Russia condemned the recent US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22 amid reports that Iran's foreign minister will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on June 23. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned the US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22, claiming that the US strikes are a violation of the UN Charter and that the UN Security Council is obliged to respond, while urging officials to return to diplomatic channels. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that that the world will descend into chaos if countries are allowed to interpret the right to self-defense in the UN Charter as they wish. Lavrov claimed that the US strikes marked a new, dangerous escalation during a phone call with Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó on June 22. CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev claimed on June 22 that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is en route to Moscow and will meet with Putin on June 23. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to the US strike in social media posts, including on his English-language channels, on June 22 by claiming that US President Donald Trump has started a new war. Medvedev also claimed that the United States failed to destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities, that Iran will continue to work towards the production of nuclear weapons, and that several unspecified countries are ready to "directly supply" Iran with nuclear warheads. The Kremlin typically leverages Medvedev to amplify narratives intended to stoke panic and fear among Western decisionmakers, particularly through nuclear saber rattling. Medvedev's veiled threats thus do not represent a significant rhetorical inflection. ISW continues to assess that Russia is constrained in its ability to provide direct support to Iran due to its war in Ukraine and has likely resigned itself to providing diplomatic overtures for the time being, showcasing the immediate limitations in the Russian-Iranian strategic relationship.

Iran's possible decision to close the Strait of Hormuz will cause a significant spike in global oil prices, which would greatly economically and financially benefit Russia by reversing months of declining Russian oil revenue and allowing Russia to continue to finance its war against Ukraine in the medium term. Brent crude oil futures prices closed at $77.27 on June 20, marking an 11.4 percent rise from June 12 just prior to the Israeli strikes against Iran. Iran’s Parliament voted on June 22 to close the Strait, but the final decision remains with Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Oil prices will likely surge exponentially in the event that Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz, with varying reports predicting a spike to prices between $90 to $130 in a worst-case scenario. Russia’s oil and gas revenue amounted to 11.1 trillion rubles ($120.3 billion) in 2024 and accounted for roughly 30 percent of Russia's total federal revenues. Russian oil revenue has been steadily decreasing through 2025 however, with May 2025 revenues notably 34 percent lower than in 2024. The Russian Finance Ministry more than tripled its budget deficit target for 2025 in May from 0.5 percent of Global Domestic Product (GDP) to 1.7 percent of GDP after several months of staggeringly low oil and gas profits.<12> The Moscow Times stated on June 9 that, according to economists from the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Russia’s high expenditures and low oil revenues could exhaust the National Wealth Fund (NWF) by 2026. The Kremlin relies on the NWF and oil and gas revenues to finance its war in Ukraine, as the Russian government allocated 41 percent (roughly $178 billion) of Russia’s total 2025 federal budget towards National Security and Defense alone. ISW previously assessed that Russia’s high losses on the battlefield and ongoing economic constraints could prevent Russia from continuing the war in Ukraine in the medium to long term, however a sustained surge in oil prices could keep Russia afloat economically.

Russian forces have continued to pursue long-standing operational objectives on the battlefield in Ukraine throughout Spring and Summer 2025 and will likely remain committed to these objectives for the coming months. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi told journalists on June 22 that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and continued Ukrainian counterattacks in northern Sumy Oblast prevented the Russian military from redeploying 60,000 troops from Kursk Oblast to reinforce offensive operations in the Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson directions in Spring 2025. Syrskyi noted that Ukraine prevented Russia from significantly intensifying offensive operations in these directions. A prominent Russian milblogger acknowledged on June 22 that Russia's "summer offensive" has mainly consisted of the same grinding offensive operations that Russian forces began in late 2023. The milblogger claimed that the situation along the frontline is unlikely to significantly change during Summer 2025 and noted that Ukrainian forces are conducting an organized defense throughout the frontline.

Russian forces are currently engaged in intense combat operations along most of the frontline in Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts and appear to be prioritizing offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast - as they have since October 2023. Russian forces intensified the tempo of offensive operations in early 2025 as the United States began to engage in efforts to mediate a resolution to the war in Ukraine, and Russian forces have sustained this intensified tempo over the last five months. Russian forces previously struggled to conduct simultaneous large-scale offensive operations and compensated by conducting pulsing, more limited, offensive operations along different sectors of the frontline with one sector decreasing in intensity as another sector increases. Russian forces currently appear to be advancing as part of at least three simultaneous large-scale offensive operations in the Borova-Lyman, Kostyantynivka, and Novopavlivka directions, however. Russian forces also appear to be allocating significant manpower to offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast, although Ukrainian forces appear to be slowing Russian gains in that area. Russian forces have failed to make significant gains during this period of intensified offensive operations, however, due in part to the fact that Russian forces are largely relying on poorly trained infantry to make gains in the face of Ukraine's drone-based defense. The continuation of Russia's intensified offensive operations likely represents the extent of Russia's current offensive capacity, and Russia is unlikely to mount a distinct summer offensive operation.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia condemned the recent US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22 amid reports that Iran's foreign minister will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on June 23.

• Iran's possible decision to close the Strait of Hormuz will cause a significant spike in global oil prices, which would greatly economically and financially benefit Russia by reversing months of declining Russian oil revenue and allowing Russia to continue to finance its war against Ukraine in the medium term.

• Russian forces have continued to pursue long-standing operational objectives on the battlefield in Ukraine throughout Spring and Summer 2025 and will likely remain committed to these objectives for the coming months.

• Russia's intensified force generation efforts appear to be generating a reserve force that Russia will be able to leverage in Ukraine or against NATO in the future, despite current limitations on Russia's offensive capacity in Ukraine.

• The Kremlin continues to promote rhetoric designed to undermine Ukrainian legitimacy and sovereignty, demonstrating its steadfast commitment to the complete destruction of Ukraine.

• Kremlin officials are leveraging the Russian education system to indoctrinate children into the mythos of the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War and create a centralized state ideology that will shape generations in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukraine, likely to justify a protracted war in Ukraine and a future military conflict against the West.

• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy oblast. Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Das Unangenehme an dem Gedöhns ist, abgesehen von den jetzt schon vielen sinnlos verpulverten Menschenleben und Ressourcen, dass die Unrechtsaktivitäten erheblicher Machtblöcke weiter zunehmen anstatt auf einem ordentlichen, kooperativen Gesprächs- und Verhandlungsweg die Angelegenheiten zu erledigen.

Wir steuern darauf zu dass China sagen kann: und jetzt sind wir dran und ebenso einfach mal agiert - und das Geknalle richtig eskaliert.

Putin hat die Sache losgetreten, Trump wird das nicht beenden und Xi schon garnicht (der kann sich ja zurücklehnen).

The Kremlin continues to only diplomatically support Iran, showcasing the limitations in the Russian-Iranian strategic relationship. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov, and Chief of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Igor Kostykov met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in Moscow on June 23. Putin claimed that Russia’s position on the Israel-Iran conflict is well-known and that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has raised Russia’s concerns at the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Putin also claimed that recent Israeli and American strikes against Iran were unprovoked and unjustified and that Russia is making every effort to help the Iranian people. Araghchi thanked Russia for its strong condemnation of the strikes against Iran and claimed that Iran regularly consults with Russia on issues of global security, as Russia and Iran’s relations have become "strategic in nature." Unspecified Iranian sources told Reuters on June 23 that Iran has not been impressed with Russia's support so far and wants Putin to do more to back Iran against Israel and the United States. Reuters reported that an Iranian source stated that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei sent Araghchi to Moscow to deliver a letter from Khamenei to Putin requesting more assistance from Russia. ISW continues to assess that Russia is constrained in its ability to provide direct support to Iran due to its war in Ukraine and has likely resigned itself to providing diplomatic overtures for the time being.

Russian officials are attempting to influence conversations about increasing NATO defense spending by misrepresenting Russia's ongoing efforts to restructure and expand Russia's military capabilities as a defensive reaction to NATO. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with graduates of Russia's military academies on June 23 and acknowledged that NATO member states will likely announce a significant increase in defense spending and efforts to increase NATO military capabilities at the upcoming summit on June 24 and 25. Putin claimed that this meeting would clarify that NATO is the party provoking "global militarization" - not Russia. Putin stated that Russia will continue to take steps to strengthen Russia's security and develop the Russian Armed Forces to guarantee Russia's sovereignty. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko told the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti on June 23 in an article ahead of the upcoming NATO summit that the European Union (EU) is accelerating its militarization and that Russia will take all necessary measures and countermeasures, "including preemptive ones," to ensure Russia's security. Grushko reiterated that Russia considers the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO to be a "direct threat" to Russia's security and stated that Russia is seeking "ironclad" guarantees that Ukraine will not join NATO, which Grushko stated includes repealing the 2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration that welcomed Ukraine's and Georgia's intention to join NATO. ISW has previously reported that Russian officials leverage escalatory rhetoric and threats during key moments of Western debates on military assistance for Ukraine in order to scare Western leaders into inaction, and Russian officials are likely again attempting to leverage threats to dissuade NATO member states from supporting increased defense spending.

Putin announced during his speech to the graduates on June 23 that Russia will complete some of its ongoing force restructuring efforts in 2025.<8> Putin stated that Russia is urgently working to increase the Russian Armed Forces' combat capabilities and reiterated that Russia is standing up the Unmanned Systems Forces as a new branch of the Russian military. Putin stated that Russia will complete the formation of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts (MMD/LMD) and will reorganize Russia's naval infantry brigades into divisions in 2025. Putin stated that Russia is also undertaking a long-term technical modernization effort in the army and navy, modernizing its Strategic Missile Forces, beginning serial production of Oreshnik ballistic missiles, and producing new ships and submarines for the Russian Navy. Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced Russia's intention to form the MMD and LMD and reorganize Russia's naval infantry brigades into divisions in the medium-term in December 2022. Russian officials had not previously provided a firm date for the completion of these efforts. ISW continues to assess that Russia's military reforms, particularly in the MMD and LMD in western Russia along its border with NATO, demonstrate Russia's longer-term preparation for a possible future conflict with NATO. These military reforms come after Kremlin officials have repeatedly threatened NATO states, including the Baltic states and Finland.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues to only diplomatically support Iran, showcasing the limitations in the Russian-Iranian strategic relationship.

• Russian officials are attempting to influence conversations about increasing NATO defense spending by misrepresenting Russia's ongoing efforts to restructure and expand Russia's military capabilities as a defensive reaction to NATO.

• Putin also acknowledged his ongoing efforts to empower Russia's internal security services in order to safeguard regime stability and internal security.

• Russian forces conducted a large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of June 22 to 23 that largely targeted Kyiv City and killed at least seven people and injured 28.

• Ukraine's Western partners continue to allocate military aid to Ukraine and collaborate with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).

• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Borova, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka and in Sumy Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte assessed that Russia is the largest existential threat to NATO members today and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war with NATO. Rutte stated on June 24 at the NATO summit at The Hague that Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to NATO, especially considering the support North Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and Belarus provide Russia. Rutte stated that Russia could attack NATO within three to seven years and is currently more prepared for a war than NATO. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with Sky News on June 24 that Russia would not be ready to attack NATO in the immediate future but could be ready for a war with NATO by 2030. Zelensky stated that the war in Ukraine is currently constraining Russia's ability to train and reconstitute its forces and that any decrease in aid to Ukraine would benefit Russia. ISW continues to assess that Russia is preparing its military and society for a potential future war with NATO in the medium- to long-term. Any future ceasefire or long-term pause in combat in Ukraine would free up Russian forces for redeployment to Russia's eastern border with NATO and allow Russia to rearm and reconstitute, whereby Russia may be able to pose a significant threat to NATO earlier than 2030.

The Kremlin continues efforts to augment Russian combat power by setting conditions to subsume forces from Russia's Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies under a Russian military command. The Russian State Duma ratified on June 24 a protocol that allows CSTO states to send their troops to other CSTO states' territory in the event of armed conflict, threats, crisis situations, and exercises; to respond to the consequences of emergencies; and to provide humanitarian aid. The protocol now allows for the CSTO to transport troops one day after a decision from the CSTO Council — as opposed to after 30 days as the protocol stated previously. The protocol also introduces the concept of a "command of formations" that will command CSTO military forces sent to one CSTO state. This “command of formations” will likely be a Russian-dominated command. The CSTO Collective Security Council approved the protocol in November 2024. ISW has long assessed that the Kremlin has been trying to subordinate the militaries of former Soviet states to the Russian Armed Forces to recreate a multinational combined army in the former Soviet space. Western assessments of Russia's future combat power must take into account the forces of Russia's CSTO allies that Russia may use in future operations — not only those of Russia.

Key Takeaways:

• NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte assessed that Russia is the largest existential threat to NATO members today and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war with NATO.

• The Kremlin continues efforts to augment Russian combat power by setting conditions to subsume forces from Russia's Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies under a Russian military command.

• Russian forces are expanding their use of motorcycles along the frontline in Ukraine — a tactic that the Russian military may leverage in future wars beyond Ukraine, possibly including operations against NATO states.

• NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte highlighted NATO's plans to invest more in its own defense capabilities, including by investing in the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) — in line with US President Donald Trump's initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden of collective security.

• Ukraine's European partners allocated military aid to Ukraine and financial support for drone production during the NATO summit on June 24.

• Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 23 to 24 that resulted in over 100 civilian casualties.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Kherson City, and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia will effectively ban Ukrainian-language education in schools in occupied Ukraine starting on September 1. The Russian Ministry of Education published a draft order on June 23 detailing plans to exclude Ukrainian-language education from the Russian federal basic general education program blocks at all educational levels starting on September 1, 2025. The Ministry of Education claimed that they will be excluding Ukrainian-language education “in connection with the changed geopolitical situation in the world,” but that students will retain the possibility to study Ukrainian in some extracurricular programs. The Russian Ministry of Education previously reported in the 2023-2024 school year that Ukrainian was taught on a “mandatory” basis in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts and “at the request of parents” in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, occupied Crimea, and Russia’s Bashkortostan Republic. The draft order will also terminate a course on Ukrainian literature. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned the draft order on June 24 as a “manifestation of Moscow’s genocidal policy” towards occupied Ukraine.

Russian authorities have severely limited access to Ukrainian language education as part of their occupation policy since 2014. In occupied Crimea, for example, only 214 students received Ukrainian language education in the 2020/2021 academic year, suggesting that constraints against the Ukrainian language were already in place prior to the full-scale invasion. The Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics occupation administrations similarly cracked down on Ukrainian language and Ukrainian history curricula in schools in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts starting in 2014. The Russian Ministry of Education’s claim that Ukrainian language instruction was “mandatory” in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts over the past few years directly contradicts statements made by Zaporizhia Oblast occupation officials, which reveal existing constraints on the availability of Ukrainian language instruction. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation Minister of Education and Science Elena Shapurova announced in March 2023 that schools in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast would abolish mandatory Ukrainian language education by the start of the 2023-2024 school year. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky stated in March 2023 that students in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast had the “option” to study Ukrainian for a maximum of three hours a week, but that Russian language instruction was the default. ISW assessed at the time that Russian occupation authorities would likely use the semblance of choice in selecting Ukrainian language education to identify individuals who partook in the ostensibly pro-Ukrainian activity of learning Ukrainian, which Russian authorities could later use as a repressive tool against identified pro-Ukrainian individuals. Further legal limits on Ukrainian language education will further Russify occupied areas, setting multigenerational conditions that will allow the Kremlin to claim that occupied Ukraine is part of Russia on a linguistic basis.


Key Takeaways:

• Russia will effectively ban Ukrainian-language education in schools in occupied Ukraine starting on September 1, setting multigenerational conditions that will allow the Kremlin to claim that occupied Ukraine is part of Russia on a linguistic basis.

• Russia continues to pursue the forced subordination and integration of Ukraine in the legal sphere using real estate law and by expanding the number of magistrates operating on the most local community levels.

• Ukrainian youth continue to face militarization and indoctrination programs in Russia.

Institute for the Study of War

South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea may deploy North Korean troops to Ukrainian territory, which would represent a significant battlefield inflection. Reuters, citing a South Korean lawmaker privy to intelligence from South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), reported on June 26 that North Korea may deploy an unspecified number of additional North Korean forces to Russia to fight against Ukraine as early as July or August 2025 and that North Korea continues to arm Russia with artillery ammunition and missiles. The South Korean lawmaker told Reuters that the NIS assessed that Russia may be preparing to initiate a large-scale assault against Ukraine in July or August 2025 and that North Korea is likely receiving technical advice from Russia on satellite launches and missile guidance systems in return. ISW has observed evidence of North Korean forces augmenting Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and North Korea supplying Russia with artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles. Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence in Kursk Oblast, so North Korean personnel participating in combat operations would most likely be fighting in Ukrainian territory. The North Korean and Russian military commands authorizing the deployment of North Korean forces to Ukrainian territory would mark a significant battlefield inflection that may improve Russian forces' ability to sustain simultaneous offensive operations in multiple directions, which the Russian military has traditionally struggled to conduct. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces compensated by conducting pulsing, more contained, offensive operations along different sectors of the frontline, but recent reporting indicates that Russian forces appear to be gradually advancing in at least three simultaneous large-scale offensive operations in the Borova-Lyman, Kostyantynivka, and Novopavlivka directions. It is not possible to forecast the likely impact of North Korean support of this type without more information about the size and composition of the North Korean troop contingent that would be going to Ukraine, nor is it clear how rapidly new North Korean troops would become effective in operations alongside Russian troops in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea may deploy North Korean troops to Ukrainian territory, which would represent a significant battlefield inflection.

• US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met at the NATO summit on June 25 and discussed possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine and joint weapons production.

• Kremlin officials continue to platform bellicose rhetoric aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and to demonstrate Russia's uncompromising position on Ukraine.

• Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia indicates that Russia continues to rely on refurbishing its Soviet-era stores of armored vehicles.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted the seventh prisoner of war (POW) exchange, in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

The Kremlin continues to downplay the social and economic costs of Russia's war in Ukraine and inflated military spending. Russian President Vladimir Putin told journalists on June 27, following the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) summit in Minsk, that sanctions cannot hurt Russia’s economy and that Russia's economic indicators are “satisfactory.” Putin acknowledged that Russia’s economy is still contending with high inflation and that Russia’s economic growth in 2025 will be “much more modest to combat inflation.” Putin also claimed that Russia’s military budget is currently 6.3 percent of its GDP, or 13.5 trillion rubles (roughly $172 billion), and that Russia plans to steadily decrease defense spending beginning in 2026. Russia notably increased its defense budget by 25 percent between the 2024 and 2025 federal budgets and has been increasing its investments in Russia's defense industry throughout 2025.

Putin’s statements likely seek to portray the Russian government as committed to social and civilian expenditures and to downplay recent indicators of the societal and economic toll of Russia’s war against Ukraine and corresponding prioritization of military-industrial sector investment. Russian officials previously claimed that the 2025-2027 federal budgets would prioritize civilian and social sector investments, despite the September 2024 draft budgets indicating Russia will spend roughly 41 percent of its annual expenditures in 2025 on national security and defense. The Russian Finance Ministry more than tripled its budget deficit target for 2025 in May – from 0.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 1.7 percent of GDP – after several months of staggeringly low oil and gas profits. Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina notably stated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 19 that Russia has exhausted many of its “free resources“ since the start of Russia‘s full-scale war against Ukraine, including Russia’s workforce, production and import substitution capacities, and reserves of the National Welfare Fund and Russia’s banking sector. Russia’s military force generation strategy currently hinges on large recruitment and pension payouts, and it remains unclear how the Kremlin intends to fund these payments in the medium- to long-term, as Russia reportedly depleted the entire 2025 federal recruitment budget fund between January and March 2025. Russia is also making significant financial investments in its domestic drone production capacity and committed 243 billion rubles (about $3 billion) to Russian drone companies between 2023 and 2024. Any sharp decrease in Russia's defense spending will likely depress the Russian economy in the medium term, as Russia’s defense industrial base now accounts for a significant portion of overall Russian domestic production.

Putin also reiterated Kremlin narratives aimed at discrediting Ukraine and blaming the West and NATO for his decision to invade Ukraine. Putin claimed that Russia has agreed to conduct a third round of negotiations, is ready to meet with Ukraine in Istanbul, and has demonstrated its willingness to negotiate through prisoner of war (POW) and killed-in-action (KIA) exchanges. Putin claimed that Ukraine is refusing to accept the bodies of some deceased servicemembers, an unsubstantiated claim that is part of an ongoing Russian information campaign depicting Ukraine as spoiling POW exchanges and KIA repatriations in order to provoke discontent and demoralize Ukrainian society and to discredit the Ukrainian government. Putin reiterated Russia's long-term claim that NATO promised Russia it would never expand east and claimed that Russia was "crudely deceived." Putin claimed that Western countries in opposition to Russia will "soon die" themselves. Putin also reiterated that Russia will only conclude its war against Ukraine on Russia’s terms and claimed that Russian defense spending is designed to achieve this goal. ISW has previously noted that Russia’s terms – the "denazification" and "demilitarization" of Ukraine, which Russia has demanded since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 – amount to demands for regime change, the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Ukraine, and significant limitations on Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues to downplay the social and economic costs of Russia's war in Ukraine and inflated military spending.

• Putin’s statements likely seek to portray the Russian government as committed to social and civilian expenditures and to downplay recent indicators of the societal and economic toll of Russia’s war against Ukraine and corresponding prioritization of military-industrial sector investment.

• Putin also reiterated Kremlin narratives aimed at discrediting Ukraine and blaming the West and NATO for his decision to invade Ukraine.

• Open-source data suggests that Russia is increasingly investing in its defense industry and expanding its drone, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and aircraft production and shipbuilding capabilities – several of the key platforms that Russia would likely rely on in a future war with NATO.

• Russia's ongoing efforts to expand drone production are having a more immediate impact on the frontline in Ukraine, although Russia will continue to benefit from enhanced drone production capabilities during any future conflict.

• Russian forces continue to implement tactical innovations that correspond with technological weapons system advancements.

• Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in direct violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Lyman. Russian forces advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Putin Says Russia to Seek Defense Cuts; How Much Depends on War

President Vladimir Putin said Russia plans to cut defense spending, acknowledging growing strains on the budget even as he insisted that reductions would depend on winning his war in Ukraine.

Russia is spending 6.3% of gross domestic product on defense this year and “that’s a lot,” Putin told reporters in Minsk, Belarus, on Friday. “It’s one of the problems, including for the budget, that we have to resolve,” and Russia paid a price in inflation from the increased expenditure, he said.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-27/putin-says-russia-to-seek-defense-cuts -though-it-depends-on-war

Russia may have recently tested a new Iranian-made Shahed (Geran) drone with new precision capabilities, while likely simultaneously fielding new Russian-made radio-controlled Shahed drones. Ukrainian forces discovered Shahed drone debris on June 18 that had an advanced camera, a computing platform with artificial intelligence (AI)/machine learning (ML) capabilities, and a radio operation system that allows the drone operator to remotely operate the Shahed drone from Russia. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov told the Associated Press that the new Shahed variants are white and have no markings or labels consistent with Russia-made drones, instead having stickers consistent with the standard Iranian labeling system. Drone experts told AP that Iran may have sold new Shahed variants to Russia for combat testing. Beskresnov also commented on the footage of a black Shahed drone with a radio-controlled camera striking a Ukrainian target in Kramatorsk on June 24. Beskresnov noted that while this Shahed variant appears to be different from the white, possibly Iranian-made Shahed drone. Beskresnov noted that Ukrainian intelligence previously warned that Russia sought to integrate radio communications and cameras into a portion of Shaheds and argued that the Russian-made radio-controlled Shahed variants likely have "primitive" and cheap video and radio communications, whereas the Iranian-made drone likely had expensive components. Beskresnov added that the Russian-made Shaheds are still likely vulnerable to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) due to their reliance on radio communications.

The Russian military also integrated thermal imaging cameras on some Shahed drones to improve Russian drone capabilities and strike precision. A Ukrainian military-analytical Telegram channel published footage on June 24 showing an intercepted Russian Shahed-136 drone that has a thermal camera. The Telegram channel observed that thermal cameras allow Shahed-136 drones to better operate at night and in low visibility conditions; identify targets such as engines, generators, and thermal power plants; automate target identification if the drone has machine vision capabilities; and target homing in GPS jamming conditions. The Telegram channel added that Shahed-136 drones can use thermal cameras to improve and correct the strike trajectory, home in on thermal signatures, and ignore decoys and targets with cold thermal signatures. The Telegram channel added that Shahed drones with thermal cameras can also adapt to the environment even if it does not have precise coordinates of the target, whereas Shaheds without thermal cameras operate blindly on GPS programs. Russian milbloggers amplified footage on June 19, reportedly showing a Shahed drone striking a target in Zaporizhzhia City, commenting that the strikes show that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) modified Shahed drones to not rely on geofence coordinates and granted the drones the ability to livestream the strike.

Key Takeaways:

Russian Technological Adaptations

• Russia may have recently tested a new Iranian-made Shahed (Geran) drone with new precision capabilities, while likely simultaneously fielding new Russian-made radio-controlled Shahed drones.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts

• The Russian State Duma is setting legal conditions to recruit stateless people into the Russian military and will likely use these conditions to illegally coerce Ukrainians and foreigners into military service.

Force Retention

• The Russian MoD is reportedly designing modified uniforms that would enable Russian commanders to commit wounded Russian servicemen to combat.

Russian Force Centralization

• The Russian State Duma adopted a bill that grants Russian commanders the ability to certify power of attorney over Russian volunteers, which will likely make it easier for the Russian MoD to deny compensation to Russian servicemen fighting in Ukraine.

Russian Military Reforms and Force Restructuring

• Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov claimed that Russia will raise 13,000 officers in 2025, amidst reports that Russia's war in Ukraine is degrading Russia’s officer corps and professionalism among officers.

• Russian commentators stated that a lack of equipment and financing is impeding Russia’s efforts to prepare more specialized military personnel, which may inhibit Russia’s reconstitution of a professional force.

Integration of Veterans into Russian Society

• The Kremlin continues to arrest Russian voices who are actively involved in searching for missing and deceased Russian servicemen, despite attempting to portray the Russian government as attentive to servicemen and their needs.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities from June 26 to 28. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on June 28 that the SBU conducted a drone strike that destroyed a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system and three combat helicopters — Mi-8, Mi-26, and Mi-28 — at the Kirovske Air Base in occupied Crimea on the night of June 27 and 28. The SBU noted that the strike also caused a secondary explosion at the airfield. A local Crimean source reported on June 28 that the strike caused five to six explosions and likely damaged an ammunition depot, warehouses, and air defense facilities, and set at least one combat helicopter on fire. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 27 that Ukrainian Special Forces and the SBU struck the Marinovka Air Base in Volgograd Oblast on the night of June 26 and 27 and damaged four Su-34 aircraft and a technical maintenance facility. The Ukrainian General Staff is conducting ongoing battle damage assessments (BDA). An unspecified intelligence source told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on June 28 that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted several drone strikes targeting facilities linked to the 120th arsenal of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) in Bryansk Oblast and that Ukrainian authorities are conducting BDA. An unspecified intelligence source reported on June 26 that the GUR conducted a drone strike against a fuel and lubricants depot located at the GRU's 1061st MTZ Center in Bryansk Oblast on the night of June 26 and 27. Residents reported heavy gunfire and a series of explosions and noted that the oil depot was on fire.

Russia’s deployment of an experimental Grom-1 missile-bomb and likely efforts to increase its Shahed production are part of ongoing efforts to adapt Russian strike packages against Ukraine to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and cause maximum damage. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported on June 28 that Ukrainian air defenses downed a Russian Grom-1 hybrid missile-bomb on the outskirts of Dnipro City. A local Ukrainian air defender in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on June 28 that Russian forces may have deployed an experimental KAB guided glide bomb as part of ongoing efforts to increase the range of KAB bombs. The local source stated that Russia has long used jet engines on the bomb to increase its range and likely used a bomb with a lighter warhead against Dnipro City to decrease the weight and increase the range of the bomb. The source also stated that Russian forces may have launched the bomb from a plane as close to Dnipro City as possible. Ukrainian political scientist and design engineer at satellite and rocket design enterprise Pivdnenne Design Office Oleksandr Kochetkov told Suspilne on June 28 that Russia created the Grom-1 as part of an effort to increase the range and accuracy of KAB bombs in order to preserve Russian aircraft that launch the bombs. Kochetkov stated that Grom-1 is a hybrid of a glide bomb and the Kh-38 air-to-air missile and uses the Kh-38 missile’s engine, which gives the bomb a range of 100 to 150 kilometers. Kochetkov noted that Russian forces used the Grom-1 possibly for the first time in August 2024 during a strike against Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast, and that Russia is not yet mass producing Grom-1 missile-bombs.

Ukrainian outlet New Voice assessed on June 27 that satellite imagery from early October 2024 and June 2025 shows that Russia is expanding its Shahed factory in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) near Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan. The imagery shows that Russia has built four new sites at the Alabuga SEZ spanning about 163 hectares between October 2024 and June 2025, and that another 30-hectare site is currently under construction. New Voice reported that the new construction includes dormitories for factory workers and that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) previously assessed in June 2025 that laborers are Russia's main need to increase its drone production. New Voice noted that the GUR reported on June 21 that Russia produces up to 170 Shahed and decoy drones daily and that production rates may increase to 190 drones per day by the end of 2025. Japanese outlet NHK reported on June 19, citing unspecified Western and Russian diplomatic sources, that North Korea is “considering” sending 25,000 workers to drone production facilities at the Alabuga SEZ, and dormitory construction may be related to this possible influx of workers in the future.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities from June 26 to 28.

• Russia’s deployment of an experimental Grom-1 missile-bomb and likely efforts to increase its Shahed production are part of ongoing efforts to adapt Russian strike packages against Ukraine to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and cause maximum damage.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Lyman. Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia conducted its largest combined strike series of the war on the night of June 28 to 29 by launching over 500 missiles and drones against Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian launched a total of 537 strike vehicles, including 447 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace above Tambov Oblast; seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast; 41 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles from Saratov, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts; five Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea; and three S-300 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 221 drones, one Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile, 33 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles, and four Kalibr cruise missiles and that 225 drones and one Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missile were "lost in location" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure, including residences and educational facilities, in Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Cherkasy, and Mykolaiv oblasts and railway and industrial infrastructure in Lviv and Poltava oblasts. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged that a Ukrainian F-16 fighter pilot died while repelling the strikes. Russia is continuing to use increasingly large numbers of drones in its overnight strike packages in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and enable subsequent cruise and ballistic missile strikes. The increases in Russia's strike packages in recent weeks are largely due to Russia's efforts to scale up its defense industrial production, particularly of Shahed and decoy drones and ballistic missiles.

Ukrainian forces were notably only able to shoot down one of the seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and did not shoot down any of the four Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles during the June 28 to 29 strike series. Zelensky called on Ukraine to strengthen its air defenses and reiterated that Ukraine is ready to buy US air defense systems. US President Donald Trump recently spoke with Zelensky about possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems on June 25. Patriot systems are vital to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes, especially as Russia is reportedly increasing its production and stockpile of ballistic missile production capacity to enable larger and more frequent ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine.

Russia appears to be increasingly striking civilian areas in its large-scale strike packages. Kyiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko stated that Russia has changed its strike tactics in order to inflict as much damage to civilian areas as possible. Tkachenko noted that Russian missile and drone strikes heavily targeted Kyiv City three times in June 2025, launching a total of 285 drones and 65 missiles against the capital so far in June 2025 – a sharp increase from the 35 drones and one ballistic missile that Russian forces launched against Kyiv City in January 2025. Tkachenko noted that 42 civilians, including a child, have died due to Russian strikes against the capital since the start of June 2025 and that 234 people, including 11 children, have sustained injuries. Tkachenko reported that Russian forces are conducting "double tap" strikes against emergency responders and using cluster munitions with delayed detonations that threaten both civilians and rescue workers. ISW has observed Russian officials and milbloggers respond to recent large-scale and deadly Russian strikes against Kyiv City by calling on Russia to intensify its strikes.<[br />
Key Takeaways:

• Russia conducted its largest combined strike series of the war on the night of June 28 to 29 by launching over 500 missiles and drones against Ukraine.

• Russia appears to be increasingly striking civilian areas in its large-scale strike packages.

• Satellite imagery and Russian government announcements indicate that Russia is trying to increase its aircraft production in the medium- to long-term.

• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar.

Institute for the Study of War

High-ranking Kremlin statements, including from Russian President Vladimir Putin, continue to demonstrate Russia's wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting on June 30 on the socioeconomic development of occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts during which he frequently referred to occupied Ukraine as “Donbas and Novorossiya.” Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on June 30 to a June 27 statement by Odesa City Mayor Gennadiy Trukhanov that Odesa City is not a “Russian” city and has its own history, claiming that the history of Odesa City is "inextricably linked" with Russia. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky claimed on June 30 that Russians and Ukrainians are "one people" with a "historical homeland" and referenced the "ancient Russian lands on both sides of the Dnipro (River), Novorossiya, and Crimea."

Putin's, Peskov's, and Medinsky's June 30 statements are only the latest statements from high-ranking Kremlin officials indicating the extent of Russia's territorial ambitions. Putin reiterated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 20 that he considers the Russian and Ukrainian people to be "one people in reality" and that "Ukraine is ." Kremlin officials have routinely labelled Odesa City as a "Russian" city, including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov most recently on June 9. Kremlin officials have also repeatedly referenced "Novorossiya," which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine. Medinsky's reference to the "ancient Russian" lands on "both sides of the Dnipro" also coheres with Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo's April 2025 call for Russia to completely control the areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa stated in early June 2025 that Russia intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and seize Odesa Oblast by the end of 2026. Putin and other Kremlin officials have consistently indicated that they do not believe that Ukraine is an independent state with its own history, identity, and culture separate from Russia. Russian officials' ongoing commitment to these narratives demonstrates the Kremlin's continued objective of destroying the Ukrainian state and subjugating the Ukrainian people.

Key Takeaways:

• High-ranking Kremlin statements, including from Russian President Vladimir Putin, continue to demonstrate Russia's wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed.

• The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) issued its December 2024-May 2025 report detailing Ukrainian civilian casualties, systemic Russian mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), and limited Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs.

• The Kremlin is poised to launch a new "national messenger" application affiliated with Kremlin-controlled social media site VKontakte (VK) as part of ongoing efforts to censor Russian citizens and isolate them from the global internet.

• Azerbaijani authorities raided the offices of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet Sputnik in Baku as Russian-Azerbaijani relations have deteriorated recently after a raid against ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

The Russian federal Unified Institute for Spatial Planning (EIPP) announced plans on June 30 to develop the “tourist potential” of occupied Ukraine. The EIPP, a subordinate entity to the Russian Ministry of Construction, Housing, and Utilities, stated that it identified opportunities for the development of “health and wellness tourism” in occupied Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts and “cultural and educational, sports, military-patriotic, industrial, and pilgrimage tourism” in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The EIPP project includes plans for the development of transportation infrastructure to facilitate the movement of tourists to occupied areas of Ukraine. The EIPP stressed that the development of tourism in occupied Ukraine is “a strategic direction” for Russia. The EIPP also created a plan for the development of several cities and districts in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, largely intended to link transportation logistics to tourism projects. ISW has previously reported on EIPP’s role in creating and implementing infrastructure projects throughout occupied Ukraine, and continues to assess that such projects allow Russia to simultaneously integrate occupied Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence while also setting conditions to generate revenue off of the occupation. Russia’s insistence on treating occupied Ukraine as a viable tourist destination is notable: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has turned these areas into active combat zones, and continued Russian plans to attract tourists to occupied areas is both irresponsible and a potential violation of international law.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian occupation administrators continue efforts to incentivize Russians and loyalists to relocate to occupied Ukraine.

• The Russian federal Unified Institute for Spatial Planning (EIPP) announced plans on June 30 to develop the “tourist potential” of occupied Ukraine. Russia’s insistence on treating occupied Ukraine as a viable tourist destination is a potential violation of international law.

• Russia is likely to leverage the new occupation head of Mariupol to deepen links between the occupied city and Russian federal subjects and to pursue the proliferation of profitable development projects.

• The Russian youth military-patriotic activism group “Movement of the First” is expanding its influence in occupied Ukraine.

• Russia continues sending Ukrainian children to summer camps and military-patriotic programs across the Russian Federation.

Institute for the Study of War

A Russian occupation official claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Luhansk Oblast for the second time during Russia's full-scale invasion, but Russian milbloggers denied this claim. Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on June 30 that Russian forces seized all of Luhansk Oblast. Russian milbloggers denied Pasechnik's claim, however, stating that Russian forces have not cleared Nadiya and Novoyehorivka (both east of Borova). One milblogger claimed that some border areas are still contested "gray zones." Then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed on July 3, 2022, that Russian forces captured all of Luhansk Oblast, but Ukrainian forces were subsequently able to regain positions in Luhansk Oblast during the Fall 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive. Ukrainian forces made advances in Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts during the Fall 2022 counteroffensive and disrupted Russian plans to resume efforts to drive on the northern edge of the "fortress belt" in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have since failed to retake significant swathes of territory that Ukrainian forces liberated in the Kharkiv counteroffensive, including Kupyansk, Borova, Izyum, and Lyman. Russian forces intensified offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions in early 2024 and have continued attempts to advance toward these three settlements over the last one and a half years. ISW assessed in late November 2024 that Russian forces had seized roughly 99 percent of Luhansk Oblast, and Russian forces have struggled in the seven months to seize the last one percent.

The Russian military command is modernizing Russian training grounds to include motorcycle tracks and reportedly intends to purchase up to 200,000 Chinese-made motorcycles for the Russian military. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on June 27 and 28 showing Russian officials visiting the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School and a new military training ground in Krasnodar Krai and highlighted that Russia is creating motorcycle training programs at these facilities. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and Russian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev discussed improving Russia's ability to train forces and generate new officers at the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School, and Belousov ordered Mordvichev to equip the school with motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to help train cadets in modern tactics. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov stated that the Krasnodar Krai training ground has a modern driving range for motorcycles, ATVs, and quad bikes and noted that Russia has modernized over 200 training centers to account for the new tactics that Russian forces are using in Ukraine. The Russian military command has been working to formalize motorcycle tactics and training throughout the Russian military in recent months.

Key Takeaways:

• A Russian occupation official claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Luhansk Oblast for the second time during Russia's full-scale invasion, but Russian milbloggers denied this claim.

• The Russian military command is modernizing Russian training grounds to include motorcycle tracks and reportedly intends to purchase up to 200,000 Chinese-made motorcycles for the Russian military.

• Ukrainian forces continue to strike defense industrial enterprises in Russia's rear.

• The Ukrainian military command continues to transition to a corps structure and improve its training system.

• Russian-Azerbaijani relations continue to deteriorate over a number of smaller-scale incidents in recent days, inflaming unresolved disputes over the December 2024 Russian shoot down of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane.

• An investigation by the Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict found that Russian forces were responsible for a 2022 strike that killed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast, as ISW assessed at the time.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced near Toretsk and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

A Primer on Russian Cognitive Warfare

Cognitive warfare is Russia’s way of war, governance, and occupation. The goals, means, and effects of Russian cognitive warfare are far greater than disinformation at the tactical level. Russian cognitive warfare is:

• The way of war: The Russian way of war is centered on the notion that wars can be won and lost in the opponent’s mind. The Kremlin’s main effort is shaping its opponents' decisions to achieve aims unattainable through Russia’s physical capabilities alone. The Russian strategy that matters most is not its warfighting strategy, but rather the Kremlin’s strategy to cause us to see the world as Moscow wishes us to see it and make decisions in that Kremlin-generated perception of reality.

• The way of governance: The Kremlin has been waging an information war inside Russia and on territories that Russia illegally occupies in order to maintain the regime's control and stability. Russia’s internal and external information operations, while distinct from one another, interact and cannot be understood in siloes. The Kremlin's domestic information control helps it generate resources for Russia’s military efforts abroad.

• Born out of need: Russia is not weak, but it is weak relative to its goals. The Kremlin uses cognitive warfare to close gaps between its goals and its means. The main purpose of Russia’s cognitive warfare is to generate a perception of reality that allows Russia to win more in the real world than it could through the force it can actually generate and at a lower cost.

• Targets reasoning: The primary objective of Russian cognitive warfare is to shape its adversaries’ decision-making and erode our will to act. The Kremlin aims to decrease US and allied will and capability to resist Russia to lower the barrier to achieving its aims. Russia needs its opponents to do less so that Moscow can achieve more of its goals. The Kremlin uses cognitive warfare to create a world that would simply accept, and not fight, Russian premises and actions.

• Beyond media: Russia uses all platforms that transmit narratives - media, conferences, international frameworks, diplomatic channels, individuals ¬¬— as tools of its cognitive warfare.

• Beyond information means: Russian cognitive warfare is supported by physical activities. These physical tools include military exercises; sabotage; cyber-attacks; combat operations, and exaggerations of Russia’s military capabilities and battlefield progress.

• Cross-theater and multigenerational: Russian information operations span decades and geographies. The effects of Russian cognitive warfare may occur years after Russia launches information operations. Russia selectively activates and deactivates a set of narratives over decades to adapt them to the Kremlin’s evolving requirements.

• Effective, but only to a point: Cognitive warfare allowed Russia to make some gains that would have been impossible with conventional forces alone. Russian cognitive warfare is not always effective, however, as Russian information operations regularly succeed only partially, fail, and even backfire.

• A constant pursuit: Russia is always fighting for the initiative in the information space. The initiative is not permanent and can be contested.

• A vulnerability: The Kremlin is overly dependent on cognitive warfare. The Kremlin’s ability to achieve its objectives abroad critically depends on the West’s acceptance of Russia’s assertions about reality. Putin’s presidency also depends in part on his ability to maintain a perception that an alternative to his rule is either worse or too costly to fight for.

• Predictable, hence targetable: Russian cognitive warfare supports the Kremlin’s strategic aims, which have not changed in years. This fact presents opportunities for defense and offense. The Kremlin also relies on a set of predetermined messages, making it hard for the Kremlin to rapidly pivot to new information operations.

The United States should not counter Russian cognitive warfare symmetrically. The key to defending against Russian cognitive warfare is doing so at the level of strategic reasoning while resisting the urge to chase Russia's tactical disinformation efforts. Debunking individual false narratives only grapples with the tactical level of Russian cognitive warfare and is insufficient for countering Russian cognitive warfare. The United States and its allies should understand what premises the Kremlin wants us to believe at any given time and over generations, which decisions of ours it is trying to shape, and in support of which aims. The United States and its allies can then defend against Russian cognitive warfare by rejecting the very premises the Kremlin is trying to establish in its effort to have us reason from those premises to conclusions that benefit Russia.

Institute for the Study of War

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/primer-russian-cognitive-warfare

The United States paused weapons supplies to Ukraine, including critical air defense interceptors, artillery shells, missiles, and rockets. Western media outlets reported that sources stated on July 2 that the US pause on weapons supplies to Ukraine will affect dozens of PAC-3 interceptors for Patriot air defense systems, dozens of Stinger man-portable air defense systems, thousands of 155mm high explosive howitzer munitions, over 100 Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, over 250 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets, dozens of grenade launchers, and dozens of AIM air-to-air missiles. Familiar sources told Politico on July 1 that the United States decided in early June 2025 to withhold some of the aid that the United States promised Ukraine under the Biden administration but that the decision is only now taking effect. Politico reported that the halted weapons come from two different streams of Biden administration-era support — weapons from drawdowns of current US stockpiles that the US Department of Defense (DoD) received money to replenish, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, in which the United States funds the purchase of weapons for Ukraine from US defense firms. White House Deputy Press Secretary Anna Kelly stated on July 1 that US authorities made the decision following a DoD review of US military support to states around the world. Six defense officials, congressional officials, and other sources told NBC that the Pentagon ordered the pause after a review of US munitions stockpiles. NBC's defense and congressional sources stated that the United States could hold up the weapons flow to Ukraine until the assessment of US stockpiles is complete but that the United States could extend the pause of military assistance to Ukraine even longer if the weapons are in short supply or if the United States needs to supply them to other parts of the world.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on July 2 that continued deliveries of previously allocated US defense packages are critically important, particularly in order to strengthen Ukraine's air defense. The Ukrainian MFA emphasized that any delay in supporting Ukraine's defense capabilities will encourage Russia to continue its war — and not seek peace. The Ukrainian MFA stated that US-Ukrainian consultations about defense supplies are ongoing at all levels and that Ukraine will speak with the United States about finding mutually beneficial solutions to strengthen Ukraine's defense capabilities.

The decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will likely force Ukrainian forces to continue to husband materiel, although the exact timing of the planned deliveries that the United States paused remains unclear at this time. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Ukraine had not received any official notifications about any suspension or revision to the delivery schedules of the agreed US military aid prior to the US announcement. The New York Times (NYT) reported that US officials stated that the United States had not scheduled to ship the affected munitions to Ukraine for several months, but the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that US weapons shipments already in Poland were halted as of July 1. A Trump administration official told Politico that the administration had not requested any further aid but that there is enough aid left over from the Biden administration to last Ukraine "several more months." The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion told the Washington Post in an article published on July 2, however, that Ukrainian forces already have to concentrate on holding positions and conserving resources rather than advancing. Ukrainian forces have had to husband critical materiel, including air defense interceptors, GMLRS rockets, and artillery shells, during previous suspensions of US aid. Ukraine's European partners are increasing their efforts to provide Ukraine with military assistance and the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues its efforts to become self-sufficient, but only the United States can provide certain weapons systems at scale and quickly. Ukrainian forces very likely will have to conserve materiel again should the United States continue to suspend weapons deliveries.

The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will likely accelerate Russian gains on the battlefield, as previous US aid suspensions have in the past. Delays in US military aid in Fall 2023 and Winter-Spring 2024 set conditions for Russian forces to make more accelerated battlefield gains than Russian forces had previously been able to make. Russian forces significantly intensified offensive operations near Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast in mid-January 2024 and concentrated significant manpower and materiel to their effort to seize the settlement in mid-February 2024 amid the protracted debate in the US (from October 2023 until April 2024) about passing supplemental aid for Ukraine. Ukrainian forces also faced significant artillery constraints during the Russian offensive against Avdiivka, allowing Russian forces to attack under less pressure from Ukrainian counterbattery fire. Russian forces sustained a high tempo of offensive operations after seizing Avdiivka in order to push as far west as possible, and Russian forces subsequently launched offensive operations in Spring 2024 intended to seize Pokrovsk when the suspension of US assistance was still greatly constraining Ukrainian materiel supplies. ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced roughly three kilometers per day between the suspension of US aid to Ukraine on December 6, 2023 and the resumption of aid on April 24, 2024, much of which was in Donetsk Oblast — as compared to the six months prior to the December 2023 aid suspension when Russian forces actually lost a total of roughly 203 square kilometers at a rate of 1.1 square kilometers lost per day (due to Ukraine’s gains during the 2023 counteroffensive, which was enabled by the US and other allies surging military aid to Ukraine).

Russian forces also notably intensified offensive operations in Kursk Oblast following the suspension of US intelligence sharing in early March 2025. Russian forces, augmented by North Korean forces, had been trying to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast through slow, grinding advances since the start of Ukraine's incursion in August 2024. The Trump administration suspended US intelligence sharing with Ukraine on March 5, and Russian forces intensified offensive operations to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast on March 6 and 7. Ukrainian sources reportedly stated at the time that Russian forces started making more rapid advances in Kursk Oblast on March 5 and that the suspension of US intelligence sharing impacted Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast the most. Kremlin officials at the time announced their intention to take advantage of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing to "inflict maximum damage" to Ukrainian forces "on the ground." Russian forces very likely exploited the US suspension of aid and intelligence sharing in March 2025 to accelerate Russia’s ongoing counteroffensive operation in Kursk Oblast. ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced at a rate of about 31 square kilometers per day in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast between the suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine on March 3, 2025 and the resumption of intelligence sharing on March 11, 2025 — as opposed to a rate of advance of about 19 square kilometers per day in the six months prior to the intelligence sharing suspension.

Key Takeaways:

• The United States paused weapons supplies to Ukraine, including critical air defense interceptors, artillery shells, missiles, and rockets.

• The decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will likely force Ukrainian forces to continue to husband materiel, although the exact timing of the planned deliveries that the United States paused remains unclear at this time.

• The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will likely accelerate Russian gains on the battlefield, as previous US aid suspensions have in the past.

• The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will reinforce Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory that posits that Russia can win the war of attrition by making slow, creeping advances and outlasting Western support for Ukraine.

• Kremlin officials are responding to the US military aid suspension by publicly flouting Putin's theory of military victory as successful, in direct opposition to US President Donald Trump's stated goal of bringing Russia to the negotiating table and achieving a lasting and just peace.

• The Kremlin is also using the US aid suspension as a basis to continue rhetorical attacks against European defensive efforts that are in line with Trump's initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden for collective defense.

• The US decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will particularly degrade Ukraine's ability to defend against Russia's enhanced long-range missile and drone strike capabilities that have inflicted significant civilian casualties — in sharp contrast to President Trump's stated objective of stopping civilian casualties in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Toretsk and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected US President Donald Trump's call for a quick peace in Ukraine during a phone call with Trump on July 3. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed on July 3 that Trump once again raised the issue of a quick end to Russia's war in Ukraine and that Putin claimed that Russia continues its efforts for a negotiated end to the war. Ushakov claimed, however, that Putin reiterated that Russia "will achieve its goals" and "eliminat the root causes" that led to the war and that "Russia will not back down from these goals," essentially emphasizing that Russia will continue its war on its own terms. Ushakov claimed that Putin and Trump discussed the possibility of a third round of Ukrainian–Russian negotiations in Istanbul and agreed that peace negotiations will continue in a bilateral format at an unspecified date. Ushakov claimed that Putin and Trump did not discuss the recent US decision to halt military aid shipments to Ukraine but discussed bilateral economic projects, including in the energy and space spheres.

Putin's stated commitment to his goals in Ukraine, including eliminating the so-called "root causes" of the war directly contradicts his claim that Russia supports meaningful negotiations to end the war. Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly referred to the need for any future peace settlement to eliminate the alleged "root causes" of the war to allude to Russia's unwavering demands for regime change in Ukraine, Ukrainian neutrality, and changes to NATO's foundational open-door policy. ISW continues to assess that Russia remains uninterested in good-faith peace negotiations to end the war. Putin's statement that Russia will not back down from its goals further demonstrates Putin's willingness to prolong the war in Ukraine and achieve his goals through military means should Russia be unable to force Ukraine to capitulate through diplomatic means — in direct contrast to Trump's calls for a speedy end to the war. The Kremlin has continually indicated in recent weeks that there are no plans yet for a third round of bilateral negotiations in Istanbul, so it is unclear if or when bilateral Ukrainian–Russian negotiations will resume. ISW continues to assess that Russia will likely leverage any future negotiations to try to extract concessions from Ukraine and the United States while Russian forces continue efforts to secure additional gains on the battlefield through creeping and highly attritional advances. Russia previously exploited peace talks with Ukraine in Istanbul to obfuscate its own uninterest in meaningful negotiations, and any future Ukrainian–Russian negotiations on anyone's terms but Kyiv's are very unlikely to bring about Trump's desired expeditious end to the war and just and lasting peace.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected US President Donald Trump's call for a quick peace in Ukraine during a phone call with Trump on July 3.

• Putin's stated commitment to his goals in Ukraine, including eliminating the so-called "root causes" of the war directly contradicts his claim that Russia supports meaningful negotiations to end the war.

• Details about the recent US suspension of aid to Ukraine remain unclear.

• A Ukrainian strike killed the deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy in Kursk Oblast, and an unknown actor may have assassinated a high-ranking Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) official in Moscow City.

• Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reportedly assassinated the former occupation mayor of Luhansk City.

• Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, but the United States remains the only Ukrainian partner that can provide certain critical weapons systems – especially air defenses -- at scale and quickly.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Siversk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia is training Ukrainian children to become drone operators for future service in the Russian military or employment in the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). Occupied Luhansk Oblast-based media reported on June 30 that 20 children from occupied Luhansk Oblast took part in the regional stage of the “Pilots of the Future-2025” drone operation competition. The Russian “Movement of the First” youth activism organization, the Russian Drone Racing Federation, and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Sports Ministry organized the “Pilots of the Future-2025” competition. Participants of the competition, who range from seven to 18 years old, learn how to assemble, program, and control drones and compete against each other in drone obstacle races. Competition winners will take part in the “Pilot of the Future-2025” final in Sochi, Krasnodar Krai, in the coming month.

Russia has been gradually increasing the integration of Ukrainian children into its wider drone development, production, and operation ecosystem. The Ukrainian Eastern Human Rights Group (EHRG) and Institute for Strategic Research and Security (ISRS) released a report in April 2025 that found that Russia has instituted drone training curricula for over 10,000 teenagers in schools throughout occupied Ukraine. The report noted that Russia is trying to incentivize youth participation in drone operator training programs by “gamifying” the process and holding drone racing competitions—an effort which “Pilots of the Future-2025” clearly supports. Drone operation has become a critical part of Russia’s military concept of operations in Ukraine, and Russian officials clearly understand that drone warfare will only grow in importance in future conflicts. Russia’s training of Ukrainian children to become drone developers and operators will prepare these children for future service in the Russian military and augment the Russian DIB’s drone production capabilities.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is training Ukrainian children to become drone operators for future service in the Russian military or employment in the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).

• Russian occupation officials are using the threat of disconnecting residents of occupied Ukraine from mobile communications networks in order to coerce passportization.

• The Kremlin is introducing a “war risks” insurance program to encourage Russian construction and development in occupied Ukraine. Russian development projects are a core part of Russia’s efforts to permanently and irreversibly subsume Ukraine and complicate any future Ukrainian reintegration efforts.

• Russia continues efforts to steal Ukraine’s agricultural output for its own profit.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion on the night of July 3 to 4, primarily targeting Kyiv City. Russian forces have conducted 10 of the largest strikes in the war since January 2025. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 330 Shahed drones and 209 Shahed-type and other decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched one Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal" aeroballistic missile from the airspace over Lipetsk Oblast, six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast, and four Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed two Iskander-K cruise missiles and 268 drones, and that 208 drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that nine missiles and 63 drones struck eight locations throughout Ukraine and that Kyiv City was the primary target of the strikes. The Ukrainian General Staff and the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that the Russian strikes injured at least 20 people in Kyiv City. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Russian strikes injured at least 23 people in total. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and civilian infrastructure in Kirovohrad, Poltava, Odesa, and Kyiv oblasts. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski confirmed that the Russian strike against Kyiv City damaged a consular building at the Polish Embassy. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha reported that the Russian strike against Odesa City damaged the People's Republic of China (PRC) consulate. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on July 4 that Ukrainian investigators discovered components manufactured at the Chinese Suzhou Ecod Precision Manufacturing Company in Russian Geran-type drones (Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed drone) recovered in Kyiv City.

US Patriot air defense systems remain critical to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes. ISW continues to assess that US aid to Ukraine, particularly Patriot air defense systems and interceptors, is critical to Ukraine's ability to protect its defense industrial base (DIB), safeguard the capabilities it obtains from its partners in the face of long-range Russian strikes, and defend its civilian population. US-provided air defense systems are vital to Ukraine's DIB and will support Ukraine's efforts to increase self-sufficiency and protect civilian lives.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion on the night of July 3 to 4, primarily targeting Kyiv City. Russian forces have conducted 10 of the largest strikes in the war since January 2025.

• US Patriot air defense systems remain critical to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes.

• US President Donald Trump acknowledged Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to end the war in Ukraine on July 3 as Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate a critical lack of interest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump discussed diplomatic efforts and joint work supporting Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) during a phone call on July 4.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted the eighth prisoner of war (POW) exchange since Ukrainian and Russian officials met in Istanbul and agreed to a series of exchanges on June 2.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Pokrovsk and may attempt to advance further toward Dobropillya as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to envelop Pokrovsk and bypass Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast from the west in the coming months. Geolocated footage published on July 4 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Koptieve and Shevchenko Pershe and advanced to southeastern Razine (all northeast of Pokrovsk). Russian forces have recently seized on opportunistic advances northeast of Pokrovsk, following their focus on advances along the Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka T-0504 highway since early 2025. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on June 28 that Russian forces appear to be attacking in the “Dobropillya direction” (northwest of Toretsk and Pokrovsk) and that elements of the Russian 68th Army Corps (AC) (Eastern Military District ) and 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th Combined Arms Army , Southern Military District ) are attacking in the area. ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command may intend to leverage the Russian salient between Pokrovsk and Toretsk to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast and north or to bypass Ukrainian defenses in Kostyantynivka from the southwest and west.

The Russian units conducting these assaults have been engaged in combat since they redeployed to reinforce the Russian force grouping operating east of Pokrovsk in February and March 2025. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 3 that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC) and 150th Motorized Rifle Division have been operating near Novotoretske (north of Razine) and Novoekonomichne (south of Razine) after seizing Malynivka in mid-June 2025 and recently seizing Koptieve (all northeast of Pokrovsk). Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic AC, SMD) are also operating northeast of Pokrovsk. Ukrainian forces have been degrading these Russian units, and it is unclear whether the Russian military command intends to leverage the same units to push further north and west of Razine or if Russia may attempt to reinforce these units with additional redeployments. These Russian units will have to cross the Kazenyi Torets River to advance west of Razine, which may present another obstacle to the Russian advance depending on the river’s water level.

Russian advances west and northwest of Razine most immediately support the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad — an operational objective that Russian forces have been pursuing over the last 18 months. ISW forecasted in December 2024 that Russian forces would need to make significant advances in the direction of Rodynske (west of Razine) to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast, and the Russian forces' recent advances near Razine cohere with this assessment. The commander of a Ukrainian National Guard artillery reconnaissance battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on July 5 that Russian forces are focusing their attacks between Malynivka, Novoolenivka, and Popiv Yar (all northeast of Pokrovsk) in an effort to interdict Ukrainian logistics into Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian commander noted that Russian forces are constantly conducting assaults with motorcycles and buggies. Russian milbloggers claimed on July 4 and 5 that Russian forces are trying to complicate Ukrainian logistics in the area by damaging a bridge near Shakhove (east of Dobropillya), interdicting Ukrainian forces' ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Udachne, and along the railway line near Kotlyne.

Russian forces have largely struggled to advance southeast, south, and southwest of Pokrovsk in the face of Ukrainian drones since late 2024 and have essentially held close to the same positions in these areas since January 2025. The Russian military command may be prioritizing advances northeast of Pokrovsk in an effort to establish a stronghold in Rodynske, which could enable Russian forces to either attack Pokrovsk directly or advance toward Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Pokrovsk) with the aim of interdicting the Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad M-30 highway and forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Pokrovsk under the threat of envelopment Russian forces could also advance north of Udachne or Kotlyne (both southwest of Pokrovsk) in order to interdict the M-30 highway if they can overcome Ukrainian defensive positions in the area, which currently seems uncertain.

Further Russian advances toward Dobropillya would indicate that Russian forces are placing a tactical prioritization on advancing west of Ukraine's fortress belt — a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions — and forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the fortress belt under pressure of envelopment rather than conduct a head-on assault against the fortress belt. Russian forces have thus far struggled to break out of Toretsk and make significant advances from Chasiv Yar or north of the Kleban Byk Reservoir (northwest of Toretsk), which has likely complicated the Russian military command's original plan for an operation against Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk) and the wider fortress belt. The Russian military command may be adjusting its plan, and Russian forces may attempt to create a salient in the fields and small settlements between Dobropillya and Kostyantynivka in order to bypass the fortress belt from the west. Russian forces would likely have to cross the Kazenyi Torets River in several places and would have to be able to sufficiently supply troops on the west (right) bank in order to maintain such a salient. Russian forces would likely also have to seize the settlements along the Pokrovsk-Oleksandrivka (north of Dobropillya) line in order to fully interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the fortress belt. It is unclear whether the Russian Central Grouping of Forces, which is currently in charge of activity in the Pokrovsk direction, is capable of conducting such an operation with the degraded forces currently at its disposal. Russian forces are likely reaching higher levels of exhaustion and degradation after well over a year of intensified offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction. Such an operation would likely be a multi-year effort with significant personnel losses and hard-fought gains, although Russian forces have proven willing to undertake such long-term operations.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Pokrovsk and may attempt to advance further toward Dobropillya as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to envelop Pokrovsk and bypass Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast from the west in the coming months.

• Russian advances west and northwest of Razine most immediately support the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad — an operational objective that Russian forces have been pursuing over the last 18 months.

• Further Russian advances toward Dobropillya would indicate that Russian forces are placing a tactical prioritization on advancing west of Ukraine's fortress belt - a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions - and forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the fortress belt under pressure of envelopment rather than conduct a head-on assault against the fortress belt.

• Such an operation would be consistent with Russia's recent tactics and operational concepts designed to advance by leveraging smaller partial envelopments to seize territory instead of attempting rapid, deep operational-level penetrations of Ukraine's defense, which Russian forces currently do not have the means to conduct.

• Ukrainian forces continue to demonstrate their ability to conduct long-range strikes that target Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).

• Ukraine's Western partners to continue to allocate aid to Ukraine and collaborate with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).

• European intelligence services continue to report that Russia is intensifying its deployment of chemical agents in Ukraine in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Siversk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, and Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 5 to 6, including a "double-tap strike" against emergency responders. Recent adaptations to Russian long-range drone technologies and strike tactics suggests that Russian strikes against civilian targets are very likely intentional. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 6 that Russian forces launched 157 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, and four S-300 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 177 drones and that 19 were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian, energy, and military infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Zaporizhia oblasts. Ukraine’s Ground Forces reported that Russian forces targeted a Ukrainian military registration and enlistment office in Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast - the third such strike since June 30. Russian strikes against Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices likely aim to disrupt Ukrainian recruitment efforts.

Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported on July 6 that Russian forces conducted two double-tap strikes targeting Ukrainian emergency responders during overnight drone strikes against Kharkiv City and after shelling against Kherson City on the morning of July 6. Russia’s recent drone technological adaptations and strike tactics, such as accumulating drones near a target before simultaneously striking, have increased Russia's ability to precisely coordinate strikes and hit intended targets. Russia's recent overnight strikes series have increasingly resulted in civilian casualties, and Russia is very likely intentionally targeting Ukrainian civilians, including with "double tap" strikes likely meant to kill first responders and strikes against military registration and enlistment offices.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be trying to increase volunteer recruitment among the Russian population, likely due to waning domestic support for the Kremlin's crypto-mobilization efforts.

• Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 5 to 6, including a "double-tap strike" against emergency responders. Recent adaptations to Russian long-range drone technologies and strike tactics suggests that Russian strikes against civilian targets are very likely intentional.

• Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) has stopped reporting on the number of deaths in Russia, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to conceal Russia's losses from the war in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated the Kremlin's rejection of a ceasefire and unchanged demands, including demilitarization and regime change in Ukraine. Lavrov gave an interview to Hungarian outlet Magyar Nemzet published on July 7 and claimed that a settlement to the war must eliminate the "root causes" of the war, which Lavrov again defined as NATO's expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers. Lavrov claimed that Russia is against a ceasefire as Ukraine and its allies would use the pause to regroup and reconstitute Ukraine's military. Lavrov explicitly highlighted Russia's demands for Ukraine's demilitarization and "denazification" (a phrase Russia uses to demand regime change in Ukraine), and these demands are notably Russia's original war goals. Lavrov also demanded international recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea – including the areas of these four oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy – and called for a future settlement to include sanctions relief and the return of frozen Russian assets. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin remains uninterested in good-faith peace negotiations and any settlement to the war that does not acquiesce to its demands.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated the Kremlin's rejection of a ceasefire and unchanged demands, including demilitarization and regime change in Ukraine.

• Russia is leveraging its "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to improve its theater-wide drone capabilities, including in priority frontline areas in Donetsk Oblast.

• Russian forces have yet to reach parity with Ukraine's innovative and deeply integrated drone program, however.

• Russian forces appear to be reprioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction over the Kostyantynivka direction after several weeks of unsuccessful activity aimed at advancing toward Kostyantynivka.

• Russian Minister of Transport and former Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit reportedly recently committed suicide after Russian President Vladimir Putin removed Starovoit from his position, likely due in part to the Ministry of Transport's role in Russian failures that enabled Ukraine's Operation Spider Web in June 2025.

• Putin may have planned to punish Starovoit by arresting him on charges related to his time as the governor of Kursk Oblast in order to avoid acknowledging the Kremlin's failure to prevent Operation Spider Web.

• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct long-range strikes against Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

US President Donald Trump announced on July 7 that the United States would resume weapons deliveries to Ukraine as discussions about provisions of additional air defense systems and interceptors are reportedly ongoing. Trump stated on July 7 that the United States will send more weapons to Ukraine to help Ukraine defend itself. Trump stated that the United States is "going to see if can make some available." Politico reported that two sources stated that shipments of US military aid to Ukraine could resume over the "coming weeks." Chief Pentagon Spokesperson Sean Parnell stated on July 7 that Trump directed the US Department of Defense (DoD) to send additional defensive weapons to Ukraine to ensure that Ukraine can defend itself while the United States works to secure a "lasting peace." Axios reported on July 8 that sources stated that Trump told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that he wants to help Ukraine's air defenses and promised to immediately send 10 Patriot interceptors and help to find other means of supply. Axios' sources reportedly stated that Trump suggested that Germany should sell one of its Patriot batteries to Ukraine and that the United States and Europe would split the costs of the purchase. Axios reported that US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has identified Patriot batteries in Germany and Greece that the US could finance and send to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that US-provided Patriot systems and interceptors are critical for Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian long-range overnight strikes, particularly against Russian ballistic missiles.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast amidst a series of ongoing counterattacks. Geolocated footage published on July 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern and northeastern Kindrativka (north of Sumy City). Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces advanced between Kindrativka and Kostyantynivka (north of Kindrativka) and east of Oleksiivka (east of Kindrativka) and entered Novomykolaivka (northeast of Oleksiivka). A Russian milblogger claimed on July 8 that Ukrainian forces entered Kindrativka from the northwest and Oleksiivka from the northeast. The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized central and northern Kindrativka and have cut off Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) along the C-191502 Novomykolaivka-Volodymyrivka road. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command deployed elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) to Kindrativka to support Russian personnel retreating from the settlement. The milblogger claimed that the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) is fighting to establish a foothold south of Oleksiivka, but that recent Ukrainian advances are complicating this effort.

Russian advances in northern Sumy Oblast slowed between late May and early June 2025, and Ukrainian forces began counterattacking and regaining territory in mid-June. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 14 that Ukrainian forces retook Andriivka (southeast of Kindrativka), and Ukrainian forces advanced in other areas of northern Sumy Oblast throughout late June 2025. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on July 8 that fighting remains intense in the North Slobozhansk (Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts) direction and that Ukrainian forces are restoring positions in this direction and maintaining positions in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts. The Russian military command redeployed some drone and elite naval infantry units from the Kursk and Sumy directions to other higher-priority sectors of the frontline in Donetsk Oblast in May and June 2025, and the command may further deprioritize the offensive in northern Sumy Oblast if Ukrainian forces continue to complicate further Russian advances. Russia could also reinforce its frontline units in northern Sumy Oblast in the near future in order to continue advancing toward Sumy City, however.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump announced on July 7 that the United States would resume weapons deliveries to Ukraine as discussions about provisions of additional air defense systems and interceptors are reportedly ongoing.

• The Kremlin continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's aggressive rhetoric to undermine support for US military aid to Ukraine, likely as part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational effort.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast amidst a series of ongoing counterattacks.

• Russia continues to expand its domestic drone production capacity amid the ever-growing role of tactical drones in frontline combat operations and Russia's increasingly large nightly long-range strike packages against Ukraine.

• Ongoing Russian cooperation with Chinese companies is facilitating Russia's increasing domestic drone production.

• Russian milblogger complaints suggest that the Russian military command is struggling to supply frontline units with drones despite increased drone production, possibly indicating how Russia's centralization and bureaucracy are degrading the effectiveness of Russian drone operations and slowing the Russian innovation cycle.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike of the war so far on the night of July 8 to 9 with 741 total drones and missiles — an about 34 percent increase from the previous record high of 550 Russian drones and missiles launched on the night of July 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 728 Shahed-type strike and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles from Engels Raion, Saratov Oblast and from Kursk Oblast, and six Kh-47M2 Khinzhal aeroballistic missiles from Lipetsk Oblast airspace. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 718 of the drones and missiles, including seven Kh-101/Iskander-K missiles shot down, 296 Shahed-type drones shot down, and 415 drones “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Lutsk, Volyn Oblast, and Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes damaged a warehouse, private enterprise, and civilian areas in Lutsk. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes also hit residential areas, an enterprise, and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Zhytomyr oblasts. Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that the July 8 to 9 Russian strike was one of the largest strikes targeting Kyiv Oblast and that the strikes lasted for over seven hours. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces used interceptor drones to repel the strike and downed "tens" of drones.

The New York Times reported on July 9 that military analysts estimate that Russia will be able to routinely launch over 1,000 drones per strike package by Fall 2025, echoing a recent warning from Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Major Robert Brovdi that Russia could escalate its strike packages to include over 1,000 Shahed-type drones per day. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov estimated on June 20 that Russia has increased Shahed production sevenfold and forecasted that Russian strike packages may soon incorporate up to 800 Shaheds — a forecast that is in line with the July 8 to 9 Russian strike package. ISW previously reported that Russia is significantly expanding its long-range drone production capabilities for modified Geran-2 drones (the Russian-made analogue of the Iranian-origin Shahed-136 drones), including by opening production lines with companies in the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The continued increase in the size of strike packages is likely intended to support Russian efforts to degrade Ukrainian morale in the face of constant Russian aggression. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that Russian forces used over 400 decoy drones in this strike package in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense. Russian forces have equipped their decoy long-range drones with warheads and have also modified their strike drones with warheads designed to inflict a wide spread of damage, indicating that Russian forces aim to maximize damage against areas in Ukraine writ large — which disproportionately affects civilian areas. Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev stated in an interview with the Washington Post on July 9 that recent Russian strikes against Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices seek to disrupt Ukrainian force generation efforts. Sarantsev stated that Russia aims to sow fear among Ukrainians and create the perception that it is dangerous to go to recruitment and enlistment offices. ISW assessed in previous years that Russia has used strike packages targeting civilian areas to generate a morale effect in Ukraine, as seems to be the case with the most recent strikes.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike of the war so far on the night of July 8 to 9 with 741 total drones and missiles — an about 34 percent increase from the previous record high of 550 Russian drones and missiles launched on the night of July 3 to 4.

• The continued increase in the size of strike packages is likely intended to support Russian efforts to degrade Ukrainian morale in the face of constant Russian aggression.

• The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found that Russian forces and pro-Russian separatists engaged in illegal military activity in Ukraine between 2014 and 2022.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed frustration following a June 10 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov about Russia's lack of progress towards ending the war in Ukraine. Rubio stated after the meeting with Lavrov that he conveyed US President Donald Trump's frustration with Russia's insufficient "flexibility" to end the war. Rubio stated that he and Lavrov shared ideas about "a new or different approach" from Russia and that there must be a "roadmap moving forward" about how the war can end. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that Rubio and Lavrov discussed their "mutual intention" to find a solution to the war. Kremlin officials' public statements continue to demonstrate that Russia remains committed to achieving its original war goals in Ukraine and is not interested in good faith negotiations to end the war, however. Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reiterated on July 9 Russia's original war demands for Ukrainian regime change and "demilitarization." Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 10 that Russia prefers to achieve its war goals through peaceful and diplomatic means but that the war continues and the "realities on the ground" are changing every day. Kremlin officials often call for Ukraine to recognize the "realities on the ground" (a reference to the frontline in Ukraine) to allude to the idea that Russia is in a stronger negotiating position given the battlefield situation and to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia's unwavering demands amounting to complete capitulation to Russia.

The Kremlin continues efforts to use its diplomatic engagements with the United States in an effort to divert attention from the war in Ukraine and toward the potential restoration of US-Russian relations. The Russian MFA readout of the Rubio-Lavrov meeting heavily emphasized Rubio and Lavrov's reported discussions about bilateral US-Russian issues unrelated to the war in Ukraine, including the restoration of US-Russian contacts, economic and humanitarian cooperation, direct air traffic, and diplomatic missions. The Russian MFA's readout concluded that the United States and Russia will continue dialogue about a "growing range of issues of mutual interest." Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on July 10 there has been no "slowdown in progress" in developing US-Russian relations. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin attempted to use economic incentives unrelated to the war in Ukraine and the prospect of US-Russian arms control talks to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine. ISW also recently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin unsuccessfully attempted to use Iranian nuclear negotiations and offers to mediate the Israel-Iran war to pose himself to Trump as an effective negotiator as part of efforts to secure concessions on the war in Ukraine. The Kremlin is likely attempting to push the United States to suspend its diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine in exchange for developing US-Russian bilateral relations and economic opportunities.

Key Takeaways:

• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed frustration following a June 10 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov about Russia's lack of progress towards ending the war in Ukraine.

• The Kremlin continues efforts to use its diplomatic engagements with the United States in an effort to divert attention from the war in Ukraine and toward the potential restoration of US-Russian relations.

• The Economist assessed that it would take Russia about 89 years to seize all of Ukraine at its current relatively accelerated rate of advance, which has fluctuated throughout the war and is unlikely to remain constant.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg in Rome on July 9.

• The United States reportedly resumed some military aid shipments to Ukraine.

• Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.

• Russia launched another large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 9 to 10 that heavily targeted Kyiv City, resulting in civilian casualties and significant damage to civilian infrastructure.

• Russia's strike tactics, coupled with the increased scale and concentrated targeting of Russia's recent strike packages, aim to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and are resulting in significant damage.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Deputy Foreign Minister and Presidential Special Representative to the Middle East and Africa Mikhail Bogdanov on July 9.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

US President Donald Trump announced on July 10 that the United States will sell NATO weapons, including air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO can then give to Ukraine. Trump stated in an interview with NBC News that the United States will sell NATO an unspecified number and type of American-made weapons, including Patriot air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO will then give to Ukraine. Axios reported on July 11 that sources stated that NATO allies discussed the possibility of the United States using NATO as an intermediary to sell weapons to Ukraine at the most recent NATO Summit on June 24 to 25, and that these weapons could include both air defense support as well as offensive weaponry. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on July 10 that Ukraine requested 10 Patriot air defense systems and additional interceptors, and that Germany is ready to purchase two Patriot systems from the United States for Ukraine, and that Norway is willing to purchase another one. It remains unclear how many Patriot air defense systems or other weapons the United States will sell to NATO. ISW continues to assess that US-provided Patriot systems and interceptors are critical for Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian long-range overnight strikes and protect its civilian population, particularly against Russian ballistic missiles.

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide additional aid and pursue joint production initiatives with Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB). The Ukrainian Ministry of Finance announced on July 11 that the United Kingdom (UK) approved a 1.7-billion-pound (roughly $2.3 billion) loan to finance improving Ukraine’s air defense capabilities. The European Commission and Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation announced that Europe and Ukraine will partner in the BraveTech EU Initiative, which will work to accelerate the European DIB’s innovation cycle. The European Commission reported that the BraveTech EU Initiative will expand on existing European Defense Fund (EDF) projects and will expand relationships between Ukrainian and European defense companies beginning in Fall 2025. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on July 10 that Ukraine signed an agreement with NATO Command Transformation allowing Ukrainian personnel to attend the Joint NATO-Ukraine Analysis, Training, and Education Center (JATEC).

Ukraine continues to expand its production and innovation of interceptor drones for use against Shahed-type drones. Kyiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko announced on July 11 that Kyiv City will allocate 260 million hryvnia ($6.2 million) to Ukraine’s Clean Sky program aimed at using interceptor drones to defend Kyiv against nightly Russian long-range drone strikes. Tkachenko stated that the program will fund additional equipment, the creation of an interceptor drone training center, and several mobile interceptor drone units. Tkachenko stated that the project has downed 550 Russian drones over Kyiv City in the last four months. Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk estimated that the project has downed almost 650 drones over Kyiv Oblast more broadly. Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov stated that interceptor drones are downing dozens of Russian long-range drones each night. Ukraine’s interceptor drones will play a critical role in lowering the cost of defense against nightly Russian drone and missile strikes, although US-provided Patriot air defense systems remain the only system capable of downing Russian ballistic missiles.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump announced on July 10 that the United States will sell NATO weapons, including air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO can then give to Ukraine.

• Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide additional aid and pursue joint production initiatives with Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB).

• Ukraine continues to expand its production and innovation of interceptor drones for use against Shahed-type drones.

• Ukrainian intelligence assesses that Russian forces are unlikely to realize the Kremlin's goal of seizing the entirety of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2025, which is consistent with ISW's ongoing assessment of Russia's offensive capabilities.

• Kremlin officials continue to justify the Kremlin's ongoing censorship efforts and appear to be seizing on Russia's hypercontrolled information space to push the Kremlin's informal state ideology.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy and western Zaporizhia oblasts, and near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.

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Russia launched another large-scale drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of July 11 to 12 — the third combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles in July alone. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 339 Shahed-type drones and 258 decoy drones (597 drones total) from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 26 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 319 Shahed-type drones and 25 Kh-101 cruise missiles and that 258 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged critical electrical networks and administrative and civilian infrastructure in Chernivtsi, Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, Sumy, and Volyn oblasts. Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported that Russian strikes killed two civilians in Chernivtsi City and injured 14. Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that Ukraine’s Clean Sky program, which uses interceptor drones to defend Kyiv Oblast against nightly Russian long-range drone strikes, downed over 50 drones during Russia’s overnight strike. ISW continues to assess that Russia's ongoing large-scale strikes are intended to degrade Ukrainian and Western morale and underscore Ukraine's need for continued Western support for Ukraine's interceptor drone program and for the continued supply of Western air defense systems, especially US-provided Patriot systems.

Russian forces recently advanced from the international border toward Velykyi Burluk in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast — likely in an effort to connect Russian operations near Vovchansk with those near Dvorichna, possibly to facilitate Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone along the international border. Geolocated footage published on July 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk). Elements of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army , Leningrad Military District ) and the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th Army Corps , LMD) first advanced into central Milove in early July 2025. Elements of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment defended against limited Ukrainian attacks into northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast in March and April 2025, and elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division participated in retaking Kursk Oblast and attacking into northern Sumy Oblast in Spring and early Summer 2025. Some elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly continuing to operate in northern Sumy Oblast, although the Russian military command appears to have recently redeployed other elements of the division and the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment to the Velykyi Burluk direction.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia launched another large-scale drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of July 11 to 12 — the third combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles in July alone.

• Russian forces recently advanced from the international border toward Velykyi Burluk in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast — likely in an effort to connect Russian operations near Vovchansk with those near Dvorichna, possibly to facilitate Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone along the international border.

• Ukraine signed several strategic agreements with Western defense companies to bolster Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) during the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.

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Recent satellite imagery suggests that Russia is constructing protective structures at some of its air bases following Ukraine's Operation Spider Web on June 1. Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight reported that satellite imagery collected on July 7 shows that Russian forces have constructed roughly 10 reinforced bunkers with soil coverings, 12 concrete bunker-type structures without soil coverings, and eight hangar-style buildings on the aprons at Khalino Air Base in Kursk Oblast. Planet Labs satellite imagery collected on June 27 of Khalino Air Base also shows reinforced hangars, supporting Frontelligence's assessment. Frontelligence reported that satellite imagery collected on July 9 shows that Russian forces have constructed two concrete bunker-style structures at Saky Air Base in occupied Crimea, and Planet Labs satellite imagery collected on July 7 also shows concrete aircraft shelters. Frontelligence reported that satellite imagery collected on July 9 shows no construction efforts at Dzhankoi Air Base in occupied Crimea, however. Frontelligence reported that recent satellite imagery shows bomber wreckage still present at Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast and Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast – two of the air bases that Ukrainian forces struck during Operation Spider Web. Russian officials and milbloggers have blamed Russian leadership for failing to defend Russian military infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes throughout Russia's full-scale invasion. Russia may be starting to construct protective structures at its air bases after three years of war in response to Operation Spider Web.

Key Takeaways:

• A German official confirmed that Germany is interested in purchasing Patriot air defense systems from the United States on behalf of Ukraine.

• Recent satellite imagery suggests that Russia is constructing protective structures at some of its air bases following Ukraine's Operation Spider Web on June 1.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka.

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US President Donald Trump announced large-scale and rapid military aid supplies to Ukraine via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and possible future secondary tariffs against Russia. Trump stated on July 14 during a meeting with NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte that the United States will impose "severe" 100 percent secondary tariffs on Russia's trade partners if there is no peace settlement to end Russia's war in Ukraine within 50 days. Trump also announced that the United States will send "billions of dollars' worth" of military equipment and weapons to NATO, that NATO will pay for the US weapons, and that NATO will "quickly distribute" these weapons to Ukrainian forces. Rutte stated that NATO will supply Ukraine with "massive" amounts of military equipment, including air defenses, missiles, and ammunition. Trump answered a question about whether the United States was providing Patriot air defense batteries or just missiles, stating that the United States will send "everything…a full complement with the batteries." Trump stated that some Patriot systems will arrive in Ukraine "within days" as unspecified NATO states give Ukraine their own Patriot systems, after which the United States will replace those systems. Trump stated that an unspecified state has "17 Patriots ready to be shipped" and that a "big portion of the 17 will go to the war zone" in Ukraine "very quickly." It is unclear if Trump was referring to 17 Patriot launchers or batteries.

Trump is acting upon the reality that successful US efforts to bring Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table require that economic instruments be coupled with Western military support to allow Ukraine to increase pressure on Russia on the battlefield. Trump stated that the Russian economy is doing "very poorly" and that Russia is using its assets for war, not trade. Trump stated that Russia is wasting money and people on its war. Rutte stated that Russian forces have suffered 100,000 deaths since January 1, 2025. ISW continues to assess that Russia's battlefield losses are the key driver of Russia's economic woes as Russia suffers from the consequences of increased and unsustainable war spending, growing inflation, significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia's sovereign wealth fund. Increased pressure on Russian forces on the battlefield would risk Putin's efforts to balance butter and guns and could force Putin to face hard choices sooner than he would like. Forcing Putin either to make unpopular decisions or to face a scenario in which Russia cannot continue the war at the current tempo could bring Putin to the negotiating table, ready to offer concessions to end the war on terms acceptable to Ukraine and the United States.

Timely and reliable Western military assistance to Ukraine coupled with increased economic pressure is necessary to bring about an end of the war on terms satisfactory for the United States, Europe, and Ukraine. Well-provisioned Ukrainian forces have previously demonstrated their ability to prevent Russian forces from making even marginal gains and to retake significant territory despite Russian manpower and materiel advantages. Western military aid to Ukraine will enable Ukrainian forces to maintain, if not increase, their ability to inflict the significant materiel and personnel losses on the battlefield that are straining Russia's economy. Western provisions of air defense systems to Ukraine will protect Ukraine's people and enable Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) to flourish and increasingly meet Ukraine's long-term national security needs. Ukraine's DIB has proven critical for maintaining Ukraine's drone-based defenses that are limiting Russian forces to creeping advances at high costs, and the West will continue to benefit from Ukrainian innovations and industrial capacity in the long-term. Economic pressure, in the form of both Western sanctions and enduring labor shortages and demographic issues brought on by losses in Ukraine, will further strain the Russian economy and reduce the funds available to Moscow for its protracted war effort.


Key Takeaways:

• Trump noted that Russia has been delaying negotiations to end the war and that the recent intensification of Russia's overnight drone and missile strikes demonstrates that Russia is not interested in peace – in line with ISW's longstanding assessment of Kremlin intentions.

• Trump said that European security benefits US interests and noted that Europe is committed to helping Ukraine defend itself.

• Additional US military aid to Ukrainian forces will arrive at a dynamic, not static, frontline characterized by ongoing Russian offensive operations aimed at achieving slow maneuver and by Ukrainian counterattacks in key frontline areas.

• Russian forces' ability to advance deep enough into Ukraine's defenses to establish these salients indicates that the Russian military command has improved its ability to seize on opportunities to advance, but the rate of Russian advances has not increased beyond foot pace.

• Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast near Hulyaipole – the first tactically significant activity in this area of the frontline since the Summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive.

• The Russian military command likely intends to seize on recent advances in western Donetsk Oblast in order to advance westward into Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.

• Russian forces may leverage advances in western Donetsk Oblast to launch an offensive operation toward Pokrovske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, in pursuit of Russia's long-standing desire to seize Zaporizhzhia City.

• Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in key areas of the front to slow Russian advances and are inflicting significant costs on the Russian military, however.

• Forcing Putin to abandon his current theory of victory and agree to end the war on reasonable terms requires Ukrainian forces to stop Russian advances and begin to retake operationally significant areas. Western aid provided in support of this effort is essential to hastening an end to the war.

• Timely and reliable Western military assistance to Ukraine coupled with increased economic pressure is necessary to bring about an end of the war on terms satisfactory for the United States, Europe, and Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Zaporizhia oblasts and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.

Institute for the Study of War