The United States and Ukraine signed a bilateral economic partnership agreement on April 30. The US Department of the Treasury announced the agreement, which created the United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund that aims to accelerate Ukraine's economic recovery. The precise terms of the agreement are unspecified as of this publication. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent reiterated that the United States remains committed to peace and prosperity in a free Ukraine and noted that "no state or person who financed or supplied the Russian war machine" will be allowed to benefit from Ukraine's reconstruction. Bessent also stated that the agreement signals to Russia that the Trump administration is “committed to a peace process centered on a free, sovereign, and prosperous Ukraine over the long term.” The BBC Russian Service reported that the agreement includes language that future US military aid to Ukraine could be labeled as US “investment” in Ukraine, though these details remain unconfirmed as of this report.

Key Takeaways:

• The United States and Ukraine signed a bilateral economic partnership agreement on April 30.

• Russian officials continue to demand full Ukrainian capitulation as the sole basis on which Russia is willing to accept a future peace agreement.

• Peskov overinflated Russia's current military strength and battlefield victories thus far in the war in an attempt to justify Russia's continued unwillingness to make territorial concessions.

• Russian officials continue to call for the cessation of Western aid to Ukraine as part of efforts to reintensify offensive operations when Ukraine's defense capabilities are weakened.

• Senior Russian officials continue claim that Russia is open to diplomacy to end the war while rejecting US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals that would allow for formal peace negotiations to begin.

• Russian officials continue to falsely portray European efforts to increase their own defense capabilities – in line with US President Donald Trump's objective to have Europe shoulder more of the burden for collective security - as a threat to Russian national security, likely to support Russian efforts to justify future Russian aggression against NATO.

• North Korea and Russia continue to enhance bilateral cooperation, particularly in the military and labor spheres.

• Ukrainian sources continue to report on cases of Russian commanders ordering their subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of international law.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

The United States and Ukraine published additional information about their April 30 bilateral economic partnership agreement.The Trump administration and the Ukrainian government published the joint text of the US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund on May 1 and reported that the agreement is a "fully collaborative partnership" that will fund Ukraine's long-term reconstruction and modernization. The agreement establishes a joint fund that the United States and Ukraine will equally pay into to fund development, infrastructure, and natural resource extraction projects in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials noted that Ukraine will retain full control over "subsoil, infrastructure, and natural resources" and the right to determine the terms of use for Ukraine's natural resources. Ukrainian officials stated that United States can make monetary contributions or supply additional military assistance to Ukraine as part of the fund, and that Ukraine will allocate 50 percent of its state budget revenues from rent payments, license fees, and other revenue from national resource extraction projects to the fund. The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada must ratify the agreement, and it appears that the United States and Ukraine will also have to sign a series of more technical agreements that will define the terms of the investments and projects in the future.

The Trump administration noted that the agreement signals US commitment to "Ukraine's long-term success" and noted that the United States and Ukraine will not allow any person, company, or state that supplied the Russian war effort to benefit from the reconstruction of Ukraine. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also noted during an interview on Fox News on May 1 that the agreement is a "strong signal" to Russian officials that there "is no daylight" between the United States and Ukraine. Ukraine's participation in this agreement underscores Ukraine's continued willingness to make compromises in pursuit of a long-term, sustainable resolution of the war in Ukraine despite consistent Russian disinterest in US and Ukrainian peace proposals.

Key Takeaways:

• The United States and Ukraine published additional information about their April 30 bilateral economic partnership agreement.

• US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg recently reaffirmed that Ukrainian officials remain committed to resolving the war in Ukraine, despite ongoing Russian refusals to accept US President Donald Trump’s repeated proposals for a general ceasefire in pursuit of lasting peace in Ukraine.

• Russia continues to reject US and European proposals to deploy Western peacekeeping forces to Ukraine and calls for Russia to make territorial concessions in pursuit of a lasting peace in Ukraine, signaling the Kremlin's unyielding negotiating position.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian gains along the frontline have slowed over the last four months, but Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances between September and December 2024. ISW assesses that Russian forces gained a total of 1,627 square kilometers in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast in January, February, March, and April 2025, and daily Russian casualty reports from the Ukrainian General Staff indicate that Russian forces suffered 160,600 casualties during the last four months for an average of 99 casualties for every square kilometer taken over the last four months. ISW assesses that Russian forces seized an estimated 496 square kilometers in January 2025; an estimated 313 square kilometers in February 2025; an estimated 601 square kilometers in March 2025; and an estimated 217 square kilometers in April 2025. Ukrainian General Staff reports indicate that Russian forces lost an estimated 48,060 casualties in January 2025, 35,300 casualties in February 2025, 40,670 casualties in March 2025, and 36,570 casualties in April 2025. Russian advances significantly increased in March 2025 due to the elimination of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, coinciding with the temporary cessation of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine, although Russian advances on average decreased between January, February, and April 2025. Russian gains have also slowed as Russian forces come up against more well-defended Ukrainian positions in and around larger towns such as Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk over the last four months.

Russian forces are currently sustaining a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained than in Fall 2024. Russian forces gained an estimated 2,949 square kilometers at the cost of 174,935 casualties between September and December 2024 — an average of 59 casualties per square kilometer taken. Russian casualty rates consistently increased throughout September, October, November, and December 2024 and peaked at an estimated 49,135 total monthly casualties in December 2024. Monthly Russian rates of advance plateaued at 839 square kilometers in November 2024, however, and began to slow in December 2024 to an assessed 593 square kilometers and have continued to slow in 2025 (with the exception of the elimination of the Kursk salient). Russian gains have been 45 percent slower between January and April 2025 than in the period between September and December 2024, although Russian casualty rates have only decreased by 10 percent in that interval. The Russian military command thus appears to be tolerating similar personnel loss rates despite a significant decrease in the rate of territorial gains.

Russia has thus far sustained these casualties and the current tempo of offensive operations by rapidly deploying low-quality troops to frontline units, although the reliance on such troops is also hindering Russia's ability to conduct complex operations and make rapid advances in Ukraine. ISW has not observed a notable decrease in the tempo of Russian offensive operations along the frontline in recent months, despite the slowing rates of advance, suggesting that Russia is generating enough forces to sustain these casualties without having to deprioritize any frontline area. ISW has repeatedly observed reports that new Russian recruits only receive a month of training before deploying to Ukraine, and this limited training is likely constraining recruits' combat capabilities and the Russian military's overall capacity to successfully conduct complex operations. The Russian military command is currently prioritizing funneling poorly trained recruits into highly attritional infantry assaults to offset personnel losses in Ukraine while sustaining the current tempo of operations, possibly at the expense of Russia's long-term warfighting capabilities. The Russian military does not have a reserve pool of well-trained troops who are not currently engaged in combat in Ukraine and can rapidly deploy along the frontline, and the Russian military command's decision to funnel poorly trained troops to the frontline in Ukraine is undermining Russia's ability to create a pool of such forces.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to maintaining the tempo of offensive operations despite diminishing returns underscores Putin's ongoing efforts to leverage further battlefield gains to generate pressure on Ukraine in ceasefire and peace negotiations or otherwise to force Ukraine's collapse. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to prolong negotiations to extract additional concessions from the United States and Ukraine and make additional battlefield gains. Russian forces intensified offensive operations throughout the frontline in February and March 2025, including a limited offensive operation into northern Sumy Oblast, as part of an ongoing Russian effort to slowly degrade frontline Ukrainian positions and make opportunistic tactical advances. Putin may intend to leverage any gains over the last four months and in the near future to extract further Ukrainian and Western concessions during future peace negotiations. It remains unclear if Russia will maintain sufficient force generation rates to sustain offensive operations in Ukraine indefinitely, however, due to the rising economic cost of social benefits and one-time payments for Russian servicemembers. ISW previously noted that Russia's ongoing and forecasted economic struggles are closely tied to Russian losses on the battlefield and that it is not possible for the United States or the wider West to exert maximum pressure on Russia with economic tools alone. The United States can better leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger negotiating position and more durable resolution to the war in Ukraine by forcing Putin to rethink his negotiation and battlefield strategies and empowering Ukrainian forces to continue inflicting significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian gains along the frontline have slowed over the last four months, but Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances between September and December 2024.

• Russian forces are currently sustaining a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained than in Fall 2024.

• Russia has thus far sustained these casualties and the current tempo of offensive operations by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units, although the reliance on such troops is also hindering Russia's ability to conduct complex operations and make rapid advances in Ukraine.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to maintaining the tempo of offensive operations despite diminishing returns underscores Putin's ongoing efforts to leverage further battlefield gains to generate pressure on Ukraine in ceasefire and peace negotiations or otherwise to force Ukraine's collapse.

• Western intelligence reportedly suggests that Putin may begin prioritizing short-term goals such as consolidating Russia's gains in Ukraine and Russia's immediate economic viability over seizing more territory, but Putin's demonstrated commitment to maintaining the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine despite continuing high casualty rates is a counter-indicator to this reported assessment.

• A future slowing of Russian offensive operations and/or transition to defensive operations in all or part of the theater would be indicators that Putin is shifting his short-term goals from seizing more territory to consolidating previously held territory.

• ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his long-term military objectives of seizing all of Ukraine and undermining NATO.

• Statements by US officials suggest that the Trump administration is considering stepping back from intensified mediation efforts to end the war in Ukraine.

• The US Department of State submitted a proposed license for defense exports to Ukraine to the US Congress on April 29.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky denied that Ukraine would concede to the vague terms of Russian President Vladimir Putin's unilateral May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire proposal. Zelensky referred to Putin's May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire demand as a "theatrical production" that does not appear to be serious and is designed to create a sense of comfort and safety for participants of Russia's Victory Day celebration. Zelensky once again articulated Ukraine's willingness to extend a short-term ceasefire to 30 days and stated that an effective ceasefire requires high-quality monitoring mechanisms. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that any joint ceasefire should be comprehensive and last for at least 30 days with the possibility for renewal. Kovalenko noted that shorter ceasefires with vague terms and a lack of monitoring mechanisms afford Russian forces the opportunity to seize on tactical pauses to better prepare ahead of a future summer offensive in Ukraine. Victory Day is Russia's principal patriotic holiday that commemorates the Soviet Union's contributions to victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War (known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War), and Russia celebrates Victory Day on May 9. Putin first announced on April 28 Russia's intention to implement a Victory Day ceasefire between midnight on the night of May 7 to 8 and midnight on the night of May 10 to 11. Putin's decision to unilaterally impose a fleeting ceasefire during Russia's Victory Day celebration is a deliberate attempt to project a sense of power and control in Russia to both domestic and international audiences. Putin likely also seeks to avoid the embarrassment of Ukrainian strikes during these celebrations by imposing such an agreement.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the purpose of Russia's unilateral Easter and Victory Day ceasefires is to "test" Ukraine's readiness to pursue paths towards a sustainable peace. Peskov claimed that Russia will wait for "final," unambiguous statements from Ukraine and will look for Ukrainian actions aimed at de-escalating the war during the holiday. Ukraine and the United States have previously proposed a 30-day general ceasefire to Russia, but Russian officials continue to ignore or outright reject these general ceasefire proposals. Ukraine has also repeatedly called for longer ceasefires so as to pave the way for negotiations toward a durable peace settlement — which is in line with US President Donald Trump's efforts to leverage a ceasefire as the foundation for a lasting peace agreement in Ukraine. Russia is very likely to continue its pattern of leveraging short-term ceasefires to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations in an effort to discredit Ukraine and to create tactical or operational pauses to conduct troop rotations, resupply units, and prepare for future offensive operations, as evidenced by the Easter and long-range energy infrastructure strikes ceasefires. Russia's continued rejection of Ukrainian and US ceasefire proposals of any reasonable length with necessary monitoring mechanisms showcases Russia's disinterest in peace in Ukraine in the near term.

The Trump administration appears to have finalized its first military equipment sale to Ukraine. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced on May 2 that the US State Department approved and notified the US Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) of equipment and maintenance services for Ukraine’s F-16s worth an estimated $310.5 million. The DSCA reported that the sale will include aircraft modifications and upgrades; personnel training related to operation, maintenance, and sustainment support; spare parts, consumables, and accessories; repair and return support; ground handling equipment; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documents; studies and surveys; and US Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky denied that Ukraine would concede to the vague terms of Russian President Vladimir Putin's unilateral May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire proposal.

• The Trump administration appears to have finalized its first military equipment sale to Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone for the first time on May 3.

• Senior Kremlin officials continue to set informational conditions that could support military operations against Lithuania (and other NATO states) by advancing narratives that deny the sovereignty of Lithuania and other former Soviet states.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Novopavlivka, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated that Russia maintains the initial objectives of its war in Ukraine, which are tantamount to Ukraine's surrender, despite ongoing negotiations with the United States. Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin published a documentary on Russian state TV channel Rossiya 1 about Putin on May 4, in which Putin claimed that Russia has enough manpower and materiel to bring the war in Ukraine to its "logical conclusion with the result that Russia needs." Putin also claimed that Russian reconciliation with the Ukrainian part of the Russian people is "inevitable." Putin has repeatedly claimed that the Ukrainian people are simply a subset of Russians rather than a distinctly separate nation to justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the occupation of Ukrainian territory and people.Russian state media notably highlighted that Putin has previously made the false claim that Russians and Ukrainians are one people. Putin’s statements indicate that Russia continues to assess that it can achieve its original objectives of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which include demilitarizing Ukraine, installing a pro-Russian government in Ukraine, forcing Ukraine to abandon its aspirations to join NATO and other security blocs, and forcing Ukraine to make massive territorial concessions to Russia, including parts of Ukraine that Russia does not currently occupy. These demands amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation. Russia will likely continue efforts to achieve these goals through military and diplomatic means, as Russian officials continue attempts to leverage battlefield gains to strengthen their negotiating position.

Putin highlighted domestic support for the war and promoted the ideal of sacrifice on the frontline and the home front, likely in an effort to prepare Russian society for a longer war in Ukraine and potential future confrontations with the West. Putin told Zarubin that Russian society reacted positively to the invasion of Ukraine and that each citizen realized that "he is the state" and Russia's survival depends on each individual. Putin stated that Russia is a country of "moral and ethical values" and that the basis of the Russian conscience is "the family, the state, and the future of Russia." Putin is notably attempting to frame the Russian public's support for the war through shared values despite the Kremlin's reliance on financial incentives to recruit the majority of its military personnel and to maintain its war effort. Putin accused the West once again of "deceiving" Russia following the 2015 Minsk agreements, likely in an effort to convince the Russian domestic audience that Russia cannot negotiate with the West and needs to continue the war.

Putin's statements throughout the documentary indicate that Putin likely does not intend to slow offensive operations or transition to defensive operations in Ukraine and instead is attempting to ideologically prepare domestic Russian society for a long war. ISW has previously assessed that Russian officials are setting conditions to maintain a long war and to justify future aggression against Ukraine and NATO.Russian officials have also consistently intensified efforts to militarize Russian society since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, further indicating that Russia is preparing for a protracted conflict. Russian officials are engaged in long-term efforts to consolidate control over Russia’s veteran civil society and elevate a cadre of loyal veterans to positions in Russia's regional and federal government. Putin officially declared 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland," following the launch of myriad militaristic initiatives in 2023 and 2024 to provide veterans with social and financial support and reinforce the Russian state narrative that veterans are the new "elite" class Russia is also investing heavily in military-patriotic education for Russia’s youth, demonstrating the Kremlin's interest in creating a new generation of militarized, loyal citizens in the medium to long term

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov provided new details on May 4 about the report that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone on May 2. Budanov reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two Russian Su-30 fighter jets over the Black Sea with AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles fired from Magura-7 naval drones.

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated that Russia maintains its initial objectives of its war in Ukraine, which are tantamount to Ukraine's surrender, despite ongoing negotiations with the United States.
Putin highlighted domestic support for the war and promoted the ideal of sacrifice on the frontline and the home front, likely in an effort to prepare Russian society for a longer war in Ukraine and potential future confrontations with the West.
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov provided new details on May 4 about the report that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone on May 2.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian sources claimed on May 5 that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of limited attacks across the Russia-Ukraine international border near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast. Russian sources claimed on May 5 that Ukrainian forces attacked across the Russia-Ukraine international border near Tetkino and Popova-Lezhachi (far west of Sudzha and southwest of Glushkovo) and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino) on the evening of May 4 and morning of May 5. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces used mine clearing equipment to create a path through Russian minefields along the border, but that Ukrainian forces have not made significant advances in the area thus far. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces engaged in a small arms clash near the Tetkino Railway Station in southern Tetkino and that Ukrainian forces later withdrew back into Sumy Oblast. A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces have not seized Tetkino or broken through Russia's defenses near Novyi Put. Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, likely referring to the 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, other Russian military personnel, and Russian border guards are defending against the Ukrainian attacks.

The Russian military command reportedly recently redeployed elements of the 68th Army Corps and 58th Combined Arms Army to the Toretsk direction from the Kurakhove and western Zaporizhia directions. Geolocated footage published on May 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern and southern Myrne (southwest of Toretsk) during a platoon-sized mechanized assault. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps , Eastern Military District ) participated in the advance and were attacking in the direction of Malynivka (just west of Myrne). ISW first observed reports that elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade redeployed to the Toretsk direction in late March 2025 after operating in the Vuhledar and Kurakhove directions. Elements of the brigade may be currently deployed across several sectors of the front. A Russian milblogger claimed on May 4 that elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army , Southern Military District ) are attacking in Stara Mykolaivka and Oleksandropil and conducting clearing operations near Kalynove (all southwest of Toretsk). Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division have been operating in the Zaporizhia direction since at least Summer 2023 during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area. ISW observed reports that elements of the division were operating in the Zaporizhia direction as of May 4, and the division is likely currently split between the Zaporizhia and Toretsk directions. The Russian military command previously reinforced offensive operations southwest of Toretsk with elements of the 150th and 20th motorized rifle divisions (both part of the 8th CAA, SMD) in early 2025, and the repeated reinforcing of this effort from three different sectors of the frontline indicates that the Russian military command views this as a priority frontline sector.


Key Takeaways:

• Russian sources claimed on May 5 that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of limited attacks across the Russia-Ukraine international border near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast.

• The Russian military command reportedly recently redeployed elements of the 68th Army Corps and 58th Combined Arms Army to the Toretsk direction from the Kurakhove and western Zaporizhia directions.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Czech President Petr Pavel announced on May 4 that Czechia will work with Ukraine to establish a school to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighter jets outside of Ukraine.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Siversk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks across the international border near Tetkino and Novyi Put, Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed on May 6 that Russian forces repelled the Ukrainian attacks near Novyi Put and Volfino (southwest of Glushkovo) and that fighting continued near the railway station in southern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo). Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces seized up to two streets in southwestern Tetkino, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division), and 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are defending near Tetkino.

Ukrainian forces also continued drone, air, and artillery strikes aimed at isolating Russian units in and near Tetkino. Geolocated footage published on May 6 shows Ukrainian forces conducting a Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guided munition strike on a Russian position in southwestern Tetkino, indicating that Russian forces maintain positions near the Tetkino Railway Station. Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting drone and artillery strikes against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to isolate Russian units near Tetkino. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones have interdicted and maintained fire control over an unspecified section of the 38K-040 Tetkino-Karyzh highway. Russian milbloggers claimed on May 5 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a bridge over the Seim River between Zvannoye (northwest of Glushkovo) and Tetkino.

Ukraine and Russia conducted a 205-for-205 prisoner of war (POW) exchange on May 6. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on May 6 that Ukrainian authorities returned 205 Ukrainian POWs, comprising members of almost all branches of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Zelensky thanked the United Arab Emirates for mediating the POW exchange with Russia. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also reported on May 6 that Russia and Ukraine conducted a 205-for-205 POW exchange.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks across the international border near Tetkino and Novyi Put, Kursk Oblast.

• Ukrainian forces also continued drone, air, and artillery strikes aimed at isolating Russian units in and near Tetkino.

• Kremlin officials are continuing to leverage the mythos of the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War to form the basis of a new state ideology that will span generations and that Russia intends to leverage to justify a future military conflict against the West.

• The Kremlin appears to be consolidating around an informal state ideology predicated on perpetuating the belief that the West is determined to encircle and defeat Russia.

• Russian officials also appear to be leveraging the story of the Second World War (referred to as the Great Patriotic War in Russia) to dismiss Russia's early failures in the war in Ukraine and present the false image that Russian victory in Ukraine is as inevitable as the Soviet triumph over Germany became at the end of World War II.

• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov expressed his desire to resign from his post but acknowledged that only Russian President Vladimir Putin can approve this request. Kadyrov has helped stabilize interethnic tensions in the North Caucasus, and leaving his post without a suitable successor could threaten the stability of Putin's regime.

• It remains unclear who might succeed Kadyrov in the event of his resignation or death.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted a 205-for-205 prisoner of war (POW) exchange on May 6.

• Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

US officials acknowledged Russia's continued intransigence toward any ceasefire agreement in Ukraine while reiterating that Ukraine remains committed to US President Donald Trump's proposed comprehensive 30-day ceasefire. US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg stated on May 6 that Russian President Vladimir Putin's refusal to agree to a 30-day ceasefire is the main impediment to establishing peace in Ukraine and that Russia will be hurt if the parties do not agree to a comprehensive ceasefire, as "Russia is not winning the war." Kellogg noted Russia's failure to secure positions on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast, its inability to reach Kyiv and Odesa cities, and Russian forces' high attrition rates — all in line with ISW's assessment that Russia's battlefield situation has deteriorated since 2022. US Vice President JD Vance stated on May 7 that Russia is "asking for a certain set of requirements" and "concessions in order to end the conflict," but that the United States thinks that Russia is "asking for too much."

Kellogg reiterated that Ukraine has agreed to a renewable comprehensive sea, air, and land ceasefire for a minimum of 30 days and that Ukraine is willing to immediately sign the agreement. Kellogg stated that Ukraine is prepared to accept a "ceasefire in place" that will require both Russia and Ukraine to withdraw 15 kilometers from the current frontline in order to establish a 30-kilometer demilitarized zone that could fall under an unspecified monitoring mechanism. Kellogg stated that members of the UK- and French-led Coalition of the Willing are willing to deploy a "ceasefire force" west of the Dnipro River that will patrol and reinforce the comprehensive ceasefire. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Kellogg's statement on May 7, claiming that Russia has not received any Ukrainian proposals to establish a demilitarized zone.

Russia is likely attempting to prolong and delay discussions about a comprehensive ceasefire to obfuscate its continued rejection of the United States' ceasefire proposals. ISW continues to assess that Russia likely remains opposed to any sort of enforcement or monitoring mechanisms, as Russia would likely weaponize the absence of such mechanisms to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations, as it has done before. The Kremlin has also repeatedly outright rejected the prospect of European peacekeepers in Ukraine, claiming that such deployments would be unacceptable for Russia. Russia remains committed to its long-standing effort to prolong peace negotiations in order to make battlefield gains and attempt to secure additional concessions from the United States.

Ukrainian forces likely recently advanced across the international border into southern Tetkino, Kursk Oblast, amid continued limited Ukrainian attacks in the area. Geolocated footage published on May 6 shows Russian forces conducting an airstrike against a building in southern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), indicating that Ukrainian forces likely seized positions in Tetkino. Russian milbloggers claimed on May 6 that Ukrainian forces seized up to two streets in southern Tetkino and continued to claim on May 7 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within the settlement. Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), pushed Ukrainian forces out of Tetkino, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled limited Ukrainian mechanized assaults against Tetkino and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino along the international border) on May 7 and that Ukrainian forces continue efforts to use mine-clearing equipment to create paths through Russian minefields in the area. One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Novyi Put, but other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults in the area. ISW has not observed geolocated footage indicating that Ukrainian forces have entered Novyi Put. Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Tetkino.

Key Takeaways:

• US officials acknowledged Russia's continued intransigence toward any ceasefire agreement in Ukraine while reiterating that Ukraine remains committed to US President Donald Trump's proposed comprehensive 30-day ceasefire.

• Ukrainian forces likely recently advanced across the international border into southern Tetkino, Kursk Oblast, amid continued limited Ukrainian attacks in the area.

• Ukrainian forces conducted long-range drone strikes against defense industrial facilities and airbases in Russia overnight on May 6 and 7.

• Russian authorities will likely test their ability to completely disconnect large areas of Russia from the internet on May 9 under the guise of protecting Russian Victory Day celebrations.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro signed the Russia-Venezuela Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement on May 7.

• Ukrainian and European officials continue to report on Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of international law and Russia's use of chemical weapons in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared to reject Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s recent request to resign from his post.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

The Kremlin continues to seize on the Russian mythos of the Second World War ahead of Russia's May 9 Victory Day holiday to set informational conditions to justify a prolonged war in Ukraine and future aggression against NATO to Russian society. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov published an article on May 8 in which he argued that Russia's war in Ukraine will go down in history as a feat of courage and significance equal to the victory of the Soviet military and people during the Second World War. Belousov claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine is a continuation of the "glorious traditions" of Soviet bravery and heroism and of the Soviet people's enthusiasm for enlisting and otherwise supporting the war effort. Belousov claimed that Russia's victory in Ukraine is "inevitable." Belousov said that domestic unity is a necessity for Russia's victory in Ukraine just as the Soviet Union's "moral and spiritual unity" was a critical factor for its victory in the Second World War. Russian state media highlighted Belousov's statements comparing the Second World War to Russia's war in Ukraine in their coverage of his 10-page essay, indicating that the Kremlin is trying to message to the domestic audience that Russia will achieve its goals in its war in Ukraine as long as Russian society remains unified and supportive. Kremlin officials have recently seized on the mythos of the Second World War to form the basis of a new pseudo-state ideology that will span across generations and that the Kremlin intends to use to justify potential future aggression against the West.

Belousov reiterated the Kremlin's oft-repeated fallacious narrative that Russia had no choice but to launch its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 because the situation was "life or death." Belousov claimed that Ukraine is a conduit for the collective West's "crusade" against Russia, which Belousov claimed is a manifestation of "eternal Russophobia" and intended to eradicate Russian statehood. Belousov quoted Russian President Vladimir Putin's speech from February 24, 2022, announcing the full-scale invasion. Belousov amplified Putin's accusations that the United States and its Western allies had a policy of "containment" against Russia and created a situation in which Russia had to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine to defend Russia's interests. The Kremlin is attempting to link Putin's anti-Western claims to the mythos of the Second World War in order to heighten the existential threat against Russia that the Kremlin claims Russia is currently facing. It is also reconstructing the Soviet-era narrative that the West is conspiring to destroy Russia (in place of the Soviet Union) and that the conflict will be unending.

Belousov explicitly identified large-scale Russian military reforms as preparations for a future conflict with NATO as Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev threatened European countries that support Ukraine. Belousov stated in his May 8 essay that Russia has reformed and augmented its military specifically in response to NATO expansion and military build-up (undertaken only well after the Russian 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine), including by reorganizing Russia's Western Military District (WMD) into the Moscow and Leningrad military districts (MMD and LMD); re-opening two former military academies and establishing a new third military academy; and fully forming, staffing, and equipping two combined arms armies, a river flotilla, a mixed aviation corps, and 50 other formations and units. ISW has long assessed that Russian military restructuring efforts, including reforms of the LMD and MMD, are part of future preparations for war against NATO.

Medvedev threatened that European countries must "remember" the "crushing defeat of Nazi Germany" when supporting Ukraine. Medvedev notably made his threat on his English-language X account, indicating that Medvedev intended this threat for international audiences. Other senior Russian officials have also intensified accusations against European states for supporting "Naziism" in recent days. Medvedev's threat and Russian claims of European "Nazism" are part of the Kremlin's ongoing reflexive control campaign that aims to push European countries into refraining from providing further assistance to Ukraine. Kremlin officials have also recently framed European efforts to shoulder more of their own defense requirements (in line with US President Donald Trump's efforts) as threatening to Russia, and the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign likely also aims to prevent European states from building up their defenses. Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service Head Vice Admiral Peter Reesink warned in an interview with Politico published on May 8 that Russia's most threatening behavior is its military buildup and moving military assets towards Russia's borders with Finland and the Baltic states. Reesink stated that Russia appears to be producing more artillery than the Russian military needs for its war in Ukraine when taking account of the assistance Russia is receiving from its allies. Reuters published an investigation on May 8 revealing that Russia has been constructing a significant new production line for explosives at the Biysk Oleum Plant in Siberia that is planned to produce 6,000 metric tons of explosives annually. Reuters noted that this would be enough explosive to manufacture 1.28 million 152mm artillery rounds and that Russia produced nearly two million 122mm and 152mm artillery rounds in 2024, suggesting that this new production line could expand Russia's artillery shell production capacity by over 50 percent when completed.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues to seize on the Russian mythos of the Second World War ahead of Russia's May 9 Victory Day holiday to set informational conditions to justify a prolonged war in Ukraine and future aggression against NATO to Russian society.

• Belousov explicitly identified large-scale Russian military reforms as preparations for a future conflict with NATO as Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev threatened European countries that support Ukraine.

• Russia claimed to have implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8 and accused Ukraine of ceasefire violations even though Ukraine did not officially and publicly agree to Russia's ceasefire. Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire and accusations of violations continue to demonstrate the necessity that any ceasefire or peace agreement be formally agreed to in advance by all parties and include robust monitoring mechanisms.

• Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's willingness to implement US President Donald Trump's desired 30-day ceasefire to precede peace talks.

• The Kremlin is attempting to exploit its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress toward a longer-term ceasefire and peace negotiations despite Russia's continued rejection of such a longer-term ceasefire.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping conducted a series of bilateral engagements in Moscow on May 8, showcasing deeper Russian–Chinese cooperation and alignment.

• The joint Russian–Chinese statement on May 8 referenced Putin's original aims in launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in an attempt to lend international support and legitimacy to Russia's goals and attempted justifications for the war.

• The joint Russian–Chinese statement supported Putin's proposed Eurasian security architecture and Russia's ongoing efforts to create a Russia-dominated alternative, anti-Western bloc.

• The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine’s (UN HRMMU) reported that Ukrainian civilian casualties have significantly increased between 2024 and 2025.

• The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada ratified the US-Ukrainian bilateral economic partnership agreement on May 8.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts and near Kupyansk, Borova, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian resistance with Western support has prevented Russian forces from seizing any of their self-identified objectives in Ukraine over the past year, depriving Russian President Vladimir Putin of significant battlefield successes to celebrate on Victory Day. Putin did not discuss the battlefield situation in Ukraine during Russia’s Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on May 8 and 9 but claimed that all of Russia supports Russian servicemembers fighting in Ukraine. Russian forces have not seized any significant towns in Ukraine since the seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024, and the only mid-sized settlement that Russian forces have seized in Ukraine since December 2024 is Velyka Novosilka (pre-war population of 5,000). Ukrainian sources previously reported that Russian forces were trying to seize Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and the remaining area of Luhansk Oblast and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast by Victory Day on May 9. Russian forces did not accomplish any of those objectives, and have in fact been trying to seize Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk for roughly a year.

Ukrainian long-range strikes and improved integration of tactical drone operations with defensive operations and counterattacks — all enabled by Western military support — have slowed, and in some places stalled, Russian offensive operations in Ukraine. Ukraine’s successful integration of Ukrainian drone innovators and operators with ground forces appears to have stalled Russia’s offensive against Pokrovsk and Toretsk in 2024 and early 2025. Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian ammunition depots, defense industry facilities, and oil and gas infrastructure have at times compromised Russia’s ability to supply frontline units and have compounded the rising costs of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Ukrainian forces have also intentionally exacerbated other Russian vulnerabilities over the last year, including exacerbating Russia’s shortage of operational reserves by launching the incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 and forcing the Russian military to redeploy troops from other frontline areas to defend against the incursion.

The only recent military operation that Putin featured on Victory Day was the repulsion of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. Putin thanked and highlighted North Korean troops at the Victory Day parade on May 9, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov noted that high-ranking North Korean commanders who participated in recapturing Kursk Oblast attended the parade. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov declared that Russian forces pushed all Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast on April 26, after almost nine months of Russian operations to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast. Russian officials have repeatedly platformed the recapture of Kursk Oblast as a significant military achievement, and ISW previously forecasted that Russian officials would highlight the Kursk operation as part of the Victory Day celebrations. Russian officials’ praise of the Kursk operation ignores the fact that Putin reportedly initially tasked Russian forces with retaking Kursk Oblast by mid-October 2024 and Putin’s continued willingness to extend this timeline throughout Fall 2024 and Winter 2024-2025, prioritizing offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast over retaking Russian territory. Russian officials are also ignoring recent Ukrainian attacks and advances into Tetkino, Kursk Oblast.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump explicitly called for a longer-term ceasefire in Ukraine that would precede peace negotiations — a sequence that Ukraine has consistently supported and that Russia has consistently rejected.

• Ukrainian resistance with Western support has prevented Russian forces from seizing any of their self-identified objectives in Ukraine over the past year, depriving Russian President Vladimir Putin of significant battlefield successes to celebrate on Victory Day.

• The only recent military operation that Putin featured on Victory Day was the repulsion of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.

• Russian officials highlighted technological adaptations and innovations that Russian forces have integrated in Ukraine over the last three years during national and regional Victory Day celebrations.

• The Kremlin seized on Russia’s May 9 Victory Day celebrations to posture itself as having broad international support three years into its invasion of Ukraine and especially highlighted Russia’s growing partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea.

• Putin used the Victory Day holiday to promote the development of a civic Russian identity at odds with Russian ultranationalist efforts to promote ethno-religious nationalism predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians.

• Delegations from 35 countries and the Council of Europe visited Lviv City on May 9 in celebration of Europe Day in Ukraine.

• Ukraine’s European allies continue to support the Ukrainian military and defense industrial base (DIB).

• Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions and in Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

The Kremlin is projecting the narrative of a powerful Russia and a powerful Russian President Vladimir Putin to conceal the real weaknesses and limitations of Russia's capabilities and distract from Russia's battlefield failures. Putin has long held that the perception of weakness can be lethal in a system built on the premise of strength — a principle that applies to the stability of his regime as well as to Russia's position in the world. The world should not take the Kremlin's displays at face value, but should look past them to the realities of Russia and this war.

The Kremlin is trying to portray the 80th Anniversary Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9 as a diplomatic success to present Russia as a superpower and Putin as a respected world leader. The Kremlin boasted that senior leaders and representatives of over 20 foreign countries are attending the parade. The Kremlin media particularly celebrated the attendance of People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic. Kremlin media framed Fico's and Vucic's parade attendance as an act of Slovak and Serbian resistance against the European Union's (EU) "orders" and "threats." Some Kremlin outlets presented Xi's, Vuvic's, and Fico's attendance as direct support for Putin.

The parade was hardly a diplomatic success, however, but was instead an attempt to conceal Russia's international isolation, military failures, and domestic problems. The Kremlin only convinced Russia’s known allies to attend the parade, while most world leaders refrained from traveling to Moscow. The Kremlin's emphasis on Xi's attendance shows that Russia remains dependent on its relationship with the PRC and that Putin needs great powers to validate his stature as well as to support his war effort. Three years into its war against Ukraine, the Kremlin is unable to protect a parade in Russia’s capital from a risk of drone strikes launched from Ukraine — a country over a thousand miles away from Moscow that Russia thought it could conquer in a matter of days in 2022.

The Kremlin hype of the "Victory Day" parades on May 9 is a part of the Kremlin’s long-standing effort to conceal and distract from Putin’s and Russia's weaknesses. The Kremlin has been focused on concealing Putin's and Russia's weaknesses since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 by portraying Putin as an effective and caring wartime leader and downplaying Russian failures and Ukraine’s successes, while exaggerating Russian successes.

The Kremlin’s information efforts have helped preserve the regime and support in Russia for the war effort despite Russia's battlefield failings and the enormous cost Putin has imposed on the Russian people. These efforts are not always effective, however, and sometimes highlight the very weaknesses the Kremlin seeks to conceal.

Institute for the Study of War

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/hiding-russia%E2%80%99s-weakness

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected another US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal on May 10 amid continued Russian demands that any future ceasefire include conditions that support Russia's long-term goal of gaining control of all of Ukraine and would allow Russia to resume offensive operations from a more advantageous position at a time of its choosing. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced following the Coalition of the Willing meeting in Kyiv on May 10 that he, European officials, and US President Donald Trump are proposing a general ceasefire at least 30 days long beginning on May 12. Zelensky called on Russian officials to respond to the proposal and stated that Europe and the United States should impose additional sanctions on Russia's energy and banking sectors if Russia fails to agree to the ceasefire proposal. Peskov responded by claiming that Ukraine has not responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin's previous ceasefire proposals and that pressuring Russia is "useless." Peskov claimed during an interview with ABC News published on May 10 that Putin supported the idea of a ceasefire but has "questions" about how a ceasefire will account for recent and possible future Russian advances in Ukraine, Ukrainian mobilization, and Western military assistance to Ukraine. Peskov reiterated Putin's previous demands for the West to stop all military aid to Ukraine and force Ukraine to stop mobilizing and training servicemembers as a condition of a ceasefire. Putin criticized the initial March 13 US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal and insinuated that any ceasefire agreement should limit Ukraine's ability to mobilize and train new troops and receive military aid.

Putin, Peskov, and other Russian officials have not yet offered any comparable concessions, such as stopping Russia's own force generation and defense industrial efforts, as part of a ceasefire agreement. Russian officials appear to be trying to define the conditions of any and all ceasefires in a way that facilitates further Russian battlefield gains in the short term and supports Russia's ability to attack Ukraine again in the future. Peskov also claimed that Ukraine is trying to leverage ceasefire proposals to "escape from negotiations," questioning Trump's stated objective of using a general ceasefire as a building block to precede peace negotiations.

The UK and French-led Coalition of the Willing expressed support for the US-Ukrainian proposal of a general ceasefire of 30 days or more on May 10. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with the Coalition of the Willing during a semi-virtual summit on May 10, consisting of officials from Lithuania, Romania, Finland, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Canada, Latvia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Australia, Croatia, Iceland, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, the European Commission, and the European Council. Zelensky welcomed French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk in Kyiv for the summit. The Coalition of the Willing and NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte expressed support for the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal. Macron stated that the coalition is working on a proposal to deploy a military contingent to Ukraine and that the coalition will hold a series of meetings in the coming weeks. NBC News reported that Ukraine, the United States, and European partners formulated a term sheet with a list of conditions for Russia to consider. The document, according to an unspecified Western official, contains 22 proposals, including the 30-day general ceasefire. Reuters reported on May 9 that a French diplomatic source stated that US and European partners are finalizing the 30-day ceasefire proposal and new sanction packages if Russia refuses the proposal.

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected another US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal on May 10 amid continued Russian demands that any future ceasefire include conditions that support Russia's long-term goal of gaining control of all of Ukraine and would allow Russia to resume offensive operations from a more advantageous position at a time of its choosing.

• The UK and French-led Coalition of the Willing expressed support for the US-Ukrainian proposal of a general ceasefire of 30 days or more on May 10.

• Iran will reportedly deliver short-range ballistic missile launchers to Russia for use in Ukraine.

• The United States Embassy in Kyiv issued a statement on May 9 warning of a significant Russian air strike against Ukraine over the next several days -- potentially involving Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missiles.

• US and Western military support remains vital to Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian aggression.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin called for Russia and Ukraine to resume bilateral negotiations based on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that include Russian demands amounting to full Ukrainian surrender. Any agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document. Putin spoke to media organizations on the night of May 10 to 11, following the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a general ceasefire at least 30 days long beginning on May 12. Putin did not agree to the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal and instead proposed that Russia and Ukraine "resume" the direct negotiations that he claimed " interrupted" in 2022 on May 15. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated that Russia will soon announce its delegation to the resumed negotiations in Istanbul and that such negotiations should account for "developments of the 2022 talks."

Putin and Ushakov are referring to Russia's April 2022 Istanbul protocols draft agreement, which included terms that would have amounted to Ukraine's surrender and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that both publications obtained several versions of the draft protocols from the April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul. The draft protocols demanded that Ukraine forego its NATO membership aspirations and amend its constitution to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances, concluding military agreements, or hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia also demanded that it, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus serve as security guarantors of the agreement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality ," including military aid agreements. Russia demanded to limit the Ukrainian military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.

Russia insisted on these terms in the first and second months of the war when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war, despite the fact that Ukrainian forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance across the theater. Putin is rejecting the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a general ceasefire and instead continues to demand Ukrainian surrender in an attempt to secure his strategic goals by drawing out negotiations while continuing to make battlefield gains.

Putin also continues to demand that any negotiations address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Putin stated during the press conference that the purpose of renewed bilateral Russian-Ukrainian negotiations would be to "eliminate the root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Putin suggested that Russia and Ukraine could pursue a ceasefire as part of these renewed negotiations, but claimed that a "real truce" should not enable the "rearmament" and "replenishment" of the Ukrainian military. The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that Russia must eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Russian officials have defined as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into Eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine. Kremlin officials recently claimed that any ceasefire agreement should limit Ukraine's ability to mobilize and train new troops and receive Western military aid, while failing to offer similar concessions for Russia to limit its own force generation and defense production efforts. Calls for the elimination of these alleged "root causes" and limitations on Ukraine's force generation capabilities are in line with Putin's demands for Ukrainian neutrality, as well as Putin's pre-war demand that would have required NATO to roll back to its pre-1997 borders.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin called for Russia and Ukraine to resume bilateral negotiations based on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that include Russian demands amounting to full Ukrainian surrender. Any agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document.

• Putin also continues to demand that any negotiations address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war in Ukraine.

• Putin is attempting to manipulate ongoing discussions about a ceasefire and future peace in Ukraine, likely in an effort to undermine Ukrainian-US-European unity around a comprehensive 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposal to hold bilateral negotiations in Turkey on May 15.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in the northern Kharkiv and Novopavlivka directions.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian officials appear to be setting conditions for Russian President Vladimir Putin to reject Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to meet on May 15 in Istanbul for bilateral ceasefire negotiations. Russian Federation Council Deputy Speaker Konstantin Kosachev responded to Zelensky on May 12 and claimed that Zelensky’s invitation is "pure spectacle” and “comedy.” Kosachev claimed that high-level meetings are not organized in “such a difficult situation” and accused Zelensky of trying to blame Russia for what he claimed was Ukraine's disinterest in negotiations. Russian Ambassador-at-Large Rodion Miroshnik questioned the intentions behind Zelensky's invitation to Putin to meet in Istanbul. Russian State Duma Committee on International Affairs Deputy Chairperson Alexei Chepa expressed doubt on May 12 that Putin will travel to Istanbul to meet with Zelensky. Chepa insinuated that Russia cannot trust Ukraine in any negotiations because Ukraine has violated previous agreements and unilaterally imposed Russian ceasefires. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on May 12 that Zelensky is trying to co-opt the ongoing discussion around negotiations by inviting Putin to Istanbul and making Putin seem intransigent if he does not attend. Kremlin-level officials have not formally responded to Zelensky's invitation as of this report, although statements from lower-level Russian officials indicate that Putin will likely not travel to Istanbul and meet with Zelensky.

Putin has engaged in significant rhetorical efforts to prepare the Russian public for a long-term war effort — and not a near-term peace agreement — including by promoting the false narrative that Zelensky and the Ukrainian government are illegitimate. Putin and Russian officials often use this narrative to justify Russia’s refusal to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine and to further Russia's strategic war goal of establishing a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv. Putin may assess that the Kremlin would need to adjust or completely retract this narrative in order to rhetorically prepare the Russian public for direct negotiations with Zelensky before such meetings. Putin notably referred to the "Kyiv authorities" rather than Zelensky or the Ukrainian government in his invitation to negotiate in Istanbul. Senior Kremlin officials most recently reiterated this false narrative in late April, and Russian media continues to reiterate this narrative in publications as of May 12. ISW has not observed any indications that the Kremlin will alter or abandon this rhetoric. Putin may instead choose to let this narrative lie dormant for now and intensify this rhetoric should Russia and Ukraine sign a peace agreement in order to set conditions for Russia to justify reneging on any future peace agreement and relaunching the war at the time of Russia's choosing. Any long-term peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia's explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and the Ukrainian Constitution.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials appear to be setting conditions for Russian President Vladimir Putin to reject Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to meet on May 15 in Istanbul for bilateral ceasefire negotiations.

• Russia has reportedly deployed a largely ceremonial regiment of the Federal Security Service (FSB) to the frontline in Donetsk Oblast, likely in an effort to generate fear of more rapid future Russian advances.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions.

Institute for the Study of War

The Russian military is reportedly generating enough forces to replace losses and is reinforcing the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite experiencing an increased casualty rate per square kilometer gained. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be embracing significant losses in exchange for diminishing returns to make battlefield gains and manage perceptions about Russia’s military capabilities to pressure Ukraine in negotiations. Putin stated on May 13 that 50,000 to 60,000 people voluntarily join the Russian military per month. Putin gave this figure as part of a statement claiming that Russia has a higher monthly recruitment than Ukraine and therefore may be exaggerating these recruitment figures to posture a large Russian military amid ongoing negotiations with Ukraine and the West, however. Putin did not explicitly state when Russian recruitment levels hit 50,000 to 60,000 personnel each month, but previous Ukrainian and Russian statements imply that Russia may have aimed to reach this monthly recruitment figure in 2025. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov gave recruitment figures at the end of 2024, indicating that Russia is recruiting just enough military personnel to replace its recent casualty rates. Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated in late January 2025 that roughly 450,000 people signed Russian military service contracts, that an additional 40,000 people joined Russian volunteer formations in 2024, and that the Russian military aimed to "maintain this momentum." Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in early March 2025 that Russia's recruitment plans for 2025 will "mostly" allow the Russian military command to replace its battlefield losses should the current tempo of offensive operations and losses continue. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated in April 2024 that Russian forces are "increasing the number" of personnel in Ukraine by 8,000 to 9,000 new personnel per month through contract recruitment and that the Russian force grouping fighting against Ukraine increased from about 603,000 on January 1, 2025, to 623,000 just over three months later. Syrskyi stated on May 13 that Russian forces have suffered 177,000 casualties in Ukraine since the start of 2025. Syrskyi's and Putin's figures indicate that Russia may be generating enough forces to replace losses while also increasing the overall size of its force grouping in Ukraine.

Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances in Fall 2024, despite a slowed rate of advance in the first four months of 2025. Russian forces are likely able to generate enough forces to sustain their replacement rate and increase the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units. ISW has repeatedly observed reports that new Russian recruits only receive a month of training before deploying to Ukraine, and this limited training is likely constraining recruits' combat capabilities and the Russian military's overall capacity to successfully conduct complex operations. The Russian military is currently prioritizing sending poorly-trained recruits into highly-attritional infantry assaults to make grinding advances — despite enduring a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained — in an effort to pressure Ukraine and the West into acquiescing to Russian demands amid ongoing negotiations. Russia is also attempting to prolong negotiations to extract additional concessions from the United States and while making additional battlefield advances.

Ukrainian officials recently clarified that a September 2022 presidential decree does not preclude Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Zelensky signed a decree on September 30, 2022, prohibiting Ukrainian negotiations with Putin. Zelensky told journalists during a press briefing on May 13 that Russian officials are misrepresenting the decree as an obstacle to negotiations as the decree is intended to prevent Ukrainian persons besides Zelensky from negotiating with Putin on Ukraine’s behalf, rather than restricting Zelensky from exercising his “ rights and duties,” as Ukraine’s head negotiator. Chairperson of Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada Foreign Affairs Committee Oleksandr Merezhko reiterated this point to Ukrainian English-language news outlet Kyiv Independent on May 13 and stated that Ukraine’s Constitution "clearly" specifies Zelensky as Ukraine’s chief negotiator and noted that Zelensky’s constitutional powers allow him to override past decrees. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Mykhailo Podolyak stated on May 13 that Zelensky will only negotiate with Putin in Istanbul, as lower-level officials from either country would lack the authority to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine. Russian officials routinely cite this decree as an "obstacle" to negotiations despite ongoing Ukrainian outreach to Russia to engage in good-faith negotiations.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian military is reportedly generating enough forces to replace losses and is reinforcing the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite experiencing an increased casualty rate per square kilometer gained. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be embracing significant losses in exchange for diminishing returns to make battlefield gains and manage perceptions about Russia’s military capabilities to pressure Ukraine in negotiations.

• The Russian military may also be prioritizing recruitment as part of longer-term efforts to build out a post-war strategic reserve for a potential future conflict with NATO.

• Ukrainian officials recently clarified that a September 2022 presidential decree does not preclude Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

• The Russian military command appears to be establishing a tactical doctrine and force structure for motorcycle and civilian vehicle units in frontal assaults, underscoring the Russian military's efforts to offset Ukraine’s drone advantages and achieve maneuver in modern ground warfare.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent call to base future negotiations with Ukraine on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that included Russian demands for Ukraine's complete capitulation. Russian Ambassador-at-Large and former Russian occupation official, Rodion Miroshnik, claimed on May 14 that the April 2022 draft Istanbul protocols could be the basis for an agreement to end Russia's war in Ukraine. Miroshnik is echoing Putin's May 11 call to "resume" the 2022 Istanbul direct negotiations in response to the May 10 joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a 30-day minimum general ceasefire. Miroshnik noted that Russia and Ukraine could make "adjustments" to the 2022 Istanbul protocols to account for changes in the past three years, but specifically insisted that Russia's April 2022 demands that Ukraine significantly reduce its military capabilities and amend its constitution to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances — including NATO — remain unchanged. Putin and Miroshnik are deliberately reiterating Russia's terms in the Istanbul protocols because the protocols included terms that would have amounted to Ukraine's surrender and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression — aims that the Kremlin continues to pursue. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that they both obtained several versions of the draft protocols from the April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul. The draft protocols also would have banned Ukraine from hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia demanded that it, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus serve as security guarantors of the agreement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality ," including military aid agreements. Russia demanded that Ukraine limit its military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.

Russia demanded these terms in the first and second months of the full-scale invasion when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and making gains throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war, despite the fact that Ukrainian forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance across the theater. Miroshnik's observation that Russia and Ukraine could adjust aspects of the Istanbul protocols to reflect the changes in the war over the past three years is an attempt to frame the Kremlin as willing to negotiate, which obfuscates the fact that Russia has actually maintained its long-term goal of total Ukrainian surrender. Putin, Miroshnik, and other Russian officials continue to demand Ukraine's full surrender in an attempt to secure Russia's strategic goals by drawing out negotiations while continuing to make battlefield gains.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent call to base future negotiations with Ukraine on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that included Russian demands for Ukraine's complete capitulation.

• Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also reiterated the Kremlin's demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions against the West ahead of negotiations in Istanbul.

• Polling from early May 2025 indicates that the majority of Ukrainians support Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate leader of Ukraine and are against holding elections before a final end to the war — in accordance with Ukrainian law and the Ukrainian Constitution.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to engage in bilateral negotiations in Istanbul and continues refusing to offer concessions to end the war in Ukraine. Putin spoke to media organizations on the night of May 10 to 11, following the May 10 joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a general ceasefire for at least 30 days beginning on May 12. Putin did not agree to the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal and instead proposed that Russia and Ukraine "resume" on May 15 the direct negotiations that he claimed Ukraine "interrupted" in 2022 in Istanbul. Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted Putin's proposal to hold bilateral negotiations in Turkey on May 15. Zelensky stated that he would personally wait for Putin in Turkey and arrived in Turkey on May 15. Putin assigned several Russian officials, who are notably not in Putin's innermost circle, to attend the talks in Istanbul, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed on May 15 that Putin will not travel to Istanbul. Putin's rejection of Zelensky's invitation demonstrates Putin's continued resistance to making any concessions and engaging in legitimate, good-faith negotiations at the highest level.

The Russian delegation in Istanbul does not include officials in Putin's innermost circle and is largely the same delegation that Russia sent to the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in 2022 in Istanbul. Putin announced on the night of May 14 that Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky is leading the Russian delegation in Istanbul. The delegation also includes Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin, Chief of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Igor Kostykov, and Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin. Medinsky similarly headed the delegation in 2022, and Fomin and Galuzin's predecessor participated in the 2022 talks. Kostyukov is the only 2025 participant who did not attend the 2022 talks.

Medinsky explicitly described the May 2025 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul as a continuation of the early 2022 Istanbul negotiations during which Russia issued demands that were tantamount to Ukraine's complete capitulation. Medinsky told journalists on May 15 in Istanbul that Russia considers the May 2025 negotiations a "continuation" of previous negotiations in Istanbul in April 2022, which he claimed Ukraine interrupted. Medinsky is reiterating Putin's May 11 framing that the new bilateral negotiations in Istanbul would be based on the April 2022 Istanbul protocols draft agreement, which included terms that would have amounted to Ukraine's surrender and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that they both obtained several versions of the Istanbul protocols draft agreement. The draft protocols demanded that Ukraine forego its NATO membership aspirations and amend its constitution to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances. The draft protocols also would have banned Ukraine from hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia demanded that it, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus serve as security guarantors of the agreement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality ," including military aid agreements. Russia demanded that Ukraine limit its military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.

Russia demanded these terms in the first and second months of its full-scale invasion when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and making significant gains throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war, despite the fact that Ukrainian forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance across the theater. Medinsky is purposefully attempting to frame the May 2025 talks as a continuation of the April 2022 Istanbul negotiations to portray Russia's demands for Ukraine's surrender as legitimate, despite the fact that Ukraine is now in a much stronger battlefield position on the battlefield than in April 2022 and the Russian military is much weaker than in the early months of the full-scale invasion.

Medinsky also reiterated Putin's longstanding demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions on NATO. Medinsky claimed that Russia's goal for the May 2025 Istanbul negotiations is to "establish long-term peace by eliminating the root causes" of the war. Russian officials routinely demand that any peace agreement address the war's "root causes," which Russian officials define as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine. Russian officials have leveraged claims that Ukraine has mistreated Russian speakers in Ukraine to justify the Kremlin's demands for regime change in Ukraine, the establishment of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv, and Russia's occupation and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. Medinsky's attempt to frame May 2025 Istanbul negotiations as peace talks contradicts stated Ukrainian, US, and European efforts to first establish a longer-term ceasefire in Ukraine that would precede peace negotiations. Medinsky's framing echoes consistent Russian rejections of this sequence of events, which Ukraine and the United States have consistently supported.

Reported Kremlin instructions to Russian media explaining how to cover the Istanbul negotiations indicate that the Kremlin is preparing the Russian population for a longer war in Ukraine and is not interested in engaging in good-faith negotiations that require compromises from both sides. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on May 15 that it acquired a manual that Russian media received from the Presidential Administration's political bloc with instructions about how to cover the negotiations in Istanbul. The manual reportedly instructed Russian media to explain Medinsky's participation in the Russian delegation as "logical" since he led the Russian delegation in Istanbul in 2022 and is continuing this work. A political strategist who works with the Kremlin told Meduza that Russian officials overseeing domestic policy assess that the Istanbul talks will end in "deadlock" and that the Kremlin assesses that the West will likely impose new sanctions in response to such "deadlock." The manual reportedly advises Russian media to preemptively talk about a "new package of sanctions" while claiming that new sanctions will not harm Russia's development as Russia "successfully copes with the challenges of any sanctions." Russian media should reportedly vaguely say that "negotiations are taking place on worse terms for Ukraine" than three years ago, but the manual does not explain how current battlefield realities where Russia controls much less of Ukraine are "worse terms."

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to engage in bilateral negotiations in Istanbul and continues refusing to offer concessions to end the war in Ukraine.

• The Russian delegation in Istanbul does not include officials in Putin's innermost circle and is largely the same delegation that Russia sent to the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in 2022 in Istanbul.

• Medinsky explicitly described the May 2025 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul as a continuation of the early 2022 Istanbul negotiations during which Russia issued demands that were tantamount to Ukraine's complete capitulation.

• Medinsky also reiterated Putin's longstanding demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions on NATO.

• Reported Kremlin instructions to Russian media explaining how to cover the Istanbul negotiations indicate that the Kremlin is preparing the Russian population for a longer war in Ukraine and is not interested in engaging in good-faith negotiations that require compromises from both sides.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on May 16 but made little progress towards agreeing to a full ceasefire or a peace settlement to Russia's war against Ukraine. The Russian delegation reportedly formally demanded that Ukraine cede territory to which Russia has informally been laying claim, while asserting that Russia is ready to continue the war for years. Russia may again formalize previously informal territorial claims in the future as part of Russia's effort to secure full Ukrainian capitulation. Turkish, Ukrainian, and American delegations met on the morning of May 16 in Istanbul, after which Turkish, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations met. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, the head of the Russian delegation, likely met with US State Department Director of Policy Planning Staff Michael Anton before the Ukrainian-Russian meeting. The Ukrainian delegation, including Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha, and Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak, met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg, UK National Security Advisor Jonathan Powell, French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonn, and German Chancellor's Advisor for Foreign and Security Policy Gunter Sautter to coordinate positions before the Ukrainian-Russian meeting. Umerov and Medinsky announced that Ukraine and Russia would exchange 1,000 prisoners of war (POWs) each in the near future. Medinsky stated that the Russian and Ukrainian delegations agreed to "write...down in detail" and present their visions for a possible future ceasefire and that bilateral negotiations will continue after this presentation. Kremlin newswire TASS reported that an unspecified source stated that there was no specific date set for Russia and Ukraine to exchange their ceasefire plans.

Medinsky highlighted that Russia is prepared to continue its war in Ukraine for years to come. Medinsky claimed that those "who do not know history" say that there should be a ceasefire first, then negotiations to achieve peace. Medinsky claimed that war and negotiations should be conducted simultaneously, and Carroll reported that Medinsky stated that Russia is "ready to fight for a year, two, three – however long it takes." Medinsky reportedly referenced the Great Northern War (1700-1721) when asking "how long ready to fight?" and claimed that "Russia is prepared to fight forever." Russia state media confirmed that Medinsky spoke about the 18th-century war with Sweden during the meeting.

Ukrainian diplomatic sources told various Western and Ukrainian outlets that the Russian delegation made "unrealistic" and "unacceptable" demands that went "far beyond" any demands Russia has previously discussed. The delegation reportedly repeated the Kremlin's demand that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the entirety of the illegally annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before the start of a ceasefire. The Economist foreign correspondent Oliver Carroll reported that a source stated that the Russian delegation additionally threatened to seize Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts, and Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Oleksiy Goncharenko similarly reported that the Russian delegation threatened to annex Sumy Oblast in order to create a "security zone."

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on May 16 but made little progress towards agreeing to a full ceasefire or a peace settlement to Russia's war against Ukraine.

• Medinsky highlighted that Russia is prepared to continue its war in Ukraine for years to come.

• The Kremlin has repeatedly publicly demanded that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – even the territory that Russian forces currently do not occupy - but had not formally demanded that Ukraine cede all of Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts before the May 16 Istanbul meeting.

• ISW has consistently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not compromise in peace negotiations unless Ukraine and the West inflict significant battlefield and economic losses on Russia and force Putin to rethink his theory of victory.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly approved a series of command changes in the Russian military, including a new Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces.

• Russian forces are continuing to expand their salient northeast of Pokrovsk and southwest of Toretsk, although it remains unclear whether the Russian military command will prioritize further advances towards Kostyantynivka or Pokrovsk during Summer 2025.

• Russia is unlikely to have sufficient manpower, materiel, and operational planning capabilities to conduct both an envelopment of Pokrovsk and a significant offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka in the coming months.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka and in the Zaporizhia direction.

Institute for the Study of War

The Russian delegation in Istanbul reportedly framed its demands for a final peace settlement as preconditions that Ukraine must meet before Russia will agree to a ceasefire. Most of Russia's demands are contrary to US President Donald Trump's proposed peace plan. Sources familiar with the May 16 Ukrainian–Russian talks in Istanbul reported to Bloomberg that the Russian delegation demanded that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea to Russia and that the international community recognize the four oblasts and the peninsula as Russian territory before Russia will agree to a ceasefire. The Russian delegation also reportedly demanded that Ukraine adopt a neutral status, that no foreign troops be allowed on Ukrainian territory, and that Ukraine abandon its demands for war reparations from Russia. Chairperson of the Russian Federation Council's Committee on Foreign Affairs Grigory Karasin stated on May 17 that the Russian delegation maintained Russian President Vladimir Putin's June 2024 demands, including that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the entirety of the four oblasts and abandon its NATO aspirations before Russia would agree to a ceasefire and peace negotiations. The United States reportedly presented Russia in April 2025 with a seven-point peace plan that offered Russia "de jure" US recognition of Russian sovereignty over occupied Crimea and "de facto" recognition of Russian control over the parts of Ukraine that Russian forces currently occupy. The US proposal also reportedly included "a robust security guarantee" involving a group of European states and possibly non-European states as a likely peacekeeping force. The Russian delegation's demands in Istanbul outright reject these aspects of the US peace proposal.

ISW continues to assess that Russia's war aim remains full Ukrainian capitulation. Russia is reframing its territorial demands — typically the subject of war termination negotiations — as preconditions for a ceasefire. Russia is attempting to posture itself as open to negotiations but is putting forward demands that Ukraine cannot reasonably accept while offering no compromises of its own. ISW continues to assess that Putin will continue to refuse to offer compromises until Ukraine and the West are able to alter his theory of victory, which posits that Russia will win a war of attrition through indefinite creeping advances that prevent Ukraine from conducting successful, operationally significant counteroffensive operations.

Russia's continued protraction of negotiations emphasizes its unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations for either a ceasefire or a final peace agreement. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on May 17 that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky may meet only if the Russian and Ukrainian delegations reach unspecified agreements and underscored that all talks should be conducted behind closed doors. Peskov's statements are likely intentionally vague in order to further delay progress in Russian-Ukrainian talks. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on May 17 that a source close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated the Kremlin viewed discussions between Putin and Zelensky as "out of the question" as Moscow knew that the conditions it was pushing Ukraine to accept were non-starters for Kyiv. Another Verstka source close to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) similarly stated that Russian officials do not plan to discuss preparations for a Putin-Zelensky meeting. Russia has doubled down on its efforts to protract peace processes by continuing to present Ukraine with ultimatums that Ukraine cannot accept. The Verstka source close to the Presidential Administration added that Russia's demand that the Ukrainian–Russian talks occur without a mediator shows that the Kremlin seeks to demonstrate that it is capable of demanding that the United States limit the influence of Ukraine's Western partners. Peskov's comments and Verstka's report cohere with ISW's long-standing assessment that Russia remains committed to prolonging peace negotiations so as to continue making battlefield advances and to extract additional concessions from the West. Ukraine has continually demonstrated its willingness to compromise and engage in good-faith negotiations in contrast.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian delegation in Istanbul reportedly framed its demands for a final peace settlement as preconditions that Ukraine must meet before Russia will agree to a ceasefire. Most of Russia's demands are contrary to US President Donald Trump's proposed peace plan.

• Russia's continued protraction of negotiations emphasizes its unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations for either a ceasefire or a final peace agreement.

• Kremlin officials continue to signal that Russia is prepared to continue or even escalate its war against Ukraine should Ukraine and the West not agree to Russia's demands for Ukraine's surrender.

• Russia continues to deny the current Ukrainian government's legitimacy and is likely setting conditions to renege on any future Ukrainian–Russian peace agreement.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Kurakhove.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted the largest single drone strike of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 17 to 18 – in disregard of US President Donald Trump's calls for Russia to stop long-range strikes against Ukraine, particularly against Kyiv Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 273 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 88 drones over eastern, northern, and central Ukraine; that 128 decoy drones were "lost in location;" and that one drone was still in Ukrainian airspace as of 0800 local time. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike largely targeted Kyiv Oblast and that drones struck Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk oblasts. Russian forces launched 267 drones (and three ballistic missiles) in their overnight strike series against Ukraine on the night of February 22 and 23. Russian forces have significantly intensified their nightly strikes against Ukraine over the last five months and have conducted several of the largest strikes of the entire war since January 2025. A Russian milblogger claimed that the May 17-18 record-breaking strike was effective due to Russia's use of the "Geran-3" drone (the Russian analogue to the Iranian Shahed-238), which is reportedly equipped with a turbo jet and 300-kilogram warhead. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are innovating their long-range drone strike tactics in order to offset the effectiveness of Ukrainian mobile defense units and overwhelm the Ukrainian air defense umbrella.

The Kremlin continues efforts to project Russia's military strength ahead of US President Donald Trump’s scheduled phone call with Putin on May 19. Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin published on May 18 excerpts of an allegedly "new" interview with Putin, in which Putin claimed that Russia has enough manpower and materiel to bring the war in Ukraine to its "logical" conclusion with the "necessary" results for Russia. Putin reiterated long-standing Kremlin narratives about the necessity that peace negotiations address the war’s "root causes" and "protect" of Russian-speakers of Ukraine, whom Putin claimed consider Russia their "motherland." Ukrainian outlet The Kyiv Independent and Russian state media reported on May 18 that the excerpts that Zarubin published on May 18 are unaired footage from the documentary "Russia.Kremlin.Putin.25 Years" that the Kremlin published on May 4 in which Putin repeatedly promoted claims about Russia’s ability to bring the war to its "logical conclusion." The Kremlin's decision to delay publishing these clips until May 18 suggests that the Kremlin is trying to project a strong, militarily superior Russia to the West and to domestic Russian audiences ahead of Putin’s May 19 phone call with Trump. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky recently stated that Russia is prepared to fight for "however long it takes," and Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev recently made thinly veiled nuclear threats in reference to what Medvedev categorized as "negotiating ultimatums."

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted the largest single drone strike of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 17 to 18 — in disregard of US President Donald Trump's calls for Russia to stop long-range strikes against Ukraine, particularly against Kyiv Oblast.

• The Kremlin continues efforts to project Russia's military strength ahead of US President Donald Trump’s scheduled phone call with Putin on May 19.

• Reported support within the Russian military and society for continuing the war until Russia achieves its original war aims and territorial demands reflects the success of the Kremlin's years-long narrative efforts to justify a protracted war effort.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues efforts to negotiate a diplomatic end to the war in Ukraine.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine and support Ukraine's defense industry. Italian media reported in mid-May 2025 that Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto announced that Italy approved an eleventh military aid package for Ukraine, which will include one SAMP/T air and missile defense system, 400 M-113 armored personnel carriers, and ammunition. Ukrainian state-owned defense enterprise manager Ukroboronprom reported on May 20 that it signed a memorandum of cooperation with Belgian ammunition manufacturer KNDS Belgium to coordinate the joint assembly of medium-caliber ammunition for automatic cannons.

The European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) announced several sanctions packages against Russia on May 20. The package is the EU's largest targeting Russia's shadow fleet and the Russian energy and military-industrial sector. The EU also sanctioned the Russian Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops; the 27th Scientific Center; and the Russian Ministry of Defense's 33rd Central Scientific Research and Testing Institute for Russia's use of chemical weapons in Ukraine. The UK also announced new sanctions against Russia's military, energy, and financial sectors on May 20.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed Colonel General Valery Solodchuk's recent appointment as Central Military District (CMD) commander on May 20. Solodchuk most recently served as commander of the Kursk Grouping of Forces and led Russia's efforts to eliminate the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. Solodchuk is replacing Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev, who reportedly recently replaced General Oleg Salyukov as Russian Ground Forces Commander.

Key Takeaways:

• Senior Russian officials continue to deny the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and constitution and Ukraine's sovereignty despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent efforts to feign interest in peace negotiations to end the war.

• Medvedev also reiterated long-standing Russian demands tantamount to Ukraine’s complete capitulation.

• Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine and support Ukraine's defense industry.

• The European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) announced several sanctions packages against Russia on May 20.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed Colonel General Valery Solodchuk's recent appointment as Central Military District (CMD) commander on May 20.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, and in the Zaporizhia direction.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to prioritize leveraging migrants to mitigate ongoing labor shortages, despite ongoing complaints from Russian ultranationalists advocating for the Kremlin to impose harsher restrictions on migrants. Putin on April 28 extended the deadline for migrants who entered Russia illegally to apply for legal status or leave Russia from April 30 to September 10, 2025. Putin initially signed the decree setting the deadline on December 30, 2024. Migrants can obtain legal status by submitting to a series of health screenings; passing a Russian language, history, and legal exams; and paying off all debts, or by signing a military service contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Russia is reportedly suffering a labor shortage of 1.5 million people due to its war in Ukraine. Putin likely does not want to exacerbate ongoing labor shortages with arbitrarily imposed deadlines that will further restrict migrants from contributing to the Russian economy, given that a significant number of migrants work in consumer services, construction, delivery, and other low-skilled industries. Putin's migrant policies notably contradict his efforts to appease the ultranationalist crowd that has been increasingly calling for Putin to take harsher measures against migrants in Russia.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin is fostering the formation of an informal state ideology based on Russian nationalism that positions Russia in opposition to the West as part of ongoing efforts to militarize and unify Russian society. Putin stated on May 22 at a likely highly scripted award ceremony that "strong family foundations" and "traditional values" support Russia's "1,000-year-old statehood." Putin emphasized that Russia's "most important" task is to preserve its people, culture, and spirituality. A Russian Orthodox priest who received an award during the ceremony thanked Putin for protecting Russian traditional culture, spirituality, and language. The priest noted that Russia's celebrations of its contributions to victory in the Second World War teach Russian youth and those in the "Russkiy Mir" ("Russian World") to defend Russia and love Russia's culture and spiritual foundations. (The "Russian World" is a Kremlin-promoted geopolitical concept with amorphous parameters that broadly encompass those who live outside of Russia's borders but relate in some vague way to Russian language, culture, Orthodoxy, and media). Russian State Historical Museum General Director and awardee Alexei Levikin claimed that many countries hostile to Russia are basing their policies and ideologies on the falsification of historical events and facts. A martial arts school director who received an award claimed that Russia always proves that its fighters are the best on the battlefields and in sports arenas.

Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin — one of the most outspoken Russian ultranationalists in Putin's inner circle — expressed support for the inclusion of an informal state ideology based on Russian nationalism in the Russian Constitution. Russian State Duma Deputy Speaker Pyotr Tolstoy stated on May 19 at the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum that Russia may change its constitution in the future. Duma Committee on State Building and Legislation Head Pavel Krasheninnikov later stated at the forum that the Russian Constitution "meets current realities" and does not need amending, however. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on May 19, in response to Tolstoy, that changing the constitution is "not on the agenda." Bastrykin claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on May 22 that Russia is built on traditional values, such as patriotism, citizenship, service to the Fatherland, and a strong family, and that these traditional values should underpin Russia's "national idea." Bastrykin further claimed that Russia should enshrine this "national idea" in its constitution. Bastrykin emphasized Russia's need to protect and preserve its "historical heritage" through legal frameworks. Bastrykin routinely publicly expresses interest in an informal Russian state ideology predicated on Russian ethno-religious nationalism and opposition to the West, in contrast to other senior Russian officials. The Russian Constitution notably forbids the adoption of a formal state ideology. Peskov stated on May 22 that it is difficult to comment on proposals to amend the Russian Constitution because the Kremlin does not have the specifics of such proposals — a departure from his May 19 statement apparently dismissing changes to the constitution. Kremlin officials most recently leveraged Victory Day, Russia's largest holiday that commemorates the Soviet Union's contributions to the Second World War, to promote a new informal state ideology based on Russian unity in the face of opposition from the West. The Kremlin is likely accelerating its promotion of this ideology to prepare the domestic population for a future military conflict against the West. Bastrykin is likely spearheading efforts to formally enshrine Russian nationalist ideology in the constitution as one of the most powerful and influential ultranationalists within the Kremlin elite.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is fostering the formation of an informal state ideology based on Russian nationalism that positions Russia in opposition to the West as part of ongoing efforts to militarize and unify Russian society.

• Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin — one of the most outspoken Russian ultranationalists in Putin's inner circle — expressed support for the inclusion of an informal state ideology based on Russian nationalism in the Russian Constitution.

• Russian authorities are renewing their years-long narrative rejecting the legality of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, possibly to deny Ukrainian and Belarusian sovereignty and independence in the future.

• Russian authorities and state media continue to publicly question the legitimacy of the Ukrainian negotiating team and the Ukrainian government, likely to further efforts to reject and delay negotiations and to set conditions to renege on any future peace agreement with Ukraine.

• Recent Western reporting provided additional details in a case in which Russian forces executed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in November 2024, supporting ISW's assessment that high-level Russian military commanders are likely involved in these executions.

• Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov confirmed on May 22 Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev's appointment as Russian Ground Forces Commander.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov demanded that any future peace agreement in Ukraine include conditions to prevent the election and establishment of future pro-Western governments in Ukraine. Lavrov insisted on May 23 that any peace agreement must include conditions preventing the "repetition of what brought putschists to power through a bloody revolution," referring to Ukraine's 2014 Euromaidan protests and the Revolution of Dignity, which drove out Ukraine's former pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych. Lavrov also reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's repeated claim that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is not the legitimate leader of Ukraine and claimed that Russia could negotiate with the leadership of Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada (parliament) instead of Zelensky.

Russian officials often deliberately misread the Ukrainian Constitution to claim that Zelensky's government is illegitimate since Ukraine did not hold presidential elections in 2024, although the Ukrainian Constitution and law prohibit the government from holding elections during times of martial law and external aggression. Russian officials have repeatedly characterized Ukraine's Euromaidan protests and Revolution of Dignity as a "coup," and leverage this narrative to reinforce Russia's claims that the current Ukrainian government is not legitimate and thus cannot negotiate with Russia. Lavrov's statement is also an explicit demand for regime change in Ukraine as a condition of any future peace agreement – a demand that Russian officials routinely make under the guise of demands for "denazification" in Ukraine. Russian officials will likely falsely frame any future pro-Western government in Ukraine as inheriting the illegitimacy of all Ukrainian governments since 2014 and set conditions to claim that any agreement that Russia concludes with Ukraine is non-binding.

Lavrov also rejected US President Donald Trump's recent suggestion that the Vatican could host negotiations on Russia's war against Ukraine. Lavrov claimed that negotiations in the Vatican would be "unrealistic" and that it would be "uncomfortable" for the representatives of "two Orthodox countries" to meet in the Vatican.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov demanded that any future peace agreement in Ukraine include conditions to prevent the election and establishment of future pro-Western governments in Ukraine.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted a 390-for-390 prisoner-of-war (POW) and civilian exchange on May 23 as part of a larger 1,000-for-1,000 exchange agreed upon during recent bilateral negotiations in Istanbul.

• Russian forces reportedly recently executed more Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on the battlefield.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin approved an experimental application to monitor migrants, likely in an effort to placate Russian ultranationalist demands while continuing to leverage migrants to support force generation and mitigate labor shortages.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka and Kurakhove.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted one of the largest combined drone and missile strikes of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 23 to 24, but used fewer missiles than in previous large-scale combined strikes. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on May 24 that Russian forces launched 14 Iskander-M ballistic missiles from the directions of Taganrog, Rostov Oblast; Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai; Bryansk City; and occupied Crimea; and 250 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down six Iskander-M missiles and 128 Shahed drones, and that 117 drones were “lost in location.” Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike heavily targeted Kyiv City and that drones and missiles also struck Odesa, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed prior to the strike on March 23 that Russian forces would respond "adequately" to recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian positions and defense facilities. Russian forces have significantly intensified their nightly attacks against Ukraine over the last five months and have conducted several of the largest strikes of the entire war since January 2025.

Russian forces appear to be reducing their use of cruise missiles, indicating that increased Russian drone production and innovations to long-range drones and related strike tactics are providing Russian forces with a cheaper alternative to cruise missiles. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat stated on May 24 that Ukrainian forces are struggling to use Patriot air defense systems to down modified Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles due to recent Russian improvements, including enhancements that enable the missile to change trajectory and perform maneuvers rather than flying in a straight line. Ukrainian aviation expert Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi reported on February 11 that Russian forces had reduced their use of Kh-101 and Kh-555 cruise missiles and were increasingly using Kh-59 and Kh-69 cruise missiles. ISW has observed Russian forces rarely using Kh-101, Kh-55, and Kh-555 cruise missiles against Ukraine since February 2025 and infrequently using Kh-59 and Kh-69 cruise missiles since March 2025. Russian forces most recently used almost 60 cruise missiles against Ukraine on April 24, but Russia typically uses large numbers of Shahed and decoy drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses in nightly strikes and has recently relied on small numbers of ballistic missiles to conduct more targeted strikes against Ukrainian cities. Russian forces appear to be increasing their use of long-range drones and decreasing their use of cruise missiles in strikes against Ukraine, possibly to conserve the fixed-wing airframes that Russian forces use to launch cruise missiles.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted one of the largest combined drone and missile strikes of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 23 to 24, but used fewer missiles than in previous large-scale combined strikes.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted a second round of prisoner-of-war (POW) exchanges on May 24 as part of a larger 1,000-for-1,000 exchange agreed upon during recent bilateral negotiations in Istanbul.

• Russian officials will reportedly submit a draft document of their conditions for peace in Ukraine following the conclusion of the POW exchanges, although Russia's conditions are unlikely to be anything short of Ukraine's full surrender.

• Russian forces have significantly expanded their salient southwest of Kostyantynivka in recent weeks and established sufficient positions to launch an offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka from the south or to support the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad from the northeast in the coming weeks and months.

• The Russian salient southwest of Kostyantynivka is likely sufficient to support a future Russian offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka or Pokrovsk, but Russian forces will have to make further advances from Chasiv Yar and Toretsk and west of Pokrovsk before Russian forces will pose a significant threat to either of these towns.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Die EU kauft noch immer um Milliarden Öl und Gas aus Russland.
D.h. wir zahlen jetzt die Bewaffnung Russlands.
Unsere Kinder zahlen dann die Bewaffnung der EU, da ja unsere Waffen auf Kredit gekauft werden.
Solange wir weiter ÖL und Gas aus Russland beziehen erübrigen sich doch alle Sanktionen!

Die EU gibt mehr Geld für russisches Öl und Gas aus als für Ukraine-Hilfen, zeigt eine Analyse.
https://de.finance.yahoo.com/nachrichten/eu-gibt-mehr-f%C3%BCr-russisches-145918033.html< /a>

Leider.

Jeder ist sich selbst der nächste.
Es werden alle Grauzonen ausgereizt bis zum Äußersten,
Mitunter auch überschritten.

Kapitalismus in seiner reinsten Form ist böse.
Also ohne dass man die Auswirkungen des eigenen Tuns auf andere mitdenkt.

Meine Meinung und all jener die das Selbstständige Denken noch nicht verlernt haben und nicht dass glauben was in den Medien verfälscht dargestellt wird.
Sämtliche Maßnahmen welche die EU derzeit durchzieht sind für mich nicht nachvollziehbar.
Sämtliche Politiker sind nur mehr Marionetten der Europäischen Union und lehnen jede eigenständige Verantwortung komplett ab.
Zum Glück wird gerade versucht die EU-nahe bevormundungsgeile WHO in die Schranken zu weisen.
Was sind die abzulehnendsten Maßnahmen der kriegsgeilen EU.
Europa muss aufrüsten 😆 um ein Schweinegeld obwohl die Kohle notwendigerweise sinnvoll verwendet werden müsste.
Zelensky bittet nicht, nein er fordert und bekommt weiterhin Unterstützung damit der Krieg mit massenhaft unschuldiger Toten weitergeht. Ein Krieg den die Ukraine niemals gewinnen kann. Ein Krieg der vorher schon jahrelang verbal existierte
und durch Androhungen der EU (Ukraine zur EU und eventuell sogar zur Nato) zu einem echten Krieg wurde.
Russland wird versucht mit sinnlosen Sanktionen einzuschüchtern über die Putin berechtigterweise nur schmunzeln kann.
Wenn sich in dieser EU nicht baldigst was ändert dann Gnade uns Gott.
Dann wird nämlich nicht die Ukraine sondern Europa der große Verlierer sein.

Andere Medien zu konsumieren bedeutet noch kein "selbständiges denken".

Deine Worte lese ich auf Facebook hunderte Male pro Tag, wie die Lemminge folgen sie den Argumenten des Kreml, exakt einseitig, genau wie sie es den anderen vorwerfen, von selbständigem Denken kann keine Rede sein. Wär in Russland ja auch nicht erlaubt.

Versuch es einfach mit selbständigem Denken, bilde Dir Deine eigene Meinung. Du brauchst Dich von niemandem bevormunden lassen. Auch wenn das grad gross in Mode ist.

Und am zweiten Weltkrieg ist auch Polen schuld, die haben ja begonnen zu schießen, und die Nazis haben ja nur zurückgeschossen.
"Seit 5:45 Uhr wird jetzt zurückgeschossen" – Hitler erklärt Kriegsbeginn und Pakt mit Stalin
https://www.swr.de/swrkultur/wissen/archivradio/seit-5-45-wird-jetzt-zurueckgeschossen-hi tler-september-1939-zum-kriegsbeginn-102.html

Stalin hat übrigens auch zurückgeschossen,
Polen hatte keine Chance gegen zwei Weltmächte gleichzeitig.
Weil Hitler mit Stalin paktiert hat,
Die haben Europa unter sich aufgeteilt.
Weil gar so ein Engel, wie die Russen immer tun,
War der Stalin auch nicht.

>Meine Meinung und all jener die das Selbstständige Denken
>noch nicht verlernt haben und nicht dass glauben was in den
>Medien verfälscht dargestellt wird.

Wer sind denn "die Medien", die etwas verfälscht darstellen?
Alle westlichen Medien?
Wer glaubt selbstständig zu denken, wenn er keinen dieser Medien glaubt, kann ja wenigstens den Vertretern Russlands glauben, die die Ziele Russlands unverblümt wiedergeben und sich die Folgen eines "Friedens" nach russischen Vorstellungen vorstellen. Mit ganz wenig selbstständigem Denken ist zu erahnen, dass zumindest ein zweites Weißrussland entstehen soll, wenn die Ukraine schon nicht gleich Teil Russlands wird.
Millionen Ukrainer werden flüchten - müssen, wenn man bedenkt, was Russen droht, wenn sie z.B. nur die "Spezialoperation" als Krieg bezeichnen.

Die Erwähnung der WHO in einem Posting über den Ukraine-Krieg lässt aber ohnehin an der Fähigkeit (selbstständig) zu denken zweifeln.

Ukraine conducted a large-scale and simultaneous series of drone strikes against multiple air bases in Russia on June 1. Sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told various media outlets that the SBU conducted widespread first-person view (FPV) drone strikes that struck four air bases in Russia. The SBU sources reported that Ukrainian forces struck Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast; Olenya Air Base in Murmansk Oblast; Dyagilevo Air Base in Ryazan Oblast; and Ivanovo Air Base in Ivanovo Oblast. The SBU sources confirmed that Ukrainian drone operators struck 41 Russian strategic bombers, including A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft and Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 strategic bombers – fixed-wing aircraft that Russia uses to detect Ukrainian air defenses and launch cruise missiles against Ukraine. The SBU reported that the operation inflicted roughly $7 billion worth of damage on Russia. The SBU sources confirmed that the SBU facilitated drone strikes by transporting the FPV drones to Russia at an unspecified time; storing the FPV drones in trucks carrying cargo units with retractable roofs; parking the trucks near the Russian air bases; and remotely opening the truck roofs and launching the FPVs. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that the operation used 117 drones and destroyed 34 percent of Russia's strategic cruise missile carriers. Zelensky stated that Ukrainian authorities withdrew the people who "assisted" Ukraine with the operation from Russia before the operation. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted FPV drone strikes against air bases in Irkutsk, and Murmansk oblasts, causing several aircraft to catch fire. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled all strikes against air bases in Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Amur oblasts and that Russian authorities reportedly linked Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported that Ukrainian authorities planned to conduct FPV drone strikes against an air base in Amur Oblast, and Russian sources claimed that a truck carrying FPV drones near the Ukrainika Air Base in Amur Oblast caught fire before Ukrainian forces could launch the drones.

Ukraine continues to innovate its drone technology and tactics to achieve operational surprise and successfully target Russian military infrastructure in the rear. The SBU was reportedly able to launch the FPV drones close to the targeted Russian air bases, which likely enabled the FPV drones to evade Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems and deny Russian air defenders enough time to detect the drones. The SBU innovative use of semi-trucks to launch the FPV drones directly in Russian territory enabled Ukrainian drone operators to strike targets deep in Russia's rear and conduct the first drone strike during the war against a target in Siberia. The SBU's tactics to use FPV drones and not aircraft-type long-range drones also allowed drone operators to maintain operational surprise to inflict maximum damage and minimize Russia's response window.

Ukraine's drone strike operation against strategic Russian aircraft may at least temporarily constrain Russia's ability to conduct long-range drone and missile strikes into Ukraine. Ukraine's June 1 operation targeted aircraft that Russia uses to launch cruise missiles against Ukraine and airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) systems that Russia uses to identify Ukrainian air defense systems and coordinate Russian fighter jet targeting. Russia regularly deploys Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 to launch Kh-101/Kh-555 and Kh-59/69 cruise missiles against Ukraine. The downing of Russian A-50 aircraft has previously temporarily constrained Russian aviation activities over Ukraine. The June 1 Ukrainian drone operation will force Russian officials to consider redistributing Russia's air defense systems to cover a much wider range of territory and possibly deploying mobile air defense groups that can more quickly react to possible similar Ukrainian drone strikes in the future.

Russia will likely struggle to replace the aircraft that Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed. Forbes reported in September 2023 that a single A-50 aircraft costs roughly $500 million, and the Kyiv Independent reported on June 1 that Russia has less than 10 A-50s in operation. Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov stated on June 1 that Ukrainian forces destroyed some strategic aircraft that Russia does not currently produce. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russia no longer produces chassis for the Tu-95 and Tu-22 bombers and noted that the chassis are impossible to replace. The Economist reported on June 1 that Russia likely has fewer than 90 operational Tu-22, Tu-95, and Tu-160s in total. Ukrainian sources have recently noted that Russia is increasingly using Sukhoi aircraft — and not strategic bombers — to launch cruise missiles. Russia likely turned to Sukhoi aircraft so as to not risk their strategic bombers, suggesting that Russia is concerned about its limited quantities of strategic bombers.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine conducted a large-scale and simultaneous series of drone strikes against multiple air bases in Russia on June 1.

• Ukraine continues to innovate its drone technology and tactics to achieve operational surprise and successfully target Russian military infrastructure in the rear.

• Ukraine's drone strike operation against strategic Russian aircraft may at least temporarily constrain Russia's ability to conduct long-range drone and missile strikes into Ukraine.

• Russia will likely struggle to replace the aircraft that Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed.

• Russian officials and milbloggers continue to blame Russian leadership for failing to defend Russian military infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes — a widespread complaint throughout the war after successful Ukrainian strikes.

• Russian state media and milbloggers attempted to frame Ukraine's strikes against legitimate Russian military targets as undermining Russia's nuclear stability and as grounds for a Russian nuclear response – mirroring the Kremlin's repeated nuclear saber-rattling throughout the war that has aimed to prevent Western support for Ukraine.

• Russian officials blamed Ukraine for the collapse of two bridges and subsequent train derailments in western Russia on May 31, likely as part of efforts to justify the recent launch of Russian offensive operations in Sumy Oblast and the Kremlin's disinterest in peace negotiations to end the war.

• Russian forces conducted their largest combined drone and missile strike of the war that included over 400 drones against Ukraine on the night of May 31 to June 1.

• Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Mykhailo Drapatyi submitted his resignation following a Russian missile strike on a Ukrainian training unit on June 1.

• Russian forces continue to adapt their strike packages in an effort to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky established a delegation to participate in peace negotiations to end the war as Russian officials continue to flout their own proposed negotiation mechanisms.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War