Russian forces recently advanced to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk administrative border as Kremlin officials
continued to demonstrate that Russia has wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Luhansk, Donetsk,
Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea. Geolocated footage published on June 9 indicates that Russian
forces recently advanced to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk administrative border northwest of Horikhove
(southeast of Novopavlivka). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 9 that Russia's
Central Grouping of Forces seized more territory in unspecified areas of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Russian
milbloggers claimed on June 8 and 9 that Russian forces, including elements of the 90th Tank Division
(41st Combined Arms Army , Central Military District ), are fighting near and across the
Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on June 9 that Russia
has begun an offensive into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast "within the framework of the creation of a buffer zone"
in Ukraine. First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev claimed
that Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is now within the "sphere of interests" of the Russian military. Chairperson
of the Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building Andrei Klishas
claimed that Russia's offensive into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast indicates the beginning of Russia's
"denazification" of the oblast - a reference to Russia's longtime demand for regime change in Ukraine.
Chairperson of the Duma Defense Committee Dmitry Sablin claimed that Russia will "definitely take" Dnipro
City and other unspecified Ukrainian cities if Ukraine "does not make peace on terms." Russian
officials are likely setting information conditions to illegally declare Dnipropetrovsk Oblast annexed,
as ISW has previously assessed. Kremlin officials have repeatedly signaled that Russia maintains
territorial ambitions beyond the four oblasts that Russia has already illegally annexed, and Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov notably repeated a longstanding Kremlin claim that Odesa City is a
"Russian" city as recently as June 9. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa
stated on June 5 that Russia likely seeks to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of
the Dnipro River, including parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and to seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts by
the end of 2026. ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in peace negotiations with Ukraine
and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war in order to make further battlefield gains.
ISW continues to assess that current Russian tactical activity in the vicinity of southeastern
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is a continuation of ongoing Russian offensive efforts in southwestern Donetsk
Oblast — not the beginning of a new major offensive operation to seize operationally significant
territory in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. ISW will continue to assess the situation in southeastern
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and update its assessment.
Russian forces conducted the largest combined
missile and drone strike of the war overnight on June 8 and 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Russian forces launched 499 projectiles, including 479 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of
Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk,
Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched four Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal"
aeroballistic missiles from Tambov Oblast; 10 Kh-101 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast; three Kh-22
cruise missiles and two Kh-31P anti-radar missiles from airspace over the Black Sea; and one Kh-35
anti-ship cruise missile from occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces
shot down 277 Shahed and decoy drones and that 183 drones "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic
warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all 10 Kh-101
cruise missiles, all four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missiles, two Kh-22 cruise missiles, both of the Kh-31P
anti-radar missiles, and the one Kh-35 cruise missile. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian
strikes hit Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Kyiv, Rivne, and Volyn oblasts, damaging civilian
infrastructure.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces recently advanced to the
Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk administrative border as Kremlin officials continued to demonstrate that Russia
has wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and
Crimea.
• The Kremlin appears to be dangling the prospect of bilateral arms control talks with
the United States to extract preemptive concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.
• Western security officials continue to assess that Russia is preparing for a protracted
confrontation with NATO.
• Russian forces conducted the largest combined missile and drone
strike of the war overnight on June 8 and 9.
• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone
strikes against Russian military and defense industrial targets that are involved in Russia's long-range
drone and missile strikes against Ukraine.
• Ukraine and Russia on June 9 conducted the first
round of the prisoner of war (POW) exchanges that the parties agreed to during the latest bilateral talks
in Istanbul on June 2 as Russian officials continued to baselessly accuse Ukraine of failing to
repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced
near Lyman. Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Kurakhove.
Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be switching between rhetoric focused on Russian ethnic
nationalism and Russian multinationalism, but remains committed to promoting anti-Western sentiment and
the militarization of Russia's youth. Putin held a meeting with the Security Council on June 10 that
largely focused on the unification of the peoples of Russia and the use of military-patriotic youth
programs and Russian government initiatives to promote Russian patriotism. Putin highlighted the work of
the "Movement of the First," a Russian youth movement aimed at promoting military-patriotic education in
Russia and occupied Ukraine, and "Yunarmiya" ("The Youth Army"), a movement that is responsible for
instilling pro-war sentiments in Russian children and teenagers. Putin also highlighted the Russian
state-mandated weekly lessons in schools that often include lectures by soldiers from the war in Ukraine.
Putin platformed BRICS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) — Russian-dominated organizations that Putin and other Kremlin officials have
repeatedly postured as the foundation of Putin's envisioned anti-Western and anti-NATO Eurasian security
architecture. Putin stated that Russia must respond to challenges that promote interethnic and
interreligious conflict in Russia and highlighted the "unity of the peoples of Russia." Putin recently
began forwarding an unofficial ideology formulated on Russian nationalism that positions Russia in
opposition to the West, which marked a notable departure from Putin's usual rhetoric promoting the
multiethnic and multireligious makeup of Russia's population. Putin's remarks at the June 10 Security
Council meeting appear to be a return to this rhetoric about the diversity of Russia and Russian civic
nationalism. Putin appears committed, however, to promoting anti-Western and pro-war sentiments,
especially in Russian youth, likely as part of efforts to prepare Russian society for a protracted war in
Ukraine and possible future conflict with NATO. Putin's June 10 statements about harmony and unity in
Russia indicate that he likely remains hesitant to fully commit to a nationalist ideology centered around
ethnic Russians, as this risks fragmenting Russia's multiethnic population. ISW continues to assess that
Putin must work to balance appeasing the influential xenophobic and ultranationalist community, which is
a key constituency for Putin, with the need to leverage migrants to offset immediate economic and force
generation challenges and long-term demographic decline.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian
President Vladimir Putin appears to be switching between rhetoric focused on Russian ethnic nationalism
and Russian multinationalism, but remains committed to promoting anti-Western sentiment and the
militarization of Russia's youth.
• Russia is reportedly working to increase the number of
North Korean labor migrants in Russia, likely to support Russia's workforce and to directly join the
Russian military.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted the second round of prisoner of war (POW)
exchanges on June 10, in accordance with agreements the parties reached in Istanbul on June 2.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Borova, Lyman, and Toretsk. Russian forces
recently advanced near Kupyansk and Toretsk.
US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated on June 10 that the United States intends to reduce its budget
for the purchase of weapons for Ukraine in 2026. Hegseth did not specify the extent of the planned
cutbacks. Hegseth stated that "a negotiated, peaceful settlement" is in the best interest of Ukraine,
Russia, and the United States but that "the word victory," as well as the path to victory and to peace,
have not been clearly defined.
Reducing US military aid to Ukraine will neither lead to a
sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Russian President Vladimir Putin to reassess his theory of
victory. Putin's theory of victory posits that the Russian military can sustain creeping, incremental
advances on the battlefield longer than Ukrainian forces can defend and longer than the West is willing
to support Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Western military aid, particularly that which only the
United States can provide rapidly and at scale, remains crucial in enabling Ukrainian forces to make
decisive gains on the battlefield and pressuring Putin to reassess his theory of victory. Battlefield
gains that change Putin's calculus would force Russia to engage in constructive negotiations to ensure a
peaceful resolution to the war. A reduction in US aid to Ukraine risks giving Russia greater advantages
on the battlefield and would likely embolden Putin to continue his war and strengthen his belief that
Russia can conquer Ukraine, which is incompatible with US President Donald Trump's stated goal of
ensuring an enduring peace in Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
• Reducing US military aid to
Ukraine will neither lead to a sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Russian President Vladimir Putin
to reassess his theory of victory.
• The Kremlin continues to attack Ukraine using rhetoric
presenting an anachronistic reading of Ukraine's history, denying the existence of an independent
Ukrainian language and culture, and discrediting the Ukrainian government.
• Russian officials
are also attempting to rhetorically split Ukraine from its Western partners and advocating for an
escalation of Russian strike tactics in Ukraine as part of wider efforts to intimidate the West into
weakening its support for Ukraine.
• Russian officials continue to promote anti-NATO and
anti-Western rhetoric, likely as part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to prepare Russian society for a
potential future war against NATO.
• Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and
defense industrial targets in the Russian rear.
• Ukraine and Russia exchanged the bodies of
killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 11, in accordance with agreements previously reached during talks
in Istanbul.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Borova. Russian forces advanced near Chasiv Yar,
Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.
Ukrainian officials warned that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly enabling Russia to
improve and grow its drone production. Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) Spokesperson Oleh
Aleksandrov told Politico in an interview published on June 5 that Chinese manufacturers are providing
Russian developers with hardware, electronics, navigation, optical, and telemetry systems, engines,
microcircuits, processor modules, antenna field systems, and control boards. Aleksandrov stated that
Chinese manufacturers evade sanctions and export controls by changing company names and using shell
companies. Aleksandrov added that Russia has a critical dependency on Chinese components to produce
tactical and long-range drones and that Russia boosted its long-range drone production from 15,000 drones
in 2024 to over 30,000 drones in 2025 and small tactical drone production to two million drones per year.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also implied that the PRC placed restrictions on Ukrainian and
European drone procurement but did not impose the same restrictions on Russia.
Russian
developers are increasingly relying on Chinese components to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) and
machine learning (ML) capabilities into Russian drones and expand the use of AI/ML drones on the
frontlines in Ukraine. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate's (GUR) War&Sanctions project
reported on June 9 that Russian forces are actively using V2U strike unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in
the Sumy direction. The War&Sanctions project reported that V2U drones can autonomously search and select
targets using AI and that these drones are based on the Chinese Leetop A203 minicomputer and a central
processor with an American NVIDIA Jetson Orin module. The War&Sanctions project reported that V2U drones
only have one GPS module, which the GUR assessed indicated that Russian forces gave up on using satellite
navigation due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) effectiveness. The War&Sanctions project added that
V2Us are likely using "computer vision" for navigation, which allows the drone to compare the image
obtained from the drones' cameras and pre-loaded photos of the area. The War&Sanctions project noted that
Russian drone operators can control the V2U drones as first-person-view (FPV) drones via LTE connection
and that an installed modem-router allows the drone to work with Ukrainian mobile operator SIM cards. The
War&Sanctions project reported that the base of the modem is of Chinese origin despite Russian markings.
The War&Sanctions project added that Russian developers assembled V2U drones mainly with Chinese-made
components such as the engine, GPS module, servos, solid-state drive, rangefinder, speed controllers, and
batteries. ISW recently assessed that Russia has been increasingly scaling up the development of drones
with machine vision in Spring 2025 and increased their use on the battlefield in May 2025.
Russian developers also rely on Chinese manufacturers to extend the range of Russian fiber-optic
drones. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov amplified footage on
June 5 reportedly showing a Chinese-made, 50-kilometers-long fiber-optic coil that will enable Russian
forces to fly these drones at a longer range. The coil reportedly weighs 3.8 kilograms. Russian forces
have been increasingly using fiber-optic drones on the battlefield, particularly in the
Toretsk-Kostyantynivka direction.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian officials warned that
the People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly enabling Russia to improve and grow its drone
production.
Russian Force Centralization
• The Wagner Group announced on June 6
that it is leaving Mali after 3.5 years likely as part of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) ongoing
effort to replace remaining Wagner personnel with state-controlled Africa Corps.
• The Kremlin
appears to have entrusted a Russian billionaire with control of the Africa Corps, contradicting the
ongoing centralization effort.
Russian Military Reforms and Force Restructuring
• The Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) is reportedly planning to bolster security around Russian
infrastructure to protect infrastructure from Ukrainian drones.
Militarization of Society and
Youth
• Russian authorities reportedly proposed that Rosgvardia oblige cadets to watch state
media propaganda programs in an effort to involve them in special propaganda and counter propaganda
efforts.
• Russian authorities approved a plan to construct a "Warrior Temple" for Russian
veterans of the war in Ukraine outside of St. Petersburg.
Russian Defense Industrial Base
• The Russian Government announced on June 9 the establishment of the Russian Artificial
Intelligence (AI) Development Center.
Russian Technological Adaptations
• Russia is
belatedly constructing hangars and other defensive infrastructure across airfields in Russia and in
occupied Ukraine to protect Russian aircraft from Ukrainian drones.
Significant Russian
Military Exercises
• Russian forces continued major naval exercises in the Baltic Sea
involving more than 20 warships and 25 aircraft, likely in support of the Kremlin's recent escalatory
rhetoric against the Baltic States.
Occupied Crimea is poised to face a severe water crisis in the coming months, a crisis that the Russian
occupation of Crimea has precipitated and which ongoing Russian mismanagement and resource misallocation
will exacerbate. Head of the Department of Chemical Technologies of Water Use at the Russian-founded
Crimean Federal University Ilya Nikolenko stated in an interview with Russian media on June 5 that
reservoirs in occupied Crimea lost 11 million cubic meters of water in May 2025 alone. Nikolenko noted
that water reservoirs in Crimea are operating at about 50 percent of maximum volume, compared to 75
percent at the same time in 2024. Nikolenko warned that the current rates of the depletion of Crimea’s
water reserves presage an acute water crisis reminiscent of the 2020-2021 water shortages. Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Crimea Service Krym Realli reported on June 6 that the Bilohirsk Reservoir (in
southeastern Crimea about 35km east of Sevastopol) began to rapidly lose water in recent weeks due to the
onset of hot weather and resulting increased water consumption throughout Crimea. Russian occupation
officials are clearly aware of the looming water crisis, but are nevertheless continuing efforts to
attract Russian tourists to Crimea for the summer season. Head of the Committee on Ecology and Natural
Resources in the Crimean occupation parliament Svetlana Shabelnikova claimed that Russia will provide
Crimea with 60 percent of its needed drinking water this summer despite supply challenges, and that
resort towns in southern Crimea will be “supplied drinking water without interruption.” It remains
unclear how the Russian occupation administration intends to supply the 40 percent shortfall of potable
water, but Shabelnikova’s statements make it evident that Russian authorities are prioritizing water
supply for tourist hotspots, potentially leaving hundreds of thousands of people who do not live in or
near resort towns without reliable water supply.
Russia as a belligerent occupying power is
obliged by international law to provide for the health of the population it occupies, which extends to
the provision of basic goods and services such as drinking water. Ukraine initially shut off water supply
to Crimea via the North Crimean Canal as a form of sanction when Russia invaded and annexed Crimea in
2014. Russia then struggled with maintaining water supply, particularly as it inundated the peninsula
with Russian servicemembers and re-located Russian civilians to Crimea, all of which added strain on
already limited water resources. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has mismanaged
water infrastructure in Crimea, failed to invest in alternative water sources, continued diverting water
resources to military needs, and mired water projects corruption scandals. Russia’s June 2023 destruction
of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam further severely limited water supplies to Crimea.
Despite mounting water concerns, Russian officials continue to insist on bringing Russian tourism to the
occupied peninsula, which will likely further stretch scarce water resources and disproportionately
impact Ukrainian residents.
Key Takeaways:
• Occupied Crimea is poised to face a
severe water crisis in the coming months, a crisis that the Russian occupation of Crimea has precipitated
and which ongoing Russian mismanagement and resource misallocation will exacerbate.
• Russia
is intensifying filtration processes against Ukrainians, greatly restricting their freedom of movement
and their ability to leave occupied Ukraine.
• Kherson Oblast occupation officials continue
efforts to consolidate control over the oblast’s agricultural output for Russia’s economic gain.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky approved sanctions on June 10 targeting numerous Russian
officials and organizations for their role in the deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children. The
sanctions list supports ISW’s assessment of the links between high-ranking Kremlin officials, Russian
youth organizations, and the widescale deportation of Ukrainian children.
The Russian
“University Shifts” program has begun summer sessions, facilitating the deportation of Ukrainian children
and teenagers to participate in university classes at schools throughout the Russian Federation.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces have sustained over one million casualties since
the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, over half of which occurred since January
2024. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 12 that Russian forces have sustained 628,000
casualties since January 2024. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported a breakdown of Russian casualty
rates since 2022: Russian forces reportedly sustained 106,720 casualties in 2022 (average of 340
casualties per day); 253,290 casualties in 2023 (average of 693 casualties per day); and 430,790
casualties in 2024 (average of 1,177 casualties per day).
Russian forces have reportedly
sustained an average of 1,286 casualties per day between January and early June 2025 in exchange for
marginal territorial gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces had already
sustained over 200,000 casualties in 2025 as of June 4, 2025. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) news
agency ArmyInform reported on June 5 that an unnamed NATO official stated that Russian forces are
sustaining an average casualty rate of 1,140 personnel per day. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head
Pavlo Palisa stated on June 4 that Russia is sustaining roughly 167 casualties per square kilometer of
advance. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on June 11 that Russian forces seized more territory in
May 2025 than any other month since the end of 2022. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian
forces have seized roughly 1,935 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory thus far in 2025 as of June 12,
2025ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is willfully taking disproportionately
large manpower losses for marginal territorial gains across the theater and that these losses are
unsustainable in the medium-term and unlikely to result in significant, rapid gains. Russian forces
continue to burn through personnel in their ongoing efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk
oblasts; advance in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts; and establish buffer zones in Sumy and Kharkiv
oblasts
Key Takeaways:
• The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces
have sustained over one million casualties since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February
2022, over half of which occurred since January 2024.
• Russian forces have reportedly
sustained an average of 1,286 casualties per day between January and early June 2025 in exchange for
marginal territorial gains.
• Russian forces recently advanced across the western
Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border northwest of Kurakhove as part of a multi-pronged effort to advance
into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
• Russian forces are likely attempting to level the frontlines in
the Novopavlivka and Kurakhove directions to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
• The
Ukrainian forces continue to demonstrate their ability to conduct successful long-range strikes that
target Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukraine and Russia exchanged prisoners of war
(POWs) again on June 12, in accordance with agreements the parties previously reached during talks in
Istanbul on June 2.
• Southeastern European countries reiterated their support for Ukraine on
June 11, including Serbia signaling its willingness to improve bilateral relations with Ukraine.
• Germany pledged to supply Ukraine with additional financial and materiel support, including air
defense systems.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces advanced in northern
Sumy Oblast and near Siversk and Kurakhove.
Russian officials largely condemned the June 13 Israeli strikes against Iran, as Russian President
Vladimir Putin continued to offer to facilitate negotiations on Iran's nuclear program. Putin had
separate phone calls with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu on June 13. The Kremlin claimed that Putin condemned Israel's strikes as violations of the UN
Charter and international law. Putin reportedly stated that Russia supports efforts to resolve the
situation about Iran's nuclear program and noted that Russia has already suggested initiatives aimed at
finding a "mutually acceptable agreement." The Kremlin claimed that Putin emphasized to Netanyahu the
importance of returning to the negotiation process and resolving issues about Iran's nuclear program
through political and diplomatic means. Putin reportedly told Netanyahu that Russia is willing to mediate
talks between Iran and Israel.
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned
Israel's strikes against Iran and notably claimed that "unprovoked military strikes against a sovereign
UN member state, its citizens, sleeping peaceful cities, and nuclear energy infrastructure facilities are
categorically unacceptable." The Russian MFA claimed that these Israeli strikes against Iran undermined
and set back efforts to find solutions to "eliminate any suspicions and prejudices regarding Iran's
peaceful nuclear energy." The Russian MFA blamed Western states for provoking anti-Iranian "hysteria" in
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), referencing a June 10 resolution that the United States
and E3 (United Kingdom, Germany, and France) proposed to declare Iran as noncompliant with its nuclear
safeguarding obligations. The Russian MFA issued travel advisories for Russian citizens for Israel and
Iran. The Russian Embassy in Iran called on Russian citizens and "compatriots" in Iran to avoid military
facilities and refrain from photographing or videoing "any part of Iran," and the Russian Embassy in
Israel called for Russians in Israel to leave the country.
Other Kremlin officials condemned
Israel and the West for the strikes and advocated for a political and diplomatic Israeli-Iranian
settlement. First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev claimed
that Russia's ties with Iran, including military ties, can become closer if necessary. Zhuravlev claimed
that Russia has provided Iran with air defense systems and praised Iran's military technology, including
technology that Russia helps Iran develop. Zhuravlev criticized the West for perpetuating "global
injustice" and inequality and claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine is aimed at fighting this
injustice.
Oil price increases following Israeli strikes against Iran may increase Russian
revenue from oil sales and improve Russia's ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine. Brent crude oil
futures prices rose by over five percent to $74.47 per barrel on June 13 following the Israeli strikes
against Iran. Russia's oil and gas earnings accounted for roughly 30 percent of total federal revenues in
2024, underscoring the significant role oil and gas revenues play in financing Russian government
spending. ISW previously assessed that compounding economic constraints on Russia are increasingly
hindering Russia's ability to sustain a prolonged war effort in Ukraine. Russia may be able to leverage
sudden upticks in oil prices to weather economic challenges and finance a protracted war in Ukraine,
assuming the price of oil remains high (such as over $60 per barrel). Russian President Vladimir Putin
has previously signaled concern about reduced oil prices, suggesting that any reduction in the oil price
would likely risk destabilizing Russia's economy.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian
officials largely condemned the June 13 Israeli strikes against Iran, as Russian President Vladimir Putin
continued to offer to facilitate negotiations on Iran's nuclear program.
• Oil price increases
following Israeli strikes against Iran may increase Russian revenue from oil sales and improve Russia's
ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is continuing efforts to prepare
the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) for a protracted war with Ukraine and a potential future war
with NATO.
• Russia released the bodies of killed in action (KIA) Ukrainian servicemembers to
Ukraine on June 13.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces advanced in
northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian forces continue to make marginal territorial gains east of Novopavlivka as Russian forces attempt
to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and toward the settlement from three tactical directions.
Geolocated footage published on June 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central
Horikhove (east of Novopavlivka) and likely seized the settlement. An assault detachment commander in the
Russian 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army , Central Military District
) told Kremlin newswire TASS on June 14 that the regiment participated in the advance into
Horikhove. ISW previously noted that Russian forces are currently engaged in a multi-pronged effort to
advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and Russian forces appear to be attacking from three tactical
directions: east, southeast, and south of Novopavlivka. The Russian 41st CAA appears to be the main
formation operating east of Novopavlivka. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 80th Tank
Regiment also recently advanced west of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka). Ukrainian military observer
Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 74th and 137th motorized rifle brigades (41st
CAA) are also attacking near Kotlyarivka and Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and that additional
elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade are attacking Horikhove from the north. Russian forces
intensified offensive operations southwest of Pokrovsk between Solone and Bohdanivka in the direction of
the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary in March and April 2025 and recently advanced
to the administrative boundary within seven kilometers east of Novopavlivka.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces continue to make marginal territorial gains east of Novopavlivka as Russian
forces attempt to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and toward the settlement from three tactical
directions.
• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct long-range strikes against Russia's defense
industrial base.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a fourth round of prisoner of war (POWs)
exchanges on June 14, in accordance with the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian bilateral talks in Istanbul.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced near Toretsk and
Novopavlivka.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to portray Russia as an effective and necessary international
partner for the United States amid ongoing Iran-Israel tensions. US President Donald Trump stated on June
14 that he and Putin spoke by phone for about an hour about the ongoing Israel-Iran strikes and spent
“much less” time talking about Ukraine than Iran. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on June
14 that Putin and Trump mainly spoke about military escalation in the Middle East. Ushakov claimed that
Putin expressed concern over the escalation of tensions between Iran and Israel and offered Russia’s
assistance in negotiating a peace settlement. Trump stated that he reminded Putin that the war against
Ukraine must end during the call. Putin is likely attempting to distract from his ongoing war of
aggression against Ukraine by offering to help the United States mediate the situation in the Middle
East.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to portray Russia
as an effective and necessary international partner for the United States amid ongoing Iran-Israel
tensions.
• Russia conducted a large drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of
June 14 to 15, primarily targeting Poltava Oblast.
• Russia repatriated the bodies of over
1,000 Ukrainian citizens on June 15, in accordance with the June 2 Ukrainian–Russian bilateral talks in
Istanbul.
• Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Siversk, Chasiv
Yar, and Toretsk.
Russia’s consumption of its Soviet-era tank stores appears to be slowing, possibly due to Russia's
increasing transition to using motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) on the battlefield. A social
media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots via satellite imagery shared an updated
assessment of smaller Russian tank and armored vehicle storage facilities on June 15 and assessed that
Russia still has 46 percent of its pre-war tank reserves, 42 percent of its pre-war infantry fighting
vehicle (IFV) reserves, and 48 percent of its pre-war armored personnel carrier (APC) reserves as of a
recent unspecified date. The source stated that imagery of eight Russian military depot appears to show
that Russia has emptied most of the depots of their vehicle reserves and assessed that Russia will likely
deplete its remaining tank and armored vehicle reserves by the end of 2025. The social media source
assessed in late December 2024 that Russia had 47 percent of its pre-war tank reserves, 52 percent of its
pre-war IFV reserves, and 45 percent of its pre-war APC reserves remaining in storage. (The source noted
on June 15 that they updated their previous assessments of Russia’s pre-war reserves and found that
Russia had 241 more tanks, 174 more IFVs, and 687 more APCs before the full-scale invasion than the
source previously assessed, which likely accounts for the increase in Russian APCs stores from 45 percent
in the December 2024 assessment to 48 percent in June 2024.) The social media source also stated that
satellite imagery analysis indicates a ”dramatic” increase in ”almost all” types of equipment deployed to
a Russian military base near Petrozavodsk, Republic of Karelia, located roughly 373 kilometers from the
international border with Finland. Russia may have additional armored vehicles and tanks in covered
storage that are not visible in satellite imagery. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on April 27
that a senior Finnish military official stated that Russia is sending "almost none" of its newly produced
tanks to the frontline in Ukraine but is stockpiling the."
The social media source's data
suggests that Russia's consumption of Soviet-era tank stocks has slowed in recent months, an observation
consistent with ISW’s study of recent battlefield combat footage which shows that Russian forces are
increasingly using motorcycles and buggies in place of armored vehicles along the frontline in Ukraine.
Russian forces have been increasingly using unarmored civilian vehicles, mainly motorcycles and
all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), throughout the theater in Ukraine since late Fall 2024. ISW previously noted
that Russia's increased use of motorcycles is an adaptation in response to pervasive Ukrainian drone
strikes against Russian armored vehicles and the unsustainable armored vehicle losses that Russian forces
suffered in late 2023 and 2024. Ukrainian drone operations have significantly complicated how to
tactically employ tanks, as large and slow-moving armored vehicles and tanks are vulnerable to drones.
Russian forces appear to be leveraging faster-moving motorcycles and buggies to advance through the
contested "gray zones" that Ukrainian and Russian drone operators have created along the frontline.
Russia's adaption has succeeded in granting Russian forces marginal tactical gains at the expense of
significant infantry losses. ISW previously assessed that Russian armored vehicle losses are
unsustainable and are undermining Russia’s ability to sustain a protracted high-intensity war, but it
remains unclear if Russia’s increased reliance on motorcycles and buggies will be sufficient to offset
these losses in the medium- to long-term.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukraine and Russia
conducted an exchange that included the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on June 16 in
accordance with agreements reached during talks in Istanbul on June 2.
• Ukraine's Foreign
Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported that the Kremlin is spreading narratives about the POW and KIA
exchanges in order to sow panic in Ukraine and discredit Ukraine in the international community – in line
with ISW’s recent assessments.
• Russia’s consumption of its Soviet-era tank stores appears to
be slowing, possibly due to Russia's increasing transition to using motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles
(ATVs) on the battlefield.
• Russia continues to set conditions to pose a long-term strategic
threat to the United States and its Western allies even after the end to Russia's war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and in Zaporizhia Oblast, and Russian forces
recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.
Russia is attempting to leverage the Ukrainian children it has illegally deported in ongoing negotiations
with Ukraine, thereby contradicting recent Russian efforts to deny and downplay the scale of its
deportation campaign and confirming that Russia has indeed stolen Ukrainian children in clear violation
of international law. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 16 during a press conference
with Austrian President Alexander Van der Bellen that Russian officials proposed exchanging deported
Ukrainian children for Russian prisoners of war (POWs). Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine will not
exchange children for Russian combatants, condemned the proposal as “beyond international law,” and
called for Russia to return the children unilaterally, without exchanging them. The Russian suggestion
that children be treated as combatants runs contrary to international law, which grants children special
protected status in times of war. The Russian proposal additionally acknowledges that Russia has deported
Ukrainian children, despite recent Russian attempts to either deny or greatly downplay the scale of the
deportations. ISW continues to assess that there can be no just peace in Ukraine until Russia has
returned all of the children it has deported. Russia cannot use children as bargaining chips and must
ensure their return unilaterally and unconditionally, not in exchange for anything.
Key
Takeaways:
• Russia is attempting to leverage the Ukrainian children it has illegally deported
in ongoing negotiations with Ukraine, thereby contradicting recent Russian efforts to deny and downplay
the scale of its deportation campaign and confirming that Russia has indeed stolen Ukrainian children in
clear violation of international law.
• Russian occupation officials used the circumstances of
Russia Day festivities to forcibly passportize Ukrainian children.
• The Republic of Kalmykia
is facilitating the deportation of Ukrainian children via its patronage ties with a local Luhansk Oblast
occupation administration.
• Russia continues to deport Ukrainian children to Russia for
military-patriotic training and ideological indoctrination through the “Time of Young Heroes” program.
• Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky credited Kremlin-appointed Russian
Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova and the “Country for Children” charitable foundation
for the recent deportation of 100 children from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian
occupation authorities are suppressing religious freedom in occupied Crimea by prosecuting religious
minority groups as “extremists” and by appropriating worship sites for the benefit of the occupation
administration.
• Ukrainian partisan groups conducted attacks on Russian military personnel
and assets in occupied Ukraine on June 11 and 12.
Russian forces conducted the third largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine since the
start of Russia's full-scale invasion on the night of June 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported
that Russian forces launched 440 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk
cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The
Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from
the airspace over Tambov Oblast, 16 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast, four
Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea, nine Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from the airspace over Belgorod
and Bryansk oblasts, and one Kh-31P anti-radar missile from an unspecified location. The Ukrainian Air
Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 239 drones, one Kh-47M2 missile, 15 Kh-101 missiles, and
seven Kh-59/59 missiles and that 163 drones, one Kh-47M2 missile, one Kh-59/69 missile, and one Kh-31P
missile were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian Air Force
Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that the Shahed and decoy drones targeting Kyiv City flew from
different directions, including along the Dnipro River and from the east and west. Ihnat and Kyiv City
Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko stated that Ukrainian authorities found remnants of cluster munitions at the site
of missile explosions, and a Ukrainian source posted footage reportedly showing a Russian missile with
cluster munitions striking Kyiv City overnight. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes hit
residential areas and civilian infrastructure in Kyiv City and Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Odesa, Sumy, and
Zaporizhia oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported civilian casualties in Kyiv and Odesa cities and
Chernihiv Oblast.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces conducted the third largest
combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion on the
night of June 16 to 17.
• The June 16-17 strike series heavily targeted Kyiv City and hit
residential areas in the capital, as Russian officials and milbloggers called on Russia to intensify its
strikes against Ukraine.
• Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu announced that
North Korea would send 6,000 sappers and military engineers to help with reconstruction efforts in Kursk
Oblast.
• The European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) announced sanctions packages
against Russia on June 16 and 17.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk,
and Pokrovsk.
Russian forces conducted an at least platoon-sized mechanized assault in the Toretsk direction on June
17. Geolocated footage published on June 17 shows that Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault west
of Yablunivka (west of Toretsk) with at least three armored vehicles and four motorized vehicles, likely
all-terrain vehicles (ATVs). Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov reported on June 18 that Russian
forces conducted a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault near Kostyantynivka and that Ukrainian
forces destroyed 15 pieces of heavy equipment and eight motorized vehicles. Russian forces have been
conducting mechanized assaults less frequently since Winter 2024–2025, likely due to Ukrainian drone
capabilities and Russia's dwindling supply of armored vehicles. ISW recently observed reports indicating
that Russia's consumption of Soviet-era tank stores is slowing. Russian forces have become increasingly
reliant on civilian vehicles, ATVs, and motorcycles for assaults, and the Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD) began efforts in April 2025 to formally integrate motorcycle usage into offensive operations.
Russian mechanized assaults in the Toretsk direction may indicate that the Russian military command
intends to prioritize this sector of the front. ISW will continue to monitor this area of the frontline
for additional evidence of mechanized assaults.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces
conducted an at least platoon-sized mechanized assault in the Toretsk direction on June 17.
• The Kremlin likely aims to use the ongoing St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) to
support ongoing efforts to consolidate control over the information space and prepare Russian society for
a prolonged war effort.
• The Kremlin also aims to use SPIEF to promote Kremlin narratives to
Western audiences.
• Ukraine's Western partners continue to supply Ukraine with military aid
and announce new sanctions packages against Russia.
• The Kremlin continues to crack down on
critical Russian milbloggers as part of its years-long effort to censor and control the Russian
information space.
• Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts and near
Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.
The West has failed to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin to reevaluate his theory of victory in
Ukraine in the past year. Putin’s public statements indicate that he continues to assess that Russian
forces will be able to win a war of attrition by sustaining gradual advances along the frontline
indefinitely. Putin articulated a theory of victory during the St. Petersburg International Economic
Forum (SPIEF) in June 2024 that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping
advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant
counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces. Putin's assessment that
gradual Russian gains will allow Russia to achieve his goals in Ukraine is predicated on the assumption
that Ukrainian forces will be unable to liberate any significant territory that Russian forces seize and
that the Russian military will be able to sustain offensive operations that achieve gradual tactical
gains regardless of heavy losses. Putin's discussion with foreign media at SPIEF on June 19, 2025,
demonstrated that Putin still maintains this theory of victory one year later. Putin claimed that Russian
forces have a "strategic advantage" in all areas of the front. Putin claimed that Russian forces are
advancing along the entire frontline every day and that even if Russian forces advance less on some days,
they are "still advancing." Putin claimed that the "situation has changed" since the March 2022
Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Istanbul and that the terms Russia proposed in 2022 are "much softer"
than the terms Russia demands today. Putin threatened that the situation may worsen for Ukraine if
Ukraine does not make significant concessions and agree to a peace settlement on Russia's terms and
called on Ukraine's partners to "point to the realities of today" to push Ukraine toward a settlement.
Putin reiterated that Russia is prepared to achieve its war goals militarily if it is not able to achieve
these goals diplomatically. Putin has repeatedly indicated that Russia's war aims include regime change
in Ukraine, the installation of a pro-Kremlin proxy government in Kyiv, significant limitations of
Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression, Ukrainian neutrality, and NATO's
abandonment of its open-door policy.
Putin's theory of victory is predicated on critical
assumptions about Ukraine's capabilities and continued Western support for Ukraine — conditions that the
West can still change. Putin's theory assumes that Russian forces will be able to leverage their
advantages in manpower and materiel to overwhelm Ukrainian forces and that Ukrainian forces will be
unable to liberate any operationally- or strategically-significant territory that Russian forces seize.
Russian forces are taking disproportionately large manpower losses for marginal tactical gains that are
unsustainable in the medium- to long-term, but Putin's theory assumes that the Russian military will be
able to maintain the theater-wide initiative and sustain offensive operations that achieve gradual
tactical gains longer than the West is willing to provide security assistance to Ukraine and longer than
Ukraine's economy and population are able to mobilize for the war effort. ISW continues to assess that
Russia will face a number of challenges in its economy and defense industrial base (DIB) in the
medium-term that will impede Russia's ability to sustain a prolonged war in Ukraine. Continued rising oil
prices following Israeli strikes against Iran may increase Russian revenue from oil sales and improve
Russia's ability to sustain its war effort, but only if the price of oil remains high and if Russian oil
does not come under additional international sanctions. Increased Western military aid and economic
instruments can enable Ukrainian forces to maintain pressure on the battlefield and exacerbate Russia's
economic issues, leveraging Russia's weaknesses to achieve a strong negotiating position for Ukraine and
the West and extract critical concessions from Russia to bring about a lasting and just end to the
war.
Key Takeaways:
• The West has failed to convince Russian President Vladimir
Putin to reevaluate his theory of victory in Ukraine in the past year. Putin’s public statements indicate
that he continues to assess that Russian forces will be able to win a war of attrition by sustaining
gradual advances along the frontline indefinitely.
• Putin's theory of victory is predicated
on critical assumptions about Ukraine's capabilities and continued Western support for Ukraine –
conditions that the West can still change.
• Putin continued Russia's reflexive control
campaign that aims to deter Western provisions of military aid to Ukraine and NATO rearmament but appears
to be adapting this campaign for different audiences.
• Putin explicitly stated that he will
not sign a peace agreement with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
• Putin used his
meeting with international journalists to reinject longstanding Kremlin rhetorical lines into the media
space, as ISW previously forecasted.
• Russian officials appear to be struggling to posture
Russia's economic strength amid increasing signs of a slowing Russian economy.
• Ukraine and
Russia conducted the fifth prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance the June 2 Istanbul agreements,
amid reports that Russia artificially inflated the number of bodies released to Ukraine in previous
killed in action (KIA) exchanges.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian
forces advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.
Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation and all of Ukraine
is effectively Russian as part of efforts to justify his continued conquest of Ukraine. Putin answered a
question after his speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 20 about why
Russian forces are advancing beyond the territories in Ukraine that Russia has illegally annexed,
claiming that he considers Russian and Ukrainian people to be "one people in reality" and that "Ukraine
is ." Putin has repeatedly demonstrated that he does not consider Ukraine as an independent
state with its own history, identity, and culture separate from Russia, as evidenced by his 2021 "On the
Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" essay and his repeated false assertion that Russians,
Belarusians, and Ukrainians are all part of one historical people.
ISW has previously noted
that the Kremlin's ongoing information operation attempting to portray Russians and Ukrainians as one
unified nation and culturally and historically homogeneous is one of its most significant information
operations aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and justifying the war effort to the Russian
people. Putin's commitment to this narrative underscores his ongoing commitment to destroying the
Ukrainian state and subjugating the Ukrainian people.
Putin asserted that Russia will be able
to achieve its goals through a protracted war in Ukraine. Putin claimed on June 20 that it would be
better for Ukraine to stop fighting because the battlefield and geopolitical situation will only worsen
for Ukraine, and that Ukraine will have to negotiate from a weaker position. Putin attempted to posture
Russia as interested in engaging in negotiations to end the war, claiming that Russia is not seeking
"Ukrainian capitulation," yet insisted that Ukraine recognize the "realities that have developed on the
ground." Kremlin officials often call for Ukraine to recognize the "realities on the ground" (a reference
to the frontline in Ukraine) to allude to the idea that Russia is in a stronger negotiating position
given the situation on the battlefield and to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia's unwavering
demands.
Putin's claim that Ukraine must recognize the "realities on the ground" and should
negotiate before the situation worsens also coheres with Putin's theory of victory, which assesses that
Russian forces will be able to win a war of attrition by indefinitely sustaining gradual advances along
the frontline despite the high costs of such creeping advances. Putin's statement ignores that the true
"realities on the ground" show a complicated and hotly contested frontline situation in which Russian
forces are slowly making marginal advances at the cost of significant manpower and materiel losses in the
face of significant Ukrainian drone-based defenses.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian
President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation and all of Ukraine is
effectively Russian as part of efforts to justify his continued conquest of Ukraine.
• Putin
asserted that Russia will be able to achieve its goals through a protracted war in Ukraine.
• Putin and other Kremlin officials are using the guise of "buffer zones" to expand Russia's
territorial demands in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues to prioritize maintaining the facade
of economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia's economic
instability.
• Putin is attempting to obfuscate the reality that increased investment in
Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) has come at the cost of Russia's civilian economic sectors.
• Open-source intelligence suggests that Russia is increasing its T-90M tank production
capabilities
• Ukraine and Russia conducted the sixth prisoner of war (POW) exchange in
accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky
appointed Brigadier General Hennadii Shapovalov as Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces on June
19.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
Russian President Vladimir Putin's long-term demands for full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged.
Putin told Sky News Arabia on June 20 that Ukraine needs to accept neutrality, reject foreign alliances,
and agree to nuclear non-proliferation before Russia and Ukraine can establish long-term peace. Putin
insisted that Kyiv recognize Russian control over the illegally annexed, partially occupied Donetsk,
Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts or risk future Russian aggression. Putin also claimed that
Ukrainian leaders are being guided by the interests of "external parties" rather than national interest,
reiterating a long-term Russian narrative accusing Ukraine of being controlled by the West and denying
the Ukrainian government agency to make its own decisions and defend itself. Putin claimed that Ukraine
deserves a "better fate" than to be used by other countries as a tool against Russia. Putin also stated
that no future settlement can be reached unless Russia and Ukraine resolve "outstanding humanitarian
issues." Russian officials had repeatedly issued the same pre-war demands that Russian officials
presented at negotiations in Istanbul in 2022, which included recognition of occupied Ukraine as Russian
territory and the "demilitarization" of Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in
peace negotiations with Ukraine and remains committed to its pre-war demands, which amount essentially to
the elimination of Ukraine as a sovereign country independent of Russian control.
Ukrainian
officials responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 20 statements at the St. Petersburg
International Economic Forum (SPIEF) and urged the international community to take more decisive action
against Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky responded to Putin’s statement that Russia owns
everywhere a "Russian soldier steps" and emphasized that Putin clearly laid out Russia’s intention to
seize all of Ukraine during this speech. Zelensky noted that this ideology implies that Russia could also
lay claim to Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova, the Caucasus, and Central Asian countries like
Kazakhstan. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated that Russian soldiers bring "only death,
destruction, and devastation” wherever they step. Sybiha stated that the only way that Putin will accept
peace would be if the West forced his hand through increased support for Ukrainian defense, severe
economic sanctions, the recognition of Russia as a terrorist state, and complete diplomatic isolation.
Sybiha called on the international community to push back against Putin’s continued aspirations toward
new territorial gains. ISW has previously noted that Putin's theory of victory is based on the assumption
that Russia can outlast Ukraine's will to fight and the Western coalition supporting Ukraine, and that
reducing US military aid to Ukraine will neither lead to a sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Putin
to reassess his theory of victory.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir
Putin's long-term demands for full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged.
• Ukrainian
officials responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 20 statements at the St. Petersburg
International Economic Forum (SPIEF) and urged the international community to take more decisive action
against Russia.
• Kremlin officials appear to be reviving the false narrative that Ukraine
intends to use a "dirty bomb" against Russia, likely in an attempt to influence Western discussions about
providing additional military assistance to Ukraine.
• US Special Envoy to Ukraine General
Keith Kellogg met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk on June 21.
• Russia continues to field modernized Shahed drones, expand domestic drone production capabilities,
and innovate long-range strike tactics.
• The Russian government formally announced its
intention to reassess Russia's territorial waters in the Baltic Sea over a year after the Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) published and subsequently deleted a similar proposal.
• Russian
forces advanced near Novopavlivka and Velyka Novosilka.
Russia condemned the recent US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22 amid reports that Iran's
foreign minister will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on June 23. The Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned the US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22,
claiming that the US strikes are a violation of the UN Charter and that the UN Security Council is
obliged to respond, while urging officials to return to diplomatic channels. Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov stated that that the world will descend into chaos if countries are allowed to interpret
the right to self-defense in the UN Charter as they wish. Lavrov claimed that the US strikes marked a
new, dangerous escalation during a phone call with Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó on June 22.
CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and Presidential Special Representative for Investment
and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev claimed on June 22 that Iranian Foreign
Minister Abbas Araghchi is en route to Moscow and will meet with Putin on June 23. Russian Security
Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to the US strike in social media posts, including on
his English-language channels, on June 22 by claiming that US President Donald Trump has started a new
war. Medvedev also claimed that the United States failed to destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities, that
Iran will continue to work towards the production of nuclear weapons, and that several unspecified
countries are ready to "directly supply" Iran with nuclear warheads. The Kremlin typically leverages
Medvedev to amplify narratives intended to stoke panic and fear among Western decisionmakers,
particularly through nuclear saber rattling. Medvedev's veiled threats thus do not represent a
significant rhetorical inflection. ISW continues to assess that Russia is constrained in its ability to
provide direct support to Iran due to its war in Ukraine and has likely resigned itself to providing
diplomatic overtures for the time being, showcasing the immediate limitations in the Russian-Iranian
strategic relationship.
Iran's possible decision to close the Strait of Hormuz will cause a
significant spike in global oil prices, which would greatly economically and financially benefit Russia
by reversing months of declining Russian oil revenue and allowing Russia to continue to finance its war
against Ukraine in the medium term. Brent crude oil futures prices closed at $77.27 on June 20, marking
an 11.4 percent rise from June 12 just prior to the Israeli strikes against Iran. Iran’s Parliament voted
on June 22 to close the Strait, but the final decision remains with Iran’s Supreme National Security
Council and leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Oil prices will likely surge exponentially in the event that
Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz, with varying reports predicting a spike to prices between $90 to $130
in a worst-case scenario. Russia’s oil and gas revenue amounted to 11.1 trillion rubles ($120.3 billion)
in 2024 and accounted for roughly 30 percent of Russia's total federal revenues. Russian oil revenue has
been steadily decreasing through 2025 however, with May 2025 revenues notably 34 percent lower than in
2024. The Russian Finance Ministry more than tripled its budget deficit target for 2025 in May from 0.5
percent of Global Domestic Product (GDP) to 1.7 percent of GDP after several months of staggeringly low
oil and gas profits.<12> The Moscow Times stated on June 9 that, according to economists from the Russian
Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Russia’s high expenditures and low
oil revenues could exhaust the National Wealth Fund (NWF) by 2026. The Kremlin relies on the NWF and oil
and gas revenues to finance its war in Ukraine, as the Russian government allocated 41 percent (roughly
$178 billion) of Russia’s total 2025 federal budget towards National Security and Defense alone. ISW
previously assessed that Russia’s high losses on the battlefield and ongoing economic constraints could
prevent Russia from continuing the war in Ukraine in the medium to long term, however a sustained surge
in oil prices could keep Russia afloat economically.
Russian forces have continued to pursue
long-standing operational objectives on the battlefield in Ukraine throughout Spring and Summer 2025 and
will likely remain committed to these objectives for the coming months. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief
General Oleksandr Syrskyi told journalists on June 22 that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and
continued Ukrainian counterattacks in northern Sumy Oblast prevented the Russian military from
redeploying 60,000 troops from Kursk Oblast to reinforce offensive operations in the Lyman, Toretsk,
Pokrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson directions in Spring 2025. Syrskyi noted that Ukraine prevented Russia
from significantly intensifying offensive operations in these directions. A prominent Russian milblogger
acknowledged on June 22 that Russia's "summer offensive" has mainly consisted of the same grinding
offensive operations that Russian forces began in late 2023. The milblogger claimed that the situation
along the frontline is unlikely to significantly change during Summer 2025 and noted that Ukrainian
forces are conducting an organized defense throughout the frontline.
Russian forces are
currently engaged in intense combat operations along most of the frontline in Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk,
and Zaporizhia oblasts and appear to be prioritizing offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast - as they
have since October 2023. Russian forces intensified the tempo of offensive operations in early 2025 as
the United States began to engage in efforts to mediate a resolution to the war in Ukraine, and Russian
forces have sustained this intensified tempo over the last five months. Russian forces previously
struggled to conduct simultaneous large-scale offensive operations and compensated by conducting pulsing,
more limited, offensive operations along different sectors of the frontline with one sector decreasing in
intensity as another sector increases. Russian forces currently appear to be advancing as part of at
least three simultaneous large-scale offensive operations in the Borova-Lyman, Kostyantynivka, and
Novopavlivka directions, however. Russian forces also appear to be allocating significant manpower to
offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast, although Ukrainian forces appear to be slowing Russian
gains in that area. Russian forces have failed to make significant gains during this period of
intensified offensive operations, however, due in part to the fact that Russian forces are largely
relying on poorly trained infantry to make gains in the face of Ukraine's drone-based defense. The
continuation of Russia's intensified offensive operations likely represents the extent of Russia's
current offensive capacity, and Russia is unlikely to mount a distinct summer offensive operation.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia condemned the recent US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities
on June 22 amid reports that Iran's foreign minister will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in
Moscow on June 23.
• Iran's possible decision to close the Strait of Hormuz will cause a
significant spike in global oil prices, which would greatly economically and financially benefit Russia
by reversing months of declining Russian oil revenue and allowing Russia to continue to finance its war
against Ukraine in the medium term.
• Russian forces have continued to pursue long-standing
operational objectives on the battlefield in Ukraine throughout Spring and Summer 2025 and will likely
remain committed to these objectives for the coming months.
• Russia's intensified force
generation efforts appear to be generating a reserve force that Russia will be able to leverage in
Ukraine or against NATO in the future, despite current limitations on Russia's offensive capacity in
Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues to promote rhetoric designed to undermine Ukrainian
legitimacy and sovereignty, demonstrating its steadfast commitment to the complete destruction of
Ukraine.
• Kremlin officials are leveraging the Russian education system to indoctrinate
children into the mythos of the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War and create a centralized
state ideology that will shape generations in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukraine, likely to justify a
protracted war in Ukraine and a future military conflict against the West.
• Ukrainian forces
advanced in northern Sumy oblast. Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka.
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