Russian President Vladimir Putin is leveraging long-range strikes against Ukrainian cities, aggressive rhetorical campaigns, and excessive pessimism in the West about the battlefield situation in Ukraine in a multi-pronged effort to degrade Ukrainian morale and convince the West that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and that supporting Ukraine is futile. Russian forces have intensified long-range strikes against Ukraine over the last eight months and have conducted seven of the largest drone and missile strikes during the war to date since January 2025. Russian officials are currently inundating the information space with calls for Ukraine to make concessions on its sovereignty and territorial integrity, although most of these statements are consistent with long-standing Russian war demands and in fact demonstrate that Russia's demands have not changed over the last three years of war. These demands ignore the fact that the battlefield situation has shifted dramatically since early 2022, and that three years of manpower and materiel losses have significantly degraded the Russian military's ability to conquer Ukraine. Russian advances have significantly slowed as Russian forces continue to suffer personnel losses and increasingly rely on poorly trained and equipped infantry to make gains. Putin remains deeply committed to distracting from the realities of the battlefield situation, however, as bringing about the cessation of Western military assistance to Ukraine is Russia's only real hope of winning this war.

Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on May 25 that Russian forces launched nine Iskander-M and Kn-23 ballistic missiles from Kursk Oblast, 55 Kh-101 and Kalibr cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast and the Black Sea, one Kh-22 cruise missile from the airspace over the Black Sea, and four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from an unspecified area of Russia and 298 Shahed and decoy drones from the direction of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 45 cruise missiles and that two Kh-59/69 missiles were "lost in location." The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukraine shot down 139 drones and that 127 drones were "lost." Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike primarily targeted Kyiv and Chernihiv oblasts and also targeted Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, Sumy, Odesa, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, and Cherkasy oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes killed at least 12 people and injured up to 60 people.

Ukrainian sources noted on May 25 that Russian forces are increasingly launching missiles from occupied Crimea after using missiles less frequently over the last five months. Ukrainian Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Chernyak reported that Russian forces have launched more than 50 missiles from mobile missile systems in occupied Crimea since January 1, 2025. Chernyak stated that Ukrainian Forces struggle to strike the mobile missile launch systems since Russian forces can deploy the systems in 20 minutes and quickly break down and move the systems after a launch. Experts familiar with the topic reported that Russian forces have been launching Iskander ballistic missiles, Oniks supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, and Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles from Crimea. ISW assessed on May 24 that Russian forces have used fewer cruise missiles in strike packages since January 2025, likely due to increased reliance on cheaper long-range drones. The May 24 to 25 overnight combined strike indicates that Russia may be stockpiling cruise missiles in order to conduct large-scale combined strikes against multiple areas of Ukraine at will. Russia may also be using highly varied strike packages in order to confuse Ukrainian forces and prevent Ukrainian forces from conducting consistently effective air defense.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is leveraging long-range strikes against Ukrainian cities, aggressive rhetorical campaigns, and excessive pessimism in the West about the battlefield situation in Ukraine in a multi-pronged effort to degrade Ukrainian morale and convince the West that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and that supporting Ukraine is futile.

• Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 24 to 25.

• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev suggested that Russia will occupy most of Ukraine if the West continues to aid Ukraine.

• The Kremlin is attempting to leverage large strike packages and increasingly aggressive rhetorical efforts to distract from the Russian military's poor performance during this current stage of the war.

• Russian forces have eliminated the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk after a four-month-long offensive operation to level the frontline south and southwest of Kostyantynivka in order to set conditions to advance towards the settlement.

• Russian forces would need roughly a century to seize Medvedev's proposed "buffer zone" at their current rate of advance at the cost of nearly 50 million casualties at current loss rates.

• The Kremlin is also using its bilateral engagements with Ukraine and the United States to maintain the appearance of being interested in peace and delay Western discussion of additional aid to Ukraine.

• Russia's only real hope of winning this war is to convince the West to abandon Ukraine.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kharkiv, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted one of their largest drone and missile strikes of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 25 to 26 after three nights of record strikes. The May 25-26 strike is now the second largest combined strike of the war, after Russian forces conducted the largest combined strike on the night of May 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched nine Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast and 355 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all nine Kh-101 missiles and 233 drones over northern, eastern, southern, western, and central Ukraine and that 55 drones were "lost." Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes targeted Chernihiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Kyiv oblasts. Ukrainian officials stated that the strikes caused civilian casualties and damaged civilian infrastructure and private residences.

Russia has launched three of its largest strike packages against Ukraine over the last three days, including its two largest combined strikes, and eight of the largest strikes of the war since January 2025. Russian strikes against Ukraine continue to disproportionately impact civilians and civilian infrastructure. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 26 that Russia launched over 900 drones against Ukraine over the last three days and that intensified Russian strikes have a significant political meaning. Zelensky stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin is choosing to continue the war rather than engage in meaningful peace negotiations and that there is no evidence that Russia is considering a diplomatic end to the war. Russia may be increasing strikes against Ukraine as part of a cognitive warfare effort to weaken Ukrainian resolve and to undermine Western support for Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted one of their largest drone and missile strikes of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 25 to 26, after three nights of record strikes. The May 25-26 strike is now the second largest combined strike of the war, after Russian forces conducted the largest combined strike on the night of May 24 to 25.

• Russia's increased missile stockpiling, drone production, and drone adaptations demonstrate Russia's commitment to achieving its war goals through military means in a protracted war in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian intelligence continues to assess that the Kremlin is committed to its war aim of achieving complete Ukrainian capitulation and is preparing for a potential future conflict with NATO — in line with ISW's assessments.

• Ukrainian intelligence also assessed that Russia is facing a number of critical constraints in its economy and on the battlefield — in line with ISW's ongoing assessments.

• Russia's own defense industrial production limitations are pushing Russia to rely on its allies and partners and to find cheap solutions to adapt to Ukraine's drone and counter-drone capabilities.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent demand for Russian forces to create a "buffer zone" along the Russia-Ukraine international border, in addition to Russia's ongoing efforts to seize the remainder of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, ignores Russia's constraints and underscores Putin's intention to increase his territorial demands.

• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises in the Republic of Tatarstan and Ivanovo and Tula oblasts on May 25 and 26.

• The Kremlin's ongoing cognitive warfare effort aimed at preventing future Western military assistance to Ukraine is rooted in fear and the acknowledgement that Russia's only real hope in defeating Ukraine is by isolating Ukraine from its allies.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Vovchansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

The Kremlin is setting conditions to establish permanent control over the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), suggesting that Russia plans to illegally occupy and annex additional territory in Ukraine. Greenpeace's Ukraine service reported on May 27 that satellite imagery from early February 2025 to May 23, 2025, shows that Russia has laid 90 kilometers of powerlines near the Sea of Azov in occupied Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts. Greenpeace reported that these new powerlines are the first observed indications that Russia is acting upon its long-held plans to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid. Russian state nuclear energy operator Rosatom Head Alexei Likhachev claimed on May 21 that Rosatom had developed a plan to bring the ZNPP to "full capacity," suggesting that Russia intends to bring the ZNPP's reactors out of their current cold shutdown state. Likhachev claimed in May 2024 to agree with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) assessment that restarting the ZNPP was currently "impossible" and that the first condition for restarting the ZNPP must be to ensure its security, either with a security guarantee or after the frontline had shifted away from the ZNPP.

US President Donald Trump's April 2025 seven-point peace proposal to Ukraine included a provision for Ukraine to regain control over the ZNPP with US involvement, and the proposed Ukraine-European peace plan also contained this provision. Russian officials have repeatedly rejected giving up control over the ZNPP, however. Russian officials have also increased their rhetoric, invoking Russia's alleged historical ties to "Novorossiya," which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine, and Russian occupation authorities have recently called for Russia to control areas of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast near the Dnipro River that Russia has not yet illegally annexed. The Russian definition of Novorossiya notably includes the area directly across from the ZNPP on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River. Russia's efforts to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid suggest that Russia wants to maintain its control over the ZNPP and operate it safely as Russia likely expects to significantly push the frontline away from the plant or plans to occupy and annex Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

Russian officials are likely leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war. US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg told Fox News on May 27 that the United States had received Ukraine’s list of conditions and timelines for a potential peace treaty and is now waiting for Russia to submit its version to begin reconciling the two countries’ positions. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky stated after the May 16 Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul that the two delegations agreed to "write...down in detail" and present their versions for a possible future ceasefire, but did not specify a deadline. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 27 that Russia is preparing its version of the memorandum. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov stated on May 27 that the success of peace negotiations will depend on the participants’ willingness to address the war’s ”root causes,” reiterating long-standing Russian demands that amount to full Ukrainian capitulation. The Kremlin is likely leveraging the lack of a deadline to prolong negotiations in an attempt to extract more concessions and improve Russia’s negotiating position by making battlefield advances.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is setting conditions to establish permanent control over the Russian-occupied Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), suggesting that Russia plans to illegally occupy and annex additional territory in Ukraine.

• Russian officials are likely leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war.

• Putin continues to use orchestrated public engagements to forward the Kremlin's effort to create a militarized Russian society united against the West that supports a prolonged war in Ukraine and possible future conflict with NATO.

• The European Union (EU) Council approved the first phase of the European Commission’s ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 plan.

• Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar. Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Kupyansk, and Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Western insider reporting about Kremlin demands to end the war in Ukraine continues to align with repeated public statements from Kremlin officials outlining Russia's demands, indicating that Russia's goal of Ukrainian capitulation and destruction of NATO remains unchanged. Reuters reported on May 28 that three Russian sources familiar with the peace negotiations stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin wants Western states to submit a "written" pledge stipulating that NATO will not expand eastward; Ukrainian neutrality; sanctions relief; the unfreezing of Russian assets in the West; and unspecified protections for Russian speakers in Ukraine. Kremlin officials have repeatedly used allegations that the Ukrainian government is discriminating against Russian-speakers in Ukraine to justify Russia's calls for Ukrainian regime change and the installation of a pro-Kremlin puppet regime. Russia's demands for a ban on NATO expansion, Ukrainian neutrality, and regime change are the same demands that Russia issued before the war in 2021 and when Putin launched his full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Putin reportedly maintains his demand that Ukraine cede all of the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed but not fully occupied, even as Kremlin officials have signaled that Russia has territorial ambitions beyond these four oblasts. A Reuters source reportedly stated that Putin is less inclined now to make territorial compromises and continues to demand the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — including the areas that Russian forces do not currently occupy. The source stated that "Putin has toughened his position" about territory. Putin first demanded in June 2024 that Ukraine cede all of the four oblasts, and Russian officials have often reiterated this demand since. The Washington Post reported on May 27 that Ukrainian military intelligence assesses that the Russian military command has deployed 125,000 personnel to the borders of Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts — two oblasts that Russia has not illegally annexed. Russian forces have been conducting offensive operations aimed at creating a buffer zone in Kharkiv Oblast since May 2024. Russian forces also recently launched attacks to create a buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast, with Russian officials calling for Russia to seize Sumy City, likely to set conditions for Russia to annex the oblast. Russia will likely struggle to seize the entirety of the four illegally annexed oblasts, especially as the seizure of the heavily fortified fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast and the forcing of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast will require significantly larger force groupings than the forces currently deployed in eastern and southern Ukraine. The Russian military command would have solely concentrated its efforts on seizing all of the four oblasts if the Kremlin's territorial ambitions were truly limited to the four oblasts, but the deployment of significant forces to attack in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts suggests that Russia intends to increase its territorial demands. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin maintains significant territorial ambitions in southern and eastern Ukraine, and Russian officials within Putin's innermost circle have even called for Russia to take control of most of the country.

Key Takeaways:

• Western insider reporting about Kremlin demands to end the war in Ukraine continues to align with repeated public statements from Kremlin officials outlining Russia's demands, indicating that Russia's goal of Ukrainian capitulation and destruction of NATO remains unchanged.

• Putin reportedly maintains his demand that Ukraine cede all of the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed but not fully occupied, even as Kremlin officials have signaled that Russia has territorial ambitions beyond these four oblasts.

• Putin continues to demonstrate his willingness to achieve his war aims militarily through a prolonged war in Ukraine during which Russian forces would continue to only make gradual, creeping advances.

• The Kremlin continues to promote its long-standing false narratives that the threat of NATO expansion forced Russia to invade Ukraine in 2022, and that NATO continues to threaten Russia's security.

• The Kremlin continues to promote Russian President Vladimir Putin's envisioned Eurasian security architecture — a Russian-led bloc aimed at countering the West and NATO.

• Russia and Belarus reduced the scope of the September 2025 Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarussian military exercise and relocated the main maneuver away from Belarus's western borders, likely to promote a veneer of cooperation and distract from Russia's limited military capacity outside of the Ukraine theater.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to forward an unofficial Russian ideology formulated on Russian nationalism and to try to unify Russian society in support of Russia's war in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes targeting Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) on May 27 and 28.

• Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.

• Ukrainian authorities recently identified a Russian servicemember responsible for the execution of two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) in January 2025.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian officials continue to dictate the terms and timing of peace negotiations with Ukraine and are attempting to obfuscate the current state of negotiations. Russian officials are setting conditions to falsely accuse Ukraine of delaying negotiations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on May 28 that Russia is prepared to present its memorandum on terms for peace negotiations during the next bilateral meeting with Ukraine and suggested that Russian and Ukrainian representatives should meet in Istanbul on June 2. Lavrov claimed that Russia's memorandum proposes how to "reliably" overcome the Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Lavrov has previously defined the root causes of the war in Ukraine as NATO's eastward expansion following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russian speakers and Russian culture. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, who led the last Russian delegation in Istanbul, claimed on May 28 that he spoke with Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and proposed a date for Russia and Ukraine to exchange their memoranda. Umerov responded to the Russian proposal on May 28 and stated that Ukraine is ready for a ceasefire and further negotiations and that Ukraine has already presented its memorandum to Russia. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on May 29 that Russia has not received a copy of Ukraine's memorandum and that Ukraine has not responded to Lavrov's proposal, however.

Russia is forcing Ukraine to make concessions on the timing, terms, and location of negotiations. Russian President Vladimir Putin initially suggested on the night of May 10 to 11 "resuming" the 2022 bilateral peace negotiations in Istanbul but later rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation for an in-person, one-on-one meeting in Istanbul. Ukraine's willingness to attend the May 15 to 16 talks in Istanbul with Russian officials was itself a significant concession, as holding the talks in Istanbul fit into Putin's narrative that the current talks are a resumption of the 2022 Istanbul Protocols in which Russia demanded that Ukraine effectively capitulate to Russia. US President Donald Trump previously suggested that Russia and Ukraine could move peace talks to the Vatican, but Russian officials rejected this offer and continue to suggest meetings in Istanbul. Putin unilaterally announced Easter and Victory Day ceasefires in April and May 2025, and Russia is now again unilaterally imposing timelines and terms on Ukraine. Ukraine, the United States, and European states have repeatedly called for Russia to agree to a renewable ceasefire in Ukraine before Russia and Ukraine begin negotiations for an enduring peace, calls that the Kremlin has repeatedly rejected. Russian officials are instead demanding that negotiations address both a ceasefire and long-term peace agreement in Ukraine. Russian forces will continue to press along the frontline until Ukraine accepts Russia's terms or they are no longer able to do so, and Russian officials will attempt to leverage any additional battlefield gains to extract additional concessions from Ukraine and the West during negotiations.

ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war. Medinsky stated after the May 16 Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul that the two delegations agreed to "write ... down in detail" the terms for peace and present a memorandum for a possible future ceasefire in the future, but did not specify a deadline. Putin told journalists on May 19 that Russia would present Ukraine with a "memorandum" detailing conditions and timing for a future peace treaty as the two countries move toward conducting bilateral negotiations, but also did not specify a deadline. Lavrov claimed on May 23 that Russia would present its memorandum to Ukraine as soon as Russia and Ukraine completed their large-scale prisoner of war (POW) exchange on May 25. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated on May 23 that Ukraine expected Russia to present a draft proposal for an unconditional ceasefire agreement after the third and final POW exchange on May 25. US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg told Fox News on May 27 that the United States received Ukraine’s memorandum of conditions and timelines for a potential peace treaty and is waiting for Russia to submit its version to begin reconciling the two countries’ positions. Russian officials appear to be withholding their memorandum and may attempt to withhold the memorandum until the June 2 meeting. Russian officials may assess that Ukraine will refuse to attend the June 2 meeting if Russia does not provide its memorandum in advance as Ukraine has done and likely intend to seize on Ukraine's refusal to blame Ukraine for stalling peace negotiations.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continue to dictate the terms and timing of peace negotiations with Ukraine and are attempting to obfuscate the current state of negotiations. Russian officials are setting conditions to falsely accuse Ukraine of delaying negotiations.

• Russia is forcing Ukraine to make concessions on the timing, terms, and location of negotiations.

• ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are leveraging the fact that Ukraine and Russia set no concrete deadlines for the next steps in the peace process in order to delay the process altogether and prolong the war.

• Western reporting indicates that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasing drone deliveries to Russia while reducing sales to Ukrainian and Western buyers, further demonstrating China's increasingly overt support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine.

• A Ukrainian defense manufacturer and official announced that Ukraine has fielded a long-range drone with sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI).

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Kupyansk, Borova, Lyman, and Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian officials continue to signal the Kremlin's uncompromising position ahead of proposed talks in Istanbul on June 2, suggesting that the upcoming Istanbul meeting is very unlikely to yield substantive results in support of an enduring peace in Ukraine. Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya claimed during a UN Security Council meeting on May 30 that Russia is prepared to fight Ukraine for as long as necessary and that Ukraine can either accept peace, presumably on Russia's terms, or face inevitable battlefield defeat. Nebenzya stated that the United States recently "opened its eyes" to the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine and reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's demands that the West stop arming Ukraine and that Ukraine cease force generation efforts as preconditions to a ceasefire. CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev also called for officials to eliminate the conflict‘s "root causes" in an English-language post to X on May 30. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov previously defined the root causes of the war in Ukraine as NATO's eastward expansion following the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russian speakers and Russian culture. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on May 29 that Russia’s delegation to the proposed bilateral discussion in Istanbul on June 2 will be the ”same” as Russia's delegation at previous talks held in Istanbul on May 15 and 16. Russia sent a low-level delegation led by Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky and consisting of Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin, Chief of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Igor Kostykov, and Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin to the May 15-16 Istanbul talks.

Russian officials' decision to reiterate long-standing demands and send the same low-level delegation to the next Istanbul meeting indicates that Russia remains disinterested in engaging in good-faith negotiations. ISW continues to assess that Russia remains dedicated to protracting peace negotiations to support continued offensive operations in Ukraine and extract additional concessions from Ukraine and the West.

Russian officials are pocketing major US concessions and continuing to make further demands of Ukraine and the West. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on May 30 that Kremlin officials are encouraged by the Trump administration's understanding of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s concerns about further eastward expansion of NATO and that Russia has previously shared these concerns with the United States during closed-door negotiations. Peskov stated that the US position on further NATO expansion is "very appealing" to Russia, given that the United States continues to play a mediating role in negotiations to end the war.

US officials previously indicated a willingness to consider Russia’s objections to Ukraine’s possible future NATO membership – a long-standing Russian demand that officials frequently claim to be a "root cause" of the war in Ukraine – in exchange for Russia making concessions on other demands. Peskov’s statement indicates that Russian officials assess that the United States supports Russia's demand for NATO to alter its foundational open-door policy. Such a commitment would effectively grant Russia a veto over elements of the NATO charter, disproportionally benefit Russia’s desired postwar security posture, and undermine US President Donald Trump‘s stated objectives of achieving a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian officials are pocketing US concessions regarding negotiations and potential postwar security arrangements and are failing to make any comparable concessions, such as relinquishing Russia’s claim to currently unoccupied Ukrainian territory like Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continue to signal the Kremlin's uncompromising position ahead of proposed talks in Istanbul on June 2, suggesting that the upcoming Istanbul meeting is very unlikely to yield substantive results in support of an enduring peace in Ukraine.

• Russian officials are pocketing major US concessions and continuing to make further demands of Ukraine and the West.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Kurakhove.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian recruiters continue to offer Russian recruits low-quality and ineffective military training before deploying them to Ukraine. A Russian military observer visited a Moscow Military District (MMD) training center and reported on May 18 that Russian contract servicemen undergo only a week-long basic military training and spend another two weeks in training centers in occupied Ukraine. The observer stated that Russian instructors have limited combat knowledge and cannot adequately prepare servicemen for war. The observer stated that Russian recruits train in small groups of four to five men due to the continuous threat of Ukrainian drones and Russia's inability to establish tactical air superiority. The observer stated that Russian military commanders expect recruits to know how to operate machine guns and mortars, conduct successful assaults on Ukrainian positions, recognize minefields, learn tactical medicine techniques, and familiarize themselves with radio communications. The observer stated that recruits would realistically need at least seven days to learn how to use one weapon and at least four days to learn engineering and assault techniques.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and its Main Directorate of Combat Training have not reprioritized improving military training since at least 2024. Russian milbloggers similarly observed in 2024 that recruits received 14 to 16 days of training, of which only four or five days constituted real training. Russian milbloggers also observed in December 2024 that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov did not issue a decree formalizing training requirements and timeframes, meaning that Russian tactical training levels depend on whether a given unit received orders from operational-level groupings of forces (GOFs) commands.

The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is reportedly not producing sufficient military equipment for recruit training. The observer stated that Russian training grounds lack military equipment for training purposes, such as machine guns and sights for grenade launchers. The observer attributed these equipment shortages to bureaucratic bottlenecks that emerged because the Russian MoD has failed to conclude long-term contracts with weapon manufacturers. The observer noted that Russian manufacturers are unwilling to risk scaling up their weapon production before obtaining contracts and implied that Russia's high interest rate of 21 percent is further impeding independent weapon production initiatives. The observer highlighted that the Russian 333rd Training Center in Mulino, Nizhny Novgorod, does not have a streamlined training methodology or competent instructors. The observer added that a Russian colonel stated several times during the visit that recruits “don’t need to be taught anything special" and that "if these run out, will send others.” The observer claimed that Russian units have serious shortages of electronic warfare (EW) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities at the company level.

Russian recruits appear to be suffering significant casualties because of poor training, equipment shortages, and systematic misuse of assault units in combat. A former Storm-Z instructor and milblogger claimed on April 13 that poor training of recruits is limiting Russia's ability to conduct any other operations aside from "meat" assaults and that Russia is suffering high losses because the Russian military command does not have sufficient time to properly train recruits. The Storm Z instructor also noted that Russian forces lack training for drone specialists and that the Russian military command is misusing such specialists as infantry. Another milblogger complained that the Russian military’s commitment of junior officers and military specialists to assaults is reducing Russia's training capacity and is eliminating junior Russian command staff. The Russian milblogger observed that Russian military doctrine reserves assault operations for highly experienced personnel, as assault units often have to seize important infrastructure such as airports and military bases. The milblogger implied that poor training and ineffective military leadership diluted the function of assault units and degraded the appeal of service in specialized assault units.

Key Takeaways:

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts

• Russian recruiters continue to offer Russian recruits low-quality and ineffective military training before deploying them to Ukraine.

Russian Force Centralization

• Russian officials indicated their intent to severely limit independent crowdfunding efforts as part of an ongoing force centralization campaign, an effort that may negatively impact Russia's organic crowdfunding efforts that emerged in response to the Russian war in Ukraine.

Integration of Veterans into Russian Society

• Russian President Vladimir Putin may be setting information conditions to extend combat veteran statuses to the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) clergy who participated in Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in apparent violation of world Orthodox canons.

• The Kremlin and high-ranking regional officials are using veteran appointments as a way to conduct a large-scale purge of Russian officials and businessmen who do not align with the Kremlin's pro-war and ultranationalist objectives.

Militarization of Society and Youth

• Russian officials approved a textbook that will teach 8th and 9th-grade schoolchildren to operate drones.

Russian Command Changes and Chain of Command

• The Russian high military command reportedly removed a popular commander of an assault battalion fighting in southwestern Donetsk Oblast, sparking outrage among Russian servicemen and ultranationalists.

Russian Defense Industrial Base

• The Russian Defense Industrial Base (DIB) continues to scale up the modernization of optical systems and increase missile production amid ongoing sanctions, persistent quality issues, and manufacturing delays.

Russian Technological Adaptations

• Ukrainian officials and Russian milbloggers reported that Russian first-person view (FPV) drones armed with rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) warheads can now reach Kharkiv City and can operate over 40 kilometers into the rear.

• The Kremlin is attempting to create a new command and control system to improve interoperability among Russian air, space, and relevant cyberspace domain assets, likely in an effort to improve Russian systems' interoperability and improve Russian defenses against Ukrainian long-range drone attacks.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian officials' public statements continue to demonstrate that Russia maintains wider territorial goals in Ukraine beyond the four oblasts that Russia has illegally declared as annexed. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov told Kremlin newswire TASS on May 31 that Ukraine risks losing Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv cities if Ukraine refuses a peace settlement and claimed that every day that Ukraine delays a diplomatic solution to the war worsens the conditions for Ukraine. Russia may illegally declare Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts annexed, especially should Russian forces launch offensive operations to seize these regional centers. Russia notably did not — and still does not — occupy Zaporizhzhia City when the Kremlin annexed Zaporizhia Oblast in September 2022. Kartapolov’s statement indicates that Russia maintains territorial ambitions beyond Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — in line with Russian officials' calls for Russia to seize Sumy City, claims that Kharkiv and Odesa cities are "Russian" cities, and increasing rhetoric about Russia's alleged historical ties to "Novorossiya" (which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine). Kartopolov's statement also indicates that the Kremlin continues to assess that Russian forces will be able to fight a protracted war against Ukraine to achieve these territorial goals and is not interested in good-faith negotiations to achieve a diplomatic settlement to the war. ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin holds a theory of victory that assumes that the Russian military will be able to continue gradual, creeping advances in Ukraine indefinitely.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials' public statements continue to demonstrate that Russia maintains wider territorial goals in Ukraine beyond the four oblasts that Russia has illegally declared as annexed.

• The Kremlin is continuing efforts to prepare Russian society and the Russian defense industry base (DIB) for a protracted war with Ukraine and potential future war with NATO.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk and Toretsk and in western Zaporizhia. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on June 2 and only reached agreements about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges. Russia's refusal to give Ukraine its memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement before the meeting ensured that the meeting was largely unproductive and further protracted the negotiation process. The Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul for roughly one hour. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, who led the Ukrainian delegation in Istanbul, stated that Ukraine proposed a 90-day ceasefire, the release of all prisoners of war (POWs), the return of Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have abducted, and another round of Ukrainian-Russian talks between June 20 and 30 to prepare for a meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Russian delegation appears to have rejected Ukraine's proposal for a 90-day ceasefire. The Ukrainian and Russian delegations agreed to conduct an "all for all" exchange of seriously ill and wounded POWs and POWs aged 18 to 25, which the Russian delegation later claimed would involve at least 1,000 total POWs. The delegations also agreed to exchange the bodies of dead servicemembers in a “6,000 for 6,000” format. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, who led the Russian delegation, stated that Russia proposed a two-to-three-day ceasefire on unspecified areas of the front to allow both sides to retrieve bodies from the battlefield. Medinsky stated that Ukraine and Russia will create permanent medical commissions to conduct regular exchanges of seriously wounded POWs without having to wait for ”political decisions." Umerov noted that Russia first gave its memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement to Ukraine during the meeting and that Ukraine will study the document for a week before deciding on further action. Umerov stated on May 28 that Ukraine, in contrast, had already presented its memorandum to Russia — well ahead of the June 2 talks. ISW continues to assess that Russia is trying to disrupt the peace process and prolong the war in order to make additional battlefield gains.

Ukrainian and Russian media published the major points of both sides' memorandums on June 1 and 2, respectively. Ukranian outlet Suspilne published the full text of Ukraine's memorandum on June 1, which reflected Umerov's statements about Ukraine's proposals during the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian talks. Ukraine's memorandum calls for:

• A complete and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land, and at sea as a precondition to peace negotiations;
• Confidence building measures, including the return of all Ukrainian children and civilians and the exchange of all POWs;
• The goal of negotiations to be a permanent, lasting peace agreement, as part of which Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees and maintains its territorial integrity and ability to join any security alliance, including NATO;
• And for Russia and Ukraine to continue negotiations after the June 2 Istanbul meeting, work towards confidence building measures, and prepare for a future Zelensky-Putin meeting.

Kremlin newswire TASS published photos of Russia's memorandum following the Ukrainian-Russian talks on June 2. Russia's memorandum is divided into three sections: the first section defines Russia's demands for the "final settlement" of the war; the second section proposes two different sets of pre-conditions that Russia would accept as part of a ceasefire; and the third section outlines Russia's ideal timeline for negotiations. The first section of Russia's memorandum lists demands that Ukraine should concede to as part of a long-term peace agreement, including:

• International recognition of Russia's occupation of all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea and the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from these oblasts;
• Indefinite Ukrainian commitment to neutrality (a promise to never join military alliances and coalitions), a ban on future foreign military deployments and infrastructure in Ukraine, termination of all of Ukraine's existing security agreements, and a permanent ban on Ukraine having nuclear weapons;
• And protection of the "full rights, freedoms, and interests" of Russians and Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine and legislation against the "glorification and propaganda of Nazism."

The second section of Russia's memorandum demands that Ukraine and Russia pursue one of two paths toward a ceasefire. The first path requires Ukraine to completely withdraw from the unoccupied areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts up to an unspecified distance beyond the oblasts' borders. The second path requires Ukraine to agree a different set of Russian demands, including:

• Ban redeployments of all its units, except as part of withdrawals from Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts;
• End all Ukrainian force generation efforts, begin demobilization, end martial law, and organize presidential elections within 100 days of ending martial law, and elect a new government;
• And terminate all foreign military assistance, including the supply of satellite imagery and intelligence, and ban all foreign military deployments to Ukraine.

The third section of Russia's memorandum recommends that Russia and Ukraine sign a longer-term ceasefire agreement after exchanging the bodies of dead servicemembers and a two-to-three-day general ceasefire to retrieve bodies from the battlefield. The memorandum demands that Ukraine completely withdraw from Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts within 30 days of the beginning of the ceasefire and that Ukraine elect a new government before Russia and Ukraine sign a formal peace agreement.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on June 2 and only reached agreements about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges. Russia's refusal to give Ukraine its memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement before the meeting ensured that the meeting was largely unproductive and further protracted the negotiation process.

• Ukrainian and Russian media published the major points of both sides' memorandums on June 1 and 2, respectively.

• Russia's memorandum reflects the Kremlin's long-standing public demands for Ukraine to make significant territorial and political concessions while Russia offers no concessions of its own.

• The Russian delegation dismissed Russia's systemic kidnapping of Ukrainian children.

• Russian forces appear to be intensifying efforts to widen the frontline in northern Sumy Oblast along three axes of advance north and northeast of Sumy City.

• Open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage following the Ukrainian long-range drone strike series on June 1.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Kremlin officials publicly acknowledged that Russia seeks the “complete destruction” of Ukraine, indicating Moscow’s disinterest in good faith peace negotiations and a near-term resolution to the war. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on June 3 in posts on his Russian- and English-language Telegram channels that Russia needs the negotiations in Istanbul to result in Russia's "swift victory and the complete destruction" of the Ukrainian government and not a "compromise peace on someone else's delusional terms." Medvedev stated that Russia's June 2 Istanbul memorandum was in line with these goals and threatened that Russia will "explode" everything and "disappear" anyone who opposes Russia in response to the June 1 long-range Ukrainian drone strikes against Russia. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on June 3 that Russia's Istanbul memorandum is aimed at "eliminating the root causes" of the war in Ukraine and that people should not expect "immediate decisions" from Istanbul. Peskov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin is interested in a future trilateral meeting with US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, but that Putin wants to hold this meeting after all of the technical details are worked out as part of a future ceasefire or long-term peace agreement.

Ukraine struck the Kerch Strait Bridge on June 3 for the third time since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported that SBU agents mined the underwater support pillars of the Kerch Strait Bridge and detonated the equivalent of 1,100 kilograms of TNT at 0444 on June 3. The SBU reported that the operation took several months to plan and execute and stated that this is the third time that Ukraine has conducted an operation against the bridge. The SBU reported that the structural integrity of the bridge is in critical condition. The SBU released an image of the bridge which indicates that the explosion did not damage the roadway, though the force of the explosion threw structural elements onto the roadway. Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows an explosion at the base of the Kerch Strait Bridge. Russian opposition outlets Sota and Astra and Russian milbloggers circulated footage indicating that Ukraine conducted a naval drone strike against the bridge around 1500 on June 3, though it is unclear if the strike caused damage to the structure. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that damage to the Kerch Strait Bridge undermines Russia’s ability to resupply Russian units and facilities in Crimea. The Kerch Strait Bridge is a critical Russian logistics route, and Russian forces heavily defend the bridge with layered air defense, anti-sabotage measures, and personnel who monitor surface and underwater activity. Russian sources claimed that authorities temporarily halted traffic across the bridge, but later claimed that traffic resumed. Russian state media and the Russian government have not responded to the strike as of this publication.

Western officials and open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage following the Ukrainian long-range drone strike series (Operation Spider Web) on June 1. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat told Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda on June 2 that Ukrainian officials estimated about 10 to 12 of Russia's 19 Tu-160 bombers and 36 of Russia's 57 Tu-95 bombers were operational prior to Ukraine’s June 1 strikes on Russian airbases. Bloomberg reported on June 2 that a senior Western official stated that Ukrainian special services likely destroyed or damaged at least seven Tu-95 bombers and four Tu-22 bombers during the June 1 strike. Bloomberg also assessed that Russia will likely struggle to repair and replace aircraft damaged in the June 1 strike as its strategic aviation fleet relies on critical Western components that Russia has failed to source in the wake of Western sanctions. The New York Times (NYT) reported on June 3 that Western officials and military analysts assessed that Ukrainian special services likely destroyed or damaged six Tu-95 bombers, four Tu-22M bombers, and one A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, and that Ukrainian special services may have destroyed or severely damaged up to 20 Russian strategic aircraft during the strike. Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight assessed on June 3 that satellite imagery and open-source analysis indicate that Ukrainian special services likely destroyed or damaged 11 bombers of various types and one An-12 transport aircraft. Frontelligence noted that publicly available satellite imagery has yet to confirm reporting that Ukrainian special services destroyed or damaged over 20 bombers. Ukrainian military observer Tatarigami and journalists from the Telegraph and Insider stated on June 3 that Ukrainian special services shared a video of Ukrainian drones striking at least two A-50 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft and that Ukraine may release this video soon. ISW has not observed the video’s publication as of the time of this report but will continue to monitor for additional information.

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials publicly acknowledged that Russia seeks the “complete destruction” of Ukraine, indicating Moscow’s disinterest in good faith peace negotiations and a near-term resolution to the war.

• Ukraine struck the Kerch Strait Bridge on June 3 for the third time since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

• Western officials and open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage following the Ukrainian long-range drone strike series (Operation Spider Web) on June 1.

• Russia continues to produce and stockpile missiles and drones to strike Ukraine, demonstrating Russia's continued commitment to winning the war through military means.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced a series of Ukrainian military command changes on June 3.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove.

Institute for the Study of War

The Kremlin is fixating on recent train derailments in Russia in order to further long-standing Kremlin narratives claiming that Ukraine is an illegitimate negotiating partner that is uninterested in peace, likely to distract the broader information space from recent Kremlin officials' statements about Russia's own disinterest in a negotiated settlement. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting with members of the Russian government on June 4 and discussed the May 31 collapse of two railway bridges in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts. The meeting included a staged statement from a children's doctor who promoted the Kremlin's longstanding justifications for its initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and full-scale invasion in 2022. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin claimed during the meeting that Ukrainian special services "without a doubt" conducted an operation to down railway bridges in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts on May 31, but did not present concrete evidence to link the collapsed bridges to Ukraine. Putin claimed that the train derailments confirm that the "already illegitimate" Ukrainian government that previously "seized power" is "gradually degenerating into a terrorist organization." Putin questioned if Russia can negotiate with "terrorists" and questioned why Russia should agree to Ukraine's proposed 30-day or longer ceasefires, claiming that Ukraine will use the ceasefires to continue to receive Western weapons provisions, mobilize military personnel, and prepare "other terrorist acts." Putin claimed that the Ukrainian government "does not need peace at all" and values power over peace. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated that Putin later emphasized Ukraine's alleged "terrorism" during a phone call on June 4 with US President Donald Trump. Ushakov repeated Putin's claim that Ukraine has "degenerated into a terrorist organization."

Kremlin officials have long alleged that the current Ukrainian government is "illegitimate," and Putin previously questioned on March 27 how Russia can negotiate with Ukraine as "neo-Nazi formations" are allegedly ruling the country. Putin has also repeatedly used questions about Ukrainian force generation and Western weapons deliveries to reject Ukraine's previous ceasefire proposals. Putin's June 4 claims that the Ukrainian government is a "terrorist organization" with which Russia cannot negotiate, and which will exploit any longer-term ceasefire, is the latest iteration of this Kremlin effort to justify delaying the negotiation process and prolonging the war by attacking Ukraine's sovereignty as a legitimate negotiating partner. The Kremlin is likely link its messaging surrounding the train derailments and Ukraine's alleged perpetuation of "terrorism" in order to distract from Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's claim on June 3 that Russia needs the negotiations in Istanbul to result in Russia's "swift victory and the complete destruction" of the Ukrainian government and not a "compromise peace on someone else's delusional terms."

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to express Ukraine's willingness to negotiate with Russia to establish a just and lasting peace. Zelensky stated on June 4 that the Ukrainian delegation to Istanbul has not received a response to the ceasefire proposal it presented during the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian talks. Zelensky also proposed that Ukraine and Russia implement a comprehensive ceasefire until Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Zelensky in order to demonstrate a mutual commitment to de-escalation. Zelensky stated that Ukraine is ready to negotiate with Russia any day and that Russia can choose the location of negotiations. Zelensky said that he is willing to meet with Putin even without a ceasefire in order to prove Ukraine's willingness to negotiate.

Ukrainian and Western officials and open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage resulting from Ukraine's "Operation Spider's Web" long-range drone strike series against Russian air bases on June 1. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) published new footage on June 4 from Operation Spider's Web showing Ukrainian drones approaching the wings, sides, tops, and underbellies of Russian fixed-wing aircraft at various airfields. The SBU reported that the footage shows first-person view (FPV) drones striking A-50 airborne early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft, Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers, Tu-22 supersonic bombers, An-12 transport aircraft, and Il-78 aerial refueling tankers at Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast; Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast; Dyagilevo Air Base in Ryazan Oblast; and Ivanovo Air Base in Ivanovo Oblast. Some of the clips in the video show aircraft on fire. The SBU stated that Ukrainian drones struck 41 Russian aircraft. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the SBU stated that Russia will be unable to restore half of the Russian aircraft that Ukraine struck or that it will take Russia years to restore them. A senior NATO official reported to Ukrainian news outlet Suspilne that Operation Spider's Web damaged 40 Russian aircraft and confirmed that the operation destroyed 10 to 13 aircraft. The official also stated that Russia may respond to the loss of its strategic bombers, which Russia uses to launch cruise missiles against Ukraine, by adjusting strike packages to include more drones and ballistic missiles and fewer cruise missiles. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that a NATO official stated that Russian forces previously used the destroyed aircraft to launch over 3,000 cruise missiles that have struck critical infrastructure and civilian targets in Ukraine since February 2022.

Maxar satellite imagery collected on June 4 indicates that Ukrainian drone strikes destroyed at least two Tu-22 bombers and three Tu-95 bombers at Belaya Airbase (see embedded imagery below). Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) group AviVector posted satellite imagery on June 4 that indicates that Ukrainian drones destroyed four Tu-95MS bombers and one An-12 transport aircraft at Olenya Airbase. AviVector assessed that Ukrainian forces destroyed seven Tu-95MS bombers, four Tu-22M3 bombers, and one An-12 transport aircraft and likely damaged a Tu-95MS bomber at Olenya and Belaya airbases.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is fixating on recent train derailments in Russia in order to further long-standing Kremlin narratives claiming that Ukraine is an illegitimate negotiating partner that is uninterested in peace, likely to distract the broader information space from recent Kremlin officials' statements about Russia's own disinterest in a negotiated settlement.

• Putin also used his June 4 phone call with Trump to further falsely portray Ukraine as an illegitimate negotiating partner that is uninterested in peace.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to express Ukraine's willingness to negotiate with Russia to establish a just and lasting peace.

• Ukrainian and Western officials and open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage resulting from Ukraine's "Operation Spider's Web" long-range drone strike series against Russian air bases on June 1.

• Ukrainian special services reportedly used artificial intelligence (AI) to direct drones during Operation Spider's Web.

• Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces are reportedly sustaining an average of 1,140 casualties per day and suffering disproportionately high personnel casualties for marginal, grinding territorial gains. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) news agency ArmyInform reported on June 5 that an unnamed NATO official stated that Russian forces are sustaining an average casualty rate of 1,140 personnel per day, of whom nearly 975 are killed in action (KIA) – a much higher number of killed than the standard one-to-three KIA-to-wounded-in-action (WIA) ratio. The NATO official noted that Russian forces suffered approximately 160,000 casualties from January to April 2025 and that Russian losses remain high despite a slight decrease in May 2025 "due to a slowdown in the pace of hostilities." Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on May 13 that Russian forces suffered about 177,000 casualties since January 1, 2025 (an average daily casualty rate of 1,351). This daily casualty rate is lower than the record high average daily casualty rate of 1,523 that Russian forces reportedly suffered in November 2024, but Russian forces are still expending quantities of manpower that are disproportionate to their marginal territorial gains. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa stated on June 4 that Russia seized only 0.4 percent of Ukraine's total territory in 2024 and just 0.2 percent thus far in 2025, which is largely consistent with ISW's assessment of Russian advances in 2024 and 2025, respectively. Palisa stated that Russia is suffering roughly 167 casualties per square kilometer of advance. ISW continues to assess that Russia's disproportionately large manpower and materiel losses for marginal territorial gains across the theater are unsustainable in the medium-term and unlikely to result in significant and rapid gains.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are reportedly sustaining an average of 1,140 casualties per day and suffering disproportionately high personnel casualties for marginal, grinding territorial gains.

• The Kremlin continues efforts to falsely portray Russia as willing to engage in good-faith negotiations to end the war in Ukraine, despite Russia’s repeated refusal to offer any concessions.

• Ukraine's allies and partners continued to provide military aid to Ukraine during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) on June 4 and 5.

• Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on June 5 the launch of a new initiative for joint production of Ukrainian weapons in Ramstein states in order to supply weapons to the Ukrainian military and to increase Ramstein states' industrial capacity.

• North Korea reaffirmed its support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine during Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu's visit to North Korea on June 4.

• Russian authorities cracked down on a publication that has previously speculated about several Russian command changes.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole and in western Zaporizhia. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

A senior Ukrainian official reported that the Russian military intends to seize half of Ukraine by the end of 2026. Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to make such large advances in such a narrow time frame, given Russia’s current offensive capabilities and assuming that the flow of Western aid to Ukraine continues. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa told reporters on June 5 that Russia likely seeks to seize the full extent of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by September 1, 2025, and create a buffer zone along the northern Ukrainian-Russian border by the end of 2025. Palisa also stated that Russia intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts by the end of 2026, depriving Ukraine of access to the Black Sea. Western sources published a map on June 4 and 6 that Palisa reportedly presented to US officials and journalists. The map suggests that Russia intends to seize roughly 222,700 additional square kilometers of Ukrainian territory and hold a total of 336,300 square kilometers by the end of 2026 – almost double the roughly 162,000 total square kilometers that Russia held as of the first month of Russia's initial full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The total area of Ukraine is roughly 603,500 square kilometers.

Palisa’s map of purported Russian operational objectives suggests that Russian forces will attempt to seize and leverage positions in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts to support concurrent efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts prior to September 1, 2025. Palisa’s map suggests that the Russian military command does not intend for Russian forces to seize Zaporizhzhia City by September 1. Palisa’s map suggests that Russian forces seek to leverage these positions to eventually seize Zaporizhzhia City, which is consistent with the Russian government’s formal territorial demands for all Zaporizhia Oblast.

It remains unclear on what basis the Russian military may be able to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast within the next three months or even advance the 50 to 80 kilometers from the current Russian frontline to the administrative boundaries of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have spent the last 15 months advancing between 30 and 50 kilometers from the outskirts of Avdiivka to their current positions northeast and southwest of Pokrovsk, a far slower rate of advance than the one necessary to seize all of Donetsk Oblast by September 1. The rate of Russian advance as depicted by the map also appears to assume that Russian forces will be able to fight through the Kostyantynivka-Kramatorsk-Slovyansk fortress belt – a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions in Donetsk Oblast – at a rate never demonstrated by Russian forces at any point during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian forces have not fought through a comparable town since Russian forces engaged in a year-long and pyrrhic effort to seize Bakhmut that ended in May 2023.

Palisa’s assessment posits that Russian forces would then sequentially attempt to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast and create a “buffer zone” along the international border in northern Ukraine by the end of 2025. Palisa’s map suggests that Russian forces would attempt to ford the Dnipro River, retake the remainder of Kherson Oblast, marginally advance further in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and establish a defensible buffer zone along the international border in Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts by the end of 2025. The Russian military command would likely have to redeploy significant Russian forces from other areas of the frontline to accomplish these objectives, assuming Ukraine’s international partners continue supporting Ukraine.

Russian forces would struggle to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast, as it would require crossing the Dnipro River, establishing a lodgement on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River, seizing Kherson City, and then advancing further west and north to the oblast's administrative borders. Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces have successfully conducted cross-river operations at scale across the Dnipro River since Russia’s withdrawal to east (left) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022, and the establishment of significant Ukrainian defenses in west bank Kherson Oblast since liberating this area will only further hamper Russia’s ability to seize the remainder of Kherson Oblast.

A series of intensified, simultaneous Russian offensives into northern Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts would spread Russia’s manpower and materiel along the entire thousand-kilometer-long frontline and likely exacerbate existing constraints. Russia’s reported operational objectives through the end of 2025 are consistent with long-standing Russian demands that Ukraine concede the illegally annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea, however.

Key Takeaways:

• A senior Ukrainian official reported that the Russian military intends to seize half of Ukraine by the end of 2026. Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to make such large advances in such a narrow time frame, given Russia’s current offensive capabilities and assuming that the flow of Western aid to Ukraine continues.

• The Russian military command’s purported objectives for 2026 extend far beyond Russia’s formal territorial demands and aim to seize a significant part of central Ukraine and most of southern and eastern Ukraine.

• Russia’s purported military campaign plans for 2025 and 2026 are consistent with long-standing Russian territorial objectives and recent statements by pro-Kremlin voices in the information space.

• The Russian military is likely unable to achieve its purported 2026 objectives, given the significant manpower and materiel losses Russian forces have sustained over the last three years of war and the Russian forces’ inability to achieve operational maneuver on the battlefield. Putin’s theory of victory depends on the Western alliance backing Ukraine, abandoning Ukraine as a necessary condition to bring about this scale of advance

• Russian forces conducted the second-largest series of missile and drone strikes of the war overnight on June 5 to 6.

• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian military facilities, airfields, and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities overnight on June 5 to 6.

• Russia's Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the first time since September 2022, likely prematurely due to increased Kremlin pressure to project economic stability.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Belgorod and Sumy oblasts and near Lyman and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia baselessly accused Ukraine of failing to conduct a prisoner of war (POW) exchange and to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 6 — part of the Kremlin's efforts to undermine mutually agreed upon confidence building measures with Ukraine. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, Russian First Deputy Chief of Information of the General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Alexander Zorin, and Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin claimed on June 7 that Russia was prepared to exchange severely wounded and sick POWs, POWs under the age of 25, and 6,000 bodies of KIA soldiers on June 6 as Russia and Ukraine agreed to during the most recent bilateral talks in Istanbul on June 2. Zorin further claimed that Russian representatives waited for Ukrainian representatives on the border of Belarus to work out the technicalities involved in exchanging the bodies, but that Ukrainian representatives never arrived, and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova and Deputy Chairperson of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs Andrei Klimov claimed that Ukraine refused to repatriate the KIA bodies. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs refuted Russian officials' claims and clarified that Ukraine and Russia have not yet agreed upon a date for the repatriation of the bodies and that the two parties are still finalizing lists for the POW exchange. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reiterated that Ukraine remains fully committed to engaging constructively to ensure the successful implementation of the KIA repatriation and POW exchange. The Kremlin remains committed to promoting narratives that vilify Ukraine, likely to socialize its domestic audience ahead of Russia's possible rejection of any peace agreement in the future and to discredit Ukraine on the international stage. The Kremlin's unwillingness to engage in good faith in lower-level confidence building measures designed to facilitate larger peace negotiations further demonstrates Russia's disinterest in peace negotiations.

Russian officials continue efforts to deflect blame away from Russia and onto Western states for the lack of progress toward a peace settlement. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov accused European states of becoming the main obstacle to negotiating peace in Ukraine, as European states seek to disrupt negotiations on June 6. Ryabkov also claimed that German Chancellor Friedrich Merz opposes peace in Ukraine and is trying to convince US President Donald Trump to return the United States to "the path of escalation" in the war. Ryabkov claimed that the United States is aware that Russia will not stray — even in the face of threats of more sanctions — from its position on the need to eliminate the alleged "root causes" of the war (a phrase which Kremlin officials have repeatedly used to call for regime change in Ukraine and changes to NATO's open-door policy and other unilateral American concessions which the Trump administration described as being “too much“). ISW continues to assess that Russia is uninterested in meaningful negotiations with Ukraine and is very likely setting information conditions to protract or possibly expand the war.

US President Donald Trump signaled on June 6 that he could be willing to increase sanctions against Russia. Russia's economic struggles, however, have been and will continue to be driven by Russian military losses on the battlefield. Maximum US economic pressure against Russia is not possible without continued military sales to Ukraine. Trump stated to reporters on June 6 that he would be willing to "use if it's necessary" and impose additional sanctions on Russia if Russia demonstrates that it will not "make a deal" or stop fighting. The Sanctioning Russia Act of 2025 has wide bipartisan support in the US Senate and has 82 cosponsors as of June 7.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia baselessly accused Ukraine of failing to conduct a prisoner of war (POW) exchange and to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 6 – part of the Kremlin's efforts to undermine mutually agreed upon confidence building measures with Ukraine.

• Russian officials continue efforts to deflect blame away from Russia and onto Western states for the lack of progress toward a peace settlement.

• US President Donald Trump signaled on June 6 that he could be willing to increase sanctions against Russia. Russia's economic struggles, however, have been and will continue to be driven by Russian military losses on the battlefield. Maximum US economic pressure against Russia is not possible without continued military sales to Ukraine.

• Any increased economic pressure against Russia – while a positive policy development – by itself is insufficient to force Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table or change Putin’s theory of victory.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Novopavlivka, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Kremlin officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 8 that Russian forces reached the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border and are conducting offensive operations into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — an oblast that Russia has not illegally declared as annexed. The Russian MoD claimed on June 8 that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army , Central Military District ) reached the western border of Donetsk Oblast and are continuing to develop an offensive in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on June 8 that Russian forces “began an offensive” in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and threatened that those who do not acknowledge current "realities of war" on the battlefield during negotiations will "receive new realities on the ground." Kremlin officials have repeatedly claimed that any negotiations to end the war must consider the "realities on the ground" (a reference to the current frontline in Ukraine) to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia's demands under threat of further Russian demands. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 8 that Russian forces reached the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border northwest of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka) and advanced southeast of Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka), west of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka), and west and southwest of Bohdanivka (southeast of Novopavlivka). ISW has not observed geolocated evidence of these claimed advances near the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border as of this writing. ISW forecasted in November 2024 that the Russian military command could advance to the southeasternmost part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and to envelop these Ukrainian positions in support of Russia's wider campaign to seize all of Donetsk Oblast.

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on June 8 that fighting continued in the Novopavlivka direction but only in Donetsk Oblast. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the area stated that Russian forces did not cross the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that Ukrainian General Staff Representative Andriy Kovalev stated that claims that Russian forces crossed the border are "Russian disinformation" and not true. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows satellite-detected heat and infrared anomalies along the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border, and satellite imagery collected on June 7 and 8 shows the appearance of new artillery craters near the border in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. FIRMS data and artillery craters near the border indicate artillery missions in the area and are not inconsistent with official Ukrainian statements about continued fighting in Donetsk Oblast east of the border. ISW assesses that current Russian tactical activity in the vicinity of southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is a continuation of ongoing Russian offensive efforts in southwestern Donetsk Oblast — not the beginning of a new major offensive operation to seize operationally significant territory in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. ISW will continue to assess the situation in southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and update its assessment.

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 8 that Russian forces reached the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border and are conducting offensive operations into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — an oblast that Russia has not illegally declared as annexed.

• Russian officials have repeatedly signaled that the Kremlin has wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine, including in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

• Russia continued to baselessly accuse Ukraine of failing to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 8 — part of the Kremlin's efforts to undermine mutually agreed upon confidence-building measures with Ukraine.

• The Kremlin appears to have orchestrated a concerted media campaign that aimed to use the purportedly agreed-upon KIA exchange in order to discredit Ukraine and promote Russia's justifications for its war to both domestic and international audiences.

• Russian officials appear to be setting conditions to withdraw from international arms control treaties, likely as part of preparation for a potential future war with NATO.

• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a chemical plant in Tula Oblast on June 8.

• Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces recently advanced to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk administrative border as Kremlin officials continued to demonstrate that Russia has wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea. Geolocated footage published on June 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk administrative border northwest of Horikhove (southeast of Novopavlivka). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 9 that Russia's Central Grouping of Forces seized more territory in unspecified areas of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed on June 8 and 9 that Russian forces, including elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army , Central Military District ), are fighting near and across the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on June 9 that Russia has begun an offensive into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast "within the framework of the creation of a buffer zone" in Ukraine. First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev claimed that Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is now within the "sphere of interests" of the Russian military. Chairperson of the Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building Andrei Klishas claimed that Russia's offensive into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast indicates the beginning of Russia's "denazification" of the oblast - a reference to Russia's longtime demand for regime change in Ukraine. Chairperson of the Duma Defense Committee Dmitry Sablin claimed that Russia will "definitely take" Dnipro City and other unspecified Ukrainian cities if Ukraine "does not make peace on terms." Russian officials are likely setting information conditions to illegally declare Dnipropetrovsk Oblast annexed, as ISW has previously assessed. Kremlin officials have repeatedly signaled that Russia maintains territorial ambitions beyond the four oblasts that Russia has already illegally annexed, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov notably repeated a longstanding Kremlin claim that Odesa City is a "Russian" city as recently as June 9. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa stated on June 5 that Russia likely seeks to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River, including parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and to seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts by the end of 2026. ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in peace negotiations with Ukraine and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war in order to make further battlefield gains.

ISW continues to assess that current Russian tactical activity in the vicinity of southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is a continuation of ongoing Russian offensive efforts in southwestern Donetsk Oblast — not the beginning of a new major offensive operation to seize operationally significant territory in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. ISW will continue to assess the situation in southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and update its assessment.

Russian forces conducted the largest combined missile and drone strike of the war overnight on June 8 and 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 499 projectiles, including 479 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched four Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal" aeroballistic missiles from Tambov Oblast; 10 Kh-101 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast; three Kh-22 cruise missiles and two Kh-31P anti-radar missiles from airspace over the Black Sea; and one Kh-35 anti-ship cruise missile from occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 277 Shahed and decoy drones and that 183 drones "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down all 10 Kh-101 cruise missiles, all four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missiles, two Kh-22 cruise missiles, both of the Kh-31P anti-radar missiles, and the one Kh-35 cruise missile. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes hit Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Kyiv, Rivne, and Volyn oblasts, damaging civilian infrastructure.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently advanced to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk administrative border as Kremlin officials continued to demonstrate that Russia has wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea.

• The Kremlin appears to be dangling the prospect of bilateral arms control talks with the United States to extract preemptive concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.

• Western security officials continue to assess that Russia is preparing for a protracted confrontation with NATO.

• Russian forces conducted the largest combined missile and drone strike of the war overnight on June 8 and 9.

• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian military and defense industrial targets that are involved in Russia's long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine.

• Ukraine and Russia on June 9 conducted the first round of the prisoner of war (POW) exchanges that the parties agreed to during the latest bilateral talks in Istanbul on June 2 as Russian officials continued to baselessly accuse Ukraine of failing to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman. Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Kurakhove.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be switching between rhetoric focused on Russian ethnic nationalism and Russian multinationalism, but remains committed to promoting anti-Western sentiment and the militarization of Russia's youth. Putin held a meeting with the Security Council on June 10 that largely focused on the unification of the peoples of Russia and the use of military-patriotic youth programs and Russian government initiatives to promote Russian patriotism. Putin highlighted the work of the "Movement of the First," a Russian youth movement aimed at promoting military-patriotic education in Russia and occupied Ukraine, and "Yunarmiya" ("The Youth Army"), a movement that is responsible for instilling pro-war sentiments in Russian children and teenagers. Putin also highlighted the Russian state-mandated weekly lessons in schools that often include lectures by soldiers from the war in Ukraine. Putin platformed BRICS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) — Russian-dominated organizations that Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly postured as the foundation of Putin's envisioned anti-Western and anti-NATO Eurasian security architecture. Putin stated that Russia must respond to challenges that promote interethnic and interreligious conflict in Russia and highlighted the "unity of the peoples of Russia." Putin recently began forwarding an unofficial ideology formulated on Russian nationalism that positions Russia in opposition to the West, which marked a notable departure from Putin's usual rhetoric promoting the multiethnic and multireligious makeup of Russia's population. Putin's remarks at the June 10 Security Council meeting appear to be a return to this rhetoric about the diversity of Russia and Russian civic nationalism. Putin appears committed, however, to promoting anti-Western and pro-war sentiments, especially in Russian youth, likely as part of efforts to prepare Russian society for a protracted war in Ukraine and possible future conflict with NATO. Putin's June 10 statements about harmony and unity in Russia indicate that he likely remains hesitant to fully commit to a nationalist ideology centered around ethnic Russians, as this risks fragmenting Russia's multiethnic population. ISW continues to assess that Putin must work to balance appeasing the influential xenophobic and ultranationalist community, which is a key constituency for Putin, with the need to leverage migrants to offset immediate economic and force generation challenges and long-term demographic decline.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be switching between rhetoric focused on Russian ethnic nationalism and Russian multinationalism, but remains committed to promoting anti-Western sentiment and the militarization of Russia's youth.

• Russia is reportedly working to increase the number of North Korean labor migrants in Russia, likely to support Russia's workforce and to directly join the Russian military.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted the second round of prisoner of war (POW) exchanges on June 10, in accordance with agreements the parties reached in Istanbul on June 2.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Borova, Lyman, and Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated on June 10 that the United States intends to reduce its budget for the purchase of weapons for Ukraine in 2026. Hegseth did not specify the extent of the planned cutbacks. Hegseth stated that "a negotiated, peaceful settlement" is in the best interest of Ukraine, Russia, and the United States but that "the word victory," as well as the path to victory and to peace, have not been clearly defined.

Reducing US military aid to Ukraine will neither lead to a sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Russian President Vladimir Putin to reassess his theory of victory. Putin's theory of victory posits that the Russian military can sustain creeping, incremental advances on the battlefield longer than Ukrainian forces can defend and longer than the West is willing to support Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Western military aid, particularly that which only the United States can provide rapidly and at scale, remains crucial in enabling Ukrainian forces to make decisive gains on the battlefield and pressuring Putin to reassess his theory of victory. Battlefield gains that change Putin's calculus would force Russia to engage in constructive negotiations to ensure a peaceful resolution to the war. A reduction in US aid to Ukraine risks giving Russia greater advantages on the battlefield and would likely embolden Putin to continue his war and strengthen his belief that Russia can conquer Ukraine, which is incompatible with US President Donald Trump's stated goal of ensuring an enduring peace in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Reducing US military aid to Ukraine will neither lead to a sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Russian President Vladimir Putin to reassess his theory of victory.

• The Kremlin continues to attack Ukraine using rhetoric presenting an anachronistic reading of Ukraine's history, denying the existence of an independent Ukrainian language and culture, and discrediting the Ukrainian government.

• Russian officials are also attempting to rhetorically split Ukraine from its Western partners and advocating for an escalation of Russian strike tactics in Ukraine as part of wider efforts to intimidate the West into weakening its support for Ukraine.

• Russian officials continue to promote anti-NATO and anti-Western rhetoric, likely as part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to prepare Russian society for a potential future war against NATO.

• Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and defense industrial targets in the Russian rear.

• Ukraine and Russia exchanged the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 11, in accordance with agreements previously reached during talks in Istanbul.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Borova. Russian forces advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian officials warned that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly enabling Russia to improve and grow its drone production. Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) Spokesperson Oleh Aleksandrov told Politico in an interview published on June 5 that Chinese manufacturers are providing Russian developers with hardware, electronics, navigation, optical, and telemetry systems, engines, microcircuits, processor modules, antenna field systems, and control boards. Aleksandrov stated that Chinese manufacturers evade sanctions and export controls by changing company names and using shell companies. Aleksandrov added that Russia has a critical dependency on Chinese components to produce tactical and long-range drones and that Russia boosted its long-range drone production from 15,000 drones in 2024 to over 30,000 drones in 2025 and small tactical drone production to two million drones per year. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also implied that the PRC placed restrictions on Ukrainian and European drone procurement but did not impose the same restrictions on Russia.

Russian developers are increasingly relying on Chinese components to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) capabilities into Russian drones and expand the use of AI/ML drones on the frontlines in Ukraine. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate's (GUR) War&Sanctions project reported on June 9 that Russian forces are actively using V2U strike unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the Sumy direction. The War&Sanctions project reported that V2U drones can autonomously search and select targets using AI and that these drones are based on the Chinese Leetop A203 minicomputer and a central processor with an American NVIDIA Jetson Orin module. The War&Sanctions project reported that V2U drones only have one GPS module, which the GUR assessed indicated that Russian forces gave up on using satellite navigation due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) effectiveness. The War&Sanctions project added that V2Us are likely using "computer vision" for navigation, which allows the drone to compare the image obtained from the drones' cameras and pre-loaded photos of the area. The War&Sanctions project noted that Russian drone operators can control the V2U drones as first-person-view (FPV) drones via LTE connection and that an installed modem-router allows the drone to work with Ukrainian mobile operator SIM cards. The War&Sanctions project reported that the base of the modem is of Chinese origin despite Russian markings. The War&Sanctions project added that Russian developers assembled V2U drones mainly with Chinese-made components such as the engine, GPS module, servos, solid-state drive, rangefinder, speed controllers, and batteries. ISW recently assessed that Russia has been increasingly scaling up the development of drones with machine vision in Spring 2025 and increased their use on the battlefield in May 2025.

Russian developers also rely on Chinese manufacturers to extend the range of Russian fiber-optic drones. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov amplified footage on June 5 reportedly showing a Chinese-made, 50-kilometers-long fiber-optic coil that will enable Russian forces to fly these drones at a longer range. The coil reportedly weighs 3.8 kilograms. Russian forces have been increasingly using fiber-optic drones on the battlefield, particularly in the Toretsk-Kostyantynivka direction.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials warned that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly enabling Russia to improve and grow its drone production.

Russian Force Centralization

• The Wagner Group announced on June 6 that it is leaving Mali after 3.5 years likely as part of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) ongoing effort to replace remaining Wagner personnel with state-controlled Africa Corps.

• The Kremlin appears to have entrusted a Russian billionaire with control of the Africa Corps, contradicting the ongoing centralization effort.

Russian Military Reforms and Force Restructuring

• The Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) is reportedly planning to bolster security around Russian infrastructure to protect infrastructure from Ukrainian drones.

Militarization of Society and Youth

• Russian authorities reportedly proposed that Rosgvardia oblige cadets to watch state media propaganda programs in an effort to involve them in special propaganda and counter propaganda efforts.

• Russian authorities approved a plan to construct a "Warrior Temple" for Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine outside of St. Petersburg.

Russian Defense Industrial Base

• The Russian Government announced on June 9 the establishment of the Russian Artificial Intelligence (AI) Development Center.

Russian Technological Adaptations

• Russia is belatedly constructing hangars and other defensive infrastructure across airfields in Russia and in occupied Ukraine to protect Russian aircraft from Ukrainian drones.

Significant Russian Military Exercises

• Russian forces continued major naval exercises in the Baltic Sea involving more than 20 warships and 25 aircraft, likely in support of the Kremlin's recent escalatory rhetoric against the Baltic States.


Institute for the Study of War

Occupied Crimea is poised to face a severe water crisis in the coming months, a crisis that the Russian occupation of Crimea has precipitated and which ongoing Russian mismanagement and resource misallocation will exacerbate. Head of the Department of Chemical Technologies of Water Use at the Russian-founded Crimean Federal University Ilya Nikolenko stated in an interview with Russian media on June 5 that reservoirs in occupied Crimea lost 11 million cubic meters of water in May 2025 alone. Nikolenko noted that water reservoirs in Crimea are operating at about 50 percent of maximum volume, compared to 75 percent at the same time in 2024. Nikolenko warned that the current rates of the depletion of Crimea’s water reserves presage an acute water crisis reminiscent of the 2020-2021 water shortages. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Crimea Service Krym Realli reported on June 6 that the Bilohirsk Reservoir (in southeastern Crimea about 35km east of Sevastopol) began to rapidly lose water in recent weeks due to the onset of hot weather and resulting increased water consumption throughout Crimea. Russian occupation officials are clearly aware of the looming water crisis, but are nevertheless continuing efforts to attract Russian tourists to Crimea for the summer season. Head of the Committee on Ecology and Natural Resources in the Crimean occupation parliament Svetlana Shabelnikova claimed that Russia will provide Crimea with 60 percent of its needed drinking water this summer despite supply challenges, and that resort towns in southern Crimea will be “supplied drinking water without interruption.” It remains unclear how the Russian occupation administration intends to supply the 40 percent shortfall of potable water, but Shabelnikova’s statements make it evident that Russian authorities are prioritizing water supply for tourist hotspots, potentially leaving hundreds of thousands of people who do not live in or near resort towns without reliable water supply.

Russia as a belligerent occupying power is obliged by international law to provide for the health of the population it occupies, which extends to the provision of basic goods and services such as drinking water. Ukraine initially shut off water supply to Crimea via the North Crimean Canal as a form of sanction when Russia invaded and annexed Crimea in 2014. Russia then struggled with maintaining water supply, particularly as it inundated the peninsula with Russian servicemembers and re-located Russian civilians to Crimea, all of which added strain on already limited water resources. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has mismanaged water infrastructure in Crimea, failed to invest in alternative water sources, continued diverting water resources to military needs, and mired water projects corruption scandals. Russia’s June 2023 destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam further severely limited water supplies to Crimea. Despite mounting water concerns, Russian officials continue to insist on bringing Russian tourism to the occupied peninsula, which will likely further stretch scarce water resources and disproportionately impact Ukrainian residents.

Key Takeaways:

• Occupied Crimea is poised to face a severe water crisis in the coming months, a crisis that the Russian occupation of Crimea has precipitated and which ongoing Russian mismanagement and resource misallocation will exacerbate.

• Russia is intensifying filtration processes against Ukrainians, greatly restricting their freedom of movement and their ability to leave occupied Ukraine.

• Kherson Oblast occupation officials continue efforts to consolidate control over the oblast’s agricultural output for Russia’s economic gain.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky approved sanctions on June 10 targeting numerous Russian officials and organizations for their role in the deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children. The sanctions list supports ISW’s assessment of the links between high-ranking Kremlin officials, Russian youth organizations, and the widescale deportation of Ukrainian children.

The Russian “University Shifts” program has begun summer sessions, facilitating the deportation of Ukrainian children and teenagers to participate in university classes at schools throughout the Russian Federation.

Institute for the Study of War

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces have sustained over one million casualties since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, over half of which occurred since January 2024. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 12 that Russian forces have sustained 628,000 casualties since January 2024. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported a breakdown of Russian casualty rates since 2022: Russian forces reportedly sustained 106,720 casualties in 2022 (average of 340 casualties per day); 253,290 casualties in 2023 (average of 693 casualties per day); and 430,790 casualties in 2024 (average of 1,177 casualties per day).

Russian forces have reportedly sustained an average of 1,286 casualties per day between January and early June 2025 in exchange for marginal territorial gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces had already sustained over 200,000 casualties in 2025 as of June 4, 2025. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) news agency ArmyInform reported on June 5 that an unnamed NATO official stated that Russian forces are sustaining an average casualty rate of 1,140 personnel per day. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa stated on June 4 that Russia is sustaining roughly 167 casualties per square kilometer of advance. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on June 11 that Russian forces seized more territory in May 2025 than any other month since the end of 2022. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized roughly 1,935 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory thus far in 2025 as of June 12, 2025ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is willfully taking disproportionately large manpower losses for marginal territorial gains across the theater and that these losses are unsustainable in the medium-term and unlikely to result in significant, rapid gains. Russian forces continue to burn through personnel in their ongoing efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts; advance in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts; and establish buffer zones in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts

Key Takeaways:

• The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces have sustained over one million casualties since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, over half of which occurred since January 2024.

• Russian forces have reportedly sustained an average of 1,286 casualties per day between January and early June 2025 in exchange for marginal territorial gains.

• Russian forces recently advanced across the western Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border northwest of Kurakhove as part of a multi-pronged effort to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

• Russian forces are likely attempting to level the frontlines in the Novopavlivka and Kurakhove directions to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

• The Ukrainian forces continue to demonstrate their ability to conduct successful long-range strikes that target Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).

• Ukraine and Russia exchanged prisoners of war (POWs) again on June 12, in accordance with agreements the parties previously reached during talks in Istanbul on June 2.

• Southeastern European countries reiterated their support for Ukraine on June 11, including Serbia signaling its willingness to improve bilateral relations with Ukraine.

• Germany pledged to supply Ukraine with additional financial and materiel support, including air defense systems.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Siversk and Kurakhove.

Institute for the Study of War

Ob der Iran seine Drohnen jetzt selber verwendet bzw. wurde die Produktion zerstört?

Ich glaube, eine Drohnenproduktion kann man nicht zerstören. Das ist ja, wenn man mal weiß, wie es geht, die simpelste Technik im Krieg.

Russian officials largely condemned the June 13 Israeli strikes against Iran, as Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to offer to facilitate negotiations on Iran's nuclear program. Putin had separate phone calls with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on June 13. The Kremlin claimed that Putin condemned Israel's strikes as violations of the UN Charter and international law. Putin reportedly stated that Russia supports efforts to resolve the situation about Iran's nuclear program and noted that Russia has already suggested initiatives aimed at finding a "mutually acceptable agreement." The Kremlin claimed that Putin emphasized to Netanyahu the importance of returning to the negotiation process and resolving issues about Iran's nuclear program through political and diplomatic means. Putin reportedly told Netanyahu that Russia is willing to mediate talks between Iran and Israel.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned Israel's strikes against Iran and notably claimed that "unprovoked military strikes against a sovereign UN member state, its citizens, sleeping peaceful cities, and nuclear energy infrastructure facilities are categorically unacceptable." The Russian MFA claimed that these Israeli strikes against Iran undermined and set back efforts to find solutions to "eliminate any suspicions and prejudices regarding Iran's peaceful nuclear energy." The Russian MFA blamed Western states for provoking anti-Iranian "hysteria" in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), referencing a June 10 resolution that the United States and E3 (United Kingdom, Germany, and France) proposed to declare Iran as noncompliant with its nuclear safeguarding obligations. The Russian MFA issued travel advisories for Russian citizens for Israel and Iran. The Russian Embassy in Iran called on Russian citizens and "compatriots" in Iran to avoid military facilities and refrain from photographing or videoing "any part of Iran," and the Russian Embassy in Israel called for Russians in Israel to leave the country.

Other Kremlin officials condemned Israel and the West for the strikes and advocated for a political and diplomatic Israeli-Iranian settlement. First Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Alexei Zhuravlev claimed that Russia's ties with Iran, including military ties, can become closer if necessary. Zhuravlev claimed that Russia has provided Iran with air defense systems and praised Iran's military technology, including technology that Russia helps Iran develop. Zhuravlev criticized the West for perpetuating "global injustice" and inequality and claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine is aimed at fighting this injustice.

Oil price increases following Israeli strikes against Iran may increase Russian revenue from oil sales and improve Russia's ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine. Brent crude oil futures prices rose by over five percent to $74.47 per barrel on June 13 following the Israeli strikes against Iran. Russia's oil and gas earnings accounted for roughly 30 percent of total federal revenues in 2024, underscoring the significant role oil and gas revenues play in financing Russian government spending. ISW previously assessed that compounding economic constraints on Russia are increasingly hindering Russia's ability to sustain a prolonged war effort in Ukraine. Russia may be able to leverage sudden upticks in oil prices to weather economic challenges and finance a protracted war in Ukraine, assuming the price of oil remains high (such as over $60 per barrel). Russian President Vladimir Putin has previously signaled concern about reduced oil prices, suggesting that any reduction in the oil price would likely risk destabilizing Russia's economy.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials largely condemned the June 13 Israeli strikes against Iran, as Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to offer to facilitate negotiations on Iran's nuclear program.

• Oil price increases following Israeli strikes against Iran may increase Russian revenue from oil sales and improve Russia's ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine.

• The Kremlin is continuing efforts to prepare the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) for a protracted war with Ukraine and a potential future war with NATO.

• Russia released the bodies of killed in action (KIA) Ukrainian servicemembers to Ukraine on June 13.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces continue to make marginal territorial gains east of Novopavlivka as Russian forces attempt to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and toward the settlement from three tactical directions. Geolocated footage published on June 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Horikhove (east of Novopavlivka) and likely seized the settlement. An assault detachment commander in the Russian 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army , Central Military District ) told Kremlin newswire TASS on June 14 that the regiment participated in the advance into Horikhove. ISW previously noted that Russian forces are currently engaged in a multi-pronged effort to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and Russian forces appear to be attacking from three tactical directions: east, southeast, and south of Novopavlivka. The Russian 41st CAA appears to be the main formation operating east of Novopavlivka. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 80th Tank Regiment also recently advanced west of Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka). Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 74th and 137th motorized rifle brigades (41st CAA) are also attacking near Kotlyarivka and Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and that additional elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade are attacking Horikhove from the north. Russian forces intensified offensive operations southwest of Pokrovsk between Solone and Bohdanivka in the direction of the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary in March and April 2025 and recently advanced to the administrative boundary within seven kilometers east of Novopavlivka.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continue to make marginal territorial gains east of Novopavlivka as Russian forces attempt to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and toward the settlement from three tactical directions.

• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct long-range strikes against Russia's defense industrial base.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted a fourth round of prisoner of war (POWs) exchanges on June 14, in accordance with the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian bilateral talks in Istanbul.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced near Toretsk and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to portray Russia as an effective and necessary international partner for the United States amid ongoing Iran-Israel tensions. US President Donald Trump stated on June 14 that he and Putin spoke by phone for about an hour about the ongoing Israel-Iran strikes and spent “much less” time talking about Ukraine than Iran. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on June 14 that Putin and Trump mainly spoke about military escalation in the Middle East. Ushakov claimed that Putin expressed concern over the escalation of tensions between Iran and Israel and offered Russia’s assistance in negotiating a peace settlement. Trump stated that he reminded Putin that the war against Ukraine must end during the call. Putin is likely attempting to distract from his ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine by offering to help the United States mediate the situation in the Middle East.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to portray Russia as an effective and necessary international partner for the United States amid ongoing Iran-Israel tensions.

• Russia conducted a large drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of June 14 to 15, primarily targeting Poltava Oblast.

• Russia repatriated the bodies of over 1,000 Ukrainian citizens on June 15, in accordance with the June 2 Ukrainian–Russian bilateral talks in Istanbul.

• Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia’s consumption of its Soviet-era tank stores appears to be slowing, possibly due to Russia's increasing transition to using motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) on the battlefield. A social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots via satellite imagery shared an updated assessment of smaller Russian tank and armored vehicle storage facilities on June 15 and assessed that Russia still has 46 percent of its pre-war tank reserves, 42 percent of its pre-war infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) reserves, and 48 percent of its pre-war armored personnel carrier (APC) reserves as of a recent unspecified date. The source stated that imagery of eight Russian military depot appears to show that Russia has emptied most of the depots of their vehicle reserves and assessed that Russia will likely deplete its remaining tank and armored vehicle reserves by the end of 2025. The social media source assessed in late December 2024 that Russia had 47 percent of its pre-war tank reserves, 52 percent of its pre-war IFV reserves, and 45 percent of its pre-war APC reserves remaining in storage. (The source noted on June 15 that they updated their previous assessments of Russia’s pre-war reserves and found that Russia had 241 more tanks, 174 more IFVs, and 687 more APCs before the full-scale invasion than the source previously assessed, which likely accounts for the increase in Russian APCs stores from 45 percent in the December 2024 assessment to 48 percent in June 2024.) The social media source also stated that satellite imagery analysis indicates a ”dramatic” increase in ”almost all” types of equipment deployed to a Russian military base near Petrozavodsk, Republic of Karelia, located roughly 373 kilometers from the international border with Finland. Russia may have additional armored vehicles and tanks in covered storage that are not visible in satellite imagery. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on April 27 that a senior Finnish military official stated that Russia is sending "almost none" of its newly produced tanks to the frontline in Ukraine but is stockpiling the."

The social media source's data suggests that Russia's consumption of Soviet-era tank stocks has slowed in recent months, an observation consistent with ISW’s study of recent battlefield combat footage which shows that Russian forces are increasingly using motorcycles and buggies in place of armored vehicles along the frontline in Ukraine. Russian forces have been increasingly using unarmored civilian vehicles, mainly motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), throughout the theater in Ukraine since late Fall 2024. ISW previously noted that Russia's increased use of motorcycles is an adaptation in response to pervasive Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian armored vehicles and the unsustainable armored vehicle losses that Russian forces suffered in late 2023 and 2024. Ukrainian drone operations have significantly complicated how to tactically employ tanks, as large and slow-moving armored vehicles and tanks are vulnerable to drones. Russian forces appear to be leveraging faster-moving motorcycles and buggies to advance through the contested "gray zones" that Ukrainian and Russian drone operators have created along the frontline. Russia's adaption has succeeded in granting Russian forces marginal tactical gains at the expense of significant infantry losses. ISW previously assessed that Russian armored vehicle losses are unsustainable and are undermining Russia’s ability to sustain a protracted high-intensity war, but it remains unclear if Russia’s increased reliance on motorcycles and buggies will be sufficient to offset these losses in the medium- to long-term.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine and Russia conducted an exchange that included the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on June 16 in accordance with agreements reached during talks in Istanbul on June 2.

• Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported that the Kremlin is spreading narratives about the POW and KIA exchanges in order to sow panic in Ukraine and discredit Ukraine in the international community – in line with ISW’s recent assessments.

• Russia’s consumption of its Soviet-era tank stores appears to be slowing, possibly due to Russia's increasing transition to using motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) on the battlefield.

• Russia continues to set conditions to pose a long-term strategic threat to the United States and its Western allies even after the end to Russia's war in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and in Zaporizhia Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia is attempting to leverage the Ukrainian children it has illegally deported in ongoing negotiations with Ukraine, thereby contradicting recent Russian efforts to deny and downplay the scale of its deportation campaign and confirming that Russia has indeed stolen Ukrainian children in clear violation of international law. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 16 during a press conference with Austrian President Alexander Van der Bellen that Russian officials proposed exchanging deported Ukrainian children for Russian prisoners of war (POWs). Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine will not exchange children for Russian combatants, condemned the proposal as “beyond international law,” and called for Russia to return the children unilaterally, without exchanging them. The Russian suggestion that children be treated as combatants runs contrary to international law, which grants children special protected status in times of war. The Russian proposal additionally acknowledges that Russia has deported Ukrainian children, despite recent Russian attempts to either deny or greatly downplay the scale of the deportations. ISW continues to assess that there can be no just peace in Ukraine until Russia has returned all of the children it has deported. Russia cannot use children as bargaining chips and must ensure their return unilaterally and unconditionally, not in exchange for anything.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is attempting to leverage the Ukrainian children it has illegally deported in ongoing negotiations with Ukraine, thereby contradicting recent Russian efforts to deny and downplay the scale of its deportation campaign and confirming that Russia has indeed stolen Ukrainian children in clear violation of international law.

• Russian occupation officials used the circumstances of Russia Day festivities to forcibly passportize Ukrainian children.

• The Republic of Kalmykia is facilitating the deportation of Ukrainian children via its patronage ties with a local Luhansk Oblast occupation administration.

• Russia continues to deport Ukrainian children to Russia for military-patriotic training and ideological indoctrination through the “Time of Young Heroes” program.

• Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky credited Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova and the “Country for Children” charitable foundation for the recent deportation of 100 children from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

• Russian occupation authorities are suppressing religious freedom in occupied Crimea by prosecuting religious minority groups as “extremists” and by appropriating worship sites for the benefit of the occupation administration.

• Ukrainian partisan groups conducted attacks on Russian military personnel and assets in occupied Ukraine on June 11 and 12.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted the third largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion on the night of June 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 440 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace over Tambov Oblast, 16 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast, four Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea, nine Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from the airspace over Belgorod and Bryansk oblasts, and one Kh-31P anti-radar missile from an unspecified location. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 239 drones, one Kh-47M2 missile, 15 Kh-101 missiles, and seven Kh-59/59 missiles and that 163 drones, one Kh-47M2 missile, one Kh-59/69 missile, and one Kh-31P missile were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that the Shahed and decoy drones targeting Kyiv City flew from different directions, including along the Dnipro River and from the east and west. Ihnat and Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko stated that Ukrainian authorities found remnants of cluster munitions at the site of missile explosions, and a Ukrainian source posted footage reportedly showing a Russian missile with cluster munitions striking Kyiv City overnight. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes hit residential areas and civilian infrastructure in Kyiv City and Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhia oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported civilian casualties in Kyiv and Odesa cities and Chernihiv Oblast.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted the third largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion on the night of June 16 to 17.

• The June 16-17 strike series heavily targeted Kyiv City and hit residential areas in the capital, as Russian officials and milbloggers called on Russia to intensify its strikes against Ukraine.

• Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu announced that North Korea would send 6,000 sappers and military engineers to help with reconstruction efforts in Kursk Oblast.

• The European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) announced sanctions packages against Russia on June 16 and 17.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted an at least platoon-sized mechanized assault in the Toretsk direction on June 17. Geolocated footage published on June 17 shows that Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault west of Yablunivka (west of Toretsk) with at least three armored vehicles and four motorized vehicles, likely all-terrain vehicles (ATVs). Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov reported on June 18 that Russian forces conducted a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault near Kostyantynivka and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 15 pieces of heavy equipment and eight motorized vehicles. Russian forces have been conducting mechanized assaults less frequently since Winter 2024–2025, likely due to Ukrainian drone capabilities and Russia's dwindling supply of armored vehicles. ISW recently observed reports indicating that Russia's consumption of Soviet-era tank stores is slowing. Russian forces have become increasingly reliant on civilian vehicles, ATVs, and motorcycles for assaults, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) began efforts in April 2025 to formally integrate motorcycle usage into offensive operations. Russian mechanized assaults in the Toretsk direction may indicate that the Russian military command intends to prioritize this sector of the front. ISW will continue to monitor this area of the frontline for additional evidence of mechanized assaults.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted an at least platoon-sized mechanized assault in the Toretsk direction on June 17.

• The Kremlin likely aims to use the ongoing St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) to support ongoing efforts to consolidate control over the information space and prepare Russian society for a prolonged war effort.

• The Kremlin also aims to use SPIEF to promote Kremlin narratives to Western audiences.

• Ukraine's Western partners continue to supply Ukraine with military aid and announce new sanctions packages against Russia.

• The Kremlin continues to crack down on critical Russian milbloggers as part of its years-long effort to censor and control the Russian information space.

• Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts and near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

The West has failed to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin to reevaluate his theory of victory in Ukraine in the past year. Putin’s public statements indicate that he continues to assess that Russian forces will be able to win a war of attrition by sustaining gradual advances along the frontline indefinitely. Putin articulated a theory of victory during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in June 2024 that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces. Putin's assessment that gradual Russian gains will allow Russia to achieve his goals in Ukraine is predicated on the assumption that Ukrainian forces will be unable to liberate any significant territory that Russian forces seize and that the Russian military will be able to sustain offensive operations that achieve gradual tactical gains regardless of heavy losses. Putin's discussion with foreign media at SPIEF on June 19, 2025, demonstrated that Putin still maintains this theory of victory one year later. Putin claimed that Russian forces have a "strategic advantage" in all areas of the front. Putin claimed that Russian forces are advancing along the entire frontline every day and that even if Russian forces advance less on some days, they are "still advancing." Putin claimed that the "situation has changed" since the March 2022 Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Istanbul and that the terms Russia proposed in 2022 are "much softer" than the terms Russia demands today. Putin threatened that the situation may worsen for Ukraine if Ukraine does not make significant concessions and agree to a peace settlement on Russia's terms and called on Ukraine's partners to "point to the realities of today" to push Ukraine toward a settlement. Putin reiterated that Russia is prepared to achieve its war goals militarily if it is not able to achieve these goals diplomatically. Putin has repeatedly indicated that Russia's war aims include regime change in Ukraine, the installation of a pro-Kremlin proxy government in Kyiv, significant limitations of Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression, Ukrainian neutrality, and NATO's abandonment of its open-door policy.

Putin's theory of victory is predicated on critical assumptions about Ukraine's capabilities and continued Western support for Ukraine — conditions that the West can still change. Putin's theory assumes that Russian forces will be able to leverage their advantages in manpower and materiel to overwhelm Ukrainian forces and that Ukrainian forces will be unable to liberate any operationally- or strategically-significant territory that Russian forces seize. Russian forces are taking disproportionately large manpower losses for marginal tactical gains that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term, but Putin's theory assumes that the Russian military will be able to maintain the theater-wide initiative and sustain offensive operations that achieve gradual tactical gains longer than the West is willing to provide security assistance to Ukraine and longer than Ukraine's economy and population are able to mobilize for the war effort. ISW continues to assess that Russia will face a number of challenges in its economy and defense industrial base (DIB) in the medium-term that will impede Russia's ability to sustain a prolonged war in Ukraine. Continued rising oil prices following Israeli strikes against Iran may increase Russian revenue from oil sales and improve Russia's ability to sustain its war effort, but only if the price of oil remains high and if Russian oil does not come under additional international sanctions. Increased Western military aid and economic instruments can enable Ukrainian forces to maintain pressure on the battlefield and exacerbate Russia's economic issues, leveraging Russia's weaknesses to achieve a strong negotiating position for Ukraine and the West and extract critical concessions from Russia to bring about a lasting and just end to the war.

Key Takeaways:

• The West has failed to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin to reevaluate his theory of victory in Ukraine in the past year. Putin’s public statements indicate that he continues to assess that Russian forces will be able to win a war of attrition by sustaining gradual advances along the frontline indefinitely.

• Putin's theory of victory is predicated on critical assumptions about Ukraine's capabilities and continued Western support for Ukraine – conditions that the West can still change.

• Putin continued Russia's reflexive control campaign that aims to deter Western provisions of military aid to Ukraine and NATO rearmament but appears to be adapting this campaign for different audiences.

• Putin explicitly stated that he will not sign a peace agreement with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

• Putin used his meeting with international journalists to reinject longstanding Kremlin rhetorical lines into the media space, as ISW previously forecasted.

• Russian officials appear to be struggling to posture Russia's economic strength amid increasing signs of a slowing Russian economy.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted the fifth prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance the June 2 Istanbul agreements, amid reports that Russia artificially inflated the number of bodies released to Ukraine in previous killed in action (KIA) exchanges.

• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation and all of Ukraine is effectively Russian as part of efforts to justify his continued conquest of Ukraine. Putin answered a question after his speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 20 about why Russian forces are advancing beyond the territories in Ukraine that Russia has illegally annexed, claiming that he considers Russian and Ukrainian people to be "one people in reality" and that "Ukraine is ." Putin has repeatedly demonstrated that he does not consider Ukraine as an independent state with its own history, identity, and culture separate from Russia, as evidenced by his 2021 "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" essay and his repeated false assertion that Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians are all part of one historical people.

ISW has previously noted that the Kremlin's ongoing information operation attempting to portray Russians and Ukrainians as one unified nation and culturally and historically homogeneous is one of its most significant information operations aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and justifying the war effort to the Russian people. Putin's commitment to this narrative underscores his ongoing commitment to destroying the Ukrainian state and subjugating the Ukrainian people.

Putin asserted that Russia will be able to achieve its goals through a protracted war in Ukraine. Putin claimed on June 20 that it would be better for Ukraine to stop fighting because the battlefield and geopolitical situation will only worsen for Ukraine, and that Ukraine will have to negotiate from a weaker position. Putin attempted to posture Russia as interested in engaging in negotiations to end the war, claiming that Russia is not seeking "Ukrainian capitulation," yet insisted that Ukraine recognize the "realities that have developed on the ground." Kremlin officials often call for Ukraine to recognize the "realities on the ground" (a reference to the frontline in Ukraine) to allude to the idea that Russia is in a stronger negotiating position given the situation on the battlefield and to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia's unwavering demands.

Putin's claim that Ukraine must recognize the "realities on the ground" and should negotiate before the situation worsens also coheres with Putin's theory of victory, which assesses that Russian forces will be able to win a war of attrition by indefinitely sustaining gradual advances along the frontline despite the high costs of such creeping advances. Putin's statement ignores that the true "realities on the ground" show a complicated and hotly contested frontline situation in which Russian forces are slowly making marginal advances at the cost of significant manpower and materiel losses in the face of significant Ukrainian drone-based defenses.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation and all of Ukraine is effectively Russian as part of efforts to justify his continued conquest of Ukraine.

• Putin asserted that Russia will be able to achieve its goals through a protracted war in Ukraine.

• Putin and other Kremlin officials are using the guise of "buffer zones" to expand Russia's territorial demands in Ukraine.

• The Kremlin continues to prioritize maintaining the facade of economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia's economic instability.

• Putin is attempting to obfuscate the reality that increased investment in Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) has come at the cost of Russia's civilian economic sectors.

• Open-source intelligence suggests that Russia is increasing its T-90M tank production capabilities

• Ukraine and Russia conducted the sixth prisoner of war (POW) exchange in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Brigadier General Hennadii Shapovalov as Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces on June 19.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin's long-term demands for full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged. Putin told Sky News Arabia on June 20 that Ukraine needs to accept neutrality, reject foreign alliances, and agree to nuclear non-proliferation before Russia and Ukraine can establish long-term peace. Putin insisted that Kyiv recognize Russian control over the illegally annexed, partially occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts or risk future Russian aggression. Putin also claimed that Ukrainian leaders are being guided by the interests of "external parties" rather than national interest, reiterating a long-term Russian narrative accusing Ukraine of being controlled by the West and denying the Ukrainian government agency to make its own decisions and defend itself. Putin claimed that Ukraine deserves a "better fate" than to be used by other countries as a tool against Russia. Putin also stated that no future settlement can be reached unless Russia and Ukraine resolve "outstanding humanitarian issues." Russian officials had repeatedly issued the same pre-war demands that Russian officials presented at negotiations in Istanbul in 2022, which included recognition of occupied Ukraine as Russian territory and the "demilitarization" of Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in peace negotiations with Ukraine and remains committed to its pre-war demands, which amount essentially to the elimination of Ukraine as a sovereign country independent of Russian control.

Ukrainian officials responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 20 statements at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) and urged the international community to take more decisive action against Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky responded to Putin’s statement that Russia owns everywhere a "Russian soldier steps" and emphasized that Putin clearly laid out Russia’s intention to seize all of Ukraine during this speech. Zelensky noted that this ideology implies that Russia could also lay claim to Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova, the Caucasus, and Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated that Russian soldiers bring "only death, destruction, and devastation” wherever they step. Sybiha stated that the only way that Putin will accept peace would be if the West forced his hand through increased support for Ukrainian defense, severe economic sanctions, the recognition of Russia as a terrorist state, and complete diplomatic isolation. Sybiha called on the international community to push back against Putin’s continued aspirations toward new territorial gains. ISW has previously noted that Putin's theory of victory is based on the assumption that Russia can outlast Ukraine's will to fight and the Western coalition supporting Ukraine, and that reducing US military aid to Ukraine will neither lead to a sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Putin to reassess his theory of victory.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin's long-term demands for full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged.

• Ukrainian officials responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 20 statements at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) and urged the international community to take more decisive action against Russia.

• Kremlin officials appear to be reviving the false narrative that Ukraine intends to use a "dirty bomb" against Russia, likely in an attempt to influence Western discussions about providing additional military assistance to Ukraine.

• US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk on June 21.

• Russia continues to field modernized Shahed drones, expand domestic drone production capabilities, and innovate long-range strike tactics.

• The Russian government formally announced its intention to reassess Russia's territorial waters in the Baltic Sea over a year after the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published and subsequently deleted a similar proposal.

• Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia condemned the recent US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22 amid reports that Iran's foreign minister will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on June 23. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned the US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22, claiming that the US strikes are a violation of the UN Charter and that the UN Security Council is obliged to respond, while urging officials to return to diplomatic channels. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that that the world will descend into chaos if countries are allowed to interpret the right to self-defense in the UN Charter as they wish. Lavrov claimed that the US strikes marked a new, dangerous escalation during a phone call with Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó on June 22. CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev claimed on June 22 that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is en route to Moscow and will meet with Putin on June 23. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to the US strike in social media posts, including on his English-language channels, on June 22 by claiming that US President Donald Trump has started a new war. Medvedev also claimed that the United States failed to destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities, that Iran will continue to work towards the production of nuclear weapons, and that several unspecified countries are ready to "directly supply" Iran with nuclear warheads. The Kremlin typically leverages Medvedev to amplify narratives intended to stoke panic and fear among Western decisionmakers, particularly through nuclear saber rattling. Medvedev's veiled threats thus do not represent a significant rhetorical inflection. ISW continues to assess that Russia is constrained in its ability to provide direct support to Iran due to its war in Ukraine and has likely resigned itself to providing diplomatic overtures for the time being, showcasing the immediate limitations in the Russian-Iranian strategic relationship.

Iran's possible decision to close the Strait of Hormuz will cause a significant spike in global oil prices, which would greatly economically and financially benefit Russia by reversing months of declining Russian oil revenue and allowing Russia to continue to finance its war against Ukraine in the medium term. Brent crude oil futures prices closed at $77.27 on June 20, marking an 11.4 percent rise from June 12 just prior to the Israeli strikes against Iran. Iran’s Parliament voted on June 22 to close the Strait, but the final decision remains with Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Oil prices will likely surge exponentially in the event that Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz, with varying reports predicting a spike to prices between $90 to $130 in a worst-case scenario. Russia’s oil and gas revenue amounted to 11.1 trillion rubles ($120.3 billion) in 2024 and accounted for roughly 30 percent of Russia's total federal revenues. Russian oil revenue has been steadily decreasing through 2025 however, with May 2025 revenues notably 34 percent lower than in 2024. The Russian Finance Ministry more than tripled its budget deficit target for 2025 in May from 0.5 percent of Global Domestic Product (GDP) to 1.7 percent of GDP after several months of staggeringly low oil and gas profits.<12> The Moscow Times stated on June 9 that, according to economists from the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Russia’s high expenditures and low oil revenues could exhaust the National Wealth Fund (NWF) by 2026. The Kremlin relies on the NWF and oil and gas revenues to finance its war in Ukraine, as the Russian government allocated 41 percent (roughly $178 billion) of Russia’s total 2025 federal budget towards National Security and Defense alone. ISW previously assessed that Russia’s high losses on the battlefield and ongoing economic constraints could prevent Russia from continuing the war in Ukraine in the medium to long term, however a sustained surge in oil prices could keep Russia afloat economically.

Russian forces have continued to pursue long-standing operational objectives on the battlefield in Ukraine throughout Spring and Summer 2025 and will likely remain committed to these objectives for the coming months. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi told journalists on June 22 that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and continued Ukrainian counterattacks in northern Sumy Oblast prevented the Russian military from redeploying 60,000 troops from Kursk Oblast to reinforce offensive operations in the Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson directions in Spring 2025. Syrskyi noted that Ukraine prevented Russia from significantly intensifying offensive operations in these directions. A prominent Russian milblogger acknowledged on June 22 that Russia's "summer offensive" has mainly consisted of the same grinding offensive operations that Russian forces began in late 2023. The milblogger claimed that the situation along the frontline is unlikely to significantly change during Summer 2025 and noted that Ukrainian forces are conducting an organized defense throughout the frontline.

Russian forces are currently engaged in intense combat operations along most of the frontline in Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts and appear to be prioritizing offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast - as they have since October 2023. Russian forces intensified the tempo of offensive operations in early 2025 as the United States began to engage in efforts to mediate a resolution to the war in Ukraine, and Russian forces have sustained this intensified tempo over the last five months. Russian forces previously struggled to conduct simultaneous large-scale offensive operations and compensated by conducting pulsing, more limited, offensive operations along different sectors of the frontline with one sector decreasing in intensity as another sector increases. Russian forces currently appear to be advancing as part of at least three simultaneous large-scale offensive operations in the Borova-Lyman, Kostyantynivka, and Novopavlivka directions, however. Russian forces also appear to be allocating significant manpower to offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast, although Ukrainian forces appear to be slowing Russian gains in that area. Russian forces have failed to make significant gains during this period of intensified offensive operations, however, due in part to the fact that Russian forces are largely relying on poorly trained infantry to make gains in the face of Ukraine's drone-based defense. The continuation of Russia's intensified offensive operations likely represents the extent of Russia's current offensive capacity, and Russia is unlikely to mount a distinct summer offensive operation.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia condemned the recent US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22 amid reports that Iran's foreign minister will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on June 23.

• Iran's possible decision to close the Strait of Hormuz will cause a significant spike in global oil prices, which would greatly economically and financially benefit Russia by reversing months of declining Russian oil revenue and allowing Russia to continue to finance its war against Ukraine in the medium term.

• Russian forces have continued to pursue long-standing operational objectives on the battlefield in Ukraine throughout Spring and Summer 2025 and will likely remain committed to these objectives for the coming months.

• Russia's intensified force generation efforts appear to be generating a reserve force that Russia will be able to leverage in Ukraine or against NATO in the future, despite current limitations on Russia's offensive capacity in Ukraine.

• The Kremlin continues to promote rhetoric designed to undermine Ukrainian legitimacy and sovereignty, demonstrating its steadfast commitment to the complete destruction of Ukraine.

• Kremlin officials are leveraging the Russian education system to indoctrinate children into the mythos of the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War and create a centralized state ideology that will shape generations in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukraine, likely to justify a protracted war in Ukraine and a future military conflict against the West.

• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy oblast. Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Das Unangenehme an dem Gedöhns ist, abgesehen von den jetzt schon vielen sinnlos verpulverten Menschenleben und Ressourcen, dass die Unrechtsaktivitäten erheblicher Machtblöcke weiter zunehmen anstatt auf einem ordentlichen, kooperativen Gesprächs- und Verhandlungsweg die Angelegenheiten zu erledigen.

Wir steuern darauf zu dass China sagen kann: und jetzt sind wir dran und ebenso einfach mal agiert - und das Geknalle richtig eskaliert.

Putin hat die Sache losgetreten, Trump wird das nicht beenden und Xi schon garnicht (der kann sich ja zurücklehnen).

The Kremlin continues to only diplomatically support Iran, showcasing the limitations in the Russian-Iranian strategic relationship. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov, and Chief of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Igor Kostykov met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi in Moscow on June 23. Putin claimed that Russia’s position on the Israel-Iran conflict is well-known and that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has raised Russia’s concerns at the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Putin also claimed that recent Israeli and American strikes against Iran were unprovoked and unjustified and that Russia is making every effort to help the Iranian people. Araghchi thanked Russia for its strong condemnation of the strikes against Iran and claimed that Iran regularly consults with Russia on issues of global security, as Russia and Iran’s relations have become "strategic in nature." Unspecified Iranian sources told Reuters on June 23 that Iran has not been impressed with Russia's support so far and wants Putin to do more to back Iran against Israel and the United States. Reuters reported that an Iranian source stated that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei sent Araghchi to Moscow to deliver a letter from Khamenei to Putin requesting more assistance from Russia. ISW continues to assess that Russia is constrained in its ability to provide direct support to Iran due to its war in Ukraine and has likely resigned itself to providing diplomatic overtures for the time being.

Russian officials are attempting to influence conversations about increasing NATO defense spending by misrepresenting Russia's ongoing efforts to restructure and expand Russia's military capabilities as a defensive reaction to NATO. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with graduates of Russia's military academies on June 23 and acknowledged that NATO member states will likely announce a significant increase in defense spending and efforts to increase NATO military capabilities at the upcoming summit on June 24 and 25. Putin claimed that this meeting would clarify that NATO is the party provoking "global militarization" - not Russia. Putin stated that Russia will continue to take steps to strengthen Russia's security and develop the Russian Armed Forces to guarantee Russia's sovereignty. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko told the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti on June 23 in an article ahead of the upcoming NATO summit that the European Union (EU) is accelerating its militarization and that Russia will take all necessary measures and countermeasures, "including preemptive ones," to ensure Russia's security. Grushko reiterated that Russia considers the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO to be a "direct threat" to Russia's security and stated that Russia is seeking "ironclad" guarantees that Ukraine will not join NATO, which Grushko stated includes repealing the 2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration that welcomed Ukraine's and Georgia's intention to join NATO. ISW has previously reported that Russian officials leverage escalatory rhetoric and threats during key moments of Western debates on military assistance for Ukraine in order to scare Western leaders into inaction, and Russian officials are likely again attempting to leverage threats to dissuade NATO member states from supporting increased defense spending.

Putin announced during his speech to the graduates on June 23 that Russia will complete some of its ongoing force restructuring efforts in 2025.<8> Putin stated that Russia is urgently working to increase the Russian Armed Forces' combat capabilities and reiterated that Russia is standing up the Unmanned Systems Forces as a new branch of the Russian military. Putin stated that Russia will complete the formation of the Moscow and Leningrad military districts (MMD/LMD) and will reorganize Russia's naval infantry brigades into divisions in 2025. Putin stated that Russia is also undertaking a long-term technical modernization effort in the army and navy, modernizing its Strategic Missile Forces, beginning serial production of Oreshnik ballistic missiles, and producing new ships and submarines for the Russian Navy. Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced Russia's intention to form the MMD and LMD and reorganize Russia's naval infantry brigades into divisions in the medium-term in December 2022. Russian officials had not previously provided a firm date for the completion of these efforts. ISW continues to assess that Russia's military reforms, particularly in the MMD and LMD in western Russia along its border with NATO, demonstrate Russia's longer-term preparation for a possible future conflict with NATO. These military reforms come after Kremlin officials have repeatedly threatened NATO states, including the Baltic states and Finland.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues to only diplomatically support Iran, showcasing the limitations in the Russian-Iranian strategic relationship.

• Russian officials are attempting to influence conversations about increasing NATO defense spending by misrepresenting Russia's ongoing efforts to restructure and expand Russia's military capabilities as a defensive reaction to NATO.

• Putin also acknowledged his ongoing efforts to empower Russia's internal security services in order to safeguard regime stability and internal security.

• Russian forces conducted a large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of June 22 to 23 that largely targeted Kyiv City and killed at least seven people and injured 28.

• Ukraine's Western partners continue to allocate military aid to Ukraine and collaborate with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).

• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Borova, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka and in Sumy Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte assessed that Russia is the largest existential threat to NATO members today and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war with NATO. Rutte stated on June 24 at the NATO summit at The Hague that Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to NATO, especially considering the support North Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and Belarus provide Russia. Rutte stated that Russia could attack NATO within three to seven years and is currently more prepared for a war than NATO. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with Sky News on June 24 that Russia would not be ready to attack NATO in the immediate future but could be ready for a war with NATO by 2030. Zelensky stated that the war in Ukraine is currently constraining Russia's ability to train and reconstitute its forces and that any decrease in aid to Ukraine would benefit Russia. ISW continues to assess that Russia is preparing its military and society for a potential future war with NATO in the medium- to long-term. Any future ceasefire or long-term pause in combat in Ukraine would free up Russian forces for redeployment to Russia's eastern border with NATO and allow Russia to rearm and reconstitute, whereby Russia may be able to pose a significant threat to NATO earlier than 2030.

The Kremlin continues efforts to augment Russian combat power by setting conditions to subsume forces from Russia's Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies under a Russian military command. The Russian State Duma ratified on June 24 a protocol that allows CSTO states to send their troops to other CSTO states' territory in the event of armed conflict, threats, crisis situations, and exercises; to respond to the consequences of emergencies; and to provide humanitarian aid. The protocol now allows for the CSTO to transport troops one day after a decision from the CSTO Council — as opposed to after 30 days as the protocol stated previously. The protocol also introduces the concept of a "command of formations" that will command CSTO military forces sent to one CSTO state. This “command of formations” will likely be a Russian-dominated command. The CSTO Collective Security Council approved the protocol in November 2024. ISW has long assessed that the Kremlin has been trying to subordinate the militaries of former Soviet states to the Russian Armed Forces to recreate a multinational combined army in the former Soviet space. Western assessments of Russia's future combat power must take into account the forces of Russia's CSTO allies that Russia may use in future operations — not only those of Russia.

Key Takeaways:

• NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte assessed that Russia is the largest existential threat to NATO members today and that Russia is preparing for a protracted war with NATO.

• The Kremlin continues efforts to augment Russian combat power by setting conditions to subsume forces from Russia's Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies under a Russian military command.

• Russian forces are expanding their use of motorcycles along the frontline in Ukraine — a tactic that the Russian military may leverage in future wars beyond Ukraine, possibly including operations against NATO states.

• NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte highlighted NATO's plans to invest more in its own defense capabilities, including by investing in the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) — in line with US President Donald Trump's initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden of collective security.

• Ukraine's European partners allocated military aid to Ukraine and financial support for drone production during the NATO summit on June 24.

• Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 23 to 24 that resulted in over 100 civilian casualties.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Kherson City, and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia will effectively ban Ukrainian-language education in schools in occupied Ukraine starting on September 1. The Russian Ministry of Education published a draft order on June 23 detailing plans to exclude Ukrainian-language education from the Russian federal basic general education program blocks at all educational levels starting on September 1, 2025. The Ministry of Education claimed that they will be excluding Ukrainian-language education “in connection with the changed geopolitical situation in the world,” but that students will retain the possibility to study Ukrainian in some extracurricular programs. The Russian Ministry of Education previously reported in the 2023-2024 school year that Ukrainian was taught on a “mandatory” basis in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts and “at the request of parents” in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, occupied Crimea, and Russia’s Bashkortostan Republic. The draft order will also terminate a course on Ukrainian literature. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned the draft order on June 24 as a “manifestation of Moscow’s genocidal policy” towards occupied Ukraine.

Russian authorities have severely limited access to Ukrainian language education as part of their occupation policy since 2014. In occupied Crimea, for example, only 214 students received Ukrainian language education in the 2020/2021 academic year, suggesting that constraints against the Ukrainian language were already in place prior to the full-scale invasion. The Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics occupation administrations similarly cracked down on Ukrainian language and Ukrainian history curricula in schools in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts starting in 2014. The Russian Ministry of Education’s claim that Ukrainian language instruction was “mandatory” in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts over the past few years directly contradicts statements made by Zaporizhia Oblast occupation officials, which reveal existing constraints on the availability of Ukrainian language instruction. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation Minister of Education and Science Elena Shapurova announced in March 2023 that schools in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast would abolish mandatory Ukrainian language education by the start of the 2023-2024 school year. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky stated in March 2023 that students in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast had the “option” to study Ukrainian for a maximum of three hours a week, but that Russian language instruction was the default. ISW assessed at the time that Russian occupation authorities would likely use the semblance of choice in selecting Ukrainian language education to identify individuals who partook in the ostensibly pro-Ukrainian activity of learning Ukrainian, which Russian authorities could later use as a repressive tool against identified pro-Ukrainian individuals. Further legal limits on Ukrainian language education will further Russify occupied areas, setting multigenerational conditions that will allow the Kremlin to claim that occupied Ukraine is part of Russia on a linguistic basis.


Key Takeaways:

• Russia will effectively ban Ukrainian-language education in schools in occupied Ukraine starting on September 1, setting multigenerational conditions that will allow the Kremlin to claim that occupied Ukraine is part of Russia on a linguistic basis.

• Russia continues to pursue the forced subordination and integration of Ukraine in the legal sphere using real estate law and by expanding the number of magistrates operating on the most local community levels.

• Ukrainian youth continue to face militarization and indoctrination programs in Russia.

Institute for the Study of War

South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea may deploy North Korean troops to Ukrainian territory, which would represent a significant battlefield inflection. Reuters, citing a South Korean lawmaker privy to intelligence from South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), reported on June 26 that North Korea may deploy an unspecified number of additional North Korean forces to Russia to fight against Ukraine as early as July or August 2025 and that North Korea continues to arm Russia with artillery ammunition and missiles. The South Korean lawmaker told Reuters that the NIS assessed that Russia may be preparing to initiate a large-scale assault against Ukraine in July or August 2025 and that North Korea is likely receiving technical advice from Russia on satellite launches and missile guidance systems in return. ISW has observed evidence of North Korean forces augmenting Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and North Korea supplying Russia with artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles. Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence in Kursk Oblast, so North Korean personnel participating in combat operations would most likely be fighting in Ukrainian territory. The North Korean and Russian military commands authorizing the deployment of North Korean forces to Ukrainian territory would mark a significant battlefield inflection that may improve Russian forces' ability to sustain simultaneous offensive operations in multiple directions, which the Russian military has traditionally struggled to conduct. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces compensated by conducting pulsing, more contained, offensive operations along different sectors of the frontline, but recent reporting indicates that Russian forces appear to be gradually advancing in at least three simultaneous large-scale offensive operations in the Borova-Lyman, Kostyantynivka, and Novopavlivka directions. It is not possible to forecast the likely impact of North Korean support of this type without more information about the size and composition of the North Korean troop contingent that would be going to Ukraine, nor is it clear how rapidly new North Korean troops would become effective in operations alongside Russian troops in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea may deploy North Korean troops to Ukrainian territory, which would represent a significant battlefield inflection.

• US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met at the NATO summit on June 25 and discussed possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine and joint weapons production.

• Kremlin officials continue to platform bellicose rhetoric aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and to demonstrate Russia's uncompromising position on Ukraine.

• Satellite imagery of select armored vehicle repair plants in Russia indicates that Russia continues to rely on refurbishing its Soviet-era stores of armored vehicles.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted the seventh prisoner of war (POW) exchange, in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

The Kremlin continues to downplay the social and economic costs of Russia's war in Ukraine and inflated military spending. Russian President Vladimir Putin told journalists on June 27, following the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) summit in Minsk, that sanctions cannot hurt Russia’s economy and that Russia's economic indicators are “satisfactory.” Putin acknowledged that Russia’s economy is still contending with high inflation and that Russia’s economic growth in 2025 will be “much more modest to combat inflation.” Putin also claimed that Russia’s military budget is currently 6.3 percent of its GDP, or 13.5 trillion rubles (roughly $172 billion), and that Russia plans to steadily decrease defense spending beginning in 2026. Russia notably increased its defense budget by 25 percent between the 2024 and 2025 federal budgets and has been increasing its investments in Russia's defense industry throughout 2025.

Putin’s statements likely seek to portray the Russian government as committed to social and civilian expenditures and to downplay recent indicators of the societal and economic toll of Russia’s war against Ukraine and corresponding prioritization of military-industrial sector investment. Russian officials previously claimed that the 2025-2027 federal budgets would prioritize civilian and social sector investments, despite the September 2024 draft budgets indicating Russia will spend roughly 41 percent of its annual expenditures in 2025 on national security and defense. The Russian Finance Ministry more than tripled its budget deficit target for 2025 in May – from 0.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 1.7 percent of GDP – after several months of staggeringly low oil and gas profits. Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina notably stated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 19 that Russia has exhausted many of its “free resources“ since the start of Russia‘s full-scale war against Ukraine, including Russia’s workforce, production and import substitution capacities, and reserves of the National Welfare Fund and Russia’s banking sector. Russia’s military force generation strategy currently hinges on large recruitment and pension payouts, and it remains unclear how the Kremlin intends to fund these payments in the medium- to long-term, as Russia reportedly depleted the entire 2025 federal recruitment budget fund between January and March 2025. Russia is also making significant financial investments in its domestic drone production capacity and committed 243 billion rubles (about $3 billion) to Russian drone companies between 2023 and 2024. Any sharp decrease in Russia's defense spending will likely depress the Russian economy in the medium term, as Russia’s defense industrial base now accounts for a significant portion of overall Russian domestic production.

Putin also reiterated Kremlin narratives aimed at discrediting Ukraine and blaming the West and NATO for his decision to invade Ukraine. Putin claimed that Russia has agreed to conduct a third round of negotiations, is ready to meet with Ukraine in Istanbul, and has demonstrated its willingness to negotiate through prisoner of war (POW) and killed-in-action (KIA) exchanges. Putin claimed that Ukraine is refusing to accept the bodies of some deceased servicemembers, an unsubstantiated claim that is part of an ongoing Russian information campaign depicting Ukraine as spoiling POW exchanges and KIA repatriations in order to provoke discontent and demoralize Ukrainian society and to discredit the Ukrainian government. Putin reiterated Russia's long-term claim that NATO promised Russia it would never expand east and claimed that Russia was "crudely deceived." Putin claimed that Western countries in opposition to Russia will "soon die" themselves. Putin also reiterated that Russia will only conclude its war against Ukraine on Russia’s terms and claimed that Russian defense spending is designed to achieve this goal. ISW has previously noted that Russia’s terms – the "denazification" and "demilitarization" of Ukraine, which Russia has demanded since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 – amount to demands for regime change, the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Ukraine, and significant limitations on Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues to downplay the social and economic costs of Russia's war in Ukraine and inflated military spending.

• Putin’s statements likely seek to portray the Russian government as committed to social and civilian expenditures and to downplay recent indicators of the societal and economic toll of Russia’s war against Ukraine and corresponding prioritization of military-industrial sector investment.

• Putin also reiterated Kremlin narratives aimed at discrediting Ukraine and blaming the West and NATO for his decision to invade Ukraine.

• Open-source data suggests that Russia is increasingly investing in its defense industry and expanding its drone, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and aircraft production and shipbuilding capabilities – several of the key platforms that Russia would likely rely on in a future war with NATO.

• Russia's ongoing efforts to expand drone production are having a more immediate impact on the frontline in Ukraine, although Russia will continue to benefit from enhanced drone production capabilities during any future conflict.

• Russian forces continue to implement tactical innovations that correspond with technological weapons system advancements.

• Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in direct violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Lyman. Russian forces advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Putin Says Russia to Seek Defense Cuts; How Much Depends on War

President Vladimir Putin said Russia plans to cut defense spending, acknowledging growing strains on the budget even as he insisted that reductions would depend on winning his war in Ukraine.

Russia is spending 6.3% of gross domestic product on defense this year and “that’s a lot,” Putin told reporters in Minsk, Belarus, on Friday. “It’s one of the problems, including for the budget, that we have to resolve,” and Russia paid a price in inflation from the increased expenditure, he said.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-27/putin-says-russia-to-seek-defense-cuts -though-it-depends-on-war

Russia may have recently tested a new Iranian-made Shahed (Geran) drone with new precision capabilities, while likely simultaneously fielding new Russian-made radio-controlled Shahed drones. Ukrainian forces discovered Shahed drone debris on June 18 that had an advanced camera, a computing platform with artificial intelligence (AI)/machine learning (ML) capabilities, and a radio operation system that allows the drone operator to remotely operate the Shahed drone from Russia. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov told the Associated Press that the new Shahed variants are white and have no markings or labels consistent with Russia-made drones, instead having stickers consistent with the standard Iranian labeling system. Drone experts told AP that Iran may have sold new Shahed variants to Russia for combat testing. Beskresnov also commented on the footage of a black Shahed drone with a radio-controlled camera striking a Ukrainian target in Kramatorsk on June 24. Beskresnov noted that while this Shahed variant appears to be different from the white, possibly Iranian-made Shahed drone. Beskresnov noted that Ukrainian intelligence previously warned that Russia sought to integrate radio communications and cameras into a portion of Shaheds and argued that the Russian-made radio-controlled Shahed variants likely have "primitive" and cheap video and radio communications, whereas the Iranian-made drone likely had expensive components. Beskresnov added that the Russian-made Shaheds are still likely vulnerable to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) due to their reliance on radio communications.

The Russian military also integrated thermal imaging cameras on some Shahed drones to improve Russian drone capabilities and strike precision. A Ukrainian military-analytical Telegram channel published footage on June 24 showing an intercepted Russian Shahed-136 drone that has a thermal camera. The Telegram channel observed that thermal cameras allow Shahed-136 drones to better operate at night and in low visibility conditions; identify targets such as engines, generators, and thermal power plants; automate target identification if the drone has machine vision capabilities; and target homing in GPS jamming conditions. The Telegram channel added that Shahed-136 drones can use thermal cameras to improve and correct the strike trajectory, home in on thermal signatures, and ignore decoys and targets with cold thermal signatures. The Telegram channel added that Shahed drones with thermal cameras can also adapt to the environment even if it does not have precise coordinates of the target, whereas Shaheds without thermal cameras operate blindly on GPS programs. Russian milbloggers amplified footage on June 19, reportedly showing a Shahed drone striking a target in Zaporizhzhia City, commenting that the strikes show that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) modified Shahed drones to not rely on geofence coordinates and granted the drones the ability to livestream the strike.

Key Takeaways:

Russian Technological Adaptations

• Russia may have recently tested a new Iranian-made Shahed (Geran) drone with new precision capabilities, while likely simultaneously fielding new Russian-made radio-controlled Shahed drones.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts

• The Russian State Duma is setting legal conditions to recruit stateless people into the Russian military and will likely use these conditions to illegally coerce Ukrainians and foreigners into military service.

Force Retention

• The Russian MoD is reportedly designing modified uniforms that would enable Russian commanders to commit wounded Russian servicemen to combat.

Russian Force Centralization

• The Russian State Duma adopted a bill that grants Russian commanders the ability to certify power of attorney over Russian volunteers, which will likely make it easier for the Russian MoD to deny compensation to Russian servicemen fighting in Ukraine.

Russian Military Reforms and Force Restructuring

• Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov claimed that Russia will raise 13,000 officers in 2025, amidst reports that Russia's war in Ukraine is degrading Russia’s officer corps and professionalism among officers.

• Russian commentators stated that a lack of equipment and financing is impeding Russia’s efforts to prepare more specialized military personnel, which may inhibit Russia’s reconstitution of a professional force.

Integration of Veterans into Russian Society

• The Kremlin continues to arrest Russian voices who are actively involved in searching for missing and deceased Russian servicemen, despite attempting to portray the Russian government as attentive to servicemen and their needs.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities from June 26 to 28. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on June 28 that the SBU conducted a drone strike that destroyed a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system and three combat helicopters — Mi-8, Mi-26, and Mi-28 — at the Kirovske Air Base in occupied Crimea on the night of June 27 and 28. The SBU noted that the strike also caused a secondary explosion at the airfield. A local Crimean source reported on June 28 that the strike caused five to six explosions and likely damaged an ammunition depot, warehouses, and air defense facilities, and set at least one combat helicopter on fire. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 27 that Ukrainian Special Forces and the SBU struck the Marinovka Air Base in Volgograd Oblast on the night of June 26 and 27 and damaged four Su-34 aircraft and a technical maintenance facility. The Ukrainian General Staff is conducting ongoing battle damage assessments (BDA). An unspecified intelligence source told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on June 28 that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted several drone strikes targeting facilities linked to the 120th arsenal of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) in Bryansk Oblast and that Ukrainian authorities are conducting BDA. An unspecified intelligence source reported on June 26 that the GUR conducted a drone strike against a fuel and lubricants depot located at the GRU's 1061st MTZ Center in Bryansk Oblast on the night of June 26 and 27. Residents reported heavy gunfire and a series of explosions and noted that the oil depot was on fire.

Russia’s deployment of an experimental Grom-1 missile-bomb and likely efforts to increase its Shahed production are part of ongoing efforts to adapt Russian strike packages against Ukraine to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and cause maximum damage. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported on June 28 that Ukrainian air defenses downed a Russian Grom-1 hybrid missile-bomb on the outskirts of Dnipro City. A local Ukrainian air defender in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on June 28 that Russian forces may have deployed an experimental KAB guided glide bomb as part of ongoing efforts to increase the range of KAB bombs. The local source stated that Russia has long used jet engines on the bomb to increase its range and likely used a bomb with a lighter warhead against Dnipro City to decrease the weight and increase the range of the bomb. The source also stated that Russian forces may have launched the bomb from a plane as close to Dnipro City as possible. Ukrainian political scientist and design engineer at satellite and rocket design enterprise Pivdnenne Design Office Oleksandr Kochetkov told Suspilne on June 28 that Russia created the Grom-1 as part of an effort to increase the range and accuracy of KAB bombs in order to preserve Russian aircraft that launch the bombs. Kochetkov stated that Grom-1 is a hybrid of a glide bomb and the Kh-38 air-to-air missile and uses the Kh-38 missile’s engine, which gives the bomb a range of 100 to 150 kilometers. Kochetkov noted that Russian forces used the Grom-1 possibly for the first time in August 2024 during a strike against Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast, and that Russia is not yet mass producing Grom-1 missile-bombs.

Ukrainian outlet New Voice assessed on June 27 that satellite imagery from early October 2024 and June 2025 shows that Russia is expanding its Shahed factory in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) near Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan. The imagery shows that Russia has built four new sites at the Alabuga SEZ spanning about 163 hectares between October 2024 and June 2025, and that another 30-hectare site is currently under construction. New Voice reported that the new construction includes dormitories for factory workers and that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) previously assessed in June 2025 that laborers are Russia's main need to increase its drone production. New Voice noted that the GUR reported on June 21 that Russia produces up to 170 Shahed and decoy drones daily and that production rates may increase to 190 drones per day by the end of 2025. Japanese outlet NHK reported on June 19, citing unspecified Western and Russian diplomatic sources, that North Korea is “considering” sending 25,000 workers to drone production facilities at the Alabuga SEZ, and dormitory construction may be related to this possible influx of workers in the future.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities from June 26 to 28.

• Russia’s deployment of an experimental Grom-1 missile-bomb and likely efforts to increase its Shahed production are part of ongoing efforts to adapt Russian strike packages against Ukraine to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and cause maximum damage.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Lyman. Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia conducted its largest combined strike series of the war on the night of June 28 to 29 by launching over 500 missiles and drones against Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian launched a total of 537 strike vehicles, including 447 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace above Tambov Oblast; seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast; 41 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles from Saratov, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts; five Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea; and three S-300 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 221 drones, one Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile, 33 Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles, and four Kalibr cruise missiles and that 225 drones and one Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missile were "lost in location" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure, including residences and educational facilities, in Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Cherkasy, and Mykolaiv oblasts and railway and industrial infrastructure in Lviv and Poltava oblasts. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged that a Ukrainian F-16 fighter pilot died while repelling the strikes. Russia is continuing to use increasingly large numbers of drones in its overnight strike packages in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and enable subsequent cruise and ballistic missile strikes. The increases in Russia's strike packages in recent weeks are largely due to Russia's efforts to scale up its defense industrial production, particularly of Shahed and decoy drones and ballistic missiles.

Ukrainian forces were notably only able to shoot down one of the seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and did not shoot down any of the four Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles during the June 28 to 29 strike series. Zelensky called on Ukraine to strengthen its air defenses and reiterated that Ukraine is ready to buy US air defense systems. US President Donald Trump recently spoke with Zelensky about possible US sales of Patriot air defense systems on June 25. Patriot systems are vital to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes, especially as Russia is reportedly increasing its production and stockpile of ballistic missile production capacity to enable larger and more frequent ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine.

Russia appears to be increasingly striking civilian areas in its large-scale strike packages. Kyiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko stated that Russia has changed its strike tactics in order to inflict as much damage to civilian areas as possible. Tkachenko noted that Russian missile and drone strikes heavily targeted Kyiv City three times in June 2025, launching a total of 285 drones and 65 missiles against the capital so far in June 2025 – a sharp increase from the 35 drones and one ballistic missile that Russian forces launched against Kyiv City in January 2025. Tkachenko noted that 42 civilians, including a child, have died due to Russian strikes against the capital since the start of June 2025 and that 234 people, including 11 children, have sustained injuries. Tkachenko reported that Russian forces are conducting "double tap" strikes against emergency responders and using cluster munitions with delayed detonations that threaten both civilians and rescue workers. ISW has observed Russian officials and milbloggers respond to recent large-scale and deadly Russian strikes against Kyiv City by calling on Russia to intensify its strikes.<[br />
Key Takeaways:

• Russia conducted its largest combined strike series of the war on the night of June 28 to 29 by launching over 500 missiles and drones against Ukraine.

• Russia appears to be increasingly striking civilian areas in its large-scale strike packages.

• Satellite imagery and Russian government announcements indicate that Russia is trying to increase its aircraft production in the medium- to long-term.

• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar.

Institute for the Study of War

High-ranking Kremlin statements, including from Russian President Vladimir Putin, continue to demonstrate Russia's wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting on June 30 on the socioeconomic development of occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts during which he frequently referred to occupied Ukraine as “Donbas and Novorossiya.” Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on June 30 to a June 27 statement by Odesa City Mayor Gennadiy Trukhanov that Odesa City is not a “Russian” city and has its own history, claiming that the history of Odesa City is "inextricably linked" with Russia. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky claimed on June 30 that Russians and Ukrainians are "one people" with a "historical homeland" and referenced the "ancient Russian lands on both sides of the Dnipro (River), Novorossiya, and Crimea."

Putin's, Peskov's, and Medinsky's June 30 statements are only the latest statements from high-ranking Kremlin officials indicating the extent of Russia's territorial ambitions. Putin reiterated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 20 that he considers the Russian and Ukrainian people to be "one people in reality" and that "Ukraine is ." Kremlin officials have routinely labelled Odesa City as a "Russian" city, including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov most recently on June 9. Kremlin officials have also repeatedly referenced "Novorossiya," which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine. Medinsky's reference to the "ancient Russian" lands on "both sides of the Dnipro" also coheres with Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo's April 2025 call for Russia to completely control the areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa stated in early June 2025 that Russia intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and seize Odesa Oblast by the end of 2026. Putin and other Kremlin officials have consistently indicated that they do not believe that Ukraine is an independent state with its own history, identity, and culture separate from Russia. Russian officials' ongoing commitment to these narratives demonstrates the Kremlin's continued objective of destroying the Ukrainian state and subjugating the Ukrainian people.

Key Takeaways:

• High-ranking Kremlin statements, including from Russian President Vladimir Putin, continue to demonstrate Russia's wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed.

• The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) issued its December 2024-May 2025 report detailing Ukrainian civilian casualties, systemic Russian mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), and limited Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs.

• The Kremlin is poised to launch a new "national messenger" application affiliated with Kremlin-controlled social media site VKontakte (VK) as part of ongoing efforts to censor Russian citizens and isolate them from the global internet.

• Azerbaijani authorities raided the offices of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet Sputnik in Baku as Russian-Azerbaijani relations have deteriorated recently after a raid against ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

The Russian federal Unified Institute for Spatial Planning (EIPP) announced plans on June 30 to develop the “tourist potential” of occupied Ukraine. The EIPP, a subordinate entity to the Russian Ministry of Construction, Housing, and Utilities, stated that it identified opportunities for the development of “health and wellness tourism” in occupied Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts and “cultural and educational, sports, military-patriotic, industrial, and pilgrimage tourism” in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The EIPP project includes plans for the development of transportation infrastructure to facilitate the movement of tourists to occupied areas of Ukraine. The EIPP stressed that the development of tourism in occupied Ukraine is “a strategic direction” for Russia. The EIPP also created a plan for the development of several cities and districts in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, largely intended to link transportation logistics to tourism projects. ISW has previously reported on EIPP’s role in creating and implementing infrastructure projects throughout occupied Ukraine, and continues to assess that such projects allow Russia to simultaneously integrate occupied Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence while also setting conditions to generate revenue off of the occupation. Russia’s insistence on treating occupied Ukraine as a viable tourist destination is notable: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has turned these areas into active combat zones, and continued Russian plans to attract tourists to occupied areas is both irresponsible and a potential violation of international law.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian occupation administrators continue efforts to incentivize Russians and loyalists to relocate to occupied Ukraine.

• The Russian federal Unified Institute for Spatial Planning (EIPP) announced plans on June 30 to develop the “tourist potential” of occupied Ukraine. Russia’s insistence on treating occupied Ukraine as a viable tourist destination is a potential violation of international law.

• Russia is likely to leverage the new occupation head of Mariupol to deepen links between the occupied city and Russian federal subjects and to pursue the proliferation of profitable development projects.

• The Russian youth military-patriotic activism group “Movement of the First” is expanding its influence in occupied Ukraine.

• Russia continues sending Ukrainian children to summer camps and military-patriotic programs across the Russian Federation.

Institute for the Study of War

A Russian occupation official claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Luhansk Oblast for the second time during Russia's full-scale invasion, but Russian milbloggers denied this claim. Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on June 30 that Russian forces seized all of Luhansk Oblast. Russian milbloggers denied Pasechnik's claim, however, stating that Russian forces have not cleared Nadiya and Novoyehorivka (both east of Borova). One milblogger claimed that some border areas are still contested "gray zones." Then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed on July 3, 2022, that Russian forces captured all of Luhansk Oblast, but Ukrainian forces were subsequently able to regain positions in Luhansk Oblast during the Fall 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive. Ukrainian forces made advances in Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts during the Fall 2022 counteroffensive and disrupted Russian plans to resume efforts to drive on the northern edge of the "fortress belt" in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have since failed to retake significant swathes of territory that Ukrainian forces liberated in the Kharkiv counteroffensive, including Kupyansk, Borova, Izyum, and Lyman. Russian forces intensified offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions in early 2024 and have continued attempts to advance toward these three settlements over the last one and a half years. ISW assessed in late November 2024 that Russian forces had seized roughly 99 percent of Luhansk Oblast, and Russian forces have struggled in the seven months to seize the last one percent.

The Russian military command is modernizing Russian training grounds to include motorcycle tracks and reportedly intends to purchase up to 200,000 Chinese-made motorcycles for the Russian military. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on June 27 and 28 showing Russian officials visiting the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School and a new military training ground in Krasnodar Krai and highlighted that Russia is creating motorcycle training programs at these facilities. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and Russian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev discussed improving Russia's ability to train forces and generate new officers at the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School, and Belousov ordered Mordvichev to equip the school with motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to help train cadets in modern tactics. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov stated that the Krasnodar Krai training ground has a modern driving range for motorcycles, ATVs, and quad bikes and noted that Russia has modernized over 200 training centers to account for the new tactics that Russian forces are using in Ukraine. The Russian military command has been working to formalize motorcycle tactics and training throughout the Russian military in recent months.

Key Takeaways:

• A Russian occupation official claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Luhansk Oblast for the second time during Russia's full-scale invasion, but Russian milbloggers denied this claim.

• The Russian military command is modernizing Russian training grounds to include motorcycle tracks and reportedly intends to purchase up to 200,000 Chinese-made motorcycles for the Russian military.

• Ukrainian forces continue to strike defense industrial enterprises in Russia's rear.

• The Ukrainian military command continues to transition to a corps structure and improve its training system.

• Russian-Azerbaijani relations continue to deteriorate over a number of smaller-scale incidents in recent days, inflaming unresolved disputes over the December 2024 Russian shoot down of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane.

• An investigation by the Center for Human Rights in Armed Conflict found that Russian forces were responsible for a 2022 strike that killed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in occupied Donetsk Oblast, as ISW assessed at the time.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced near Toretsk and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

A Primer on Russian Cognitive Warfare

Cognitive warfare is Russia’s way of war, governance, and occupation. The goals, means, and effects of Russian cognitive warfare are far greater than disinformation at the tactical level. Russian cognitive warfare is:

• The way of war: The Russian way of war is centered on the notion that wars can be won and lost in the opponent’s mind. The Kremlin’s main effort is shaping its opponents' decisions to achieve aims unattainable through Russia’s physical capabilities alone. The Russian strategy that matters most is not its warfighting strategy, but rather the Kremlin’s strategy to cause us to see the world as Moscow wishes us to see it and make decisions in that Kremlin-generated perception of reality.

• The way of governance: The Kremlin has been waging an information war inside Russia and on territories that Russia illegally occupies in order to maintain the regime's control and stability. Russia’s internal and external information operations, while distinct from one another, interact and cannot be understood in siloes. The Kremlin's domestic information control helps it generate resources for Russia’s military efforts abroad.

• Born out of need: Russia is not weak, but it is weak relative to its goals. The Kremlin uses cognitive warfare to close gaps between its goals and its means. The main purpose of Russia’s cognitive warfare is to generate a perception of reality that allows Russia to win more in the real world than it could through the force it can actually generate and at a lower cost.

• Targets reasoning: The primary objective of Russian cognitive warfare is to shape its adversaries’ decision-making and erode our will to act. The Kremlin aims to decrease US and allied will and capability to resist Russia to lower the barrier to achieving its aims. Russia needs its opponents to do less so that Moscow can achieve more of its goals. The Kremlin uses cognitive warfare to create a world that would simply accept, and not fight, Russian premises and actions.

• Beyond media: Russia uses all platforms that transmit narratives - media, conferences, international frameworks, diplomatic channels, individuals ¬¬— as tools of its cognitive warfare.

• Beyond information means: Russian cognitive warfare is supported by physical activities. These physical tools include military exercises; sabotage; cyber-attacks; combat operations, and exaggerations of Russia’s military capabilities and battlefield progress.

• Cross-theater and multigenerational: Russian information operations span decades and geographies. The effects of Russian cognitive warfare may occur years after Russia launches information operations. Russia selectively activates and deactivates a set of narratives over decades to adapt them to the Kremlin’s evolving requirements.

• Effective, but only to a point: Cognitive warfare allowed Russia to make some gains that would have been impossible with conventional forces alone. Russian cognitive warfare is not always effective, however, as Russian information operations regularly succeed only partially, fail, and even backfire.

• A constant pursuit: Russia is always fighting for the initiative in the information space. The initiative is not permanent and can be contested.

• A vulnerability: The Kremlin is overly dependent on cognitive warfare. The Kremlin’s ability to achieve its objectives abroad critically depends on the West’s acceptance of Russia’s assertions about reality. Putin’s presidency also depends in part on his ability to maintain a perception that an alternative to his rule is either worse or too costly to fight for.

• Predictable, hence targetable: Russian cognitive warfare supports the Kremlin’s strategic aims, which have not changed in years. This fact presents opportunities for defense and offense. The Kremlin also relies on a set of predetermined messages, making it hard for the Kremlin to rapidly pivot to new information operations.

The United States should not counter Russian cognitive warfare symmetrically. The key to defending against Russian cognitive warfare is doing so at the level of strategic reasoning while resisting the urge to chase Russia's tactical disinformation efforts. Debunking individual false narratives only grapples with the tactical level of Russian cognitive warfare and is insufficient for countering Russian cognitive warfare. The United States and its allies should understand what premises the Kremlin wants us to believe at any given time and over generations, which decisions of ours it is trying to shape, and in support of which aims. The United States and its allies can then defend against Russian cognitive warfare by rejecting the very premises the Kremlin is trying to establish in its effort to have us reason from those premises to conclusions that benefit Russia.

Institute for the Study of War

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/primer-russian-cognitive-warfare

The United States paused weapons supplies to Ukraine, including critical air defense interceptors, artillery shells, missiles, and rockets. Western media outlets reported that sources stated on July 2 that the US pause on weapons supplies to Ukraine will affect dozens of PAC-3 interceptors for Patriot air defense systems, dozens of Stinger man-portable air defense systems, thousands of 155mm high explosive howitzer munitions, over 100 Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, over 250 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets, dozens of grenade launchers, and dozens of AIM air-to-air missiles. Familiar sources told Politico on July 1 that the United States decided in early June 2025 to withhold some of the aid that the United States promised Ukraine under the Biden administration but that the decision is only now taking effect. Politico reported that the halted weapons come from two different streams of Biden administration-era support — weapons from drawdowns of current US stockpiles that the US Department of Defense (DoD) received money to replenish, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, in which the United States funds the purchase of weapons for Ukraine from US defense firms. White House Deputy Press Secretary Anna Kelly stated on July 1 that US authorities made the decision following a DoD review of US military support to states around the world. Six defense officials, congressional officials, and other sources told NBC that the Pentagon ordered the pause after a review of US munitions stockpiles. NBC's defense and congressional sources stated that the United States could hold up the weapons flow to Ukraine until the assessment of US stockpiles is complete but that the United States could extend the pause of military assistance to Ukraine even longer if the weapons are in short supply or if the United States needs to supply them to other parts of the world.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on July 2 that continued deliveries of previously allocated US defense packages are critically important, particularly in order to strengthen Ukraine's air defense. The Ukrainian MFA emphasized that any delay in supporting Ukraine's defense capabilities will encourage Russia to continue its war — and not seek peace. The Ukrainian MFA stated that US-Ukrainian consultations about defense supplies are ongoing at all levels and that Ukraine will speak with the United States about finding mutually beneficial solutions to strengthen Ukraine's defense capabilities.

The decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will likely force Ukrainian forces to continue to husband materiel, although the exact timing of the planned deliveries that the United States paused remains unclear at this time. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Ukraine had not received any official notifications about any suspension or revision to the delivery schedules of the agreed US military aid prior to the US announcement. The New York Times (NYT) reported that US officials stated that the United States had not scheduled to ship the affected munitions to Ukraine for several months, but the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that US weapons shipments already in Poland were halted as of July 1. A Trump administration official told Politico that the administration had not requested any further aid but that there is enough aid left over from the Biden administration to last Ukraine "several more months." The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion told the Washington Post in an article published on July 2, however, that Ukrainian forces already have to concentrate on holding positions and conserving resources rather than advancing. Ukrainian forces have had to husband critical materiel, including air defense interceptors, GMLRS rockets, and artillery shells, during previous suspensions of US aid. Ukraine's European partners are increasing their efforts to provide Ukraine with military assistance and the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues its efforts to become self-sufficient, but only the United States can provide certain weapons systems at scale and quickly. Ukrainian forces very likely will have to conserve materiel again should the United States continue to suspend weapons deliveries.

The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will likely accelerate Russian gains on the battlefield, as previous US aid suspensions have in the past. Delays in US military aid in Fall 2023 and Winter-Spring 2024 set conditions for Russian forces to make more accelerated battlefield gains than Russian forces had previously been able to make. Russian forces significantly intensified offensive operations near Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast in mid-January 2024 and concentrated significant manpower and materiel to their effort to seize the settlement in mid-February 2024 amid the protracted debate in the US (from October 2023 until April 2024) about passing supplemental aid for Ukraine. Ukrainian forces also faced significant artillery constraints during the Russian offensive against Avdiivka, allowing Russian forces to attack under less pressure from Ukrainian counterbattery fire. Russian forces sustained a high tempo of offensive operations after seizing Avdiivka in order to push as far west as possible, and Russian forces subsequently launched offensive operations in Spring 2024 intended to seize Pokrovsk when the suspension of US assistance was still greatly constraining Ukrainian materiel supplies. ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced roughly three kilometers per day between the suspension of US aid to Ukraine on December 6, 2023 and the resumption of aid on April 24, 2024, much of which was in Donetsk Oblast — as compared to the six months prior to the December 2023 aid suspension when Russian forces actually lost a total of roughly 203 square kilometers at a rate of 1.1 square kilometers lost per day (due to Ukraine’s gains during the 2023 counteroffensive, which was enabled by the US and other allies surging military aid to Ukraine).

Russian forces also notably intensified offensive operations in Kursk Oblast following the suspension of US intelligence sharing in early March 2025. Russian forces, augmented by North Korean forces, had been trying to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast through slow, grinding advances since the start of Ukraine's incursion in August 2024. The Trump administration suspended US intelligence sharing with Ukraine on March 5, and Russian forces intensified offensive operations to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast on March 6 and 7. Ukrainian sources reportedly stated at the time that Russian forces started making more rapid advances in Kursk Oblast on March 5 and that the suspension of US intelligence sharing impacted Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast the most. Kremlin officials at the time announced their intention to take advantage of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing to "inflict maximum damage" to Ukrainian forces "on the ground." Russian forces very likely exploited the US suspension of aid and intelligence sharing in March 2025 to accelerate Russia’s ongoing counteroffensive operation in Kursk Oblast. ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced at a rate of about 31 square kilometers per day in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast between the suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine on March 3, 2025 and the resumption of intelligence sharing on March 11, 2025 — as opposed to a rate of advance of about 19 square kilometers per day in the six months prior to the intelligence sharing suspension.

Key Takeaways:

• The United States paused weapons supplies to Ukraine, including critical air defense interceptors, artillery shells, missiles, and rockets.

• The decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will likely force Ukrainian forces to continue to husband materiel, although the exact timing of the planned deliveries that the United States paused remains unclear at this time.

• The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will likely accelerate Russian gains on the battlefield, as previous US aid suspensions have in the past.

• The suspension of US aid to Ukraine will reinforce Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory that posits that Russia can win the war of attrition by making slow, creeping advances and outlasting Western support for Ukraine.

• Kremlin officials are responding to the US military aid suspension by publicly flouting Putin's theory of military victory as successful, in direct opposition to US President Donald Trump's stated goal of bringing Russia to the negotiating table and achieving a lasting and just peace.

• The Kremlin is also using the US aid suspension as a basis to continue rhetorical attacks against European defensive efforts that are in line with Trump's initiative for Europe to shoulder more of the burden for collective defense.

• The US decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine will particularly degrade Ukraine's ability to defend against Russia's enhanced long-range missile and drone strike capabilities that have inflicted significant civilian casualties — in sharp contrast to President Trump's stated objective of stopping civilian casualties in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Toretsk and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected US President Donald Trump's call for a quick peace in Ukraine during a phone call with Trump on July 3. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed on July 3 that Trump once again raised the issue of a quick end to Russia's war in Ukraine and that Putin claimed that Russia continues its efforts for a negotiated end to the war. Ushakov claimed, however, that Putin reiterated that Russia "will achieve its goals" and "eliminat the root causes" that led to the war and that "Russia will not back down from these goals," essentially emphasizing that Russia will continue its war on its own terms. Ushakov claimed that Putin and Trump discussed the possibility of a third round of Ukrainian–Russian negotiations in Istanbul and agreed that peace negotiations will continue in a bilateral format at an unspecified date. Ushakov claimed that Putin and Trump did not discuss the recent US decision to halt military aid shipments to Ukraine but discussed bilateral economic projects, including in the energy and space spheres.

Putin's stated commitment to his goals in Ukraine, including eliminating the so-called "root causes" of the war directly contradicts his claim that Russia supports meaningful negotiations to end the war. Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly referred to the need for any future peace settlement to eliminate the alleged "root causes" of the war to allude to Russia's unwavering demands for regime change in Ukraine, Ukrainian neutrality, and changes to NATO's foundational open-door policy. ISW continues to assess that Russia remains uninterested in good-faith peace negotiations to end the war. Putin's statement that Russia will not back down from its goals further demonstrates Putin's willingness to prolong the war in Ukraine and achieve his goals through military means should Russia be unable to force Ukraine to capitulate through diplomatic means — in direct contrast to Trump's calls for a speedy end to the war. The Kremlin has continually indicated in recent weeks that there are no plans yet for a third round of bilateral negotiations in Istanbul, so it is unclear if or when bilateral Ukrainian–Russian negotiations will resume. ISW continues to assess that Russia will likely leverage any future negotiations to try to extract concessions from Ukraine and the United States while Russian forces continue efforts to secure additional gains on the battlefield through creeping and highly attritional advances. Russia previously exploited peace talks with Ukraine in Istanbul to obfuscate its own uninterest in meaningful negotiations, and any future Ukrainian–Russian negotiations on anyone's terms but Kyiv's are very unlikely to bring about Trump's desired expeditious end to the war and just and lasting peace.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected US President Donald Trump's call for a quick peace in Ukraine during a phone call with Trump on July 3.

• Putin's stated commitment to his goals in Ukraine, including eliminating the so-called "root causes" of the war directly contradicts his claim that Russia supports meaningful negotiations to end the war.

• Details about the recent US suspension of aid to Ukraine remain unclear.

• A Ukrainian strike killed the deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy in Kursk Oblast, and an unknown actor may have assassinated a high-ranking Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) official in Moscow City.

• Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reportedly assassinated the former occupation mayor of Luhansk City.

• Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine, but the United States remains the only Ukrainian partner that can provide certain critical weapons systems – especially air defenses -- at scale and quickly.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Siversk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia is training Ukrainian children to become drone operators for future service in the Russian military or employment in the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). Occupied Luhansk Oblast-based media reported on June 30 that 20 children from occupied Luhansk Oblast took part in the regional stage of the “Pilots of the Future-2025” drone operation competition. The Russian “Movement of the First” youth activism organization, the Russian Drone Racing Federation, and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Sports Ministry organized the “Pilots of the Future-2025” competition. Participants of the competition, who range from seven to 18 years old, learn how to assemble, program, and control drones and compete against each other in drone obstacle races. Competition winners will take part in the “Pilot of the Future-2025” final in Sochi, Krasnodar Krai, in the coming month.

Russia has been gradually increasing the integration of Ukrainian children into its wider drone development, production, and operation ecosystem. The Ukrainian Eastern Human Rights Group (EHRG) and Institute for Strategic Research and Security (ISRS) released a report in April 2025 that found that Russia has instituted drone training curricula for over 10,000 teenagers in schools throughout occupied Ukraine. The report noted that Russia is trying to incentivize youth participation in drone operator training programs by “gamifying” the process and holding drone racing competitions—an effort which “Pilots of the Future-2025” clearly supports. Drone operation has become a critical part of Russia’s military concept of operations in Ukraine, and Russian officials clearly understand that drone warfare will only grow in importance in future conflicts. Russia’s training of Ukrainian children to become drone developers and operators will prepare these children for future service in the Russian military and augment the Russian DIB’s drone production capabilities.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is training Ukrainian children to become drone operators for future service in the Russian military or employment in the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).

• Russian occupation officials are using the threat of disconnecting residents of occupied Ukraine from mobile communications networks in order to coerce passportization.

• The Kremlin is introducing a “war risks” insurance program to encourage Russian construction and development in occupied Ukraine. Russian development projects are a core part of Russia’s efforts to permanently and irreversibly subsume Ukraine and complicate any future Ukrainian reintegration efforts.

• Russia continues efforts to steal Ukraine’s agricultural output for its own profit.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion on the night of July 3 to 4, primarily targeting Kyiv City. Russian forces have conducted 10 of the largest strikes in the war since January 2025. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 330 Shahed drones and 209 Shahed-type and other decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched one Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal" aeroballistic missile from the airspace over Lipetsk Oblast, six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast, and four Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk and Voronezh oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed two Iskander-K cruise missiles and 268 drones, and that 208 drones were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that nine missiles and 63 drones struck eight locations throughout Ukraine and that Kyiv City was the primary target of the strikes. The Ukrainian General Staff and the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that the Russian strikes injured at least 20 people in Kyiv City. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Russian strikes injured at least 23 people in total. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and civilian infrastructure in Kirovohrad, Poltava, Odesa, and Kyiv oblasts. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski confirmed that the Russian strike against Kyiv City damaged a consular building at the Polish Embassy. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha reported that the Russian strike against Odesa City damaged the People's Republic of China (PRC) consulate. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on July 4 that Ukrainian investigators discovered components manufactured at the Chinese Suzhou Ecod Precision Manufacturing Company in Russian Geran-type drones (Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed drone) recovered in Kyiv City.

US Patriot air defense systems remain critical to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes. ISW continues to assess that US aid to Ukraine, particularly Patriot air defense systems and interceptors, is critical to Ukraine's ability to protect its defense industrial base (DIB), safeguard the capabilities it obtains from its partners in the face of long-range Russian strikes, and defend its civilian population. US-provided air defense systems are vital to Ukraine's DIB and will support Ukraine's efforts to increase self-sufficiency and protect civilian lives.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion on the night of July 3 to 4, primarily targeting Kyiv City. Russian forces have conducted 10 of the largest strikes in the war since January 2025.

• US Patriot air defense systems remain critical to Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes.

• US President Donald Trump acknowledged Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to end the war in Ukraine on July 3 as Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate a critical lack of interest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump discussed diplomatic efforts and joint work supporting Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) during a phone call on July 4.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted the eighth prisoner of war (POW) exchange since Ukrainian and Russian officials met in Istanbul and agreed to a series of exchanges on June 2.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Pokrovsk and may attempt to advance further toward Dobropillya as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to envelop Pokrovsk and bypass Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast from the west in the coming months. Geolocated footage published on July 4 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Koptieve and Shevchenko Pershe and advanced to southeastern Razine (all northeast of Pokrovsk). Russian forces have recently seized on opportunistic advances northeast of Pokrovsk, following their focus on advances along the Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka T-0504 highway since early 2025. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on June 28 that Russian forces appear to be attacking in the “Dobropillya direction” (northwest of Toretsk and Pokrovsk) and that elements of the Russian 68th Army Corps (AC) (Eastern Military District ) and 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th Combined Arms Army , Southern Military District ) are attacking in the area. ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command may intend to leverage the Russian salient between Pokrovsk and Toretsk to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast and north or to bypass Ukrainian defenses in Kostyantynivka from the southwest and west.

The Russian units conducting these assaults have been engaged in combat since they redeployed to reinforce the Russian force grouping operating east of Pokrovsk in February and March 2025. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 3 that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC) and 150th Motorized Rifle Division have been operating near Novotoretske (north of Razine) and Novoekonomichne (south of Razine) after seizing Malynivka in mid-June 2025 and recently seizing Koptieve (all northeast of Pokrovsk). Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic AC, SMD) are also operating northeast of Pokrovsk. Ukrainian forces have been degrading these Russian units, and it is unclear whether the Russian military command intends to leverage the same units to push further north and west of Razine or if Russia may attempt to reinforce these units with additional redeployments. These Russian units will have to cross the Kazenyi Torets River to advance west of Razine, which may present another obstacle to the Russian advance depending on the river’s water level.

Russian advances west and northwest of Razine most immediately support the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad — an operational objective that Russian forces have been pursuing over the last 18 months. ISW forecasted in December 2024 that Russian forces would need to make significant advances in the direction of Rodynske (west of Razine) to envelop Pokrovsk from the northeast, and the Russian forces' recent advances near Razine cohere with this assessment. The commander of a Ukrainian National Guard artillery reconnaissance battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on July 5 that Russian forces are focusing their attacks between Malynivka, Novoolenivka, and Popiv Yar (all northeast of Pokrovsk) in an effort to interdict Ukrainian logistics into Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian commander noted that Russian forces are constantly conducting assaults with motorcycles and buggies. Russian milbloggers claimed on July 4 and 5 that Russian forces are trying to complicate Ukrainian logistics in the area by damaging a bridge near Shakhove (east of Dobropillya), interdicting Ukrainian forces' ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Udachne, and along the railway line near Kotlyne.

Russian forces have largely struggled to advance southeast, south, and southwest of Pokrovsk in the face of Ukrainian drones since late 2024 and have essentially held close to the same positions in these areas since January 2025. The Russian military command may be prioritizing advances northeast of Pokrovsk in an effort to establish a stronghold in Rodynske, which could enable Russian forces to either attack Pokrovsk directly or advance toward Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Pokrovsk) with the aim of interdicting the Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad M-30 highway and forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Pokrovsk under the threat of envelopment Russian forces could also advance north of Udachne or Kotlyne (both southwest of Pokrovsk) in order to interdict the M-30 highway if they can overcome Ukrainian defensive positions in the area, which currently seems uncertain.

Further Russian advances toward Dobropillya would indicate that Russian forces are placing a tactical prioritization on advancing west of Ukraine's fortress belt — a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions — and forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the fortress belt under pressure of envelopment rather than conduct a head-on assault against the fortress belt. Russian forces have thus far struggled to break out of Toretsk and make significant advances from Chasiv Yar or north of the Kleban Byk Reservoir (northwest of Toretsk), which has likely complicated the Russian military command's original plan for an operation against Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk) and the wider fortress belt. The Russian military command may be adjusting its plan, and Russian forces may attempt to create a salient in the fields and small settlements between Dobropillya and Kostyantynivka in order to bypass the fortress belt from the west. Russian forces would likely have to cross the Kazenyi Torets River in several places and would have to be able to sufficiently supply troops on the west (right) bank in order to maintain such a salient. Russian forces would likely also have to seize the settlements along the Pokrovsk-Oleksandrivka (north of Dobropillya) line in order to fully interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the fortress belt. It is unclear whether the Russian Central Grouping of Forces, which is currently in charge of activity in the Pokrovsk direction, is capable of conducting such an operation with the degraded forces currently at its disposal. Russian forces are likely reaching higher levels of exhaustion and degradation after well over a year of intensified offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction. Such an operation would likely be a multi-year effort with significant personnel losses and hard-fought gains, although Russian forces have proven willing to undertake such long-term operations.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Pokrovsk and may attempt to advance further toward Dobropillya as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to envelop Pokrovsk and bypass Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast from the west in the coming months.

• Russian advances west and northwest of Razine most immediately support the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad — an operational objective that Russian forces have been pursuing over the last 18 months.

• Further Russian advances toward Dobropillya would indicate that Russian forces are placing a tactical prioritization on advancing west of Ukraine's fortress belt - a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions - and forcing Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the fortress belt under pressure of envelopment rather than conduct a head-on assault against the fortress belt.

• Such an operation would be consistent with Russia's recent tactics and operational concepts designed to advance by leveraging smaller partial envelopments to seize territory instead of attempting rapid, deep operational-level penetrations of Ukraine's defense, which Russian forces currently do not have the means to conduct.

• Ukrainian forces continue to demonstrate their ability to conduct long-range strikes that target Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).

• Ukraine's Western partners to continue to allocate aid to Ukraine and collaborate with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).

• European intelligence services continue to report that Russia is intensifying its deployment of chemical agents in Ukraine in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Siversk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, and Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 5 to 6, including a "double-tap strike" against emergency responders. Recent adaptations to Russian long-range drone technologies and strike tactics suggests that Russian strikes against civilian targets are very likely intentional. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 6 that Russian forces launched 157 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, and four S-300 air defense missiles from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 177 drones and that 19 were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian, energy, and military infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Zaporizhia oblasts. Ukraine’s Ground Forces reported that Russian forces targeted a Ukrainian military registration and enlistment office in Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast - the third such strike since June 30. Russian strikes against Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices likely aim to disrupt Ukrainian recruitment efforts.

Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported on July 6 that Russian forces conducted two double-tap strikes targeting Ukrainian emergency responders during overnight drone strikes against Kharkiv City and after shelling against Kherson City on the morning of July 6. Russia’s recent drone technological adaptations and strike tactics, such as accumulating drones near a target before simultaneously striking, have increased Russia's ability to precisely coordinate strikes and hit intended targets. Russia's recent overnight strikes series have increasingly resulted in civilian casualties, and Russia is very likely intentionally targeting Ukrainian civilians, including with "double tap" strikes likely meant to kill first responders and strikes against military registration and enlistment offices.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be trying to increase volunteer recruitment among the Russian population, likely due to waning domestic support for the Kremlin's crypto-mobilization efforts.

• Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 5 to 6, including a "double-tap strike" against emergency responders. Recent adaptations to Russian long-range drone technologies and strike tactics suggests that Russian strikes against civilian targets are very likely intentional.

• Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) has stopped reporting on the number of deaths in Russia, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to conceal Russia's losses from the war in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated the Kremlin's rejection of a ceasefire and unchanged demands, including demilitarization and regime change in Ukraine. Lavrov gave an interview to Hungarian outlet Magyar Nemzet published on July 7 and claimed that a settlement to the war must eliminate the "root causes" of the war, which Lavrov again defined as NATO's expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers. Lavrov claimed that Russia is against a ceasefire as Ukraine and its allies would use the pause to regroup and reconstitute Ukraine's military. Lavrov explicitly highlighted Russia's demands for Ukraine's demilitarization and "denazification" (a phrase Russia uses to demand regime change in Ukraine), and these demands are notably Russia's original war goals. Lavrov also demanded international recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea – including the areas of these four oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy – and called for a future settlement to include sanctions relief and the return of frozen Russian assets. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin remains uninterested in good-faith peace negotiations and any settlement to the war that does not acquiesce to its demands.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated the Kremlin's rejection of a ceasefire and unchanged demands, including demilitarization and regime change in Ukraine.

• Russia is leveraging its "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to improve its theater-wide drone capabilities, including in priority frontline areas in Donetsk Oblast.

• Russian forces have yet to reach parity with Ukraine's innovative and deeply integrated drone program, however.

• Russian forces appear to be reprioritizing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction over the Kostyantynivka direction after several weeks of unsuccessful activity aimed at advancing toward Kostyantynivka.

• Russian Minister of Transport and former Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit reportedly recently committed suicide after Russian President Vladimir Putin removed Starovoit from his position, likely due in part to the Ministry of Transport's role in Russian failures that enabled Ukraine's Operation Spider Web in June 2025.

• Putin may have planned to punish Starovoit by arresting him on charges related to his time as the governor of Kursk Oblast in order to avoid acknowledging the Kremlin's failure to prevent Operation Spider Web.

• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct long-range strikes against Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

US President Donald Trump announced on July 7 that the United States would resume weapons deliveries to Ukraine as discussions about provisions of additional air defense systems and interceptors are reportedly ongoing. Trump stated on July 7 that the United States will send more weapons to Ukraine to help Ukraine defend itself. Trump stated that the United States is "going to see if can make some available." Politico reported that two sources stated that shipments of US military aid to Ukraine could resume over the "coming weeks." Chief Pentagon Spokesperson Sean Parnell stated on July 7 that Trump directed the US Department of Defense (DoD) to send additional defensive weapons to Ukraine to ensure that Ukraine can defend itself while the United States works to secure a "lasting peace." Axios reported on July 8 that sources stated that Trump told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that he wants to help Ukraine's air defenses and promised to immediately send 10 Patriot interceptors and help to find other means of supply. Axios' sources reportedly stated that Trump suggested that Germany should sell one of its Patriot batteries to Ukraine and that the United States and Europe would split the costs of the purchase. Axios reported that US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has identified Patriot batteries in Germany and Greece that the US could finance and send to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that US-provided Patriot systems and interceptors are critical for Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian long-range overnight strikes, particularly against Russian ballistic missiles.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast amidst a series of ongoing counterattacks. Geolocated footage published on July 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern and northeastern Kindrativka (north of Sumy City). Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces advanced between Kindrativka and Kostyantynivka (north of Kindrativka) and east of Oleksiivka (east of Kindrativka) and entered Novomykolaivka (northeast of Oleksiivka). A Russian milblogger claimed on July 8 that Ukrainian forces entered Kindrativka from the northwest and Oleksiivka from the northeast. The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized central and northern Kindrativka and have cut off Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) along the C-191502 Novomykolaivka-Volodymyrivka road. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command deployed elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) to Kindrativka to support Russian personnel retreating from the settlement. The milblogger claimed that the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) is fighting to establish a foothold south of Oleksiivka, but that recent Ukrainian advances are complicating this effort.

Russian advances in northern Sumy Oblast slowed between late May and early June 2025, and Ukrainian forces began counterattacking and regaining territory in mid-June. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 14 that Ukrainian forces retook Andriivka (southeast of Kindrativka), and Ukrainian forces advanced in other areas of northern Sumy Oblast throughout late June 2025. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on July 8 that fighting remains intense in the North Slobozhansk (Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts) direction and that Ukrainian forces are restoring positions in this direction and maintaining positions in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts. The Russian military command redeployed some drone and elite naval infantry units from the Kursk and Sumy directions to other higher-priority sectors of the frontline in Donetsk Oblast in May and June 2025, and the command may further deprioritize the offensive in northern Sumy Oblast if Ukrainian forces continue to complicate further Russian advances. Russia could also reinforce its frontline units in northern Sumy Oblast in the near future in order to continue advancing toward Sumy City, however.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump announced on July 7 that the United States would resume weapons deliveries to Ukraine as discussions about provisions of additional air defense systems and interceptors are reportedly ongoing.

• The Kremlin continues to leverage Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's aggressive rhetoric to undermine support for US military aid to Ukraine, likely as part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational effort.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast amidst a series of ongoing counterattacks.

• Russia continues to expand its domestic drone production capacity amid the ever-growing role of tactical drones in frontline combat operations and Russia's increasingly large nightly long-range strike packages against Ukraine.

• Ongoing Russian cooperation with Chinese companies is facilitating Russia's increasing domestic drone production.

• Russian milblogger complaints suggest that the Russian military command is struggling to supply frontline units with drones despite increased drone production, possibly indicating how Russia's centralization and bureaucracy are degrading the effectiveness of Russian drone operations and slowing the Russian innovation cycle.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike of the war so far on the night of July 8 to 9 with 741 total drones and missiles — an about 34 percent increase from the previous record high of 550 Russian drones and missiles launched on the night of July 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 728 Shahed-type strike and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Kh-101/Iskander-K cruise missiles from Engels Raion, Saratov Oblast and from Kursk Oblast, and six Kh-47M2 Khinzhal aeroballistic missiles from Lipetsk Oblast airspace. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 718 of the drones and missiles, including seven Kh-101/Iskander-K missiles shot down, 296 Shahed-type drones shot down, and 415 drones “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Lutsk, Volyn Oblast, and Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes damaged a warehouse, private enterprise, and civilian areas in Lutsk. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes also hit residential areas, an enterprise, and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Zhytomyr oblasts. Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that the July 8 to 9 Russian strike was one of the largest strikes targeting Kyiv Oblast and that the strikes lasted for over seven hours. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces used interceptor drones to repel the strike and downed "tens" of drones.

The New York Times reported on July 9 that military analysts estimate that Russia will be able to routinely launch over 1,000 drones per strike package by Fall 2025, echoing a recent warning from Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Major Robert Brovdi that Russia could escalate its strike packages to include over 1,000 Shahed-type drones per day. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov estimated on June 20 that Russia has increased Shahed production sevenfold and forecasted that Russian strike packages may soon incorporate up to 800 Shaheds — a forecast that is in line with the July 8 to 9 Russian strike package. ISW previously reported that Russia is significantly expanding its long-range drone production capabilities for modified Geran-2 drones (the Russian-made analogue of the Iranian-origin Shahed-136 drones), including by opening production lines with companies in the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The continued increase in the size of strike packages is likely intended to support Russian efforts to degrade Ukrainian morale in the face of constant Russian aggression. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that Russian forces used over 400 decoy drones in this strike package in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense. Russian forces have equipped their decoy long-range drones with warheads and have also modified their strike drones with warheads designed to inflict a wide spread of damage, indicating that Russian forces aim to maximize damage against areas in Ukraine writ large — which disproportionately affects civilian areas. Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev stated in an interview with the Washington Post on July 9 that recent Russian strikes against Ukrainian military registration and enlistment offices seek to disrupt Ukrainian force generation efforts. Sarantsev stated that Russia aims to sow fear among Ukrainians and create the perception that it is dangerous to go to recruitment and enlistment offices. ISW assessed in previous years that Russia has used strike packages targeting civilian areas to generate a morale effect in Ukraine, as seems to be the case with the most recent strikes.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted the largest combined drone and missile strike of the war so far on the night of July 8 to 9 with 741 total drones and missiles — an about 34 percent increase from the previous record high of 550 Russian drones and missiles launched on the night of July 3 to 4.

• The continued increase in the size of strike packages is likely intended to support Russian efforts to degrade Ukrainian morale in the face of constant Russian aggression.

• The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found that Russian forces and pro-Russian separatists engaged in illegal military activity in Ukraine between 2014 and 2022.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed frustration following a June 10 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov about Russia's lack of progress towards ending the war in Ukraine. Rubio stated after the meeting with Lavrov that he conveyed US President Donald Trump's frustration with Russia's insufficient "flexibility" to end the war. Rubio stated that he and Lavrov shared ideas about "a new or different approach" from Russia and that there must be a "roadmap moving forward" about how the war can end. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that Rubio and Lavrov discussed their "mutual intention" to find a solution to the war. Kremlin officials' public statements continue to demonstrate that Russia remains committed to achieving its original war goals in Ukraine and is not interested in good faith negotiations to end the war, however. Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reiterated on July 9 Russia's original war demands for Ukrainian regime change and "demilitarization." Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 10 that Russia prefers to achieve its war goals through peaceful and diplomatic means but that the war continues and the "realities on the ground" are changing every day. Kremlin officials often call for Ukraine to recognize the "realities on the ground" (a reference to the frontline in Ukraine) to allude to the idea that Russia is in a stronger negotiating position given the battlefield situation and to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia's unwavering demands amounting to complete capitulation to Russia.

The Kremlin continues efforts to use its diplomatic engagements with the United States in an effort to divert attention from the war in Ukraine and toward the potential restoration of US-Russian relations. The Russian MFA readout of the Rubio-Lavrov meeting heavily emphasized Rubio and Lavrov's reported discussions about bilateral US-Russian issues unrelated to the war in Ukraine, including the restoration of US-Russian contacts, economic and humanitarian cooperation, direct air traffic, and diplomatic missions. The Russian MFA's readout concluded that the United States and Russia will continue dialogue about a "growing range of issues of mutual interest." Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on July 10 there has been no "slowdown in progress" in developing US-Russian relations. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin attempted to use economic incentives unrelated to the war in Ukraine and the prospect of US-Russian arms control talks to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine. ISW also recently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin unsuccessfully attempted to use Iranian nuclear negotiations and offers to mediate the Israel-Iran war to pose himself to Trump as an effective negotiator as part of efforts to secure concessions on the war in Ukraine. The Kremlin is likely attempting to push the United States to suspend its diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine in exchange for developing US-Russian bilateral relations and economic opportunities.

Key Takeaways:

• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed frustration following a June 10 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov about Russia's lack of progress towards ending the war in Ukraine.

• The Kremlin continues efforts to use its diplomatic engagements with the United States in an effort to divert attention from the war in Ukraine and toward the potential restoration of US-Russian relations.

• The Economist assessed that it would take Russia about 89 years to seize all of Ukraine at its current relatively accelerated rate of advance, which has fluctuated throughout the war and is unlikely to remain constant.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg in Rome on July 9.

• The United States reportedly resumed some military aid shipments to Ukraine.

• Ukraine’s Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.

• Russia launched another large-scale missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 9 to 10 that heavily targeted Kyiv City, resulting in civilian casualties and significant damage to civilian infrastructure.

• Russia's strike tactics, coupled with the increased scale and concentrated targeting of Russia's recent strike packages, aim to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and are resulting in significant damage.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Deputy Foreign Minister and Presidential Special Representative to the Middle East and Africa Mikhail Bogdanov on July 9.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

US President Donald Trump announced on July 10 that the United States will sell NATO weapons, including air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO can then give to Ukraine. Trump stated in an interview with NBC News that the United States will sell NATO an unspecified number and type of American-made weapons, including Patriot air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO will then give to Ukraine. Axios reported on July 11 that sources stated that NATO allies discussed the possibility of the United States using NATO as an intermediary to sell weapons to Ukraine at the most recent NATO Summit on June 24 to 25, and that these weapons could include both air defense support as well as offensive weaponry. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on July 10 that Ukraine requested 10 Patriot air defense systems and additional interceptors, and that Germany is ready to purchase two Patriot systems from the United States for Ukraine, and that Norway is willing to purchase another one. It remains unclear how many Patriot air defense systems or other weapons the United States will sell to NATO. ISW continues to assess that US-provided Patriot systems and interceptors are critical for Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian long-range overnight strikes and protect its civilian population, particularly against Russian ballistic missiles.

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide additional aid and pursue joint production initiatives with Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB). The Ukrainian Ministry of Finance announced on July 11 that the United Kingdom (UK) approved a 1.7-billion-pound (roughly $2.3 billion) loan to finance improving Ukraine’s air defense capabilities. The European Commission and Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation announced that Europe and Ukraine will partner in the BraveTech EU Initiative, which will work to accelerate the European DIB’s innovation cycle. The European Commission reported that the BraveTech EU Initiative will expand on existing European Defense Fund (EDF) projects and will expand relationships between Ukrainian and European defense companies beginning in Fall 2025. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on July 10 that Ukraine signed an agreement with NATO Command Transformation allowing Ukrainian personnel to attend the Joint NATO-Ukraine Analysis, Training, and Education Center (JATEC).

Ukraine continues to expand its production and innovation of interceptor drones for use against Shahed-type drones. Kyiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko announced on July 11 that Kyiv City will allocate 260 million hryvnia ($6.2 million) to Ukraine’s Clean Sky program aimed at using interceptor drones to defend Kyiv against nightly Russian long-range drone strikes. Tkachenko stated that the program will fund additional equipment, the creation of an interceptor drone training center, and several mobile interceptor drone units. Tkachenko stated that the project has downed 550 Russian drones over Kyiv City in the last four months. Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk estimated that the project has downed almost 650 drones over Kyiv Oblast more broadly. Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov stated that interceptor drones are downing dozens of Russian long-range drones each night. Ukraine’s interceptor drones will play a critical role in lowering the cost of defense against nightly Russian drone and missile strikes, although US-provided Patriot air defense systems remain the only system capable of downing Russian ballistic missiles.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump announced on July 10 that the United States will sell NATO weapons, including air defense systems and interceptors, that NATO can then give to Ukraine.

• Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide additional aid and pursue joint production initiatives with Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB).

• Ukraine continues to expand its production and innovation of interceptor drones for use against Shahed-type drones.

• Ukrainian intelligence assesses that Russian forces are unlikely to realize the Kremlin's goal of seizing the entirety of Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2025, which is consistent with ISW's ongoing assessment of Russia's offensive capabilities.

• Kremlin officials continue to justify the Kremlin's ongoing censorship efforts and appear to be seizing on Russia's hypercontrolled information space to push the Kremlin's informal state ideology.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Novopavlivka. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy and western Zaporizhia oblasts, and near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia launched another large-scale drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of July 11 to 12 — the third combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles in July alone. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 339 Shahed-type drones and 258 decoy drones (597 drones total) from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 26 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 319 Shahed-type drones and 25 Kh-101 cruise missiles and that 258 drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged critical electrical networks and administrative and civilian infrastructure in Chernivtsi, Cherkasy, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, Sumy, and Volyn oblasts. Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported that Russian strikes killed two civilians in Chernivtsi City and injured 14. Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that Ukraine’s Clean Sky program, which uses interceptor drones to defend Kyiv Oblast against nightly Russian long-range drone strikes, downed over 50 drones during Russia’s overnight strike. ISW continues to assess that Russia's ongoing large-scale strikes are intended to degrade Ukrainian and Western morale and underscore Ukraine's need for continued Western support for Ukraine's interceptor drone program and for the continued supply of Western air defense systems, especially US-provided Patriot systems.

Russian forces recently advanced from the international border toward Velykyi Burluk in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast — likely in an effort to connect Russian operations near Vovchansk with those near Dvorichna, possibly to facilitate Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone along the international border. Geolocated footage published on July 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk). Elements of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army , Leningrad Military District ) and the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th Army Corps , LMD) first advanced into central Milove in early July 2025. Elements of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment defended against limited Ukrainian attacks into northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast in March and April 2025, and elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division participated in retaking Kursk Oblast and attacking into northern Sumy Oblast in Spring and early Summer 2025. Some elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly continuing to operate in northern Sumy Oblast, although the Russian military command appears to have recently redeployed other elements of the division and the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment to the Velykyi Burluk direction.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia launched another large-scale drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of July 11 to 12 — the third combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles in July alone.

• Russian forces recently advanced from the international border toward Velykyi Burluk in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast — likely in an effort to connect Russian operations near Vovchansk with those near Dvorichna, possibly to facilitate Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone along the international border.

• Ukraine signed several strategic agreements with Western defense companies to bolster Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) during the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Recent satellite imagery suggests that Russia is constructing protective structures at some of its air bases following Ukraine's Operation Spider Web on June 1. Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight reported that satellite imagery collected on July 7 shows that Russian forces have constructed roughly 10 reinforced bunkers with soil coverings, 12 concrete bunker-type structures without soil coverings, and eight hangar-style buildings on the aprons at Khalino Air Base in Kursk Oblast. Planet Labs satellite imagery collected on June 27 of Khalino Air Base also shows reinforced hangars, supporting Frontelligence's assessment. Frontelligence reported that satellite imagery collected on July 9 shows that Russian forces have constructed two concrete bunker-style structures at Saky Air Base in occupied Crimea, and Planet Labs satellite imagery collected on July 7 also shows concrete aircraft shelters. Frontelligence reported that satellite imagery collected on July 9 shows no construction efforts at Dzhankoi Air Base in occupied Crimea, however. Frontelligence reported that recent satellite imagery shows bomber wreckage still present at Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast and Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast – two of the air bases that Ukrainian forces struck during Operation Spider Web. Russian officials and milbloggers have blamed Russian leadership for failing to defend Russian military infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes throughout Russia's full-scale invasion. Russia may be starting to construct protective structures at its air bases after three years of war in response to Operation Spider Web.

Key Takeaways:

• A German official confirmed that Germany is interested in purchasing Patriot air defense systems from the United States on behalf of Ukraine.

• Recent satellite imagery suggests that Russia is constructing protective structures at some of its air bases following Ukraine's Operation Spider Web on June 1.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

US President Donald Trump announced large-scale and rapid military aid supplies to Ukraine via the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and possible future secondary tariffs against Russia. Trump stated on July 14 during a meeting with NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte that the United States will impose "severe" 100 percent secondary tariffs on Russia's trade partners if there is no peace settlement to end Russia's war in Ukraine within 50 days. Trump also announced that the United States will send "billions of dollars' worth" of military equipment and weapons to NATO, that NATO will pay for the US weapons, and that NATO will "quickly distribute" these weapons to Ukrainian forces. Rutte stated that NATO will supply Ukraine with "massive" amounts of military equipment, including air defenses, missiles, and ammunition. Trump answered a question about whether the United States was providing Patriot air defense batteries or just missiles, stating that the United States will send "everything…a full complement with the batteries." Trump stated that some Patriot systems will arrive in Ukraine "within days" as unspecified NATO states give Ukraine their own Patriot systems, after which the United States will replace those systems. Trump stated that an unspecified state has "17 Patriots ready to be shipped" and that a "big portion of the 17 will go to the war zone" in Ukraine "very quickly." It is unclear if Trump was referring to 17 Patriot launchers or batteries.

Trump is acting upon the reality that successful US efforts to bring Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table require that economic instruments be coupled with Western military support to allow Ukraine to increase pressure on Russia on the battlefield. Trump stated that the Russian economy is doing "very poorly" and that Russia is using its assets for war, not trade. Trump stated that Russia is wasting money and people on its war. Rutte stated that Russian forces have suffered 100,000 deaths since January 1, 2025. ISW continues to assess that Russia's battlefield losses are the key driver of Russia's economic woes as Russia suffers from the consequences of increased and unsustainable war spending, growing inflation, significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia's sovereign wealth fund. Increased pressure on Russian forces on the battlefield would risk Putin's efforts to balance butter and guns and could force Putin to face hard choices sooner than he would like. Forcing Putin either to make unpopular decisions or to face a scenario in which Russia cannot continue the war at the current tempo could bring Putin to the negotiating table, ready to offer concessions to end the war on terms acceptable to Ukraine and the United States.

Timely and reliable Western military assistance to Ukraine coupled with increased economic pressure is necessary to bring about an end of the war on terms satisfactory for the United States, Europe, and Ukraine. Well-provisioned Ukrainian forces have previously demonstrated their ability to prevent Russian forces from making even marginal gains and to retake significant territory despite Russian manpower and materiel advantages. Western military aid to Ukraine will enable Ukrainian forces to maintain, if not increase, their ability to inflict the significant materiel and personnel losses on the battlefield that are straining Russia's economy. Western provisions of air defense systems to Ukraine will protect Ukraine's people and enable Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) to flourish and increasingly meet Ukraine's long-term national security needs. Ukraine's DIB has proven critical for maintaining Ukraine's drone-based defenses that are limiting Russian forces to creeping advances at high costs, and the West will continue to benefit from Ukrainian innovations and industrial capacity in the long-term. Economic pressure, in the form of both Western sanctions and enduring labor shortages and demographic issues brought on by losses in Ukraine, will further strain the Russian economy and reduce the funds available to Moscow for its protracted war effort.


Key Takeaways:

• Trump noted that Russia has been delaying negotiations to end the war and that the recent intensification of Russia's overnight drone and missile strikes demonstrates that Russia is not interested in peace – in line with ISW's longstanding assessment of Kremlin intentions.

• Trump said that European security benefits US interests and noted that Europe is committed to helping Ukraine defend itself.

• Additional US military aid to Ukrainian forces will arrive at a dynamic, not static, frontline characterized by ongoing Russian offensive operations aimed at achieving slow maneuver and by Ukrainian counterattacks in key frontline areas.

• Russian forces' ability to advance deep enough into Ukraine's defenses to establish these salients indicates that the Russian military command has improved its ability to seize on opportunities to advance, but the rate of Russian advances has not increased beyond foot pace.

• Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast near Hulyaipole – the first tactically significant activity in this area of the frontline since the Summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive.

• The Russian military command likely intends to seize on recent advances in western Donetsk Oblast in order to advance westward into Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.

• Russian forces may leverage advances in western Donetsk Oblast to launch an offensive operation toward Pokrovske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, in pursuit of Russia's long-standing desire to seize Zaporizhzhia City.

• Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in key areas of the front to slow Russian advances and are inflicting significant costs on the Russian military, however.

• Forcing Putin to abandon his current theory of victory and agree to end the war on reasonable terms requires Ukrainian forces to stop Russian advances and begin to retake operationally significant areas. Western aid provided in support of this effort is essential to hastening an end to the war.

• Timely and reliable Western military assistance to Ukraine coupled with increased economic pressure is necessary to bring about an end of the war on terms satisfactory for the United States, Europe, and Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Zaporizhia oblasts and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.

Institute for the Study of War

Kremlin officials dismissed US President Donald Trump's demand that Russia agree to a ceasefire agreement in Ukraine within 50 days while promoting claims that Russia can withstand economic pressure and remains committed to achieving its war aims. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Kremlin newswire TASS on July 15 that Russia views any attempt to make demands of Russia, "especially ultimatums," as "unacceptable." Ryabkov noted that Russia is ready to negotiate and prefers a diplomatic solution to its war in Ukraine, but will continue to pursue its war aims militarily if the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) do not take Russia's demands seriously. Ryabkov stated that Russia's position is "unshakable." Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov echoed Ryabkov's statements, claiming that Russia is ready to participate in a third round of Ukraine-Russia bilateral negotiations but blamed Ukraine for the lack of progress towards the next round of talks. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev posted on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account, claiming that "Russia didn't care" about Trump's "ultimatum." Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed confidence that Russia will be able to cope with US tariffs, as Russia is already "coping" with prior sanctions. A Just Russia Party Leader and Duma Deputy, Sergei Mironov, claimed that potential tariffs will not affect the course or goals of Russia's war in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin has yet to officially respond to Trump and is likely attempting to identify which narratives could convince Trump not to follow through with secondary tariffs in early September 2025.

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials dismissed US President Donald Trump's demand that Russia agree to a ceasefire agreement in Ukraine within 50 days while promoting claims that Russia can withstand economic pressure and remains committed to achieving its war aims.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory continues to drive his unwillingness to compromise on his pre-war demand for Ukraine's capitulation.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced new appointments within the Ukrainian government.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Borova, and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia may be coordinating the deployment of a Laotian military unit for demining operations in Kursk Oblast, which would make Laos the second foreign country after North Korea to directly send military personnel to aid Russia in a combat zone. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on July 5 that Russia has recruited a 50-person engineering unit of the Laotian People’s Army to conduct demining operations in Russia’s Kursk Oblast under the pretext of providing humanitarian aid. GUR reported that Laos agreed to support Russia due to its heavy dependence on foreign aid. Laotian officials denied the GUR report on July 10 and claimed that Laos has no policy of sending military personnel to intervene in foreign conflicts. Russia may be interested in using the alleged Laotian deployment to symbolize growing international support for its invasion of Ukraine, as 50 personnel are unlikely to make a significant difference to the war effort. Russia and North Korea previously denied North Korea’s military deployments to Kursk until April 2025, but now speak openly about North Korean troops’ role in the defense of Kursk Oblast. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov publicly thanked Laos on June 26 for its assistance in “resolving humanitarian issues,” including providing medical care to wounded Russian soldiers on Laotian territory. This is a service that Russia also publicly acknowledged North Korea was providing in February 2025, two months before admitting North Korean participation in military operations in Kursk. Russia and Laos have previously cooperated on military demining operations within Laos under the label of humanitarian aid. Laos may be seeking greater economic cooperation with Russia to diversify its international partnerships away from the PRC, which owns half of Laos’s debt after financing a series of expensive infrastructure projects in the country. Laotian president Thongloun Sisoulith said in 2022 that Laos was trying to diversify its partners because “relying on only one country’s resources is not enough.”

Key takeaways:

• Russia may use the deployment of 50 Laotian military engineers to Kursk Oblast to symbolize growing international support for its war in Ukraine.

• The United States sanctioned 18 Hong Kong-based companies that facilitate the sale of Iranian oil to entities abroad, including private PRC-based refineries that are the largest buyers of Iranian oil.

• Russia is encouraging Iran to concede its uranium enrichment in US-Iranian nuclear talks, likely because Russia recognizes that zero Iranian enrichment can serve Russian interests.

• Russia is offering to mediate potential future North Korean–South Korean talks in order to repair its reputation with Indo-Pacific partners, but such talks are unlikely in the near-to-medium term.

• Russia is discussing media cooperation with the PRC in a continuing effort to coordinate messaging on key interest areas and to increase the reach of Russia’s propaganda.

Institute for the Study of War

The Kremlin is recycling several longstanding informational narratives, including nuclear threats, in a renewed effort to break the United States away from Ukraine and the NATO alliance. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reaffirmed on July 16 that all provisions of Russia's nuclear doctrine, including the responsibility of nuclear countries to not "incite" non-nuclear states, remain in effect and that nuclear states must "answer" for "inciting" non-nuclear states. Russia updated its nuclear doctrine in Fall 2024 to include a clause stipulating that Russia will consider aggression against it by a non-nuclear state with the support or participation of a nuclear power as a joint attack on Russia, likely in an effort to deter Western support for Ukraine during critical Western policy discussions in late 2024. Peskov claimed that "Europeans maintain a rabid militaristic attitude towards Moscow" in response to a question regarding the US President Donald Trump-led effort to provide increased military aid to Ukraine via NATO member states. Peskov also called on the international community to pressure Ukraine into bilateral negotiations with Russia ¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬— a reversal of Western calls to pressure Russia into meaningful bilateral negotiations to end the war — likely to falsely portray Russia as willing to negotiate while undermining Ukraine's credibility. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on July 15 that Russia's war in Ukraine is aimed at eliminating "the threats that NATO has created" on Russia's borders. The Kremlin is employing the same rhetorical lines that it has continuously used throughout the war to deter Western support for Ukraine, but has shifted its objective from preventing new support for Ukraine to reversing recent support and breaking the United States away from its transatlantic allies, likely in response to President Trump‘s recent demonstration of the United States' reinvigorated commitment to arming Ukraine and supporting NATO. Trump reaffirmed in late June 2025 that the United States will uphold NATO's Article 5 collective defense clause and recently demanded that Russia agree to a ceasefire agreement by September 2 or risk stringent US secondary tariffs. The Kremlin is prioritizing informational campaigns aimed at undermining NATO unity and stoking discontent between the United States and its European allies in order to degrade Ukraine's defense capabilities and achieve its longstanding war aims that amount to Ukraine's capitulation.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is recycling several longstanding informational narratives, including nuclear threats, in a renewed effort to break the United States away from Ukraine and the NATO alliance.

• Western officials provided additional details about the new US-led effort to arm Ukraine.

• Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 15 to 16, heavily targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

• The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) accepted the resignation of Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal on July 16, dissolving the current Ukrainian government.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Borova, Lyman, and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia’s Central Bank continues efforts to maintain the facade of domestic economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia’s economic instability. Bloomberg reported on July 17, citing the Russian Central Bank's June 2025 monthly report, that Russia’s seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR) of inflation decreased to four percent in June 2025, in line with Russia’s four percent target inflation rate. Bloomberg assessed the decrease in the SAAR of inflation as the first indicator that the Central Bank’s efforts to lower the inflation rate have been successful. The Russian Central Bank report cautioned that the official annual inflation rate remains at nine percent, but assessed that if the current trajectory continues, the inflation rate could hit the target of four percent sometime in 2026. The SAAR is a short-term measurement, however, and its decrease is unlikely to positively impact the Russian economy in the long term. The Russian Central Bank reported that the cost of interest-bearing instruments — financial assets that generate interest — significantly decreased in June 2025, and that investors expect an average key interest rate below 18 percent between August 2025 and October 2025. The Russian Central Bank's report claimed that a strong Russian ruble significantly contributed to the SAAR decrease. A strong ruble increases Russia’s purchasing power on the global market, which in turn decreases the ruble cost of imported goods such as machinery and technology, lowering input costs (expenses to produce goods or services) and inflationary pressure (that increases the price of goods and services over time) on firms that rely on imported components. A strengthened ruble softens the blow of Western sanctions as it makes parallel imports cheaper and keeps substitutes affordable. ISW assesses that secondary sanctions will likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting Russian oil revenues and cheaper imports using the strengthened ruble, both of which are essential for the Kremlin's financing of its war against Ukraine. The Russian Central Bank reported two potential complicating factors in lowering the interest rate: the eventual waning of effects from earlier bouts of ruble strengthening that helped slow price growth in June 2025, and the ongoing rise in the cost of services, despite a stabilization of the exchange rate and cost of goods sensitive to credit.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia’s Central Bank continues to posture Russian economic stability and growth to maintain the facade of economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia’s economic instability.

• Russia's unsustainably high payments to soldiers and impacts of the resulting domestic labor shortage will likely further destabilize the Russian economy, regardless of the Kremlin's efforts to posture stability.

• Russian bankers are reportedly privately expressing concerns over a growing number of non-performing loans despite the Russian Central Bank's claims of economic stability.

• Reports that Ukrainian forces targeted Moscow City and St. Petersburg overnight on July 16 and 17 are likely overreacting to standard Russian statements about Ukraine's longstanding deep strike campaign aimed at degrading Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).

• Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on July 17, in accordance with agreements reached during negotiations in Istanbul on June 2.

• The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada approved the appointment of former Ukrainian Minister of Economy Yulia Svyrydenko as Ukraine's new prime minister, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Justice Minister Olha Stefanishyna as a special representative to the United States.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Borova.

Institute for the Study of War

The European Council of the European Union (EU) approved its 18th sanctions package on July 19, mainly targeting Russian oil revenues and sanctions evasion schemes. The EU announced a landmark oil cap to contain Russian oil prices at 15 percent of the average market price that will automatically adjust semi-annually, and noted that the current price cap is set at $47.60 per barrel – well below the previous $60 per barrel cap. The EU imposed a full transaction ban on any transactions related to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, which will prevent the completion, maintenance, and operation of the pipelines. The EU also ended Czechia's exemptions for Russian oil imports. The EU sanctioned an additional 105 vessels of the Russian shadow fleet, increasing the overall number of sanctioned tankers to 444. The EU sanctioned Russian and international companies managing the shadow fleet, an oil refinery in India in which the Russian state oil company Rosneft is a main shareholder, the captain of a shadow fleet vessel, a private operator of an international flag registry, and one entity in the Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector. The EU also imposed an import ban on refined petroleum products made from Russian crude oil and imported from any third country, with the exception of Canada, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Russian government reportedly accounted for some decrease in oil and gas revenue as part of Russia's upcoming national budget, although the EU oil cap and shadow fleet sanctions will likely further degrade Russian oil revenues beyond what the Kremlin previously expected. The EU measures target both Russia’s current ability to sell oil at advantageous pricing and undermines Russia's long-term ability to sell oil to Europe. The EU noted that oil revenues constitute one-third of Russia’s overall revenue, and that recent declines in Russia’s oil revenues in combination with a decrease in market earning potential poses a risk to the Russian federal budget.

The EU's new sanctions target Russia’s ability to engage with international markets. The EU fully banned EU-based specialized financial messaging services from conducting transactions with 22 Russian banks, in addition to the 23 previously sanctioned Russian banks already subject to the ban. The European Union lowered the threshold for sanctioning third-country financial, credit, and crypto-asset service providers that are connected to the Russian Central Bank’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) or generally supporting Russian sanctions evasion schemes. The EU banned any transaction with the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), its sub-funds and companies, and any companies investing in or owned by the RDIF. The EU also banned the sale, supply, transfer, and export of software management systems and banking and financial sector software to Russia. The EU sanctions target an existing vulnerability within the Russian banking and financial sector, decreasing Russia’s ability to maintain a strong presence in international trade and diversify its economy.

The EU's new sanctions package also targets actors directly supporting Russian military capabilities. The EU sanctioned three entities based in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and eight companies operating in Belarus that sell goods to the Russian military. The EU also imposed a full transaction ban on Belarusian specialized financial messaging services and embargoed arms imports from Belarus. The EU tightened export restrictions on 26 entities involved in dual-use goods and technologies, including 11 entities in third countries other than Russia. The EU approved over 2.5 billion euros worth of other export bans on items that could support Russia's war effort, including computer numerical control machines and chemicals for propellants. The EU also sanctioned several individuals involved in indoctrinating Ukrainian children, crimes in occupied Ukraine, and spreading Russian propaganda.

Key Takeaways:

• The European Council of the European Union (EU) approved its 18th sanctions package on July 19, mainly targeting Russian oil revenues and sanctions evasion schemes.

• Russian officials continued to falsely claim that sanctions do not have an impact on the Russian economy in response to the EU's new sanctions package.

• Select Russian officials are acknowledging the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy despite the Kremlin's efforts to disguise and dismiss such impacts.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed former Defense Minister Rustem Umerov as Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council on July 18.

• The Kremlin continues to advance its long-term censorship efforts to assert greater control over the Russian online information space.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 18 to 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 12 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh, Kursk, and Rostov oblasts and occupied Crimea; eight Iskander-K cruise missiles from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and 15 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched around 200 Shahed-type drones and 144 decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasondar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 208 total projectiles, including 185 Shahed-type drones, seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, seven Iskander-K cruise missiles, and nine Kh-101 cruise missiles; and that seven cruise missiles and 129 decoy drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that five missiles and 30 drones struck 12 unspecified locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the Russian strikes damaged critical infrastructure in Sumy Oblast and left thousands without power, and that Russian drones and missiles struck Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and damaged vital infrastructure. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported that Russia’s overnight strike was the largest combined strike package against Pavlohrad since Russia's initial push into Ukraine in February 2022. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck industrial, educational, and civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts.

Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated on July 18 that US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky agreed on future US investment in Ukrainian drone production and US purchases of Ukrainian drones. Svyrydenko stated that Ukrainian Defense Minister Denis Shmyhal will continue technical agreements with US counterparts and that Ukraine and the United States plan to sign a "drone deal" and are discussing US production of Ukrainian drones. Zelensky told the New York Post in an article published on July 17 that he discussed a "mega-deal" with Trump that would see the United States purchase Ukrainian drones alongside Ukrainian purchases of US-made weapons. Ukrainian drone companies have developed a weeks-long innovation cycle over the last three and a half years of war that quickly responds to Russian drone adaptations, and Ukraine's Western allies will significantly benefit from partnering with Ukrainian innovators who are familiar with the modern realities of conventional warfare.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 18 to 19.

• Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated on July 18 that US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky agreed on future US investment in Ukrainian drone production and US purchases of Ukrainian drones.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian officials continue to publicly reiterate that Russia is uninterested in a near-term solution to ending the war in Ukraine that does not acquiesce to Moscow’s demands. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 20 that Russia is ready to "move quickly" with peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine but that Russia must achieve its goals, which Peskov claimed are “obvious” and “do not change.” Kremlin officials have consistently claimed that any peace settlement must eliminate the alleged "root causes" of the war and repeated Russia's original war aims to "denazify" and "demilitarize" Ukraine – terms the Kremlin has used throughout the war to call for regime change in Ukraine, Ukrainian neutrality, changes to NATO's open-door policy, and the removal of Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression. Peskov’s July 20 statements underline the Kremlin's continued uninterest in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine and efforts rather to prolong the war — as ISW continues to assess.

German and Ukrainian officials assessed that Russia continues to expand its production of Shahed-type drones in order to launch even larger long-range drone strike packages that include up to 2,000 drones in a single night. Russian forces may be able to strike Ukraine with up to 2,000 drones in a single night by November 2025 should the current pattern of growth in nightly Russian drone usage continue. The head of the German Ministry of Defense's Planning and Command Staff, Major General Christian Freuding, assessed on July 19 that Russia plans to further increase its drone production capacity with the goal of launching 2,000 drones in one overnight strike package against Ukraine. Freuding stated that Ukraine and its international partners must consider cost-effective ways of countering Russia's large strike packages, as traditional air defense methods, such as those that use expensive Patriot interceptors, are not well-suited as an anti-drone air defense strategy. Commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Major Robert Brovdi stated on July 4 that Russia could launch 1,000 drones in a single strike package due to increased production and stockpiles. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) assessed on June 9 that Russian can produce roughly 170 Shahed-type drones per day and that Russia plans to increase production capacity to 190 drones per day by the end of 2025. Russia has been rapidly increasing the number of Shahed-type strike drones and decoy drones in its overnight strike packages in recent weeks, with Russia's largest drone strike package thus far including 728 drones on the night of July 8 to 9. Russia's increased production capacities in recent months have allowed Russia to dramatically increase its strike packages in a relatively short period of time. Russia rarely launched more than 200 drones per night between January and May 2025 but then increased the peak number of drones launched in one night from 250 in late May 2025 to over 700 in early July 2025. Russia’s use of one-way attack drones in nightly strike packages grew at an average monthly rate of 31 percent in both June and July 2025. ISW assesses that Russia may be able to launch up to 2,000 drones in one night by November 2025, should this current growth trend in drone usage continue. This forecast will be invalidated if the monthly Russian drone usage growth rate either increases or decreases from 31 percent. Russian forces will likely not be able to sustain such large strike packages every night but will likely launch large strike packages followed by days of smaller packages as they are now. Western investment in Ukraine's interceptor drone development and production remains critical for Ukraine's ability to counter large-scale Russian strike packages and protect its civilian population.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continue to publicly reiterate that Russia is uninterested in a near-term solution to ending the war in Ukraine that does not acquiesce to Moscow’s demands.

• German and Ukrainian officials assessed that Russia continues to expand its production of Shahed-type drones in order to launch even larger long-range drone strike packages that include up to 2,000 drones in a single night. Russian forces may be able to strike Ukraine with up to 2,000 drones in a single night by November 2025 should the current pattern of growth in nightly Russian drone usage continue.

• Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev reiterated demands for Russia to take responsibility for the December 2024 downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane, an incident that continues to create tension in the Russian-Azerbaijani relationship.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Zaporizhia oblasts and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Lyman and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 20 to 21 that included over 400 drones as Russia continues to launch significantly larger strike packages in June and July 2025 than in January to May 2025. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 426 Shahed-type strike drones and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched five Kh-46 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from the airspace over Tambov Oblast; four Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea; one Iskander-K cruise missile from Millerovo; and 14 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Saratov Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down and suppressed 200 Shahed-type drones and 203 decoy drones that Ukrainian air defense fire and electronic warfare (EW) downed all the missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 23 strike drones hit three locations and that drone debris fell in 12 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian and critical infrastructure in Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, and Kharkiv oblasts. Kyiv City Military Administration Head Timur Tkachenko reported that the Russian strike damaged the entrance to a metro station in the city. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Russian strikes injured 15 civilians and killed two. Russia rarely launched over 200 drones per night between January and May 2025, and an overnight strike package consisting of over 400 drones — even if far below Russia's latest record high of 728 drones in one strike package — demonstrates the dramatic shift in Russia's ability to repeatedly launch larger-scale drone strikes in recent weeks since May 2025.

Ukraine's Western partners pledged additional military and financial assistance to Ukraine during a virtual meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) on July 21. Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal announced that Germany will transfer five Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine in the near future and that Germany will also send 200,000 Gepard shells to Ukraine. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius also confirmed that Germany will send five Patriot air defense systems and necessary interceptors to Ukraine. Shmyhal stated that Canada will contribute an unspecified amount toward financing Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) via the "Danish model" (in which Ukraine's partners buy Ukrainian-manufactured weapons for the Ukrainian military) and allocated 20 million CAD ($14.6 million) to Ukrainian tank maintenance. Shmyhal stated that the Netherlands allocated 200 million euros (roughly $234 million) to fund Ukrainian production of interceptor drones to counter Russian Shahed-type drones and 125 million euros (roughly $146 million) for F-16 fighter jet maintenance. Shmyhal stated that Norway also allocated one billion euros (roughly $1.67 billion) to fund Ukrainian drone purchases in 2025, including 400 million euros (roughly $468 million) specifically to purchase drones from Ukraine's DIB.

British Defense Secretary John Healey announced during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting on July 21 a "50-day drive" to arm Ukraine on the battlefield and help push Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table. Healey noted that the group needs to seize on US President Donald Trump's threat to impose "severe" 100 percent secondary tariffs on Russia's trade partners if there is no peace settlement to end Russia's war in Ukraine within 50 days from July 14. ISW has consistently assessed that only significant Russian battlefield setbacks, enabled by timely and sufficient Western military assistance to Ukrainian forces, will force Putin to reconsider Russia's ability to militarily defeat Ukraine and bring him to the negotiating table. Such setbacks will not happen in a matter of weeks and will likely require several months or campaign seasons, assuming that the West commits to properly equipping and aiding Ukrainian forces to the point that Ukraine could successfully conduct such operations.

Ukrainian officials discussed Ukraine's increasing defense industrial capacity amid ongoing European aid announcements. Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) can accommodate an additional $6 billion in investments and that Ukraine could use these funds to produce more first-person view (FPV) and interceptor drones and long-range weapons. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine intends to increase domestic defense production over the next six months. Ukrainian Defense Procurement Agency Head Arzen Zhumadilov told Ukrainian television channel Kanal 24 that Ukraine has contracted with three companies, including one Ukrainian and one American company, to produce interceptor drones to counter Russian Shahed-type drones. Zhumadilov stated that Ukraine's DIB currently has the capacity to produce eight to 10 million FPV drones per year but that the Ukrainian government will only be able to fund the procurement of four to 4.5 million drones in 2025 due to budgetary constraints.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 20 to 21 that included over 400 drones as Russia continues to launch significantly larger strike packages in June and July 2025 than in January to May 2025.

• Ukraine's Western partners pledged additional military and financial assistance to Ukraine during a virtual meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) on July 21.

• British Defense Secretary John Healey announced during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting on July 21 a "50-day drive" to arm Ukraine on the battlefield and help push Russian President Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table.

• Ukrainian officials discussed Ukraine's increasing defense industrial capacity amid ongoing European aid announcements.

• Ukraine officially proposed a third round of negotiations with Russia amid speculation in the Ukrainian and Russian informational spaces. Russian officials continue to feign interest in good-faith negotiations, despite failing to propose or agree to a third round of negotiations.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups reportedly recently advanced into southern Pokrovsk as Russian forces continue to pursue their operational objective of enveloping the town. Geolocated footage published on July 21 reportedly shows Russian forces engaging Ukrainian forces driving along the E50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway in southern Pokrovsk.<1> A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence stated on July 21 that Russian sabotage groups of unspecified size advanced into Pokrovsk through Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk) "a couple days ago" and that Ukrainian forces are still searching for and destroying these Russian groups.<2> Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported on July 22 that Ukrainian military personnel operating in Pokrovsk confirmed that Russian sabotage elements entered the town on July 17 and that Ukrainian forces are conducting clearing operations.<3> Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on July 18 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group trying to penetrate Pokrovsk.<4> Geolocated evidence indicates that Russian forces are advancing close to Pokrovsk from the southwest. Geolocated footage published on July 21 indicates that Russian forces also recently marginally advanced east of Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk) after recently intensifying assaults south of Pokrovsk.<5> A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further northeast of Zvirove.<6> Another Russian milblogger claimed that Zvirove is a contested "gray zone."<7>

Key Takeaways:
• Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups reportedly recently advanced into southern Pokrovsk as Russian forces continue to pursue their operational objective of enveloping the town.
• Ukrainian and Russian delegations will meet on July 23 in Istanbul for the third round of bilateral negotiations, but Kremlin officials are already dismissing and undermining the upcoming talks.
• Russia’s reported long-term rearmament plans further indicate that the Kremlin is preparing for a potential future conflict with NATO.
• Russian authorities recently detained Bryansk Oblast Vice Governor Nikolai Simonenko and former Belgorod Oblast Vice Governor Rustem Zainullin, likely as part of the Kremlin’s continued efforts to scapegoat local officials for larger Russian border security failures following Ukraine's August 2024 Kursk Oblast incursion.
• Russian authorities targeted a Telegram channel that revealed Russia’s role in the late December 2024 downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane as part of a wider campaign to censor Telegram channels that are critical of the Kremlin.
• Russian forces recently executed a civilian in the Lyman direction.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Zaporizhia oblasts and near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia is weaponizing ongoing domestic protests in Ukraine to intensify rhetoric designed to undermine Ukraine's legitimacy and discourage Western support. The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) passed Draft Law No. 12414 on July 22, which subordinates Ukraine's two main anti-corruption agencies – the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAP) – to the Ukrainian Prosecutor General. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed the draft bill into law later in the evening on July 22. The bill's passage comes after the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office conducted a raid against NABU offices on July 21 as part of investigations into employees allegedly suspected of collaborating with Russia after the NABU opened investigations into SBU personnel for extortion. Ukrainians began protesting the law on June 22 in multiple large cities and continued protesting on June 23, citing concerns about the NABU's and SAP's ability to operate independent of government influence. Zelensky stated that law No. 12414 is necessary to ensure that Ukraine's anti-corruption bodies can operate without Russian influence and that he will soon propose bills to the Verkhovna Rada to support the NABU's and SAP's independent operations.

Key Takeaways:
• Russia is weaponizing ongoing domestic protests in Ukraine to intensify rhetoric designed to undermine Ukraine's legitimacy and discourage Western support.

• The ongoing Ukrainian protests are notably not anti-war demonstrations, but Russian commentators are trying to paint them as protests against Zelensky and Ukraine's war effort in order to accomplish informational effects that will generate benefits for Russian forces on the battlefield.

• Ukrainian and Russian delegations met on July 23 in Istanbul for the third round of bilateral negotiations.

• Kremlin officials continue to undermine the negotiation process while reiterating Russia's commitment to achieving its original war aims.

• Russia continues to diversify and bolster its security apparatus in an effort to centralize state power in a way that will worsen the already systematic abuse of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians in Russia and occupied Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy and in western Zaporizhia oblasts and near Borova

Institute for the Study of War

Russia will likely implement new policies to augment Russia’s military administrative capacity to significantly expand the rate at which Russia can call up a larger volume of conscripts and reservists. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov introduced a bill to the Russian State Duma on July 22 that would change the Russian military conscription administrative process to a year-round cycle, as opposed to the current system, which only processes conscripts during Russia’s semi-annual spring and fall cycles. Kartapolov claimed that this change would streamline the work of military registration and enlistment offices, which would work year-round, and relieve emergency workload pressure that military registration and enlistment offices currently experience during the traditional semi-annual conscription selection periods in the spring and fall. This new system proposed in the bill does not institute new conscription cycles beyond Russia’s traditional spring and fall conscription cycle periods. Kartapolov added that the new model would ensure a uniform load on military registration and enlistment offices and make the process more convenient for Russian citizens, as conscripts would be able to undergo their medical examination, obtain military occupational specialty (MOS) assignments, and complete other necessary procedures throughout the year without rushing during the traditional three-month conscription periods. Kartapolov claimed that the new model would not make the Russian military increase its conscription quotas, although the Kremlin has been increasing conscription classes over the past three years.

The bill would likely mitigate bureaucratic bottlenecks that complicate Russia's force generation efforts during large-scale involuntary call-ups. Russia’s military conscription registration and enlistment centers that process mobilized and conscripted personnel currently only operate for six months of the year in spring and fall to support Russia’s semi-annual conscription cycles. These offices and administrative personnel rush to call up, evaluate, and process a large number of military-aged men within the six months, reducing Russia’s ability to facilitate large-scale call-ups of reservists and conscripts outside of spring and fall. The law’s proposal to have these processing centers operate year-round would institute a permanent military administrative bureaucracy able to facilitate Russian reserve call-ups year-round to permanently augment Russia’s ability to process large numbers of mobilized personnel, regardless of the time of year. Keeping military processing centers and their staff working all year presents significant implications for the rate at which Russia can conduct mobilization, as the Russian military administration will have fewer constraints holding back the rate at which mobilized personnel can be processed and assigned to units.

The Kremlin is setting other legal conditions to facilitate the streamlining of future larger conscriptions. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on April 21 that simplified conscription procedures for military-aged men who were selected for semi-annual conscription but did not dispatch for compulsory military service. The law specifies that conscripts who underwent conscription processes, such as medical commissions, but were not assigned to military service, could be called up to military service within one year without needing to repeat the conscription procedures. The Russian military's transition to a year-round conscription structure coheres with Russia's broader strategic effort to augment and streamline its force generation capabilities – a move that will have far-reaching implications for its war in Ukraine and a possible broader confrontation with NATO.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia will likely implement new policies to augment Russia’s military administrative capacity to significantly expand the rate at which Russia can call up a larger volume of conscripts and reservists.

• Russia has planned the gradual expansion of the Russian military since 2022, and the proposed changes to Russia’s personnel processing system are likely intended to support ongoing efforts to increase the size of the Russian military.

• The expansion of Russia’s administrative capacity to process conscripts and mobilized personnel would allow Russia to mobilize forces faster and more efficiently both during a protracted war in Ukraine and a possible future war against NATO.

• Reductions in the bottlenecks in the Russian conscription process would also impact Russia's ability to wage future wars.

• Kremlin officials continued to signal Russia's unwillingness to engage substantively in efforts to establish a lasting peace in Ukraine during the third round of bilateral talks in Istanbul.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky submitted a draft bill to the Ukrainian parliament on July 24 aimed at bolstering the independence of Ukraine's anti-corruption agencies in response to public backlash against the controversial bill that Zelensky signed on July 22.

• The US State Department approved two Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Ukraine totaling $322 million.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted their ninth prisoner of war (POW) exchange on July 23, in accordance with agreements reached during the June 2 bilateral negotiations in Istanbul.

• Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Borova, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian officials continue to delay high-level negotiations between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin amid US calls for a meeting. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 25 that a meeting between Zelensky and Putin remains highly unlikely and stated that Russia and Ukraine must first develop agreements "through expert work.” US President Donald Trump told reporters on July 25 that a meeting between Putin and Zelensky is “going to happen” and that the meeting should have “happened three months ago.” Russian officials have repeatedly postponed high-level meetings between Ukrainian and Russian leaders and refused to engage in constructive negotiations that seek concrete steps to end the war. ISW continues to assess that Russia is feigning interest in negotiations in order to buy time to make gains on the battlefield and extract concessions from Ukraine and the West — in stark contrast to Ukraine’s continued willingness to engage in negotiations to end the war.

Russian forces likely seized Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) and appear to be conducting limited sabotage and reconnaissance missions into Pokrovsk amid ongoing Russian efforts to envelop the town. Geolocated footage published on July 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into central Novoekonomichne and likely seized the settlement. One Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near the Kapitalna Mine just west of Novoekonomichne and just south of the mine. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced further northeast of Pokrovsk near Nykanorivka, Boikivka, and Zatyshok and south of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Novoukrainka. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District ) recently participated in the seizure of Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk). Additional Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian infantry units and sabotage and reconnaissance groups advanced into and throughout Pokrovsk and into the outskirts of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), and one Russian milblogger claimed that several Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups temporarily advanced into central Pokrovsk. The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that reports that Russian units are in Pokrovsk are premature, however, and ISW has not observed any indication that Russian forces maintain enduring positions in Pokrovsk. Ukrainian forces are conducting limited counterattacks in the area, and additional geolocated footage published on July 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently retook positions west of Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk).


Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continue to delay high-level negotiations between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin amid US calls for a meeting.

• Russian forces likely seized Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) and appear to be conducting limited sabotage and reconnaissance missions into Pokrovsk amid ongoing Russian efforts to envelop the town.

• Russian forces recently advanced into and northwest of Kupyansk.

• The Russian military command could pursue at least three courses of action (COAs) following a future seizure of Kupyansk.

• The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the second time in two months, likely in an attempt to increase capital available to the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).

• The Kremlin dismissed First Deputy Director-General of the Kremlin newswire TASS Mikhail Gusman, likely in a continued effort to increase control over domestic media sources affecting Russian-Azerbaijani relations.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War

The Kremlin launched several programs aimed at introducing Russian schoolchildren to Russian combat drone production and operations, setting conditions to incorporate these children as experienced military drone manufacturers or operators in the future. Russian opposition outlet The Insider reported that the Russian Agency for Strategic Initiatives (ASI) created a network of clubs and training platforms to introduce schoolchildren to drone technology and operations, setting conditions to train these students to design, manufacture, and operate Russian drones. Russian President Vladimir Putin approved the Berloga training program, which describes itself as a "cyber-physical gaming program," for Russian schoolchildren in July 2022, and the Russian government has supported the program by providing funding and incentives for children to participate in the program. The Insider reported that the Berloga program teaches children to operate virtual drones for logistics support and defend against virtual aerial targets — exposing young children to logistics operations and counter-drone warfare that Russian forces currently employ on the battlefield, long before these children could start formal military training. Berloga’s developers claimed that the program aims to ensure that participants, of whom the program claims there are over 600,000, will eventually transition into programming and assembling real drones. The Insider reported that Berloga program participants move on to the Kremlin-linked Sirius Educational Center, which incentivizes student participation with scholarships and job opportunities. The Insider reported that the participants' work directly contributes to solving actual problems of the Sirius Center's partners, over 80 percent of which have direct links to the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and many of which are drone and space-oriented. The Insider reported that the children involved at the Sirius Center are likely aware of their efforts supporting military applications, but that the center has likely forbidden the students from discussing the military affiliations.

The Insider reported that the actors affiliated with the Berloga program also modified the Archipelago intensive program in 2023 to focus on teaching participants — including students over the age of 14 years — drone operations, including racing and launching drones, striking enemy targets, and conducting reconnaissance. The Insider reported that Berloga also cooperates with the Yunarmia-run youth military-patriotic game Zarnitsa 2.0 and created a special drone course for Zarnitsa 2.0 participants aged seven to 21 to learn basic quadcopter piloting skills. Zarnitsa 2.0's organizers claimed in April 2025 that over 240,000 students completed the drone program that Berloga developed for Zarnitsa 2.0.

Key Takeaways:

Russian Defense Industrial Base

• The Kremlin launched several programs aimed at introducing Russian schoolchildren to Russian combat drone production and operations, setting conditions to incorporate these children as experienced military drone manufacturers or operators in the future.

• Russia continues to use child and youth labor to produce drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan.

• Russia continues to scale up its drone production amid Russia's increasingly large nightly long-range strike packages against Ukraine.

• Russia may abolish taxes for some Russian drone manufacturers to incentivize drone production at scale.

Russian Technological Adaptations

• The Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) are continuing to introduce new optical navigation systems and machine learning (ML) capabilities to the Chernika-2 drone.

• Russian developers recently modernized the Russian Lancet loitering munition and Z-16 reconnaissance drones by integrating ML capabilities and increased flight range, but have yet to scale Lancet use on the battlefield.

• Russian forces reportedly tested a new Posokh laser air defense system against drone targets as part of Russia's efforts to develop new countermeasures against drones that are not susceptible to EW interference.

• Russian forces have reportedly been employing a new cluster warhead variant for the Kh-101 cruise missiles to strike Ukrainian cities since June 2024.

• Russian developers introduced a new unmanned surface vehicle (USV) for naval logistics named Briz.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted a combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 25 to 26 and appear to be increasingly integrating missiles into overnight strike packages after mainly relying on drones in Spring and early Summer 2025. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 26 that Russian forces launched 12 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh, Kursk, and Rostov oblasts, Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Crimea; eight Iskander-K cruise missiles from Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai and Voronezh and Rostov oblasts; and seven Kh-59/69 guided missiles from the airspace over Belgorod Oblast and occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 208 Shahed-type and decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed and suppressed 183 unspecified drones and 17 unspecified missiles and that 25 drones and 10 drones struck nine unspecified locations in Ukraine.

The Russian military has used a denser concentration of missiles in recent strikes, and ISW has observed various reports indicating that the Russian defense industry is increasing its missile and drone production capabilities. Russia's increasing missile and drone production will likely allow Russia to continue conducting increasingly larger strikes against Ukraine during Fall 2025, and ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may be able to strike Ukraine with up to 2,000 drones in a single night by November 2025 should the current pattern of growth in nightly Russian drone usage continue. Increasingly large Russian strike packages highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine's air defense capabilities, particularly with US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missile threats.

Russia is increasingly targeting densely populated cities as part of a cognitive warfare effort to weaken Ukrainian resolve and to undermine Ukraine's long-term defense capacity. Kharkiv Oblast and City officials reported on July 26 that Russia targeted the city with four guided glide bombs (KABs), two ballistic missiles, and 15 Shahed-type drones, injuring civilians and first responders. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and Dnipro City officials reported on July 26 that Russian forces conducted a combined missile and drone strike against Dnipro City, killing and injuring civilians and damaging multi-story residential buildings and industrial enterprises. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 26 that Russian forces launched 100 Shahed-136 (Geran-2) drones and up to 15 Iskander missiles against Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and 40 Shahed-136 (Geran-2) drones against Kharkiv City. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces targeted the Dnipropetrovsk Electromechanical Plant in Yelyzavetivka (northwest of Dnipro City) and the HARTRON-ARKOS research and production enterprise in Kharkiv City, suggesting that Russian forces used over half of their 208 drones and 27 missiles to target two specific areas.

Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide critical air defense and military assistance to Ukraine. Lithuanian Defense Minister Dovilė Šakalienė announced on July 26 that Lithuania plans to allocate up to 30 million euros (roughly $35 million) to purchase Patriot air defense systems for Ukraine. Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany Oleksii Makeiev stated on July 25 that Germany is preparing to send an additional IRIS-T air defense system to Ukraine. Germany is also prepared to work with Ukrainian manufacturers to produce additional air defense systems. German defense company HENSOLDT announced on July 24 that it received an order worth over 340 million euros (roughly $399 million) to provide Ukraine with TRML-4D and SPEXER radar systems for air defense needs. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) announced on July 24 that the US State Department approved a Foreign Military Sale (FMS) of $150 million to Ukraine to enhance Ukrainian capabilities for maintenance, repair, and overhaul of the M109 155mm self-propelled howitzer.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of July 25 to 26 and appear to be increasingly integrating missiles into overnight strike packages after mainly relying on drones in Spring and early Summer 2025.

• Russia is increasingly targeting densely populated cities as part of a cognitive warfare effort to weaken Ukrainian resolve and to undermine Ukraine's long-term defense capacity.

• Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide critical air defense and military assistance to Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Velykyi Burluk and Lyman. Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Siversk during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault. Geolocated footage published on July 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Siversk during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault. The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the assault reported that Russian forces used six tanks, three armored personnel carriers (APCs), six MT-LB armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), an armored recovery vehicle, 12 civilian vehicles, two buggies, and 41 motorcycles. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on July 26 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian motorized assault comprised of up to 80 unspecified pieces of armored and motorized vehicles northeast of Siversk, and the July 27 geolocated footage likely shows one wave of the July 26 assault. Russian forces have long attempted to seize Siversk and have consistently attacked along the front line in the Siversk direction since at least Summer 2024. Russian forces conducted a series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in the Siversk direction in November and December 2024 but have otherwise largely conducted slow, grinding infantry assaults in this direction. Russian forces re-intensified offensive operations in the Siversk direction in early Summer 2025, and Russian milbloggers began claiming in late June 2025 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating in the eastern outskirts of Siversk.Recent Russian advances northeast of Siversk indicate that Russian forces are within several kilometers of Siversk, and Russian forces may begin to launch more concerted attacks into the town in the near future.

Russian forces appear to be using armored vehicles more frequently in some tactical attacks after a decrease in the use of armor since Winter 2024-2025. Publicly available combat footage indicates that Russian forces have not conducted a company-sized or larger mechanized assault in Ukraine since April 2025 and have largely leveraged motorcycles and buggies to attack throughout Summer 2025. Russian forces have recently marginally increased their use of armored vehicles against Ukrainian positions and have conducted a series of smaller platoon-sized mechanized assaults in Donetsk and Zaporizhia Oblast since early July 2025. ISW has recently observed indications that Russia temporarily decreased its consumption of tanks and armored vehicles over the last six months, and that Russia appears to be slowly increasing its ability to refurbish Soviet-era armored vehicles while also replenishing armored vehicle supplies by not committing armored vehicles to highly attritional attacks. Russian forces may be temporarily increasing their use of armor to test for weaknesses in Ukraine's drone-based defense in different frontline areas, or the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be able to sufficiently repair damaged frontline armor or resupply frontline Russian units with armor. Russian forces may have also recently increased their risk tolerance to use and lose armored vehicles, possibly as part of testing a new tactic or concept of operations, although it is unclear why Russian forces would recalculate this risk. ISW will continue to study the evolution of combat in Ukraine and provide an updated assessment of Russian armor usage.

The Kremlin reasserted its unchanged commitment to achieving its long-standing war aims in Ukraine that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full capitulation, undermining Russia's diplomatic posturing. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on July 27 that Russia must first fulfill the tasks of its war in Ukraine before renewing bilateral relations with Ukraine. Peskov claimed that Ukraine and the West have rejected Russia's proposals for dialogue. Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have continually rejected US, Ukrainian, and European overtures to progress the peace imitative through dialogue and comprehensive ceasefire agreements. Russia unilaterally imposed short-term ceasefires in Spring 2025 that disproportionately benefited Russia during prominent political events that the Kremlin then weaponized to accuse Ukraine of ceasefire violations. Russia has repeatedly articulated that it seeks regime change in Ukraine, a fundamental restructuring of NATO's open-door policy, and the reduction of Ukraine's military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself in the future. ISW continues to assess that Russia aims to continue delaying the negotiation process so as to make additional gains on the battlefield and extract concessions from Ukraine and the West.

Ukrainian forces recently killed a Russian commander in the Velykyi Burluk direction. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on July 26 that Ukrainian forces killed Russian Colonel Lebedev (first name not reported), commander of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army , Leningrad Military District ) operating in the Velykyi Burluk direction. ISW recently observed reports of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment redeploying likely from northwestern Belgorod Oblast to the Velykyi Burluk area.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Siversk during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault.

• Russian forces appear to be using armored vehicles more frequently in some tactical attacks after a decrease in the use of armor since Winter 2024-2025.

• The Kremlin reasserted its unchanged commitment to achieving its long-standing war aims in Ukraine that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full capitulation, undermining Russia's diplomatic posturing.

• Ukrainian forces recently killed a Russian commander in the Velykyi Burluk direction.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

US President Donald Trump announced a new deadline for Russian President Vladimir Putin to negotiate an end to Russia’s war against Ukraine no later than August 9. Trump stated on July 28 that he is “very disappointed” with Putin and will “reduce” his previously articulated 50-day deadline by which Putin must agree to peace negotiations. Trump stated that he will make a new deadline of roughly “10 to 12 days from today " as Putin’s ongoing disinterest in peace negotiations leaves “no reason” for the United States to delay its response. Trump insinuated that he will more formally announce the new deadline on the evening of July 28 or on July 29. Trump's new deadline would expire between August 7 and 9. Trump previously stated on July 14 that Putin had 50 days (September 2) to conclude a peace agreement with Ukraine or face "severe” 100 percent secondary tariffs on its trade partners.

Kremlin officials continue to frame Russia as in direct geopolitical confrontation with the West in order to generate domestic support for the war in Ukraine and future Russian aggression against NATO. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed at a Russian youth forum on July 28 that “Russia is fighting alone against the entire West... for the first time in history” and that Russia “must rely on .” Lavrov claimed that Russia has "no allies on the battlefield," unlike during the first and second World Wars. Lavrov’s claim that Russia is operating alone in its war in Ukraine ignores the current support that Russia receives from North Korea, Iran, and the People's Republic of China (PRC). North Korea has sent ballistic missiles, artillery shells, and North Korean troops to support Russia's war effort against Ukraine, and there are economic and political signs of a growing rapprochement between Russia and North Korea. Iranian Shahed drones have played a key role in Russia‘s air campaigns against Ukrainian cities throughout the war, and Iran's assistance has allowed Russia to become self-sufficient in producing the Shahed-variants that Russian forces are increasingly leveraging in frontline strikes. Russia largely depends on the PRC for support in Russia's ongoing sanctions evasion schemes, and Chinese companies provide critical dual-use components and microelectronics for Russian military technology. Strengthening relationships between Russia, Iran, North Korea, and the PRC constitute a growing threat to Western security, and Russia is actively pursuing a global anti-Western alliance. Lavrov's statements also underscore the Kremlin's efforts to install an informal state ideology that perpetuates the idea that the West is in an existential conflict with Russia in order to foster unquestioning support of the Russian government.

Lavrov additionally claimed that Russia had “no alternative” to launching its war in Ukraine as Russia needed to protect Russian-language speakers in Ukraine, a routine narrative that Russian officials use to justify Russian aggression against Ukraine. Lavrov claimed that Russia must insist on its “legitimate” demand: “no drawing Ukraine into NATO, no expansion of NATO at all," and recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea. Lavrov's statements reinforce the Kremlin's commitment to its war goals in Ukraine to the Russian public, and specifically Russian youth. The Kremlin has devoted a significant amount of time and energy to generating domestic support for the war, and Russian state and independent polling suggest that most Russians support continuing the war in Ukraine until Russia achieves its war aims of Ukrainian "denazification," demilitarization, and neutrality. Russian society's commitment to achieving Russia's war aims, which the Kremlin has worked hard to foster, will make it much harder for Russian President Vladimir Putin to present any peace agreement that falls far short of his stated aims as a victory to his domestic audience. Putin is unlikely to make any concessions in his war aims unless he is forced to do so by significant Ukrainian battlefield victories, as any negotiated end to the war that does not achieve all of Putin's objectives would call into question the success, and, potentially, wisdom of Russia's military campaign in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump announced a new deadline for Russian President Vladimir Putin to negotiate an end to Russia’s war against Ukraine no later than August 9.

• Kremlin officials continue to frame Russia as in direct geopolitical confrontation with the West in order to generate domestic support for the war in Ukraine and future Russian aggression against NATO.

• Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka directions.

Institute for the Study of War

Kremlin officials decisively rejected US President Donald Trump's new deadline for Russia to negotiate an end to its war against Ukraine and reiterated Moscow's interest in continuing the war. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account that Trump cannot dictate the timing of peace negotiations and that negotiations will end when Russia has achieved all of its war objectives — likely referring to Russia's original war aims, including regime change in Ukraine, changes to NATO’s open-door policy, and the reduction of Ukraine's military such that it cannot defend itself. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly claimed that Russia will continue its war against Ukraine in order to protect Russia's interests, despite Trump's July 28 announcement of the new 10- or 12-day deadline. Peskov claimed that there is currently a slowdown in the process to normalize Russian-American relations, that the Kremlin remains interested in normalization, and that progress will require "impulses" from both sides. Peskov claimed that the current state of Russian-American relations is hindering the process of negotiating an extension of the New START Treaty. The Kremlin previously dangled the prospect of incentives that were unrelated to the war in Ukraine, such as bilateral arms control talks and economic projects, in order to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine. Peskov's statements about the deterioration of Russian-American relations and New START are likely part of efforts to compel Trump to renounce his deadline for the sake of normalizing bilateral relations and pursuing increased cooperation. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is uninterested in negotiations to end the war and is instead trying to protract the war in Ukraine in order to make additional gains on the battlefield.

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials decisively rejected US President Donald Trump's new deadline for Russia to negotiate an end to its war against Ukraine and reiterated Moscow's interest in continuing the war.

• Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against civilian targets near the frontline and in the Ukrainian rear on July 28 and 29 that resulted in high casualties.

• Ukrainian forces appear to be intensifying a long-range strike campaign against Russian military industrial facilities and transport networks.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka, and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

US President Donald Trump specified a deadline of no later than August 8 for Russian President Vladimir Putin to engage in meaningful negotiations for an end to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Trump stated on July 29 that he is “disappointed” in Putin and clarified that his previous deadline for Russia to meaningfully engage in negotiations to end the war by August 7 to 9 will now fall 10 days from July 29, on August 8. Trump stated that he has not received “any response” from Putin regarding Trump’s previously articulated 50-day and August 7 to 9 deadlines and assessed that Putin aims to seize “the whole” of Ukraine and “probably” wants to “keep the war going.” Trump stated that he will impose tariffs and secondary sanctions against Russia’s economic partners on August 8 to pressure Russia into negotiations if Putin again fails to agree to negotiations. US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on July 29 that Trump may choose to levy tariffs and secondary sanctions sooner than the August 8 deadline, as Trump “pretty much what the situation .”

Trump announced on July 30 that the United States will impose a 25 percent tariff and unspecified additional economic penalties on India due to India’s continued purchases of Russian military equipment and energy since the start of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. ISW previously noted that India continues to pursue military cooperation and a strategic economic relationship with Russia while it simultaneously deepens ties with Western states. India has benefitted from cheap Russian energy since February 2022 and has become one of the largest importers of Russian oil, signing a 10-year energy deal in December 2024 to receive roughly 500,000 barrels of Russian oil daily. India also continued to procure and commission Russian-built military equipment until late 2024 and likely seeks to reduce but not eliminate its reliance on Russia for military equipment. India notably purchased five S-400 air defense systems from Russia in September 2018, but Russia reportedly delayed the delivery of these systems in March 2024 until 2026 to support Russia's own war effort. Russia also leverages its relationship with India to access critical electronic components and machinery for the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).

Kremlin officials continued to posture economic strength in response to US President Donald Trump's proposed economic measures targeting Russia and rejected Trump's efforts to end the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed in response to Trump's July 29 statements that the Russian economy has been operating under sanctions for "quite some time" and has developed "immunity" to further sanctions — effectively dismissing Trump." Peskov's and other Kremlin officials' claims that Russia's economy is resilient and has been able to withstand sanctions and other economic measures throughout the war largely ignore Russia's reliance on its allies and partners, including the People's Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and North Korea, to support the Russian economy and defense industrial base (DIB). Trump emphasized on July 30, for example, that the PRC is one of the largest buyers of Russian energy exports. Russian Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matviyenko claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine can only end after the elimination of the war's "root causes" — a common Kremlin reference to NATO expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers. Russian State Duma Deputy from occupied Crimea Mikhail Sheremet claimed that the United States must engage with Russia "on equal terms" as Russia is a great power and that Russia is strong thanks to Russian President Vladimir Putin and the unity of Russia's population. Sheremet claimed that Russia is not "servile" and will not betray its national interests. Sheremet claimed that Trump's economic measures will not have the results that Trump expects but will instead hurt the global economy. Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Zhuravlev claimed that Trump's threats will not work with Russia and called on Russia to continue its "methodic" combat operations in Ukraine and not allow the United States to distract Russia from its war. Duma International Affairs Committee Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed that Russia has consistently supported a ceasefire but that a ceasefire is only possible after establishing the "main conditions" of a peace agreement. Chepa stated that Ukraine and the West are trying to secure a ceasefire in order to allow Ukraine to rearm, redeploy, and mobilize its forces to continue the war. Russia notably violated several Russian-imposed short-term frontline and strikes ceasefires in recent months, while accusing Ukraine of violating ceasefires to which both sides did not formally agree. ISW continues to assess that Russia's previous attempts to manipulate ceasefires are an indicator of how Russia will likely exploit any future agreements.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump specified a deadline of no later than August 8 for Russian President Vladimir Putin to engage in meaningful negotiations for an end to Russia’s war against Ukraine.

• Kremlin officials continued to posture economic strength in response to US President Donald Trump's proposed economic measures targeting Russia and rejected Trump's efforts to end the war in Ukraine.

• The Russian Presidential Administration reportedly issued guidance to Russian state and pro-Kremlin media outlets and commentators to promote narratives aimed at weakening the United States–European Union (EU) alliance.

• Russian officials are already amplifying the Russian Presidential Administration's talking points about the US–EU trade deal and likely intend to hinder US–European cooperation in support of Ukraine and collective European defense.

• The Kremlin continues to promote an informal state ideology centered on Russian nationalism that Russia may intend to use in justification of a protracted war in Ukraine and a future conflict against NATO.

• Russian forces continue to systematically violate the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which it is a signatory.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman.

Institute for the Study of War

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 31 that Russian forces completed the seizure of Chasiv Yar, although available geolocated footage does not support claims that Russian forces have yet advanced to the western administrative boundary of the town. Geolocated footage published on July 31 shows that Russian forces recently raised flags in western and southern Chasiv Yar and indicates that Russian forces have likely seized most of the settlement. The Russian MoD and numerous Russian milbloggers credited elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 299th VDV Regiment, with the seizure of Chasiv Yar. Tactical Russian advances westward in Chasiv Yar do not constitute an operationally significant development in this area, however, as Russian forces have held most of northern and central Chasiv Yar since late January 2025 and began advancing in southwestern Chasiv Yar in mid-June 2025. Russian forces have been within tube artillery range of Ukraine's main logistics route through the fortress belt since late January 2025 and have held positions along the T-0504 Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka highway for several months, and have yet to significantly threaten Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka. ISW has yet to observe geolocated footage showing Russian forces operating in the westernmost outskirts of Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces will have to push Ukrainian forces from positions in these outskirts in order to complete the seizure of the town.

Russian forces have taken 26 months to advance 11 kilometers from the western boundary of Bakhmut, which Russian forces seized in May 2023, to western Chasiv Yar. Russian forces began an intensified effort to seize Chasiv Yar in April 2024 after slowly advancing to the settlement's eastern outskirts and seizing Ivanivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) between May 2023 and March 2024. A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence estimated in February 2025 that Russia sustained roughly 4,880 casualties in Chasiv Yar itself between April 2024 and February 2025, although the total number of Russian casualties sustained remains unclear, and the tempo of Russian attacks in this area has varied significantly over the last 26 months. Russian forces advanced into Chasiv Yar in early April 2024 during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault, but have rarely used armored vehicles while fighting in the urban areas of the settlement. Russian forces have significantly leveraged air strikes and infantry infiltration tactics to make gains in Chasiv Yar, and as a result have suffered significant personnel losses for disproportionately small territorial gains in the ruins of Chasiv Yar. ISW currently assesses that Russian forces have seized roughly 7.81 square kilometers of the roughly 10 square kilometers within Chasiv Yar's administrative boundaries.

Russia has launched a simultaneous kinetic and cognitive response to US President Donald Trump's efforts to end Russia's war in Ukraine. Russia has used strikes largely affecting civilian areas in Kyiv City as well as threats and other rhetorical efforts in order to Trump that Russia continues rejecting Trump's demand that the Kremlin meaningfully engage in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched eight Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk City and 309 Shahed-type and decoy drones from Bryansk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of July 30 to 31. This strike package is significantly larger than the average Russian strike prior to May 2025. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces mainly targeted Kyiv City and that Ukrainian forces downed three Iskander-K cruise missiles and 288 drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that five cruise missiles and 21 drones struck 12 locations and that missile and drone debris struck 19 locations, primarily in Kyiv City. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike killed at least 11 people, injured at least 135 people in Kyiv City alone, and extensively damaged residential and civilian infrastructure in Kyiv City and Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv oblasts. Russia's ever-growing nightly strikes against Ukraine have been and remain a clear Russian rejection of Trump's calls for peace in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 31 that Russian forces completed the seizure of Chasiv Yar, although available geolocated footage does not support claims that Russian forces have yet advanced to the western administrative boundary of the town.

• Russian forces have taken 26 months to advance 11 kilometers from the western boundary of Bakhmut, which Russian forces seized in May 2023, to western Chasiv Yar.

• Russian forces will likely complete the seizure of Chasiv Yar in the coming days, which will open several possible avenues for Russian forces to attack Ukraine's fortress belt — a series of fortified cities that form the backbone of Ukraine’s defensive positions in Donetsk Oblast.

• Russia has launched a simultaneous kinetic and cognitive response to US President Donald Trump's efforts to end Russia's war in Ukraine.

• The Kremlin's nuclear threats and rhetorical efforts to delay peace negotiations are part of a broader cognitive campaign to undermine US-led efforts to end Russia's war in Ukraine.

• The People's Republic of China (PRC) is a decisive enabler of devastating long-range Russian strikes against the Ukrainian rear.

• European and US sanctions appear to be degrading Russian revenues from third-country importers of Russian oil.

• Russia continues to look to its small coalition of international partners to lend legitimacy to its illegal occupation and annexation of Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces continue to innovate technical solutions to offset Russian strike adaptations.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law on July 31 designed to safeguard the independence of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAP).

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast and near Lyman and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War

US President Donald Trump ordered the deployment of two US nuclear submarines closer to Russia presumably in response to Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's July 31 nuclear threats against the United States. Trump stated on August 1 that he ordered American military authorities to position two US nuclear submarines "in the appropriate regions" following Medvedev's "highly provocative statements." Trump stated that he gave the order "just in case foolish and inflammatory statements are more than just that." Trump previously stated on July 31 that Medvedev should "watch his words" and is "entering very dangerous territory." Medvedev responded to Trump on July 31 on both his English- and Russian-language Telegram accounts and threatened that Russia is "doing everything right" and will continue along its own path. Medvedev also alluded to Russia's automatic or semi-automatic nuclear weapons control system, referred to as the "Dead Hand" or the "Perimeter," in response to Trump. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio answered a journalist's question on July 31 about Medvedev's nuclear threat, stating that one cannot ignore Medvedev's statement. Rubio stated that Medvedev is not a "relevant decision maker," but he still has a role in the Russian government, so "his words are going to have impact" as a "provocateur."

The Kremlin continued its nuclear threats against the United States prior to the ordered deployment of US nuclear submarines on August 1 – demonstrating that Medvedev's threats are part of a wider Kremlin nuclear saber-rattling campaign. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko spoke to journalists on August 1 in a likely staged event to publicly promote the Kremlin's narratives and stances about its war in Ukraine. Lukashenko criticized Trump's recent efforts to bring Russia to the negotiating table and find a way to end the war. Lukashenko claimed that Trump must act "carefully" and that it is not possible for Trump to "dictate the rules" during the ongoing military clash, "especially to a nuclear power" like Russia. Kremlin officials and their affiliates often use nuclear saber-rattling as part of their reflexive control campaign that aims to push the West to make decisions that benefit Russia. The Kremlin had also repeatedly used staged interactions with Lukashenko to deliver indirect nuclear threats. Medvedev's July 31 nuclear threats are also part of these reflexive control efforts, as Putin often leverages Medvedev to amplify inflammatory rhetoric designed to stoke panic and fear among Western decision-makers and discourage aid to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Medvedev's provocative and threatening statements are very likely part of a top-down, concerted Kremlin informational strategy. Putin would be able to censor Medvedev's statements should Putin choose to do so, especially considering that the Kremlin coordinates official statements and controls the Russian information space, internet, and media.


Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump ordered the deployment of two US nuclear submarines closer to Russia presumably in response to Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev's July 31 nuclear threats against the United States.

• The Kremlin continued its nuclear threats against the United States before the ordered deployment of US nuclear submarines on August 1 – demonstrating that Medvedev's threats are part of a wider Kremlin nuclear saber-rattling campaign.

• Putin reiterated on August 1 the same demands that he first laid out in June 2024 – further demonstrating Russia's uncompromising position and disinterest in negotiating to end its war against Ukraine.

• Putin attempted to frame peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine as making progress while blaming Ukraine for slowing the speed of negotiations.

• Putin's and Lukashenko's August 1 statements underscore Putin's continued commitment to his theory of victory, which assumes that Russia can outlast Western support for Ukraine and will be able to seize the entirety of Ukraine through slow and costly advances.

• Putin and Lukashenko highlighted recent Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast and articulated Russia's desire to seize Ukraine's fortress belt, which ISW continues to assess as a multi-year effort.

• Putin and Lukashenko projected military strength and economic stability as part of Putin's ongoing effort to convince Trump that sanctions and military support to Ukraine will not alter the outcome of the war in Ukraine and that Trump should abandon his efforts to resolve the war.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be transforming Russia into a Soviet-style police state, likely in preparation for expected anti-war sentiment in the Russian population as the Kremlin prolongs the war in Ukraine and prepares for a future war with NATO.

• Russia continues to field long-range drone innovations to facilitate its ongoing long-range strike campaign and impose greater civilian casualties on Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Borova and Lyman. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

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Ukraine conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against energy infrastructure in Russia on the night of August 1 to 2. Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported on August 2 that it conducted a drone strike against the Rosneft Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan City, one of the four largest refineries in Russia. The USF reported that the drone strike started a large-scale fire at the refinery and caused significant damage to its production facilities. The USF reported that the facility produces about 840,000 tons of TS-1 aviation kerosene per year — about 8.4 percent of Russia's total TS-1 production — and produces up to 17 million tons of oil per year, or 6.1 percent of Russia's total oil refining. Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov claimed on August 2 that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) systems downed drones over the oblast and that drone debris fell on an unspecified enterprise. The USF stated that it also conducted a drone strike against the Annanefteproduct oil depot in Anna, Voronezh Oblast, which can receive petroleum products from up to 50 railway tanks and handle up to 160,000 tons of light petroleum products per year. Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that falling drone debris started a fire at an unspecified building in the oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 2 that Ukrainian forces struck Rosneft's Novokuybyshevsk Oil Refinery near Samara City. Geolocated footage published on August 2 shows a drone strike and subsequent explosion at the Novokuybyshevsk oil refinery. Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev claimed that falling drone debris killed one person in Kuybyshevsky Raion. Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi reported on August 2 that Ukrainian drones struck the Likhaya-Zamchalovo traction power substation at a Russian rear supply base near Uglerodovsky, Rostov Oblast. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies in the area. Rostov Oblast Acting Governor Yury Slyusar claimed that an unspecified enterprise caught fire in Uglerodovsky.

Ukrainian outlet Kyiv Post reported that its sources within Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that an explosion disabled a section of Gazprom's Central Asia-Center pipeline in Volgograd Oblast that transports natural gas from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into Russia. The GUR sources did not specify the cause of the explosion. The pipeline reportedly supplies several Russian defense industrial enterprises.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against energy infrastructure in Russia on the night of August 1 to 2.

• Ukraine also conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Russia's defense industrial base (DIB), drone launch sites, and air defense systems on the night of August 1 to 2.

• The Kremlin has yet to employ a coordinated response to US President Donald Trump’s August 1 announcement that he ordered the deployment of two US nuclear submarines closer to Russia.

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov parroted many of the same talking points that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko made during a press event on August 1 that blamed Ukraine for the lack of progress in negotiations and signaled Russia's unyielding commitment to its longstanding demands.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.

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Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on August 3. Geolocated imagery shows a fire at the Rosneft Kubannefteprodukt Oil Depot in Adler, Krasnodar Krai. Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev acknowledged that a Ukrainian drone strike caused the fire and that the fire engulfed several fuel tanks at the depot. A Ukrainian Telegram channel also published a photo on August 3 purportedly showing an oil refinery on fire in Kstovo, Nizhnyi Novgorod. Nizhnyi Novgorod Oblast Governor claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike on the night of August 2 to 3.

Russia is reportedly preparing to expand its use of occupied Ukraine to launch Shahed-type drone strikes against Ukraine. A Ukrainian Telegram channel reported on August 2 that satellite imagery of the airport in northern occupied Donetsk City from July 2025 shows that Russian authorities have partially cleared the fortifications on the runway and started construction work at the parking lots, possibly in preparation for the installation of fuel tanks. Ukrainian open-source intelligence group CyberBoroshno reported that the satellite imagery suggests that Russian occupation authorities are building closed storage areas near the destroyed airport terminal and are preparing manual drone control points, warhead unloading areas, air surveillance posts, and a runway. CyberBoroshno assessed that Russian occupation authorities are developing infrastructure at the airport to launch Shahed-type strike drones, Gerbera-type decoy drones, and possibly Geran (Shahed) jet-powered drones. Long-range drone launch sites closer to the frontline will reduce the reaction time for Ukrainian air defenses. Russian forces have been launching long-range strike drones from occupied Ukraine, and Russia's continued use of occupied Ukraine for such strikes will increasingly threaten Ukraine and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states if Russia continues to occupy Ukrainian territory.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on August 3.

• Russia is reportedly preparing to expand its use of occupied Ukraine to launch Shahed-type drone strikes against Ukraine.

• Russia appears to be trying to better protect its air bases after multiple years of Ukrainian strikes against the Russian rear.

• Russian intelligence services appear to be reassessing and possibly innovating their sabotage operations in Europe.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Lieutenant General Anatoliy Kryvonozhko as the Commander of the Ukrainian Air Force on August 3.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions.

Institute for the Study of War