Ukrainian and European representatives reportedly presented the United States with a proposal to end the
war in Ukraine during multilateral talks in London on April 23. The Telegraph reported on April 25 that
the Ukrainian-European proposal contained five points about territory, security guarantees, negotiations,
refusing Russian sovereignty over occupied Crimea, and the Ukrainian military and defense industrial base
(DIB). Reuters published the full text of the terms that Ukrainian and European officials reportedly
developed in response to the US seven-point peace plan on April 25. The proposal as presented by Reuters
calls for a full, unconditional air, sea, and land ceasefire concurrently with immediate technical
negotiations to implement the ceasefire, involving the United States and European countries; United
States-led ceasefire monitoring with support from third countries; robust Ukrainian security guarantees
absent Ukraine’s NATO accession; and for Russia to unconditionally return illegally deported Ukrainian
children and detained Ukrainian civilians as well as engage in an "all-for-all" prisoner of war (POW)
exchange. The proposal reportedly rejects restrictions on the Ukrainian military, calls for an ad hoc
group of European states and willing non-European countries to guarantee Ukraine's security, and rejects
restrictions on the deployment of any friendly forces to Ukraine.
The Ukrainian-European
proposal states that Russia and Ukraine will negotiate territorial issues only after the implementation
of a full and unconditional ceasefire and that these negotiations will use the current frontline as a
starting framework. The Ukrainian-European proposal would reportedly provide Ukraine with "unhindered
access" to the Dnipro River and control of the Kinburn Spit and Kakhovka Dam. The proposal reportedly
calls for Ukraine to regain control over the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) "with US
involvement." The Ukrainian-European proposal also reportedly states that Ukraine’s partners will work
toward a consensus on NATO membership, and that Ukraine will pursue joining the European Union (EU).
The Ukrainian-European proposal reportedly calls for the United States and Ukraine to implement
the US-Ukraine minerals deal and economic cooperation agreement. The proposal states that US sanctions on
Russia may be subject to "gradual easing" if a sustainable peace is achieved and may resume if Russia
violates a peace agreement. The proposal reportedly calls for Ukraine’s full reconstruction and financial
compensation, including using frozen Russian assets.
Reuters also published the full text of
the seven-point peace proposal that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff reportedly
presented to Ukrainian and European officials in Paris on April 17, supporting earlier reporting about
the US peace proposal. Reuters reported that the US plan demands an immediate ceasefire and direct
technical negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. The US plan reportedly provides Ukraine with strong
security guarantees from a coalition of European and willing non-European states but also calls for
Ukraine to abandon efforts to join NATO while maintaining the option to pursue European Union (EU)
membership. The US plan reportedly includes "de jure" US recognition of Russian control over occupied
Crimea and de facto recognition of Russian control of Luhansk Oblast and parts of occupied Zaporizhia,
Donetsk, and Kherson Oblasts. The recognition of de jure Russian sovereignty over Crimea or any other
areas of Ukraine under occupation since 2014 would constitute a significant concession to Russia that
should be balanced by a significant Russian concession in return.
The US plan reportedly
stipulates that Ukraine will regain territory in Kharkiv Oblast and the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant
(ZNPP), which the United States would operate and which would supply electricity to both Russia and
Ukraine. The proposed US plan would return the Kakhovka Dam and Kinburn Spit to Ukraine and guarantee
Ukrainian passage on the Dnipro River. The US plan reportedly states that Ukraine and the United States
will implement a mineral deal and economic partnership agreement, calls for Ukraine's full
reconstruction, and offers financial compensation to Ukraine, but does not specify the funding source.
The US proposal reportedly calls for lifting sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 and resuming
US-Russian economic cooperation in the energy and industrial sectors.
The newly published
Reuters document supports and clarifies earlier reporting by Axios and The Telegraph of the US
seven-point proposal to Ukraine, but some details remain unclear. The Reuters document affirms core
details, such as territorial arrangements, Ukraine's non-accession to NATO, and the US-run operation of
the ZNPP. The report also clarifies that Ukraine would regain control of the Kinburn Spit, the small part
of Mykolaiv Oblast that Russia currently occupies, and the Kakhovka Dam, which spans between occupied and
unoccupied Kherson Oblast. The Reuters document does not address Sumy Oblast, where Russian forces
recently began conducting offensive operations, or how the United States and Ukraine would gain access to
the ZNPP, given that the Kakhovka Reservoir and Dnipro River are natural barriers between current
Ukrainian positions and the ZNPP. Russian forces would have to partially withdraw from either east (left)
bank Kherson Oblast or permit a land bridge across the Kakhovka Reservoir under the US plan, but neither
option inherently provides the strategic depth Ukraine would need to defend the ZNPP against further
Russian aggression, as ISW has recently reported.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian and
European representatives reportedly presented the United States with a proposal to end the war in Ukraine
during the multilateral talks in London on April 23.
• Reuters also published the full text of
the seven-point peace proposal that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff reportedly
presented to Ukrainian and European officials in Paris on April 17, supporting earlier reporting about
the US peace proposal.
• US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with Russian
President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on April 25, reportedly to secure a major Russian concession in a
future peace deal.
• That the Kremlin is not formally demanding that Ukraine cede most or all
of its territory to Russia at this time is not a significant Russian concession, however.
• Russian officials continue to intensify narratives used to justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine in
order to set conditions to justify future Russian aggression against European states and control European
defense policy in the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign.
• Unknown actors assassinated the
deputy head of the Russian General Staff's Main Operational Directorate, Lieutenant General Yaroslav
Moskalik, in Balashikha, Moscow Oblast, on April 25.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in
western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Kursk oblasts and near
Pokrovsk.
Keine Sorge, du bist nicht allein Und auch ich war heute begeistert über die Verhandlungen im
Petersdom - obwohl doch naheliegend, weil so spontan die Sicherheit für die Regierungschefs an einem
anderen Ort in Rom herzustellen, wär wahrscheinlich viel mehr Aufwand gewesen.
>>Auch wenn ich hier im Forum wohl der einzige bin, aber >die >>Friedensbemühungen sind Trump hoch anzurechnen! > > >Aber das Vorgehen
dabei bisher nicht. >
Ich würde es eher als Kapitulationsbemühungen titulieren.
ad Trump: Natürlich ist nicht alles verkehrt was er anspricht, (bspw. Ungleichgewicht mit
China), aber die Methodik, mit der dieses oder andere Themen angegangen werden, ist jenseitig,
stümperhaft und oft kontraproduktiv.
>Ich würde es eher als Kapitulationsbemühungen titulieren. > >ad Trump: Natürlich ist
nicht alles verkehrt was er anspricht, > >(bspw. Ungleichgewicht mit China), aber die
Methodik, >mit der dieses oder andere Themen angegangen werden, >ist jenseitig,
stümperhaft und oft kontraproduktiv.
>>Auch wenn ich hier im Forum wohl der einzige bin, aber >die >>Friedensbemühungen sind Trump hoch anzurechnen! > > >Aber das Vorgehen
dabei bisher nicht. >
Ja, das Vorgehen ist manchmal fragwürdig. Aber zumindest
unternimmt er etwas, im Gegensatz zu Biden oder den EU Politikern(die noch immer von Waffen träumen).
Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on April 26 that Russian forces
pushed all Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast. Gerasimov told Russian President Vladimir Putin on April
26 that Russian forces had fully defeated Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and seized Gornal (southwest
of Sudzha), the last Ukrainian-held settlement in Kursk Oblast. Gerasimov credited elements of the
Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps , Leningrad
Military District ), 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet ), 40th Naval Infantry
Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), and 1427th Motorized Rifle
Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call up) with seizing Gornal. The Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov was visiting a Russian command post
in Kursk Oblast to hear reports from Kursk Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Valery Solodchuk
when Russian forces seized Gornal. Geolocated footage published on April 26 indicates that Russian forces
recently advanced along Gora Street in central Gornal. The Ukrainian General Staff refuted the Russian
claims later on April 26 and stated that Ukrainian forces maintain unspecified positions in Kursk Oblast.
The General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled five Russian assaults in Kursk Oblast on April
26. Russian milbloggers similarly claimed on April 26 that fighting continued near Oleshnya (northwest of
Gornal), Guyevo (south of Sudzha near the international border), and St. Nicholas Monastery (southwest of
Guyevo).
US President Donald Trump stated that the United States is no longer pursuing a
concrete deadline for achieving a resolution to the war in Ukraine — a departure from the
administration’s previously stated goal of ending the war within its first 100 days. Trump told reporters
on April 25 that the United States has "no deadline" to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine. Trump
also stated on April 26 that there was "no reason" for Russia’s strikes on civilian areas and reiterated
a previously stated concern that " is just tapping me along" by
disingenuously ceasefire and peace negotiations. Trump stated that Putin's actions make Trump think that
"maybe doesn't want to stop the war" and "has to be dealt with differently." Russian officials
have repeatedly to leverage heightened US interest in negotiating a swift resolution to the war in
Ukraine to make demands tantamount to Ukrainian surrender and incompatible with Trump’s stated goal of
achieving a stable and enduring peace in Ukraine. Russian forces have also conducted a string of strikes
against civilian areas in recent weeks, including a devastating strike on Kyiv City on the night of April
23 to 24. Trump and Ukrainian President Zelensky met in Vatican City on April 26 to discuss the ongoing
peace talks. Zelensky reported on April 26 that he and Trump discussed civilian safety, a full and
unconditional ceasefire, and a lasting peace that prevents resumption of hostilities. White House
Communications Director Steven Cheung stated that Trump and Zelensky had a "very productive
discussion."
Russia is likely preparing to systematically integrate motorcycle usage into
offensive operations in Ukraine for Summer and Fall 2025, likely to offset adept Ukrainian drone
capabilities. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on April 26 showing likely elements
of the 299th (Airborne) VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) practicing offensive and defensive tactics on
motorcycles in groups of two to three people at a Russian training ground. The video indicates that the
Russian military is likely developing a tactical doctrine for systematic offensive motorcycle usage and
may be preparing to issue an increased number of motorcycles to Russian personnel in Ukraine. Ukrainian
Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported that Ukrainian
intelligence noted that the Russian military is training its soldiers in combat tactics with motorcycles,
suggesting that Russian forces will likely increasingly integrate motorcycles into offensive operations
in Ukraine in Summer and Fall 2025. Shamshyn noted that motorcycles allow Russian soldiers to enhance
their speed and maneuverability, which is crucial for evading Ukrainian drone strikes, but that the loud
noise of the motorcycle prevents the rider from hearing approaching Ukrainian drones. ISW has observed an
increased trend of Russian units conducting mechanized and combined motorized assaults and transporting
infantry with motorcycles and civilian vehicles throughout the frontline as Russian command continues to
adapt its tactics to offset Ukrainian drone strikes and likely to mitigate the Russian military's
equipment constraints resulting from high armored vehicle losses in Summer and early Fall 2024. Russian
forces notably recently advanced during a motorized assault near Bahatyr comprised entirely of
motorcycles and civilian vehicles.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian Chief of the General
Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on April 26 that Russian forces pushed all Ukrainian forces
from Kursk Oblast.
• Ukraine's August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast successfully pinned
some Russian combat power, including elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units, but its long-term
effects remain unclear at this time.
• Gerasimov made the first official Russian
acknowledgement of North Korean troop participation in Russian operations in Kursk Oblast by thanking
North Korean servicemembers for their assistance in Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces out of the
region.
• US President Donald Trump stated that the United States is no longer pursuing a
concrete deadline for achieving a resolution to the war in Ukraine — a departure from the
administration’s previously stated goal of ending the war within its first 100 days.
• Russia
is likely preparing to systematically integrate motorcycle usage into offensive operations in Ukraine for
Summer and Fall 2025, likely to offset adept Ukrainian drone capabilities.
• Ukrainian forces
recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka, Kurkakhove, and
Velyka Novosilka.
Ukrainian and Russian forces' constant technological and tactical battlefield innovations continue to
transform the character of warfare in Ukraine. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) in a Ukrainian unmanned
systems battalion, likely operating in the Chasiv Yar direction, reported on April 27 that continuous
technological innovations and battlefield adaptations have increasingly transformed the character of
modern conventional warfare in Ukraine into a war that primarily features "long-range, remote combat"
over meeting engagements between infantry and armored vehicles. The NCO noted that Ukrainian and Russian
forces’ intensifying drone usage has expanded the area of contested gray zones and kill zones at the
forward edge of the battle area. The NCO noted that in 2024, contested gray zones were roughly 500 meters
to two kilometers in depth, but more intense drone usage since then has expanded the gray zone up to five
to seven kilometers in some areas of the frontline. The NCO reported that Russian forces are improving
and expanding their unmanned systems capabilities and emulating Ukrainian forces’ tactics of using drones
to intercept enemy drones and conduct remote mining. Ukrainian forces have successfully leveraged
superior drone capabilities to defend critical sectors of the frontline while also mitigating manpower
and materiel constraints.
Ukraine maintains over 100 brigades that must defend a frontline
(both within Ukraine and along Ukraine's international border with Russia) currently over 2,100
kilometers long and significantly leverages drone capabilities, in tandem with traditional capabilities,
to deny Russian attacks across the frontline. Ukraine has demonstrated an ability to rapidly upscale
domestic drone production and foreign drone procurement that is conducive for defending the frontline as
well as executing a sustained long-range strikes campaign targeting Russian critical energy and defense
industrial facilities deep within Russian territory that disrupts and degrades the Russian military's
production and logistics. Both Ukrainian and Russian forces have more regularly been using fiber-optic
drones to strike each other’s frontline positions and have successfully used first-person view (FPV)
drones to intercept larger reconnaissance drones over the past several months.
ISW has
observed the rapid rate at which both Ukraine and Russia have managed to conceptualize, field, and
implement near-continuous technological innovation and battlefield-adjusted tactics to optimize combat
dynamics. Ukrainian and Russian forces field new adaptations over the course of months rather than years
and are constantly experimenting, further driving the feedback loop of increased reliance on technology
and tactical innovation to maintain battlefield advantages. The innovation and operational concepts being
forged in Ukraine will set the stage for the future of warfare.
Russian forces are attempting
to offset Ukrainian technological adaptations and drone operations by integrating motorcycles and
civilian vehicles into offensive operations along the entire frontline. The NCO in the Ukrainian unmanned
systems battalion stated that Russian forces are increasingly using infantry assaults and motorized
assaults on motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and light vehicles to advance in areas where
Ukrainian forces leverage drone usage to maintain frontline positions. The non-commissioned officer
reported that Russian forces leverage motorcycles and other light vehicles to disperse forces to more
easily avoid drone strikes. A Ukrainian soldier operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on April 27
that Russian forces have conducted 13 motorized assaults on motorcycles since March 20. A Ukrainian
servicemember operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on April 27 that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk
direction cannot drive heavy armored vehicles to frontline positions due to disrupted Russian ground
lines of communication (GLOCs), resulting in Russian forces shifting tactics to prioritize daily infantry
assaults supported by motorcycles.
ISW has observed Russian forces throughout the entire
theater struggling to operate heavy armored vehicles close to the line of fire without being struck by
Ukrainian drones. Russian forces are likely leveraging the speed, maneuverability, and small profiles of
motorcycles and other light civilian vehicles to mitigate the efficacy of Ukrainian drone capabilities
and are likely developing a tactical doctrine for systematic offensive motorcycle usage and preparing to
integrate motorcycle usage into Summer and Fall 2024 offensive operations. The Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) and military command previously responded to Ukrainian drone innovations by attempting to
formally integrate and centralize Russia’s drone operations and production. The Ukrainian and Russian
defense industrial bases (DIBs) continue to compete in the innovation of new, cost-effective systems that
enhance assault and battlefield capabilities and counter each other’s innovations. Russian forces likely
see a tactical opportunity in leveraging motorcycles and civilian vehicles to advance and seize as much
Ukrainian territory as possible despite Ukraine’s drone defenses.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian and Russian forces' constant technological and tactical battlefield innovations continue to
transform the character of warfare in Ukraine.
• Russian forces are attempting to offset
Ukrainian technological adaptations and drone operations by integrating motorcycles and civilian vehicles
into offensive operations along the entire frontline.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov reaffirmed Russia's long-standing position against making any forms of territorial concessions,
undermining the US President Donald Trump's efforts to broker a lasting peace.
• Russian law
enforcement announced on April 26 the arrest of Ignat Kuzin, the suspect whom Russia accused of planting
the improvised explosive device (IED) that killed the deputy head of the Russian General Staff's Main
Operational Directorate, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, on April 25
• Ukrainian forces
recently advanced near Borova. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and
Toretsk.
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced another unilateral ceasefire in Ukraine, this time in honor of
a major Soviet and Russian military holiday, while continuing to reject the March 2025 US-Ukrainian
30-day general ceasefire proposal. Putin continues to refuse any ceasefire other than on terms that
advantage his war effort. The Kremlin announced on April 28 that Putin declared a ceasefire in honor of
Victory Day on May 9 – when Russia celebrates the Soviet Union's contributions to defeating Nazi Germany
during the Second World War (while minimizing the role played by the United States) – between midnight on
the night of May 7 to 8 and midnight on the night of May 10 to 11. The Kremlin stated that Russian forces
will respond to any Ukrainian ceasefire violations. The Kremlin claimed that the Victory Day ceasefire
demonstrates Russia's supposed readiness for peace negotiations without preconditions to eliminate the
"root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia is exchanging
information with the United States about the Victory Day ceasefire and characterized the unilateral
ceasefire as a "manifestation" of Russia's goodwill. The Kremlin is preparing to welcome a significant
number of foreign dignitaries, including from former Soviet, Latin American, Asian, and African
countries, for Russia's Victory Day celebration, and Putin likely seeks to avoid the embarrassment of
Ukrainian strikes during these celebrations.
Putin previously declared a unilateral ceasefire
in honor of Easter in mid-April 2025, but Russian and Ukrainian sources repeatedly accused each other of
violating the ceasefire throughout the theater in Ukraine. Russia also repeatedly accused Ukraine of
violating the 30-day moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes but rarely offered evidence of these
alleged violations. ISW previously noted that the energy strikes ceasefire and Easter ceasefire
underscored the need for the details of any future ceasefire or peace agreement to be publicly available,
formally agreed to in advance by all parties, and to include robust monitoring mechanisms. Putin's
proposed Victory Day ceasefire does not include any additional monitoring mechanisms, and Russian sources
will likely leverage the lack of such mechanisms to again flood the information space with
unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations. Russian officials appear disinterested in
establishing meaningful monitoring mechanisms or a general public basis for these ceasefires, likely
because Russia benefits from weaponizing the vague and unclear conditions of the ceasefires against
Ukraine.
Putin is leveraging unilateral ceasefires to achieve informational and battlefield
advantages in Ukraine, counter to US President Donald Trump's goal of using a general ceasefire as a
stepping stone towards an enduring and sustainable peace agreement in Ukraine. Putin appears to be
opportunistically declaring ceasefires during major religious and military holidays in order to force
Ukraine to accept the ceasefire or risk appearing intransigent to the West. Unilaterally declaring
ceasefires also allows Putin to distract attention from his rejection of the March 2025 US-Ukrainian
30-day general ceasefire proposal and to maintain the illusion that he is interested in peace
negotiations while keeping full control over the conditions and timing of any ceasefire agreements.
Russian forces seized on the Easter ceasefire to shell and conduct reconnaissance of frontline Ukrainian
positions and damaged vehicles along the frontline in preparation for future Russian assaults, and
Russian forces will likely use the Victory Day ceasefire for similar preparatory efforts. Putin likely
views the Victory Day ceasefire as a chance for Russian forces to rest ahead of future frontline activity
in Ukraine and as a way to ensure that Ukraine does not conduct any significant long-range strikes
against Russia during Victory Day celebrations. Putin likely does not view the Victory Day ceasefire as a
serious step towards lasting peace in Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President
Vladimir Putin announced another unilateral ceasefire in Ukraine – this time in honor of a major Soviet
and Russian military holiday, while continuing to reject the March 2025 US-Ukrainian 30-day general
ceasefire proposal. Putin continues to refuse any ceasefire other than on terms that advantage his war
effort.
• Putin is leveraging unilateral ceasefires to achieve informational and battlefield
advantages in Ukraine, counter to US President Donald Trump's goal of using a general ceasefire as a
stepping stone towards an enduring and sustainable peace agreement in Ukraine.
• Ukraine – in
contrast to Russia – continues to demonstrate its support for Trump's desired full, permanent
ceasefire.
• The Kremlin continues attempts to hold legitimate ceasefire negotiations hostage
in order to secure additional concessions from Ukraine and the United States.
• Lavrov
reiterated on April 28 Russia's longstanding demands for Ukraine's surrender and concessions from the
West, as Russia continues to offer no concessions of its own.
• Russian and North Korean
officials touted the success of their joint military operations in Kursk Oblast in order to highlight the
international community's inability to deter Russian efforts to involve its allies directly in Russia's
war against Ukraine, as the Kremlin pledged to offer North Korea reciprocal active military support.
• Russia is reportedly expanding its military infrastructure along its border with Finland and
stockpiling new tanks, likely in preparation for future aggression against NATO.
• Czech
Defense Minister Jana Černochová announced on April 27 that the Czech Ammunition Initiative will
have delivered another 400,000 rounds of large-caliber artillery ammunition to Ukraine by April 30.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and
Novopavlivka.
Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated on April 29 that Russia's war in Ukraine must
end in Russian "victory" and the "destruction" of the current Ukrainian government. Senior Kremlin
officials continue to signal that Russia has greater territorial ambitions than just the occupied areas
of Ukraine, particularly in areas bordering the Black Sea. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security
Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on April
29 that Ukrainian civilians, particularly those living in the Black Sea region, must "determine their own
future." Patrushev specifically noted that Odesa City spent over two centuries as the Russian Empire's
and Soviet Union's outpost in the Black Sea and claimed that Odesa City residents have "nothing in
common" with the current Ukrainian government. These statements are a reference to Russian President
Vladimir Putin's 2023 claim that Ukrainians living in the Black Sea region have nothing "to do with
Ukraine" and that Odesa is a "Russian city" and follows Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's April
14, 2025 claim that the Ukrainian government "does not represent" residents of Odesa City and other
Ukrainian territories. Patrushev claimed that Russia "respects the will of the people" and
attempted to justify Russia's illegal annexation of occupied Crimea, Donbas, and "Novorossiya" — an
invented region in Ukraine which the Kremlin has claimed includes all of eastern and southern Ukraine and
is an "integral" part of Russia. Medvedev also claimed that the current Ukrainian government does not
speak for the Ukrainian people. Medvedev's and Patrushev’s statements reference the longstanding Kremlin
demand for regime change in Ukraine with the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government that could
struggle to oppose or even support the Kremlin's goal to occupy more territory in Ukraine at a later time
of the Kremlin's choosing.
Russian officials are setting conditions to baselessly accuse
Ukraine of violating Russia's unilateral May 8 to 11 ceasefire, as the Kremlin has done during previous
ceasefires, while rejecting Ukraine's proposal for a 30-day ceasefire. Lavrov claimed on April 29 that
the May 8 to 11 ceasefire will be the "beginning of direct negotiations, without preconditions," but
stated that Russia considers the US- and Ukrainian-proposed 30-day ceasefire to be a "precondition."
Lavrov reiterated Putin's rejection of the US- and Ukrainian-proposed longer-term ceasefires, claiming
that Russia cannot accept any longer-term ceasefire since such ceasefires require extensive monitoring
measures. Lavrov stated that Russia does not think "honest" monitoring is possible during a 30-day
ceasefire in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 29 that the Ukrainian
government does not have full control over all Ukrainian military units and will be unable to guarantee
that Ukrainian forces adhere to the May 8 to 11 ceasefire. Putin similarly declared a unilateral Easter
ceasefire in mid-April 2025, and Russia has consistently accused Ukraine of violating previous ceasefires
while rarely offering evidence supporting these accusations. Ukraine — unlike Russia — supports US
President Donald Trump's proposals for a 30-day temporary ceasefire or more permanent ceasefires. ISW
continues to assess that the Kremlin is leveraging unilateral ceasefires to achieve informational and
battlefield advantages in Ukraine and to maintain the illusion that Russia is interested in meaningful
peace negotiations.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry
Medvedev stated on April 29 that Russia's war in Ukraine must end in Russian "victory" and the
"destruction" of the current Ukrainian government. Senior Kremlin officials continue to signal that
Russia has greater territorial ambitions than just the occupied areas of Ukraine, particularly in areas
bordering the Black Sea.
• Senior Russian officials reiterated the longstanding, false Russian
narrative that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, likely in order to set conditions to manipulate
ceasefire negotiations and renege on any future Russian-Ukrainian agreements at a time of Russia's
choosing.
• Russian officials are setting conditions to baselessly accuse Ukraine of violating
Russia's unilateral May 8 to 11 ceasefire, as the Kremlin has done during previous ceasefires, while
rejecting Ukraine's proposal for a 30-day ceasefire.
• Kremlin officials within Putin's inner
circle continue to threaten NATO as Putin himself refrains from doing so — likely as part of Kremlin
efforts to justify future Russian aggression against NATO to the Russian population.
• Putin
promoted his previously proposed Eurasian security architecture on April 29 as part of Russian efforts to
create an alternative Russian-led bloc that furthers Putin's goals of destroying NATO and weakening the
West and its allies.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces
recently advanced in Belgorod and Sumy oblasts and near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
The United States and Ukraine signed a bilateral economic partnership agreement on April 30. The US
Department of the Treasury announced the agreement, which created the United States-Ukraine
Reconstruction Investment Fund that aims to accelerate Ukraine's economic recovery. The precise terms of
the agreement are unspecified as of this publication. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent reiterated that
the United States remains committed to peace and prosperity in a free Ukraine and noted that "no state or
person who financed or supplied the Russian war machine" will be allowed to benefit from Ukraine's
reconstruction. Bessent also stated that the agreement signals to Russia that the Trump administration is
“committed to a peace process centered on a free, sovereign, and prosperous Ukraine over the long term.”
The BBC Russian Service reported that the agreement includes language that future US military aid to
Ukraine could be labeled as US “investment” in Ukraine, though these details remain unconfirmed as of
this report.
Key Takeaways:
• The United States and Ukraine signed a bilateral
economic partnership agreement on April 30.
• Russian officials continue to demand full
Ukrainian capitulation as the sole basis on which Russia is willing to accept a future peace
agreement.
• Peskov overinflated Russia's current military strength and battlefield victories
thus far in the war in an attempt to justify Russia's continued unwillingness to make territorial
concessions.
• Russian officials continue to call for the cessation of Western aid to Ukraine
as part of efforts to reintensify offensive operations when Ukraine's defense capabilities are
weakened.
• Senior Russian officials continue claim that Russia is open to diplomacy to end
the war while rejecting US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals that would allow for formal peace
negotiations to begin.
• Russian officials continue to falsely portray European efforts to
increase their own defense capabilities – in line with US President Donald Trump's objective to have
Europe shoulder more of the burden for collective security - as a threat to Russian national security,
likely to support Russian efforts to justify future Russian aggression against NATO.
• North
Korea and Russia continue to enhance bilateral cooperation, particularly in the military and labor
spheres.
• Ukrainian sources continue to report on cases of Russian commanders ordering their
subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of international law.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced
near Lyman and Toretsk.
The United States and Ukraine published additional information about their April 30 bilateral economic
partnership agreement.The Trump administration and the Ukrainian government published the joint text of
the US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund on May 1 and reported that the agreement is a "fully
collaborative partnership" that will fund Ukraine's long-term reconstruction and modernization. The
agreement establishes a joint fund that the United States and Ukraine will equally pay into to fund
development, infrastructure, and natural resource extraction projects in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials
noted that Ukraine will retain full control over "subsoil, infrastructure, and natural resources" and the
right to determine the terms of use for Ukraine's natural resources. Ukrainian officials stated that
United States can make monetary contributions or supply additional military assistance to Ukraine as part
of the fund, and that Ukraine will allocate 50 percent of its state budget revenues from rent payments,
license fees, and other revenue from national resource extraction projects to the fund. The Ukrainian
Verkhovna Rada must ratify the agreement, and it appears that the United States and Ukraine will also
have to sign a series of more technical agreements that will define the terms of the investments and
projects in the future.
The Trump administration noted that the agreement signals US
commitment to "Ukraine's long-term success" and noted that the United States and Ukraine will not allow
any person, company, or state that supplied the Russian war effort to benefit from the reconstruction of
Ukraine. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also noted during an interview on Fox News on May 1 that the
agreement is a "strong signal" to Russian officials that there "is no daylight" between the United States
and Ukraine. Ukraine's participation in this agreement underscores Ukraine's continued willingness to
make compromises in pursuit of a long-term, sustainable resolution of the war in Ukraine despite
consistent Russian disinterest in US and Ukrainian peace proposals.
Key Takeaways:
• The United States and Ukraine published additional information about their April 30 bilateral
economic partnership agreement.
• US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg recently
reaffirmed that Ukrainian officials remain committed to resolving the war in Ukraine, despite ongoing
Russian refusals to accept US President Donald Trump’s repeated proposals for a general ceasefire in
pursuit of lasting peace in Ukraine.
• Russia continues to reject US and European proposals to
deploy Western peacekeeping forces to Ukraine and calls for Russia to make territorial concessions in
pursuit of a lasting peace in Ukraine, signaling the Kremlin's unyielding negotiating position.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
Russian gains along the frontline have slowed over the last four months, but Russia continues to tolerate
personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified
advances between September and December 2024. ISW assesses that Russian forces gained a total of 1,627
square kilometers in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast in January, February, March, and April 2025, and daily
Russian casualty reports from the Ukrainian General Staff indicate that Russian forces suffered 160,600
casualties during the last four months for an average of 99 casualties for every square kilometer taken
over the last four months. ISW assesses that Russian forces seized an estimated 496 square kilometers in
January 2025; an estimated 313 square kilometers in February 2025; an estimated 601 square kilometers in
March 2025; and an estimated 217 square kilometers in April 2025. Ukrainian General Staff reports
indicate that Russian forces lost an estimated 48,060 casualties in January 2025, 35,300 casualties in
February 2025, 40,670 casualties in March 2025, and 36,570 casualties in April 2025. Russian advances
significantly increased in March 2025 due to the elimination of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast,
coinciding with the temporary cessation of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine, although Russian
advances on average decreased between January, February, and April 2025. Russian gains have also slowed
as Russian forces come up against more well-defended Ukrainian positions in and around larger towns such
as Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk over the last four months.
Russian forces are
currently sustaining a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained than in Fall 2024. Russian forces
gained an estimated 2,949 square kilometers at the cost of 174,935 casualties between September and
December 2024 — an average of 59 casualties per square kilometer taken. Russian casualty rates
consistently increased throughout September, October, November, and December 2024 and peaked at an
estimated 49,135 total monthly casualties in December 2024. Monthly Russian rates of advance plateaued at
839 square kilometers in November 2024, however, and began to slow in December 2024 to an assessed 593
square kilometers and have continued to slow in 2025 (with the exception of the elimination of the Kursk
salient). Russian gains have been 45 percent slower between January and April 2025 than in the period
between September and December 2024, although Russian casualty rates have only decreased by 10 percent in
that interval. The Russian military command thus appears to be tolerating similar personnel loss rates
despite a significant decrease in the rate of territorial gains.
Russia has thus far sustained
these casualties and the current tempo of offensive operations by rapidly deploying low-quality troops to
frontline units, although the reliance on such troops is also hindering Russia's ability to conduct
complex operations and make rapid advances in Ukraine. ISW has not observed a notable decrease in the
tempo of Russian offensive operations along the frontline in recent months, despite the slowing rates of
advance, suggesting that Russia is generating enough forces to sustain these casualties without having to
deprioritize any frontline area. ISW has repeatedly observed reports that new Russian recruits only
receive a month of training before deploying to Ukraine, and this limited training is likely constraining
recruits' combat capabilities and the Russian military's overall capacity to successfully conduct complex
operations. The Russian military command is currently prioritizing funneling poorly trained recruits into
highly attritional infantry assaults to offset personnel losses in Ukraine while sustaining the current
tempo of operations, possibly at the expense of Russia's long-term warfighting capabilities. The Russian
military does not have a reserve pool of well-trained troops who are not currently engaged in combat in
Ukraine and can rapidly deploy along the frontline, and the Russian military command's decision to funnel
poorly trained troops to the frontline in Ukraine is undermining Russia's ability to create a pool of
such forces.
Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to maintaining the tempo of
offensive operations despite diminishing returns underscores Putin's ongoing efforts to leverage further
battlefield gains to generate pressure on Ukraine in ceasefire and peace negotiations or otherwise to
force Ukraine's collapse. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to prolong negotiations
to extract additional concessions from the United States and Ukraine and make additional battlefield
gains. Russian forces intensified offensive operations throughout the frontline in February and March
2025, including a limited offensive operation into northern Sumy Oblast, as part of an ongoing Russian
effort to slowly degrade frontline Ukrainian positions and make opportunistic tactical advances. Putin
may intend to leverage any gains over the last four months and in the near future to extract further
Ukrainian and Western concessions during future peace negotiations. It remains unclear if Russia will
maintain sufficient force generation rates to sustain offensive operations in Ukraine indefinitely,
however, due to the rising economic cost of social benefits and one-time payments for Russian
servicemembers. ISW previously noted that Russia's ongoing and forecasted economic struggles are closely
tied to Russian losses on the battlefield and that it is not possible for the United States or the wider
West to exert maximum pressure on Russia with economic tools alone. The United States can better leverage
Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger negotiating position and more durable resolution to the
war in Ukraine by forcing Putin to rethink his negotiation and battlefield strategies and empowering
Ukrainian forces to continue inflicting significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian gains along the frontline have slowed over the last four months,
but Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces
sustained during a period of intensified advances between September and December 2024.
• Russian forces are currently sustaining a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained than in
Fall 2024.
• Russia has thus far sustained these casualties and the current tempo of offensive
operations by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units, although the reliance on such
troops is also hindering Russia's ability to conduct complex operations and make rapid advances in
Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to maintaining the tempo of offensive
operations despite diminishing returns underscores Putin's ongoing efforts to leverage further
battlefield gains to generate pressure on Ukraine in ceasefire and peace negotiations or otherwise to
force Ukraine's collapse.
• Western intelligence reportedly suggests that Putin may begin
prioritizing short-term goals such as consolidating Russia's gains in Ukraine and Russia's immediate
economic viability over seizing more territory, but Putin's demonstrated commitment to maintaining the
tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine despite continuing high casualty rates is a
counter-indicator to this reported assessment.
• A future slowing of Russian offensive
operations and/or transition to defensive operations in all or part of the theater would be indicators
that Putin is shifting his short-term goals from seizing more territory to consolidating previously held
territory.
• ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed
to his long-term military objectives of seizing all of Ukraine and undermining NATO.
• Statements by US officials suggest that the Trump administration is considering stepping back from
intensified mediation efforts to end the war in Ukraine.
• The US Department of State
submitted a proposed license for defense exports to Ukraine to the US Congress on April 29.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky denied that Ukraine would concede to the vague terms of Russian
President Vladimir Putin's unilateral May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire proposal. Zelensky referred to
Putin's May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire demand as a "theatrical production" that does not appear to be
serious and is designed to create a sense of comfort and safety for participants of Russia's Victory Day
celebration. Zelensky once again articulated Ukraine's willingness to extend a short-term ceasefire to 30
days and stated that an effective ceasefire requires high-quality monitoring mechanisms. Ukrainian Center
for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that any joint ceasefire should be
comprehensive and last for at least 30 days with the possibility for renewal. Kovalenko noted that
shorter ceasefires with vague terms and a lack of monitoring mechanisms afford Russian forces the
opportunity to seize on tactical pauses to better prepare ahead of a future summer offensive in Ukraine.
Victory Day is Russia's principal patriotic holiday that commemorates the Soviet Union's contributions to
victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War (known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War), and
Russia celebrates Victory Day on May 9. Putin first announced on April 28 Russia's intention to implement
a Victory Day ceasefire between midnight on the night of May 7 to 8 and midnight on the night of May 10
to 11. Putin's decision to unilaterally impose a fleeting ceasefire during Russia's Victory Day
celebration is a deliberate attempt to project a sense of power and control in Russia to both domestic
and international audiences. Putin likely also seeks to avoid the embarrassment of Ukrainian strikes
during these celebrations by imposing such an agreement.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov
claimed that the purpose of Russia's unilateral Easter and Victory Day ceasefires is to "test" Ukraine's
readiness to pursue paths towards a sustainable peace. Peskov claimed that Russia will wait for "final,"
unambiguous statements from Ukraine and will look for Ukrainian actions aimed at de-escalating the war
during the holiday. Ukraine and the United States have previously proposed a 30-day general ceasefire to
Russia, but Russian officials continue to ignore or outright reject these general ceasefire proposals.
Ukraine has also repeatedly called for longer ceasefires so as to pave the way for negotiations toward a
durable peace settlement — which is in line with US President Donald Trump's efforts to leverage a
ceasefire as the foundation for a lasting peace agreement in Ukraine. Russia is very likely to continue
its pattern of leveraging short-term ceasefires to flood the information space with unsubstantiated
claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations in an effort to discredit Ukraine and to create tactical or
operational pauses to conduct troop rotations, resupply units, and prepare for future offensive
operations, as evidenced by the Easter and long-range energy infrastructure strikes ceasefires. Russia's
continued rejection of Ukrainian and US ceasefire proposals of any reasonable length with necessary
monitoring mechanisms showcases Russia's disinterest in peace in Ukraine in the near term.
The
Trump administration appears to have finalized its first military equipment sale to Ukraine. The US
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced on May 2 that the US State Department approved and
notified the US Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) of equipment and maintenance services
for Ukraine’s F-16s worth an estimated $310.5 million. The DSCA reported that the sale will include
aircraft modifications and upgrades; personnel training related to operation, maintenance, and
sustainment support; spare parts, consumables, and accessories; repair and return support; ground
handling equipment; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and
unclassified publications and technical documents; studies and surveys; and US Government and contractor
engineering, technical, and logistics support services.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky denied that Ukraine would concede to the vague terms of Russian President
Vladimir Putin's unilateral May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire proposal.
• The Trump
administration appears to have finalized its first military equipment sale to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached
to a naval drone for the first time on May 3.
• Senior Kremlin officials continue to set
informational conditions that could support military operations against Lithuania (and other NATO states)
by advancing narratives that deny the sovereignty of Lithuania and other former Soviet states.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Novopavlivka, Kurakhove, and Velyka
Novosilka.
Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated that Russia maintains the initial objectives of its war in
Ukraine, which are tantamount to Ukraine's surrender, despite ongoing negotiations with the United
States. Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin published a documentary on Russian state TV channel Rossiya 1
about Putin on May 4, in which Putin claimed that Russia has enough manpower and materiel to bring the
war in Ukraine to its "logical conclusion with the result that Russia needs." Putin also claimed that
Russian reconciliation with the Ukrainian part of the Russian people is "inevitable." Putin has
repeatedly claimed that the Ukrainian people are simply a subset of Russians rather than a distinctly
separate nation to justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the occupation of Ukrainian territory and
people.Russian state media notably highlighted that Putin has previously made the false claim that
Russians and Ukrainians are one people. Putin’s statements indicate that Russia continues to assess that
it can achieve its original objectives of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which include
demilitarizing Ukraine, installing a pro-Russian government in Ukraine, forcing Ukraine to abandon its
aspirations to join NATO and other security blocs, and forcing Ukraine to make massive territorial
concessions to Russia, including parts of Ukraine that Russia does not currently occupy. These demands
amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation. Russia will likely continue efforts to achieve these goals through
military and diplomatic means, as Russian officials continue attempts to leverage battlefield gains to
strengthen their negotiating position.
Putin highlighted domestic support for the war and
promoted the ideal of sacrifice on the frontline and the home front, likely in an effort to prepare
Russian society for a longer war in Ukraine and potential future confrontations with the West. Putin told
Zarubin that Russian society reacted positively to the invasion of Ukraine and that each citizen realized
that "he is the state" and Russia's survival depends on each individual. Putin stated that Russia is a
country of "moral and ethical values" and that the basis of the Russian conscience is "the family, the
state, and the future of Russia." Putin is notably attempting to frame the Russian public's support for
the war through shared values despite the Kremlin's reliance on financial incentives to recruit the
majority of its military personnel and to maintain its war effort. Putin accused the West once again of
"deceiving" Russia following the 2015 Minsk agreements, likely in an effort to convince the Russian
domestic audience that Russia cannot negotiate with the West and needs to continue the war.
Putin's statements throughout the documentary indicate that Putin likely does not intend to slow
offensive operations or transition to defensive operations in Ukraine and instead is attempting to
ideologically prepare domestic Russian society for a long war. ISW has previously assessed that Russian
officials are setting conditions to maintain a long war and to justify future aggression against Ukraine
and NATO.Russian officials have also consistently intensified efforts to militarize Russian society since
the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, further indicating that Russia is preparing for a
protracted conflict. Russian officials are engaged in long-term efforts to consolidate control over
Russia’s veteran civil society and elevate a cadre of loyal veterans to positions in Russia's regional
and federal government. Putin officially declared 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland,"
following the launch of myriad militaristic initiatives in 2023 and 2024 to provide veterans with social
and financial support and reinforce the Russian state narrative that veterans are the new "elite" class
Russia is also investing heavily in military-patriotic education for Russia’s youth, demonstrating the
Kremlin's interest in creating a new generation of militarized, loyal citizens in the medium to long
term
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo
Budanov provided new details on May 4 about the report that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian
fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone on May 2. Budanov
reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two Russian Su-30 fighter jets over the Black Sea with AIM-9
Sidewinder missiles fired from Magura-7 naval drones.
Key Takeaways:
Russian
President Vladimir Putin indicated that Russia maintains its initial objectives of its war in Ukraine,
which are tantamount to Ukraine's surrender, despite ongoing negotiations with the United States. Putin highlighted domestic support for the war and promoted the ideal of sacrifice on the frontline and
the home front, likely in an effort to prepare Russian society for a longer war in Ukraine and potential
future confrontations with the West. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head
Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov provided new details on May 4 about the report that Ukrainian forces
shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone on
May 2. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near
Kupyansk and Toretsk.
Russian sources claimed on May 5 that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of limited attacks across the
Russia-Ukraine international border near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast. Russian sources claimed on May 5 that
Ukrainian forces attacked across the Russia-Ukraine international border near Tetkino and Popova-Lezhachi
(far west of Sudzha and southwest of Glushkovo) and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino) on the evening of May 4
and morning of May 5. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces used mine clearing equipment to
create a path through Russian minefields along the border, but that Ukrainian forces have not made
significant advances in the area thus far. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces
engaged in a small arms clash near the Tetkino Railway Station in southern Tetkino and that Ukrainian
forces later withdrew back into Sumy Oblast. A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces have not
seized Tetkino or broken through Russia's defenses near Novyi Put. Russian sources claimed that elements
of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, likely referring to the 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment,
other Russian military personnel, and Russian border guards are defending against the Ukrainian
attacks.
The Russian military command reportedly recently redeployed elements of the 68th Army
Corps and 58th Combined Arms Army to the Toretsk direction from the Kurakhove and western Zaporizhia
directions. Geolocated footage published on May 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in
eastern and southern Myrne (southwest of Toretsk) during a platoon-sized mechanized assault. A Russian
milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps ,
Eastern Military District ) participated in the advance and were attacking in the direction of
Malynivka (just west of Myrne). ISW first observed reports that elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle
Brigade redeployed to the Toretsk direction in late March 2025 after operating in the Vuhledar and
Kurakhove directions. Elements of the brigade may be currently deployed across several sectors of the
front. A Russian milblogger claimed on May 4 that elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division
(58th Combined Arms Army , Southern Military District ) are attacking in Stara Mykolaivka and
Oleksandropil and conducting clearing operations near Kalynove (all southwest of Toretsk). Elements of
the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division have been operating in the Zaporizhia direction since at least Summer
2023 during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area. ISW observed reports that elements of the
division were operating in the Zaporizhia direction as of May 4, and the division is likely currently
split between the Zaporizhia and Toretsk directions. The Russian military command previously reinforced
offensive operations southwest of Toretsk with elements of the 150th and 20th motorized rifle divisions
(both part of the 8th CAA, SMD) in early 2025, and the repeated reinforcing of this effort from three
different sectors of the frontline indicates that the Russian military command views this as a priority
frontline sector.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian sources claimed on May 5 that
Ukrainian forces conducted a series of limited attacks across the Russia-Ukraine international border
near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast.
• The Russian military command reportedly recently redeployed
elements of the 68th Army Corps and 58th Combined Arms Army to the Toretsk direction from the Kurakhove
and western Zaporizhia directions.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Czech
President Petr Pavel announced on May 4 that Czechia will work with Ukraine to establish a school to
train Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighter jets outside of Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently
advanced near Vovchansk, Siversk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks across the international border near Tetkino and Novyi Put,
Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed on May 6 that Russian forces repelled the Ukrainian attacks
near Novyi Put and Volfino (southwest of Glushkovo) and that fighting continued near the railway station
in southern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo). Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces
seized up to two streets in southwestern Tetkino, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.
Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 217th VDV Regiment
(98th VDV Division), and 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are defending near Tetkino.
Ukrainian forces also continued drone, air, and artillery strikes aimed at isolating Russian units in
and near Tetkino. Geolocated footage published on May 6 shows Ukrainian forces conducting a Joint Direct
Attack Munition (JDAM) guided munition strike on a Russian position in southwestern Tetkino, indicating
that Russian forces maintain positions near the Tetkino Railway Station. Russian milbloggers continued to
claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting drone and artillery strikes against Russian ground lines of
communication (GLOCs) to isolate Russian units near Tetkino. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian
drones have interdicted and maintained fire control over an unspecified section of the 38K-040
Tetkino-Karyzh highway. Russian milbloggers claimed on May 5 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a bridge
over the Seim River between Zvannoye (northwest of Glushkovo) and Tetkino.
Ukraine and Russia
conducted a 205-for-205 prisoner of war (POW) exchange on May 6. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky
reported on May 6 that Ukrainian authorities returned 205 Ukrainian POWs, comprising members of almost
all branches of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Zelensky thanked the United Arab Emirates for mediating the
POW exchange with Russia. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also reported on May 6 that Russia and
Ukraine conducted a 205-for-205 POW exchange.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces
continued limited attacks across the international border near Tetkino and Novyi Put, Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces also continued drone, air, and artillery strikes aimed at isolating Russian
units in and near Tetkino.
• Kremlin officials are continuing to leverage the mythos of the
Soviet Union's role in the Second World War to form the basis of a new state ideology that will span
generations and that Russia intends to leverage to justify a future military conflict against the
West.
• The Kremlin appears to be consolidating around an informal state ideology predicated
on perpetuating the belief that the West is determined to encircle and defeat Russia.
• Russian officials also appear to be leveraging the story of the Second World War (referred to as the
Great Patriotic War in Russia) to dismiss Russia's early failures in the war in Ukraine and present the
false image that Russian victory in Ukraine is as inevitable as the Soviet triumph over Germany became at
the end of World War II.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov expressed his desire to resign
from his post but acknowledged that only Russian President Vladimir Putin can approve this request.
Kadyrov has helped stabilize interethnic tensions in the North Caucasus, and leaving his post without a
suitable successor could threaten the stability of Putin's regime.
• It remains unclear who
might succeed Kadyrov in the event of his resignation or death.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted
a 205-for-205 prisoner of war (POW) exchange on May 6.
• Russian forces advanced near
Kupyansk, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.
US officials acknowledged Russia's continued intransigence toward any ceasefire agreement in Ukraine
while reiterating that Ukraine remains committed to US President Donald Trump's proposed comprehensive
30-day ceasefire. US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg stated on May 6 that Russian
President Vladimir Putin's refusal to agree to a 30-day ceasefire is the main impediment to establishing
peace in Ukraine and that Russia will be hurt if the parties do not agree to a comprehensive ceasefire,
as "Russia is not winning the war." Kellogg noted Russia's failure to secure positions on the west
(right) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast, its inability to reach Kyiv and Odesa cities, and
Russian forces' high attrition rates — all in line with ISW's assessment that Russia's battlefield
situation has deteriorated since 2022. US Vice President JD Vance stated on May 7 that Russia is "asking
for a certain set of requirements" and "concessions in order to end the conflict," but that the United
States thinks that Russia is "asking for too much."
Kellogg reiterated that Ukraine has agreed
to a renewable comprehensive sea, air, and land ceasefire for a minimum of 30 days and that Ukraine is
willing to immediately sign the agreement. Kellogg stated that Ukraine is prepared to accept a "ceasefire
in place" that will require both Russia and Ukraine to withdraw 15 kilometers from the current frontline
in order to establish a 30-kilometer demilitarized zone that could fall under an unspecified monitoring
mechanism. Kellogg stated that members of the UK- and French-led Coalition of the Willing are willing to
deploy a "ceasefire force" west of the Dnipro River that will patrol and reinforce the comprehensive
ceasefire. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Kellogg's statement on May 7, claiming that
Russia has not received any Ukrainian proposals to establish a demilitarized zone.
Russia is
likely attempting to prolong and delay discussions about a comprehensive ceasefire to obfuscate its
continued rejection of the United States' ceasefire proposals. ISW continues to assess that Russia likely
remains opposed to any sort of enforcement or monitoring mechanisms, as Russia would likely weaponize the
absence of such mechanisms to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian
ceasefire violations, as it has done before. The Kremlin has also repeatedly outright rejected the
prospect of European peacekeepers in Ukraine, claiming that such deployments would be unacceptable for
Russia. Russia remains committed to its long-standing effort to prolong peace negotiations in order to
make battlefield gains and attempt to secure additional concessions from the United States.
Ukrainian forces likely recently advanced across the international border into southern Tetkino, Kursk
Oblast, amid continued limited Ukrainian attacks in the area. Geolocated footage published on May 6 shows
Russian forces conducting an airstrike against a building in southern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo),
indicating that Ukrainian forces likely seized positions in Tetkino. Russian milbloggers claimed on May 6
that Ukrainian forces seized up to two streets in southern Tetkino and continued to claim on May 7 that
Ukrainian forces maintain positions within the settlement. Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces, including elements of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), pushed Ukrainian
forces out of Tetkino, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled limited
Ukrainian mechanized assaults against Tetkino and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino along the international
border) on May 7 and that Ukrainian forces continue efforts to use mine-clearing equipment to create
paths through Russian minefields in the area. One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Novyi
Put, but other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults in the area. ISW has
not observed geolocated footage indicating that Ukrainian forces have entered Novyi Put. Elements of the
Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Tetkino.
Key Takeaways:
• US officials acknowledged Russia's continued intransigence toward any ceasefire agreement in Ukraine
while reiterating that Ukraine remains committed to US President Donald Trump's proposed comprehensive
30-day ceasefire.
• Ukrainian forces likely recently advanced across the international border
into southern Tetkino, Kursk Oblast, amid continued limited Ukrainian attacks in the area.
• Ukrainian forces conducted long-range drone strikes against defense industrial facilities and
airbases in Russia overnight on May 6 and 7.
• Russian authorities will likely test their
ability to completely disconnect large areas of Russia from the internet on May 9 under the guise of
protecting Russian Victory Day celebrations.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Venezuelan
President Nicolás Maduro signed the Russia-Venezuela Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement on
May 7.
• Ukrainian and European officials continue to report on Russian executions of
Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of international law and Russia's use of chemical weapons
in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared to reject Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s recent
request to resign from his post.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Chasiv
Yar, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.
The Kremlin continues to seize on the Russian mythos of the Second World War ahead of Russia's May 9
Victory Day holiday to set informational conditions to justify a prolonged war in Ukraine and future
aggression against NATO to Russian society. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov published an article
on May 8 in which he argued that Russia's war in Ukraine will go down in history as a feat of courage and
significance equal to the victory of the Soviet military and people during the Second World War. Belousov
claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine is a continuation of the "glorious traditions" of Soviet bravery and
heroism and of the Soviet people's enthusiasm for enlisting and otherwise supporting the war effort.
Belousov claimed that Russia's victory in Ukraine is "inevitable." Belousov said that domestic unity is a
necessity for Russia's victory in Ukraine just as the Soviet Union's "moral and spiritual unity" was a
critical factor for its victory in the Second World War. Russian state media highlighted Belousov's
statements comparing the Second World War to Russia's war in Ukraine in their coverage of his 10-page
essay, indicating that the Kremlin is trying to message to the domestic audience that Russia will achieve
its goals in its war in Ukraine as long as Russian society remains unified and supportive. Kremlin
officials have recently seized on the mythos of the Second World War to form the basis of a new
pseudo-state ideology that will span across generations and that the Kremlin intends to use to justify
potential future aggression against the West.
Belousov reiterated the Kremlin's oft-repeated
fallacious narrative that Russia had no choice but to launch its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in
February 2022 because the situation was "life or death." Belousov claimed that Ukraine is a conduit for
the collective West's "crusade" against Russia, which Belousov claimed is a manifestation of "eternal
Russophobia" and intended to eradicate Russian statehood. Belousov quoted Russian President Vladimir
Putin's speech from February 24, 2022, announcing the full-scale invasion. Belousov amplified Putin's
accusations that the United States and its Western allies had a policy of "containment" against Russia
and created a situation in which Russia had to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine to defend
Russia's interests. The Kremlin is attempting to link Putin's anti-Western claims to the mythos of the
Second World War in order to heighten the existential threat against Russia that the Kremlin claims
Russia is currently facing. It is also reconstructing the Soviet-era narrative that the West is
conspiring to destroy Russia (in place of the Soviet Union) and that the conflict will be unending.
Belousov explicitly identified large-scale Russian military reforms as preparations for a future
conflict with NATO as Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev threatened European countries
that support Ukraine. Belousov stated in his May 8 essay that Russia has reformed and augmented its
military specifically in response to NATO expansion and military build-up (undertaken only well after the
Russian 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine), including by reorganizing Russia's Western Military
District (WMD) into the Moscow and Leningrad military districts (MMD and LMD); re-opening two former
military academies and establishing a new third military academy; and fully forming, staffing, and
equipping two combined arms armies, a river flotilla, a mixed aviation corps, and 50 other formations and
units. ISW has long assessed that Russian military restructuring efforts, including reforms of the LMD
and MMD, are part of future preparations for war against NATO.
Medvedev threatened that
European countries must "remember" the "crushing defeat of Nazi Germany" when supporting Ukraine.
Medvedev notably made his threat on his English-language X account, indicating that Medvedev intended
this threat for international audiences. Other senior Russian officials have also intensified accusations
against European states for supporting "Naziism" in recent days. Medvedev's threat and Russian claims of
European "Nazism" are part of the Kremlin's ongoing reflexive control campaign that aims to push European
countries into refraining from providing further assistance to Ukraine. Kremlin officials have also
recently framed European efforts to shoulder more of their own defense requirements (in line with US
President Donald Trump's efforts) as threatening to Russia, and the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign
likely also aims to prevent European states from building up their defenses. Dutch Military Intelligence
and Security Service Head Vice Admiral Peter Reesink warned in an interview with Politico published on
May 8 that Russia's most threatening behavior is its military buildup and moving military assets towards
Russia's borders with Finland and the Baltic states. Reesink stated that Russia appears to be producing
more artillery than the Russian military needs for its war in Ukraine when taking account of the
assistance Russia is receiving from its allies. Reuters published an investigation on May 8 revealing
that Russia has been constructing a significant new production line for explosives at the Biysk Oleum
Plant in Siberia that is planned to produce 6,000 metric tons of explosives annually. Reuters noted that
this would be enough explosive to manufacture 1.28 million 152mm artillery rounds and that Russia
produced nearly two million 122mm and 152mm artillery rounds in 2024, suggesting that this new production
line could expand Russia's artillery shell production capacity by over 50 percent when completed.
Key Takeaways:
• The Kremlin continues to seize on the Russian mythos of the Second
World War ahead of Russia's May 9 Victory Day holiday to set informational conditions to justify a
prolonged war in Ukraine and future aggression against NATO to Russian society.
• Belousov
explicitly identified large-scale Russian military reforms as preparations for a future conflict with
NATO as Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev threatened European countries that support
Ukraine.
• Russia claimed to have implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8
and accused Ukraine of ceasefire violations even though Ukraine did not officially and publicly agree to
Russia's ceasefire. Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire and accusations of violations continue to
demonstrate the necessity that any ceasefire or peace agreement be formally agreed to in advance by all
parties and include robust monitoring mechanisms.
• Ukrainian officials continue to highlight
Ukraine's willingness to implement US President Donald Trump's desired 30-day ceasefire to precede peace
talks.
• The Kremlin is attempting to exploit its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire to blame
Ukraine for the lack of progress toward a longer-term ceasefire and peace negotiations despite Russia's
continued rejection of such a longer-term ceasefire.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and
People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping conducted a series of bilateral engagements in
Moscow on May 8, showcasing deeper Russian–Chinese cooperation and alignment.
• The joint
Russian–Chinese statement on May 8 referenced Putin's original aims in launching his full-scale invasion
of Ukraine in an attempt to lend international support and legitimacy to Russia's goals and attempted
justifications for the war.
• The joint Russian–Chinese statement supported Putin's proposed
Eurasian security architecture and Russia's ongoing efforts to create a Russia-dominated alternative,
anti-Western bloc.
• The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine’s (UN
HRMMU) reported that Ukrainian civilian casualties have significantly increased between 2024 and 2025.
• The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada ratified the US-Ukrainian bilateral economic partnership agreement
on May 8.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk. Russian
forces recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts and near Kupyansk, Borova, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and
Velyka Novosilka.
Ukrainian resistance with Western support has prevented Russian forces from seizing any of their
self-identified objectives in Ukraine over the past year, depriving Russian President Vladimir Putin of
significant battlefield successes to celebrate on Victory Day. Putin did not discuss the battlefield
situation in Ukraine during Russia’s Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on May 8 and 9 but claimed that
all of Russia supports Russian servicemembers fighting in Ukraine. Russian forces have not seized any
significant towns in Ukraine since the seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024, and the only mid-sized
settlement that Russian forces have seized in Ukraine since December 2024 is Velyka Novosilka (pre-war
population of 5,000). Ukrainian sources previously reported that Russian forces were trying to seize
Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and the remaining area of Luhansk Oblast and advance into Dnipropetrovsk
Oblast by Victory Day on May 9. Russian forces did not accomplish any of those objectives, and have in
fact been trying to seize Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk for roughly a year.
Ukrainian
long-range strikes and improved integration of tactical drone operations with defensive operations and
counterattacks — all enabled by Western military support — have slowed, and in some places stalled,
Russian offensive operations in Ukraine. Ukraine’s successful integration of Ukrainian drone innovators
and operators with ground forces appears to have stalled Russia’s offensive against Pokrovsk and Toretsk
in 2024 and early 2025. Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian ammunition depots, defense industry
facilities, and oil and gas infrastructure have at times compromised Russia’s ability to supply frontline
units and have compounded the rising costs of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Ukrainian forces have also
intentionally exacerbated other Russian vulnerabilities over the last year, including exacerbating
Russia’s shortage of operational reserves by launching the incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 and
forcing the Russian military to redeploy troops from other frontline areas to defend against the
incursion.
The only recent military operation that Putin featured on Victory Day was the
repulsion of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. Putin thanked and highlighted North Korean troops
at the Victory Day parade on May 9, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov noted that high-ranking North
Korean commanders who participated in recapturing Kursk Oblast attended the parade. Russian Chief of the
General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov declared that Russian forces pushed all Ukrainian forces from
Kursk Oblast on April 26, after almost nine months of Russian operations to push Ukrainian forces from
Kursk Oblast. Russian officials have repeatedly platformed the recapture of Kursk Oblast as a significant
military achievement, and ISW previously forecasted that Russian officials would highlight the Kursk
operation as part of the Victory Day celebrations. Russian officials’ praise of the Kursk operation
ignores the fact that Putin reportedly initially tasked Russian forces with retaking Kursk Oblast by
mid-October 2024 and Putin’s continued willingness to extend this timeline throughout Fall 2024 and
Winter 2024-2025, prioritizing offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast over retaking Russian territory.
Russian officials are also ignoring recent Ukrainian attacks and advances into Tetkino, Kursk Oblast.
Key Takeaways:
• US President Donald Trump explicitly called for a longer-term
ceasefire in Ukraine that would precede peace negotiations — a sequence that Ukraine has consistently
supported and that Russia has consistently rejected.
• Ukrainian resistance with Western
support has prevented Russian forces from seizing any of their self-identified objectives in Ukraine over
the past year, depriving Russian President Vladimir Putin of significant battlefield successes to
celebrate on Victory Day.
• The only recent military operation that Putin featured on Victory
Day was the repulsion of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.
• Russian officials
highlighted technological adaptations and innovations that Russian forces have integrated in Ukraine over
the last three years during national and regional Victory Day celebrations.
• The Kremlin
seized on Russia’s May 9 Victory Day celebrations to posture itself as having broad international support
three years into its invasion of Ukraine and especially highlighted Russia’s growing partnerships with
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea.
• Putin used the Victory Day holiday to
promote the development of a civic Russian identity at odds with Russian ultranationalist efforts to
promote ethno-religious nationalism predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic
Russians.
• Delegations from 35 countries and the Council of Europe visited Lviv City on May 9
in celebration of Europe Day in Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s European allies continue to support the
Ukrainian military and defense industrial base (DIB).
• Russian forces recently advanced in
the Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions and in Zaporizhia Oblast, and
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.
The Kremlin is projecting the narrative of a powerful Russia and a powerful Russian President Vladimir
Putin to conceal the real weaknesses and limitations of Russia's capabilities and distract from Russia's
battlefield failures. Putin has long held that the perception of weakness can be lethal in a system built
on the premise of strength — a principle that applies to the stability of his regime as well as to
Russia's position in the world. The world should not take the Kremlin's displays at face value, but
should look past them to the realities of Russia and this war.
The Kremlin is trying to
portray the 80th Anniversary Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9 as a diplomatic success to present
Russia as a superpower and Putin as a respected world leader. The Kremlin boasted that senior leaders and
representatives of over 20 foreign countries are attending the parade. The Kremlin media particularly
celebrated the attendance of People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping, Slovak Prime Minister
Robert Fico, and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic. Kremlin media framed Fico's and Vucic's parade
attendance as an act of Slovak and Serbian resistance against the European Union's (EU) "orders" and
"threats." Some Kremlin outlets presented Xi's, Vuvic's, and Fico's attendance as direct support for
Putin.
The parade was hardly a diplomatic success, however, but was instead an attempt to
conceal Russia's international isolation, military failures, and domestic problems. The Kremlin only
convinced Russia’s known allies to attend the parade, while most world leaders refrained from traveling
to Moscow. The Kremlin's emphasis on Xi's attendance shows that Russia remains dependent on its
relationship with the PRC and that Putin needs great powers to validate his stature as well as to support
his war effort. Three years into its war against Ukraine, the Kremlin is unable to protect a parade in
Russia’s capital from a risk of drone strikes launched from Ukraine — a country over a thousand miles
away from Moscow that Russia thought it could conquer in a matter of days in 2022.
The Kremlin
hype of the "Victory Day" parades on May 9 is a part of the Kremlin’s long-standing effort to conceal and
distract from Putin’s and Russia's weaknesses. The Kremlin has been focused on concealing Putin's and
Russia's weaknesses since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 by portraying Putin as an
effective and caring wartime leader and downplaying Russian failures and Ukraine’s successes, while
exaggerating Russian successes.
The Kremlin’s information efforts have helped preserve the
regime and support in Russia for the war effort despite Russia's battlefield failings and the enormous
cost Putin has imposed on the Russian people. These efforts are not always effective, however, and
sometimes highlight the very weaknesses the Kremlin seeks to conceal.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected another US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal on May 10
amid continued Russian demands that any future ceasefire include conditions that support Russia's
long-term goal of gaining control of all of Ukraine and would allow Russia to resume offensive operations
from a more advantageous position at a time of its choosing. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky
announced following the Coalition of the Willing meeting in Kyiv on May 10 that he, European officials,
and US President Donald Trump are proposing a general ceasefire at least 30 days long beginning on May
12. Zelensky called on Russian officials to respond to the proposal and stated that Europe and the United
States should impose additional sanctions on Russia's energy and banking sectors if Russia fails to agree
to the ceasefire proposal. Peskov responded by claiming that Ukraine has not responded to Russian
President Vladimir Putin's previous ceasefire proposals and that pressuring Russia is "useless." Peskov
claimed during an interview with ABC News published on May 10 that Putin supported the idea of a
ceasefire but has "questions" about how a ceasefire will account for recent and possible future Russian
advances in Ukraine, Ukrainian mobilization, and Western military assistance to Ukraine. Peskov
reiterated Putin's previous demands for the West to stop all military aid to Ukraine and force Ukraine to
stop mobilizing and training servicemembers as a condition of a ceasefire. Putin criticized the initial
March 13 US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal and insinuated that any ceasefire agreement should limit
Ukraine's ability to mobilize and train new troops and receive military aid.
Putin, Peskov,
and other Russian officials have not yet offered any comparable concessions, such as stopping Russia's
own force generation and defense industrial efforts, as part of a ceasefire agreement. Russian officials
appear to be trying to define the conditions of any and all ceasefires in a way that facilitates further
Russian battlefield gains in the short term and supports Russia's ability to attack Ukraine again in the
future. Peskov also claimed that Ukraine is trying to leverage ceasefire proposals to "escape from
negotiations," questioning Trump's stated objective of using a general ceasefire as a building block to
precede peace negotiations.
The UK and French-led Coalition of the Willing expressed support
for the US-Ukrainian proposal of a general ceasefire of 30 days or more on May 10. Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky met with the Coalition of the Willing during a semi-virtual summit on May 10,
consisting of officials from Lithuania, Romania, Finland, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Denmark, Estonia,
Ireland, Italy, Canada, Latvia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Sweden,
Australia, Croatia, Iceland, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, the European Commission, and the European Council.
Zelensky welcomed French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, British Prime
Minister Keir Starmer, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk in Kyiv for the summit. The Coalition of the
Willing and NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte expressed support for the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal.
Macron stated that the coalition is working on a proposal to deploy a military contingent to Ukraine and
that the coalition will hold a series of meetings in the coming weeks. NBC News reported that Ukraine,
the United States, and European partners formulated a term sheet with a list of conditions for Russia to
consider. The document, according to an unspecified Western official, contains 22 proposals, including
the 30-day general ceasefire. Reuters reported on May 9 that a French diplomatic source stated that US
and European partners are finalizing the 30-day ceasefire proposal and new sanction packages if Russia
refuses the proposal.
Key Takeaways:
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected
another US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal on May 10 amid continued Russian demands that any future
ceasefire include conditions that support Russia's long-term goal of gaining control of all of Ukraine
and would allow Russia to resume offensive operations from a more advantageous position at a time of its
choosing.
• The UK and French-led Coalition of the Willing expressed support for the
US-Ukrainian proposal of a general ceasefire of 30 days or more on May 10.
• Iran will
reportedly deliver short-range ballistic missile launchers to Russia for use in Ukraine.
• The United States Embassy in Kyiv issued a statement on May 9 warning of a significant Russian air
strike against Ukraine over the next several days -- potentially involving Oreshnik medium-range
ballistic missiles.
• US and Western military support remains vital to Ukraine's ability to
defend itself against Russian aggression.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk
Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
Russian President Vladimir Putin called for Russia and Ukraine to resume bilateral negotiations based on
the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that include Russian demands amounting to full Ukrainian surrender. Any
agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document. Putin spoke to media organizations
on the night of May 10 to 11, following the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a general ceasefire
at least 30 days long beginning on May 12. Putin did not agree to the joint US-Ukrainian-European
proposal and instead proposed that Russia and Ukraine "resume" the direct negotiations that he claimed
" interrupted" in 2022 on May 15. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated that Russia
will soon announce its delegation to the resumed negotiations in Istanbul and that such negotiations
should account for "developments of the 2022 talks."
Putin and Ushakov are referring to
Russia's April 2022 Istanbul protocols draft agreement, which included terms that would have amounted to
Ukraine's surrender and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression. The
Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that both
publications obtained several versions of the draft protocols from the April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace
negotiations in Istanbul. The draft protocols demanded that Ukraine forego its NATO membership
aspirations and amend its constitution to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining
any military alliances, concluding military agreements, or hosting foreign military personnel, trainers,
or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia also demanded that it, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK),
the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus serve as security guarantors of the agreement.
Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible
with the permanent neutrality ," including military aid agreements. Russia demanded to limit
the Ukrainian military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul
protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers
(25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to
Ukraine without fear of strikes.
Russia insisted on these terms in the first and second months
of the war when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and throughout northeastern, eastern, and
southern Ukraine. Russia is now attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war,
despite the fact that Ukrainian forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern
Ukraine, liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the
Russian rate of advance across the theater. Putin is rejecting the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal
for a general ceasefire and instead continues to demand Ukrainian surrender in an attempt to secure his
strategic goals by drawing out negotiations while continuing to make battlefield gains.
Putin
also continues to demand that any negotiations address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war in
Ukraine. Putin stated during the press conference that the purpose of renewed bilateral Russian-Ukrainian
negotiations would be to "eliminate the root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Putin suggested that Russia
and Ukraine could pursue a ceasefire as part of these renewed negotiations, but claimed that a "real
truce" should not enable the "rearmament" and "replenishment" of the Ukrainian military. The Kremlin has
repeatedly claimed that Russia must eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Russian
officials have defined as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into Eastern Europe and
along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged
discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine. Kremlin
officials recently claimed that any ceasefire agreement should limit Ukraine's ability to mobilize and
train new troops and receive Western military aid, while failing to offer similar concessions for Russia
to limit its own force generation and defense production efforts. Calls for the elimination of these
alleged "root causes" and limitations on Ukraine's force generation capabilities are in line with Putin's
demands for Ukrainian neutrality, as well as Putin's pre-war demand that would have required NATO to roll
back to its pre-1997 borders.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin
called for Russia and Ukraine to resume bilateral negotiations based on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols
that include Russian demands amounting to full Ukrainian surrender. Any agreement based on those
protocols would be a capitulation document.
• Putin also continues to demand that any
negotiations address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war in Ukraine.
• Putin is
attempting to manipulate ongoing discussions about a ceasefire and future peace in Ukraine, likely in an
effort to undermine Ukrainian-US-European unity around a comprehensive 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted
Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposal to hold bilateral negotiations in Turkey on May 15.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in the northern
Kharkiv and Novopavlivka directions.
Russian officials appear to be setting conditions for Russian President Vladimir Putin to reject
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to meet on May 15 in Istanbul for bilateral ceasefire
negotiations. Russian Federation Council Deputy Speaker Konstantin Kosachev responded to Zelensky on May
12 and claimed that Zelensky’s invitation is "pure spectacle” and “comedy.” Kosachev claimed that
high-level meetings are not organized in “such a difficult situation” and accused Zelensky of trying to
blame Russia for what he claimed was Ukraine's disinterest in negotiations. Russian Ambassador-at-Large
Rodion Miroshnik questioned the intentions behind Zelensky's invitation to Putin to meet in Istanbul.
Russian State Duma Committee on International Affairs Deputy Chairperson Alexei Chepa expressed doubt on
May 12 that Putin will travel to Istanbul to meet with Zelensky. Chepa insinuated that Russia cannot
trust Ukraine in any negotiations because Ukraine has violated previous agreements and unilaterally
imposed Russian ceasefires. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on May 12 that
Zelensky is trying to co-opt the ongoing discussion around negotiations by inviting Putin to Istanbul and
making Putin seem intransigent if he does not attend. Kremlin-level officials have not formally responded
to Zelensky's invitation as of this report, although statements from lower-level Russian officials
indicate that Putin will likely not travel to Istanbul and meet with Zelensky.
Putin has
engaged in significant rhetorical efforts to prepare the Russian public for a long-term war effort — and
not a near-term peace agreement — including by promoting the false narrative that Zelensky and the
Ukrainian government are illegitimate. Putin and Russian officials often use this narrative to justify
Russia’s refusal to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine and to further Russia's strategic war
goal of establishing a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv. Putin may assess that the Kremlin would
need to adjust or completely retract this narrative in order to rhetorically prepare the Russian public
for direct negotiations with Zelensky before such meetings. Putin notably referred to the "Kyiv
authorities" rather than Zelensky or the Ukrainian government in his invitation to negotiate in Istanbul.
Senior Kremlin officials most recently reiterated this false narrative in late April, and Russian media
continues to reiterate this narrative in publications as of May 12. ISW has not observed any indications
that the Kremlin will alter or abandon this rhetoric. Putin may instead choose to let this narrative lie
dormant for now and intensify this rhetoric should Russia and Ukraine sign a peace agreement in order to
set conditions for Russia to justify reneging on any future peace agreement and relaunching the war at
the time of Russia's choosing. Any long-term peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include
Russia's explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and the Ukrainian
Constitution.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian officials appear to be setting conditions
for Russian President Vladimir Putin to reject Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to
meet on May 15 in Istanbul for bilateral ceasefire negotiations.
• Russia has reportedly
deployed a largely ceremonial regiment of the Federal Security Service (FSB) to the frontline in Donetsk
Oblast, likely in an effort to generate fear of more rapid future Russian advances.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the
Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions.
The Russian military is reportedly generating enough forces to replace losses and is reinforcing the size
of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite experiencing an increased casualty rate per square
kilometer gained. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be embracing significant losses in exchange
for diminishing returns to make battlefield gains and manage perceptions about Russia’s military
capabilities to pressure Ukraine in negotiations. Putin stated on May 13 that 50,000 to 60,000 people
voluntarily join the Russian military per month. Putin gave this figure as part of a statement claiming
that Russia has a higher monthly recruitment than Ukraine and therefore may be exaggerating these
recruitment figures to posture a large Russian military amid ongoing negotiations with Ukraine and the
West, however. Putin did not explicitly state when Russian recruitment levels hit 50,000 to 60,000
personnel each month, but previous Ukrainian and Russian statements imply that Russia may have aimed to
reach this monthly recruitment figure in 2025. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov gave recruitment
figures at the end of 2024, indicating that Russia is recruiting just enough military personnel to
replace its recent casualty rates. Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated in late
January 2025 that roughly 450,000 people signed Russian military service contracts, that an additional
40,000 people joined Russian volunteer formations in 2024, and that the Russian military aimed to
"maintain this momentum." Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major
General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in early March 2025 that Russia's recruitment plans for 2025 will
"mostly" allow the Russian military command to replace its battlefield losses should the current tempo of
offensive operations and losses continue. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated
in April 2024 that Russian forces are "increasing the number" of personnel in Ukraine by 8,000 to 9,000
new personnel per month through contract recruitment and that the Russian force grouping fighting against
Ukraine increased from about 603,000 on January 1, 2025, to 623,000 just over three months later. Syrskyi
stated on May 13 that Russian forces have suffered 177,000 casualties in Ukraine since the start of 2025.
Syrskyi's and Putin's figures indicate that Russia may be generating enough forces to replace losses
while also increasing the overall size of its force grouping in Ukraine.
Russia continues to
tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of
intensified advances in Fall 2024, despite a slowed rate of advance in the first four months of 2025.
Russian forces are likely able to generate enough forces to sustain their replacement rate and increase
the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline
units. ISW has repeatedly observed reports that new Russian recruits only receive a month of training
before deploying to Ukraine, and this limited training is likely constraining recruits' combat
capabilities and the Russian military's overall capacity to successfully conduct complex operations. The
Russian military is currently prioritizing sending poorly-trained recruits into highly-attritional
infantry assaults to make grinding advances — despite enduring a higher casualty rate per square
kilometer gained — in an effort to pressure Ukraine and the West into acquiescing to Russian demands amid
ongoing negotiations. Russia is also attempting to prolong negotiations to extract additional concessions
from the United States and while making additional battlefield advances.
Ukrainian officials
recently clarified that a September 2022 presidential decree does not preclude Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky from negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Zelensky signed a decree on
September 30, 2022, prohibiting Ukrainian negotiations with Putin. Zelensky told journalists during a
press briefing on May 13 that Russian officials are misrepresenting the decree as an obstacle to
negotiations as the decree is intended to prevent Ukrainian persons besides Zelensky from negotiating
with Putin on Ukraine’s behalf, rather than restricting Zelensky from exercising his “
rights and duties,” as Ukraine’s head negotiator. Chairperson of Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada Foreign Affairs
Committee Oleksandr Merezhko reiterated this point to Ukrainian English-language news outlet Kyiv
Independent on May 13 and stated that Ukraine’s Constitution "clearly" specifies Zelensky as Ukraine’s
chief negotiator and noted that Zelensky’s constitutional powers allow him to override past decrees.
Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Mykhailo Podolyak stated on May 13 that Zelensky will only negotiate with
Putin in Istanbul, as lower-level officials from either country would lack the authority to negotiate an
end to the war in Ukraine. Russian officials routinely cite this decree as an "obstacle" to negotiations
despite ongoing Ukrainian outreach to Russia to engage in good-faith negotiations.
Key
Takeaways:
• The Russian military is reportedly generating enough forces to replace losses and
is reinforcing the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite experiencing an increased
casualty rate per square kilometer gained. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be embracing
significant losses in exchange for diminishing returns to make battlefield gains and manage perceptions
about Russia’s military capabilities to pressure Ukraine in negotiations.
• The Russian
military may also be prioritizing recruitment as part of longer-term efforts to build out a post-war
strategic reserve for a potential future conflict with NATO.
• Ukrainian officials recently
clarified that a September 2022 presidential decree does not preclude Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky from negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
• The Russian military
command appears to be establishing a tactical doctrine and force structure for motorcycle and civilian
vehicle units in frontal assaults, underscoring the Russian military's efforts to offset Ukraine’s drone
advantages and achieve maneuver in modern ground warfare.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced
near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and
Velyka Novosilka.
Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent call to base future
negotiations with Ukraine on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that included Russian demands for
Ukraine's complete capitulation. Russian Ambassador-at-Large and former Russian occupation official,
Rodion Miroshnik, claimed on May 14 that the April 2022 draft Istanbul protocols could be the basis for
an agreement to end Russia's war in Ukraine. Miroshnik is echoing Putin's May 11 call to "resume" the
2022 Istanbul direct negotiations in response to the May 10 joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a
30-day minimum general ceasefire. Miroshnik noted that Russia and Ukraine could make "adjustments" to the
2022 Istanbul protocols to account for changes in the past three years, but specifically insisted that
Russia's April 2022 demands that Ukraine significantly reduce its military capabilities and amend its
constitution to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances —
including NATO — remain unchanged. Putin and Miroshnik are deliberately reiterating Russia's terms in the
Istanbul protocols because the protocols included terms that would have amounted to Ukraine's surrender
and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression — aims that the Kremlin
continues to pursue. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and
June 2024 that they both obtained several versions of the draft protocols from the April 2022
Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul. The draft protocols also would have banned Ukraine from
hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia demanded that it, the
United States, the United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus serve
as security guarantors of the agreement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate
international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality ," including
military aid agreements. Russia demanded that Ukraine limit its military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks,
and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian
missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to
deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.
Russia demanded
these terms in the first and second months of the full-scale invasion when Russian troops were advancing
on Kyiv City and making gains throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now
attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war, despite the fact that Ukrainian
forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated significant
swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance across the
theater. Miroshnik's observation that Russia and Ukraine could adjust aspects of the Istanbul protocols
to reflect the changes in the war over the past three years is an attempt to frame the Kremlin as willing
to negotiate, which obfuscates the fact that Russia has actually maintained its long-term goal of total
Ukrainian surrender. Putin, Miroshnik, and other Russian officials continue to demand Ukraine's full
surrender in an attempt to secure Russia's strategic goals by drawing out negotiations while continuing
to make battlefield gains.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian officials continue to reiterate
Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent call to base future negotiations with Ukraine on the early 2022
Istanbul protocols that included Russian demands for Ukraine's complete capitulation.
• Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also reiterated the Kremlin's demands that any
resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions against the West ahead of
negotiations in Istanbul.
• Polling from early May 2025 indicates that the majority of
Ukrainians support Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate leader of Ukraine and are
against holding elections before a final end to the war — in accordance with Ukrainian law and the
Ukrainian Constitution.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces
recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to engage
in bilateral negotiations in Istanbul and continues refusing to offer concessions to end the war in
Ukraine. Putin spoke to media organizations on the night of May 10 to 11, following the May 10 joint
US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a general ceasefire for at least 30 days beginning on May 12. Putin
did not agree to the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal and instead proposed that Russia and Ukraine
"resume" on May 15 the direct negotiations that he claimed Ukraine "interrupted" in 2022 in Istanbul.
Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted Putin's proposal to hold bilateral
negotiations in Turkey on May 15. Zelensky stated that he would personally wait for Putin in Turkey and
arrived in Turkey on May 15. Putin assigned several Russian officials, who are notably not in Putin's
innermost circle, to attend the talks in Istanbul, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed on
May 15 that Putin will not travel to Istanbul. Putin's rejection of Zelensky's invitation demonstrates
Putin's continued resistance to making any concessions and engaging in legitimate, good-faith
negotiations at the highest level.
The Russian delegation in Istanbul does not include
officials in Putin's innermost circle and is largely the same delegation that Russia sent to the
Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in 2022 in Istanbul. Putin announced on the night of May 14 that
Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky is leading the Russian delegation in Istanbul. The delegation also
includes Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin, Chief of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate
(GRU) Igor Kostykov, and Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin. Medinsky similarly headed the
delegation in 2022, and Fomin and Galuzin's predecessor participated in the 2022 talks. Kostyukov is the
only 2025 participant who did not attend the 2022 talks.
Medinsky explicitly described the May
2025 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul as a continuation of the early 2022 Istanbul negotiations
during which Russia issued demands that were tantamount to Ukraine's complete capitulation. Medinsky told
journalists on May 15 in Istanbul that Russia considers the May 2025 negotiations a "continuation" of
previous negotiations in Istanbul in April 2022, which he claimed Ukraine interrupted. Medinsky is
reiterating Putin's May 11 framing that the new bilateral negotiations in Istanbul would be based on the
April 2022 Istanbul protocols draft agreement, which included terms that would have amounted to Ukraine's
surrender and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression. The Wall
Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that they both obtained
several versions of the Istanbul protocols draft agreement. The draft protocols demanded that Ukraine
forego its NATO membership aspirations and amend its constitution to add a neutrality provision that
would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances. The draft protocols also would have banned Ukraine
from hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia demanded that it,
the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus
serve as security guarantors of the agreement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate
international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality ," including
military aid agreements. Russia demanded that Ukraine limit its military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks,
and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian
missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to
deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.
Russia demanded
these terms in the first and second months of its full-scale invasion when Russian troops were advancing
on Kyiv City and making significant gains throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russia
is now attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war, despite the fact that
Ukrainian forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated
significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance
across the theater. Medinsky is purposefully attempting to frame the May 2025 talks as a continuation of
the April 2022 Istanbul negotiations to portray Russia's demands for Ukraine's surrender as legitimate,
despite the fact that Ukraine is now in a much stronger battlefield position on the battlefield than in
April 2022 and the Russian military is much weaker than in the early months of the full-scale
invasion.
Medinsky also reiterated Putin's longstanding demands that any resolution to the war
must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions on NATO. Medinsky claimed that Russia's goal for
the May 2025 Istanbul negotiations is to "establish long-term peace by eliminating the root causes" of
the war. Russian officials routinely demand that any peace agreement address the war's "root causes,"
which Russian officials define as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern
Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged
discrimination against Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine. Russian officials
have leveraged claims that Ukraine has mistreated Russian speakers in Ukraine to justify the Kremlin's
demands for regime change in Ukraine, the establishment of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv, and
Russia's occupation and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. Medinsky's attempt to frame May 2025
Istanbul negotiations as peace talks contradicts stated Ukrainian, US, and European efforts to first
establish a longer-term ceasefire in Ukraine that would precede peace negotiations. Medinsky's framing
echoes consistent Russian rejections of this sequence of events, which Ukraine and the United States have
consistently supported.
Reported Kremlin instructions to Russian media explaining how to cover
the Istanbul negotiations indicate that the Kremlin is preparing the Russian population for a longer war
in Ukraine and is not interested in engaging in good-faith negotiations that require compromises from
both sides. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on May 15 that it acquired a manual that Russian
media received from the Presidential Administration's political bloc with instructions about how to cover
the negotiations in Istanbul. The manual reportedly instructed Russian media to explain Medinsky's
participation in the Russian delegation as "logical" since he led the Russian delegation in Istanbul in
2022 and is continuing this work. A political strategist who works with the Kremlin told Meduza that
Russian officials overseeing domestic policy assess that the Istanbul talks will end in "deadlock" and
that the Kremlin assesses that the West will likely impose new sanctions in response to such "deadlock."
The manual reportedly advises Russian media to preemptively talk about a "new package of sanctions" while
claiming that new sanctions will not harm Russia's development as Russia "successfully copes with the
challenges of any sanctions." Russian media should reportedly vaguely say that "negotiations are taking
place on worse terms for Ukraine" than three years ago, but the manual does not explain how current
battlefield realities where Russia controls much less of Ukraine are "worse terms."
Key
Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky's invitation to engage in bilateral negotiations in Istanbul and continues refusing to offer
concessions to end the war in Ukraine.
• The Russian delegation in Istanbul does not include
officials in Putin's innermost circle and is largely the same delegation that Russia sent to the
Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in 2022 in Istanbul.
• Medinsky explicitly described the May
2025 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul as a continuation of the early 2022 Istanbul negotiations
during which Russia issued demands that were tantamount to Ukraine's complete capitulation.
• Medinsky also reiterated Putin's longstanding demands that any resolution to the war must result in
regime change in Ukraine and restrictions on NATO.
• Reported Kremlin instructions to Russian
media explaining how to cover the Istanbul negotiations indicate that the Kremlin is preparing the
Russian population for a longer war in Ukraine and is not interested in engaging in good-faith
negotiations that require compromises from both sides.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced
near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.
Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on May 16 but made little progress towards agreeing to
a full ceasefire or a peace settlement to Russia's war against Ukraine. The Russian delegation reportedly
formally demanded that Ukraine cede territory to which Russia has informally been laying claim, while
asserting that Russia is ready to continue the war for years. Russia may again formalize previously
informal territorial claims in the future as part of Russia's effort to secure full Ukrainian
capitulation. Turkish, Ukrainian, and American delegations met on the morning of May 16 in Istanbul,
after which Turkish, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations met. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky,
the head of the Russian delegation, likely met with US State Department Director of Policy Planning Staff
Michael Anton before the Ukrainian-Russian meeting. The Ukrainian delegation, including Ukrainian Defense
Minister Rustem Umerov, Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha, and Presidential Administration Chief of Staff
Andriy Yermak, met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg, UK National Security Advisor
Jonathan Powell, French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonn, and German Chancellor's
Advisor for Foreign and Security Policy Gunter Sautter to coordinate positions before the
Ukrainian-Russian meeting. Umerov and Medinsky announced that Ukraine and Russia would exchange 1,000
prisoners of war (POWs) each in the near future. Medinsky stated that the Russian and Ukrainian
delegations agreed to "write...down in detail" and present their visions for a possible future ceasefire
and that bilateral negotiations will continue after this presentation. Kremlin newswire TASS reported
that an unspecified source stated that there was no specific date set for Russia and Ukraine to exchange
their ceasefire plans.
Medinsky highlighted that Russia is prepared to continue its war in
Ukraine for years to come. Medinsky claimed that those "who do not know history" say that there should be
a ceasefire first, then negotiations to achieve peace. Medinsky claimed that war and negotiations should
be conducted simultaneously, and Carroll reported that Medinsky stated that Russia is "ready to fight for
a year, two, three – however long it takes." Medinsky reportedly referenced the Great Northern War
(1700-1721) when asking "how long ready to fight?" and claimed that "Russia is prepared to
fight forever." Russia state media confirmed that Medinsky spoke about the 18th-century war with Sweden
during the meeting.
Ukrainian diplomatic sources told various Western and Ukrainian outlets
that the Russian delegation made "unrealistic" and "unacceptable" demands that went "far beyond" any
demands Russia has previously discussed. The delegation reportedly repeated the Kremlin's demand that
Ukrainian forces withdraw from the entirety of the illegally annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and
Kherson oblasts before the start of a ceasefire. The Economist foreign correspondent Oliver Carroll
reported that a source stated that the Russian delegation additionally threatened to seize Kharkiv and
Sumy oblasts, and Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Oleksiy Goncharenko similarly reported that the Russian
delegation threatened to annex Sumy Oblast in order to create a "security zone."
Key
Takeaways:
• Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on May 16 but made little
progress towards agreeing to a full ceasefire or a peace settlement to Russia's war against Ukraine.
• Medinsky highlighted that Russia is prepared to continue its war in Ukraine for years to
come.
• The Kremlin has repeatedly publicly demanded that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk,
Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – even the territory that Russian forces currently do not occupy
- but had not formally demanded that Ukraine cede all of Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts before the May 16
Istanbul meeting.
• ISW has consistently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin will
not compromise in peace negotiations unless Ukraine and the West inflict significant battlefield and
economic losses on Russia and force Putin to rethink his theory of victory.
• Russian
President Vladimir Putin reportedly approved a series of command changes in the Russian military,
including a new Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces.
• Russian forces are
continuing to expand their salient northeast of Pokrovsk and southwest of Toretsk, although it remains
unclear whether the Russian military command will prioritize further advances towards Kostyantynivka or
Pokrovsk during Summer 2025.
• Russia is unlikely to have sufficient manpower, materiel, and
operational planning capabilities to conduct both an envelopment of Pokrovsk and a significant offensive
operation toward Kostyantynivka in the coming months.
• Russian forces recently advanced near
Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka and in the Zaporizhia direction.
The Russian delegation in Istanbul reportedly framed its demands for a final peace settlement as
preconditions that Ukraine must meet before Russia will agree to a ceasefire. Most of Russia's demands
are contrary to US President Donald Trump's proposed peace plan. Sources familiar with the May 16
Ukrainian–Russian talks in Istanbul reported to Bloomberg that the Russian delegation demanded that
Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea to Russia and that the
international community recognize the four oblasts and the peninsula as Russian territory before Russia
will agree to a ceasefire. The Russian delegation also reportedly demanded that Ukraine adopt a neutral
status, that no foreign troops be allowed on Ukrainian territory, and that Ukraine abandon its demands
for war reparations from Russia. Chairperson of the Russian Federation Council's Committee on Foreign
Affairs Grigory Karasin stated on May 17 that the Russian delegation maintained Russian President
Vladimir Putin's June 2024 demands, including that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the entirety of the
four oblasts and abandon its NATO aspirations before Russia would agree to a ceasefire and peace
negotiations. The United States reportedly presented Russia in April 2025 with a seven-point peace plan
that offered Russia "de jure" US recognition of Russian sovereignty over occupied Crimea and "de facto"
recognition of Russian control over the parts of Ukraine that Russian forces currently occupy. The US
proposal also reportedly included "a robust security guarantee" involving a group of European states and
possibly non-European states as a likely peacekeeping force. The Russian delegation's demands in Istanbul
outright reject these aspects of the US peace proposal.
ISW continues to assess that Russia's
war aim remains full Ukrainian capitulation. Russia is reframing its territorial demands — typically the
subject of war termination negotiations — as preconditions for a ceasefire. Russia is attempting to
posture itself as open to negotiations but is putting forward demands that Ukraine cannot reasonably
accept while offering no compromises of its own. ISW continues to assess that Putin will continue to
refuse to offer compromises until Ukraine and the West are able to alter his theory of victory, which
posits that Russia will win a war of attrition through indefinite creeping advances that prevent Ukraine
from conducting successful, operationally significant counteroffensive operations.
Russia's
continued protraction of negotiations emphasizes its unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations
for either a ceasefire or a final peace agreement. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on May 17
that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky may meet only if the
Russian and Ukrainian delegations reach unspecified agreements and underscored that all talks should be
conducted behind closed doors. Peskov's statements are likely intentionally vague in order to further
delay progress in Russian-Ukrainian talks. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on May 17 that a
source close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated the Kremlin viewed discussions between
Putin and Zelensky as "out of the question" as Moscow knew that the conditions it was pushing Ukraine to
accept were non-starters for Kyiv. Another Verstka source close to the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) similarly stated that Russian officials do not plan to discuss preparations for a
Putin-Zelensky meeting. Russia has doubled down on its efforts to protract peace processes by continuing
to present Ukraine with ultimatums that Ukraine cannot accept. The Verstka source close to the
Presidential Administration added that Russia's demand that the Ukrainian–Russian talks occur without a
mediator shows that the Kremlin seeks to demonstrate that it is capable of demanding that the United
States limit the influence of Ukraine's Western partners. Peskov's comments and Verstka's report cohere
with ISW's long-standing assessment that Russia remains committed to prolonging peace negotiations so as
to continue making battlefield advances and to extract additional concessions from the West. Ukraine has
continually demonstrated its willingness to compromise and engage in good-faith negotiations in
contrast.
Key Takeaways:
• The Russian delegation in Istanbul reportedly framed its
demands for a final peace settlement as preconditions that Ukraine must meet before Russia will agree to
a ceasefire. Most of Russia's demands are contrary to US President Donald Trump's proposed peace plan.
• Russia's continued protraction of negotiations emphasizes its unwillingness to engage in
good-faith negotiations for either a ceasefire or a final peace agreement.
• Kremlin officials
continue to signal that Russia is prepared to continue or even escalate its war against Ukraine should
Ukraine and the West not agree to Russia's demands for Ukraine's surrender.
• Russia continues
to deny the current Ukrainian government's legitimacy and is likely setting conditions to renege on any
future Ukrainian–Russian peace agreement.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman, and
Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Kurakhove.
Russian forces conducted the largest single drone strike of the war against Ukraine on the night of May
17 to 18 – in disregard of US President Donald Trump's calls for Russia to stop long-range strikes
against Ukraine, particularly against Kyiv Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces
launched 273 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo,
Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian
forces shot down 88 drones over eastern, northern, and central Ukraine; that 128 decoy drones were "lost
in location;" and that one drone was still in Ukrainian airspace as of 0800 local time. Ukrainian
officials reported that the Russian strike largely targeted Kyiv Oblast and that drones struck Kyiv,
Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk oblasts. Russian forces launched 267 drones (and three ballistic missiles) in
their overnight strike series against Ukraine on the night of February 22 and 23. Russian forces have
significantly intensified their nightly strikes against Ukraine over the last five months and have
conducted several of the largest strikes of the entire war since January 2025. A Russian milblogger
claimed that the May 17-18 record-breaking strike was effective due to Russia's use of the "Geran-3"
drone (the Russian analogue to the Iranian Shahed-238), which is reportedly equipped with a turbo jet and
300-kilogram warhead. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are innovating their long-range drone
strike tactics in order to offset the effectiveness of Ukrainian mobile defense units and overwhelm the
Ukrainian air defense umbrella.
The Kremlin continues efforts to project Russia's military
strength ahead of US President Donald Trump’s scheduled phone call with Putin on May 19. Kremlin
journalist Pavel Zarubin published on May 18 excerpts of an allegedly "new" interview with Putin, in
which Putin claimed that Russia has enough manpower and materiel to bring the war in Ukraine to its
"logical" conclusion with the "necessary" results for Russia. Putin reiterated long-standing Kremlin
narratives about the necessity that peace negotiations address the war’s "root causes" and "protect" of
Russian-speakers of Ukraine, whom Putin claimed consider Russia their "motherland." Ukrainian outlet The
Kyiv Independent and Russian state media reported on May 18 that the excerpts that Zarubin published on
May 18 are unaired footage from the documentary "Russia.Kremlin.Putin.25 Years" that the Kremlin
published on May 4 in which Putin repeatedly promoted claims about Russia’s ability to bring the war to
its "logical conclusion." The Kremlin's decision to delay publishing these clips until May 18 suggests
that the Kremlin is trying to project a strong, militarily superior Russia to the West and to domestic
Russian audiences ahead of Putin’s May 19 phone call with Trump. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir
Medinsky recently stated that Russia is prepared to fight for "however long it takes," and Russian
Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev recently made thinly veiled nuclear threats in reference to
what Medvedev categorized as "negotiating ultimatums."
Key Takeaways:
• Russian
forces conducted the largest single drone strike of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 17 to 18
— in disregard of US President Donald Trump's calls for Russia to stop long-range strikes against
Ukraine, particularly against Kyiv Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to project Russia's
military strength ahead of US President Donald Trump’s scheduled phone call with Putin on May 19.
• Reported support within the Russian military and society for continuing the war until Russia
achieves its original war aims and territorial demands reflects the success of the Kremlin's years-long
narrative efforts to justify a protracted war effort.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky
continues efforts to negotiate a diplomatic end to the war in Ukraine.
• Russian forces
recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk.
Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine and support Ukraine's defense
industry. Italian media reported in mid-May 2025 that Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto announced
that Italy approved an eleventh military aid package for Ukraine, which will include one SAMP/T air and
missile defense system, 400 M-113 armored personnel carriers, and ammunition. Ukrainian state-owned
defense enterprise manager Ukroboronprom reported on May 20 that it signed a memorandum of cooperation
with Belgian ammunition manufacturer KNDS Belgium to coordinate the joint assembly of medium-caliber
ammunition for automatic cannons.
The European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK)
announced several sanctions packages against Russia on May 20. The package is the EU's largest targeting
Russia's shadow fleet and the Russian energy and military-industrial sector. The EU also sanctioned the
Russian Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Troops; the 27th Scientific Center; and the
Russian Ministry of Defense's 33rd Central Scientific Research and Testing Institute for Russia's use of
chemical weapons in Ukraine. The UK also announced new sanctions against Russia's military, energy, and
financial sectors on May 20.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed Colonel General
Valery Solodchuk's recent appointment as Central Military District (CMD) commander on May 20. Solodchuk
most recently served as commander of the Kursk Grouping of Forces and led Russia's efforts to eliminate
the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. Solodchuk is replacing Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev, who
reportedly recently replaced General Oleg Salyukov as Russian Ground Forces Commander.
Key
Takeaways:
• Senior Russian officials continue to deny the legitimacy of the Ukrainian
president, government, and constitution and Ukraine's sovereignty despite Russian President Vladimir
Putin's recent efforts to feign interest in peace negotiations to end the war.
• Medvedev also
reiterated long-standing Russian demands tantamount to Ukraine’s complete capitulation.
• Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide military aid to Ukraine and support Ukraine's defense
industry.
• The European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) announced several sanctions
packages against Russia on May 20.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed Colonel
General Valery Solodchuk's recent appointment as Central Military District (CMD) commander on May 20.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, and
in the Zaporizhia direction.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to prioritize leveraging migrants to mitigate ongoing labor
shortages, despite ongoing complaints from Russian ultranationalists advocating for the Kremlin to impose
harsher restrictions on migrants. Putin on April 28 extended the deadline for migrants who entered Russia
illegally to apply for legal status or leave Russia from April 30 to September 10, 2025. Putin initially
signed the decree setting the deadline on December 30, 2024. Migrants can obtain legal status by
submitting to a series of health screenings; passing a Russian language, history, and legal exams; and
paying off all debts, or by signing a military service contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD). Russia is reportedly suffering a labor shortage of 1.5 million people due to its war in Ukraine.
Putin likely does not want to exacerbate ongoing labor shortages with arbitrarily imposed deadlines that
will further restrict migrants from contributing to the Russian economy, given that a significant number
of migrants work in consumer services, construction, delivery, and other low-skilled industries. Putin's
migrant policies notably contradict his efforts to appease the ultranationalist crowd that has been
increasingly calling for Putin to take harsher measures against migrants in Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is fostering the formation of an informal state ideology based on
Russian nationalism that positions Russia in opposition to the West as part of ongoing efforts to
militarize and unify Russian society. Putin stated on May 22 at a likely highly scripted award ceremony
that "strong family foundations" and "traditional values" support Russia's "1,000-year-old statehood."
Putin emphasized that Russia's "most important" task is to preserve its people, culture, and
spirituality. A Russian Orthodox priest who received an award during the ceremony thanked Putin for
protecting Russian traditional culture, spirituality, and language. The priest noted that Russia's
celebrations of its contributions to victory in the Second World War teach Russian youth and those in the
"Russkiy Mir" ("Russian World") to defend Russia and love Russia's culture and spiritual foundations.
(The "Russian World" is a Kremlin-promoted geopolitical concept with amorphous parameters that broadly
encompass those who live outside of Russia's borders but relate in some vague way to Russian language,
culture, Orthodoxy, and media). Russian State Historical Museum General Director and awardee Alexei
Levikin claimed that many countries hostile to Russia are basing their policies and ideologies on the
falsification of historical events and facts. A martial arts school director who received an award
claimed that Russia always proves that its fighters are the best on the battlefields and in sports
arenas.
Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin — one of the most outspoken
Russian ultranationalists in Putin's inner circle — expressed support for the inclusion of an informal
state ideology based on Russian nationalism in the Russian Constitution. Russian State Duma Deputy
Speaker Pyotr Tolstoy stated on May 19 at the St. Petersburg International Legal Forum that Russia may
change its constitution in the future. Duma Committee on State Building and Legislation Head Pavel
Krasheninnikov later stated at the forum that the Russian Constitution "meets current realities" and does
not need amending, however. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on May 19, in response to Tolstoy,
that changing the constitution is "not on the agenda." Bastrykin claimed in an interview with
Kremlin newswire TASS published on May 22 that Russia is built on traditional values, such as patriotism,
citizenship, service to the Fatherland, and a strong family, and that these traditional values should
underpin Russia's "national idea." Bastrykin further claimed that Russia should enshrine this "national
idea" in its constitution. Bastrykin emphasized Russia's need to protect and preserve its "historical
heritage" through legal frameworks. Bastrykin routinely publicly expresses interest in an informal
Russian state ideology predicated on Russian ethno-religious nationalism and opposition to the West, in
contrast to other senior Russian officials. The Russian Constitution notably forbids the adoption of a
formal state ideology. Peskov stated on May 22 that it is difficult to comment on proposals to amend the
Russian Constitution because the Kremlin does not have the specifics of such proposals — a departure from
his May 19 statement apparently dismissing changes to the constitution. Kremlin officials most recently
leveraged Victory Day, Russia's largest holiday that commemorates the Soviet Union's contributions to the
Second World War, to promote a new informal state ideology based on Russian unity in the face of
opposition from the West. The Kremlin is likely accelerating its promotion of this ideology to prepare
the domestic population for a future military conflict against the West. Bastrykin is likely spearheading
efforts to formally enshrine Russian nationalist ideology in the constitution as one of the most powerful
and influential ultranationalists within the Kremlin elite.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is fostering the formation of an informal state ideology based on
Russian nationalism that positions Russia in opposition to the West as part of ongoing efforts to
militarize and unify Russian society.
• Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander
Bastrykin — one of the most outspoken Russian ultranationalists in Putin's inner circle — expressed
support for the inclusion of an informal state ideology based on Russian nationalism in the Russian
Constitution.
• Russian authorities are renewing their years-long narrative rejecting the
legality of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, possibly to deny Ukrainian and Belarusian
sovereignty and independence in the future.
• Russian authorities and state media continue to
publicly question the legitimacy of the Ukrainian negotiating team and the Ukrainian government, likely
to further efforts to reject and delay negotiations and to set conditions to renege on any future peace
agreement with Ukraine.
• Recent Western reporting provided additional details in a case in
which Russian forces executed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in November 2024, supporting ISW's
assessment that high-level Russian military commanders are likely involved in these executions.
• Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov confirmed on May 22 Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev's
appointment as Russian Ground Forces Commander.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near
Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov demanded that any future peace agreement in Ukraine include
conditions to prevent the election and establishment of future pro-Western governments in Ukraine. Lavrov
insisted on May 23 that any peace agreement must include conditions preventing the "repetition of what
brought putschists to power through a bloody revolution," referring to Ukraine's 2014 Euromaidan protests
and the Revolution of Dignity, which drove out Ukraine's former pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych.
Lavrov also reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's repeated claim that Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky is not the legitimate leader of Ukraine and claimed that Russia could negotiate with
the leadership of Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada (parliament) instead of Zelensky.
Russian officials
often deliberately misread the Ukrainian Constitution to claim that Zelensky's government is illegitimate
since Ukraine did not hold presidential elections in 2024, although the Ukrainian Constitution and law
prohibit the government from holding elections during times of martial law and external aggression.
Russian officials have repeatedly characterized Ukraine's Euromaidan protests and Revolution of Dignity
as a "coup," and leverage this narrative to reinforce Russia's claims that the current Ukrainian
government is not legitimate and thus cannot negotiate with Russia. Lavrov's statement is also an
explicit demand for regime change in Ukraine as a condition of any future peace agreement – a demand that
Russian officials routinely make under the guise of demands for "denazification" in Ukraine. Russian
officials will likely falsely frame any future pro-Western government in Ukraine as inheriting the
illegitimacy of all Ukrainian governments since 2014 and set conditions to claim that any agreement that
Russia concludes with Ukraine is non-binding.
Lavrov also rejected US President Donald Trump's
recent suggestion that the Vatican could host negotiations on Russia's war against Ukraine. Lavrov
claimed that negotiations in the Vatican would be "unrealistic" and that it would be "uncomfortable" for
the representatives of "two Orthodox countries" to meet in the Vatican.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov demanded that any future peace agreement in Ukraine
include conditions to prevent the election and establishment of future pro-Western governments in
Ukraine.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a 390-for-390 prisoner-of-war (POW) and civilian
exchange on May 23 as part of a larger 1,000-for-1,000 exchange agreed upon during recent bilateral
negotiations in Istanbul.
• Russian forces reportedly recently executed more Ukrainian
prisoners of war (POWs) on the battlefield.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin approved an
experimental application to monitor migrants, likely in an effort to placate Russian ultranationalist
demands while continuing to leverage migrants to support force generation and mitigate labor
shortages.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces advanced near
Novopavlivka and Kurakhove.
Russian forces conducted one of the largest combined drone and missile strikes of the war against Ukraine
on the night of May 23 to 24, but used fewer missiles than in previous large-scale combined strikes. The
Ukrainian Air Force reported on May 24 that Russian forces launched 14 Iskander-M ballistic missiles from
the directions of Taganrog, Rostov Oblast; Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai; Bryansk City; and occupied Crimea; and
250 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov
Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force
reported that Ukrainian forces shot down six Iskander-M missiles and 128 Shahed drones, and that 117
drones were “lost in location.” Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike heavily targeted
Kyiv City and that drones and missiles also struck Odesa, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and
Zaporizhia oblasts. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed prior to the strike on March 23
that Russian forces would respond "adequately" to recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian positions and
defense facilities. Russian forces have significantly intensified their nightly attacks against Ukraine
over the last five months and have conducted several of the largest strikes of the entire war since
January 2025.
Russian forces appear to be reducing their use of cruise missiles, indicating
that increased Russian drone production and innovations to long-range drones and related strike tactics
are providing Russian forces with a cheaper alternative to cruise missiles. Ukrainian Air Force
Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat stated on May 24 that Ukrainian forces are struggling to use Patriot air
defense systems to down modified Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles due to recent Russian
improvements, including enhancements that enable the missile to change trajectory and perform maneuvers
rather than flying in a straight line. Ukrainian aviation expert Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi reported on
February 11 that Russian forces had reduced their use of Kh-101 and Kh-555 cruise missiles and were
increasingly using Kh-59 and Kh-69 cruise missiles. ISW has observed Russian forces rarely using Kh-101,
Kh-55, and Kh-555 cruise missiles against Ukraine since February 2025 and infrequently using Kh-59 and
Kh-69 cruise missiles since March 2025. Russian forces most recently used almost 60 cruise missiles
against Ukraine on April 24, but Russia typically uses large numbers of Shahed and decoy drones to
overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses in nightly strikes and has recently relied on small numbers of ballistic
missiles to conduct more targeted strikes against Ukrainian cities. Russian forces appear to be
increasing their use of long-range drones and decreasing their use of cruise missiles in strikes against
Ukraine, possibly to conserve the fixed-wing airframes that Russian forces use to launch cruise
missiles.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces conducted one of the largest combined
drone and missile strikes of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 23 to 24, but used fewer
missiles than in previous large-scale combined strikes.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a
second round of prisoner-of-war (POW) exchanges on May 24 as part of a larger 1,000-for-1,000 exchange
agreed upon during recent bilateral negotiations in Istanbul.
• Russian officials will
reportedly submit a draft document of their conditions for peace in Ukraine following the conclusion of
the POW exchanges, although Russia's conditions are unlikely to be anything short of Ukraine's full
surrender.
• Russian forces have significantly expanded their salient southwest of
Kostyantynivka in recent weeks and established sufficient positions to launch an offensive operation
toward Kostyantynivka from the south or to support the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad from the
northeast in the coming weeks and months.
• The Russian salient southwest of Kostyantynivka is
likely sufficient to support a future Russian offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka or Pokrovsk, but
Russian forces will have to make further advances from Chasiv Yar and Toretsk and west of Pokrovsk before
Russian forces will pose a significant threat to either of these towns.
• Russian forces
recently advanced near Lyman, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.
Die EU kauft noch immer um Milliarden Öl und Gas aus Russland. D.h. wir zahlen jetzt die
Bewaffnung Russlands. Unsere Kinder zahlen dann die Bewaffnung der EU, da ja unsere Waffen auf
Kredit gekauft werden. Solange wir weiter ÖL und Gas aus Russland beziehen erübrigen sich doch
alle Sanktionen!
Meine Meinung und all jener die das Selbstständige Denken noch nicht verlernt haben und nicht dass
glauben was in den Medien verfälscht dargestellt wird. Sämtliche Maßnahmen welche die EU derzeit
durchzieht sind für mich nicht nachvollziehbar. Sämtliche Politiker sind nur mehr Marionetten der
Europäischen Union und lehnen jede eigenständige Verantwortung komplett ab. Zum Glück wird gerade
versucht die EU-nahe bevormundungsgeile WHO in die Schranken zu weisen. Was sind die abzulehnendsten
Maßnahmen der kriegsgeilen EU. Europa muss aufrüsten 😆 um ein Schweinegeld obwohl die Kohle
notwendigerweise sinnvoll verwendet werden müsste. Zelensky bittet nicht, nein er fordert und
bekommt weiterhin Unterstützung damit der Krieg mit massenhaft unschuldiger Toten weitergeht. Ein Krieg
den die Ukraine niemals gewinnen kann. Ein Krieg der vorher schon jahrelang verbal existierte und
durch Androhungen der EU (Ukraine zur EU und eventuell sogar zur Nato) zu einem echten Krieg wurde. Russland wird versucht mit sinnlosen Sanktionen einzuschüchtern über die Putin berechtigterweise nur
schmunzeln kann. Wenn sich in dieser EU nicht baldigst was ändert dann Gnade uns Gott. Dann
wird nämlich nicht die Ukraine sondern Europa der große Verlierer sein.
Andere Medien zu konsumieren bedeutet noch kein "selbständiges denken".
Deine Worte lese ich
auf Facebook hunderte Male pro Tag, wie die Lemminge folgen sie den Argumenten des Kreml, exakt
einseitig, genau wie sie es den anderen vorwerfen, von selbständigem Denken kann keine Rede sein. Wär in
Russland ja auch nicht erlaubt.
Versuch es einfach mit selbständigem Denken, bilde Dir Deine
eigene Meinung. Du brauchst Dich von niemandem bevormunden lassen. Auch wenn das grad gross in Mode ist.
Stalin hat übrigens auch zurückgeschossen, Polen hatte keine Chance gegen zwei Weltmächte
gleichzeitig. Weil Hitler mit Stalin paktiert hat, Die haben Europa unter sich aufgeteilt. Weil gar so ein Engel, wie die Russen immer tun, War der Stalin auch nicht.
>Meine Meinung und all jener die das Selbstständige Denken >noch nicht verlernt haben und
nicht dass glauben was in den >Medien verfälscht dargestellt wird.
Wer sind denn "die
Medien", die etwas verfälscht darstellen? Alle westlichen Medien? Wer glaubt selbstständig zu
denken, wenn er keinen dieser Medien glaubt, kann ja wenigstens den Vertretern Russlands glauben, die die
Ziele Russlands unverblümt wiedergeben und sich die Folgen eines "Friedens" nach russischen Vorstellungen
vorstellen. Mit ganz wenig selbstständigem Denken ist zu erahnen, dass zumindest ein zweites Weißrussland
entstehen soll, wenn die Ukraine schon nicht gleich Teil Russlands wird. Millionen Ukrainer werden
flüchten - müssen, wenn man bedenkt, was Russen droht, wenn sie z.B. nur die "Spezialoperation" als Krieg
bezeichnen.
Die Erwähnung der WHO in einem Posting über den Ukraine-Krieg lässt aber ohnehin
an der Fähigkeit (selbstständig) zu denken zweifeln.
Ukraine conducted a large-scale and simultaneous series of drone strikes against multiple air bases in
Russia on June 1. Sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told various media outlets that the SBU
conducted widespread first-person view (FPV) drone strikes that struck four air bases in Russia. The SBU
sources reported that Ukrainian forces struck Belaya Air Base in Irkutsk Oblast; Olenya Air Base in
Murmansk Oblast; Dyagilevo Air Base in Ryazan Oblast; and Ivanovo Air Base in Ivanovo Oblast. The SBU
sources confirmed that Ukrainian drone operators struck 41 Russian strategic bombers, including A-50
long-range radar detection aircraft and Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 strategic bombers – fixed-wing aircraft that
Russia uses to detect Ukrainian air defenses and launch cruise missiles against Ukraine. The SBU reported
that the operation inflicted roughly $7 billion worth of damage on Russia. The SBU sources confirmed that
the SBU facilitated drone strikes by transporting the FPV drones to Russia at an unspecified time;
storing the FPV drones in trucks carrying cargo units with retractable roofs; parking the trucks near the
Russian air bases; and remotely opening the truck roofs and launching the FPVs. Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed that the operation used 117 drones and destroyed 34 percent of Russia's
strategic cruise missile carriers. Zelensky stated that Ukrainian authorities withdrew the people who
"assisted" Ukraine with the operation from Russia before the operation. The Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted FPV drone strikes against air bases in Irkutsk, and
Murmansk oblasts, causing several aircraft to catch fire. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces
repelled all strikes against air bases in Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Amur oblasts and that Russian authorities
reportedly linked Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported that Ukrainian authorities planned to
conduct FPV drone strikes against an air base in Amur Oblast, and Russian sources claimed that a truck
carrying FPV drones near the Ukrainika Air Base in Amur Oblast caught fire before Ukrainian forces could
launch the drones.
Ukraine continues to innovate its drone technology and tactics to achieve
operational surprise and successfully target Russian military infrastructure in the rear. The SBU was
reportedly able to launch the FPV drones close to the targeted Russian air bases, which likely enabled
the FPV drones to evade Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems and deny Russian air defenders enough
time to detect the drones. The SBU innovative use of semi-trucks to launch the FPV drones directly in
Russian territory enabled Ukrainian drone operators to strike targets deep in Russia's rear and conduct
the first drone strike during the war against a target in Siberia. The SBU's tactics to use FPV drones
and not aircraft-type long-range drones also allowed drone operators to maintain operational surprise to
inflict maximum damage and minimize Russia's response window.
Ukraine's drone strike operation
against strategic Russian aircraft may at least temporarily constrain Russia's ability to conduct
long-range drone and missile strikes into Ukraine. Ukraine's June 1 operation targeted aircraft that
Russia uses to launch cruise missiles against Ukraine and airborne early warning and control (AEW&C)
systems that Russia uses to identify Ukrainian air defense systems and coordinate Russian fighter jet
targeting. Russia regularly deploys Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 to launch Kh-101/Kh-555 and Kh-59/69 cruise
missiles against Ukraine. The downing of Russian A-50 aircraft has previously temporarily constrained
Russian aviation activities over Ukraine. The June 1 Ukrainian drone operation will force Russian
officials to consider redistributing Russia's air defense systems to cover a much wider range of
territory and possibly deploying mobile air defense groups that can more quickly react to possible
similar Ukrainian drone strikes in the future.
Russia will likely struggle to replace the
aircraft that Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed. Forbes reported in September 2023 that a single
A-50 aircraft costs roughly $500 million, and the Kyiv Independent reported on June 1 that Russia has
less than 10 A-50s in operation. Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov stated on June 1 that
Ukrainian forces destroyed some strategic aircraft that Russia does not currently produce. A
Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russia no longer produces chassis for the Tu-95 and
Tu-22 bombers and noted that the chassis are impossible to replace. The Economist reported on June 1 that
Russia likely has fewer than 90 operational Tu-22, Tu-95, and Tu-160s in total. Ukrainian sources have
recently noted that Russia is increasingly using Sukhoi aircraft — and not strategic bombers — to launch
cruise missiles. Russia likely turned to Sukhoi aircraft so as to not risk their strategic bombers,
suggesting that Russia is concerned about its limited quantities of strategic bombers.
Key
Takeaways:
• Ukraine conducted a large-scale and simultaneous series of drone strikes against
multiple air bases in Russia on June 1.
• Ukraine continues to innovate its drone technology
and tactics to achieve operational surprise and successfully target Russian military infrastructure in
the rear.
• Ukraine's drone strike operation against strategic Russian aircraft may at least
temporarily constrain Russia's ability to conduct long-range drone and missile strikes into Ukraine.
• Russia will likely struggle to replace the aircraft that Ukrainian forces damaged and
destroyed.
• Russian officials and milbloggers continue to blame Russian leadership for
failing to defend Russian military infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes — a widespread complaint
throughout the war after successful Ukrainian strikes.
• Russian state media and milbloggers
attempted to frame Ukraine's strikes against legitimate Russian military targets as undermining Russia's
nuclear stability and as grounds for a Russian nuclear response – mirroring the Kremlin's repeated
nuclear saber-rattling throughout the war that has aimed to prevent Western support for Ukraine.
• Russian officials blamed Ukraine for the collapse of two bridges and subsequent train derailments in
western Russia on May 31, likely as part of efforts to justify the recent launch of Russian offensive
operations in Sumy Oblast and the Kremlin's disinterest in peace negotiations to end the war.
• Russian forces conducted their largest combined drone and missile strike of the war that included
over 400 drones against Ukraine on the night of May 31 to June 1.
• Ukrainian Ground Forces
Commander Mykhailo Drapatyi submitted his resignation following a Russian missile strike on a Ukrainian
training unit on June 1.
• Russian forces continue to adapt their strike packages in an effort
to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky established a
delegation to participate in peace negotiations to end the war as Russian officials continue to flout
their own proposed negotiation mechanisms.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast
and near Toretsk.
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