European officials reportedly
presented a counterproposal to US officials on August 9 as European officials continue to issue
statements of support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russian officials
welcomed the announcement that US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet
in Alaska on August 15 and referenced Russian narratives about Russia's historical claims to Alaska. Ukraine continues its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and defense industrial
base (DIB) facilities. Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)
replaced Northern Grouping of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General
Alexander Lapin with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov. Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk.
Demnächst wird Trump noch für Kriegsverlängerung eintreten weil das so ein tolles Geschäft für die USA
ist. WW1 all over again.
The United States and Ukraine's European allies agree that Europe,
not the United States, will fund further military and security assistance to Ukraine
Key
Takeaways:
The United States and Ukraine's European allies agree that Europe, not the United
States, will fund further military and security assistance to Ukraine. US President Donald Trump is
reportedly considering a trilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky during the August 15 summit in Alaska. The Kremlin is attempting to use the
upcoming Alaska summit to divide the United States from Europe rather than engage in meaningful peace
efforts. Ukraine's European allies continue to signal their support for Ukraine and US-led peace
efforts ahead of the Alaska summit. Russian tank losses appear to be declining as Russian forces
continue to deprioritize mechanized assaults across the frontline, indicating that the Russian command
recognizes that it cannot protect vehicles from Ukrainian drone strike capabilities on the frontline and
near rear. Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and
energy infrastructure overnight on August 9 to 10, including the first drone strike against a target in
the Komi Republic. Ukrainian drone manufacturers have developed a new drone capable of intercepting
higher-speed Russian drones. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman.
Trump expressed the United States' willingness to facilitate substantive peace negotiations between
Russia and Ukraine
Key Takeaways:
US President Donald Trump expressed the United
States' willingness to facilitate substantive peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in an effort
to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine. Trump signaled that the United States would aim to return
some of Ukraine's economically and strategically significant territories during the peace negotiations
process. Trump indicated that Putin's fear of the impact of US sanctions against Russia and Russia's
economic partners drove Putin to propose a bilateral summit. Putin's decision to reach out
immediately before Trump imposed further economic restrictions against Russia or its trading partners
undermines the Kremlin's ongoing narrative that sanctions have not and will not affect the Russian
economy. Kremlin officials continue to emphasize that Russia is unwilling to compromise and remains
committed to achieving its original war goals in Ukraine. Russian officials and media are also
setting informational conditions for Russia to renege on any future peace agreement to end the war. Putin may try to use the prospect of US-Russian arms control talks to gain concessions from Trump about
the war in Ukraine in the August 15 meeting in Alaska. Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups
are reportedly infiltrating areas near Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk), and Russian forces likely
recently advanced southeast of the settlement. Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike
campaign against Russian defense industrial infrastructure overnight on August 10 to 11. Russian
forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
Russian forces continued to infiltrate Ukrainian defenses east and northeast of Dobropillya (northwest of
Pokrovsk) using limited sabotage and reconnaissance groups
Key Takeaways:
Russian
forces continued to infiltrate Ukrainian defenses east and northeast of Dobropillya (northwest of
Pokrovsk) using limited sabotage and reconnaissance groups on August 12. Russian forces have yet to be
able to deploy reinforcements to hold and exploit this tactical penetration and will likely face
obstacles in trying to do so. Russian milbloggers, who often overinflate Russian advances,
questioned Russia's ability to exploit the tactical penetration. The Russian tactical penetration in
the Dobropillya direction was not immediate but came rather after months of Russian preparation and
condition setting using new drone innovations and tactics at scale. Russian advances in the Pokrovsk
direction are also only the most recent result of over 17 months’ worth of protracted campaigning. Russian officials are attempting to exploit the tactical penetration near Dobropillya to influence the
upcoming US-Russia summit in Alaska, but the Kremlin's overall strategic objective is to break the will
of Ukraine, the United States, and Europe to achieve Russia's longstanding demand for full Ukrainian
capitulation. Ukrainian intelligence indicated that North Korea recently deployed 11,000 soldiers to
Russia to facilitate Russia's war effort in Ukraine, further demonstrating Russia's commitment to leaning
on its anti-Western partners to protract the war in Ukraine. Russian forces recently advanced near
Velykyi Burluk, Borova, and Pokrovsk.
The Critical Importance of Ukraine's Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• The fortress belt is made up of four large cities and several towns and settlements that run
north to south along the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Slovyansk highway, with a total pre-war population of over
380,537 people. The belt is 50 kilometers long (roughly 31 miles, about the distance between Washington,
D.C., and Baltimore, Maryland).
• Ukraine has spent the last 11 years pouring time, money, and
effort into reinforcing the fortress belt and establishing significant defense industrial and defensive
infrastructure in and around these cities.
• Slovyansk and Kramatorsk form the northern half
of the fortress belt and serve as significant logistics hubs for Ukrainian forces defending in Donetsk
Oblast. Druzhkivka, Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka, and Kostyantynivka serve as the southern half of the fortress
belt.
• Ukrainian forces first began building up defensive positions in and around these
cities after retaking them from pro-Russian proxy forces who attacked and seized Slovyansk, Kramatorsk,
Druzhkivka, and Kostyantynivka in April 2014.
• Russia's failure to seize Slovyansk in 2022
and ongoing struggles to envelop the fortress belt underscore the success of Ukraine's long-term efforts
to reinforce the fortress belt cities.
• Russian forces are currently still attempting to
envelop the fortress belt from the southwest and are engaged in an effort to seize it that would likely
take several years to complete.
Russian officials reiterated that Russia's objectives in Ukraine remain unchanged ahead of the Alaska
summit on August 15, once again demonstrating that the Kremlin remains uninterested in pursuing serious
peace negotiations
Key Takeaways:
Russian officials reiterated that Russia's
objectives in Ukraine remain unchanged ahead of the Alaska summit on August 15, once again demonstrating
that the Kremlin remains uninterested in pursuing serious peace negotiations. The Trump
administration clarified that the United States will not pursue any agreements with Russia regarding a
peace settlement in Ukraine without an immediate ceasefire and without Ukraine's formal involvement in
peace negotiations. Trump reiterated US interest in facilitating future Ukraine-Russia peace
negotiations and warned that Russia would face "very severe consequences" if Putin fails to engage in
serious peace talks with Ukraine after the Alaska summit. The Kremlin is using the Alaska summit to
portray Russia as a world power equal to the United States and to posture Putin as an equal to US
President Donald Trump. Russia is reportedly preparing to conduct further offensive operations in
priority sectors of the frontline and to resume limited offensives in southern Ukraine, particularly in
Kherson Oblast. Russia is simultaneously preparing to continue its long-range drone strike campaign
against Ukrainian rear areas, which will likely result in further civilian casualties. Russian
forces have yet to reinforce and consolidate positions east and northeast of Dobropillya, and Russian and
Ukrainian sources continued on August 13 to characterize the Russian penetration as consisting of
limited, dismounted sabotage and reconnaissance groups. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces
do not control the territory east and northeast of Dobropillya where Russian forces recently infiltrated.
ISW's Assessed Russian Advances map layer does not differentiate between enduring Russian positions and
limited infiltration missions. Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups continue attempts to
infiltrate Pokrovsk as Russian forces heavily strike the town. The Kremlin is likely using the
upcoming Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises to facilitate its nuclear saber-rattling
campaign ahead of the Alaska summit. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast
and western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Lyman and Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in northern
Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.
Russian and US officials further clarified the details of the upcoming August 15 Alaska summit
Key Takeaways:
The Kremlin is likely to use the Alaska summit to try to deflect attention
away from peace negotiations with Ukraine and towards the Russia-US relationship in order to court the
Trump administration into offering Moscow sorely needed economic rapprochement. The Kremlin is
coming to Alaska with a severely weakened domestic economy, which affords the Trump administration
significant leverage during the summit. US President Donald Trump expressed concerns about the
success of a potential secondary meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian
President Vladimir Putin. The Kremlin is also likely to try to distract from the war in Ukraine by
pressuring the Trump administration to engage in bilateral arms control talks at the Alaska summit. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) reported that the July
2025 civilian casualties from Russia's war against Ukraine were the highest on record since May 2022. Russian forces have yet to reinforce and consolidate positions east and northeast of Dobropillya, and
Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian reinforcements are stabilizing the situation. ISW
continues to assess that Russian forces do not control the territory east and northeast of Dobropillya
where Russian forces recently infiltrated. Ukraine's European partners continue to provide military
aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons. Ukraine and Russia conducted their
67th prisoner exchange of the war on August 14. Ukrainian forces struck a large oil refinery in
Volgograd Oblast on the night of August 13 to 14. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast
and near Lyman, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velykomykhailivka.
US President Donald Trump met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at Joint
Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15. Putin said nothing in the joint press
conference to indicate that he has moderated either his war aims or his willingness to compromise on them
and reiterated language he has used since 2021 to justify Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Trump
stated that the United States and Russia did not come to a firm agreement about the war in Ukraine. Russia conducted drone and missile strikes in Ukraine in the hours before the August 15 Alaska summit,
causing civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. Ukrainian officials continue to
indicate that Ukrainian counterattacks are stabilizing the situation east and northeast of Dobropillya
(northwest of Pokrovsk). The Russian military command is reportedly trying to redeploy forces and
means to reinforce and exploit the penetration near Dobropillya but has so far been unsuccessful. Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and energy
infrastructure overnight on August 14 to 15. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and
Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka.
Various US officials indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be
willing to compromise on some war termination demands, but Putin's own statements and Russian official
statements contradict these claims. It is unclear what Putin offered in his meeting with Trump
beyond reiterating his demand for Donetsk Oblast and offering a limited ceasefire with no known timeframe
in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Putin’s demand for all of Donetsk Oblast is the most clear and
consistent demand coming out of the Alaska Summit. Ukrainian forces would not be able to conduct a
safe and orderly withdrawal from unoccupied Donetsk Oblast in accordance with Putin's demand without a
full ceasefire across the entire theater, however ISW continues to assess that a potential Ukrainian
withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast would degrade Ukraine's defensive capabilities and defense industrial base
(DIB) and put hundreds of thousands more Ukrainian civilians under Russian occupation. Ukraine would
require robust international security guarantees and the immediate deployment of an international
peacekeeping contingent to deter future Russian aggression. Seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast
would likely be a difficult and years-long effort for Russian forces rather than a quick effort as Putin
likely aims to portray, as Russian forces remain unable to secure operationally significant advances or
advance faster than foot pace. Putin's reported rejection of a full ceasefire in Ukraine and the
ongoing Russian offensives in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts indicate that Putin intends to continue his war in
Ukraine while negotiations are ongoing — a point that Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry
Medvedev welcomed. The Kremlin reportedly instructed Russian media outlets to present the Alaska
summit as a meeting between two superpowers and to prepare Russian society for the possibility of a
protracted war in Ukraine. Russian officials continue rhetorical campaigns designed to undermine
Ukraine's sovereignty and peace negotiations and to legitimize Russia's war in Ukraine. Ukrainian
forces likely cleared several settlements within the Russian penetration northeast of Dobropillya. Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces advanced near Siversk.
US officials acknowledged that Putin has yet to demonstrate a willingness to
offer the concessions necessary to reach a peace agreement. Russia will be unable to seize the
remainder of Donetsk Oblast rapidly through force, as Russian forces have failed to do for over a decade.
Russia could only rapidly seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Ukraine concedes to Putin's demand and withdraws
from the remainder of the oblast. Russian forces have historically thrown themselves into costly
campaigns to seize fortified or urban areas in eastern Ukraine, a reality far from Putin's claims of
rapid advances. Recent Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk do not indicate that Russia can
rapidly seize fortified or urban areas. Russia continues to deny Ukraine's sovereignty and to demand
the right to dictate Ukrainian domestic affairs. Russian President Vladimir Putin's insistence that
any peace agreement must address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war will make it difficult to
reach a peace agreement as rapidly as Trump desires, given the complexity of the "root causes." Russia's "root causes" extend beyond Ukraine, and eliminating them would require substantial
negotiations with NATO. Putin's offer of a Russian law forbidding a future invasion of Ukraine is
not credible because Russia has already twice broken previous binding international commitments not to
invade and because Putin has shown that he can freely change Russian law as he desires. The details
about Ukrainian security guarantees to which Putin may have agreed remain unclear at this time, but the
Kremlin may be attempting to resurrect its demands about security guarantors from April 2022 that would
have neutered such guarantees. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near
Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.
># Russische Truppen verhöhnen Trump nach Alaska-Gipfel > >Schon wieder falsch
(gefakt) kommentiert. >Es sollte bedeuten: >Ein Zeichen des Dankes an Trump für seinen
Einsatz. > >Man will das gemeine Volk wirklich für >blöd verkaufen.
Jetzt werden sie verarscht auch noch die Ukrainer.
>Ein Zeichen des Dankes an Trump für seinen Einsatz. Die Truppen danken Trump, dass sie jetzt
noch schneller verheizt werden? Oder meinst du, dass es von oben angeordnet ist und Putin dankt
Trump dafür, dass er nach seiner Pfeife tanzt? Also doch verhöhnen?
The Kremlin did not publicly commit to a bilateral or trilateral leader-level
meeting, contrary to US President Donald Trump's announcement following the August 18 multilateral
summit. Western leaders reaffirmed the importance of strong security guarantees for Ukraine to
ensure a just and lasting peace at the August 18 summit. Russian officials largely rejected Europe's
proposed security guarantees for Ukraine in a potential peace agreement. Western leaders expressed
support for a ceasefire that may follow a possible future trilateral meeting between Trump, Zelensky, and
Putin. Russian forces conducted long-range strikes against Ukrainian rear areas that resulted in
civilian casualties ahead of the August 18 White House meetings. Russian budgetary constraints are
forcing Russia to employ alternative mechanisms to fund enlistment bonus payments and recruit soldiers
for its war in Ukraine. Russian forces are struggling to exploit the infiltration in the Dobropillya
direction in the face of continued Ukrainian counterattacks. A Russian servicemember recently
murdered a Ukrainian woman in the Pokrovsk direction in clear violation of international law. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Dobropillya. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman,
Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accurately stated that the Kremlin's
objective in Ukraine is to politically control all of Ukraine rather than to seize select Ukrainian
territories such as Donetsk Oblast.
• Russia launched the full-scale invasion in 2022 after
failing to secure control over Ukraine by other means.
• Russia similarly seeks to exert
influence over the internal governance of other former Soviet countries, including NATO states,
effectively denying their sovereignty and setting conditions to threaten their independent governance. • Lavrov implicitly rejected suggestions that Russia might accept Western security guarantees for
Ukraine.
• Russian forces appear to be attempting to counterattack Ukrainian forces clearing
the Russian infiltration near Dobropillya as Ukrainian forces increasingly threaten the base of the
penetration.
• Russian infiltration tactics and a low manpower density along the frontline in
the Pokrovsk direction have seemingly allowed Russian forces to restore limited, tactical maneuver east
and southeast of Dobropillya —at least temporarily.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted another
exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on August 19.
• Ukrainian
authorities implicated a soldier of the Russian 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment in the executions of two
Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast in Summer 2024.
• Ukrainian
forces advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces advanced near Chasiv Yar and
Toretsk.
The Kremlin is demanding that Russia have a veto over any Western security
guarantees for Ukraine in an effort to undermine ongoing US, European, and Ukrainian efforts to establish
conditions for lasting peace in Ukraine. The Kremlin appears to be demanding that any security
guarantees be based on those proposed in the Istanbul 2022 framework, which would grant Russia and its
allies the right to veto Western military assistance to Ukraine and leave Ukraine helpless in the face of
future Russian threats. The Kremlin is continuing to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin
is unwilling to have an immediate bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the
timeline proposed by US President Donald Trump. The Russian economy continues to face budget
deficits as a result of increased defense spending and detrimental effects of Western sanctions and
secondary tariffs. Secondary tariffs are likely forcing Russia to sell oil below market price, which
could be decreasing the incoming flow of foreign funds into the Russian economy and depleting Russia’s
primary source of wealth. The Kremlin is reportedly considering replacing Russian Investigative
Committee (Sledkom) Chairman Alexander Bastrykin, likely as part of the Kremlin's efforts to form a new
and younger elite. Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy
Oblast and near Lyman, Toretsk, and Velykomykhailivka.
The Kremlin continues to insist that the 2022 Istanbul negotiations are the
only acceptable departure point for potential future negotiations on the war in Ukraine, thereby
demanding that Russia and its allies reserve the right to veto any Western military assistance to Ukraine
and that Ukraine be left neutered and defenseless against future Russian aggression. The Kremlin
continues to categorically reject US-backed security guarantees for Ukraine and reveal its continued
objectives of seizing control of all of Ukraine. Russia is expending considerable diplomatic effort
to court India, suggesting that the Kremlin continues to fear the impact of secondary sanctions. Russia launched the third largest strike of the war thus far against Ukraine on the night of August 20
to 21, targeting Western regions of Ukraine and causing significant damage to civilian infrastructure. The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to innovate and scale production of long-range
weapons. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officially confirmed that it replaced former Northern
Group of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin with
Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov. Ukrainian forces
recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar.
The Kremlin continues to signal that Russian President Vladimir Putin is
unwilling to have an immediate bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Russian officials continue to deflect blame for the lack of Putin-Zelensky meeting and Ukraine-Russia
peace negotiations by rejecting the legitimacy of Ukraine's democratically elected government. Ukraine continued its strike campaign against Russian military and oil infrastructure in Russia and
occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian authorities returned Ukrainian civilians whom Russian authorities
deported from occupied areas of Ukraine to a checkpoint on the Russia-Georgia border. Ukrainian
forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced in
northern Sumy and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts and near Chasiv Yar and Novopavlivka.
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continues to spell out Russian
President Vladimir Putin's rejection of a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on US
President Donald Trump's preferred timeline. The Russian MFA's statement that Lavrov is not
undermining the peace process because Lavrov is executing Putin's foreign policy directives is an
accurate assertion that Putin himself is the impediment to the peace process. Putin continues
efforts to obtain concessions from the United States in the US-Russian bilateral relationship without
meaningfully engaging in the peace process in Ukraine. Trump expressed frustration with the current
state of peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian long-range strikes campaign
targeting Russian oil refineries, Western sanctions, and struggling refinery modernization efforts in
tandem are impacting Russia's fuel reserves and could threaten oil revenues. The Kremlin is likely
escalating its hybrid campaign involving GPS and communications jamming against NATO states bordering
Russia. A former Russian servicemember confirmed ISW's assessment that echelons of the Russian
military command on the battlefield are actively ordering subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of
war (POWs). Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used an English-language interview with
a US outlet to reiterate the Kremlin's explicit rejection of US-proposed initiatives for peace in
Ukraine. Lavrov continued efforts to mischaracterize Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the
impediment to an enduring peace in Ukraine, in order to distract from the Kremlin's own unwillingness to
compromise or engage in negotiations on US President Donald Trump's proposed timeline. Lavrov denied
that Russia violated past international treaties prohibiting Russia from invading Ukraine and rejected
Western-backed security guarantees for Ukraine in the future. Ukrainian forces struck Russian energy
infrastructure in Leningrad and Samara oblasts on the night of August 23 to 24. Ukraine's Western
partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons. Ukraine and Russia conducted another prisoner exchange that included a limited number of Ukrainian
journalists and government officials on August 24. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk,
and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
Russian developers continue to
introduce and test new kinetic anti-drone measures such as drone interceptors, thermal imaging sighting
systems, and lasers. Russian and Ukrainian forces are racing to create “smart minefields” by
developing complex mining systems. Russia is reportedly collaborating with the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) to develop an automated command and control (C2) system for amphibious operations. The
Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly developed new unmanned surface
vehicles (USVs). Russian Unmanned Systems Tactics
Russian forces are reportedly
conducting an echeloned deployment of first-person view (FPV) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) interceptor
systems in Ukraine, which may be enabling Russian advances. Russia reportedly established the first
drone control center in Kamchatka Peninsula. Russian Defense Industrial Base
Russian
recruiters are continuing to recruit Russian and Central Asian children and teenagers to construct the
Alabuga factory and produce drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ). The Kremlin
officially extended tax benefits for some Russian drone manufacturers to incentivize Russian development
and production of tactical drones.
Ukrainian forces continue to pressure the Russian penetration east and
northeast of Dobropillya. The Russian military command has reportedly given up efforts to exploit
the penetration toward Dobropillya, after Russia's infiltration tactics appear to have been unsuccessful
in establishing enduring positions within this penetration. Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov
is likely to become the Chairperson of the Russian Supreme Court, reportedly after Investigative
Committee (Sledkom) Chairperson Alexander Bastrykin refused the Kremlin's offer to assume this
position. Russian authorities recently detained Acting Kursk Oblast Vice Governor Vladimir Bazarov,
likely as part of the Kremlin’s continued efforts to scapegoat local officials for Russian border
security failures. Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including
through the purchase of US weapons and joint production ventures. Ukrainian forces recently advanced
in northern Sumy Oblast and near Lyman and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk,
Lyman, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velykomykhailivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The United States is reportedly willing to supply supporting assets to a
European-led force grouping as part of postwar security guarantees for Ukraine. The Kremlin has
repeatedly rejected the presence of troops from NATO countries as part of any security guarantee for
Ukraine in recent weeks. The United States will impose an additional 25 percent tariff on India’s
exports to the United States due to India’s ongoing purchases of Russian oil. Recent Ukrainian
strikes on Russia’s oil refineries have contributed to gasoline shortages across Russia that will likely
raise inflation and cause further macroeconomic instability in Russia. The Russian government
proposed that Russian President Vladimir Putin withdraw from the European Convention for the Prevention
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Russian residents in border areas are
increasingly apathetic toward the war and accepting that Russia will not agree to an end to the war in
the near future. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Sumy and Borova. Russian forces recently
advanced near Sumy.
Limited Russian tactical forces recently infiltrated Ukrainian defenses in two
border settlements in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast but have not established enduring positions in the area. Russian forces are using infiltration tactics in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast similar to those they used near
Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) in early August 2025. The Kremlin appears to be resuming its
drone and missile strike campaign targeting Ukraine's energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025, likely
in an effort to undermine Ukrainian will to resist Russian aggression. The Kremlin is attempting to
undermine US and European joint efforts to determine appropriate security guarantees for Ukraine by
seemingly demanding that Russia and the United States privately discuss such matters. The Kremlin
signaled that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains unwilling to meet with Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky unconditionally. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reiterated Azerbaijan's
continued support for Ukraine's territorial sovereignty and condemned the Soviet Red Army for "invading
and occupying" Azerbaijan in 1920 — further aggravating already deteriorating Russian-Azerbaijani
relations. Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk and in eastern
Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russia killed at least 21 civilians, including children, and damaged civilian
infrastructure and European diplomatic facilities during the second largest strike of the war thus far
and the largest strike since the August 15 Alaska Summit on the night of August 27 to 28. Ukraine's
ongoing strike campaign targeting Russia’s oil refineries is contributing to gasoline shortages across
Russia that will likely raise inflation and cause further macroeconomic instability in Russia. The
Russian information space responded to the Ukrainian strikes against the Afipsky and Kuibyshev refineries
and reiterated concerns about the poor performance of Russia's air defense systems near critical and
military infrastructure. Russian intelligence services are likely tracking US and European military
supply lines in Europe by conducting reconnaissance operations over NATO territory. Ukrainian forces
recently advanced near Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in
northern Kharkiv Oblast, near Lyman and Pokrovsk, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russia reportedly leveraged the August 15 Alaska Summit in order to stall for a
planned Fall 2025 offensive, among other things. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov gave a
major speech at the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Collegium on August 29 and gave an update on the
ten priority directions for the Russian MoD. Belousov also discussed Russian battlefield progress in
Ukraine and exaggerated Russian gains in recent weeks. Belousov indicated that the Russian MoD has
shifted its priorities to produce light vehicles over heavy armored vehicles, reflecting Russian
battlefield tactics since Winter 2024–2025. Belousov stated that Russia continues to focus on
developing its Unmanned Systems Forces and drone production capacity. Belousov indicated that the
Russian MoD is expanding its efforts to digitalize Russian recruitment, likely as part of wider efforts
to augment Russia’s administrative capacity to handle conscription and mobilization processes. Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in Russia and
occupied Ukraine. Ukraine’s ongoing strikes campaign against Russian oil infrastructure continues to
contribute to gasoline shortages in Russia. US and Ukrainian representatives met in New York City on
August 29 and reaffirmed Ukraine’s readiness for peace negotiations with Russia, including at the level
of heads of state. The US State Department approved a $825 million Foreign Military Sale (FMS) of
aviation ammunition and related equipment to Ukraine. Russian forces recently executed seven
Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) near Myrolyubivka, Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian forces recently
advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Pokrovsk.
The Kremlin appears to have launched a coordinated informational effort
posturing military strength on the battlefield in order to shape Western thinking and falsely portray a
Russian victory as inevitable. The Kremlin's presentation of territorial gains statistics ignores
the significant losses that Russia is incurring and the gradual, creeping nature of Russia's advances —
painting an incomplete picture of Russian performance on the battlefield. Russia launched another
large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of August 29 to 30 — the third
combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska. The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions to demote a senior Kremlin official who reportedly advised
Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent months to end the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces
continue to strike Russian military and energy infrastructure in Russia Russian Investigative
Committee Chairperson Alexander Bastrykin will stay in his current position for another year following
reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin was considering moving Bastrykin to a new position. An
unknown assailant shot and killed former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Chairperson Andriy Parubiy in Lviv City
on August 30. A Russian servicemember recently murdered an elderly Ukrainian civilian in the
Pokrovsk direction. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Novopavlivka, and Russian
forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka.
The Kremlin is pursuing a multi-pronged informational effort aimed at deterring
Western support for Ukraine and undermining European participation in the peace process. Russian
milbloggers criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for exaggerating its battlefield
successes. The Kremlin is intensifying these information efforts because its territorial gains
remain disproportionately limited and slow relative to the high losses incurred. Ukrainian forces
advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced near Toretsk.
Kremlin officials continue to deny White House statements about the prospect of
a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian or trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian meeting in the near future. Russian
President Vladimir Putin continues to demonstrate his unwillingness to compromise on his unwavering
demands for Ukraine’s full capitulation. The Kremlin likely timed the publication of a video address
by former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to coincide with Putin's SCO speech in order to lend
legitimacy to Putin's demand for regime change in Ukraine. Putin's demands for regime change in his
SCO speech are not new, but rather the reiteration of his pre-war demands that he has been pursuing
throughout the war. The Russian military command reportedly redeployed relatively "elite" naval
infantry and airborne (VDV) forces to Donetsk Oblast from northern Sumy Oblast and the Kherson
direction. The reported redeployments suggest that the Russian Fall 2025 offensive will focus on
efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, particularly in the Dobropillya, Pokrovsk, and
Kostyantynivka areas. Likely Russian GPS jamming affected a plane carrying European Commission
President Ursula von der Leyen on September 1. Ukraine reportedly conducted its first strike with
its domestically produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile on August 30 against occupied Crimea. Ukrainian authorities reportedly collected new evidence of Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov
endorsing war crimes against Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). Ukrainian forces advanced near
Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian President Vladimir Putin leveraged a meeting with Slovak Prime Minister
Robert Fico to pretend to offer marginal concessions to US demands while continuing to refuse to meet
actual US demands and while blaming Europe and the United States for provoking Russian aggression. Kremlin officials continue to deny White House statements about the prospect of a bilateral
Ukrainian-Russian or trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian meeting in the near future. Russia continues to
feel the economic impacts of secondary sanctions against Russian oil-and-gas importers and of recent
Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries. North Korea is reportedly planning to send about
6,000 more troops to Russia, likely to serve in supporting roles in the Russian rear. Ukrainian
forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Lyman and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently
advanced near Kupyansk and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly stated that he does not consider
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to be the legitimate president of Ukraine, invalidating the very
basis of any future peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Putin himself is responsible for
Ukraine's inability to legally hold the referendums and elections for which Putin is calling. Putin
and other high-ranking Kremlin officials continue to explicitly and publicly state that they are
committed to achieving Russia's original war aims through military means. Putin underscored his
continued commitment to his theory of victory, a belief that Putin first outlined in June 2024, on
September 3. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to publicly deepen Belarusian
integration into Russia. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) attempted to use footage showing a
small-scale infiltration mission to lend legitimacy to inflated claims by Russian Chief of the General
Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov on August 30 that Russian forces had seized roughly half of
Kupyansk. The Russian MoD's claims about Kupyansk have failed to convince large parts of the Russian
milblogger community, even Kremlin-affiliated and coopted milbloggers. The Kremlin appears to be
trying to exploit the mapping methodologies that have become widespread throughout the war, including
from OSINT sources like ISW. Russia launched another large-scale combined drone and missile strike
against Ukraine on the night of September 2 to 3—the fourth combined strike of over 500 drones and
missiles since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near
Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Key Takeaways The British and French-led Coalition of the Willing and Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky met in Paris to discuss possible future security guarantees for Ukraine that aim to ensure a
just and lasting peace on September 4. Macron stated that a strong Ukrainian military must be at the
center of any postwar security guarantees. Macron stated that 26 states formally agreed to form a
“reassurance force” as part of security guarantees for postwar Ukraine. The Kremlin continues to
explicitly reject any foreign troops on Ukrainian territory as part of postwar security guarantees. The Coalition of the Willing also outlined ways for states that are unable to deploy ground, sea, or
air assets to participate in security guarantees for postwar Ukraine. The Coalition of the Willing
discussed additional sanctions against Russia with US President Donald Trump as part of coordinated
Western efforts to deny Russia funding for its war against Ukraine. Russian bankers continue to
express concerns over the increasingly stagnant Russian economy. Ukrainian forces advanced near
Kupyansk and Siversk and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces advanced in
northern Sumy Oblast and near Velykomykhailivka.
Key Takeaways Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the legitimacy of Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky and said that it is impossible to conclude a peace agreement with the current
Ukrainian government, effectively eliminating the possibility of serious peace negotiations. Putin
and other Russian officials continue efforts to degrade Western unity and deter Western support for
Ukraine, including undermining potential postwar security guarantees. Ukrainian forces continue to
strike Russian military and energy infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine. Russian-Azerbaijani relations continue to deteriorate. Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy
Oblast and near Siversk. Russian forces advanced near Lyman and Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia
Oblast.
Ukrainian officials warned that the Russian military command is regrouping and
reinforcing its troops in western Donetsk Oblast, likely ahead of a major offensive operation. Russian forces are also attempting to interdict key Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in
western Donetsk Oblast in order to complicate Ukrainian logistics and enable further Russian advances
during future offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast. Recent geolocated footage indicates that Russian
forces have likely advanced into northwestern Kupyansk following the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)’s
efforts to falsely portray limited infiltrations as enduring advances. Ukrainian forces recently
advanced near Lyman and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, Pokrovsk, and
Velykomykhailivka.
Russia launched its largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine of
the war to date on the night of September 6 to 7 with 823 total projectiles. The Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) attempted to deny that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure across Ukraine or the
Cabinet of Ministers building within Kyiv City. Russian drone strike packages against Ukraine will
likely continue to expand as long as Russia is able to increase its long-range strike drone
production. Russia is continuing to expand its long-range strike drone production in part due to
support from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Russia’s latest strikes against Ukraine further
demonstrate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is disinterested in ending his war in Ukraine and
stopping the killing. Ukraine continued its attacks against military and oil infrastructure in
Russia on the night of September 6 to 7. Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka
and Dobropillya tactical areas. Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev directly threatened Finland
and used language that directly mirrors the Kremlin’s false justifications for its invasions of
Ukraine. Medvedev’s threat against Finland is not unique but rather part of an ongoing Kremlin
effort to threaten NATO states and justify future Russian aggression. Russia continues to expand its
defense industrial base (DIB) and take measures to safeguard defense industrial enterprises against
long-range Ukrainian strikes. Russia is also reportedly increasing its production of FPVs with fiber
optic cables, which Russian forces have successfully leveraged in recent months to achieve some effects
of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) in Ukraine. The Kremlin appears set to institutionalize its
long-held practice of torturing and abusing Ukrainian civilian prisoners and prisoners of war (POWs). Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Lyman. Russian forces advanced in the
Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Russian territorial gains have become less costly over the last four months
compared to Spring 2025 as Russian forces are sustaining a lower casualty rate per square kilometer
seized. Russian casualty rates per square kilometer peaked in the first four months of 2025 as
Russian forces fought to maintain the intensified pace of offensive operations they began in Fall
2024. Russian advances began to slow during the first four months of 2025 as Russian casualties
remained consistent, resulting in a higher Russian casualty rate between January and April 2025. Russian forces began to make quicker gains in May 2025 and have sustained a faster rate of advance over
the last four months as Russian casualties marginally decreased, although Russian forces continue to
advance at footpace. Russian casualty rates have likely decreased in Ukraine due to Russia’s renewed
emphasis on using UAVs to generate some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI), largely led by UAV
operators of Russia’s Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies. Recent Russian polling
suggests that support among the Russian population for the war remains high despite growing casualties
and relatively slow advances on the battlefield. Ukraine continues to strike Russian energy
infrastructure. Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a combined strike against three Russian
command posts in and near occupied Donetsk City on September 8. Russian State Duma officials are
engaging in a top-down Kremlin-organized effort to threaten Finland. Russian forces conducted a
strike against a mobile pension dispersal point in Donetsk Oblast that killed and wounded dozens of
mostly elderly civilians. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka
tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.
Russian drones violated Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10 in
what NATO and European officials have suggested was an intentional Russian incursion. The large
number of Russian drones that violated Polish airspace suggests that this was likely an intentional
Russian effort. At least some of the drones that violated Polish airspace were Gerbera decoy drones,
and Russia may have been preparing for an incursion of this size into Polish airspace since Summer
2025. Russian officials denied that the drones came from Russia and attempted to deflect blame onto
Ukraine. Belarusian officials attempted to deny any involvement in the Russian drone incursion
despite evidence that the drones entered Polish airspace from the direction of Belarus. Russia is
likely attempting to gauge both Poland’s and NATO’s capabilities and reactions in the hopes of applying
lessons learned to future conflict scenarios with the NATO alliance. Russia is likely also
attempting to limit or deter Western military aid to Ukraine. Russian milbloggers amplified various
narratives to refute Western reporting about the Russian violation of Polish airspace, many of which
cohered with official Russian and Belarusian responses. Ukraine’s Western partners continue to
pledge military and financial assistance to Ukraine. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and
in the Dobropillya tactical area.
Polish officials provided additional clarification on the impacts of the
September 9-10 Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace. Poland’s allies reiterated their
support for Poland following the drone incursion, condemning Russia for purposefully conducting the
incursion to test NATO readiness. Ukrainian officials responded to the drone incursion by drawing
parallels to Russian cycles of aggression and escalation against Ukraine and offered to share Ukraine’s
now-institutional counter-drone knowledge with Poland. The Kremlin continues efforts to destabilize
the Balkans and dismantle the 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, likely as part of
a larger campaign to divide and distract Europe. Russian state media is acknowledging the growing
gasoline shortages in Russia but is downplaying the role that Ukraine’s deep strike campaign is playing
in generating these shortages. Sweden pledged additional military and financial assistance to
Ukraine. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Velykomykhailivka, and in the
Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Russian and Belarusian forces began the joint Zapad-2025 military exercises on
September 12 for the first time since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia and
Belarus may have walked back efforts to use Zapad-2025 to support nuclear saber-rattling operations
against the West, at least temporarily. Belarusian and Russian officials blamed Poland for
overreacting to the threat of Russian aggression in response to Poland’s decision to close its border
with Belarus due to Zapad-2025. NATO announced the Eastern Sentry operation on September 12 in
response to the Russian drones that violated Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10. The
Russian Central Bank likely prematurely lowered its key interest rate for the third time since June 2025
in an attempt to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability. The lowering of the key interest
rate will likely continue to exacerbate Russia’s economic instability. Ukraine’s partners continue
to sanction Russia. Ukraine conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against energy
infrastructure in Leningrad and Smolensk oblasts on the night of September 11 to 12. US senators
Lindsey Graham, Richard Blumenthal, Katie Britt, and Amy Klobuchar introduced a bill to the US Senate on
September 11 to facilitate the return of Ukrainian children that Russia deported. Ukrainian forces
recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Velykomykhailivka,
and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Russian forces recently attempted to advance behind Ukrainian positions in
Kupyansk via an underground gas pipeline – the third time Russian forces have used this tactic so far in
the war. Russia’s repeated use of this tactic further indicates that Russian forces are improving their
ability to disseminate tactical lessons between various sectors of the front line. The international
community continues to condemn the recent Russian drone incursion into Poland’s airspace. Russian
and Belarusian officials continue to deflect responsibility for Russia’s recent drone incursion into
Polish airspace. Additional information about the Russian drone incursion undermines Nebenzya’s and
Tozik’s statements, however. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and
Velykomykhailivka and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
A Russian drone entered Romanian airspace on the night of September 13, days
after a Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10. Poland
authorized NATO reinforcements to deploy to Poland for Operation Eastern Sentry in response to the
September 9 to 10 Russian drone incursion into Polish territory. Russian and Belarusian forces
continued the Zapad-2025 joint military exercises. Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike and
sabotage campaign against Russian oil, gas, railway, and military infrastructure in Russia and occupied
Crimea on the night of September 13 to 14. The Kremlin is facing a massive budget deficit and may
increase consumer taxes to compensate for the deficit rather than decreasing funding for its war machine,
passing the economic costs off as a sacrifice that the Russian population must accept to support Russia’s
war in Ukraine. Increasing the VAT could reverse any progress the Russian Central Bank may have made
against inflation while also failing to address any of the issues that will likely arise from prematurely
lowering the key interest rate. Russian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia
Oblast.
The Kremlin is escalating its rhetoric, threatening NATO states in parallel with
the kinetic escalation of Russia’s recent drone incursion into Poland. Russian and Belarusian forces
continued the Zapad-2025 joint military exercises on September 15 and appear to be implementing some
tactical lessons from Russia’s experience in Ukraine. Russia is using the Zapad-2025 exercises to
practice potential future kinetic provocations against neighboring NATO states. The September 12-14
gubernatorial elections in Russia further demonstrated the Kremlin’s grip on power throughout the
country. The Kremlin continues to build out a loyal cadre of elected officials from veterans of its
war against Ukraine. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian
forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Novopavlivka and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian President Vladimir Putin oversaw the final day of the
Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2025 joint military exercises on September 16. Ukraine’s ongoing long-range
strike campaign targeting critical Russian energy infrastructure continues to degrade Russia’s oil and
gasoline markets, likely affecting Russia’s long-term ability to finance its war in Ukraine. Ukraine
continues to demonstrate its adeptness at innovating and fielding drones with increasingly sophisticated
artificial intelligence (AI) technology while maintaining accessible costs, significantly augmenting
Ukrainian drone effectiveness. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to rhetorically
distance himself from Russia’s recent incursion into Polish airspace in an attempt to obfuscate the fact
that Belarus is de facto a cobelligerent in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Russian forces recently
advanced near Kupyansk, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in eastern Zaporizhia
Oblast.
The Trump administration reportedly approved its first European-financed foreign
military sales to Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative. Senior Russian officials continue to publicly signal the Kremlin’s unwillingness to engage in
negotiations that result in anything less than full Ukrainian capitulation. The Kremlin is using the
threat of aggression to try to prevent European states from committing troops to postwar Ukraine as part
of Western security guarantees. Senior Kremlin officials, likely with Russian President Vladimir
Putin’s approval, pushed Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Dmitry Kozak out of his senior Kremlin position
following years of disagreement with Putin’s policies about the war in Ukraine. Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) identified the base and commander of Russia’s Rubikon Center for Advanced
Unmanned Technologies. Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) command and staff military
exercises are occurring in Kyrgyzstan from September 17 to 20. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in
the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and in
western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The Russian military command continues to signal its commitment to Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s theory of victory that posits that Russia can win a war of attrition against
Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that a Russian victory is not inevitable, however, and that Ukraine
and the West can leverage several key Russian weaknesses to force Putin to change his calculus and engage
in good-faith negotiations. The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its commitment to its original war
aims in Ukraine. The Kremlin is also attempting to manipulate the Trump administration into
normalizing US-Russian bilateral relations without concluding the war in Ukraine – contrary to Trump’s
desired timeline of working on bilateral relations after concluding a peace in Ukraine. The Kremlin
appears to be conducting a coordinated information campaign threatening Finland. Lithuanian
authorities connected Russian military intelligence to several incidents of arson in Europe in late July
2024 that were likely part of Russia’s ongoing hybrid warfare campaign that aims to sow fear and discord
within Europe. Ukraine and Poland agreed on joint drone development and training mechanisms
following the Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace on September 9 to 10. The Kremlin will
likely introduce a quota to systematically appoint hand-selected veterans of the war in Ukraine to
positions in municipal, regional, and federal government in support of the Kremlin’s long-term campaign
to militarize Russian society. Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly extended Russian Chief of
the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov’s military service for five more years, demonstrating how
Putin continues to retain an aging cadre of loyalists despite his stated efforts to raise a new, younger
elite. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Velykomykhailivka and in western Zaporizhia
Oblast.
Russian MiG-31 interceptor jets violated Estonian airspace on September 19. European officials continue to discuss the creation of a defensive “drone wall” and provide military
support for Ukraine following Russia’s violation of Polish airspace on September 9 to 10. The
Kremlin continues to reject blame for the Russian drone incursion into Poland’s airspace. Russia is
reportedly using joint energy ventures to sell military equipment to Vietnam and evade Western
sanctions. Russian forces continue to commit war crimes in Ukraine, including executions of
civilians. Russia continues to censor critics of its war in Ukraine, including critics of Russia’s
handling of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. Russian forces advanced in the
Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, and near Lyman and
Novopavlivka.
Kremlin insider statements continue to indicate that Russian President Vladimir
Putin remains committed to his strategy that Russian forces will be able to win a war of attrition
against Ukraine and the West and that the West has thus far failed to convince Putin to reevaluate his
strategy. Putin may have allowed these Kremlin sources to share his logic with Bloomberg and likely
seeks to leverage Bloomberg‘s article to exploit friction between European and US officials, to feed into
the wider Russian narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable, and to create fear in
Ukrainian society ahead of Winter 2025-2026. Russian forces conducted one of the largest drone and
missile strikes against Ukraine in recent weeks on the night of September 19 to 20. Russia is
intensifying its efforts to test NATO’s defensive capabilities and resolve by violating NATO members’
safety zones in the air domain. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced the start of
Ukraine’s managed weapons exports program. Russian commanders continue to order Russian forces to
execute Ukrainian civilians and commit acts of perfidy as part of an ongoing trend of Russian commanders
systematizing deliberate war crimes among Russian units. Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy
Oblast and near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Lyman, Pokrovsk,
Novopavlivka, and Velykomykhailivka.
Russia has reportedly been forming a strategic reserve from new recruits since
July 2025. The Russian military command may have assessed that Russia could afford to create a
strategic reserve after Russian losses began to decrease in the summer of 2025. Reports that Russia
is creating a strategic reserve further indicate that the Kremlin is not interested in ending its war
against Ukraine but remains committed to achieving its war goals on the battlefield and may be preparing
for a conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia continues to test the
limits of NATO’s air defenses over the Baltic Sea as Russia increases the frequency of its violations of
NATO states’ airspace. Russian forces continue to develop drone technologies to increase the volume
and precision of strikes against the Ukrainian near rear to further complicate Ukrainian logistics. The Kremlin reportedly dismissed former Northern Group of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD)
Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin from military service. Lapin has proven to be an
incompetent commander throughout the war against Ukraine, but the Kremlin is likely punishing Lapin now
as part of its ongoing campaign to scapegoat and punish high ranking officials for their failure to repel
Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024. Russian forces recently advanced near
Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka.
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on September 22 that Russia will
adhere to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for one year following its expiration in
February 2026 and used threats to urge the United States to do the same. Putin blamed the West for
undermining Russian-US arms cooperation and violating bilateral arms agreements—ignoring how Russia has
violated numerous multilateral and bilateral treaties in the past decades. Putin is attempting to
pressure the Trump administration to engage in arms control talks to facilitate US-Russian rapprochement
and extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine, as ISW forecasted Russia would
in August 2025. Some Russian defense industrial enterprises are reportedly struggling to expand
their production and workforces due to economic constraints, while the Kremlin is prioritizing funding
for high-priority enterprises such as drone and missile manufacturers. The United Nations (UN)
reported that the number of casualties from Russian drone strikes targeting Ukrainian civilians has
increased by 40 percent so far in 2025 as compared to 2024. Ukrainian forces may have targeted high
ranking Russian officials in a reported strike against occupied Crimea on the night of September 21 to
22. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces recently
advanced near Lyman and Pokrovsk and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
US President Donald Trump expressed confidence in Ukraine’s ability to fully
liberate all of its internationally recognized territory that Russia currently occupies, following a
bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) publicly acknowledged Russia’s intent to advance
further into Kharkiv Oblast should Russian forces seize Kupyansk, supporting ISW’s assessment of Russia’s
operational intent. The Russian MoD’s September 23 statement undermines repeated Russian claims that
Russia’s main military objective and territorial demands in Ukraine are limited to Luhansk, Donetsk,
Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. The Russian MoD may be issuing this statement about Russian
operational intent to justify ongoing Russian operations to seize Kupyansk to Russian society and
frontline forces. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, Novopavlivka and in the
Dobropillya tactical area and western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in northern
Kharkiv Oblast and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Siversk.
The Kremlin is using nuclear threats to influence US President Donald Trump to
stop his efforts to secure peace in Ukraine. Russia launched a multipronged informational campaign
intended to mask Russia’s economic weakness that US President Donald Trump recently correctly
identified. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated his commitment to engaging in peace
negotiations and holding elections in accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian law. Former Ukrainian Command-in-Chief and current Ukrainian Ambassador to the United Kingdom General
Valerii Zaluzhnyi assessed on September 24 that Russian forces are adapting technological innovations and
ground tactics in an attempt to restore maneuver to the battlefield. Russian jamming originating
from Kaliningrad Oblast likely disrupted the GPS on Spanish Defense Minister Margarita Robles’ plane
flying to Lithuania on September 24. Ukrainian forces recently conducted a series of aerial and
naval drone strikes against Russia and occupied Crimea, including against Russian oil infrastructure and
drone production facilities. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Pokrovsk and in the
Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Pokrovsk, in the
Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to artificially inflate its
claims of advance in Ukraine to support the Kremlin’s false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine
is inevitable. Russian forces are reportedly rearranging forces to prepare for offensive operations
across several sectors of the frontline but lack the forces and means required to sustain these
operations simultaneously. The Russian offensive in Kupyansk is reportedly vulnerable due to the
lack of sufficient forces to sustain simultaneous offensive operations against Kupyansk and several other
areas along the frontline. Russian officials privately admitted that Russia is responsible for the
September 19 incursion of three MiG-31 interceptor jets into Estonian airspace. Russian officials
continued attempts to convince the Trump administration to allow Russia to continue its war against
Ukraine unimpeded in the wake of US President Donald Trump’s September 23 comments emphasizing that
Ukraine has the ability to retake all of its territory. The Kremlin reportedly plans to allocate
less to national defense spending in 2026 than in 2025 but acknowledged that it is increasing some taxes
to fund “defense and security.” The Kremlin is likely looking for different avenues to raise funding
for defense and national security spending without aggravating existing socio-economic tensions. Russia continues to suffer from gasoline shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine due to repeated
Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries. Ukrainian forces advanced near Velykomykhailivka.
Russian forces advanced near Lyman and within the Dobropillya salient.
NATO jets recently scrambled in response to another Russian flight close to NATO
airspace as European states struggle with unidentified, likely Russian, drone activity in border areas
and near infrastructure. Ukraine’s European allies continue to respond to increasing Russian
aggression against Europe. Russian officials continue efforts to undermine Western support for
Ukraine and defensive measures against Russia. The United States is reportedly considering lifting
existing restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to use US-produced weapons to strike legitimate military
targets located in Russian territory. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the
Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.
Gasoline shortages continue in Russia and occupied Ukraine due to repeated
Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries. Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide military
aid to Ukraine, including through the purchase of US weapons. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova absurdly blamed Ukraine on September 26 for the September 9 to 10
Russian drone incursion in Poland and the September 13 Russian drone incursion in Romania. European
officials continue to report unidentified drones operating within NATO airspace. Ukrainian forces
recently advanced in northern Sumy and western Zaporizhia oblasts. Russian forces recently advanced in
the Dobropillya tactical area and near Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.
US Vice President JD Vance criticized Russia’s rejection of American invitations
to engage in bilateral or trilateral negotiations as Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate their lack
of interest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine. Russian forces conducted the third largest
combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine of the war to date on the night of September 27 to 28
with 643 total projectiles. European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating
within NATO airspace. Kremlin-linked Moldovan politicians called for protests in Moldova following
the September 28 parliamentary election. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov emphasized that
Russia will use its upcoming United Nations Security Council (UNSC) presidency to “review” the 1995
Dayton Accords in a likely effort to destabilize the Balkans and divide and distract Europe. Russian
forces recently advanced near Lyman and Novopavlivka.
Russian President Vladimir Putin issued the decree to start the semi-annual
fall conscription cycle on October 1. The Kremlin plans to spend 17 trillion rubles ($183 billion)
on national security and defense in 2026 — about 38 percent of its planned annual expenditures. The
Russian government is planning to increase funding to televised propaganda – in line with increased
restrictions on social media and internet access. US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg
acknowledged that Ukraine has US permission to conduct long-range strikes against Russian territory. Kremlin officials are trying to preemptively deter the United States from providing Ukraine with
Tomahawk missiles. European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating within NATO
airspace. The pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won a parliamentary majority in the
September 28 elections in Moldova, as Kremlin-linked Moldovan politicians and Russian officials are
preparing to appeal the results and call for protests in the coming days. Ukrainian forces advanced
near Lyman and in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces advanced near Velykyi Burluk, Lyman,
Siversk, Novopavlivka, and Velykomykhailivka and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Russia and Belarus may conduct special forces sabotage operations against
critical infrastructure in Poland and launch additional drone incursions and blame Ukraine. Kremlin-linked Moldovan politicians may call for protests in the coming days and weeks before Moldovan
authorities validate the results of the September 28 parliamentary elections. Ukraine’s European
allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, including to support Ukraine’s defense industrial
base (DIB). European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating near European
military and economic facilities as Ukraine launched efforts to train its European allies in
counter-drone tactics. Ukrainian forces advanced near Borova and Lyman. Russian forces advanced near
Borova, Lyman, Siversk, and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical effort area.
The Kremlin continues the parallel use of nuclear threats and economic
incentives to pressure the United States into normalizing US-Russian relations while explicitly rejecting
Russian-Ukrainian negotiations. Russian shadow fleet oil tankers may be connected to the recent
incursions of unidentified drones operating in NATO airspace. The Russian command may be redeploying
elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division from the Kramatorsk direction to the Kherson direction. Gasoline shortages continue in Russia and occupied Ukraine due to repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian
oil refineries. The Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has been disconnected
from the Ukrainian power grid for over a week as Russia sets conditions to imminently transfer the plant
to the Russian power grid. The European Commission (EC) announced a $4.7 billion aid package for
Ukraine using funds from frozen Russian assets. Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya
tactical area and near Velykomykhailivka and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to threaten Europe as part of a
multi-pronged informational effort to deter the West from responding to hostile Russian actions. Putin attempted to discourage the United States from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine by
downplaying their effectiveness and indirectly threatening the United States. Putin is attempting to
exaggerate Russian advances in Ukraine to support the Kremlin’s false narrative that a Russian victory in
Ukraine is inevitable. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that US President Donald Trump
approved intelligence sharing with Ukraine for long-range strikes against legitimate military targets
within Russia. To mitigate domestic panic over Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian
oil refineries, Russian officials attempted to downplay the reported US decision to increase intelligence
sharing with Ukraine. Russian military intelligence is likely conducting hybrid operations in
Poland, Germany, and Lithuania to sow fear and discord within NATO states, following indications of a
possible future Russian false-flag operation within Poland. Ukraine and Russia conducted another
prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance with agreements reached during the June 2 bilateral
negotiations in Istanbul. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman and in the Dobropillya
tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka, and in
northern Kharkiv Oblast, eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, and western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Key Takeaways Russian forces conducted a large, combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine on
the night of October 2 to 3, increasingly leveraging missiles in large but infrequent strike packages. Russian forces likely stockpiled ballistic and cruise missiles throughout September 2025 to conduct a
few large scale drone and missile strikes on select days. Russian forces are likely leveraging
recent upgrades to Russian ballistic missiles to improve their ability to penetrate Ukrainian air defense
systems. Russia continues to escalate its destabilization efforts against Europe as European
officials continue to report unidentified drones operating in their airspace. The Kremlin continues
efforts to undermine Western-brokered peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, likely as part of a larger
campaign to divide and distract Europe. Norway and Ukraine’s European partners opened the largest
training center for Ukrainian military personnel in Poland on October 1. Ukrainian forces recently
advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka, and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv
Oblast.
German officials reported more unidentified drone sightings near airports and
military facilities. Russia continues to challenge and probe NATO states’ capabilities, possibly as
part of preparations for a potential future Russia-NATO war. Russian forces conducted a combined
missile and drone strike against Ukraine that resulted in civilian casualties and damaged critical energy
infrastructure. Ukraine continues to conduct long-range strikes against Russian oil refineries,
exacerbating ongoing gasoline shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine. Russian forces recently
advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues attempts to deter the US from sending
Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine by linking improvements in the US-Russian bilateral relationship to
concessions from the United States on the war in Ukraine. The Kremlin is trying to prevent the
United States from providing Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine in order to retain the sanctuary that Russia
enjoys in its rear. Russia launched its largest combined drone and missile strike against Lviv
Oblast on the night of October 4 to 5 with 163 combined projectiles. The pro-Russian Georgian Dream
party secured widespread majorities in municipal elections in Georgia on October 4, sparking mass
protests that Georgian Dream officials tried to blame on Ukraine. Russia is likely leveraging its
close relations with Serbia and Republika Srpska to threaten to destabilize the Balkans and undermine
European cohesion. Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Russia appears to be accelerating the informational and psychological condition
setting phase — “Phase 0” — of its campaign to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future. European officials continue to report drone sightings in European airspace. German officials
attributed recent drone flights over the Munich Airport to Russia. The Kremlin continues to deny
responsibility for recent drone incursions into NATO airspace. Russian forces conducted a fiber
optic first-person view (FPV) drone strike for the first time against Kramatorsk on October 5 —
furthering Russian efforts to disrupt Ukrainian logistics within and near the fortress belt in Donetsk
Oblast. Ukraine continues to conduct long-range drone strikes against Russian defense industrial
enterprises and oil refineries. Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine
on the night of October 5 to 6, striking a maternity hospital. The Ukrainian military continues to
transition to a corps structure. Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast, the Dobropillya
tactical area, and near Lyman. Russian forces advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area and near Velykyi
Burluk, Kupyansk, Siversk, and Pokrovsk.
The Kremlin continues its reflective control campaign aimed at preventing the US
from selling Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine. Leaked Russian estimates of Russian killed in action
(KIA) to wounded in action (WIA) rates in Ukraine underscore the impact of increased tactical drone usage
in Ukraine and the extent to which drones complicate ground advances and casualty evacuation. The
leaked estimates indicate that Russian forces suffered their highest casualties in the Pokrovsk,
Kupyansk, and Lyman directions between January and August 2025, reflecting command prioritization of
these sectors of the front. Russian forces appear able and willing to sustain these casualty rates
despite achieving limited tactical advances. European states continue to provide humanitarian and
military aid to Ukraine and conclude joint agreements with Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB). The Russian military command reportedly appointed Former Commander of the Russian Force Grouping in
Syria Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel as the deputy commander of the Northern Grouping of Forces. Ukrainian forces advanced near Novopavlivka and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces advanced in eastern
Zaporizhia Oblast, the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka and Dobropillya tactical areas and near Siversk,
Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.
Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his theory of victory,
which holds that Russia can outlast the West and Ukraine in a war of attrition, and his demand for
Ukraine’s full capitulation. Putin acknowledged Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian
oil refineries amidst ongoing gasoline shortages and price surges in Russia and occupied Ukraine. The Kremlin is intensifying its efforts to use defunct US-Russian arms control treaties to gain
concessions from the United States on the war in Ukraine. The Kremlin’s moves to withdraw from PMDA
likely immediately aim to prevent US sales of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine and are part of an ongoing
reflexive control campaign. The Russian military command reportedly redeployed elements of the 41st
Combined Arms Army (CAA, Central Military District ) from south of Pokrovsk to the Novopavlivka
direction, which will likely improve Russia’s command and control (C2) in both sectors. European
officials continue to report drone sightings and GPS interference in European airspace. European
officials continued to warn that Russia’s recent drone attacks against Europe are part of a broader
campaign to generate fear and disunity in Europe. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern
Sumy Oblast and Novopavlivka, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, and Pokrovsk
and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
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