Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be switching between rhetoric focused on Russian ethnic nationalism and Russian multinationalism, but remains committed to promoting anti-Western sentiment and the militarization of Russia's youth. Putin held a meeting with the Security Council on June 10 that largely focused on the unification of the peoples of Russia and the use of military-patriotic youth programs and Russian government initiatives to promote Russian patriotism. Putin highlighted the work of the "Movement of the First," a Russian youth movement aimed at promoting military-patriotic education in Russia and occupied Ukraine, and "Yunarmiya" ("The Youth Army"), a movement that is responsible for instilling pro-war sentiments in Russian children and teenagers. Putin also highlighted the Russian state-mandated weekly lessons in schools that often include lectures by soldiers from the war in Ukraine. Putin platformed BRICS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) — Russian-dominated organizations that Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly postured as the foundation of Putin's envisioned anti-Western and anti-NATO Eurasian security architecture. Putin stated that Russia must respond to challenges that promote interethnic and interreligious conflict in Russia and highlighted the "unity of the peoples of Russia." Putin recently began forwarding an unofficial ideology formulated on Russian nationalism that positions Russia in opposition to the West, which marked a notable departure from Putin's usual rhetoric promoting the multiethnic and multireligious makeup of Russia's population. Putin's remarks at the June 10 Security Council meeting appear to be a return to this rhetoric about the diversity of Russia and Russian civic nationalism. Putin appears committed, however, to promoting anti-Western and pro-war sentiments, especially in Russian youth, likely as part of efforts to prepare Russian society for a protracted war in Ukraine and possible future conflict with NATO. Putin's June 10 statements about harmony and unity in Russia indicate that he likely remains hesitant to fully commit to a nationalist ideology centered around ethnic Russians, as this risks fragmenting Russia's multiethnic population. ISW continues to assess that Putin must work to balance appeasing the influential xenophobic and ultranationalist community, which is a key constituency for Putin, with the need to leverage migrants to offset immediate economic and force generation challenges and long-term demographic decline.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be switching between rhetoric focused on Russian ethnic nationalism and Russian multinationalism, but remains committed to promoting anti-Western sentiment and the militarization of Russia's youth.

• Russia is reportedly working to increase the number of North Korean labor migrants in Russia, likely to support Russia's workforce and to directly join the Russian military.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted the second round of prisoner of war (POW) exchanges on June 10, in accordance with agreements the parties reached in Istanbul on June 2.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Borova, Lyman, and Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated on June 10 that the United States intends to reduce its budget for the purchase of weapons for Ukraine in 2026. Hegseth did not specify the extent of the planned cutbacks. Hegseth stated that "a negotiated, peaceful settlement" is in the best interest of Ukraine, Russia, and the United States but that "the word victory," as well as the path to victory and to peace, have not been clearly defined.

Reducing US military aid to Ukraine will neither lead to a sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Russian President Vladimir Putin to reassess his theory of victory. Putin's theory of victory posits that the Russian military can sustain creeping, incremental advances on the battlefield longer than Ukrainian forces can defend and longer than the West is willing to support Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Western military aid, particularly that which only the United States can provide rapidly and at scale, remains crucial in enabling Ukrainian forces to make decisive gains on the battlefield and pressuring Putin to reassess his theory of victory. Battlefield gains that change Putin's calculus would force Russia to engage in constructive negotiations to ensure a peaceful resolution to the war. A reduction in US aid to Ukraine risks giving Russia greater advantages on the battlefield and would likely embolden Putin to continue his war and strengthen his belief that Russia can conquer Ukraine, which is incompatible with US President Donald Trump's stated goal of ensuring an enduring peace in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Reducing US military aid to Ukraine will neither lead to a sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Russian President Vladimir Putin to reassess his theory of victory.

• The Kremlin continues to attack Ukraine using rhetoric presenting an anachronistic reading of Ukraine's history, denying the existence of an independent Ukrainian language and culture, and discrediting the Ukrainian government.

• Russian officials are also attempting to rhetorically split Ukraine from its Western partners and advocating for an escalation of Russian strike tactics in Ukraine as part of wider efforts to intimidate the West into weakening its support for Ukraine.

• Russian officials continue to promote anti-NATO and anti-Western rhetoric, likely as part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to prepare Russian society for a potential future war against NATO.

• Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and defense industrial targets in the Russian rear.

• Ukraine and Russia exchanged the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 11, in accordance with agreements previously reached during talks in Istanbul.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Borova. Russian forces advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian officials warned that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly enabling Russia to improve and grow its drone production. Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) Spokesperson Oleh Aleksandrov told Politico in an interview published on June 5 that Chinese manufacturers are providing Russian developers with hardware, electronics, navigation, optical, and telemetry systems, engines, microcircuits, processor modules, antenna field systems, and control boards. Aleksandrov stated that Chinese manufacturers evade sanctions and export controls by changing company names and using shell companies. Aleksandrov added that Russia has a critical dependency on Chinese components to produce tactical and long-range drones and that Russia boosted its long-range drone production from 15,000 drones in 2024 to over 30,000 drones in 2025 and small tactical drone production to two million drones per year. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also implied that the PRC placed restrictions on Ukrainian and European drone procurement but did not impose the same restrictions on Russia.

Russian developers are increasingly relying on Chinese components to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) capabilities into Russian drones and expand the use of AI/ML drones on the frontlines in Ukraine. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate's (GUR) War&Sanctions project reported on June 9 that Russian forces are actively using V2U strike unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the Sumy direction. The War&Sanctions project reported that V2U drones can autonomously search and select targets using AI and that these drones are based on the Chinese Leetop A203 minicomputer and a central processor with an American NVIDIA Jetson Orin module. The War&Sanctions project reported that V2U drones only have one GPS module, which the GUR assessed indicated that Russian forces gave up on using satellite navigation due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) effectiveness. The War&Sanctions project added that V2Us are likely using "computer vision" for navigation, which allows the drone to compare the image obtained from the drones' cameras and pre-loaded photos of the area. The War&Sanctions project noted that Russian drone operators can control the V2U drones as first-person-view (FPV) drones via LTE connection and that an installed modem-router allows the drone to work with Ukrainian mobile operator SIM cards. The War&Sanctions project reported that the base of the modem is of Chinese origin despite Russian markings. The War&Sanctions project added that Russian developers assembled V2U drones mainly with Chinese-made components such as the engine, GPS module, servos, solid-state drive, rangefinder, speed controllers, and batteries. ISW recently assessed that Russia has been increasingly scaling up the development of drones with machine vision in Spring 2025 and increased their use on the battlefield in May 2025.

Russian developers also rely on Chinese manufacturers to extend the range of Russian fiber-optic drones. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov amplified footage on June 5 reportedly showing a Chinese-made, 50-kilometers-long fiber-optic coil that will enable Russian forces to fly these drones at a longer range. The coil reportedly weighs 3.8 kilograms. Russian forces have been increasingly using fiber-optic drones on the battlefield, particularly in the Toretsk-Kostyantynivka direction.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials warned that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly enabling Russia to improve and grow its drone production.

Russian Force Centralization

• The Wagner Group announced on June 6 that it is leaving Mali after 3.5 years likely as part of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) ongoing effort to replace remaining Wagner personnel with state-controlled Africa Corps.

• The Kremlin appears to have entrusted a Russian billionaire with control of the Africa Corps, contradicting the ongoing centralization effort.

Russian Military Reforms and Force Restructuring

• The Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) is reportedly planning to bolster security around Russian infrastructure to protect infrastructure from Ukrainian drones.

Militarization of Society and Youth

• Russian authorities reportedly proposed that Rosgvardia oblige cadets to watch state media propaganda programs in an effort to involve them in special propaganda and counter propaganda efforts.

• Russian authorities approved a plan to construct a "Warrior Temple" for Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine outside of St. Petersburg.

Russian Defense Industrial Base

• The Russian Government announced on June 9 the establishment of the Russian Artificial Intelligence (AI) Development Center.

Russian Technological Adaptations

• Russia is belatedly constructing hangars and other defensive infrastructure across airfields in Russia and in occupied Ukraine to protect Russian aircraft from Ukrainian drones.

Significant Russian Military Exercises

• Russian forces continued major naval exercises in the Baltic Sea involving more than 20 warships and 25 aircraft, likely in support of the Kremlin's recent escalatory rhetoric against the Baltic States.


Institute for the Study of War

Occupied Crimea is poised to face a severe water crisis in the coming months, a crisis that the Russian occupation of Crimea has precipitated and which ongoing Russian mismanagement and resource misallocation will exacerbate. Head of the Department of Chemical Technologies of Water Use at the Russian-founded Crimean Federal University Ilya Nikolenko stated in an interview with Russian media on June 5 that reservoirs in occupied Crimea lost 11 million cubic meters of water in May 2025 alone. Nikolenko noted that water reservoirs in Crimea are operating at about 50 percent of maximum volume, compared to 75 percent at the same time in 2024. Nikolenko warned that the current rates of the depletion of Crimea’s water reserves presage an acute water crisis reminiscent of the 2020-2021 water shortages. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Crimea Service Krym Realli reported on June 6 that the Bilohirsk Reservoir (in southeastern Crimea about 35km east of Sevastopol) began to rapidly lose water in recent weeks due to the onset of hot weather and resulting increased water consumption throughout Crimea. Russian occupation officials are clearly aware of the looming water crisis, but are nevertheless continuing efforts to attract Russian tourists to Crimea for the summer season. Head of the Committee on Ecology and Natural Resources in the Crimean occupation parliament Svetlana Shabelnikova claimed that Russia will provide Crimea with 60 percent of its needed drinking water this summer despite supply challenges, and that resort towns in southern Crimea will be “supplied drinking water without interruption.” It remains unclear how the Russian occupation administration intends to supply the 40 percent shortfall of potable water, but Shabelnikova’s statements make it evident that Russian authorities are prioritizing water supply for tourist hotspots, potentially leaving hundreds of thousands of people who do not live in or near resort towns without reliable water supply.

Russia as a belligerent occupying power is obliged by international law to provide for the health of the population it occupies, which extends to the provision of basic goods and services such as drinking water. Ukraine initially shut off water supply to Crimea via the North Crimean Canal as a form of sanction when Russia invaded and annexed Crimea in 2014. Russia then struggled with maintaining water supply, particularly as it inundated the peninsula with Russian servicemembers and re-located Russian civilians to Crimea, all of which added strain on already limited water resources. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has mismanaged water infrastructure in Crimea, failed to invest in alternative water sources, continued diverting water resources to military needs, and mired water projects corruption scandals. Russia’s June 2023 destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam further severely limited water supplies to Crimea. Despite mounting water concerns, Russian officials continue to insist on bringing Russian tourism to the occupied peninsula, which will likely further stretch scarce water resources and disproportionately impact Ukrainian residents.

Key Takeaways:

• Occupied Crimea is poised to face a severe water crisis in the coming months, a crisis that the Russian occupation of Crimea has precipitated and which ongoing Russian mismanagement and resource misallocation will exacerbate.

• Russia is intensifying filtration processes against Ukrainians, greatly restricting their freedom of movement and their ability to leave occupied Ukraine.

• Kherson Oblast occupation officials continue efforts to consolidate control over the oblast’s agricultural output for Russia’s economic gain.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky approved sanctions on June 10 targeting numerous Russian officials and organizations for their role in the deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children. The sanctions list supports ISW’s assessment of the links between high-ranking Kremlin officials, Russian youth organizations, and the widescale deportation of Ukrainian children.

The Russian “University Shifts” program has begun summer sessions, facilitating the deportation of Ukrainian children and teenagers to participate in university classes at schools throughout the Russian Federation.

Institute for the Study of War

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces have sustained over one million casualties since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, over half of which occurred since January 2024. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 12 that Russian forces have sustained 628,000 casualties since January 2024. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported a breakdown of Russian casualty rates since 2022: Russian forces reportedly sustained 106,720 casualties in 2022 (average of 340 casualties per day); 253,290 casualties in 2023 (average of 693 casualties per day); and 430,790 casualties in 2024 (average of 1,177 casualties per day).

Russian forces have reportedly sustained an average of 1,286 casualties per day between January and early June 2025 in exchange for marginal territorial gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces had already sustained over 200,000 casualties in 2025 as of June 4, 2025. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) news agency ArmyInform reported on June 5 that an unnamed NATO official stated that Russian forces are sustaining an average casualty rate of 1,140 personnel per day. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa stated on June 4 that Russia is sustaining roughly 167 casualties per square kilometer of advance. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on June 11 that Russian forces seized more territory in May 2025 than any other month since the end of 2022. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized roughly 1,935 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory thus far in 2025 as of June 12, 2025ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is willfully taking disproportionately large manpower losses for marginal territorial gains across the theater and that these losses are unsustainable in the medium-term and unlikely to result in significant, rapid gains. Russian forces continue to burn through personnel in their ongoing efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts; advance in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts; and establish buffer zones in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts

Key Takeaways:

• The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces have sustained over one million casualties since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, over half of which occurred since January 2024.

• Russian forces have reportedly sustained an average of 1,286 casualties per day between January and early June 2025 in exchange for marginal territorial gains.

• Russian forces recently advanced across the western Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border northwest of Kurakhove as part of a multi-pronged effort to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

• Russian forces are likely attempting to level the frontlines in the Novopavlivka and Kurakhove directions to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

• The Ukrainian forces continue to demonstrate their ability to conduct successful long-range strikes that target Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).

• Ukraine and Russia exchanged prisoners of war (POWs) again on June 12, in accordance with agreements the parties previously reached during talks in Istanbul on June 2.

• Southeastern European countries reiterated their support for Ukraine on June 11, including Serbia signaling its willingness to improve bilateral relations with Ukraine.

• Germany pledged to supply Ukraine with additional financial and materiel support, including air defense systems.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Siversk and Kurakhove.

Institute for the Study of War

Ob der Iran seine Drohnen jetzt selber verwendet bzw. wurde die Produktion zerstört?

Ich glaube, eine Drohnenproduktion kann man nicht zerstören. Das ist ja, wenn man mal weiß, wie es geht, die simpelste Technik im Krieg.

Russian officials largely condemned the June 13 Israeli strikes against Iran, as Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to offer to facilitate negotiations on Iran's nuclear program. Putin had separate phone calls with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on June 13. The Kremlin claimed that Putin condemned Israel's strikes as violations of the UN Charter and international law. Putin reportedly stated that Russia supports efforts to resolve the situation about Iran's nuclear program and noted that Russia has already suggested initiatives aimed at finding a "mutually acceptable agreement." The Kremlin claimed that Putin emphasized to Netanyahu the importance of returning to the negotiation process and resolving issues about Iran's nuclear program through political and diplomatic means. Putin reportedly told Netanyahu that Russia is willing to mediate talks between Iran and Israel.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned Israel's strikes against Iran and notably claimed that "unprovoked military strikes against a sovereign UN member state, its citizens, sleeping peaceful cities, and nuclear energy infrastructure facilities are categorically unacceptable." The Russian MFA claimed that these Israeli strikes against Iran undermined and set back efforts to find solutions to "eliminate any suspicions and prejudices regarding Iran's peaceful nuclear energy." The Russian MFA blamed Western states for provoking anti-Iranian "hysteria" in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), referencing a June 10 resolution that the United States and E3 (United Kingdom, Germany, and France) proposed to declare Iran as noncompliant with its nuclear safeguarding obligations. The Russian MFA issued travel advisories for Russian citizens for Israel and Iran. The Russian Embassy in Iran called on Russian citizens and "compatriots" in Iran to avoid military facilities and refrain from photographing or videoing "any part of Iran," and the Russian Embassy in Israel called for Russians in Israel to leave the country.

Other Kremlin officials condemned Israel and the West for the strikes and advocated for a political and diplomatic Israeli-Iranian settlement. First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev claimed that Russia's ties with Iran, including military ties, can become closer if necessary. Zhuravlev claimed that Russia has provided Iran with air defense systems and praised Iran's military technology, including technology that Russia helps Iran develop. Zhuravlev criticized the West for perpetuating "global injustice" and inequality and claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine is aimed at fighting this injustice.

Oil price increases following Israeli strikes against Iran may increase Russian revenue from oil sales and improve Russia's ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine. Brent crude oil futures prices rose by over five percent to $74.47 per barrel on June 13 following the Israeli strikes against Iran. Russia's oil and gas earnings accounted for roughly 30 percent of total federal revenues in 2024, underscoring the significant role oil and gas revenues play in financing Russian government spending. ISW previously assessed that compounding economic constraints on Russia are increasingly hindering Russia's ability to sustain a prolonged war effort in Ukraine. Russia may be able to leverage sudden upticks in oil prices to weather economic challenges and finance a protracted war in Ukraine, assuming the price of oil remains high (such as over $60 per barrel). Russian President Vladimir Putin has previously signaled concern about reduced oil prices, suggesting that any reduction in the oil price would likely risk destabilizing Russia's economy.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials largely condemned the June 13 Israeli strikes against Iran, as Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to offer to facilitate negotiations on Iran's nuclear program.

• Oil price increases following Israeli strikes against Iran may increase Russian revenue from oil sales and improve Russia's ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine.

• The Kremlin is continuing efforts to prepare the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) for a protracted war with Ukraine and a potential future war with NATO.

• Russia released the bodies of killed in action (KIA) Ukrainian servicemembers to Ukraine on June 13.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces continue to make marginal territorial gains east of Novopavlivka as Russian forces attempt to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and toward the settlement from three tactical directions. Geolocated footage published on June 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Horikhove (east of Novopavlivka) and likely seized the settlement. An assault detachment commander in the Russian 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army , Central Military District ) told Kremlin newswire TASS on June 14 that the regiment participated in the advance into Horikhove. ISW previously noted that Russian forces are currently engaged in a multi-pronged effort to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and Russian forces appear to be attacking from three tactical directions: east, southeast, and south of Novopavlivka. The Russian 41st CAA appears to be the main formation operating east of Novopavlivka. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 80th Tank Regiment also recently advanced west of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka). Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 74th and 137th motorized rifle brigades (41st CAA) are also attacking near Kotlyarivka and Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and that additional elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade are attacking Horikhove from the north. Russian forces intensified offensive operations southwest of Pokrovsk between Solone and Bohdanivka in the direction of the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary in March and April 2025 and recently advanced to the administrative boundary within seven kilometers east of Novopavlivka.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continue to make marginal territorial gains east of Novopavlivka as Russian forces attempt to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and toward the settlement from three tactical directions.

• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct long-range strikes against Russia's defense industrial base.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted a fourth round of prisoner of war (POWs) exchanges on June 14, in accordance with the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian bilateral talks in Istanbul.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced near Toretsk and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to portray Russia as an effective and necessary international partner for the United States amid ongoing Iran-Israel tensions. US President Donald Trump stated on June 14 that he and Putin spoke by phone for about an hour about the ongoing Israel-Iran strikes and spent “much less” time talking about Ukraine than Iran. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on June 14 that Putin and Trump mainly spoke about military escalation in the Middle East. Ushakov claimed that Putin expressed concern over the escalation of tensions between Iran and Israel and offered Russia’s assistance in negotiating a peace settlement. Trump stated that he reminded Putin that the war against Ukraine must end during the call. Putin is likely attempting to distract from his ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine by offering to help the United States mediate the situation in the Middle East.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to portray Russia as an effective and necessary international partner for the United States amid ongoing Iran-Israel tensions.

• Russia conducted a large drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of June 14 to 15, primarily targeting Poltava Oblast.

• Russia repatriated the bodies of over 1,000 Ukrainian citizens on June 15, in accordance with the June 2 Ukrainian–Russian bilateral talks in Istanbul.

• Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia’s consumption of its Soviet-era tank stores appears to be slowing, possibly due to Russia's increasing transition to using motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) on the battlefield. A social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots via satellite imagery shared an updated assessment of smaller Russian tank and armored vehicle storage facilities on June 15 and assessed that Russia still has 46 percent of its pre-war tank reserves, 42 percent of its pre-war infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) reserves, and 48 percent of its pre-war armored personnel carrier (APC) reserves as of a recent unspecified date. The source stated that imagery of eight Russian military depot appears to show that Russia has emptied most of the depots of their vehicle reserves and assessed that Russia will likely deplete its remaining tank and armored vehicle reserves by the end of 2025. The social media source assessed in late December 2024 that Russia had 47 percent of its pre-war tank reserves, 52 percent of its pre-war IFV reserves, and 45 percent of its pre-war APC reserves remaining in storage. (The source noted on June 15 that they updated their previous assessments of Russia’s pre-war reserves and found that Russia had 241 more tanks, 174 more IFVs, and 687 more APCs before the full-scale invasion than the source previously assessed, which likely accounts for the increase in Russian APCs stores from 45 percent in the December 2024 assessment to 48 percent in June 2024.) The social media source also stated that satellite imagery analysis indicates a ”dramatic” increase in ”almost all” types of equipment deployed to a Russian military base near Petrozavodsk, Republic of Karelia, located roughly 373 kilometers from the international border with Finland. Russia may have additional armored vehicles and tanks in covered storage that are not visible in satellite imagery. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on April 27 that a senior Finnish military official stated that Russia is sending "almost none" of its newly produced tanks to the frontline in Ukraine but is stockpiling the."

The social media source's data suggests that Russia's consumption of Soviet-era tank stocks has slowed in recent months, an observation consistent with ISW’s study of recent battlefield combat footage which shows that Russian forces are increasingly using motorcycles and buggies in place of armored vehicles along the frontline in Ukraine. Russian forces have been increasingly using unarmored civilian vehicles, mainly motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), throughout the theater in Ukraine since late Fall 2024. ISW previously noted that Russia's increased use of motorcycles is an adaptation in response to pervasive Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian armored vehicles and the unsustainable armored vehicle losses that Russian forces suffered in late 2023 and 2024. Ukrainian drone operations have significantly complicated how to tactically employ tanks, as large and slow-moving armored vehicles and tanks are vulnerable to drones. Russian forces appear to be leveraging faster-moving motorcycles and buggies to advance through the contested "gray zones" that Ukrainian and Russian drone operators have created along the frontline. Russia's adaption has succeeded in granting Russian forces marginal tactical gains at the expense of significant infantry losses. ISW previously assessed that Russian armored vehicle losses are unsustainable and are undermining Russia’s ability to sustain a protracted high-intensity war, but it remains unclear if Russia’s increased reliance on motorcycles and buggies will be sufficient to offset these losses in the medium- to long-term.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine and Russia conducted an exchange that included the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on June 16 in accordance with agreements reached during talks in Istanbul on June 2.

• Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported that the Kremlin is spreading narratives about the POW and KIA exchanges in order to sow panic in Ukraine and discredit Ukraine in the international community – in line with ISW’s recent assessments.

• Russia’s consumption of its Soviet-era tank stores appears to be slowing, possibly due to Russia's increasing transition to using motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) on the battlefield.

• Russia continues to set conditions to pose a long-term strategic threat to the United States and its Western allies even after the end to Russia's war in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and in Zaporizhia Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia is attempting to leverage the Ukrainian children it has illegally deported in ongoing negotiations with Ukraine, thereby contradicting recent Russian efforts to deny and downplay the scale of its deportation campaign and confirming that Russia has indeed stolen Ukrainian children in clear violation of international law. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 16 during a press conference with Austrian President Alexander Van der Bellen that Russian officials proposed exchanging deported Ukrainian children for Russian prisoners of war (POWs). Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine will not exchange children for Russian combatants, condemned the proposal as “beyond international law,” and called for Russia to return the children unilaterally, without exchanging them. The Russian suggestion that children be treated as combatants runs contrary to international law, which grants children special protected status in times of war. The Russian proposal additionally acknowledges that Russia has deported Ukrainian children, despite recent Russian attempts to either deny or greatly downplay the scale of the deportations. ISW continues to assess that there can be no just peace in Ukraine until Russia has returned all of the children it has deported. Russia cannot use children as bargaining chips and must ensure their return unilaterally and unconditionally, not in exchange for anything.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is attempting to leverage the Ukrainian children it has illegally deported in ongoing negotiations with Ukraine, thereby contradicting recent Russian efforts to deny and downplay the scale of its deportation campaign and confirming that Russia has indeed stolen Ukrainian children in clear violation of international law.

• Russian occupation officials used the circumstances of Russia Day festivities to forcibly passportize Ukrainian children.

• The Republic of Kalmykia is facilitating the deportation of Ukrainian children via its patronage ties with a local Luhansk Oblast occupation administration.

• Russia continues to deport Ukrainian children to Russia for military-patriotic training and ideological indoctrination through the “Time of Young Heroes” program.

• Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky credited Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova and the “Country for Children” charitable foundation for the recent deportation of 100 children from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

• Russian occupation authorities are suppressing religious freedom in occupied Crimea by prosecuting religious minority groups as “extremists” and by appropriating worship sites for the benefit of the occupation administration.

• Ukrainian partisan groups conducted attacks on Russian military personnel and assets in occupied Ukraine on June 11 and 12.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted the third largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion on the night of June 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 440 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace over Tambov Oblast, 16 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast, four Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea, nine Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from the airspace over Belgorod and Bryansk oblasts, and one Kh-31P anti-radar missile from an unspecified location. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 239 drones, one Kh-47M2 missile, 15 Kh-101 missiles, and seven Kh-59/59 missiles and that 163 drones, one Kh-47M2 missile, one Kh-59/69 missile, and one Kh-31P missile were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that the Shahed and decoy drones targeting Kyiv City flew from different directions, including along the Dnipro River and from the east and west. Ihnat and Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko stated that Ukrainian authorities found remnants of cluster munitions at the site of missile explosions, and a Ukrainian source posted footage reportedly showing a Russian missile with cluster munitions striking Kyiv City overnight. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes hit residential areas and civilian infrastructure in Kyiv City and Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhia oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported civilian casualties in Kyiv and Odesa cities and Chernihiv Oblast.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted the third largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion on the night of June 16 to 17.

• The June 16-17 strike series heavily targeted Kyiv City and hit residential areas in the capital, as Russian officials and milbloggers called on Russia to intensify its strikes against Ukraine.

• Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu announced that North Korea would send 6,000 sappers and military engineers to help with reconstruction efforts in Kursk Oblast.

• The European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) announced sanctions packages against Russia on June 16 and 17.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War