Russia seeks to leverage ongoing ceasefire and future peace negotiations to seize large amounts of territory in Ukraine and install a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv but will likely continue military operations in Ukraine if the Kremlin is unable to achieve a full Ukrainian surrender through diplomacy. Bloomberg reported on April 3, according to sources in Moscow familiar with the matter, that the Kremlin is "counting on US President Donald Trump to deliver an acceptable peace deal in Ukraine," but is prepared to continue the war if it is not able to secure its goals through negotiations with the United States. The sources also claimed that the Kremlin is not concerned by Trump's recent statement that the United States is willing to introduce additional sanctions targeting Russian oil and secondary sanctions against buyers of Russian oil if Russian President Vladimir Putin does not make progress towards a general ceasefire. The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence's (ODNI) 2025 Annual Threat Assessment stated that Russia is leveraging its control of the theater-wide initiative and ongoing political and information efforts amid negotiations to end the war in Ukraine to achieve significant concessions from Ukraine and the West. The ODNI report assessed that Putin is "probably" more willing to incur the risks of a longer war than to agree to an end to the war that is unfavorable to Russia. The ODNI report further assessed that Putin "appears resolved and prepared to pay a very high price to prevail in what he sees as a defining time in Russia’s strategic competition with the United States, world history, and his personal legacy." The ODNI assessment that Putin remains committed to pursuing Ukrainian surrender through both diplomatic and military means is consistent with ISW's assessment that Putin is leveraging ongoing negotiations to secure additional concessions from Ukraine and the West as part of its long-term pursuit of total Ukrainian surrender.

Russia is facing significant military and economic challenges that could seriously compromise Russia's ability to wage its war in Ukraine, factors that could increase the Kremlin's desire to accomplish its objectives in a mediated ceasefire or peace negotiation in the short-term if possible. The ODNI report assessed that Russia has suffered significant casualties in Ukraine and that Russia must contend with the poor quality of its new recruits. The ODNI report assessed that the Russian economy is facing significant challenges as Russia continues to balance resource allocation between defense industrial production and civilian sectors. US European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher Cavoli stated on April 3 that Russian forces have lost over 4,000 tanks in Ukraine. Cavoli stated that Russia started the war with a total of 13,000 tanks and are "starting to approach near the end" of the viable tanks in storage. Cavoli noted that Russia has expanded its capability to produce shells, cruise missiles, and first-person view (FPV) drones and that Russia is preparing either to continue offensive operations in Ukraine or to launch a future campaign against a NATO member state. Cavoli stated that the war in Ukraine has "distorted" the Russian economy and "turbocharged" the Russian defense industry at the expense of Russia's civilian economic sector and that it may be difficult for Russia to "unwind" this imbalance. Cavoli assessed that Russia will be able to replace the significant personnel losses incurred in Ukraine ahead of a future conflict in Europe but noted that Russia's ability to replace materiel losses is contingent on Ukraine's ability to inflict greater losses. ISW previously noted that Russia's ongoing and forecasted economic struggles are closely tied to Russian losses on the battlefield and that it is not possible for the United States or the wider West to exert maximum pressure on Russia with economic tools alone. The United States can leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger negotiating position by continuing — or increasing — military aid to Ukraine such that Ukrainian forces can continue to inflict significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia seeks to leverage ongoing ceasefire and future peace negotiations to seize large amounts of territory in Ukraine and install a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv but will likely continue military operations in Ukraine if the Kremlin is unable to achieve a full Ukrainian surrender through diplomacy.

• Russia is facing significant military and economic challenges that could seriously compromise Russia's ability to wage its war in Ukraine, factors that could increase the Kremlin's desire to accomplish its objectives in a mediated ceasefire or peace negotiation in the short-term if possible.

• The US Treasury Department announced on April 2 that the United States lifted sanctions on Karina Rotenberg, the wife of Russian businessman and oligarch Boris Rotenberg.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced in Kursk and Belgorod and near Lyman, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

• The Russian State Duma adopted a bill on April 3 to grant veteran status to Russian military personnel and volunteer formations that fought in Kursk Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev gave several interviews with American news outlets on April 3 and presented views that contradict the current Kremlin line on Ukraine. The Kremlin remains unwilling to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine, continuing to reject the ground ceasefire that US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have offered. Dmitriev spoke with Fox News and Newsmax while visiting Washington, DC, and attempted to paint Russia as an attractive market for American investment, claiming that the Russian economy is strong and growing despite Western sanctions. Dmitriev also claimed that Russia is ready to collaborate with the United States on unspecified projects involving the Arctic, rare earth minerals, and liquified natural gas (LNG). Dmitriev has recently been at the forefront of Kremlin efforts to undermine the proposed US-Ukraine mineral deal by promoting potential US-Russia mining projects and other avenues of economic and financial cooperation, as ISW previously reported. Dmitriev notably claimed that Russia "is not asking for lifting of sanctions" and "not making any preconditions for specific sanction relief" in response to a question about whether Russia considers sanctions relief a necessary precondition to a ceasefire agreement. The Kremlin, in contrast, has explicitly demanded sanctions relief from the United States as a precondition for entering into a Black Sea strikes ceasefire.

Dmitriev made several other statements that diverge from recent statements by other Kremlin officials, for example, saying that "some security guarantees may be possible" for Ukraine. ISW recently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not accept Western-backed security guarantees for Ukraine because their acceptance will represent a major concession, and the Kremlin has rejected the idea of making any concessions on its maximalist territorial and security demands from Ukraine. Dmitriev's attempt to present Russia's interests in Ukraine as predominantly economic and financial is also disingenuous. Kremlin officials frequently make demands to address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine (NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine) as preconditions for any sort of peace agreement. The Kremlin's negotiating position has not changed despite Dmitriev's attempts to soften and deflect from Moscow's demands, and Dmitriev is attempting to use the promise of financial benefits to distract from the Kremlin's continued intransigence in negotiations about Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev gave several interviews with American news outlets on April 3 and presented views that contradict the current Kremlin line on Ukraine.

• The Kremlin remains unwilling to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine, continuing to reject the ground ceasefire that US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have offered.

• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on April 4 that the US is closely monitoring Russia's actions in Ukraine and hopes that Russia is "serious" about resolving the war rather than simply dragging out negotiations.

• A Russian ballistic missile struck a residential area in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on April 4, killing at least 16 people, including children.

• Russia continues to employ strike packages predominantly comprised of drones amid reports that it is growing its missile stockpile.

• Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia signed two contracts with Chinese rail producers in January 2025 as part of efforts to support the development and repair of Ukrainian rail infrastructure.

• Russia is reinforcing its strategic ties with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) juntas in a concerted effort to enhance Russian influence in Africa.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

• The Russian military reportedly continues to expand its conventional force end-strength.

Institute for the Study of War

European and NATO officials emphasized that a strong Ukrainian military backed by European security guarantees remains the most effective deterrent against future Russian aggression to ensure long-term peace in Ukraine and Europe. NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte gave an interview to Ukrainian outlet New Voice on April 5 and stated that the "first level" of security guarantees for Ukraine should be the Ukrainian military, which Rutte stated is the "first line of defense in deterrence." Rutte added that Ukraine's European partners, including France, the United Kingdom, and Italy, are also looking for ways to provide security guarantees to Ukraine following the conclusion of a peace agreement. The French General Staff similarly emphasized that the Ukrainian military is Ukraine's primary security guarantee for a lasting peace. The French General Staff added that France and the UK will work to define and develop "reassurance operations" to deter Russia from future aggression after the implementation of a peace deal. ISW continues to assess that a strong Ukrainian military backed by Western security guarantees remains the most vital component of a post-war European security architecture, guaranteeing a sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterring future Russian aggression. Russian demands for Ukraine's "demilitarization" such that Ukraine is unable to defend itself against future Russian aggression are counter to US President Donald Trump's efforts to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Ukraine's European partners continue preliminary technical discussions about a possible future peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine. Delegations from the British and French general staffs met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian military leaders on April 4 and 5 in Kyiv to discuss details about how the first contingent of partner state forces could deploy to Ukraine. Zelensky stated that the meetings resulted in "tangible details" about this possible deployment, established Ukraine's needs, and identified geographical vulnerabilities that may require support. Zelensky stated that the group still needs to decide where the forces would deploy, their responsibilities, and their authority to respond in case of a breach of a future peace agreement. Zelensky stated that it might take one month or longer to finalize additional details and that the group would meet weekly. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated to Ukrainian outlet New Voice on April 5 that it is best to wait to deploy peacekeepers to Ukraine until after the conclusion of a peace agreement but that countries need to keep developing ideas now to implement after peace is achieved.

Key Takeaways:

• European and NATO officials emphasized that a strong Ukrainian military backed by European security guarantees remains the most effective deterrent against future Russian aggression to ensure long-term peace in Ukraine and Europe.

• Ukraine's European partners continue preliminary technical discussions about a possible future peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the only plant in Russia that produces fiber optic cables that are vital for Russian forces' fiber optic drones.

• Ukraine's European partners continue to provide technical support to Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk and in Kursk Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has been steadily declining since November 2024, in part due to successful Ukrainian counterattacks in eastern Ukraine. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on April 5 that Russian forces advanced 143 square kilometers in Ukraine in March 2025 as Ukrainian forces conducted successful tactical counterattacks in the Pokrovsk direction. The UK MoD reported that the rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has decreased each month since November 2024, as Russian forces seized roughly 730 square kilometers in November 2024, 393 square kilometers in December 2024, 326 square kilometers in January 2025, and 195 square kilometers in February 2025.

ISW has observed geolocated footage to concur in the assessment that the monthly rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has decreased since November 2024. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces in Ukraine gained roughly 627 square kilometers in November 2024, 569 square kilometers in December 2024, 427 square kilometers in January 2025, 354 square kilometers in February 2025, and 203 square kilometers in March 2025. The UK MoD likely uses a different methodology or sources to assess Russian advances in Ukraine, but the UK MoD's report is consistent with evidence ISW has observed of decreasing monthly Russian advances between November 2024 and March 2025. Ukrainian forces have conducted localized counterattacks in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions in recent weeks, regaining lost positions in these areas and contributing to slowing Russian advances in Ukraine.

Russian forces conducted the largest series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine in nearly a month on the night of April 5 and 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that preliminary data states that Russian forces launched nine Kh-101/Kh-55SM cruise missiles from Tu-95MS aircraft from the airspace over Saratov Oblast; eight Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea; six Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast; and 109 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed six Kh-101/Kh-55SM cruise missiles, six Kalibr missiles, one Iskander-M ballistic missile, and 40 Shahed drones and that 53 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and civilian infrastructure in Kyiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, and Mykolaiv oblasts and that five Iskander-M ballistic missiles struck Kyiv Oblast.

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on April 6 that Russian forces are changing their strike tactics and constantly modernizing their Shahed drones and ballistic missiles, complicating Ukrainian forces' ability to shoot them down. Ihnat noted that the US Patriot air defense system is effective against ballistic missiles. Russian forces have repeatedly experimented with different strike packages in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and ensure that Russian missiles – particularly the ballistic missiles that are more difficult for Ukrainian air defenses to shoot down – are able to reach their intended targets. Russian forces likely launched missiles and drones on the night of April 5 to 6 from various locations in the Black Sea, Russia, and occupied Crimea, as part of these experimentation efforts.

Key Takeaways:

• The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has been steadily declining since November 2024, in part due to successful Ukrainian counterattacks in eastern Ukraine.

• Russian forces conducted the largest series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine in nearly a month on the night of April 5 and 6.

• Ukrainian officials highlighted the fact that Russia is leveraging its naval vessels in the Black Sea to conduct missile strikes against Ukraine as Russia continues to stall the Black Sea moratorium on military operations that Ukraine and the United States have jointly proposed.

• The Kremlin is attempting to portray Ukraine as consistently violating the proposed temporary ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure without providing evidence supporting these claims, in stark contrast to the pattern of Russian reporting about successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure prior to the ceasefire proposal.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

Institute for the Study of War

The Kremlin continues to deny the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government as part of efforts to claim that Ukraine is not a legitimate negotiating partner and to demand Ukrainian regime change and demilitarization. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 7 that Russian President Vladimir Putin supports the idea of a ceasefire in Ukraine but claimed that several issues "are hanging in the air." Peskov claimed that these issues include the "lack of control" over the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian government's alleged inability to control the actions of unspecified extremist and nationalist units that "simply do not obey" the Ukrainian government's orders. Peskov claimed that these units are connected to "plans for the further militarization" of Ukraine. Peskov is promoting Putin's March 28 narrative falsely claiming that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and incapable of combatting neo-Nazi groups, which Putin claimed have the "actual power in their hands." These Kremlin statements are part of a broader effort to undermine the Ukrainian government's legitimacy and repackage Russia's long-standing demands for regime change and demilitarization in Ukraine. Putin and other Russian officials previously temporarily paused promoting claims about Ukraine's alleged illegitimacy following Putin's phone call with US President Donald Trump on February 12, but later resumed these claims on March 28. Trump recently expressed dissatisfaction with Putin's disparaging remarks attacking Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy and expressed a willingness to impose additional sanctions on Russia if the United States and Russia are unable to "make a deal.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues to deny the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government as part of efforts to claim that Ukraine is not a legitimate negotiating partner and to demand Ukrainian regime change and demilitarization.

• Ukrainian officials did not report any Russian long-range missile or drone strikes on the night of April 6 to 7 or during the day on April 7 following Russia's largest strike package in over a month on the night of April 5 to 6.

• Ukraine's European allies continue to ramp up domestic materiel production and address shortages inhibiting artillery ammunition production.

• Russian authorities likely facilitated the removal of a prominent Russian insider source from Telegram as part of continued efforts to crack down on the Russian information space.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Belogorod Oblast and near Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

• The Kremlin continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to militarize regional governments and society in occupied Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces recently captured Chinese nationals fighting in the Russian military in several areas of Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on April 8 that Ukrainian forces captured several Chinese "fighters" who were fighting for Russia near Bilohorivka (east of Siversk) and Tarasivka (northeast of Pokrovsk) in recent attacks and that Ukrainian intelligence indicated that there are "significantly more Chinese nationals" in the Russian military. Zelensky noted that Ukrainian forces came into contact with a group of six Chinese fighters during several recent attacks and captured two. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated that the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) summoned the Chinese charge d'affairs in response to the incident. US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce characterized the Chinese nationals' involvement as "disturbing" on April 8 and stated that "China is a major enabler of Russia" that "provides nearly 80 percent of the dual use items Russia needs to sustain the war."

ISW has observed reports of various unspecified Russian entities recruiting vulnerable migrant workers into the Russian military to fight in Ukraine both in Russia and abroad. Indian authorities revealed in 2024 that unspecified Russian entities were managing a human trafficking network that lured Indian citizens to Russia under false pretenses and then coerced them into signing military contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense to fight in Ukraine. Indian and Russian authorities partnered to repatriate Indian citizens who had involuntarily joined the Russian military in October 2024, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) could demonstrate that its government was not involved in the participation of its citizens in this war by undertaking a similar effort in the future. Beijing has not yet offered any formal response to these reports.

Russian and US authorities announced a second round of US-Russia bilateral discussions focused on normalizing diplomatic missions but not on discussing the ceasefire agreements offered jointly by the US and Ukraine will be held in Istanbul on April 10. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on April 8 that Russian Ambassador to the United States Alexander Darchiev and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Sonata Coulter will lead their respective delegations and that the meetings will follow the same format as the February 27 meeting. Unnamed diplomatic sources told Russian outlet RBK that the discussions will be held on April 10. US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce confirmed that the bilateral discussions will occur on April 10 and will solely focus on normalizing US and Russian diplomatic operations and that discussions about Ukraine are not on the agenda. The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its refusal to substantively engage with the United States on proposed ceasefire agreements and future peace negotiations in Ukraine.

Russian forces are currently pursuing three distinct tactical objectives in the Pokrovsk direction, but Ukrainian drone operations and localized counterattacks are continuing to complicate Russian advances in the area. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on April 7 that Russian forces are trying to cut the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway northeast of Pokrovsk, bypass Pokrovsk from the west, and attack in the Novopavlivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) direction. Russian forces are making limited gains northeast of Pokrovsk toward the T-0504 highway and southwest of Pokrovsk toward Novopavlivka but appear to be struggling to advance immediately south and southwest of Pokrovsk — where Ukrainian forces have focused most of their counterattacks in February, March, and early April 2025.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces recently captured Chinese nationals fighting in the Russian military in several areas of Donetsk Oblast.

• Russian and US authorities announced a second round of US-Russia bilateral discussions focused on normalizing diplomatic missions but not on discussing the ceasefire agreements offered jointly by the US and Ukraine will be held in Istanbul on April 10.

• Russian forces are currently pursuing three distinct tactical objectives in the Pokrovsk direction, but Ukrainian drone operations and localized counterattacks are continuing to complicate Russian advances in the area.

• Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk support both the ongoing Russian effort to envelop Pokrovsk from the east and west and the effort to pressure Kostyantynivka from the south by advancing along the T-0504 highway and eliminating the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk.

• The situation immediately south and southwest of Pokrovsk remains extremely dynamic amid intensified Russian offensive operations and localized Ukrainian counterattacks and drone operations in the area.

• Russian forces continue to deplete manpower and materiel in unsuccessful mechanized assaults and ongoing infantry assaults with armored vehicle support further southwest of Pokrovsk.

• Russian forces have only made marginal advances throughout the Pokrovsk direction due to localized Ukrainian counterattacks and improved integration of Ukrainian ground and drone forces.

• Russian forces have spent the last 13 months and lost over five divisions' worth of tanks and thousands of troops attacking toward Pokrovsk and trying to seize the town. Ongoing Russian offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk and attack Kostyantynivka highlight Russian President Vladimir Putin's determination to seize all of Ukraine through military means at whatever cost if he cannot do so through negotiations.

• Russian forces renewed long-range missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 7 to 8 following a brief pause on April 6 to 7.

• Russian forces continue to innovate with long-range Shahed strike drone tactics to maximize the impact of strikes against Ukraine.

• European states continue to provide financial and military aid to Ukraine.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced an initiative ostensibly aimed at securing medical treatment and rehabilitation for wounded Russian troops, but the MoD may weaponize this initiative against wounded servicemembers in practice.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts and near Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

• The Kremlin is considering passing a bill that may incentivize volunteer recruitment for conscription-age men ages 18 to 30 years old.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces continue to marginally advance in the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border area, but the Russian force grouping in the area will likely be unable to launch a major offensive operation against Sumy City in the near term without receiving significant reinforcements. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated during an interview with Ukrainian outlet LB UA published on April 9 that Russian forces have intensified assaults in "all main directions" and begun offensive operations in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. ISW has observed gradual but consistent Russian gains and attacks along the Volodymyrivka-Zhuravka-Novenke line (north to northeast of Sumy City) in northern Sumy Oblast and ongoing Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces from remaining positions south of Sudzha in southern Kursk Oblast since early March 2025. Russian forces made rapid advances in Kursk Oblast in early March 2025 as the United States temporarily paused intelligence sharing with Ukraine, but Russian gains slowed as Ukrainian forces retreated into Sudzha and later resumed use of HIMARS long-range strike systems. Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from Sudzha in mid-March 2025 but have continued to attack the remaining Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast while starting attacks into northern Sumy Oblast over the past month.

The Russian military command is likely attempting to form a buffer zone along the international border in Sumy Oblast, although Russian commanders may intend to press further into Sumy Oblast and towards Sumy City in the future. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces would not attempt to advance further into northern Sumy Oblast or attack Sumy City so long as Ukrainian forces maintained their salient in Kursk Oblast. Recent Russian attacks into northern Sumy Oblast indicate that the Russian military command may attempt to capitalize on the collapse of the Ukrainian Kursk Oblast salient in order to create a buffer zone in Sumy Oblast or launch an offensive on Sumy City. Russian President Vladimir Putin asked Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov during a visit to a Russian command post in Kursk Oblast on March 12 to "think in the future about creating a security zone" along the Ukrainian-Russian international border. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov suggested that Russia form a similar buffer zone in Kharkiv Oblast in order to justify the Russian offensive into northern Kharkiv Oblast in March 2024, and Putin's statement indicates that the Russian military command is either considering or actively working towards creating a buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast.

Putin likely intends to use a buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast and an offensive towards Sumy City to justify expanding his claims over Ukrainian territory. Russian officials are currently demanding that Ukraine cede unoccupied territory in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as part of a future peace agreement to end the war, and Russian officials have previously claimed that Mykolaiv Oblast (which Russia occupies a miniscule part of on the Kinburn Spit) and Kharkiv Oblast (which Russian occupies limited areas of) are "historically Russian lands." Putin may intend to leverage further advances in Sumy Oblast and pressure on Sumy City to demand that Ukraine cede part of Sumy Oblast to Russia during future peace negotiations. The Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast is unlikely to be sufficiently combat capable to seize a major Ukrainian city after eight months of combat operations unless it receives significant reinforcements from another frontline area — which would require Russia to abandon a major operational effort in another area of Ukraine and possibly leave that area vulnerable to Ukrainian forces — and is therefore unlikely. Russian forces likely intend to establish a limited and defensible "buffer zone" in northern Sumy Oblast and advance within artillery range of Sumy City in order to pressure the city and make it uninhabitable for civilians. The Russian military command may also intend to establish limited, defensible positions in northern Sumy Oblast and then transfer these forces to reinforce other operational efforts in Ukraine, although the informational and political pressure that a push on Sumy City could generate may be more enticing for Putin than advances in other frontline areas.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continue to marginally advance in the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border area, but the Russian force grouping in the area will likely be unable to launch a major offensive operation against Sumy City in the near term without receiving significant reinforcements.

• The Russian military command is likely attempting to form a buffer zone along the international border in Sumy Oblast, although Russian commanders may intend to press further into Sumy Oblast and towards Sumy City in the future.

• Russia continues to utilize North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast, but ISW has not yet observed indications that North Korean troops are operating as combat forces in Ukraine.

• Syrskyi stated that there are currently 623,000 Russian military personnel fighting against Ukraine.

• Syrskyi also spoke about Ukraine's efforts to further develop its tactical and long-range drone capabilities.

• The People's Republic of China (PRC) denied sending military personnel to fight in Ukraine following Ukrainian reports of Chinese nationals fighting alongside Russian forces.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

• Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

• The Russian federal government and Russian federal subjects are increasingly focused on veteran rehabilitation and reintegration.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 9 that Ukraine is interested in purchasing a large package of weapons from the United States, possibly within the framework of a future US-Ukraine mineral deal, as part of Ukrainian efforts to obtain security guarantees that would deter a future Russian invasion. Zelensky stated on April 9 that Ukraine recently proposed to the United States that Ukraine purchase "30 to 50 billion" (likely USD) worth of air defense and weapons systems from the United States and that Ukraine is prepared to purchase these systems itself — either through direct payment to the United States or through the fund established by the potential US-Ukrainian minerals deal. Zelensky stated that he recently told US President Donald Trump that Ukraine wants to buy at least 10 air defense systems to "help after the end of the war" and that Ukraine will consider the provision of these air defense and weapons systems as a "security guarantee." ISW continues to assess that a strong Ukrainian military backed by Western security guarantees remains the most vital component of a stable post-war European security architecture, guaranteeing a sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterring future Russian aggression.

Russia’s continued unsubstantiated accusations of Ukrainian violations of the energy strike ceasefire —despite the lack of any publicly available official ceasefire agreement — demonstrate how Russia will likely act in the event that Russia accepts the ground ceasefire to which Ukraine and the United States have already agreed. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed without evidence on April 9 that Ukrainian forces struck energy infrastructure in "Russian regions" 32 times between April 4 and 7. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed without evidence on April 10 that Ukraine conducted 11 strikes against energy facilities in occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts; Krasnodar Krai; and Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts in the past day. The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces struck energy facilities in the Russian near rear and rear in occupied Ukraine, including in Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast (roughly six kilometers from the frontline) and Holoprystanskyi Raion, Kherson Oblast (just south of the Dnipro River and inclusive of areas immediately on the east bank of the Dnipro River). It is unclear if frontline energy infrastructure in the Russian near rear and rear are covered under the strikes ceasefire as the terms of the agreement have not been published. ISW continues to assess that Russian officials are using the lack of a clearly defined and public ceasefire agreement to cast Ukraine as a disingenuous participant in the peace negotiation process. Russian officials’ continued insistence that Ukraine is violating the ceasefire underscores the importance of a signed and publicly available ceasefire agreement that includes monitoring and adjudication processes -elements that will be even more important in the potential future ground ceasefire to which the United States and Ukraine have already agreed.

Russia continues to use bilateral talks with the United States to delay negotiations about the war in Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin remains uninterested in serious peace negotiations to end the war. The US Department of State (DoS) reported that US and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on April 10 to discuss the finalization of "an understanding to ensure the stability of diplomatic banking for Russian and US bilateral missions." The US DoS stated that the US delegation reiterated concerns about the current Russian policy prohibiting the US Embassy in Moscow from employing local staff, which the United States sees as a barrier to the embassy's stable and sustainable staffing. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on April 10 that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the US DoS would only discuss bilateral relations and would not discuss Ukraine. Russian Ambassador to the United States Alexander Darchiev stated on April 10 that the United States and Russia agreed to measures to facilitate the movement of diplomats and accelerate the granting of diplomatic visas. Darchiev also stated that the Russian delegation prioritized discussions about the return of confiscated Russian diplomatic property in the United States. Russia continues to use bilateral talks with the United States to discuss issues unrelated to the war in Ukraine, even as US President Donald Trump continues efforts to achieve the temporary ground ceasefire upon which both the United States and Ukraine have agreed. The talks in Istanbul suggest that Russia is using diplomatic engagements with the United States to distract from the war and to obfuscate its own disinterest in productive peace negotiations.

Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 9 that Ukraine is interested in purchasing a large package of weapons from the United States, possibly within the framework of a future US-Ukraine mineral deal, as part of Ukrainian efforts to obtain security guarantees that would deter a future Russian invasion.

• Russia’s continued unsubstantiated accusations of Ukrainian violations of the energy strike ceasefire - despite the lack of any publicly available official ceasefire agreement – demonstrate how Russia will likely act in the event that Russia accepts the ground ceasefire to which Ukraine and the United States have already agreed.

• Russia continues to use bilateral talks with the United States to delay negotiations about the war in Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin remains uninterested in serious peace negotiations to end the war.

• Russia is reportedly using social media and financial incentives to recruit Chinese nationals to voluntarily join the Russian military.

• Russian forces reportedly recently executed a wounded Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW) in the Lyman direction.

• The Kremlin continues to use narratives it has historically used against Ukraine to set conditions to justify possible future aggression against Estonia.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

• A Russian insider source claimed that Russian authorities are preparing a dedicated position in Russian regional governments that will oversee veterans' affairs, and the federal government may include similar positions in the future.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukraine's European partners announced new military aid during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting on April 11. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced on April 11 that Germany will provide Ukraine with four IRIS-T air defense systems, 33 missiles for the systems, 120 man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), 25 Marder infantry fighting vehicles, 15 Leopard tanks, 14 artillery systems, and 130,000 155mm artillery shells. Pistorius stated that Germany recently provided 30 Patriot missiles to Ukraine as well. The German Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on April 11 that Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) are establishing an electronic warfare (EW) coalition for Ukraine. The UK MoD announced a military aid package worth 450 million pounds (about $588 million) drones, radars, and anti-tank mines. Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur stated that Estonia will deliver 10,000 155mm artillery shells and 750,000 rations packages to Ukraine; Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans stated that the Netherland will provide 150 million euros (about $170 million) to strengthen Ukraine's air defenses; and Lithuanian Defense Minister Dovilė Šakalienė announced that Lithuania will allocate 20 million euros (about $22 million) to Ukraine for the purchase of ammunition.

US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev in St. Petersburg on April 11 to discuss the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the Putin-Witkoff meeting would continue discussions about the war in Ukraine, that Putin would listen to the points that Witkoff delivers from US President Donald Trump, and that the meeting is a good chance for Russia to convey its "main concerns" to Trump via Witkoff. Peskov claimed that the officials may discuss a future meeting between Trump and Putin and that Trump and Putin could "theoretically" have a phone call following the Putin-Witkoff meeting. Peskov claimed that one should not "expect any breakthroughs" during the Putin-Witkoff meeting and that Russia and the United States are in the process of normalizing relations and "searching" for a way to settle the war in Ukraine. Peskov claimed that the Putin-Witkoff meeting and the April 10 US-Russian bilateral meeting in Istanbul are not related but are "two different tracks with one common process." White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated on April 11 that the Putin-Witkoff meeting is another step in the negotiating process toward a ceasefire and an "ultimate peace deal" in the war in Ukraine. Dmitriev stated that his meeting with Witkoff was "productive."

Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate Russia's unwillingness to make territorial compromises in Ukraine in a future peace settlement. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on April 11, following a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) foreign ministers meeting in Almaty, that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will have to accept territorial concessions and that it is "impossible" for Ukraine to return to its 1991 borders – Ukraine's internationally recognized borders. Lavrov attempted to deflect blame for Russia's intransigence onto Zelensky and Ukraine's alleged mistreatment of Russian speakers in Ukraine. The Kremlin continues to explicitly demonstrate its unwillingness to make compromises and cede Russian-occupied territory in Ukraine as part of any future peace negotiations – in contrast to Ukrainian officials who have expressed their willingness to make territorial compromises in a future peace agreement. Russian President Vladimir Putin has even demanded that Ukraine cede territory in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy and claimed that Mykolaiv and Kharkiv oblasts are "historically Russian lands."

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's European partners announced new military aid during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting on April 11.

• US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev in St. Petersburg on April 11 to discuss the war in Ukraine.

• Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate Russia's unwillingness to make territorial compromises in Ukraine in a future peace settlement.

• Russian authorities continue efforts to extract concessions from the United States as part of ongoing bilateral US-Russian negotiations while delaying progress towards peace in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian sources continue to speculate about which directions Russian forces will prioritize in Spring and Summer 2024. ISW is updating the axis sections in its Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment to reflect shifting Russian operational efforts along the frontline.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to emphasize Russia's large-scale and long-term investments in Russia's navy and naval strategic nuclear forces.

• Russian forces recently executed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued reports of systematic executions of Ukrainian POWs across the theater of war.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.

• Russian opposition media provided additional details regarding Russia's efforts to recruit Chinese citizens to serve in Ukraine following Ukrainian reports about Chinese nationals fighting in Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg expressed support on April 11 for the deployment of an allied "reassurance force" in rear areas of western Ukraine after a possible future ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia. The Times reported on April 11 that Kellogg expressed support for a "partition" of Ukraine between European, Ukrainian, and Russian forces; the deployment of a European "reassurance force" in western Ukraine; and establishing an 18-mile-wide "demilitarized zone" along the current frontline. Kellogg clarified later on April 11 that he supports the presence of a "reassurance force" that does not include US troops to support Ukrainian sovereignty, but that none of his statements during the interview suggested "a partitioning of Ukraine." Kellogg noted that the Times misrepresented some of his statements referencing possible areas of responsibility (AORs) of a future European "reassurance force."

Kellogg's clarification regarding the deployment of a "reassurance force" in Ukraine's rear areas is consistent with several statements from Ukrainian and European leaders about a possible future peacekeeping contingent deployed to Ukraine. Ukrainian Commander in Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on April 9 that a putative peacekeeping contingent would not deploy to the frontline. European Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas stated on April 10 that a future peacekeeping contingent would be likely to deploy not to the frontline but rather deeper within Ukraine or even outside of Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on April 10 that UK Defense Secretary John Healey and French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu stated that the Coalition of the Willing aims to develop more detailed plans within the next two weeks about how the coalition will help secure Ukrainian airspace, coastline, and land. People familiar with the matter told Bloomberg that the coalition hopes that the United States will agree to "backstop" any future European deployments to Ukraine with air power, border surveillance, and intelligence.

Russian state-owned and pro-Kremlin media amplified a Russian official's blanket rejection of any peacekeeping force in Ukraine on April 12. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Ambassador-at-Large Rodion Miroshnik responded to Kellogg's statements on April 12 and reiterated the Kremlin's objection to the presence of any peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine following a possible future ceasefire or peace agreement because a peacekeeping force would preserve the "level of toxicity" that supposedly prompted Russia to launch its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russian state-owned and pro-state media widely amplified Miroshnik's statement. Kremlin officials have repeatedly rejected the idea of a possible future peacekeeping force in Ukraine or any European involvement in post-war Ukraine. Miroshnik's accusation of "toxicity" in Ukraine is an indirect reference to the Kremlin's continued demands that any conclusion to the war in Ukraine must address Russia's so-called "root causes" of the war. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov previously defined Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and the Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine. Russian officials frequently directly invoke these "root causes" to justify Russia's continued war effort and pre-war demands amounting to total Ukrainian capitulation, and Miroshnik's April 12 statement is an indirect restatement of this concept.

Russian forces have resumed a more typical strike pattern in late March and early April 2025 after a temporary spike in the size of Russian long-range strike packages in mid-February and early March 2025. Russian forces conducted notably larger strike packages in mid-February and early March 2025 but have launched strike packages more comparable to trends last observed in January and early February 2025, albeit using fewer missiles, in recent weeks. Russian forces notably conducted no strikes against Ukraine on April 7 - the day after conducting their largest strike in over a month on April 6 — but have since resumed daily strikes. Russian officials have thus far refused to engage with or have outright rejected the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff presumably proposed to Russian President Vladimir Putin during a meeting on March 13. The proposed long-range strikes ceasefire on energy infrastructure would not require Russia to cease all long-range drone and missile strikes, but the proposed general ceasefire along the current frontline and in the air and sea would likely require Russia to end all strikes on Ukraine. Russian forces are likely delaying negotiations on a general ceasefire in order to continue making gains along the frontline in Ukraine and continue devastating long-range strikes against Ukrainian defense industrial and civilian areas in order to intimidate civilians and undermine Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.

Key Takeaways:

• US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg expressed support on April 11 for the deployment of an allied "reassurance force" in the rear areas of western Ukraine after a possible future ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia.

• Russian state-owned and pro-Kremlin media amplified a Russian official's blanket rejection of any peacekeeping force in Ukraine on April 12.

• Russian forces have resumed a more typical strike pattern in late March and early April 2025 after a temporary spike in the size of Russian long-range strike packages in mid-February and early March 2025.

• People's Republic of China (PRC) military officials reportedly visited the frontline in Ukraine to glean insights for future warfare amid reports that at least 155 Chinese nationals are fighting in Ukraine.

• Ukraine’s European partners announced additional military aid packages within the context of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting on April 11.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that ongoing US-Russian negotiations are unlikely to result in "lightning-fast results," contrary to US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a general ceasefire and lasting peace agreement in Ukraine in the near future. Peskov told Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on April 13 that "everything is moving very well" regarding US-Russian bilateral talks and discussions about the war in Ukraine but that there will likely not be immediate results. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Second Department of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Director Alexei Polishchuk gave an interview to Russian state media group Rossiya Today (RT) and stated that Russia is willing to engage in negotiations that “take into account the modern realities” of the war and eliminate the “root causes” of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that any peace process in Ukraine must address these so-called “root causes." Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov previously defined "root causes" as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine. These so-called ”root causes” are a reference to Russia’s pre-war demands that effectively amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation and the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine. Peskov's and Polishchuk's comments also reflect the Kremlin's continued rejection of President Trump's stated approach of first establishing a ceasefire and then negotiating a broader peace agreement and the Kremlin's commitment to war aims that are incompatible with President Trump’s goal of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Any future general ceasefire or peace agreement must include robust monitoring mechanisms, given the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to portray Ukraine as violating the long-range energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire without providing evidence of these strikes and despite the lack of public details about the ceasefire’s terms. It remains unclear what monitoring mechanisms the West could leverage to enforce and monitor a future general ceasefire or if the Kremlin would accept any such mechanisms. Peskov and Polishchuk reiterated ongoing Russian claims on April 13 that Ukraine is violating the temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure. Russian officials, led by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), have accused Ukraine of violating the temporary ceasefire almost every day since March 29 but have not provided evidence to substantiate most of these claims. Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that Ukrainian forces are striking energy infrastructure along Ukraine's northern border with Russia, although it remains unclear if strikes with tactical first-person view (FPV) drones or routine shelling would be a violation of the energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire as the terms of the ceasefire are publicly unclear. Russian officials appear to be weaponizing the vague conditions of the ceasefire and exploiting the absence of independent monitoring mechanisms to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims about supposed Ukrainian ceasefire violations.

Russian officials may attempt to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations in the future if a general ceasefire does not include robust independent monitoring mechanisms. Russian forces may conduct false flag attacks along the frontline in the event of a future general ceasefire in order to accuse Ukraine of violating the ceasefire and justify reigniting the conflict. ISW has previously assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin's claims that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate are setting conditions to legitimize future Russian ceasefire violations. The Kremlin is weaponizing the lack of monitoring mechanisms for the temporary energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire, and any future general ceasefire must have more robust monitoring mechanisms to deter, adjudicate, or at least properly record future violations.

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that ongoing US-Russian negotiations are unlikely to result in "lightning-fast results," contrary to US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a general ceasefire and lasting peace agreement in Ukraine in the near future.

• Any future general ceasefire or peace agreement must include robust monitoring mechanisms, given the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to portray Ukraine as violating the long-range energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire without providing evidence of these strikes and despite the lack of public details about the ceasefire’s terms. It remains unclear what monitoring mechanisms the West could leverage to enforce and monitor a future general ceasefire or if the Kremlin would accept any such mechanisms.

• Russian officials continue to weaponize the vague terms of the current ceasefire on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure and ongoing ceasefire negotiations in an effort to falsely portray Ukraine- and not Russia- as unwilling to engage in constructive dialogue.

• Russian forces conducted a devastating ballistic missile strike against Sumy City on April 13, causing more than 100 casualties.

• Ongoing milblogger complaints about the Russian military's conduct of the war in Ukraine reinforce ISW’s assessment that Russian tactics will degrade Russia’s manpower and materiel resources and contribute to slowing Russian advances along the frontline.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Kharkiv City, Borova, and Chasiv Yar.

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Russian forces appear to be leveraging redeployed elements of the 8th Combined Arms Army to close the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk and level the frontline as part of ongoing Russian efforts to attack Kostyantynivka from the south. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on April 14 that elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army , Southern Military District ) recently seized Oleksandropil, Panteleymonivka, and Valentynivka (all southwest of Toretsk) and pushed Ukrainian forces from positions east of the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynopil highway. Russian milbloggers also claimed on April 13 and 14 that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from positions east of the H-20 highway, seized Valentynivka, and are attacking Sukha Balka (north of Valentynivka). Mashovets stated that elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) continue to attack north of Vozdvyzhenka (west of Oleksandropil and east of Pokrovsk) in the direction of Nova Poltavka and Novoolenivka (both northeast of Pokrovsk and west of Toretsk). Russian milbloggers recently credited elements of the 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) with seizing Panteleymonivka and Oleksandropil and elements of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) with seizing Kalynove (east of Pokrovsk).

The Russian military command redeployed elements of the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk directions in February 2025 and likely intended to leverage these redeployments to break out of Toretsk and advance towards Kostyantynivka along or parallel to the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway. Elements of the Russian 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps , SMD) previously operating in these two areas failed to break through Ukraine's defense in Fall 2024 and Winter 2024-2025 , likely prompting the Russian military command to introduce elements of the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions – potentially prematurely – into combat in order to maintain the operational tempo in these areas. Russian forces marginally advanced along the frontline between Vozdvyzhenka (northeast of Pokrovsk) and Sukha Balka in February and March 2025, but have made more tactically significant advances near Kalynove and along the Sukha Balka-Oleksandropil line since early April 2025. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may aim to eliminate the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk in order to level out their southern flank ahead of a planned push on Kostyantynivka, and recent Russian redeployments and tactical activity supports this assessment. Russian forces likely intend to leverage advances southwest of Toretsk to push along the H-20 highway and facilitate deeper advances northeast of Pokrovsk along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway toward Kostyantynivka. Russian forces must break out of Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, advance toward Kostyantynivka broadly from the east, or advance roughly 24 kilometers from Pokrovsk along the T-0504 highway to Kostyantynivka’s southwestern flank before Russian forces will pose any notable threat to seizing Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka, and a Russian offensive to seize the city or Ukraine's wider fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast would likely be a years' long effort - assuming that the West continues to bolster Ukraine's defense.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces appear to be leveraging redeployed elements of the 8th Combined Arms Army to close the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk and level the frontline as part of ongoing Russian efforts to attack Kostyantynivka from the south.

• Russian forces appear to be intensifying their use of armored vehicles throughout the theater after mainly relegating armored vehicles to fire support roles and relying on infantry assaults to advance in late 2024 and early 2025.

• A Russian military court recently decided to keep former 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov in custody after reports that Popov would command a penal assault detachment in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Two high-ranking members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's inner circle reiterated Putin's June 2024 non-negotiable demands that any resolution of the war in Ukraine must result in regime change, extensive territorial concessions, and long-term limitations on Ukraine's military after US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff's April 11 meeting with Putin. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergey Naryshkin claimed on April 15 that any future peace agreement ending Russia's invasion of Ukraine must include terms concerning Ukraine's neutrality; the demilitarization and "denazification" of the Ukrainian state; the abolition of Ukrainian laws that allegedly discriminate against Russian-speakers in Ukraine; and the recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed to Russian state business outlet Kommersant on April 14 that the current Ukrainian government is "unconstitutional" and that Russia "cannot give up" following the illegal and sham referendums Russia conducted in the four oblasts to join Russia in Fall 2022. Lavrov reiterated that Putin "very clearly outlined" Russia's demands for a future peace agreement to end the war during Putin's speech on June 14, 2024, and stated that these June 2024 demands were "not some kind of request." Lavrov stated that there are "no secrets" about Russia's demands and reiterated the importance of addressing the "root causes" of the war in a future peace agreement.

Russian officials are using Putin's June 2024 speech as the Kremlin's current standing guidance on negotiations and the resolution of the war in Ukraine. Putin demanded on June 14, 2024 that Ukrainian forces must "completely withdraw" from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Ukraine must officially abandon its goal of joining NATO (by amending its constitution in which that goal is enshrined) before Russia can agree to a future ceasefire and peace negotiations. Putin stated that Russia is prepared to begin negotiations with Ukraine as soon as Ukraine agrees to withdraw from the entirety of the four oblasts. Putin also demanded that the international community recognize the four illegally annexed and occupied oblasts as part of Russia and lift all Western sanctions against Russia in the event of a resolution to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin reiterated his calls for Ukraine to agree to full demilitarization and "denazification" and abandon its aspirations to join any external security blocs. These demands would preclude the bilateral security agreements Ukraine has negotiated and is negotiating with several European states.

Putin and other Kremlin officials have routinely issued these same demands, including by using vague language to obfuscate Russia's most extreme demands. Russian officials, including Putin, use this language to articulate their overarching demand that the West acknowledge Russia's illegal annexation of occupied Ukraine and force Ukraine to concede not only territory but also its future sovereignty and ability to defend itself. Kremlin officials have consistently demanded that:

• Ukraine must demilitarize. Putin named "demilitarization" as one of the main goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and stated on July 4, 2024, that Ukraine should undergo "irreversible" "demilitarization" in the event of a future ceasefire. Russia demanded in the April 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft agreement that Ukraine shrink its military beyond pre-2022 levels and commit to never fielding a military capable of defending the country against future Russian aggression. Russia demanded in the protocol that the Ukrainian military should be confined to fewer than 85,000 active-duty personnel, fewer than 15,000 National Guard personnel, and fewer than 1,400 tanks and armored vehicles. The pre-2022 Ukrainian military had 196,600 active-duty personnel, 60,000 National Guard personnel, and over 3,000 tanks and armored vehicles.

• Ukraine must "denazify" and install a "legitimate" government. Putin named "denazification" as another of the main goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and Russian officials have previously defined "denazification" as the "liquidation of those who instill" Russophobia in other people. Russian officials often invoke the term "denazification" to call for regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv. Putin has routinely labeled all Ukrainian governments since 2014 as "illegitimate" and claimed on January 28 that Russia will not view any agreements it concludes with the current Ukrainian government as binding.

• Ukraine must abandon its aspirations to join NATO or any security bloc in the future. Putin's demand for Ukraine's “neutrality” remains one of the central justifications for his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia demanded in the Istanbul Protocol draft agreement that Ukraine amend its constitution to remove the provision committing Ukraine to NATO membership and add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances, concluding military agreements, or hosting foreign military personnel or systems in Ukraine.

• Ukraine must concede occupied Ukrainian territory and "Novorossiya" to Russia. Putin stated on June 14, 2024, that Russia will not be content with ending the war on the lines it currently holds and explicitly called for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the non-occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts as a prerequisite for any sort of "peace" negotiations with Ukraine. Kremlin officials have indicated that they have territorial ambitions beyond the administrative borders of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and often invoke the term "Novorossiya" (an amorphous, invented region in Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia) to lay claim to other areas of eastern and southern Ukraine, including Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.

• Any resolution of the war must address the war's "root causes." Lavrov has repeatedly defined the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine. Russian officials have leveraged claims that Ukraine has mistreated Russian speakers to justify Russia's occupation and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory.

Key Takeaways:

• Two high-ranking members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's inner circle reiterated Putin's June 2024 non-negotiable demands that any resolution of the war in Ukraine must result in regime change, extensive territorial concessions, and long-term limitations on Ukraine's military after US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff's April 11 meeting with Putin.

• Kremlin officials continue to set informational conditions to demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not currently occupy and to justify Russia's ambitions of asserting control over independent countries, including NATO member states.

• Naryshkin threatened a Russian attack against NATO states in response to NATO states building up their defenses in line with US President Donald Trump's push for Europe to increase its own defense capabilities.

• Lavrov reiterated Putin's rejection of Trump's proposal for a 30-day full ceasefire.

• Russia may recognize the end of the 30-day energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire soon and intensify its long-range strikes against Ukraine, but the exact parameters of the ceasefire — including its end date — remain unclear.

• Ukraine's National Guard announced on April 15 the formation of two new army corps on the basis of two existing brigades, amid Ukraine's continued efforts to transition to a corps structure.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

The White House reiterated that the United States will not engage in economic agreements with Russia until Russia agrees to a ceasefire, amid continued Russian efforts to deflect blame onto Ukraine for the Kremlin's rejection of such a ceasefire. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that Trump made it "very clear" that US-Russian economic partnerships could be an incentive for Russia to end its war against Ukraine, but that the United States "needs to see a ceasefire first" — likely in reference to a temporary or permanent full ceasefire in Ukraine. The Trump administration has previously characterized a temporary full ceasefire as a "necessary step" toward achieving an enduring peace settlement in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the joint US-Ukrainian 30-day full ceasefire proposal when Trump called Putin on March 18, and senior Russian officials have reiterated Putin's rejection since then by attempting to deflect blame onto Ukraine and secure additional bilateral concessions from the United States. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 16 that Ukraine's decision to extend martial law and continue general mobilization until August 6, 2025 is an attempt to preserve Ukraine's "unstable structure" and implied that Ukraine's ban on negotiations with Russia is inhibiting progress towards ending the war. The Ukrainian government is legally prohibited from lifting martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine, however. Russian authorities also appear to be intensifying their recruitment efforts, suggesting that the Kremlin intends to sustain its current force generation efforts for some time, peace talks notwithstanding. The Kremlin is continuing efforts to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress towards Trump's desired full ceasefire. Ukraine has already agreed to Trump's temporary full ceasefire proposal, while Kremlin officials have consistently reiterated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's non-negotiable demands for regime change in Ukraine, extensive territorial concessions, and limitations on Ukraine's military that would render Ukraine defenseless as conditions must be met before Russia can agree to a future ceasefire.

Russia is reportedly heavily dependent on North Korean artillery ammunition as North Korea continues to learn lessons from Russia's war against Ukraine. Reuters published a joint investigation with UK-based research organization Open Source Center (OSC) on April 15 detailing the extent of Russia's dependence on North Korean artillery and the evolution of North Korean forces' participation in fighting alongside Russian forces. Reuters and the OSC tracked 64 shipments from North Korea to Russia from September 2023 to March 2025 that involved 16,000 containers carrying millions of North Korean artillery rounds and recorded a shipment from North Korea as recently as March 17, 2025. Reuters and the OSC reported that four Russian-flagged ships — the Angara, Maria, Maia-1, and Lady R cargo ships — transported the ammunition from North Korea's port of Rajin to the Russian ports of Vostochny and Dunai. Reuters reviewed Russian military documents of everyday Russian artillery usage that showed that some Russian units depended on North Korean artillery shells for half or more of their shells used in daily fire missions. Reuters reported that an unspecified Russian unit fighting in Zaporizhia Oblast reported that nearly 50 percent of its 152mm D-20 howitzer rounds and 100 percent of its 122mm rockets fired came from North Korea. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Reuters that North Korea has provided Russia with three million artillery rounds and an unspecified number of mortar rounds since mid-2023 and that half of all of Russia's artillery rounds come from North Korea. The GUR also stated that North Korea supplied Russia with 148 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles as of January 2025.

Key Takeaways:

• The White House reiterated that the United States will not engage in economic agreements with Russia until Russia agrees to a ceasefire, amid continued Russian efforts to deflect blame onto Ukraine for the Kremlin's rejection of such a ceasefire.

• Russia is reportedly heavily dependent on North Korean artillery ammunition as North Korea continues to learn lessons from Russia's war against Ukraine.

• Russian authorities recently detained former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov, likely as part of the Kremlin efforts to scapegoat Kursk Oblast officials for their failure in responding to Ukraine’s August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast.

• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces recently executed at least one unarmed Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW) near Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka).

• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

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Russian forces recently conducted a roughly battalion-sized mechanized assault across a wide front in western Zaporizhia Oblast, representing an inflection in recently observed Russian mechanized assault tactics. Ukrainian military officials reported on April 17 that Ukrainian forces repelled a series of mechanized assaults by elements of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District ) that consisted of roughly a battalion's worth of equipment, including 320 personnel, 40 armored vehicles, three tanks, and about 10 buggies, along the Pyatykhatky-Stepove-Lobkove-Mali Shcherbaky-Mala Tokmachka line (a frontage of roughly 40 kilometers) south and southwest of Orikhiv on the evening of April 16. Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed all three Russian tanks and 29 armored vehicles and killed or wounded 140 Russian soldiers. Geolocated footage of the assault indicates that Russian forces advanced along the T-0515 Orikhiv-Polohy highway south of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv). ISW has not observed any other geolocated footage as of this writing to indicate any further advances along the wide front of attack. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Russian forces conducted a similar assault in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 13 — likely in reference to a recent Russian reinforced company-sized mechanized assault in the Zaporizhia direction. Voloshyn reported that Russian forces spent months preparing for these assaults and have concentrated additional assault groups for possible future assaults. Ukrainian officials have warned of the possibility of intensified Russian offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast since November 2024.

Russian forces fighting in Ukraine since 2023 do not usually conduct mechanized assaults spread out across a wide front. Russian forces typically conduct mechanized assaults in singular frontal assaults in narrower and more limited areas, likely intending to break through Ukrainian defenses with a greater concentration of forces in a single area, or as part of turning movements to outflank and envelop Ukrainian positions. The tactical objective of this battalion-sized attack remains unclear, and the available footage and Ukrainian reporting indicates that Ukrainian forces defeated the attack. Russian forces may have intended for the April 16 mechanized assault to probe Ukrainian defenses to gauge the Ukrainian reaction and to detect possible weak points in Ukrainian positions ahead of future, more concentrated assaults. Elements of the 58th CAA may have been testing a different tactic, alternatively. ISW has not observed evidence to suggest that Russian forces elsewhere along the frontline recently have implemented similar mechanized assault tactics. The decision to dedicate roughly a battalion's worth of armored vehicles to a broad mechanized assault with likely minimal gains is notable given Russia's extensive armored vehicle losses in the war, dwindling Soviet-era armored vehicle stockpiles, and limited capacity to produce, refurbish, and repair armored vehicles.

Russian forces continue to intensify their usage of armored vehicles across the frontline amid continued negotiations to end the war. Commander of the Ukrainian National Guard, Brigadier General Oleksandr Pivnenko, reported on April 17 that Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault in the Pokrovsk direction and that preliminary information confirms that Ukrainian forces destroyed 21 armored fighting vehicles, two other vehicles, and 96 motorcycles and killed and wounded over 240 Russian soldiers. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on the evening of April 17 that Russian forces launched an attack in the Pokrovsk direction and that Ukrainian forces destroyed the entire Russian grouping consisting of 115 pieces of equipment (likely including armored vehicles, other vehicles, and motorcycles), killed 200 Russian soldiers, and wounded 30 more. ISW has recently observed an increase in Russia's use of armored vehicles throughout the theater after mainly relegating armored vehicles to fire support roles and relying on infantry assaults to advance in late 2024 and early 2025. This intensification may be related to changing weather conditions and hardening terrain as Ukraine is coming out of its muddy rasputitsa season, the spring period in which melting frozen winter ground and spring rains degrade conditions for mechanized movement. This intensification may also be related to the Kremlin's continued insistence that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts to Russia and that the four oblasts be recognized as Russian territory.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's non-negotiable demands for extensive territorial concessions from Ukraine while noting that ongoing peace negotiations are unlikely to achieve results quickly.

• Russian forces recently conducted a roughly battalion-sized mechanized assault across a wide front in western Zaporizhia Oblast, representing an inflection in recently observed Russian mechanized assault tactics.

• The Kremlin is adopting increasingly threatening rhetoric towards Europe aimed at preventing Europe from supporting Ukraine and defending itself.

• Russia is increasingly adapting its drones to facilitate chemical weapons strikes against the frontline and rear areas of Ukraine — in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the United States and Ukraine are making progress towards signing a bilateral mineral deal.
• European countries continue to increase their domestic defense production, including in support of Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's rejection of a general ceasefire in Ukraine. Nebenzya claimed on April 18 that discussing a general ceasefire in Ukraine is "unrealistic" and accused Ukraine of not observing the temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure over the last month. Putin rejected the joint US-Ukrainian 30-day full ceasefire proposal during a phone call with US President Donald Trump on March 18, and senior Russian officials have reiterated Putin's rejection since then, attempting to deflect blame onto Ukraine and extract additional bilateral concessions from the United States. ISW previously noted that any future general ceasefire agreement must include robust monitoring mechanisms, given the Kremlin's efforts to claim that Ukraine was violating the temporary strikes ceasefire without providing evidence, and that it is unclear if Russian officials will accept any meaningful monitoring mechanisms.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced that the temporary ceasefire on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure ended on April 18. Peskov responded to a question about whether Russia will resume strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities and claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin has not issued further instructions. Russian officials have not expressed any interest in extending the temporary strikes ceasefire and the actual terms of the ceasefire remain unclear due to the lack of formal, publicly available, joint ceasefire documents. Russian officials accused Ukraine of violating the temporary strikes ceasefire almost daily over the last month, but provided no evidence for most of these accusations.

ISW previously assessed that Russia may intensify its long-range strikes against Ukraine following the end of the strikes moratorium, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned at an event for Ukrainian energy workers on April 17 that Russia may intensify strikes on Ukraine around Easter (April 20). It remains unclear how the ending of the temporary strikes ceasefire may impact Russia's nightly strikes against Ukraine, as the specifics of Putin's previous order to stop strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure also remain unclear. Putin claimed to have issued an order to the Russian military immediately following his March 18 phone call with President Trump to stop strikes on energy infrastructure facilities, but Russian officials have provided no further context about the duration or other specifics of this supposed order.

Kremlin mouthpieces continue to reject all US proposals to end the war in Ukraine that do not concede to all of Russia's demands for Ukraine, including regime change, demilitarization, and significant territorial concessions. Russian propagandist and RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan responded on April 18 to Bloomberg's report that the United States proposed freezing the war on the current frontlines, leaving occupied Ukraine "under Moscow's control," and taking Ukraine's NATO membership "off the table" as part of a plan to end the war and claimed that this plan is a "bad deal for Russia." Simonyan claimed that Russia should reject this plan because the plan does not include terms for Ukraine's "denazification" or a formal recognition of occupied Ukraine as part of Russia, and additionally does not include assurances that Europe will not deploy a potential European peacekeeping contingent to Ukraine. Simonyan also attempted to delegitimize Ukraine and the United States as negotiating partners and claimed that "there can be no negotiating with the insane" in reference to the plan and the Ukrainian government. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev urged the United States to "wash its hands" of the war in Ukraine and let Russia "figure it out faster" in a social media post on April 18.

Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have repeatedly stated that they are unwilling to accept any agreement that does not concede to all of Russia's territorial and political demands for Ukraine. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff told the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) in an article published on April 17 that Russian President Vladimir Putin has been "fixated" on territorial concessions during their bilateral meetings, indicating that Russian officials likely continue to reiterate their territorial and political demands about Ukraine both in public and in private. Russian officials have noted that Putin remains committed to accomplishing all his goals in Ukraine, which Putin has explicitly defined in part as the "denazification" and demilitarization of Ukraine. Russian officials often invoke the term "denazification" to call for regime change in Ukraine and to demand the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv. ISW previously noted that Russia demanded in the April 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft agreement that Ukraine shrink its military beyond pre-2022 levels and commit to never fielding a military capable of defending the country against future Russian aggression. Putin has also called for Ukraine to concede unoccupied territory to Russia, and Russian officials appear to be considering these demands as the Kremlin's standing guidance on negotiations.

Russian officials' continued insistence on these demands has also set conditions for Russian society to expect these demands to be fulfilled in any conclusion of the war in Ukraine, and Kremlin mouthpieces stating explicitly that these demands must be met even in a peace deal favorable to Russia is a reflection of this long-term rhetorical line. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin maintains its long-standing goals in Ukraine, and Russian officials continue to indicate and explicitly state that they are unwilling to compromise on these goals.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's rejection of a general ceasefire in Ukraine.

• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced that the temporary ceasefire on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure ended on April 18.

• Kremlin mouthpieces continue to reject all US proposals to end the war in Ukraine that do not concede to all of Russia's demands for Ukraine, including regime change, demilitarization, and significant territorial concessions.

• Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian demands for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement — a reference to Russia's initial war demands that directly contradict US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian officials held bilateral talks with US officials and multilateral talks with Coalition of the Willing partners in Paris, France, on April 16 to 18 regarding peace negotiations.

• Ukrainian officials announced on April 17 that the United States and Ukraine signed a memorandum of intent to conclude a future bilateral mineral deal and enhance economic cooperation.

• Russian forces conducted a ballistic missile strike against civilian areas in Kharkiv City on April 18, the latest in a string of high-casualty Russian strikes against civilian areas in Ukraine in recent weeks.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on April 18 that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is supplying Russia with weapons and military materials.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Kurakhove.

Institute for the Study of War

The snap Russian-proposed Easter truce underscores the necessity that the text of any ceasefire or peace agreement be publicly available, formally agreed to in advance by all parties, and include robust monitoring mechanisms. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported at 2000 local time April 20 that Russian forces in "all main frontline directions" conducted ground attacks and drone and artillery strikes against Ukrainian forces in violation of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 30-hour unilateral truce from 1800 Moscow time on April 19 to 0000 Moscow time on April 21. Zelensky also stated on April 20 that Russian forces conducted attacks in the Siversk, Toretsk, and Zaporizhia directions and are conducting offensive operations most intensely in the Pokrovsk direction. Zelensky’s statement from 1600 local time April 20 also reported Russian truce violations in Kursk Oblast, although Zelensky stated earlier at 0000 local time April 20 that Putin did not extend the truce to Kursk or Belgorod oblasts. Zelensky reiterated that an effective ceasefire agreement must provide monitoring mechanisms of potential violations and that Ukrainian forces will respond "symmetrically" to Russian assaults. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 20 that Russian forces had "strictly" observed the truce and claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted drone and artillery strikes against Russian positions and Russian-occupied settlements since the truce began. Ukrainian and Russian sources noted that fighting abated but did not fully cease in some directions, including the Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Toretsk directions, and that fighting in other directions temporarily ceased around 1800 on April 19 but has since resumed with variable frequency and intensity. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows satellite-detected heat anomalies along the frontline on April 20 that may suggest military activity, but ISW is unable to independently verify the specific reports of violations made by Russian or Ukrainian sources.

Zelensky reported that Russian forces did not conduct long-range strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 19 to 20 and during the day on April 20 and proposed a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure. Zelensky stated that Ukraine and Russia achieved a long-range strikes ceasefire between April 19 and 20 and during the day on April 20 and such a ceasefire is the easiest to extend. Zelensky proposed a temporary ceasefire on long-range missile and drone strikes against civilian infrastructure for a minimum of 30 days, with the opportunity to extend the ceasefire beyond 30 days. Russia and Ukraine repeatedly accused each other of violating the temporary energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire, but Putin and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly rejected the March 13 joint US-Ukrainian 30-day full ceasefire proposal over the last five weeks. A temporary civilian infrastructure strikes ceasefire agreement — and especially a general ceasefire agreement — would require robust monitoring mechanisms, public and formal terms, and a clearly defined time frame. The Kremlin may continue to leverage any vague future ceasefire agreements to obfuscate Russia's rejection of US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals and to accuse Ukraine of violating such ceasefire terms.

Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Russia's systematic persecution of religious communities throughout occupied Ukraine, including against Christians. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on April 20 that Russian forces have killed or tortured 67 Ukrainian priests, pastors, and monks and destroyed 640 religious sites, most of which are Christian sites, since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. ISW has previously reported on Russia's religious oppression in occupied Ukraine, including arbitrary detention and assassinations of Ukrainian clergy or religious leaders and the looting, desecration, and deliberate destruction of places of worship. ISW has also reported at length on Russia's systematic repression of Orthodox Church of Ukraine and other religious minorities, particularly Ukrainian Protestants and Baptists, who have faced Russian brutality and other repressions throughout Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• The snap Russian-proposed Easter truce underscores the necessity that the text of any ceasefire or peace agreement be publicly available, formally agreed to in advance by all parties, and include robust monitoring mechanisms.

• Zelensky reported that Russian forces did not conduct long-range strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 19 to 20 and during the day on April 20 and proposed a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure.

• Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Russia's systematic persecution of religious communities throughout occupied Ukraine, including against Christians.

• The Kremlin continues to repurpose narratives that Russian officials have repeatedly used to justify Russia's invasions of Ukraine in an effort to further militarize Russian society in the long term, likely in preparation for a potential future protracted conflict with NATO.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk before the start of the Easter truce.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's April 20 proposal for a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure, declined Zelensky's offer to extend Putin's own 30-hour Easter truce, and attempted to justify recent Russian strikes against civilian targets in Ukraine. Zelensky stated on April 20 that Ukraine and Russia achieved a long-range strikes ceasefire between April 19 and 20 and during the day on April 20 and proposed a temporary ceasefire on long-range missile and drone strikes against civilian infrastructure for a minimum of 30 days, with the opportunity to extend the ceasefire beyond 30 days. Putin announced the end of the Easter truce on April 21 and rejected Zelensky's proposed temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure while speaking to journalists, stating that Russia would need to "sort out" the proposed civilian infrastructure strikes moratorium. Putin attempted to soften his rejection of Zelensky's ceasefire proposal by claiming that Russia and other unspecified actors need to study strikes against civilian targets where military personnel are operating and "make appropriate decisions." Putin did not suggest the possibility of creating independent monitoring mechanisms to determine the legitimacy of such strikes, and Russian officials have previously expressed disinterest in Western-led monitoring mechanisms as a condition of future ceasefires in Ukraine. Putin also attempted to justify Russia's recent missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and to obfuscate his ongoing rejection of US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals. Putin acknowledged that Russian forces recently struck civilian infrastructure in Sumy City — likely referring to the April 13 Russian missile strike against Sumy City — but suggested that the reported presence of Ukrainian military personnel in Sumy City constituted a legitimate military target. Putin claimed that Russian forces also targeted Ukrainian military personnel during a recent Russian strike against Odesa City.

Putin reiterated his rejection of the full ceasefire that Zelensky and the US have offered. Zelensky reiterated on April 20 Ukraine's readiness to agree to a full and unconditional ceasefire for a minimum of 30 days. Putin rejected the full ceasefire proposal on April 21, claiming that Ukraine was attempting to "seize the initiative and talk about expan" the ceasefire, and alleging that Russia would need to "carefully evaluate everything." Ukraine and the United States initially proposed a full ceasefire on March 13, and Putin and other Russian officials have repeatedly rejected the proposal over the past five weeks. The US Department of State told Reuters on April 20 that the United States would welcome the extension of the Easter truce, however. US President Donald Trump expressed hope on April 20 that Russia and Ukraine would make a deal this week, possibly referring to a general ceasefire agreement that would precede future peace negotiations. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov appeared to respond to Trump's statement by stating that the Kremlin is not ready to discuss a time frame to end the war. Putin's continued rejection of the US-Ukrainian March 2025 proposed general ceasefire and the Kremlin's refusal to commit to any time frame to end the war highlight Putin's disinterest in ending the war via peace negotiations in the near term. Putin's continued rejection of US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals runs counter to Trump's stated approach of first establishing a ceasefire and then negotiating a broader peace agreement and to Trump's goal of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Russian state media amplified Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo's calls for additional territorial concessions from Ukraine in areas to which Russia has not yet laid formal claim. Saldo stated on April 21 to Kremlin newswire TASS that the "return" of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River is "fundamentally important" and an "absolute priority" for Russia. Saldo claimed that Ukrainian forces will continue efforts to use the east (left) bank of the river as a "lever of pressure" against Russia and that the presence of Ukrainian forces on the west bank hinders the resumption of shipping along the river. Saldo concluded that "the segment of the that passes through Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts must be completely under control" so as to guarantee the development of infrastructure "associated with the river." Russian forces only currently occupy positions on the east bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts, yet Russian President Vladimir Putin has consistently demanded since June 2024 that Ukraine cede all of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts to Russia. Saldo appears to be calling for additional Russian territorial claims along the river in central Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — an oblast that Russia has not formally claimed or illegally annexed. It is unclear how much territory along the banks of the river in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Saldo is claiming must be under Russian control or if Saldo is implying that Russian forces must occupy extensive territory east and northeast of the river such that Russia "completely control" the river and its immediate surrounding areas. Russian forces may want to control a minimum 25 kilometers of territory on both banks of the Dnipro River so as to prevent Ukrainian forces from conducting tube artillery strikes against the area.


Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's April 20 proposal for a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure, declined Zelensky's offer to extend Putin's own 30-hour Easter truce, and attempted to justify recent Russian strikes against civilian targets in Ukraine.

• Putin reiterated his rejection of the full ceasefire that Zelensky and the US have offered.

• Russian state media amplified Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo's calls for additional territorial concessions from Ukraine in areas to which Russia has not yet laid formal claim.

• Saldo's call for additional Russian territorial claims along the Dnipro River is consistent with other Kremlin official statements, as Russia continues to make extensive territorial demands of Ukraine while offering no concessions of its own.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

The Financial Times (FT) reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin is willing to end the war in Ukraine on the current frontlines. Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly and explicitly emphasized that Russia maintains its territorial demands over all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, however, while also publicly signaling that Russia has greater territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond these four oblasts. The FT reported on April 22 that sources familiar with the matter stated that Putin told US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff during their April 11 meeting that Russia could relinquish its claims to the Ukrainian-controlled parts of the four oblasts that Russia has formally laid claim to and illegally annexed. European officials briefed on the US efforts to end the war stated that Putin would probably use this to lure US President Donald Trump into accepting Russia's other demands and force these demands onto Ukraine as a fait accompli. Russia's "other demands" referenced by FT likely include Russia’s public demands for Ukrainian neutrality, regime change, and demilitarization — Putin's pre-war demands that Kremlin officials have consistently reiterated throughout the war and during negotiations about possible ceasefires and a peace deal.

Russian officials have recently repeated Putin's June 2024 demand that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before Russia can agree to a ceasefire and peace negotiations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explicitly cited Putin's June 2024 speech on April 14, and Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergey Naryshkin claimed on April 15 that any future peace agreement must include the recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of the entirety of these four oblasts. Russia passed constitutional amendments in October 2022 that defined the four oblasts as Russian territory, and Russian officials have recently reiterated how the Russian Constitution holds primacy over international law. Russian officials have also repeatedly invoked the term "Novorossiya" when talking about Russian-occupied and Russian-claimed territory in southern Ukraine, with Putin most recently using the term on April 21. Novorossiya is an invented region in Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia. A senior Russian occupation official, recently on April 21, called for Russia to control areas of southern Ukraine near the Dnipro River, including territory in oblasts that Russia has not formally claimed or illegally annexed. Russian officials. including Putin, have also labelled Odesa City a "Russian city" that has nothing to do with Ukraine." Kremlin newswire TASS has notably begun, as of April 2025, to characterize any Kremlin statements about Russian-claimed territory in Ukraine as about "Donbas and Novorossiya," likely as part of Kremlin efforts to set conditions for Russian society to expect Russia to achieve extensive territorial concessions in Ukraine.

The Moscow Times reported that the Kremlin is attempting to use economic incentives to sway US-Russian talks about the war in Ukraine, as the Kremlin is not sincerely interested in US President Donald Trump's efforts to end the war. ISW cannot independently verify Kremlin sources' statements, but recent Kremlin behavior is consistent with the Moscow Times' insider reporting. Independent Russian outlet the Moscow Times reported on April 21 that five current Russian government officials, including two diplomats and three sources close to the Kremlin who are employees of three major state-owned companies, stated that the Kremlin is looking for incentives to "hold...Trump's attention." One current Russian government official stated that Russian authorities are working "in full swing" to prepare proposals for Trump across "key economic sectors." One source who has participated in the Kremlin discussions on the matter stated that Russia "needs to milk Trump as much as possible, dangling the possibility of a ceasefire like a carrot before him." A Russian diplomat stated that the Kremlin's priority is to "recalibrate" relations with the United States while keeping dialogue about the war in Ukraine "alive." The Moscow Times reported that the official Russian sources see two main scenarios that could unfold: either Russia agrees to a Trump-brokered ceasefire in exchange for concessions, such as limitations on US weapons supplies to Ukraine, or Russia will blame Ukraine should talks collapse.

Russia has recently offered the United States economic incentives that are unrelated to Russia’s war in Ukraine, likely as part of efforts to extract concessions from the United States about Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russian Presidential Aide Nikolai Patrushev, for example, called for the United States and Russia to jointly work to solve problems in the Arctic in an April 21 article in Russian business outlet Kommersant. This Russian effort goes against the Trump administration's desired timeline of events, as the White House has stated that the United States "needs to see a ceasefire first" before developing US-Russian economic partnerships. Kremlin officials have claimed that Russia is willing to negotiate to end the war in Ukraine while attempting to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress towards ending the war. Putin, however, has rejected multiple full or temporary ceasefire offers that the United States and Ukraine have proposed. Putin rejected the March 18 US-Ukrainian proposed temporary ceasefire along the entire frontline; refused to extend the unilateral Russian Easter truce on April 21, despite both US and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's support for such an extension; and rejected Zelensky's recent proposal for a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure. Putin has already started to question whether Ukraine would be able to receive military aid from its allies in the event of a temporary full ceasefire — possibly to set conditions to demand the cessation of United States and likely also European weapons supplies to Ukraine as a condition for accepting a full ceasefire.

Any potential future Russian agreement to freeze the front short of Russia's full control of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts does not preclude future Russian aggression to achieve Russia's more extensive territorial demands, especially if the agreement stipulates a moratorium on Ukraine receiving Western military aid. A Russian diplomat reportedly told the Moscow Times that "the situation on the ground will dictate the next moves" in US-Russian talks about the war and that "it is all about time, patience, and staying the course." The current frontlines do not provide the strategic depth that Ukraine will need to reliably defend against renewed Russian aggression, as Russian forces are just across the Dnipro River from Kherson City, roughly 25 kilometers from Zaporizhzhia City, and 20 kilometers from Kharkiv City. Russia has notably intensified its use of armored vehicles across the frontline and appears to have started a likely years' long effort to seize Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast - likely as part of efforts to gain as much territory as possible in eastern and southern Ukraine, particularly in the four oblasts to which Russia has formally laid claim. Russia may tactically and temporarily stop pushing for Putin's demands for the Ukrainian-controlled areas of the four illegally annexed oblasts in southern and eastern Ukraine in order to extract other concessions from the United States under the rubric of negotiations. Such concessions could be Russia's "other demands" of installing a pro-Russian government in Kyiv and drastically shrinking the Ukrainian military in order to decrease resistance against renewed Russian aggression. The Kremlin will likely exploit any ceasefire predicated on limitations on US weapons supplies to Ukraine to prepare for renewed aggression.

Key Takeaways:

• The Financial Times (FT) reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin is willing to end the war in Ukraine on the current frontlines. Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly and explicitly emphasized that Russia maintains its territorial demands over all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, however, while also publicly signaling that Russia has greater territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond these four oblasts.

• The Moscow Times reported that the Kremlin is attempting to use economic incentives to sway US-Russian talks about the war in Ukraine as the Kremlin is not sincerely interested in US President Donald Trump's efforts to end the war. ISW cannot independently verify Kremlin sources' statements, but recent Kremlin behavior is consistent with the Moscow Times' insider reporting.

• Any potential future Russian agreement to freeze the front short of Russia's full control of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts does not preclude future Russian aggression to achieve Russia's more extensive territorial demands, especially if the agreement stipulates a moratorium on Ukraine receiving Western military aid.

• Kremlin officials continued efforts on April 22 to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress towards Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's proposed temporary ceasefire on strikes against civilian infrastructure.

• The Kremlin continues to reject Trump's stated goal of achieving a ceasefire in Ukraine before a full peace settlement to end the war – in contrast to Ukraine's continued support for a general ceasefire.

• Russian forces continue to innovate their long-range drone strike tactics in order to offset the effectiveness of Ukrainian mobile defense units.

• Russia is reportedly recruiting North Korean citizens to compensate for labor shortages in Russia, indicating that Russian-North Korean cooperation continues to deepen.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

The United States reportedly recently presented Ukraine with a seven-point proposal to end the war in Ukraine in which the United States would recognize Crimea as part of Russia and allow Russian forces to continue to occupy significant parts of southern and eastern Ukraine. Available reporting about the contents of the US proposal suggests that it marks a sudden and substantial change in the Trump administration's strategy for ending the war in Ukraine. The Telegraph and Axios reported on April 22 and 23 that sources familiar with the matter stated that the United States presented Ukraine with a proposal to end the war during the April 17 meeting in Paris and that the United States expected that the April 23 multilateral talks in London would discuss the proposal. There have been no official statements about the reported US proposal. The Telegraph reported that the document contains seven points about an immediate ceasefire, Ukrainian-Russian talks, Ukraine's inability to join NATO, territory, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the US-Ukrainian mineral deal, and US-Russian relations. Axios and The Telegraph reported that the plan calls for the United States to "de jure" recognize Russian control of Crimea and "de facto" recognize Russia's occupation of most of the areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russian forces currently occupy. Russia would also reportedly have to withdraw from the parts of Kharkiv Oblast that Russian forces currently occupy. Axios stated that the plan would grant Ukraine "unimpeded passage" along the Dnipro River, with The Telegraph reporting that Ukraine would gain “unhindered access to the mouth” of the river. The Telegraph noted that the proposal states that Russian forces would withdraw from another unspecified area of Kherson Oblast. The proposal calls for the ZNPP, which Russian forces currently occupy, to be "considered as Ukrainian territory" but under US operation. The US-operated ZNPP would reportedly supply both Ukraine and Russia with electricity. The US proposal reportedly states that the United States would promise that Ukraine would not become a member of NATO, while Ukraine could still join the European Union (EU). The proposal would give Ukraine "a robust security guarantee" involving a group of European states and possibly non-European states, but the document does not offer details about how this "peacekeeping operation" would operate, nor mention US participation in this peacekeeping force. The United States would also reportedly lift all US sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 and would enhance US-Russian economic cooperation, especially in the energy and industrial sectors. The proposal reportedly calls for Ukraine to receive compensation and assistance for reconstruction from an unspecified funding source.

The reported US proposal suggests that the Trump administration is seeking to simultaneously achieve a full ceasefire in Ukraine, conclude a peace settlement to end the war, and develop US-Russian economic relations – a sharp contrast to the timeline of events that the administration has called for in recent weeks. The White House stated on March 25 that Trump's "imperative that the killing on both sides of the must stop" is a "necessary step toward achieving an enduring peace settlement" — demonstrating how the Trump administration viewed a full ceasefire as the first step toward securing a peace settlement. Ukraine agreed to the March 18 US-proposed full ceasefire along the frontline and agreed to the US-supported extension of the unilateral Russian Easter truce on April 21 — in sharp contrast to Russia, which refused to accept or extend these US-proposed and US-supported ceasefires. The White House also stated on April 15 that the United States "needs to see a ceasefire first" before developing US-Russian economic partnerships, and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio reportedly stated in February 2025 that US sanctions on Russia would remain in place until Russia and Ukraine had reached a peace deal to end the war — in contrast to the reported US proposal that would simultaneously put a ceasefire in place in Ukraine, lift US sanctions against Russia, and develop US-Russian economic cooperation.

Significant details about the territorial swaps in the US proposal are unclear from the available reporting. Russian forces currently occupy a small part of Mykolaiv Oblast — the Kinburn Spit — and recently began conducting offensive operations into northern Sumy Oblast — two oblasts which the available reporting about the US proposal does not address. It is unclear whether Ukraine would gain access only to the mouth of the Dnipro River or a wider littoral area along the river‘s left bank given differences between reporting from Axios and The Telegraph. Details about the extent of the territory near the ZNPP on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River that would be considered Ukrainian are also unspecified, but Russian forces would have to withdraw from some territory in the area according to the US plan as Russian forces currently occupy significant portions of Zaporizhia Oblast behind the Dnipro River’s east bank. The Dnipro River would nevertheless present itself as a significant barrier between the Ukrainian-controlled and US-operated ZNPP from the rest of the territory under Ukraine's control under the reported US plan, assuming Russian forces do not withdraw from territory around the Kakhovka Reservoir to permit a land bridge from Ukrainian-controlled Zaporizhia Oblast to the ZNPP. The location of such a strategically important facility close to the frozen frontline would greatly complicate Ukraine's ability to defend the ZNPP due to the lack of defensive depth. ISW previously conduced a terrain study and assessed that freezing the Russian war in Ukraine on anything like the current lines — particularly those in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts — enormously advantages Russia and increases the risks and costs to Ukraine and the West of deterring, let alone defeating, a future Russian operations against war against Ukraine.

Ukrainian officials reiterated Ukraine's continued commitment to the United States' March 2025 proposal for a full ceasefire as part of efforts to achieve a lasting peace. Zelensky recalled on April 22 that Ukraine supported and continues to support Trump's March 18 unconditional ceasefire proposal. Zelensky stated that Ukraine is ready to hold discussions "in any format" after the implementation of a ceasefire. Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov similarly stated on April 23 that the Ukrainian delegation in London discussed ways to achieve a full and unconditional ceasefire as a "first step" toward a peace settlement and that Ukraine is committed to Trump's peace efforts. Ukrainian Economic Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated on April 23 that Ukraine is ready to negotiate and that a full ground, air, and sea ceasefire is a necessary first step toward peace.

Zelensky stated on April 22 that Ukraine does not legally recognize Russia's occupation of Crimea in accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution, which ensures Ukraine's territorial integrity and recognizes the Autonomous Republic of Crimea as part of Ukraine. Svyrydenko also noted that Ukraine cannot agree to a settlement that grants Russia a "stronger foundation" to regroup and renew its aggression in the future. ISW continues to assess that freezing the front along the current lines enormously advantages Russia and increases the risks and costs to Ukraine and the West of deterring and defeating future Russian aggression. Russia's occupation of Crimea and Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts will continue to threaten Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa cities, the Ukrainian southwestern coast, and Ukrainian ships attempting to transit the western Black Sea.

Key Takeaways:

• The United States reportedly recently presented Ukraine with a seven-point proposal to end the war in Ukraine in which the United States would recognize Crimea as part of Russia and allow Russian forces to continue to occupy significant parts of southern and eastern Ukraine. Available reporting about the contents of the US proposal suggests that it marks a sudden and substantial change in the Trump administration's strategy for ending the war in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian officials reiterated Ukraine's continued commitment to the United States' March 2025 proposal for a full ceasefire as part of efforts to achieve a lasting peace.

• Russian officials rejected aspects of Trump's reported peace plan.

• Senior US, Ukrainian, and European officials held bilateral and multilateral talks about support for Ukraine and ending the war in London on April 23, but officials cancelled the scheduled multilateral talks at the foreign minister level.

• The US and Ukraine continue to take steps toward signing a joint mineral deal.

• Ukrainian forces likely conducted a drone strike against the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan, where Russia assembles Iranian-provided Shahed drones.

• Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia is extracting economic benefits from occupied Ukraine by exploiting Ukrainian infrastructure and logistics networks. The Russian Federal Agency for Railway Transport (Roszheldor) announced on April 21 that the first container train carrying unspecified cargo travelled along the Russian “Novorossiya Railways” network through occupied Ukraine and arrived in occupied Sevastopol. The train’s cargo will be unloaded at Sevastopol and exported via ship through Russian-occupied Black Sea ports to unspecified final destinations. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin signed an order in May 2023 creating “Novorossiya Railways” to unite rail lines in occupied Ukraine and Russia by merging them under the auspices of Roszheldor. “Novorossiya Railways” currently operates three lines in occupied Ukraine: the Donetsk branch, the Luhansk branch, and the Kherson-Melitopol branch (linking occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts), all operated on the basis of railways that Ukraine controlled before the full-scale invasion in 2022. Russia’s use of railways in occupied Ukraine supports two Russian objectives—first, to provide logistical support for Russian troops fighting in Ukraine via rail, which can be quicker and safer than logistical support by vehicles, and second, to transport various goods to Black Sea ports for maritime export. Russia can use these railways to transport goods from Russia to ports in occupied Crimea without having to rely on the Kerch Strait Railway Bridge, which in recent years has been routinely non-operational due to Ukrainian long-range strikes, or to directly take resources from occupied Ukraine and export them to international markets. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Crimea service Krym Realii reported on April 21, for example, that Russia is using ports in occupied Kerch to export stolen Ukrainian liquified natural gas (LNG) and grain. The Wall Street Journal found that Russia had sold nearly $1 billion in stolen Ukrainian grain as of September 2024, using railway lines and roads in occupied Ukraine to bring massive amounts of grain to occupied Black Sea ports for export. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko similarly reported that Russia exported over 12,000 tons of coal via occupied Mariupol during the week of April 14-20 alone.

Despite Russia’s drive to exploit economic resources in occupied Ukraine, some Russian companies are struggling to properly manage coal mines in occupied Ukraine, likely putting residents of occupied areas near these mines at risk. Russian business-focused state outlet RBK reported on April 21 that Russian companies Impex-Don LLC and Donskie Ugli Trading House LLC are ending their leases on nine coal mines in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and returning them to the occupation administrations due to high operating costs and low profits. Both these companies began their leases for the nine mines in 2024. The Russian Federal State Budgetary Institution for the Reorganization and Liquidation of Unprofitable Mines (GURSH) will now oversee liquidating (in effect, shutting down) the nine mines. Russia has gone to great lengths to exploit Ukraine’s coal industry and the coal-rich Donetsk Basin, and reportedly exported over $288 million worth of coal from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts between 2014 and 2022. This number has likely significantly increased since 2022, as Russia now has access to additional mines in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Russia was in the process of liquidating 114 coal mines in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as of September 2023. Russia is likely liquidating these mines in part due to the mismanagement of coal mine infrastructure, and also due to volatile international markets. If GURSH fails to close down these coal mines properly, they may degrade in a way that will pose health and environmental risks to nearby communities, namely the Ukrainian residents of these occupied areas.


Key Takeaways:

• Russia is extracting economic benefits from occupied Ukraine by exploiting Ukrainian infrastructure and logistics networks.

• Despite Russia’s drive to exploit economic resources in occupied Ukraine, some Russian companies are struggling to properly manage coal mines in occupied Ukraine, likely putting residents of occupied areas near these mines at risk.

• Russia is actively recruiting teachers from throughout the Russian Federation to teach in occupied Luhansk Oblast as part of the “Zemskyi Uchitel” (“Rural Teacher”) program.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted a large series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 23 to 24, the largest strike series against Kyiv City thus far in 2025. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 215 drones and missiles at Ukraine, including 11 Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Bryansk, Voronezh, and Kursk oblasts; 37 Kh-101 cruise missiles from airspace over Saratov Oblast; six Iskander-K cruise missiles from occupied Donetsk Oblast; 12 Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea; four Kh-59/Kh-69 cruise missiles from airspace over Belgorod Oblast; and 145 Shahed and decoy drones from Bryansk and Kursk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast: Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 7 Iskander-M missiles, 31 Kh-101 missiles, 6 Kalibr missiles, 4 Kh-59/Kh-69 missiles, and 64 Shahed drones, and that 68 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian officials reported that Russia’s strike series injured at least 80 Ukrainians and killed 9 people in Kyiv City alone, and damaged residential areas, energy infrastructure, and other buildings in five raions of the city. Ukrainian officials stated that Russian strikes also damaged civilian, industrial, rail, and energy infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City, and Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Poltava, Khmelnytskyi, and Sumy oblasts.

Russian forces have adjusted their long-range strike tactics and weapons in recent weeks, likely to mitigate Ukrainian air defenses and inflict significant damage even when Ukrainian forces intercept some Russian drones and missiles. Such adaptations disproportionately affect civilians, as ISW has previously noted. US President Donald Trump stated in a post on Truth Social on April 24 that he is "not happy" with Russia's overnight strikes against Kyiv City, calling them "not necessary" and stating that Russia has "very bad timing." Trump called on Russian President Vladimir Putin to stop such strikes and agree to his proposal to end the war.

Key Takeaways:

• The official Kremlin spokesperson and the Russian Security Council secretary repeated a series of long-standing Russian demands that purposely preclude the establishment of a stable and enduring peace in Ukraine and set conditions for future Russian aggression from an advantaged position.

• Kremlin officials continue to baselessly threaten NATO states for adhering to US President Donald Trump's objective that Europe take on more of its own defense requirements.

• Russian forces conducted a large series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 23 to 24, the largest strike series against Kyiv City thus far in 2025.

• Denmark announced a new military aid package to Ukraine for artillery ammunition procurement on April 23.

• A Russian military court sentenced former 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov to imprisonment, likely as part of an ongoing Kremlin effort to punish Russian military commanders who weaponized the information space to advance their political goals that undermine Putin’s power vertical.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Belgorod and Sumy oblasts and near Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian and European representatives reportedly presented the United States with a proposal to end the war in Ukraine during multilateral talks in London on April 23. The Telegraph reported on April 25 that the Ukrainian-European proposal contained five points about territory, security guarantees, negotiations, refusing Russian sovereignty over occupied Crimea, and the Ukrainian military and defense industrial base (DIB). Reuters published the full text of the terms that Ukrainian and European officials reportedly developed in response to the US seven-point peace plan on April 25. The proposal as presented by Reuters calls for a full, unconditional air, sea, and land ceasefire concurrently with immediate technical negotiations to implement the ceasefire, involving the United States and European countries; United States-led ceasefire monitoring with support from third countries; robust Ukrainian security guarantees absent Ukraine’s NATO accession; and for Russia to unconditionally return illegally deported Ukrainian children and detained Ukrainian civilians as well as engage in an "all-for-all" prisoner of war (POW) exchange. The proposal reportedly rejects restrictions on the Ukrainian military, calls for an ad hoc group of European states and willing non-European countries to guarantee Ukraine's security, and rejects restrictions on the deployment of any friendly forces to Ukraine.

The Ukrainian-European proposal states that Russia and Ukraine will negotiate territorial issues only after the implementation of a full and unconditional ceasefire and that these negotiations will use the current frontline as a starting framework. The Ukrainian-European proposal would reportedly provide Ukraine with "unhindered access" to the Dnipro River and control of the Kinburn Spit and Kakhovka Dam. The proposal reportedly calls for Ukraine to regain control over the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) "with US involvement." The Ukrainian-European proposal also reportedly states that Ukraine’s partners will work toward a consensus on NATO membership, and that Ukraine will pursue joining the European Union (EU).

The Ukrainian-European proposal reportedly calls for the United States and Ukraine to implement the US-Ukraine minerals deal and economic cooperation agreement. The proposal states that US sanctions on Russia may be subject to "gradual easing" if a sustainable peace is achieved and may resume if Russia violates a peace agreement. The proposal reportedly calls for Ukraine’s full reconstruction and financial compensation, including using frozen Russian assets.

Reuters also published the full text of the seven-point peace proposal that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff reportedly presented to Ukrainian and European officials in Paris on April 17, supporting earlier reporting about the US peace proposal. Reuters reported that the US plan demands an immediate ceasefire and direct technical negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. The US plan reportedly provides Ukraine with strong security guarantees from a coalition of European and willing non-European states but also calls for Ukraine to abandon efforts to join NATO while maintaining the option to pursue European Union (EU) membership. The US plan reportedly includes "de jure" US recognition of Russian control over occupied Crimea and de facto recognition of Russian control of Luhansk Oblast and parts of occupied Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Kherson Oblasts. The recognition of de jure Russian sovereignty over Crimea or any other areas of Ukraine under occupation since 2014 would constitute a significant concession to Russia that should be balanced by a significant Russian concession in return.

The US plan reportedly stipulates that Ukraine will regain territory in Kharkiv Oblast and the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), which the United States would operate and which would supply electricity to both Russia and Ukraine. The proposed US plan would return the Kakhovka Dam and Kinburn Spit to Ukraine and guarantee Ukrainian passage on the Dnipro River. The US plan reportedly states that Ukraine and the United States will implement a mineral deal and economic partnership agreement, calls for Ukraine's full reconstruction, and offers financial compensation to Ukraine, but does not specify the funding source. The US proposal reportedly calls for lifting sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 and resuming US-Russian economic cooperation in the energy and industrial sectors.

The newly published Reuters document supports and clarifies earlier reporting by Axios and The Telegraph of the US seven-point proposal to Ukraine, but some details remain unclear. The Reuters document affirms core details, such as territorial arrangements, Ukraine's non-accession to NATO, and the US-run operation of the ZNPP. The report also clarifies that Ukraine would regain control of the Kinburn Spit, the small part of Mykolaiv Oblast that Russia currently occupies, and the Kakhovka Dam, which spans between occupied and unoccupied Kherson Oblast. The Reuters document does not address Sumy Oblast, where Russian forces recently began conducting offensive operations, or how the United States and Ukraine would gain access to the ZNPP, given that the Kakhovka Reservoir and Dnipro River are natural barriers between current Ukrainian positions and the ZNPP. Russian forces would have to partially withdraw from either east (left) bank Kherson Oblast or permit a land bridge across the Kakhovka Reservoir under the US plan, but neither option inherently provides the strategic depth Ukraine would need to defend the ZNPP against further Russian aggression, as ISW has recently reported.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian and European representatives reportedly presented the United States with a proposal to end the war in Ukraine during the multilateral talks in London on April 23.

• Reuters also published the full text of the seven-point peace proposal that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff reportedly presented to Ukrainian and European officials in Paris on April 17, supporting earlier reporting about the US peace proposal.

• US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on April 25, reportedly to secure a major Russian concession in a future peace deal.

• That the Kremlin is not formally demanding that Ukraine cede most or all of its territory to Russia at this time is not a significant Russian concession, however.

• Russian officials continue to intensify narratives used to justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine in order to set conditions to justify future Russian aggression against European states and control European defense policy in the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign.

• Unknown actors assassinated the deputy head of the Russian General Staff's Main Operational Directorate, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, in Balashikha, Moscow Oblast, on April 25.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Kursk oblasts and near Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Auch wenn ich hier im Forum wohl der einzige bin, aber die Friedensbemühungen sind Trump hoch anzurechnen!

edit:

Wow, what a picture.
https://x.com/piersmorgan/status/1916076805712158899

Keine Sorge, du bist nicht allein
Und auch ich war heute begeistert über die Verhandlungen im Petersdom - obwohl doch naheliegend, weil so spontan die Sicherheit für die Regierungschefs an einem anderen Ort in Rom herzustellen, wär wahrscheinlich viel mehr Aufwand gewesen.

>Auch wenn ich hier im Forum wohl der einzige bin, aber die
>Friedensbemühungen sind Trump hoch anzurechnen!


Aber das Vorgehen dabei bisher nicht.

>>Auch wenn ich hier im Forum wohl der einzige bin, aber
>die
>>Friedensbemühungen sind Trump hoch anzurechnen!
>
>
>Aber das Vorgehen dabei bisher nicht.
>

Ich würde es eher als Kapitulationsbemühungen titulieren.

ad Trump: Natürlich ist nicht alles verkehrt was er anspricht,
(bspw. Ungleichgewicht mit China), aber die Methodik,
mit der dieses oder andere Themen angegangen werden,
ist jenseitig, stümperhaft und oft kontraproduktiv.

>Ich würde es eher als Kapitulationsbemühungen titulieren.
>
>ad Trump: Natürlich ist nicht alles verkehrt was er anspricht,
>
>(bspw. Ungleichgewicht mit China), aber die Methodik,
>mit der dieses oder andere Themen angegangen werden,
>ist jenseitig, stümperhaft und oft kontraproduktiv.


Exakt.

>>Auch wenn ich hier im Forum wohl der einzige bin, aber
>die
>>Friedensbemühungen sind Trump hoch anzurechnen!
>
>
>Aber das Vorgehen dabei bisher nicht.
>

Ja, das Vorgehen ist manchmal fragwürdig. Aber zumindest unternimmt er etwas, im Gegensatz zu Biden oder den EU Politikern(die noch immer von Waffen träumen).

Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on April 26 that Russian forces pushed all Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast. Gerasimov told Russian President Vladimir Putin on April 26 that Russian forces had fully defeated Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and seized Gornal (southwest of Sudzha), the last Ukrainian-held settlement in Kursk Oblast. Gerasimov credited elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps , Leningrad Military District ), 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet ), 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), and 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call up) with seizing Gornal. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov was visiting a Russian command post in Kursk Oblast to hear reports from Kursk Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Valery Solodchuk when Russian forces seized Gornal. Geolocated footage published on April 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Gora Street in central Gornal. The Ukrainian General Staff refuted the Russian claims later on April 26 and stated that Ukrainian forces maintain unspecified positions in Kursk Oblast. The General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled five Russian assaults in Kursk Oblast on April 26. Russian milbloggers similarly claimed on April 26 that fighting continued near Oleshnya (northwest of Gornal), Guyevo (south of Sudzha near the international border), and St. Nicholas Monastery (southwest of Guyevo).

US President Donald Trump stated that the United States is no longer pursuing a concrete deadline for achieving a resolution to the war in Ukraine — a departure from the administration’s previously stated goal of ending the war within its first 100 days. Trump told reporters on April 25 that the United States has "no deadline" to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine. Trump also stated on April 26 that there was "no reason" for Russia’s strikes on civilian areas and reiterated a previously stated concern that " is just tapping me along" by disingenuously ceasefire and peace negotiations. Trump stated that Putin's actions make Trump think that "maybe doesn't want to stop the war" and "has to be dealt with differently." Russian officials have repeatedly to leverage heightened US interest in negotiating a swift resolution to the war in Ukraine to make demands tantamount to Ukrainian surrender and incompatible with Trump’s stated goal of achieving a stable and enduring peace in Ukraine. Russian forces have also conducted a string of strikes against civilian areas in recent weeks, including a devastating strike on Kyiv City on the night of April 23 to 24. Trump and Ukrainian President Zelensky met in Vatican City on April 26 to discuss the ongoing peace talks. Zelensky reported on April 26 that he and Trump discussed civilian safety, a full and unconditional ceasefire, and a lasting peace that prevents resumption of hostilities. White House Communications Director Steven Cheung stated that Trump and Zelensky had a "very productive discussion."

Russia is likely preparing to systematically integrate motorcycle usage into offensive operations in Ukraine for Summer and Fall 2025, likely to offset adept Ukrainian drone capabilities. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on April 26 showing likely elements of the 299th (Airborne) VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) practicing offensive and defensive tactics on motorcycles in groups of two to three people at a Russian training ground. The video indicates that the Russian military is likely developing a tactical doctrine for systematic offensive motorcycle usage and may be preparing to issue an increased number of motorcycles to Russian personnel in Ukraine. Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn reported that Ukrainian intelligence noted that the Russian military is training its soldiers in combat tactics with motorcycles, suggesting that Russian forces will likely increasingly integrate motorcycles into offensive operations in Ukraine in Summer and Fall 2025. Shamshyn noted that motorcycles allow Russian soldiers to enhance their speed and maneuverability, which is crucial for evading Ukrainian drone strikes, but that the loud noise of the motorcycle prevents the rider from hearing approaching Ukrainian drones. ISW has observed an increased trend of Russian units conducting mechanized and combined motorized assaults and transporting infantry with motorcycles and civilian vehicles throughout the frontline as Russian command continues to adapt its tactics to offset Ukrainian drone strikes and likely to mitigate the Russian military's equipment constraints resulting from high armored vehicle losses in Summer and early Fall 2024. Russian forces notably recently advanced during a motorized assault near Bahatyr comprised entirely of motorcycles and civilian vehicles.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on April 26 that Russian forces pushed all Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.

• Ukraine's August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast successfully pinned some Russian combat power, including elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units, but its long-term effects remain unclear at this time.

• Gerasimov made the first official Russian acknowledgement of North Korean troop participation in Russian operations in Kursk Oblast by thanking North Korean servicemembers for their assistance in Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces out of the region.

• US President Donald Trump stated that the United States is no longer pursuing a concrete deadline for achieving a resolution to the war in Ukraine — a departure from the administration’s previously stated goal of ending the war within its first 100 days.

• Russia is likely preparing to systematically integrate motorcycle usage into offensive operations in Ukraine for Summer and Fall 2025, likely to offset adept Ukrainian drone capabilities.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka, Kurkakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian and Russian forces' constant technological and tactical battlefield innovations continue to transform the character of warfare in Ukraine. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) in a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion, likely operating in the Chasiv Yar direction, reported on April 27 that continuous technological innovations and battlefield adaptations have increasingly transformed the character of modern conventional warfare in Ukraine into a war that primarily features "long-range, remote combat" over meeting engagements between infantry and armored vehicles. The NCO noted that Ukrainian and Russian forces’ intensifying drone usage has expanded the area of contested gray zones and kill zones at the forward edge of the battle area. The NCO noted that in 2024, contested gray zones were roughly 500 meters to two kilometers in depth, but more intense drone usage since then has expanded the gray zone up to five to seven kilometers in some areas of the frontline. The NCO reported that Russian forces are improving and expanding their unmanned systems capabilities and emulating Ukrainian forces’ tactics of using drones to intercept enemy drones and conduct remote mining. Ukrainian forces have successfully leveraged superior drone capabilities to defend critical sectors of the frontline while also mitigating manpower and materiel constraints.

Ukraine maintains over 100 brigades that must defend a frontline (both within Ukraine and along Ukraine's international border with Russia) currently over 2,100 kilometers long and significantly leverages drone capabilities, in tandem with traditional capabilities, to deny Russian attacks across the frontline. Ukraine has demonstrated an ability to rapidly upscale domestic drone production and foreign drone procurement that is conducive for defending the frontline as well as executing a sustained long-range strikes campaign targeting Russian critical energy and defense industrial facilities deep within Russian territory that disrupts and degrades the Russian military's production and logistics. Both Ukrainian and Russian forces have more regularly been using fiber-optic drones to strike each other’s frontline positions and have successfully used first-person view (FPV) drones to intercept larger reconnaissance drones over the past several months.

ISW has observed the rapid rate at which both Ukraine and Russia have managed to conceptualize, field, and implement near-continuous technological innovation and battlefield-adjusted tactics to optimize combat dynamics. Ukrainian and Russian forces field new adaptations over the course of months rather than years and are constantly experimenting, further driving the feedback loop of increased reliance on technology and tactical innovation to maintain battlefield advantages. The innovation and operational concepts being forged in Ukraine will set the stage for the future of warfare.

Russian forces are attempting to offset Ukrainian technological adaptations and drone operations by integrating motorcycles and civilian vehicles into offensive operations along the entire frontline. The NCO in the Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion stated that Russian forces are increasingly using infantry assaults and motorized assaults on motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and light vehicles to advance in areas where Ukrainian forces leverage drone usage to maintain frontline positions. The non-commissioned officer reported that Russian forces leverage motorcycles and other light vehicles to disperse forces to more easily avoid drone strikes. A Ukrainian soldier operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on April 27 that Russian forces have conducted 13 motorized assaults on motorcycles since March 20. A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on April 27 that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction cannot drive heavy armored vehicles to frontline positions due to disrupted Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), resulting in Russian forces shifting tactics to prioritize daily infantry assaults supported by motorcycles.

ISW has observed Russian forces throughout the entire theater struggling to operate heavy armored vehicles close to the line of fire without being struck by Ukrainian drones. Russian forces are likely leveraging the speed, maneuverability, and small profiles of motorcycles and other light civilian vehicles to mitigate the efficacy of Ukrainian drone capabilities and are likely developing a tactical doctrine for systematic offensive motorcycle usage and preparing to integrate motorcycle usage into Summer and Fall 2024 offensive operations. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and military command previously responded to Ukrainian drone innovations by attempting to formally integrate and centralize Russia’s drone operations and production. The Ukrainian and Russian defense industrial bases (DIBs) continue to compete in the innovation of new, cost-effective systems that enhance assault and battlefield capabilities and counter each other’s innovations. Russian forces likely see a tactical opportunity in leveraging motorcycles and civilian vehicles to advance and seize as much Ukrainian territory as possible despite Ukraine’s drone defenses.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian and Russian forces' constant technological and tactical battlefield innovations continue to transform the character of warfare in Ukraine.

• Russian forces are attempting to offset Ukrainian technological adaptations and drone operations by integrating motorcycles and civilian vehicles into offensive operations along the entire frontline.

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reaffirmed Russia's long-standing position against making any forms of territorial concessions, undermining the US President Donald Trump's efforts to broker a lasting peace.

• Russian law enforcement announced on April 26 the arrest of Ignat Kuzin, the suspect whom Russia accused of planting the improvised explosive device (IED) that killed the deputy head of the Russian General Staff's Main Operational Directorate, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, on April 25

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced another unilateral ceasefire in Ukraine, this time in honor of a major Soviet and Russian military holiday, while continuing to reject the March 2025 US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire proposal. Putin continues to refuse any ceasefire other than on terms that advantage his war effort. The Kremlin announced on April 28 that Putin declared a ceasefire in honor of Victory Day on May 9 – when Russia celebrates the Soviet Union's contributions to defeating Nazi Germany during the Second World War (while minimizing the role played by the United States) – between midnight on the night of May 7 to 8 and midnight on the night of May 10 to 11. The Kremlin stated that Russian forces will respond to any Ukrainian ceasefire violations. The Kremlin claimed that the Victory Day ceasefire demonstrates Russia's supposed readiness for peace negotiations without preconditions to eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia is exchanging information with the United States about the Victory Day ceasefire and characterized the unilateral ceasefire as a "manifestation" of Russia's goodwill. The Kremlin is preparing to welcome a significant number of foreign dignitaries, including from former Soviet, Latin American, Asian, and African countries, for Russia's Victory Day celebration, and Putin likely seeks to avoid the embarrassment of Ukrainian strikes during these celebrations.

Putin previously declared a unilateral ceasefire in honor of Easter in mid-April 2025, but Russian and Ukrainian sources repeatedly accused each other of violating the ceasefire throughout the theater in Ukraine. Russia also repeatedly accused Ukraine of violating the 30-day moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes but rarely offered evidence of these alleged violations. ISW previously noted that the energy strikes ceasefire and Easter ceasefire underscored the need for the details of any future ceasefire or peace agreement to be publicly available, formally agreed to in advance by all parties, and to include robust monitoring mechanisms. Putin's proposed Victory Day ceasefire does not include any additional monitoring mechanisms, and Russian sources will likely leverage the lack of such mechanisms to again flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations. Russian officials appear disinterested in establishing meaningful monitoring mechanisms or a general public basis for these ceasefires, likely because Russia benefits from weaponizing the vague and unclear conditions of the ceasefires against Ukraine.

Putin is leveraging unilateral ceasefires to achieve informational and battlefield advantages in Ukraine, counter to US President Donald Trump's goal of using a general ceasefire as a stepping stone towards an enduring and sustainable peace agreement in Ukraine. Putin appears to be opportunistically declaring ceasefires during major religious and military holidays in order to force Ukraine to accept the ceasefire or risk appearing intransigent to the West. Unilaterally declaring ceasefires also allows Putin to distract attention from his rejection of the March 2025 US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire proposal and to maintain the illusion that he is interested in peace negotiations while keeping full control over the conditions and timing of any ceasefire agreements. Russian forces seized on the Easter ceasefire to shell and conduct reconnaissance of frontline Ukrainian positions and damaged vehicles along the frontline in preparation for future Russian assaults, and Russian forces will likely use the Victory Day ceasefire for similar preparatory efforts. Putin likely views the Victory Day ceasefire as a chance for Russian forces to rest ahead of future frontline activity in Ukraine and as a way to ensure that Ukraine does not conduct any significant long-range strikes against Russia during Victory Day celebrations. Putin likely does not view the Victory Day ceasefire as a serious step towards lasting peace in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin announced another unilateral ceasefire in Ukraine – this time in honor of a major Soviet and Russian military holiday, while continuing to reject the March 2025 US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire proposal. Putin continues to refuse any ceasefire other than on terms that advantage his war effort.

• Putin is leveraging unilateral ceasefires to achieve informational and battlefield advantages in Ukraine, counter to US President Donald Trump's goal of using a general ceasefire as a stepping stone towards an enduring and sustainable peace agreement in Ukraine.

• Ukraine – in contrast to Russia – continues to demonstrate its support for Trump's desired full, permanent ceasefire.

• The Kremlin continues attempts to hold legitimate ceasefire negotiations hostage in order to secure additional concessions from Ukraine and the United States.

• Lavrov reiterated on April 28 Russia's longstanding demands for Ukraine's surrender and concessions from the West, as Russia continues to offer no concessions of its own.

• Russian and North Korean officials touted the success of their joint military operations in Kursk Oblast in order to highlight the international community's inability to deter Russian efforts to involve its allies directly in Russia's war against Ukraine, as the Kremlin pledged to offer North Korea reciprocal active military support.

• Russia is reportedly expanding its military infrastructure along its border with Finland and stockpiling new tanks, likely in preparation for future aggression against NATO.

• Czech Defense Minister Jana Černochová announced on April 27 that the Czech Ammunition Initiative will have delivered another 400,000 rounds of large-caliber artillery ammunition to Ukraine by April 30.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated on April 29 that Russia's war in Ukraine must end in Russian "victory" and the "destruction" of the current Ukrainian government. Senior Kremlin officials continue to signal that Russia has greater territorial ambitions than just the occupied areas of Ukraine, particularly in areas bordering the Black Sea. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on April 29 that Ukrainian civilians, particularly those living in the Black Sea region, must "determine their own future." Patrushev specifically noted that Odesa City spent over two centuries as the Russian Empire's and Soviet Union's outpost in the Black Sea and claimed that Odesa City residents have "nothing in common" with the current Ukrainian government. These statements are a reference to Russian President Vladimir Putin's 2023 claim that Ukrainians living in the Black Sea region have nothing "to do with Ukraine" and that Odesa is a "Russian city" and follows Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's April 14, 2025 claim that the Ukrainian government "does not represent" residents of Odesa City and other Ukrainian territories. Patrushev claimed that Russia "respects the will of the people" and attempted to justify Russia's illegal annexation of occupied Crimea, Donbas, and "Novorossiya" — an invented region in Ukraine which the Kremlin has claimed includes all of eastern and southern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia. Medvedev also claimed that the current Ukrainian government does not speak for the Ukrainian people. Medvedev's and Patrushev’s statements reference the longstanding Kremlin demand for regime change in Ukraine with the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government that could struggle to oppose or even support the Kremlin's goal to occupy more territory in Ukraine at a later time of the Kremlin's choosing.

Russian officials are setting conditions to baselessly accuse Ukraine of violating Russia's unilateral May 8 to 11 ceasefire, as the Kremlin has done during previous ceasefires, while rejecting Ukraine's proposal for a 30-day ceasefire. Lavrov claimed on April 29 that the May 8 to 11 ceasefire will be the "beginning of direct negotiations, without preconditions," but stated that Russia considers the US- and Ukrainian-proposed 30-day ceasefire to be a "precondition." Lavrov reiterated Putin's rejection of the US- and Ukrainian-proposed longer-term ceasefires, claiming that Russia cannot accept any longer-term ceasefire since such ceasefires require extensive monitoring measures. Lavrov stated that Russia does not think "honest" monitoring is possible during a 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 29 that the Ukrainian government does not have full control over all Ukrainian military units and will be unable to guarantee that Ukrainian forces adhere to the May 8 to 11 ceasefire. Putin similarly declared a unilateral Easter ceasefire in mid-April 2025, and Russia has consistently accused Ukraine of violating previous ceasefires while rarely offering evidence supporting these accusations. Ukraine — unlike Russia — supports US President Donald Trump's proposals for a 30-day temporary ceasefire or more permanent ceasefires. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is leveraging unilateral ceasefires to achieve informational and battlefield advantages in Ukraine and to maintain the illusion that Russia is interested in meaningful peace negotiations.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated on April 29 that Russia's war in Ukraine must end in Russian "victory" and the "destruction" of the current Ukrainian government. Senior Kremlin officials continue to signal that Russia has greater territorial ambitions than just the occupied areas of Ukraine, particularly in areas bordering the Black Sea.

• Senior Russian officials reiterated the longstanding, false Russian narrative that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, likely in order to set conditions to manipulate ceasefire negotiations and renege on any future Russian-Ukrainian agreements at a time of Russia's choosing.

• Russian officials are setting conditions to baselessly accuse Ukraine of violating Russia's unilateral May 8 to 11 ceasefire, as the Kremlin has done during previous ceasefires, while rejecting Ukraine's proposal for a 30-day ceasefire.

• Kremlin officials within Putin's inner circle continue to threaten NATO as Putin himself refrains from doing so — likely as part of Kremlin efforts to justify future Russian aggression against NATO to the Russian population.

• Putin promoted his previously proposed Eurasian security architecture on April 29 as part of Russian efforts to create an alternative Russian-led bloc that furthers Putin's goals of destroying NATO and weakening the West and its allies.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Belgorod and Sumy oblasts and near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

The United States and Ukraine signed a bilateral economic partnership agreement on April 30. The US Department of the Treasury announced the agreement, which created the United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund that aims to accelerate Ukraine's economic recovery. The precise terms of the agreement are unspecified as of this publication. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent reiterated that the United States remains committed to peace and prosperity in a free Ukraine and noted that "no state or person who financed or supplied the Russian war machine" will be allowed to benefit from Ukraine's reconstruction. Bessent also stated that the agreement signals to Russia that the Trump administration is “committed to a peace process centered on a free, sovereign, and prosperous Ukraine over the long term.” The BBC Russian Service reported that the agreement includes language that future US military aid to Ukraine could be labeled as US “investment” in Ukraine, though these details remain unconfirmed as of this report.

Key Takeaways:

• The United States and Ukraine signed a bilateral economic partnership agreement on April 30.

• Russian officials continue to demand full Ukrainian capitulation as the sole basis on which Russia is willing to accept a future peace agreement.

• Peskov overinflated Russia's current military strength and battlefield victories thus far in the war in an attempt to justify Russia's continued unwillingness to make territorial concessions.

• Russian officials continue to call for the cessation of Western aid to Ukraine as part of efforts to reintensify offensive operations when Ukraine's defense capabilities are weakened.

• Senior Russian officials continue claim that Russia is open to diplomacy to end the war while rejecting US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals that would allow for formal peace negotiations to begin.

• Russian officials continue to falsely portray European efforts to increase their own defense capabilities – in line with US President Donald Trump's objective to have Europe shoulder more of the burden for collective security - as a threat to Russian national security, likely to support Russian efforts to justify future Russian aggression against NATO.

• North Korea and Russia continue to enhance bilateral cooperation, particularly in the military and labor spheres.

• Ukrainian sources continue to report on cases of Russian commanders ordering their subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of international law.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

The United States and Ukraine published additional information about their April 30 bilateral economic partnership agreement.The Trump administration and the Ukrainian government published the joint text of the US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund on May 1 and reported that the agreement is a "fully collaborative partnership" that will fund Ukraine's long-term reconstruction and modernization. The agreement establishes a joint fund that the United States and Ukraine will equally pay into to fund development, infrastructure, and natural resource extraction projects in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials noted that Ukraine will retain full control over "subsoil, infrastructure, and natural resources" and the right to determine the terms of use for Ukraine's natural resources. Ukrainian officials stated that United States can make monetary contributions or supply additional military assistance to Ukraine as part of the fund, and that Ukraine will allocate 50 percent of its state budget revenues from rent payments, license fees, and other revenue from national resource extraction projects to the fund. The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada must ratify the agreement, and it appears that the United States and Ukraine will also have to sign a series of more technical agreements that will define the terms of the investments and projects in the future.

The Trump administration noted that the agreement signals US commitment to "Ukraine's long-term success" and noted that the United States and Ukraine will not allow any person, company, or state that supplied the Russian war effort to benefit from the reconstruction of Ukraine. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also noted during an interview on Fox News on May 1 that the agreement is a "strong signal" to Russian officials that there "is no daylight" between the United States and Ukraine. Ukraine's participation in this agreement underscores Ukraine's continued willingness to make compromises in pursuit of a long-term, sustainable resolution of the war in Ukraine despite consistent Russian disinterest in US and Ukrainian peace proposals.

Key Takeaways:

• The United States and Ukraine published additional information about their April 30 bilateral economic partnership agreement.

• US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg recently reaffirmed that Ukrainian officials remain committed to resolving the war in Ukraine, despite ongoing Russian refusals to accept US President Donald Trump’s repeated proposals for a general ceasefire in pursuit of lasting peace in Ukraine.

• Russia continues to reject US and European proposals to deploy Western peacekeeping forces to Ukraine and calls for Russia to make territorial concessions in pursuit of a lasting peace in Ukraine, signaling the Kremlin's unyielding negotiating position.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian gains along the frontline have slowed over the last four months, but Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances between September and December 2024. ISW assesses that Russian forces gained a total of 1,627 square kilometers in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast in January, February, March, and April 2025, and daily Russian casualty reports from the Ukrainian General Staff indicate that Russian forces suffered 160,600 casualties during the last four months for an average of 99 casualties for every square kilometer taken over the last four months. ISW assesses that Russian forces seized an estimated 496 square kilometers in January 2025; an estimated 313 square kilometers in February 2025; an estimated 601 square kilometers in March 2025; and an estimated 217 square kilometers in April 2025. Ukrainian General Staff reports indicate that Russian forces lost an estimated 48,060 casualties in January 2025, 35,300 casualties in February 2025, 40,670 casualties in March 2025, and 36,570 casualties in April 2025. Russian advances significantly increased in March 2025 due to the elimination of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, coinciding with the temporary cessation of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine, although Russian advances on average decreased between January, February, and April 2025. Russian gains have also slowed as Russian forces come up against more well-defended Ukrainian positions in and around larger towns such as Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk over the last four months.

Russian forces are currently sustaining a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained than in Fall 2024. Russian forces gained an estimated 2,949 square kilometers at the cost of 174,935 casualties between September and December 2024 — an average of 59 casualties per square kilometer taken. Russian casualty rates consistently increased throughout September, October, November, and December 2024 and peaked at an estimated 49,135 total monthly casualties in December 2024. Monthly Russian rates of advance plateaued at 839 square kilometers in November 2024, however, and began to slow in December 2024 to an assessed 593 square kilometers and have continued to slow in 2025 (with the exception of the elimination of the Kursk salient). Russian gains have been 45 percent slower between January and April 2025 than in the period between September and December 2024, although Russian casualty rates have only decreased by 10 percent in that interval. The Russian military command thus appears to be tolerating similar personnel loss rates despite a significant decrease in the rate of territorial gains.

Russia has thus far sustained these casualties and the current tempo of offensive operations by rapidly deploying low-quality troops to frontline units, although the reliance on such troops is also hindering Russia's ability to conduct complex operations and make rapid advances in Ukraine. ISW has not observed a notable decrease in the tempo of Russian offensive operations along the frontline in recent months, despite the slowing rates of advance, suggesting that Russia is generating enough forces to sustain these casualties without having to deprioritize any frontline area. ISW has repeatedly observed reports that new Russian recruits only receive a month of training before deploying to Ukraine, and this limited training is likely constraining recruits' combat capabilities and the Russian military's overall capacity to successfully conduct complex operations. The Russian military command is currently prioritizing funneling poorly trained recruits into highly attritional infantry assaults to offset personnel losses in Ukraine while sustaining the current tempo of operations, possibly at the expense of Russia's long-term warfighting capabilities. The Russian military does not have a reserve pool of well-trained troops who are not currently engaged in combat in Ukraine and can rapidly deploy along the frontline, and the Russian military command's decision to funnel poorly trained troops to the frontline in Ukraine is undermining Russia's ability to create a pool of such forces.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to maintaining the tempo of offensive operations despite diminishing returns underscores Putin's ongoing efforts to leverage further battlefield gains to generate pressure on Ukraine in ceasefire and peace negotiations or otherwise to force Ukraine's collapse. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is attempting to prolong negotiations to extract additional concessions from the United States and Ukraine and make additional battlefield gains. Russian forces intensified offensive operations throughout the frontline in February and March 2025, including a limited offensive operation into northern Sumy Oblast, as part of an ongoing Russian effort to slowly degrade frontline Ukrainian positions and make opportunistic tactical advances. Putin may intend to leverage any gains over the last four months and in the near future to extract further Ukrainian and Western concessions during future peace negotiations. It remains unclear if Russia will maintain sufficient force generation rates to sustain offensive operations in Ukraine indefinitely, however, due to the rising economic cost of social benefits and one-time payments for Russian servicemembers. ISW previously noted that Russia's ongoing and forecasted economic struggles are closely tied to Russian losses on the battlefield and that it is not possible for the United States or the wider West to exert maximum pressure on Russia with economic tools alone. The United States can better leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger negotiating position and more durable resolution to the war in Ukraine by forcing Putin to rethink his negotiation and battlefield strategies and empowering Ukrainian forces to continue inflicting significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian gains along the frontline have slowed over the last four months, but Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances between September and December 2024.

• Russian forces are currently sustaining a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained than in Fall 2024.

• Russia has thus far sustained these casualties and the current tempo of offensive operations by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units, although the reliance on such troops is also hindering Russia's ability to conduct complex operations and make rapid advances in Ukraine.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to maintaining the tempo of offensive operations despite diminishing returns underscores Putin's ongoing efforts to leverage further battlefield gains to generate pressure on Ukraine in ceasefire and peace negotiations or otherwise to force Ukraine's collapse.

• Western intelligence reportedly suggests that Putin may begin prioritizing short-term goals such as consolidating Russia's gains in Ukraine and Russia's immediate economic viability over seizing more territory, but Putin's demonstrated commitment to maintaining the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine despite continuing high casualty rates is a counter-indicator to this reported assessment.

• A future slowing of Russian offensive operations and/or transition to defensive operations in all or part of the theater would be indicators that Putin is shifting his short-term goals from seizing more territory to consolidating previously held territory.

• ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to his long-term military objectives of seizing all of Ukraine and undermining NATO.

• Statements by US officials suggest that the Trump administration is considering stepping back from intensified mediation efforts to end the war in Ukraine.

• The US Department of State submitted a proposed license for defense exports to Ukraine to the US Congress on April 29.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky denied that Ukraine would concede to the vague terms of Russian President Vladimir Putin's unilateral May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire proposal. Zelensky referred to Putin's May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire demand as a "theatrical production" that does not appear to be serious and is designed to create a sense of comfort and safety for participants of Russia's Victory Day celebration. Zelensky once again articulated Ukraine's willingness to extend a short-term ceasefire to 30 days and stated that an effective ceasefire requires high-quality monitoring mechanisms. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that any joint ceasefire should be comprehensive and last for at least 30 days with the possibility for renewal. Kovalenko noted that shorter ceasefires with vague terms and a lack of monitoring mechanisms afford Russian forces the opportunity to seize on tactical pauses to better prepare ahead of a future summer offensive in Ukraine. Victory Day is Russia's principal patriotic holiday that commemorates the Soviet Union's contributions to victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War (known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War), and Russia celebrates Victory Day on May 9. Putin first announced on April 28 Russia's intention to implement a Victory Day ceasefire between midnight on the night of May 7 to 8 and midnight on the night of May 10 to 11. Putin's decision to unilaterally impose a fleeting ceasefire during Russia's Victory Day celebration is a deliberate attempt to project a sense of power and control in Russia to both domestic and international audiences. Putin likely also seeks to avoid the embarrassment of Ukrainian strikes during these celebrations by imposing such an agreement.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the purpose of Russia's unilateral Easter and Victory Day ceasefires is to "test" Ukraine's readiness to pursue paths towards a sustainable peace. Peskov claimed that Russia will wait for "final," unambiguous statements from Ukraine and will look for Ukrainian actions aimed at de-escalating the war during the holiday. Ukraine and the United States have previously proposed a 30-day general ceasefire to Russia, but Russian officials continue to ignore or outright reject these general ceasefire proposals. Ukraine has also repeatedly called for longer ceasefires so as to pave the way for negotiations toward a durable peace settlement — which is in line with US President Donald Trump's efforts to leverage a ceasefire as the foundation for a lasting peace agreement in Ukraine. Russia is very likely to continue its pattern of leveraging short-term ceasefires to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations in an effort to discredit Ukraine and to create tactical or operational pauses to conduct troop rotations, resupply units, and prepare for future offensive operations, as evidenced by the Easter and long-range energy infrastructure strikes ceasefires. Russia's continued rejection of Ukrainian and US ceasefire proposals of any reasonable length with necessary monitoring mechanisms showcases Russia's disinterest in peace in Ukraine in the near term.

The Trump administration appears to have finalized its first military equipment sale to Ukraine. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced on May 2 that the US State Department approved and notified the US Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) of equipment and maintenance services for Ukraine’s F-16s worth an estimated $310.5 million. The DSCA reported that the sale will include aircraft modifications and upgrades; personnel training related to operation, maintenance, and sustainment support; spare parts, consumables, and accessories; repair and return support; ground handling equipment; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documents; studies and surveys; and US Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky denied that Ukraine would concede to the vague terms of Russian President Vladimir Putin's unilateral May 8-11 Victory Day ceasefire proposal.

• The Trump administration appears to have finalized its first military equipment sale to Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone for the first time on May 3.

• Senior Kremlin officials continue to set informational conditions that could support military operations against Lithuania (and other NATO states) by advancing narratives that deny the sovereignty of Lithuania and other former Soviet states.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Novopavlivka, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated that Russia maintains the initial objectives of its war in Ukraine, which are tantamount to Ukraine's surrender, despite ongoing negotiations with the United States. Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin published a documentary on Russian state TV channel Rossiya 1 about Putin on May 4, in which Putin claimed that Russia has enough manpower and materiel to bring the war in Ukraine to its "logical conclusion with the result that Russia needs." Putin also claimed that Russian reconciliation with the Ukrainian part of the Russian people is "inevitable." Putin has repeatedly claimed that the Ukrainian people are simply a subset of Russians rather than a distinctly separate nation to justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the occupation of Ukrainian territory and people.Russian state media notably highlighted that Putin has previously made the false claim that Russians and Ukrainians are one people. Putin’s statements indicate that Russia continues to assess that it can achieve its original objectives of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which include demilitarizing Ukraine, installing a pro-Russian government in Ukraine, forcing Ukraine to abandon its aspirations to join NATO and other security blocs, and forcing Ukraine to make massive territorial concessions to Russia, including parts of Ukraine that Russia does not currently occupy. These demands amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation. Russia will likely continue efforts to achieve these goals through military and diplomatic means, as Russian officials continue attempts to leverage battlefield gains to strengthen their negotiating position.

Putin highlighted domestic support for the war and promoted the ideal of sacrifice on the frontline and the home front, likely in an effort to prepare Russian society for a longer war in Ukraine and potential future confrontations with the West. Putin told Zarubin that Russian society reacted positively to the invasion of Ukraine and that each citizen realized that "he is the state" and Russia's survival depends on each individual. Putin stated that Russia is a country of "moral and ethical values" and that the basis of the Russian conscience is "the family, the state, and the future of Russia." Putin is notably attempting to frame the Russian public's support for the war through shared values despite the Kremlin's reliance on financial incentives to recruit the majority of its military personnel and to maintain its war effort. Putin accused the West once again of "deceiving" Russia following the 2015 Minsk agreements, likely in an effort to convince the Russian domestic audience that Russia cannot negotiate with the West and needs to continue the war.

Putin's statements throughout the documentary indicate that Putin likely does not intend to slow offensive operations or transition to defensive operations in Ukraine and instead is attempting to ideologically prepare domestic Russian society for a long war. ISW has previously assessed that Russian officials are setting conditions to maintain a long war and to justify future aggression against Ukraine and NATO.Russian officials have also consistently intensified efforts to militarize Russian society since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, further indicating that Russia is preparing for a protracted conflict. Russian officials are engaged in long-term efforts to consolidate control over Russia’s veteran civil society and elevate a cadre of loyal veterans to positions in Russia's regional and federal government. Putin officially declared 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland," following the launch of myriad militaristic initiatives in 2023 and 2024 to provide veterans with social and financial support and reinforce the Russian state narrative that veterans are the new "elite" class Russia is also investing heavily in military-patriotic education for Russia’s youth, demonstrating the Kremlin's interest in creating a new generation of militarized, loyal citizens in the medium to long term

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov provided new details on May 4 about the report that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone on May 2. Budanov reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two Russian Su-30 fighter jets over the Black Sea with AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles fired from Magura-7 naval drones.

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated that Russia maintains its initial objectives of its war in Ukraine, which are tantamount to Ukraine's surrender, despite ongoing negotiations with the United States.
Putin highlighted domestic support for the war and promoted the ideal of sacrifice on the frontline and the home front, likely in an effort to prepare Russian society for a longer war in Ukraine and potential future confrontations with the West.
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov provided new details on May 4 about the report that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian fixed-wing aircraft with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) attached to a naval drone on May 2.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian sources claimed on May 5 that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of limited attacks across the Russia-Ukraine international border near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast. Russian sources claimed on May 5 that Ukrainian forces attacked across the Russia-Ukraine international border near Tetkino and Popova-Lezhachi (far west of Sudzha and southwest of Glushkovo) and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino) on the evening of May 4 and morning of May 5. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces used mine clearing equipment to create a path through Russian minefields along the border, but that Ukrainian forces have not made significant advances in the area thus far. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces engaged in a small arms clash near the Tetkino Railway Station in southern Tetkino and that Ukrainian forces later withdrew back into Sumy Oblast. A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces have not seized Tetkino or broken through Russia's defenses near Novyi Put. Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, likely referring to the 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, other Russian military personnel, and Russian border guards are defending against the Ukrainian attacks.

The Russian military command reportedly recently redeployed elements of the 68th Army Corps and 58th Combined Arms Army to the Toretsk direction from the Kurakhove and western Zaporizhia directions. Geolocated footage published on May 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern and southern Myrne (southwest of Toretsk) during a platoon-sized mechanized assault. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps , Eastern Military District ) participated in the advance and were attacking in the direction of Malynivka (just west of Myrne). ISW first observed reports that elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade redeployed to the Toretsk direction in late March 2025 after operating in the Vuhledar and Kurakhove directions. Elements of the brigade may be currently deployed across several sectors of the front. A Russian milblogger claimed on May 4 that elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army , Southern Military District ) are attacking in Stara Mykolaivka and Oleksandropil and conducting clearing operations near Kalynove (all southwest of Toretsk). Elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division have been operating in the Zaporizhia direction since at least Summer 2023 during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the area. ISW observed reports that elements of the division were operating in the Zaporizhia direction as of May 4, and the division is likely currently split between the Zaporizhia and Toretsk directions. The Russian military command previously reinforced offensive operations southwest of Toretsk with elements of the 150th and 20th motorized rifle divisions (both part of the 8th CAA, SMD) in early 2025, and the repeated reinforcing of this effort from three different sectors of the frontline indicates that the Russian military command views this as a priority frontline sector.


Key Takeaways:

• Russian sources claimed on May 5 that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of limited attacks across the Russia-Ukraine international border near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast.

• The Russian military command reportedly recently redeployed elements of the 68th Army Corps and 58th Combined Arms Army to the Toretsk direction from the Kurakhove and western Zaporizhia directions.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Czech President Petr Pavel announced on May 4 that Czechia will work with Ukraine to establish a school to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighter jets outside of Ukraine.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Siversk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks across the international border near Tetkino and Novyi Put, Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed on May 6 that Russian forces repelled the Ukrainian attacks near Novyi Put and Volfino (southwest of Glushkovo) and that fighting continued near the railway station in southern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo). Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces seized up to two streets in southwestern Tetkino, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division), and 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are defending near Tetkino.

Ukrainian forces also continued drone, air, and artillery strikes aimed at isolating Russian units in and near Tetkino. Geolocated footage published on May 6 shows Ukrainian forces conducting a Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guided munition strike on a Russian position in southwestern Tetkino, indicating that Russian forces maintain positions near the Tetkino Railway Station. Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting drone and artillery strikes against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to isolate Russian units near Tetkino. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones have interdicted and maintained fire control over an unspecified section of the 38K-040 Tetkino-Karyzh highway. Russian milbloggers claimed on May 5 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a bridge over the Seim River between Zvannoye (northwest of Glushkovo) and Tetkino.

Ukraine and Russia conducted a 205-for-205 prisoner of war (POW) exchange on May 6. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on May 6 that Ukrainian authorities returned 205 Ukrainian POWs, comprising members of almost all branches of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Zelensky thanked the United Arab Emirates for mediating the POW exchange with Russia. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also reported on May 6 that Russia and Ukraine conducted a 205-for-205 POW exchange.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks across the international border near Tetkino and Novyi Put, Kursk Oblast.

• Ukrainian forces also continued drone, air, and artillery strikes aimed at isolating Russian units in and near Tetkino.

• Kremlin officials are continuing to leverage the mythos of the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War to form the basis of a new state ideology that will span generations and that Russia intends to leverage to justify a future military conflict against the West.

• The Kremlin appears to be consolidating around an informal state ideology predicated on perpetuating the belief that the West is determined to encircle and defeat Russia.

• Russian officials also appear to be leveraging the story of the Second World War (referred to as the Great Patriotic War in Russia) to dismiss Russia's early failures in the war in Ukraine and present the false image that Russian victory in Ukraine is as inevitable as the Soviet triumph over Germany became at the end of World War II.

• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov expressed his desire to resign from his post but acknowledged that only Russian President Vladimir Putin can approve this request. Kadyrov has helped stabilize interethnic tensions in the North Caucasus, and leaving his post without a suitable successor could threaten the stability of Putin's regime.

• It remains unclear who might succeed Kadyrov in the event of his resignation or death.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted a 205-for-205 prisoner of war (POW) exchange on May 6.

• Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

US officials acknowledged Russia's continued intransigence toward any ceasefire agreement in Ukraine while reiterating that Ukraine remains committed to US President Donald Trump's proposed comprehensive 30-day ceasefire. US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg stated on May 6 that Russian President Vladimir Putin's refusal to agree to a 30-day ceasefire is the main impediment to establishing peace in Ukraine and that Russia will be hurt if the parties do not agree to a comprehensive ceasefire, as "Russia is not winning the war." Kellogg noted Russia's failure to secure positions on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast, its inability to reach Kyiv and Odesa cities, and Russian forces' high attrition rates — all in line with ISW's assessment that Russia's battlefield situation has deteriorated since 2022. US Vice President JD Vance stated on May 7 that Russia is "asking for a certain set of requirements" and "concessions in order to end the conflict," but that the United States thinks that Russia is "asking for too much."

Kellogg reiterated that Ukraine has agreed to a renewable comprehensive sea, air, and land ceasefire for a minimum of 30 days and that Ukraine is willing to immediately sign the agreement. Kellogg stated that Ukraine is prepared to accept a "ceasefire in place" that will require both Russia and Ukraine to withdraw 15 kilometers from the current frontline in order to establish a 30-kilometer demilitarized zone that could fall under an unspecified monitoring mechanism. Kellogg stated that members of the UK- and French-led Coalition of the Willing are willing to deploy a "ceasefire force" west of the Dnipro River that will patrol and reinforce the comprehensive ceasefire. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Kellogg's statement on May 7, claiming that Russia has not received any Ukrainian proposals to establish a demilitarized zone.

Russia is likely attempting to prolong and delay discussions about a comprehensive ceasefire to obfuscate its continued rejection of the United States' ceasefire proposals. ISW continues to assess that Russia likely remains opposed to any sort of enforcement or monitoring mechanisms, as Russia would likely weaponize the absence of such mechanisms to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations, as it has done before. The Kremlin has also repeatedly outright rejected the prospect of European peacekeepers in Ukraine, claiming that such deployments would be unacceptable for Russia. Russia remains committed to its long-standing effort to prolong peace negotiations in order to make battlefield gains and attempt to secure additional concessions from the United States.

Ukrainian forces likely recently advanced across the international border into southern Tetkino, Kursk Oblast, amid continued limited Ukrainian attacks in the area. Geolocated footage published on May 6 shows Russian forces conducting an airstrike against a building in southern Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), indicating that Ukrainian forces likely seized positions in Tetkino. Russian milbloggers claimed on May 6 that Ukrainian forces seized up to two streets in southern Tetkino and continued to claim on May 7 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within the settlement. Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), pushed Ukrainian forces out of Tetkino, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled limited Ukrainian mechanized assaults against Tetkino and Novyi Put (east of Tetkino along the international border) on May 7 and that Ukrainian forces continue efforts to use mine-clearing equipment to create paths through Russian minefields in the area. One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Novyi Put, but other milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults in the area. ISW has not observed geolocated footage indicating that Ukrainian forces have entered Novyi Put. Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Tetkino.

Key Takeaways:

• US officials acknowledged Russia's continued intransigence toward any ceasefire agreement in Ukraine while reiterating that Ukraine remains committed to US President Donald Trump's proposed comprehensive 30-day ceasefire.

• Ukrainian forces likely recently advanced across the international border into southern Tetkino, Kursk Oblast, amid continued limited Ukrainian attacks in the area.

• Ukrainian forces conducted long-range drone strikes against defense industrial facilities and airbases in Russia overnight on May 6 and 7.

• Russian authorities will likely test their ability to completely disconnect large areas of Russia from the internet on May 9 under the guise of protecting Russian Victory Day celebrations.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro signed the Russia-Venezuela Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement on May 7.

• Ukrainian and European officials continue to report on Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of international law and Russia's use of chemical weapons in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared to reject Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s recent request to resign from his post.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

The Kremlin continues to seize on the Russian mythos of the Second World War ahead of Russia's May 9 Victory Day holiday to set informational conditions to justify a prolonged war in Ukraine and future aggression against NATO to Russian society. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov published an article on May 8 in which he argued that Russia's war in Ukraine will go down in history as a feat of courage and significance equal to the victory of the Soviet military and people during the Second World War. Belousov claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine is a continuation of the "glorious traditions" of Soviet bravery and heroism and of the Soviet people's enthusiasm for enlisting and otherwise supporting the war effort. Belousov claimed that Russia's victory in Ukraine is "inevitable." Belousov said that domestic unity is a necessity for Russia's victory in Ukraine just as the Soviet Union's "moral and spiritual unity" was a critical factor for its victory in the Second World War. Russian state media highlighted Belousov's statements comparing the Second World War to Russia's war in Ukraine in their coverage of his 10-page essay, indicating that the Kremlin is trying to message to the domestic audience that Russia will achieve its goals in its war in Ukraine as long as Russian society remains unified and supportive. Kremlin officials have recently seized on the mythos of the Second World War to form the basis of a new pseudo-state ideology that will span across generations and that the Kremlin intends to use to justify potential future aggression against the West.

Belousov reiterated the Kremlin's oft-repeated fallacious narrative that Russia had no choice but to launch its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 because the situation was "life or death." Belousov claimed that Ukraine is a conduit for the collective West's "crusade" against Russia, which Belousov claimed is a manifestation of "eternal Russophobia" and intended to eradicate Russian statehood. Belousov quoted Russian President Vladimir Putin's speech from February 24, 2022, announcing the full-scale invasion. Belousov amplified Putin's accusations that the United States and its Western allies had a policy of "containment" against Russia and created a situation in which Russia had to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine to defend Russia's interests. The Kremlin is attempting to link Putin's anti-Western claims to the mythos of the Second World War in order to heighten the existential threat against Russia that the Kremlin claims Russia is currently facing. It is also reconstructing the Soviet-era narrative that the West is conspiring to destroy Russia (in place of the Soviet Union) and that the conflict will be unending.

Belousov explicitly identified large-scale Russian military reforms as preparations for a future conflict with NATO as Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev threatened European countries that support Ukraine. Belousov stated in his May 8 essay that Russia has reformed and augmented its military specifically in response to NATO expansion and military build-up (undertaken only well after the Russian 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine), including by reorganizing Russia's Western Military District (WMD) into the Moscow and Leningrad military districts (MMD and LMD); re-opening two former military academies and establishing a new third military academy; and fully forming, staffing, and equipping two combined arms armies, a river flotilla, a mixed aviation corps, and 50 other formations and units. ISW has long assessed that Russian military restructuring efforts, including reforms of the LMD and MMD, are part of future preparations for war against NATO.

Medvedev threatened that European countries must "remember" the "crushing defeat of Nazi Germany" when supporting Ukraine. Medvedev notably made his threat on his English-language X account, indicating that Medvedev intended this threat for international audiences. Other senior Russian officials have also intensified accusations against European states for supporting "Naziism" in recent days. Medvedev's threat and Russian claims of European "Nazism" are part of the Kremlin's ongoing reflexive control campaign that aims to push European countries into refraining from providing further assistance to Ukraine. Kremlin officials have also recently framed European efforts to shoulder more of their own defense requirements (in line with US President Donald Trump's efforts) as threatening to Russia, and the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign likely also aims to prevent European states from building up their defenses. Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service Head Vice Admiral Peter Reesink warned in an interview with Politico published on May 8 that Russia's most threatening behavior is its military buildup and moving military assets towards Russia's borders with Finland and the Baltic states. Reesink stated that Russia appears to be producing more artillery than the Russian military needs for its war in Ukraine when taking account of the assistance Russia is receiving from its allies. Reuters published an investigation on May 8 revealing that Russia has been constructing a significant new production line for explosives at the Biysk Oleum Plant in Siberia that is planned to produce 6,000 metric tons of explosives annually. Reuters noted that this would be enough explosive to manufacture 1.28 million 152mm artillery rounds and that Russia produced nearly two million 122mm and 152mm artillery rounds in 2024, suggesting that this new production line could expand Russia's artillery shell production capacity by over 50 percent when completed.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues to seize on the Russian mythos of the Second World War ahead of Russia's May 9 Victory Day holiday to set informational conditions to justify a prolonged war in Ukraine and future aggression against NATO to Russian society.

• Belousov explicitly identified large-scale Russian military reforms as preparations for a future conflict with NATO as Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev threatened European countries that support Ukraine.

• Russia claimed to have implemented its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 8 and accused Ukraine of ceasefire violations even though Ukraine did not officially and publicly agree to Russia's ceasefire. Russia's unilateral Victory Day ceasefire and accusations of violations continue to demonstrate the necessity that any ceasefire or peace agreement be formally agreed to in advance by all parties and include robust monitoring mechanisms.

• Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's willingness to implement US President Donald Trump's desired 30-day ceasefire to precede peace talks.

• The Kremlin is attempting to exploit its unilateral Victory Day ceasefire to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress toward a longer-term ceasefire and peace negotiations despite Russia's continued rejection of such a longer-term ceasefire.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping conducted a series of bilateral engagements in Moscow on May 8, showcasing deeper Russian–Chinese cooperation and alignment.

• The joint Russian–Chinese statement on May 8 referenced Putin's original aims in launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in an attempt to lend international support and legitimacy to Russia's goals and attempted justifications for the war.

• The joint Russian–Chinese statement supported Putin's proposed Eurasian security architecture and Russia's ongoing efforts to create a Russia-dominated alternative, anti-Western bloc.

• The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine’s (UN HRMMU) reported that Ukrainian civilian casualties have significantly increased between 2024 and 2025.

• The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada ratified the US-Ukrainian bilateral economic partnership agreement on May 8.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts and near Kupyansk, Borova, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian resistance with Western support has prevented Russian forces from seizing any of their self-identified objectives in Ukraine over the past year, depriving Russian President Vladimir Putin of significant battlefield successes to celebrate on Victory Day. Putin did not discuss the battlefield situation in Ukraine during Russia’s Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on May 8 and 9 but claimed that all of Russia supports Russian servicemembers fighting in Ukraine. Russian forces have not seized any significant towns in Ukraine since the seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024, and the only mid-sized settlement that Russian forces have seized in Ukraine since December 2024 is Velyka Novosilka (pre-war population of 5,000). Ukrainian sources previously reported that Russian forces were trying to seize Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and the remaining area of Luhansk Oblast and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast by Victory Day on May 9. Russian forces did not accomplish any of those objectives, and have in fact been trying to seize Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk for roughly a year.

Ukrainian long-range strikes and improved integration of tactical drone operations with defensive operations and counterattacks — all enabled by Western military support — have slowed, and in some places stalled, Russian offensive operations in Ukraine. Ukraine’s successful integration of Ukrainian drone innovators and operators with ground forces appears to have stalled Russia’s offensive against Pokrovsk and Toretsk in 2024 and early 2025. Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian ammunition depots, defense industry facilities, and oil and gas infrastructure have at times compromised Russia’s ability to supply frontline units and have compounded the rising costs of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Ukrainian forces have also intentionally exacerbated other Russian vulnerabilities over the last year, including exacerbating Russia’s shortage of operational reserves by launching the incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 and forcing the Russian military to redeploy troops from other frontline areas to defend against the incursion.

The only recent military operation that Putin featured on Victory Day was the repulsion of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. Putin thanked and highlighted North Korean troops at the Victory Day parade on May 9, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov noted that high-ranking North Korean commanders who participated in recapturing Kursk Oblast attended the parade. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov declared that Russian forces pushed all Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast on April 26, after almost nine months of Russian operations to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast. Russian officials have repeatedly platformed the recapture of Kursk Oblast as a significant military achievement, and ISW previously forecasted that Russian officials would highlight the Kursk operation as part of the Victory Day celebrations. Russian officials’ praise of the Kursk operation ignores the fact that Putin reportedly initially tasked Russian forces with retaking Kursk Oblast by mid-October 2024 and Putin’s continued willingness to extend this timeline throughout Fall 2024 and Winter 2024-2025, prioritizing offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast over retaking Russian territory. Russian officials are also ignoring recent Ukrainian attacks and advances into Tetkino, Kursk Oblast.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump explicitly called for a longer-term ceasefire in Ukraine that would precede peace negotiations — a sequence that Ukraine has consistently supported and that Russia has consistently rejected.

• Ukrainian resistance with Western support has prevented Russian forces from seizing any of their self-identified objectives in Ukraine over the past year, depriving Russian President Vladimir Putin of significant battlefield successes to celebrate on Victory Day.

• The only recent military operation that Putin featured on Victory Day was the repulsion of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.

• Russian officials highlighted technological adaptations and innovations that Russian forces have integrated in Ukraine over the last three years during national and regional Victory Day celebrations.

• The Kremlin seized on Russia’s May 9 Victory Day celebrations to posture itself as having broad international support three years into its invasion of Ukraine and especially highlighted Russia’s growing partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea.

• Putin used the Victory Day holiday to promote the development of a civic Russian identity at odds with Russian ultranationalist efforts to promote ethno-religious nationalism predicated on a Russian state mainly led by and comprised of ethnic Russians.

• Delegations from 35 countries and the Council of Europe visited Lviv City on May 9 in celebration of Europe Day in Ukraine.

• Ukraine’s European allies continue to support the Ukrainian military and defense industrial base (DIB).

• Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions and in Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

The Kremlin is projecting the narrative of a powerful Russia and a powerful Russian President Vladimir Putin to conceal the real weaknesses and limitations of Russia's capabilities and distract from Russia's battlefield failures. Putin has long held that the perception of weakness can be lethal in a system built on the premise of strength — a principle that applies to the stability of his regime as well as to Russia's position in the world. The world should not take the Kremlin's displays at face value, but should look past them to the realities of Russia and this war.

The Kremlin is trying to portray the 80th Anniversary Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9 as a diplomatic success to present Russia as a superpower and Putin as a respected world leader. The Kremlin boasted that senior leaders and representatives of over 20 foreign countries are attending the parade. The Kremlin media particularly celebrated the attendance of People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic. Kremlin media framed Fico's and Vucic's parade attendance as an act of Slovak and Serbian resistance against the European Union's (EU) "orders" and "threats." Some Kremlin outlets presented Xi's, Vuvic's, and Fico's attendance as direct support for Putin.

The parade was hardly a diplomatic success, however, but was instead an attempt to conceal Russia's international isolation, military failures, and domestic problems. The Kremlin only convinced Russia’s known allies to attend the parade, while most world leaders refrained from traveling to Moscow. The Kremlin's emphasis on Xi's attendance shows that Russia remains dependent on its relationship with the PRC and that Putin needs great powers to validate his stature as well as to support his war effort. Three years into its war against Ukraine, the Kremlin is unable to protect a parade in Russia’s capital from a risk of drone strikes launched from Ukraine — a country over a thousand miles away from Moscow that Russia thought it could conquer in a matter of days in 2022.

The Kremlin hype of the "Victory Day" parades on May 9 is a part of the Kremlin’s long-standing effort to conceal and distract from Putin’s and Russia's weaknesses. The Kremlin has been focused on concealing Putin's and Russia's weaknesses since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 by portraying Putin as an effective and caring wartime leader and downplaying Russian failures and Ukraine’s successes, while exaggerating Russian successes.

The Kremlin’s information efforts have helped preserve the regime and support in Russia for the war effort despite Russia's battlefield failings and the enormous cost Putin has imposed on the Russian people. These efforts are not always effective, however, and sometimes highlight the very weaknesses the Kremlin seeks to conceal.

Institute for the Study of War

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/hiding-russia%E2%80%99s-weakness

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected another US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal on May 10 amid continued Russian demands that any future ceasefire include conditions that support Russia's long-term goal of gaining control of all of Ukraine and would allow Russia to resume offensive operations from a more advantageous position at a time of its choosing. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced following the Coalition of the Willing meeting in Kyiv on May 10 that he, European officials, and US President Donald Trump are proposing a general ceasefire at least 30 days long beginning on May 12. Zelensky called on Russian officials to respond to the proposal and stated that Europe and the United States should impose additional sanctions on Russia's energy and banking sectors if Russia fails to agree to the ceasefire proposal. Peskov responded by claiming that Ukraine has not responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin's previous ceasefire proposals and that pressuring Russia is "useless." Peskov claimed during an interview with ABC News published on May 10 that Putin supported the idea of a ceasefire but has "questions" about how a ceasefire will account for recent and possible future Russian advances in Ukraine, Ukrainian mobilization, and Western military assistance to Ukraine. Peskov reiterated Putin's previous demands for the West to stop all military aid to Ukraine and force Ukraine to stop mobilizing and training servicemembers as a condition of a ceasefire. Putin criticized the initial March 13 US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal and insinuated that any ceasefire agreement should limit Ukraine's ability to mobilize and train new troops and receive military aid.

Putin, Peskov, and other Russian officials have not yet offered any comparable concessions, such as stopping Russia's own force generation and defense industrial efforts, as part of a ceasefire agreement. Russian officials appear to be trying to define the conditions of any and all ceasefires in a way that facilitates further Russian battlefield gains in the short term and supports Russia's ability to attack Ukraine again in the future. Peskov also claimed that Ukraine is trying to leverage ceasefire proposals to "escape from negotiations," questioning Trump's stated objective of using a general ceasefire as a building block to precede peace negotiations.

The UK and French-led Coalition of the Willing expressed support for the US-Ukrainian proposal of a general ceasefire of 30 days or more on May 10. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with the Coalition of the Willing during a semi-virtual summit on May 10, consisting of officials from Lithuania, Romania, Finland, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Canada, Latvia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Australia, Croatia, Iceland, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, the European Commission, and the European Council. Zelensky welcomed French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk in Kyiv for the summit. The Coalition of the Willing and NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte expressed support for the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal. Macron stated that the coalition is working on a proposal to deploy a military contingent to Ukraine and that the coalition will hold a series of meetings in the coming weeks. NBC News reported that Ukraine, the United States, and European partners formulated a term sheet with a list of conditions for Russia to consider. The document, according to an unspecified Western official, contains 22 proposals, including the 30-day general ceasefire. Reuters reported on May 9 that a French diplomatic source stated that US and European partners are finalizing the 30-day ceasefire proposal and new sanction packages if Russia refuses the proposal.

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected another US-Ukrainian general ceasefire proposal on May 10 amid continued Russian demands that any future ceasefire include conditions that support Russia's long-term goal of gaining control of all of Ukraine and would allow Russia to resume offensive operations from a more advantageous position at a time of its choosing.

• The UK and French-led Coalition of the Willing expressed support for the US-Ukrainian proposal of a general ceasefire of 30 days or more on May 10.

• Iran will reportedly deliver short-range ballistic missile launchers to Russia for use in Ukraine.

• The United States Embassy in Kyiv issued a statement on May 9 warning of a significant Russian air strike against Ukraine over the next several days -- potentially involving Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missiles.

• US and Western military support remains vital to Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian aggression.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin called for Russia and Ukraine to resume bilateral negotiations based on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that include Russian demands amounting to full Ukrainian surrender. Any agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document. Putin spoke to media organizations on the night of May 10 to 11, following the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a general ceasefire at least 30 days long beginning on May 12. Putin did not agree to the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal and instead proposed that Russia and Ukraine "resume" the direct negotiations that he claimed " interrupted" in 2022 on May 15. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated that Russia will soon announce its delegation to the resumed negotiations in Istanbul and that such negotiations should account for "developments of the 2022 talks."

Putin and Ushakov are referring to Russia's April 2022 Istanbul protocols draft agreement, which included terms that would have amounted to Ukraine's surrender and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that both publications obtained several versions of the draft protocols from the April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul. The draft protocols demanded that Ukraine forego its NATO membership aspirations and amend its constitution to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances, concluding military agreements, or hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia also demanded that it, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus serve as security guarantors of the agreement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality ," including military aid agreements. Russia demanded to limit the Ukrainian military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.

Russia insisted on these terms in the first and second months of the war when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war, despite the fact that Ukrainian forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance across the theater. Putin is rejecting the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a general ceasefire and instead continues to demand Ukrainian surrender in an attempt to secure his strategic goals by drawing out negotiations while continuing to make battlefield gains.

Putin also continues to demand that any negotiations address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Putin stated during the press conference that the purpose of renewed bilateral Russian-Ukrainian negotiations would be to "eliminate the root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Putin suggested that Russia and Ukraine could pursue a ceasefire as part of these renewed negotiations, but claimed that a "real truce" should not enable the "rearmament" and "replenishment" of the Ukrainian military. The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that Russia must eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Russian officials have defined as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into Eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine. Kremlin officials recently claimed that any ceasefire agreement should limit Ukraine's ability to mobilize and train new troops and receive Western military aid, while failing to offer similar concessions for Russia to limit its own force generation and defense production efforts. Calls for the elimination of these alleged "root causes" and limitations on Ukraine's force generation capabilities are in line with Putin's demands for Ukrainian neutrality, as well as Putin's pre-war demand that would have required NATO to roll back to its pre-1997 borders.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin called for Russia and Ukraine to resume bilateral negotiations based on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that include Russian demands amounting to full Ukrainian surrender. Any agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document.

• Putin also continues to demand that any negotiations address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war in Ukraine.

• Putin is attempting to manipulate ongoing discussions about a ceasefire and future peace in Ukraine, likely in an effort to undermine Ukrainian-US-European unity around a comprehensive 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted Russian President Vladimir Putin's proposal to hold bilateral negotiations in Turkey on May 15.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in the northern Kharkiv and Novopavlivka directions.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian officials appear to be setting conditions for Russian President Vladimir Putin to reject Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to meet on May 15 in Istanbul for bilateral ceasefire negotiations. Russian Federation Council Deputy Speaker Konstantin Kosachev responded to Zelensky on May 12 and claimed that Zelensky’s invitation is "pure spectacle” and “comedy.” Kosachev claimed that high-level meetings are not organized in “such a difficult situation” and accused Zelensky of trying to blame Russia for what he claimed was Ukraine's disinterest in negotiations. Russian Ambassador-at-Large Rodion Miroshnik questioned the intentions behind Zelensky's invitation to Putin to meet in Istanbul. Russian State Duma Committee on International Affairs Deputy Chairperson Alexei Chepa expressed doubt on May 12 that Putin will travel to Istanbul to meet with Zelensky. Chepa insinuated that Russia cannot trust Ukraine in any negotiations because Ukraine has violated previous agreements and unilaterally imposed Russian ceasefires. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on May 12 that Zelensky is trying to co-opt the ongoing discussion around negotiations by inviting Putin to Istanbul and making Putin seem intransigent if he does not attend. Kremlin-level officials have not formally responded to Zelensky's invitation as of this report, although statements from lower-level Russian officials indicate that Putin will likely not travel to Istanbul and meet with Zelensky.

Putin has engaged in significant rhetorical efforts to prepare the Russian public for a long-term war effort — and not a near-term peace agreement — including by promoting the false narrative that Zelensky and the Ukrainian government are illegitimate. Putin and Russian officials often use this narrative to justify Russia’s refusal to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine and to further Russia's strategic war goal of establishing a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv. Putin may assess that the Kremlin would need to adjust or completely retract this narrative in order to rhetorically prepare the Russian public for direct negotiations with Zelensky before such meetings. Putin notably referred to the "Kyiv authorities" rather than Zelensky or the Ukrainian government in his invitation to negotiate in Istanbul. Senior Kremlin officials most recently reiterated this false narrative in late April, and Russian media continues to reiterate this narrative in publications as of May 12. ISW has not observed any indications that the Kremlin will alter or abandon this rhetoric. Putin may instead choose to let this narrative lie dormant for now and intensify this rhetoric should Russia and Ukraine sign a peace agreement in order to set conditions for Russia to justify reneging on any future peace agreement and relaunching the war at the time of Russia's choosing. Any long-term peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia's explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian president, government, and the Ukrainian Constitution.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials appear to be setting conditions for Russian President Vladimir Putin to reject Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to meet on May 15 in Istanbul for bilateral ceasefire negotiations.

• Russia has reportedly deployed a largely ceremonial regiment of the Federal Security Service (FSB) to the frontline in Donetsk Oblast, likely in an effort to generate fear of more rapid future Russian advances.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions.

Institute for the Study of War

The Russian military is reportedly generating enough forces to replace losses and is reinforcing the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite experiencing an increased casualty rate per square kilometer gained. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be embracing significant losses in exchange for diminishing returns to make battlefield gains and manage perceptions about Russia’s military capabilities to pressure Ukraine in negotiations. Putin stated on May 13 that 50,000 to 60,000 people voluntarily join the Russian military per month. Putin gave this figure as part of a statement claiming that Russia has a higher monthly recruitment than Ukraine and therefore may be exaggerating these recruitment figures to posture a large Russian military amid ongoing negotiations with Ukraine and the West, however. Putin did not explicitly state when Russian recruitment levels hit 50,000 to 60,000 personnel each month, but previous Ukrainian and Russian statements imply that Russia may have aimed to reach this monthly recruitment figure in 2025. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov gave recruitment figures at the end of 2024, indicating that Russia is recruiting just enough military personnel to replace its recent casualty rates. Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated in late January 2025 that roughly 450,000 people signed Russian military service contracts, that an additional 40,000 people joined Russian volunteer formations in 2024, and that the Russian military aimed to "maintain this momentum." Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in early March 2025 that Russia's recruitment plans for 2025 will "mostly" allow the Russian military command to replace its battlefield losses should the current tempo of offensive operations and losses continue. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated in April 2024 that Russian forces are "increasing the number" of personnel in Ukraine by 8,000 to 9,000 new personnel per month through contract recruitment and that the Russian force grouping fighting against Ukraine increased from about 603,000 on January 1, 2025, to 623,000 just over three months later. Syrskyi stated on May 13 that Russian forces have suffered 177,000 casualties in Ukraine since the start of 2025. Syrskyi's and Putin's figures indicate that Russia may be generating enough forces to replace losses while also increasing the overall size of its force grouping in Ukraine.

Russia continues to tolerate personnel losses comparable to the casualty rate Russian forces sustained during a period of intensified advances in Fall 2024, despite a slowed rate of advance in the first four months of 2025. Russian forces are likely able to generate enough forces to sustain their replacement rate and increase the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine by rapidly deploying low quality troops to frontline units. ISW has repeatedly observed reports that new Russian recruits only receive a month of training before deploying to Ukraine, and this limited training is likely constraining recruits' combat capabilities and the Russian military's overall capacity to successfully conduct complex operations. The Russian military is currently prioritizing sending poorly-trained recruits into highly-attritional infantry assaults to make grinding advances — despite enduring a higher casualty rate per square kilometer gained — in an effort to pressure Ukraine and the West into acquiescing to Russian demands amid ongoing negotiations. Russia is also attempting to prolong negotiations to extract additional concessions from the United States and while making additional battlefield advances.

Ukrainian officials recently clarified that a September 2022 presidential decree does not preclude Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Zelensky signed a decree on September 30, 2022, prohibiting Ukrainian negotiations with Putin. Zelensky told journalists during a press briefing on May 13 that Russian officials are misrepresenting the decree as an obstacle to negotiations as the decree is intended to prevent Ukrainian persons besides Zelensky from negotiating with Putin on Ukraine’s behalf, rather than restricting Zelensky from exercising his “ rights and duties,” as Ukraine’s head negotiator. Chairperson of Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada Foreign Affairs Committee Oleksandr Merezhko reiterated this point to Ukrainian English-language news outlet Kyiv Independent on May 13 and stated that Ukraine’s Constitution "clearly" specifies Zelensky as Ukraine’s chief negotiator and noted that Zelensky’s constitutional powers allow him to override past decrees. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Mykhailo Podolyak stated on May 13 that Zelensky will only negotiate with Putin in Istanbul, as lower-level officials from either country would lack the authority to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine. Russian officials routinely cite this decree as an "obstacle" to negotiations despite ongoing Ukrainian outreach to Russia to engage in good-faith negotiations.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian military is reportedly generating enough forces to replace losses and is reinforcing the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite experiencing an increased casualty rate per square kilometer gained. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be embracing significant losses in exchange for diminishing returns to make battlefield gains and manage perceptions about Russia’s military capabilities to pressure Ukraine in negotiations.

• The Russian military may also be prioritizing recruitment as part of longer-term efforts to build out a post-war strategic reserve for a potential future conflict with NATO.

• Ukrainian officials recently clarified that a September 2022 presidential decree does not preclude Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from negotiating with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

• The Russian military command appears to be establishing a tactical doctrine and force structure for motorcycle and civilian vehicle units in frontal assaults, underscoring the Russian military's efforts to offset Ukraine’s drone advantages and achieve maneuver in modern ground warfare.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent call to base future negotiations with Ukraine on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that included Russian demands for Ukraine's complete capitulation. Russian Ambassador-at-Large and former Russian occupation official, Rodion Miroshnik, claimed on May 14 that the April 2022 draft Istanbul protocols could be the basis for an agreement to end Russia's war in Ukraine. Miroshnik is echoing Putin's May 11 call to "resume" the 2022 Istanbul direct negotiations in response to the May 10 joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a 30-day minimum general ceasefire. Miroshnik noted that Russia and Ukraine could make "adjustments" to the 2022 Istanbul protocols to account for changes in the past three years, but specifically insisted that Russia's April 2022 demands that Ukraine significantly reduce its military capabilities and amend its constitution to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances — including NATO — remain unchanged. Putin and Miroshnik are deliberately reiterating Russia's terms in the Istanbul protocols because the protocols included terms that would have amounted to Ukraine's surrender and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression — aims that the Kremlin continues to pursue. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that they both obtained several versions of the draft protocols from the April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul. The draft protocols also would have banned Ukraine from hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia demanded that it, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus serve as security guarantors of the agreement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality ," including military aid agreements. Russia demanded that Ukraine limit its military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.

Russia demanded these terms in the first and second months of the full-scale invasion when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and making gains throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war, despite the fact that Ukrainian forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance across the theater. Miroshnik's observation that Russia and Ukraine could adjust aspects of the Istanbul protocols to reflect the changes in the war over the past three years is an attempt to frame the Kremlin as willing to negotiate, which obfuscates the fact that Russia has actually maintained its long-term goal of total Ukrainian surrender. Putin, Miroshnik, and other Russian officials continue to demand Ukraine's full surrender in an attempt to secure Russia's strategic goals by drawing out negotiations while continuing to make battlefield gains.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent call to base future negotiations with Ukraine on the early 2022 Istanbul protocols that included Russian demands for Ukraine's complete capitulation.

• Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also reiterated the Kremlin's demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions against the West ahead of negotiations in Istanbul.

• Polling from early May 2025 indicates that the majority of Ukrainians support Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate leader of Ukraine and are against holding elections before a final end to the war — in accordance with Ukrainian law and the Ukrainian Constitution.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to engage in bilateral negotiations in Istanbul and continues refusing to offer concessions to end the war in Ukraine. Putin spoke to media organizations on the night of May 10 to 11, following the May 10 joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal for a general ceasefire for at least 30 days beginning on May 12. Putin did not agree to the joint US-Ukrainian-European proposal and instead proposed that Russia and Ukraine "resume" on May 15 the direct negotiations that he claimed Ukraine "interrupted" in 2022 in Istanbul. Zelensky and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accepted Putin's proposal to hold bilateral negotiations in Turkey on May 15. Zelensky stated that he would personally wait for Putin in Turkey and arrived in Turkey on May 15. Putin assigned several Russian officials, who are notably not in Putin's innermost circle, to attend the talks in Istanbul, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed on May 15 that Putin will not travel to Istanbul. Putin's rejection of Zelensky's invitation demonstrates Putin's continued resistance to making any concessions and engaging in legitimate, good-faith negotiations at the highest level.

The Russian delegation in Istanbul does not include officials in Putin's innermost circle and is largely the same delegation that Russia sent to the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in 2022 in Istanbul. Putin announced on the night of May 14 that Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky is leading the Russian delegation in Istanbul. The delegation also includes Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin, Chief of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Igor Kostykov, and Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin. Medinsky similarly headed the delegation in 2022, and Fomin and Galuzin's predecessor participated in the 2022 talks. Kostyukov is the only 2025 participant who did not attend the 2022 talks.

Medinsky explicitly described the May 2025 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul as a continuation of the early 2022 Istanbul negotiations during which Russia issued demands that were tantamount to Ukraine's complete capitulation. Medinsky told journalists on May 15 in Istanbul that Russia considers the May 2025 negotiations a "continuation" of previous negotiations in Istanbul in April 2022, which he claimed Ukraine interrupted. Medinsky is reiterating Putin's May 11 framing that the new bilateral negotiations in Istanbul would be based on the April 2022 Istanbul protocols draft agreement, which included terms that would have amounted to Ukraine's surrender and left Ukraine helpless to defend against potential future Russian aggression. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that they both obtained several versions of the Istanbul protocols draft agreement. The draft protocols demanded that Ukraine forego its NATO membership aspirations and amend its constitution to add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances. The draft protocols also would have banned Ukraine from hosting foreign military personnel, trainers, or weapon systems in Ukraine. Russia demanded that it, the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Belarus serve as security guarantors of the agreement. Russia demanded that the guarantor states “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality ," including military aid agreements. Russia demanded that Ukraine limit its military to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems as part of the Istanbul protocols. Russia additionally demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes.

Russia demanded these terms in the first and second months of its full-scale invasion when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and making significant gains throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Russia is now attempting to reiterate these same demands after three years of war, despite the fact that Ukrainian forces have since successfully forced Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine, liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, and blunted the Russian rate of advance across the theater. Medinsky is purposefully attempting to frame the May 2025 talks as a continuation of the April 2022 Istanbul negotiations to portray Russia's demands for Ukraine's surrender as legitimate, despite the fact that Ukraine is now in a much stronger battlefield position on the battlefield than in April 2022 and the Russian military is much weaker than in the early months of the full-scale invasion.

Medinsky also reiterated Putin's longstanding demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions on NATO. Medinsky claimed that Russia's goal for the May 2025 Istanbul negotiations is to "establish long-term peace by eliminating the root causes" of the war. Russian officials routinely demand that any peace agreement address the war's "root causes," which Russian officials define as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine. Russian officials have leveraged claims that Ukraine has mistreated Russian speakers in Ukraine to justify the Kremlin's demands for regime change in Ukraine, the establishment of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv, and Russia's occupation and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. Medinsky's attempt to frame May 2025 Istanbul negotiations as peace talks contradicts stated Ukrainian, US, and European efforts to first establish a longer-term ceasefire in Ukraine that would precede peace negotiations. Medinsky's framing echoes consistent Russian rejections of this sequence of events, which Ukraine and the United States have consistently supported.

Reported Kremlin instructions to Russian media explaining how to cover the Istanbul negotiations indicate that the Kremlin is preparing the Russian population for a longer war in Ukraine and is not interested in engaging in good-faith negotiations that require compromises from both sides. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on May 15 that it acquired a manual that Russian media received from the Presidential Administration's political bloc with instructions about how to cover the negotiations in Istanbul. The manual reportedly instructed Russian media to explain Medinsky's participation in the Russian delegation as "logical" since he led the Russian delegation in Istanbul in 2022 and is continuing this work. A political strategist who works with the Kremlin told Meduza that Russian officials overseeing domestic policy assess that the Istanbul talks will end in "deadlock" and that the Kremlin assesses that the West will likely impose new sanctions in response to such "deadlock." The manual reportedly advises Russian media to preemptively talk about a "new package of sanctions" while claiming that new sanctions will not harm Russia's development as Russia "successfully copes with the challenges of any sanctions." Russian media should reportedly vaguely say that "negotiations are taking place on worse terms for Ukraine" than three years ago, but the manual does not explain how current battlefield realities where Russia controls much less of Ukraine are "worse terms."

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's invitation to engage in bilateral negotiations in Istanbul and continues refusing to offer concessions to end the war in Ukraine.

• The Russian delegation in Istanbul does not include officials in Putin's innermost circle and is largely the same delegation that Russia sent to the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in 2022 in Istanbul.

• Medinsky explicitly described the May 2025 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul as a continuation of the early 2022 Istanbul negotiations during which Russia issued demands that were tantamount to Ukraine's complete capitulation.

• Medinsky also reiterated Putin's longstanding demands that any resolution to the war must result in regime change in Ukraine and restrictions on NATO.

• Reported Kremlin instructions to Russian media explaining how to cover the Istanbul negotiations indicate that the Kremlin is preparing the Russian population for a longer war in Ukraine and is not interested in engaging in good-faith negotiations that require compromises from both sides.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on May 16 but made little progress towards agreeing to a full ceasefire or a peace settlement to Russia's war against Ukraine. The Russian delegation reportedly formally demanded that Ukraine cede territory to which Russia has informally been laying claim, while asserting that Russia is ready to continue the war for years. Russia may again formalize previously informal territorial claims in the future as part of Russia's effort to secure full Ukrainian capitulation. Turkish, Ukrainian, and American delegations met on the morning of May 16 in Istanbul, after which Turkish, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations met. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, the head of the Russian delegation, likely met with US State Department Director of Policy Planning Staff Michael Anton before the Ukrainian-Russian meeting. The Ukrainian delegation, including Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha, and Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak, met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg, UK National Security Advisor Jonathan Powell, French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonn, and German Chancellor's Advisor for Foreign and Security Policy Gunter Sautter to coordinate positions before the Ukrainian-Russian meeting. Umerov and Medinsky announced that Ukraine and Russia would exchange 1,000 prisoners of war (POWs) each in the near future. Medinsky stated that the Russian and Ukrainian delegations agreed to "write...down in detail" and present their visions for a possible future ceasefire and that bilateral negotiations will continue after this presentation. Kremlin newswire TASS reported that an unspecified source stated that there was no specific date set for Russia and Ukraine to exchange their ceasefire plans.

Medinsky highlighted that Russia is prepared to continue its war in Ukraine for years to come. Medinsky claimed that those "who do not know history" say that there should be a ceasefire first, then negotiations to achieve peace. Medinsky claimed that war and negotiations should be conducted simultaneously, and Carroll reported that Medinsky stated that Russia is "ready to fight for a year, two, three – however long it takes." Medinsky reportedly referenced the Great Northern War (1700-1721) when asking "how long ready to fight?" and claimed that "Russia is prepared to fight forever." Russia state media confirmed that Medinsky spoke about the 18th-century war with Sweden during the meeting.

Ukrainian diplomatic sources told various Western and Ukrainian outlets that the Russian delegation made "unrealistic" and "unacceptable" demands that went "far beyond" any demands Russia has previously discussed. The delegation reportedly repeated the Kremlin's demand that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the entirety of the illegally annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before the start of a ceasefire. The Economist foreign correspondent Oliver Carroll reported that a source stated that the Russian delegation additionally threatened to seize Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts, and Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Oleksiy Goncharenko similarly reported that the Russian delegation threatened to annex Sumy Oblast in order to create a "security zone."

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on May 16 but made little progress towards agreeing to a full ceasefire or a peace settlement to Russia's war against Ukraine.

• Medinsky highlighted that Russia is prepared to continue its war in Ukraine for years to come.

• The Kremlin has repeatedly publicly demanded that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts – even the territory that Russian forces currently do not occupy - but had not formally demanded that Ukraine cede all of Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts before the May 16 Istanbul meeting.

• ISW has consistently assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not compromise in peace negotiations unless Ukraine and the West inflict significant battlefield and economic losses on Russia and force Putin to rethink his theory of victory.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly approved a series of command changes in the Russian military, including a new Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces.

• Russian forces are continuing to expand their salient northeast of Pokrovsk and southwest of Toretsk, although it remains unclear whether the Russian military command will prioritize further advances towards Kostyantynivka or Pokrovsk during Summer 2025.

• Russia is unlikely to have sufficient manpower, materiel, and operational planning capabilities to conduct both an envelopment of Pokrovsk and a significant offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka in the coming months.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka and in the Zaporizhia direction.

Institute for the Study of War

The Russian delegation in Istanbul reportedly framed its demands for a final peace settlement as preconditions that Ukraine must meet before Russia will agree to a ceasefire. Most of Russia's demands are contrary to US President Donald Trump's proposed peace plan. Sources familiar with the May 16 Ukrainian–Russian talks in Istanbul reported to Bloomberg that the Russian delegation demanded that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea to Russia and that the international community recognize the four oblasts and the peninsula as Russian territory before Russia will agree to a ceasefire. The Russian delegation also reportedly demanded that Ukraine adopt a neutral status, that no foreign troops be allowed on Ukrainian territory, and that Ukraine abandon its demands for war reparations from Russia. Chairperson of the Russian Federation Council's Committee on Foreign Affairs Grigory Karasin stated on May 17 that the Russian delegation maintained Russian President Vladimir Putin's June 2024 demands, including that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the entirety of the four oblasts and abandon its NATO aspirations before Russia would agree to a ceasefire and peace negotiations. The United States reportedly presented Russia in April 2025 with a seven-point peace plan that offered Russia "de jure" US recognition of Russian sovereignty over occupied Crimea and "de facto" recognition of Russian control over the parts of Ukraine that Russian forces currently occupy. The US proposal also reportedly included "a robust security guarantee" involving a group of European states and possibly non-European states as a likely peacekeeping force. The Russian delegation's demands in Istanbul outright reject these aspects of the US peace proposal.

ISW continues to assess that Russia's war aim remains full Ukrainian capitulation. Russia is reframing its territorial demands — typically the subject of war termination negotiations — as preconditions for a ceasefire. Russia is attempting to posture itself as open to negotiations but is putting forward demands that Ukraine cannot reasonably accept while offering no compromises of its own. ISW continues to assess that Putin will continue to refuse to offer compromises until Ukraine and the West are able to alter his theory of victory, which posits that Russia will win a war of attrition through indefinite creeping advances that prevent Ukraine from conducting successful, operationally significant counteroffensive operations.

Russia's continued protraction of negotiations emphasizes its unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations for either a ceasefire or a final peace agreement. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on May 17 that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky may meet only if the Russian and Ukrainian delegations reach unspecified agreements and underscored that all talks should be conducted behind closed doors. Peskov's statements are likely intentionally vague in order to further delay progress in Russian-Ukrainian talks. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on May 17 that a source close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated the Kremlin viewed discussions between Putin and Zelensky as "out of the question" as Moscow knew that the conditions it was pushing Ukraine to accept were non-starters for Kyiv. Another Verstka source close to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) similarly stated that Russian officials do not plan to discuss preparations for a Putin-Zelensky meeting. Russia has doubled down on its efforts to protract peace processes by continuing to present Ukraine with ultimatums that Ukraine cannot accept. The Verstka source close to the Presidential Administration added that Russia's demand that the Ukrainian–Russian talks occur without a mediator shows that the Kremlin seeks to demonstrate that it is capable of demanding that the United States limit the influence of Ukraine's Western partners. Peskov's comments and Verstka's report cohere with ISW's long-standing assessment that Russia remains committed to prolonging peace negotiations so as to continue making battlefield advances and to extract additional concessions from the West. Ukraine has continually demonstrated its willingness to compromise and engage in good-faith negotiations in contrast.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian delegation in Istanbul reportedly framed its demands for a final peace settlement as preconditions that Ukraine must meet before Russia will agree to a ceasefire. Most of Russia's demands are contrary to US President Donald Trump's proposed peace plan.

• Russia's continued protraction of negotiations emphasizes its unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations for either a ceasefire or a final peace agreement.

• Kremlin officials continue to signal that Russia is prepared to continue or even escalate its war against Ukraine should Ukraine and the West not agree to Russia's demands for Ukraine's surrender.

• Russia continues to deny the current Ukrainian government's legitimacy and is likely setting conditions to renege on any future Ukrainian–Russian peace agreement.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Lyman, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Kurakhove.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted the largest single drone strike of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 17 to 18 – in disregard of US President Donald Trump's calls for Russia to stop long-range strikes against Ukraine, particularly against Kyiv Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 273 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 88 drones over eastern, northern, and central Ukraine; that 128 decoy drones were "lost in location;" and that one drone was still in Ukrainian airspace as of 0800 local time. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike largely targeted Kyiv Oblast and that drones struck Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk oblasts. Russian forces launched 267 drones (and three ballistic missiles) in their overnight strike series against Ukraine on the night of February 22 and 23. Russian forces have significantly intensified their nightly strikes against Ukraine over the last five months and have conducted several of the largest strikes of the entire war since January 2025. A Russian milblogger claimed that the May 17-18 record-breaking strike was effective due to Russia's use of the "Geran-3" drone (the Russian analogue to the Iranian Shahed-238), which is reportedly equipped with a turbo jet and 300-kilogram warhead. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are innovating their long-range drone strike tactics in order to offset the effectiveness of Ukrainian mobile defense units and overwhelm the Ukrainian air defense umbrella.

The Kremlin continues efforts to project Russia's military strength ahead of US President Donald Trump’s scheduled phone call with Putin on May 19. Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin published on May 18 excerpts of an allegedly "new" interview with Putin, in which Putin claimed that Russia has enough manpower and materiel to bring the war in Ukraine to its "logical" conclusion with the "necessary" results for Russia. Putin reiterated long-standing Kremlin narratives about the necessity that peace negotiations address the war’s "root causes" and "protect" of Russian-speakers of Ukraine, whom Putin claimed consider Russia their "motherland." Ukrainian outlet The Kyiv Independent and Russian state media reported on May 18 that the excerpts that Zarubin published on May 18 are unaired footage from the documentary "Russia.Kremlin.Putin.25 Years" that the Kremlin published on May 4 in which Putin repeatedly promoted claims about Russia’s ability to bring the war to its "logical conclusion." The Kremlin's decision to delay publishing these clips until May 18 suggests that the Kremlin is trying to project a strong, militarily superior Russia to the West and to domestic Russian audiences ahead of Putin’s May 19 phone call with Trump. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky recently stated that Russia is prepared to fight for "however long it takes," and Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev recently made thinly veiled nuclear threats in reference to what Medvedev categorized as "negotiating ultimatums."

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted the largest single drone strike of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 17 to 18 — in disregard of US President Donald Trump's calls for Russia to stop long-range strikes against Ukraine, particularly against Kyiv Oblast.

• The Kremlin continues efforts to project Russia's military strength ahead of US President Donald Trump’s scheduled phone call with Putin on May 19.

• Reported support within the Russian military and society for continuing the war until Russia achieves its original war aims and territorial demands reflects the success of the Kremlin's years-long narrative efforts to justify a protracted war effort.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues efforts to negotiate a diplomatic end to the war in Ukraine.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War