Russian forces recently advanced to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk administrative border as Kremlin officials continued to demonstrate that Russia has wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea. Geolocated footage published on June 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk administrative border northwest of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 9 that Russia's Central Grouping of Forces seized more territory in unspecified areas of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed on June 8 and 9 that Russian forces, including elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army , Central Military District ), are fighting near and across the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on June 9 that Russia has begun an offensive into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast "within the framework of the creation of a buffer zone" in Ukraine. First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev claimed that Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is now within the "sphere of interests" of the Russian military. Chairperson of the Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building Andrei Klishas claimed that Russia's offensive into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast indicates the beginning of Russia's "denazification" of the oblast - a reference to Russia's longtime demand for regime change in Ukraine. Chairperson of the Duma Defense Committee Dmitry Sablin claimed that Russia will "definitely take" Dnipro City and other unspecified Ukrainian cities if Ukraine "does not make peace on terms." Russian officials are likely setting information conditions to illegally declare Dnipropetrovsk Oblast annexed, as ISW has previously assessed. Kremlin officials have repeatedly signaled that Russia maintains territorial ambitions beyond the four oblasts that Russia has already illegally annexed, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov notably repeated a longstanding Kremlin claim that Odesa City is a "Russian" city as recently as June 9. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa stated on June 5 that Russia likely seeks to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River, including parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and to seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts by the end of 2026. ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in peace negotiations with Ukraine and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war in order to make further battlefield gains.

ISW continues to assess that current Russian tactical activity in the vicinity of southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is a continuation of ongoing Russian offensive efforts in southwestern Donetsk Oblast — not the beginning of a new major offensive operation to seize operationally significant territory in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. ISW will continue to assess the situation in southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and update its assessment.

Russian forces conducted the largest combined missile and drone strike of the war overnight on June 8 and 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 499 projectiles, including 479 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched four Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal" aeroballistic missiles from Tambov Oblast; 10 Kh-101 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast; three Kh-22 cruise missiles and two Kh-31P anti-radar missiles from airspace over the Black Sea; and one Kh-35 anti-ship cruise missile from occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 277 Shahed and decoy drones and that 183 drones "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all 10 Kh-101 cruise missiles, all four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missiles, two Kh-22 cruise missiles, both of the Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, and the one Kh-35 cruise missile. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes hit Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Kyiv, Rivne, and Volyn oblasts, damaging civilian infrastructure.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently advanced to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk administrative border as Kremlin officials continued to demonstrate that Russia has wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea.

• The Kremlin appears to be dangling the prospect of bilateral arms control talks with the United States to extract preemptive concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.

• Western security officials continue to assess that Russia is preparing for a protracted confrontation with NATO.

• Russian forces conducted the largest combined missile and drone strike of the war overnight on June 8 and 9.

• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian military and defense industrial targets that are involved in Russia's long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine.

• Ukraine and Russia on June 9 conducted the first round of the prisoner of war (POW) exchanges that the parties agreed to during the latest bilateral talks in Istanbul on June 2 as Russian officials continued to baselessly accuse Ukraine of failing to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman. Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Kurakhove.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be switching between rhetoric focused on Russian ethnic nationalism and Russian multinationalism, but remains committed to promoting anti-Western sentiment and the militarization of Russia's youth. Putin held a meeting with the Security Council on June 10 that largely focused on the unification of the peoples of Russia and the use of military-patriotic youth programs and Russian government initiatives to promote Russian patriotism. Putin highlighted the work of the "Movement of the First," a Russian youth movement aimed at promoting military-patriotic education in Russia and occupied Ukraine, and "Yunarmiya" ("The Youth Army"), a movement that is responsible for instilling pro-war sentiments in Russian children and teenagers. Putin also highlighted the Russian state-mandated weekly lessons in schools that often include lectures by soldiers from the war in Ukraine. Putin platformed BRICS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) — Russian-dominated organizations that Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly postured as the foundation of Putin's envisioned anti-Western and anti-NATO Eurasian security architecture. Putin stated that Russia must respond to challenges that promote interethnic and interreligious conflict in Russia and highlighted the "unity of the peoples of Russia." Putin recently began forwarding an unofficial ideology formulated on Russian nationalism that positions Russia in opposition to the West, which marked a notable departure from Putin's usual rhetoric promoting the multiethnic and multireligious makeup of Russia's population. Putin's remarks at the June 10 Security Council meeting appear to be a return to this rhetoric about the diversity of Russia and Russian civic nationalism. Putin appears committed, however, to promoting anti-Western and pro-war sentiments, especially in Russian youth, likely as part of efforts to prepare Russian society for a protracted war in Ukraine and possible future conflict with NATO. Putin's June 10 statements about harmony and unity in Russia indicate that he likely remains hesitant to fully commit to a nationalist ideology centered around ethnic Russians, as this risks fragmenting Russia's multiethnic population. ISW continues to assess that Putin must work to balance appeasing the influential xenophobic and ultranationalist community, which is a key constituency for Putin, with the need to leverage migrants to offset immediate economic and force generation challenges and long-term demographic decline.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be switching between rhetoric focused on Russian ethnic nationalism and Russian multinationalism, but remains committed to promoting anti-Western sentiment and the militarization of Russia's youth.

• Russia is reportedly working to increase the number of North Korean labor migrants in Russia, likely to support Russia's workforce and to directly join the Russian military.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted the second round of prisoner of war (POW) exchanges on June 10, in accordance with agreements the parties reached in Istanbul on June 2.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Borova, Lyman, and Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Toretsk.

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US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated on June 10 that the United States intends to reduce its budget for the purchase of weapons for Ukraine in 2026. Hegseth did not specify the extent of the planned cutbacks. Hegseth stated that "a negotiated, peaceful settlement" is in the best interest of Ukraine, Russia, and the United States but that "the word victory," as well as the path to victory and to peace, have not been clearly defined.

Reducing US military aid to Ukraine will neither lead to a sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Russian President Vladimir Putin to reassess his theory of victory. Putin's theory of victory posits that the Russian military can sustain creeping, incremental advances on the battlefield longer than Ukrainian forces can defend and longer than the West is willing to support Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Western military aid, particularly that which only the United States can provide rapidly and at scale, remains crucial in enabling Ukrainian forces to make decisive gains on the battlefield and pressuring Putin to reassess his theory of victory. Battlefield gains that change Putin's calculus would force Russia to engage in constructive negotiations to ensure a peaceful resolution to the war. A reduction in US aid to Ukraine risks giving Russia greater advantages on the battlefield and would likely embolden Putin to continue his war and strengthen his belief that Russia can conquer Ukraine, which is incompatible with US President Donald Trump's stated goal of ensuring an enduring peace in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Reducing US military aid to Ukraine will neither lead to a sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Russian President Vladimir Putin to reassess his theory of victory.

• The Kremlin continues to attack Ukraine using rhetoric presenting an anachronistic reading of Ukraine's history, denying the existence of an independent Ukrainian language and culture, and discrediting the Ukrainian government.

• Russian officials are also attempting to rhetorically split Ukraine from its Western partners and advocating for an escalation of Russian strike tactics in Ukraine as part of wider efforts to intimidate the West into weakening its support for Ukraine.

• Russian officials continue to promote anti-NATO and anti-Western rhetoric, likely as part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to prepare Russian society for a potential future war against NATO.

• Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and defense industrial targets in the Russian rear.

• Ukraine and Russia exchanged the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 11, in accordance with agreements previously reached during talks in Istanbul.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Borova. Russian forces advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.

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Ukrainian officials warned that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly enabling Russia to improve and grow its drone production. Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) Spokesperson Oleh Aleksandrov told Politico in an interview published on June 5 that Chinese manufacturers are providing Russian developers with hardware, electronics, navigation, optical, and telemetry systems, engines, microcircuits, processor modules, antenna field systems, and control boards. Aleksandrov stated that Chinese manufacturers evade sanctions and export controls by changing company names and using shell companies. Aleksandrov added that Russia has a critical dependency on Chinese components to produce tactical and long-range drones and that Russia boosted its long-range drone production from 15,000 drones in 2024 to over 30,000 drones in 2025 and small tactical drone production to two million drones per year. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also implied that the PRC placed restrictions on Ukrainian and European drone procurement but did not impose the same restrictions on Russia.

Russian developers are increasingly relying on Chinese components to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) capabilities into Russian drones and expand the use of AI/ML drones on the frontlines in Ukraine. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate's (GUR) War&Sanctions project reported on June 9 that Russian forces are actively using V2U strike unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the Sumy direction. The War&Sanctions project reported that V2U drones can autonomously search and select targets using AI and that these drones are based on the Chinese Leetop A203 minicomputer and a central processor with an American NVIDIA Jetson Orin module. The War&Sanctions project reported that V2U drones only have one GPS module, which the GUR assessed indicated that Russian forces gave up on using satellite navigation due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) effectiveness. The War&Sanctions project added that V2Us are likely using "computer vision" for navigation, which allows the drone to compare the image obtained from the drones' cameras and pre-loaded photos of the area. The War&Sanctions project noted that Russian drone operators can control the V2U drones as first-person-view (FPV) drones via LTE connection and that an installed modem-router allows the drone to work with Ukrainian mobile operator SIM cards. The War&Sanctions project reported that the base of the modem is of Chinese origin despite Russian markings. The War&Sanctions project added that Russian developers assembled V2U drones mainly with Chinese-made components such as the engine, GPS module, servos, solid-state drive, rangefinder, speed controllers, and batteries. ISW recently assessed that Russia has been increasingly scaling up the development of drones with machine vision in Spring 2025 and increased their use on the battlefield in May 2025.

Russian developers also rely on Chinese manufacturers to extend the range of Russian fiber-optic drones. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov amplified footage on June 5 reportedly showing a Chinese-made, 50-kilometers-long fiber-optic coil that will enable Russian forces to fly these drones at a longer range. The coil reportedly weighs 3.8 kilograms. Russian forces have been increasingly using fiber-optic drones on the battlefield, particularly in the Toretsk-Kostyantynivka direction.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials warned that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly enabling Russia to improve and grow its drone production.

Russian Force Centralization

• The Wagner Group announced on June 6 that it is leaving Mali after 3.5 years likely as part of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) ongoing effort to replace remaining Wagner personnel with state-controlled Africa Corps.

• The Kremlin appears to have entrusted a Russian billionaire with control of the Africa Corps, contradicting the ongoing centralization effort.

Russian Military Reforms and Force Restructuring

• The Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) is reportedly planning to bolster security around Russian infrastructure to protect infrastructure from Ukrainian drones.

Militarization of Society and Youth

• Russian authorities reportedly proposed that Rosgvardia oblige cadets to watch state media propaganda programs in an effort to involve them in special propaganda and counter propaganda efforts.

• Russian authorities approved a plan to construct a "Warrior Temple" for Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine outside of St. Petersburg.

Russian Defense Industrial Base

• The Russian Government announced on June 9 the establishment of the Russian Artificial Intelligence (AI) Development Center.

Russian Technological Adaptations

• Russia is belatedly constructing hangars and other defensive infrastructure across airfields in Russia and in occupied Ukraine to protect Russian aircraft from Ukrainian drones.

Significant Russian Military Exercises

• Russian forces continued major naval exercises in the Baltic Sea involving more than 20 warships and 25 aircraft, likely in support of the Kremlin's recent escalatory rhetoric against the Baltic States.


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