ISW has observed no geolocated evidence to indicate that Russian forces have encircled a significant
number of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast or elsewhere along the frontline in Ukraine. Russian President
Vladimir Putin claimed during a press conference on March 13 that Russian forces have "isolated"
Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and that it is "impossible" for small groups of Ukrainian forces to
withdraw from positions in Kursk Oblast. Putin claimed that Ukrainian forces will not be able to leave
Kursk at all "if" Russian forces can conduct a "physical blockade" in the coming days. Putin stated
during a Russian Security Council meeting on March 14 that Russian forces have "blocked" unspecified
Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 14 that Russian
authorities are fabricating claims about the alleged "encirclement" of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast
in order to influence the political and informational scene. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that
Ukrainian forces have regrouped and withdrawn to more advantageous defensive positions in Kursk Oblast
and that Ukrainian forces are not under threat of encirclement.
Russian milbloggers have also
not coalesced around claims that Russian forces have encircled or "blocked" a significant number of
Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast in recent days, but milbloggers may alter their reporting to mirror
Putin's claims in the coming days. Some Russian milbloggers claimed on March 12 and 13 that Russian
forces encircled an unspecified number of Ukrainian forces in an unspecified area of Kursk Oblast, but
many Russian milbloggers published maps on March 13 and 14 acknowledging that Ukrainian forces have
viable egress routes into Sumy Oblast from their remaining positions in Kursk Oblast. At least one
Russian milblogger explicitly questioned claims that Russian forces encircled Ukrainian forces in Kursk
Oblast on March 12, and another complained on March 12 that Russian forces are unable to encircle
Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast because Russian forces cannot conduct rapid, mechanized breakthroughs
into rear Ukrainian areas.
Putin claimed in October 2024 that Russian forces "encircled" 2,000
Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast, but ISW never observed any Russian milblogger claims or geolocated
footage to substantiate Putin's October 2024 claim. Putin has repeatedly failed to acknowledge that the
Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast extends from the Ukrainian-Russian international border and that
Ukrainian forces can transit the sections of the border under Ukrainian control.
Putin seized
on a statement by US President Donald Trump about the supposed encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Kursk
Oblast to distract from his recent rejection of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal. President Trump
stated in a post on Truth Social on March 14 that Russian forces have "completely surrounded" "thousands"
of Ukrainian forces, presumably in Kursk Oblast, and called on Putin to "spare" their lives. Putin
responded directly to Trump's request during the March 14 security council meeting and claimed that
Russian forces will guarantee the "life and decent treatment" of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast if
Ukrainian forces surrender. Putin reiterated unsubstantiated claims that Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast
have committed crimes against Russian civilians in the area and said that Russia considers the Ukrainian
incursion an act of "terrorism." Putin claimed that Ukrainian authorities must order Ukrainian forces to
surrender in order for Russia to implement Trump's request. Putin is attempting to present himself as a
reasonable and merciful leader whom President Trump can engage with and to generate a new narrative to
distract from Putin's decision to reject the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal on March 13.
Key
Takeaways
• ISW has observed no geolocated evidence to indicate that Russian forces have
encircled a significant number of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast or elsewhere along the frontline in
Ukraine.
• Putin seized on a statement by US President Donald Trump about the supposed
encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast to distract from his recent rejection of the
US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal.
• Kremlin statements following Putin's meeting with US
Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff on March 13 underscore Putin's rejection of the
US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal and continued unwillingness to engage in good faith negotiations to end
the war in Ukraine.
• Russian forces marginally advanced towards the international border in
Kursk Oblast on March 14, but Ukrainian forces still maintain limited positions in Kursk Oblast.
• Consistent Ukrainian strikes against Russian air defense assets are reportedly allowing Ukrainian
long-range drones to increasingly penetrate the Russian air defense umbrella in deep rear areas,
including in Moscow Oblast.
• The Ukrainian military reorganized the Ukrainian 3rd Separate
Assault Brigade into the 3rd Army Corps, further showcasing Ukraine's force efforts to transition to a
corps structure.
• Ukraine's European allies continue to provide military assistance and
technical support and demonstrate interest in strengthening bilateral cooperation.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Toretsk and
near Siversk and Pokrovsk.
Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian officials continue to deny Russian President Vladimir Putin's
unsubstantiated claim that Russian forces have encircled a significant number of Ukrainian troops in
Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers published maps on March 14 and 15 showing Russian and Ukrainian
positions in Kursk Oblast that do not indicate Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces, and two
Russian milbloggers explicitly denied Putin's claim that Russian forces encircled a significant number of
Ukrainian forces in the area on March 13 and 14. One milblogger characterized Putin's claims as a
narrative intended to influence US President Donald Trump ahead of peace negotiations. Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky noted that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attempting to encircle
Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast, that no encirclement currently exists, and stated that Putin is
attempting to delay discussion of the US-Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposal by spreading these
claims.Independent Ukrainian sources also denied Putin's claims about Russian encirclements of Ukrainian
forces and noted that Ukrainian forces maintain the ability to maneuver from their remaining positions in
Kursk Oblast despite a difficult tactical situation. ISW has still not observed any Russian milblogger
claims or geolocated footage suggesting that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian troops in Kursk
Oblast. Ukrainian forces appear to maintain egress routes across the international border from their
positions in Kursk Oblast as of this publication.
Russian forces continued offensive
operations in Kursk Oblast but have not completely pushed Ukrainian forces out of the area as of this
publication. Geolocated footage published on March 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in
western Basivka (northeast of Sumy City in Sumy Oblast). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other
Russian sources claimed on March 15 that Russian forces seized Zaoleshenka (immediately west of Sudzha)
and Rubanshchina (west of Sudzha), but ISW has not observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have
seized the entirety of these settlements. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized
Gogolevka (west of Sudzha) and are clearing Guyevo (south of Sudzha). Russian milbloggers claimed that
Ukrainian forces maintain positions near Oleshnya and Gornal (both southwest of Sudzha). Russian forces
continued attacking near Rubanshchina, Gogolevka, and Guyevo. Elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV)
Brigade are reportedly operating near Gogolevka, and elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black
Sea Fleet) and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Guyevo.
Key Takeaways
• Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian officials continue to deny Russian
President Vladimir Putin's unsubstantiated claim that Russian forces have encircled a significant number
of Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk
Oblast but have not completely pushed Ukrainian forces out of the area as of this publication.
• Ukrainian officials expressed concern about Russian ground operations in northern Sumy Oblast but
doubt Russia's ability to conduct an effective concerted offensive operation against Sumy City.
• The Kremlin is likely preparing to intensify a narrative that accuses Ukrainian forces of war crimes
in Kursk Oblast in an attempt to discredit the Ukrainian military, erode Western support for Ukraine, and
spoil or delay straightforward discussions about the 30-day ceasefire that US President Donald Trump
proposed to Putin.
• Russian forces conducted drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the
night of March 14 to 15, including conducting their third double-tap strike against Ukraine in the past
week.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed the official Ukrainian delegation to
"engage with Ukraine's international partners" in the negotiation process to end the war on March 15.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy
Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk.
Mit Blick auf die von ihm geforderte „Kriegswirtschaft“ sagte Weber, das
bedeute zum Beispiel beschleunigte Genehmigungsverfahren bei Rüstungsgütern und mehr Zusammenarbeit
zwischen den europäischen Rüstungsherstellern. Aber auch, dass Unternehmen von der Produktion ziviler auf
militärische Produkte umgestellt werden.
„Klare Ansagen bei Beschaffung“ Zudem brauche
Europa ein gemeinsames europäisches Führungskommando, sagte Weber. Ein europäischer Generalstabschef
solle dann „die aufgerüsteten nationalen Armeen befehligen und klare Ansagen bei der Beschaffung machen
können“, verlangte der EVP-Fraktionschef.
>Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian officials continue to deny >Russian President Vladimir
Putin's unsubstantiated claim that >Russian forces have encircled a significant number of >Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast.
Eine Seite sagt so, die andere so, wenn man
nicht direkt selbst vor Ort ist bleibt eine Einschätzung schwierig.
US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz stated on March 16 that Ukraine will receive unspecified security
guarantees in exchange for unspecified territorial concessions. Waltz also stated that the United States
is considering "the reality of the situation on the ground" in diplomatic talks when discussing an end to
the war in Ukraine. It is not clear exactly what Waltz meant by "the reality of the situation on the
ground." Russian officials have frequently used the narrative that any negotiations must consider the
"realities on the ground" to refer to the current frontline in Ukraine and their claims of the
inevitability of further Russian battlefield gains. Waltz's acknowledgement that Ukraine will receive
unspecified security guarantees is a key aspect of achieving US President Donald Trump's stated goal of
securing a lasting peace in Ukraine, but stopping hostilities on indefensible lines would limit the
effectiveness of security guarantees.
The current frontlines do not provide the strategic
depth that Ukraine will need to reliably defend against renewed Russian aggression. Russian forces are
just across the Dnipro River from Kherson City, roughly 25 kilometers from Zaporizhzhia City, and 30
kilometers from Kharkiv City. Russian troops on the Dnipro River could use a ceasefire to prepare for the
extremely difficult task of conducting an opposed river crossing undisturbed, significantly increasing
the likelihood of success in such an endeavor. Stopping a well-prepared, major mechanized offensive cold
is extremely rare in war, which means that a renewed Russian assault would likely threaten both Kharkiv
and Zaporizhzhia cities, as well as key cities in the Donetsk "fortress belt," almost immediately. Russia
is constructing a large highway and railway aimed at connecting major cities in occupied Ukraine and
Russia, which will reinforce Russia's hold on occupied Ukraine and Russia's ability to transport and
supply Russian forces operating in Ukraine in the event of a future Russian offensive in southern
Ukraine.
The US and Europe would likely need to provide military aid to Ukraine more rapidly,
in much larger volumes, and at higher cost the closer the ultimate ceasefire lines are to the current
frontline. Ukraine would likely need an even larger military with greater capabilities to play its
critical role in deterring and, if necessary, defeating future aggression along current frontline (both
within Ukraine and along Ukraine’s international border with Russia) that is over 2,100 kilometers long.
Enforcing a ceasefire along the current frontline would also require the commitment of large numbers of
Western forces. Helping Ukraine regain strategically critical territory, as Trump has suggested he
intends to do, could significantly reduce the cost and difficulty of securing a future peace. A ceasefire
along more defensible positions would also place Russian forces in a more disadvantaged position for
renewed offensive operations, making future Russian aggression less likely.
Russian officials
maintain their maximalist territorial claims over all occupied Ukraine and significant parts of
unoccupied Ukraine, however. Senior Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have
consistently demanded that Ukraine surrender the entirety of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson
oblasts, including areas that Russian forces do not already occupy, and have reiterated these claims in
recent weeks. Russian state media has also recently amplified similar sentiments from Kremlin-affiliated
mouthpieces. Putin recently claimed that "Novorossiya" is an integral part of Russia, and Kremlin
Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov defined "Novorossiya" as all of eastern and southern Ukraine including
Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts. Russia currently occupies a small portion of
Kharkiv Oblast and the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast, and Russian forces are advancing towards the
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border. Continued Kremlin statements demanding that Ukraine cede
unoccupied Ukrainian territory indicate that the Kremlin and Putin remain committed to these territorial
goals despite ongoing negotiations.
Russian officials have given no public indications that
they are willing to make concessions on their territorial or security demands of Ukraine. Accepting
Western-backed security guarantees for Ukraine would be a significant concession for Putin. Putin has
repeatedly called for Ukraine to permanently abandon its goals of joining NATO or any security bloc and
to reject future offers of foreign military assistance, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
recently claimed that Russia will reject the future deployment of any European peacekeepers to Ukraine
and consider any such deployment as the "direct, official, undisguised involvement of NATO countries" in
the war. Russian officials also appear to be generating increased support for their demands in Russian
society despite the costs of Russia's protracted war effort, and Putin likely remains committed to
securing a return for Russia's investment in the war he regards as sufficient. Putin and Kremlin
officials have been regularly broadcasting their demands for Ukrainian territorial and security
concessions beyond the current frontlines to the Russian people, underscoring how unlikely Putin is to
abandon his ambitions in Ukraine even after a ceasefire.
Key Takeaways
• US
National Security Advisor Mike Waltz stated on March 16 that Ukraine will receive unspecified security
guarantees in exchange for unspecified territorial concessions.
• The current frontlines do
not provide the strategic depth that Ukraine will need to reliably defend against renewed Russian
aggression.
• Russian officials maintain their maximalist territorial claims over all
occupied Ukraine and significant parts of unoccupied Ukraine, however.
• Russian officials
have given no public indications that they are willing to make concessions on their territorial or
security demands of Ukraine.
• Russia continues to seize on diplomatic engagements with the
United States to normalize its war demands.
• The United Kingdom (UK) convened a virtual
Coalition of the Willing summit on March 15 to reiterate support for Ukraine and discuss plans for
peace.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Russian forces advanced in Sumy
Oblast and near Velyka Novosilka.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues efforts
to posture as solving issues with the Russian military.
Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have been partially successful in holding the ceasefire
proposal hostage as part of his efforts to extract preemptive concessions from US President Donald Trump
in negotiations to end the war. Trump stated on March 17 that he plans to speak with Putin on March 18
and "wants] to see if he and Putin can bring the war to an end." Trump added that he and Putin will "be
talking about land," "power plants," and "dividing up certain assets." The United States and Ukraine
agreed on March 11 to a 30-day ceasefire proposal that is contingent on Russia's "acceptance and
concurrent implementation." The proposal stated that Ukraine and the United States intend to name their
negotiating teams and immediately begin negotiations toward an enduring peace — noting the distinction
between the temporary ceasefire and future negotiations on a peace settlement. Putin rejected the
temporary ceasefire proposal on March 13 and claimed that the cessation of hostilities "should be such
that it would lead to long-term peace and eliminate the initial causes" of the war. Putin thus rejected
one of the main principles of the US-Ukrainian proposal — that the temporary ceasefire precedes formal
negotiations to end the war. The US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal noted that the United States
and Ukraine discussed the return of prisoners of war (POWs), detained civilians, and forcibly deported
Ukrainian children — all of which will require future talks with Russia. The US-Ukrainian temporary
ceasefire proposal did not mention talks with Russia about Ukrainian territory, energy infrastructure, or
assets. Putin also suggested on March 13 that he may call Trump to discuss "issues" involved in the
ceasefire proposal, such as Ukraine's continued ability to mobilize forces and receive military aid from
partners and allies — issues notably not included in the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal. Putin
is attempting to change the sequence of talks in order to push Trump into making preemptive concessions
on issues that are not part of the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire but are part of Russia's war aims.
The acceptance of these Russian demands in the context of negotiations for an immediate ceasefire would
cede valuable US and Ukrainian leverage during future negotiations to secure a lasting peace in Ukraine.
Russian officials continue to demonstrate that Russia's aim of destroying Ukrainian
sovereignty remains unchanged since before Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022. Russian
Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko claimed in an interview with Kremlin-affiliated outlet
Izvestiya on March 17 that Russia continues to demand that Ukraine be a neutral state and that NATO
states refuse to accept Ukraine as a member. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated to RBK
Ukraine on March 17 that no country should have a "veto" over Ukraine's choice to participate in
alliances, including the EU or NATO. Syhiba noted that Ukraine's NATO aspirations are enshrined in the
Ukrainian Constitution and reflect a "strategic choice of the Ukrainian people." A Russian "veto" of
Ukraine's choices about these matters would amount to a denial of Ukraine's ability to make choices about
its alliances and security arrangements as a sovereign and independent state. Grushko acknowledged during
his interview that Russia's demands for Ukrainian neutrality and NATO's refusal to allow Ukraine into the
alliance are the same demands that Russia made in 2021 before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine —
demonstrating how Russia's demands to destroy Ukraine as an independent, sovereign state have remained
unchanged.
The Kremlin continues to reject the prospect of European peacekeepers in Ukraine,
in opposition to US and Ukrainian positions on the matter and impeding the establishment of a stable,
lasting peace to end the war. Grushko stated on March 17 that Russia will not accept peacekeepers from
the EU, NATO, or individual Western states in post-war Ukraine as Russia considers all of these possible
peacekeeping contingents to be "NATO contingents." Grushko claimed that any talks about future
international peacekeeping missions in Ukraine should only occur after the conclusion of the final peace
agreement to end the war and only if parties to the peace agreement agree that the peace agreement
requires international support. The Kremlin appears to be trying to dictate the timing and sequence of
talks, demanding that final peace talks precede any discussions about peacekeeping missions in post-war
Ukraine. Russia continues to make clear its rejection of any European involvement in post-war Ukraine —
in contradiction to US and Ukrainian positions on the matter. Trump stated on February 26 that Europe
should be responsible for security guarantees for Ukraine, and the joint US-Ukrainian March 11 statement
outlining the temporary ceasefire proposal stated that Ukraine reiterated its positions that European
partners should be involved in the peace process. Sybiha stressed the importance of European support to
assist in monitoring and enforcing the terms of a permanent ceasefire in Ukraine and noted that Ukraine
is already discussing specific details with those European countries willing to deploy peacekeeping
forces to Ukraine. Significant European involvement in post-war Ukraine is critical for any peace
settlement that aims to establish an enduring peace in Ukraine.
A strong Ukrainian military
backed by security guarantees remains the most important component of a sustainable peace in Ukraine and
deterrence of future Russian aggression. Sybiha emphasized that there can be no restriction on Ukraine's
defensive capabilities or military strength in any future peace agreement and that Ukraine must keep
working towards a self-sufficient defense industrial sector to deter further Russian aggression. Sybiha,
responding to a question about Ukraine's fundamental stipulations in "any" future negotiations, stated
that Ukraine will not compromise its territorial integrity and sovereignty and "will never recognize
occupied territories." Discussions on the permanent status of occupied Ukrainian territory should
properly only be a part of negotiations on a permanent settlement of the war.
Key Takeaways
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have been partially successful in holding the
ceasefire proposal hostage as part of his efforts to extract preemptive concessions from US President
Donald Trump in negotiations to end the war.
• Russian officials continue to demonstrate that
Russia's aim of destroying Ukrainian sovereignty remains unchanged since before Russia launched its
full-scale invasion in 2022.
• The Kremlin continues to reject the prospect of European
peacekeepers in Ukraine, in opposition to US and Ukrainian positions on the matter and impeding the
establishment of a stable, lasting peace to end the war.
• A strong Ukrainian military backed
by security guarantees remains the most important component of a sustainable peace in Ukraine and
deterrence of future Russian aggression.
• The United States announced its withdrawal from war
crimes monitoring agencies related to the war in Ukraine – essentially a unilateral concession to Russia
with no Russian concessions in return.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Chief
of General Staff Lieutenant General Anatoliy Barhylevych with Major General Andriy Hnatov on March 16.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near
Toretsk and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian occupation officials
continue to develop analogues to the federal "Time of Heroes" programming in occupied Ukraine as part of
long-term efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia and militarize society in occupied
Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin did not accept the US-Ukrainian proposal for a temporary ceasefire along
the frontline and reiterated his demands for a resolution to the war that amount to Ukrainian
capitulation. Putin and US President Donald Trump held a phone call on March 18. The Kremlin's official
readout of the call stated that Putin emphasized the need to address the "root causes" of the war.
Russian officials have repeatedly defined these root causes as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's
alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine. Russian officials’ calls for
the elimination of these "root causes" amount to Russian demands for Ukraine's permanent neutrality and
the installation of a pro-Russian government in Kyiv.
Putin demanded on March 18 that Ukraine
stop mobilizing (i.e. recruiting and training) forces during a potential temporary ceasefire. Putin also
called for a halt to all foreign military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine but did not discuss
Russia's military support from North Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Iran. Putin claimed
that Russia and the United States should continue their efforts toward a peace settlement in "bilateral
mode," excluding Ukraine or Europe from future negotiations about the war in Ukraine. Putin's demands on
the March 18 call parallel the demands he made on March 13.
ISW continues to assess that Putin
is attempting to hold the temporary ceasefire proposal hostage in order to extract preemptive concessions
ahead of formal negotiations to end the war. ISW also continues to assess that Putin's demands for the
removal of the legitimate government of Ukraine, the weakening of the Ukrainian military such that it
cannot defend against future Russian aggression, and the denial of Ukraine's sovereignty and independence
remain unchanged. The persistence of Putin's demands for Ukraine's capitulation demonstrates that Putin
is not interested in good-faith negotiations to pursue Trump's stated goal of achieving a lasting peace
in Ukraine.
Trump and Putin agreed on a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against
energy infrastructure, but the exact contours of the moratorium remain unclear at this time. The Kremlin
stated that Putin accepted Trump's proposal for a 30-day moratorium on strikes against "energy
infrastructure" and that Putin "immediately gave the Russian military the corresponding order," whereas
the White House stated that Putin and Trump agreed to "an energy and infrastructure ceasefire." It is
unclear which targets are explicitly prohibited under the 30-day moratorium given the difference in
language between the two readouts of the call.
The Kremlin also stated that Putin "informed"
Trump that Russia and Ukraine will each exchange 175 prisoners of war (POWs) on March 19 and that Russia
will also transfer 23 seriously wounded Ukrainian soldiers, whom Putin claimed are currently undergoing
medical treatment in Russian hospitals, as a "gesture of goodwill." The March 11 US-Ukrainian temporary
ceasefire proposal stated that Ukrainian and American delegations discussed POW exchanges as part of the
peace process, particularly during a potential temporary ceasefire on the frontline. The White House
stated on March 18 that Russia and the United States will "immediately" begin negotiations in an
unspecified country in the Middle East about a temporary maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea, a "full
ceasefire," and a permanent peace settlement. The Kremlin stated that the United States and Russia are
creating "expert groups" to continue efforts to achieve a peace settlement "in bilateral mode."
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky endorsed the Trump-Putin energy strikes moratorium agreement on
March 18 and said that Ukraine expects to receive additional information from Trump about the proposal.
Zelensky stated that Ukraine would not accept a situation in which Russia strikes Ukrainian energy
infrastructure and Ukraine is unable to respond.
Key Takeaways
• Russian President
Vladimir Putin did not accept the US-Ukrainian proposal for a temporary ceasefire along the frontline and
reiterated his demands for a resolution to the war that amount to Ukrainian capitulation.
• Trump and Putin agreed on a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure,
but the exact contours of the moratorium remain unclear at this time.
• Putin continues to
hold the temporary ceasefire hostage, likely to extract further concessions from US President Donald
Trump and delay or spoil negotiations for an enduring peace in Ukraine.
• Russian forces
recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid intensified Russian offensive operations in the area,
likely as part of efforts to leverage Russia's deliberate stalling of the temporary ceasefire proposal to
make battlefield gains.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove, and Russian
forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova.
• The Russian military is reportedly
increasing the number of its information and psychological operations units.
Russia and Ukraine have not formally announced the implementation of the temporary long-range strikes
ceasefire. Ceasefires take time to negotiate, execute, and monitor and require both sides to agree to
cease attacks on specified targets at a specific time and date. Ceasefires also require both sides to
agree to mechanisms to monitor the ceasefire and to address allegations of violations. Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 19 that if Russia and Ukraine come to a temporary strikes
ceasefire agreement, then Ukraine will prepare a list of "civilian objects, energy objects,
infrastructure objects" to give to Ukraine's partners — indicating that Russia and Ukraine have not
finalized the details of which targets would be off limits or agreed on an implementation date.
Official American, Ukrainian, and Russian statements indicate that the parties to the ceasefire have
not yet finalized the details of the agreement. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on March 19
that the temporary ceasefire only applies to "energy infrastructure facilities," and Kremlin newswire
TASS reported that Peskov declined to comment on the White House statement — likely referring to the
March 18 White House statement following the call between US President Donald Trump and Russian President
Vladimir Putin — that the ceasefire applied to "energy and infrastructure." Trump told the Washington
Examiner on March 18 after his call with Putin that Russia agreed to "an immediate ceasefire on energy
and infrastructure." US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff similarly stated on March 18 after
the call that the temporary ceasefire covers "energy and infrastructure in general." The Trump
administration's statement following Trump's March 19 call with Zelensky stated that Trump and Zelensky
"agreed on a partial ceasefire against energy." Zelensky stated on March 19 that Ukraine is "ready to
implement" a ceasefire on strikes against "energy and civilian infrastructure."
Russian
President Vladimir Putin is adding confusion about the timing and details of the ceasefire in an attempt
to falsely blame Ukraine for violating the ceasefire before both countries have officially implemented
the agreement. The Kremlin is attempting to posture Russia as already adhering to the temporary ceasefire
while claiming that Ukraine is violating the ceasefire — even though both parties have not agreed on the
details of the agreement or officially implemented the ceasefire. The Kremlin readout of the March 18
phone call between Putin and Trump stated that Putin "immediately gave the Russian military" an order
that "corresponded" with his "positive response" to Trump's temporary ceasefire proposal. The Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that seven Russian drones were en route to striking Ukrainian energy
facilities connected to defense industrial enterprises in Mykolaiv Oblast when Putin issued the order to
the Russian military. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces received orders to "neutralize" the
drones and that Russian forces used Pantsir air defense systems to down six drones and that a Russian
Aerospace Forces (VKS) fighter jet destroyed the other. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces
launched a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 18 to 19, and
Zelensky noted on March 19 that Russian drones had struck a hospital in Sumy Oblast and unspecified areas
in Donetsk Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian drones struck an oil transshipment facility in
Krasnodar Krai following the Trump-Putin call and attempted to frame the Ukrainian strike as a violation
of the ceasefire agreement. Russian claims that Russia adhered to the ceasefire by abstaining from
conducting strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and that Ukraine violated the ceasefire are
inaccurate as Russia and Ukraine have not yet officially implemented the agreement. Such Russian claims
are attempts to take advantage of the lack of clarity about the details of the ceasefire that the Kremlin
is injecting. Putin's attempt to confuse and manipulate the temporary strikes ceasefire and blame Ukraine
for violations even before the agreement has come into effect is an indicator of how Putin will likely
exploit any future agreements.
Key Takeaways
• Russia and Ukraine have not formally
announced the implementation of the temporary long-range strikes ceasefire.
• Official
American, Ukrainian, and Russian statements indicate that the parties to the ceasefire have not yet
finalized the details of the agreement.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is adding confusion
about the timing and details of the ceasefire in an attempt to falsely blame Ukraine for violating the
ceasefire before both countries have officially implemented the agreement.
• The Kremlin
continues to contradict Trump's report of his call with Putin on March 18.
• The Kremlin
continues to demand that Ukraine cede Ukrainian territory that Russia does not currently occupy and to
set conditions to make further territorial demands.
• The United States, Ukraine, and Europe
continue to agree that Ukraine and Europe must be involved in peace negotiations to end the war, despite
Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to exclude Ukraine and Europe from such negotiations.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on March 19.
• The Russian
Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz
Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, described recent Russian deception tactics that may amount to
acts of perfidy — a war crime under the Geneva Convention.
• Ukrainian forces recently
advanced in Belgorod Oblast and near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar,
Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian milbloggers argued that the Russian
government should give military awards and social benefits to military instructors and Russian defense
industrial base (DIB) employees.
>• The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main >Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head
and Akhmat Spetsnaz >Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, described recent >Russian
deception tactics that may amount to acts of perfidy — >a war crime under the Geneva
Convention.
Acts of perfidy?
Man lernt. In Praxis wohl das Tragen
ukrainischer Uniformen.
Article 37 - Prohibition of perfidy
(d) the feigning
of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral or other
States not Parties to the conflict. 2. Ruses of war are not prohibited.
Die Aussagen von John Bolten würde ich nicht allzu ernst nehmen. Der ist noch immer sauer, weil ihn
Trump, während der 1. Amtszeit, als Berater rausgeschmissen hat. Bolton, einer der für mehr Krieg, als
weniger Krieg eintritt..
"The U.S. leader called Bolton “a disgruntled boring fool who only
wanted to go to war. Never had a clue, was ostracized & happily dumped. What a dope!”
Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against Engels Airbase in Saratov Oblast on the night of March
19 to 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 20 that elements of Ukraine's Security Service
(SBU), Unmanned Systems Forces, Special Operations Forces (SSO), and other Ukrainian forces struck the
Engels Airbase in Saratov Oblast causing a fire, explosions, and a secondary detonation of ammunition in
the vicinity of the airfield. Geolocated footage and other footage published on March 20 show an
explosion and fire at the Engels Airbase. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces use
Engels Airbase to conduct missile strikes against Ukraine, and an SBU source told Ukrainian news outlet
Suspilne that Engels is a key base for Russian strategic aviation, housing Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, and Tu-160
strategic bombers as well as FAB and KAB glide bombs and cruise missiles storage facilities. Ukrainian
Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that the Ukrainian strike
destroyed a large number of Russian Kh-101 cruise missiles that Russian forces use in nightly strikes
against Ukraine. Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed on March 20 that Ukrainian forces
conducted the "most massive drone strike of all time" against Saratov Oblast and that Ukrainian drones
struck civilian infrastructure near Engels and caused a fire near the base.
Russia, Ukraine,
and the United States have not yet concluded the details of the moratorium against energy infrastructure
strikes. The Ukrainian strike against Engels Airbase would not have been subject to this moratorium in
any event because it is a military target. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria
Zakharova absurdly accused Ukraine of violating the Russia-Ukraine 30-day moratorium on strikes against
"energy infrastructure" by targeting the Engels Air Base. Russian forces notably conducted strikes
against Ukrainian energy and other infrastructure on both nights since Russian President Vladimir Putin's
March 18 statements agreeing to the moratorium.
The Kremlin announced that Russia and the
United States will hold another round of talks in Riyadh, Saudia Arabia on March 24, and it is unclear
whether these talks will include Ukraine. Russian Presidential Aide for International Affairs Yuriy
Ushakov announced on March 20 that Russian Federation Council International Affairs Committee Chairperson
Grigory Karasin and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Director's advisor, Colonel General Sergei
Beseda, will lead the Russian delegation in bilateral discussions on the technical details of a possible
maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea with US officials in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on March 24. Beseda served
as the Director of the FSB's Fifth Directorate, which is officially tasked with overseeing operational
information and international relations, from 2009 to 2024. Karasin worked in Russia's MFA from the 1970s
to 2019 and served as a Deputy Foreign Minister in 1996 and from 2005 to 2019, when Karasin joined the
Federation Council. Karasin has headed the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs since
2021. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated on March 20 that
Russian MFA representatives will not participate in the March 24 talks in Riyadh. US State Department
Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on March 19 in response to a question about whether these talks will be
bilateral or trilateral that it is "still being discussed or arranged."
Key Takeaways
Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against Engels Airbase in Saratov Oblast on the night of
March 19 to 20.
Russia, Ukraine, and the United States have not yet concluded the details of
the moratorium against energy infrastructure strikes. The Ukrainian strike against Engels Airbase would
not have been subject to this moratorium in any event because it is a military target.
The
Kremlin announced that Russia and the United States will hold another round of talks in Riyadh, Saudia
Arabia on March 24, and it is unclear whether these talks will include Ukraine.
Kremlin
officials continue to amplify narratives indicating that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains
committed to his long-standing goal of conquering Ukraine and is attempting to leverage upcoming
ceasefire negotiations to secure preemptive concessions from Ukraine and the United States.
Kremlin officials are also working to exacerbate tension between the United States and its European
allies in order to break Western support for Ukraine and undermine the NATO alliance.
Putin
continues to condition domestic Russian audiences to prepare for a protracted war in Ukraine rather than
a sustainable peace built on compromise.
The Kremlin is intensifying efforts to change the
demographic makeup of occupied Ukraine in order to legitimize Putin's claim over occupied areas.
The Kremlin also continues Russifying Ukrainian children in occupied areas to further the destruction
of Ukrainian national and cultural identity and to portray Russia as the humane governor of occupied
Ukraine.
Kremlin officials continue advertising the possibility of future economic cooperation
with the United States, likely to extract preemptive concessions from the United States in ceasefire or
peace negotiations.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump spoke
about investments in Ukraine's energy infrastructure during their call on March 19.
US State
Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce condemned North Korea's involvement in Russia's war against Ukraine
on March 19 and expressed concern about Russian support to North Korea.
Ukraine’s allies
continue to provide financial and material military assistance to Ukraine, including funds from frozen
Russian assets in Europe.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast and Russian
forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russia may extend military veteran status to Russian milbloggers and military correspondents covering
the war in Ukraine, likely in an effort to further coopt and appease the Russian ultranationalist
milblogger community.
The Kremlin is weaponizing ongoing ceasefire negotiations and deliberately misrepresenting the status and
terms of a future ceasefire agreement in order to delay and undermine negotiations for a settlement to
the war. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 21 that Ukrainian forces blew up the
Sudzha gas distribution station in Kursk Oblast while withdrawing on the night of March 20 to 21 in order
to discredit Russian President Vladimir Putin's "peace initiatives" and to provoke Russia. The Ukrainian
General Staff denied the Russian MoD's claim and stated that Russian forces shelled the station, causing
a fire. The Ukrainian General Staff warned that Russian authorities are attempting to mislead the
international community and discredit Ukraine. Footage published on March 21 shows a fire at the station,
although ISW cannot independently verify the cause of the fire. Russian officials seized on the fire to
claim falsely that Ukrainian forces violated the proposed 30-day ceasefire banning Russian and Ukrainian
strikes on civilian and energy facilities, which is not yet formally in effect and terms of which remain
disputed. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russian forces are "implementing" an order from
Putin to refrain from striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure in accordance with the US ceasefire
proposal. Russian milbloggers observed that the ceasefire proposal has not come into force yet, however,
and acknowledged that Russia has continued nightly strikes on Ukraine, including Ukraine's port
infrastructure in Odesa Oblast, in recent days. Founder of the Kremlin-awarded Rybar telegram channel,
Mikhail Zvinchuk, recently published a video of himself mocking US officials for believing that Russia is
currently or intends to commit to the proposed temporary ceasefire in the area. The exact contours of
Putin's supposed order or a future moratorium on energy and infrastructure strikes between Russia and
Ukraine remain unclear as of this report.
Kremlin officials are leveraging narratives about
Ukrainian strikes and combat operations in Russian territory to justify rejecting peace negotiations with
Ukraine and continuing the war to a domestic Russian audience. Peskov claimed in reaction to the Sudzha
gas distribution station fire that Ukraine's denial of blowing up the station "shows how much one can
believe and trust" Ukrainian officials. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria
Zakharova asked how the United States will "manage" Ukraine given Ukraine's alleged violation of the
moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes (that has yet to be finalized and implemented). Zakharova's
and Peskov's comments are an effort to revive the narrative that Ukraine is the aggressor in this war,
that Ukraine only acts under guidance or pressure from the West, and that the war in Ukraine is an
existential risk to the Russian state to which Russia must respond. Russian authorities have also revived
narratives accusing Ukrainian forces of targeting Russian nuclear power plants and committing war crimes
against Russian civilians to undermine Ukraine's credibility and heighten the invented existential threat
to domestic audiences. The Russian Investigative Committee published a summary on March 21 of ongoing
criminal investigations, cases, and convictions of Ukrainian soldiers and high-level commanders for
allegedly targeting the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and civilians in strikes. ISW recently assessed
that the Kremlin was preparing to intensify narratives accusing Ukrainian forces of war crimes in Kursk
Oblast to discredit the Ukrainian military, erode Western support for Ukraine, and spoil or delay talks
about temporary ceasefire proposals.
Key Takeaways
The Kremlin is weaponizing
ongoing ceasefire negotiations and deliberately misrepresenting the status and terms of a future
ceasefire agreement in order to delay and undermine negotiations for a settlement to the war.
Kremlin officials are leveraging narratives about Ukrainian strikes and combat operations in Russian
territory to justify rejecting peace negotiations with Ukraine and continuing the war to a domestic
Russian audience.
US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated that US officials will
conduct "shuttle diplomacy" to engage bilaterally with both Ukrainian and Russian delegations in Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia.
Russia continues to strengthen its bilateral relations with North Korea, despite
growing warnings from the US against deeper Russian-North Korean cooperation.
Russian
officials also continue to deepen ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Ukraine's
European allies continue efforts to provide Ukraine with military assistance and bolster Ukraine's
defense industrial base (DIB).
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast. Russian
forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
Ukrainian
and Western defense officials estimated that the Russian monthly casualty rate is between 20,000 and
35,000 servicemembers.
US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff uncritically amplified a number of Russian demands,
claims, and justifications regarding the war in Ukraine during an interview on March 21. Witkoff told
American media personality Tucker Carlson in an interview published on March 21 that Russia "100 percent"
does not want to invade Europe and that Russia "does not need to absorb Ukraine." Witkoff stated that
Russia "reclaimed" five regions in Ukraine — Crimea and Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts
— and that Russia "has gotten what wants" and will not want more. The Kremlin has repeatedly and
falsely claimed that Crimea and these four oblasts are Russian territory contrary to international law,
and Witkoff's statement about Russia "reclaiming" these areas (which Russia has illegally occupied and
annexed) amplifies the Kremlin's justifications for its expansionist territorial demands and multiple
invasions of Ukraine.
Vladislav Surkov, a former close adviser to Russian President Vladimir
Putin, recently reiterated a number of longstanding Kremlin claims and ambitions that directly contradict
Witkoff's assertions in an interview with French media aimed at Western audiences. Surkov previously
served as a long-time close advisor to Putin and organized protests in Crimea against the Ukrainian
government in 2014. Surkov also oversaw the Kremlin's 2014-2015 project to promote the creation of
"Novorossiya" (an amorphous, invented region in Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all
of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia) in eastern Ukraine. Putin relieved
Surkov of his duties as Presidential Aide in February 2020. Surkov stated in an interview with French
outlet L'Express on March 19 that a Russian victory in Ukraine would be the "military or military and
diplomatic crushing of Ukraine" and the "division of this artificial quasi-state into its natural
fragments." Surkov stated that Russia will achieve this strategic objective — which Surkov stated has not
changed since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 — even if there are
"maneuvers, slowdowns, and pauses along the way." Surkov stated that the return of Ukraine to Russia's
desired and self-defined sphere of influence has been a Russian objective since the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Surkov claimed that "Ukraine is an artificial political entity" consisting of "at least"
three regions — the "Russian" southern and eastern Ukraine, the "Russian-non-Russian" central area, and
the "anti-Russian" west. Surkov claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine "will separate the Russians and the
anti-Russians" and will "confine" the "anti-Russians" to their "historical territory" such that they
"stop spreading across Russian soil." Surkov claimed that "perhaps" Ukraine will exist as a "real state"
in the future but as a much smaller entity. Surkov implied that Europe will be involved in the future
partitioning of Ukraine, claiming that "a balanced division of Ukraine will have to include a share for
Brussels." Surkov responded to a question about how he sees Russian borders, stating that the ideology of
the Russian World (Russkiy Mir) "has no borders" and exists "everywhere there is Russian influence,"
including cultural, military, economic, ideological, or humanitarian influence. Surkov claimed that
Russia's influence varies across regions in the world, but "is never zero." Surkov claimed that Russia
"will spread out in all directions." The Kremlin has repeatedly used the idea of the Russian World to
justify Russian military interventions into former Soviet states and to claim that areas of the former
Soviet Union and Russian Empire are historical Russian territories. Surkov's statements about Russia's
claims over southern and eastern Ukraine and the future expansion of Russkiy Mir are in direct contrast
to Witkoff's statement that Russia has no territorial ambitions beyond Crimea and Luhansk, Donetsk,
Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.
Witkoff's statements undermine US President Donald Trump's
stated desired end state for the war in Ukraine that achieves an enduring peace and is in the best
interests of the United States, Ukraine, and Europe. Trump has said that the United States will try to
return as much territory to Ukraine as possible. Trump also recently stated that the United States is
interested in taking control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), which Russian forces
currently occupy — implying that Russia would have to cede this territory in Zaporizhia Oblast before the
United States can take control of the ZNPP. Witkoff's March 21 presentation of Russia's territorial
demands for the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — including areas of these
four oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy — undermines Trump's efforts to achieve a
resolution to the war favorable to US interests. Ceding territory in these four oblasts to Russia —
either along the current frontlines or along the oblasts' administrative boundaries – would not provide
Ukraine with the defensible lines required to reliably defend against renewed Russian aggression in the
future, hindering Trump's stated objective of securing a lasting, sustainable peace in Ukraine. Witkoff
also claimed that Ukrainian officials have "conceded" that Ukraine will not be a member of NATO — a
preemptive US concession to Russia on one of the Kremlin's main demands as Russia continues to make no
concessions in return. Witkoff's statements appear to yield to multiple Kremlin demands before the start
of official negotiations for a peace settlement, ceding valuable US and Ukrainian leverage over Russia in
future negotiations that the United States will need in order to achieve Trump's desired end to the
war.
Key Takeaways
US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff uncritically
amplified a number of Russian demands, claims, and justifications regarding the war in Ukraine during an
interview on March 21.
Vladislav Surkov, a former close adviser to Russian President Vladimir
Putin, recently reiterated a number of longstanding Kremlin claims and ambitions that directly contradict
Witkoff's assertions in an interview with French media aimed at Western audiences.
Surkov's
statements are consistent with those made by Putin and senior Russian officials, who have recently and
repeatedly stated that Russia intends to bring Ukraine under Russian control and establish suzerainty
over neighboring countries in order to weaken the West and strengthen Russia's global influence.
Witkoff uncritically repeated several inaccurate Russian claims regarding the status of the Ukrainian
territories that Russia illegally occupies.
Witkoff's statements undermine US President Donald
Trump's stated desired end state for the war in Ukraine that achieves an enduring peace and is in the
best interests of the United States, Ukraine, and Europe.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced
near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia
Oblast.
The Kremlin continues to innovate new ways to leverage conscripts to increase the pool
of servicemembers eligible for military service in the future.
US and Ukrainian officials are meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on the evening of March 23 to discuss the
contours of the temporary moratorium on long-range strikes and a possible temporary maritime ceasefire in
the Black Sea. An unnamed US official told the Financial Times (FT) on March 23 that the talks will cover
the technical aspects of the temporary strikes moratorium, including monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms, and Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhiy Tykhyi added that the
talks will define the scope of this ceasefire. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov is leading the
Ukrainian delegation, which also includes Ukrainian Presidential Office deputy heads Pavlo Palisa and
Ihor Zhovka, Deputy Energy Minister Mykola Kolisnyk, MFA State Secretary Oleksandr Karasevich, and
several unspecified military officers. FT reported that the US delegation includes US National Security
Council member Andrew Peek and State Department Policy Planning Director Michael Anton. A Ukrainian
official told the New York Times (NYT) that the US and Ukrainian delegations may hold additional talks on
March 24 depending on the progress of negotiations. The US-Ukrainian meeting is ongoing as of this
publication and ISW will report on the details of the talks in-depth on March 24.
Unconfirmed
reports suggest that there is tension between Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina and the
Kremlin over Russia's high interest rate and wartime monetary policies. A Russian insider source claimed
on March 23 that the Russian Federation Council Accounts Chamber (the Russian Federation’s highest audit
body) recently initiated an audit of the Russian Central Bank to investigate its monetary policy from
2022 to 2024 and the impact of the interest rate on inflation, budget expenditures, and investment. The
source claimed that the investigation is "effectively" an attack on Nabiullina. The insider source
claimed that a group of lobbyists from large Russian businesses seek interest rate reductions. ISW cannot
independently verify this insider source's claim and has not observed other reporting about the alleged
audit.
Russian inflation has been rising due to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and
the Russian Central Bank decided in December 2024 to maintain the key interest rate at 21 percent – the
highest Russian interest rate since 2003 – as part of efforts to curb growing inflation rates. The
Russian Central Bank‘s interest rate through 2025 has remained relatively conservative despite
significant and growing inflationary pressures. The Kremlin has claimed in recent months that the
inflation rate is about nine to 10 percent, but these figures are likely far below the actual inflation
rate, which is likely closer to 20 to 25 percent. Russia's current interest rate should likely be higher,
and the Kremlin likely pressured the Central Bank to keep the rate at 21 percent when the Central Bank
should have increased it to curb inflation.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has also
attempted to shift blame for the rising inflation rate on the Central Bank, and on Nabiullina in
particular. This was likely in an effort to draw the ire of the Russian business community away from the
Kremlin and onto her, although Nabiullina likely has not been able to exercise fully independent monetary
policy. The audit on the Central Bank may be part of the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to apply political
pressure on the bank to prevent further interest rate hikes beyond the current rate of 21 percent, manage
the expectations and frustrations of the Russian business community, and further the Kremlin's narrative
about Russia's economic stability. The Kremlin’s continued manipulation of the Central Bank's decisions
is likely hampering the Russian government's ability to enact sound wartime monetary policies.
Key Takeaways
US and Ukrainian officials are meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on the evening
of March 23 to discuss the contours of the temporary moratorium on long-range strikes and a possible
temporary maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea.
Unconfirmed reports suggest that there is
tension between Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina and the Kremlin over Russia's high
interest rate and wartime monetary policies.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova,
and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
US and Russian delegations met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on March 24 following US–Ukrainian talks on March
23 about the details of temporary ceasefires on long-range strikes and in the Black Sea. Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 23 that the US–Ukrainian talks are "more technical in
nature." Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on March 23 that the US–Ukrainian talks
discussed proposals for the safety of energy and infrastructure facilities and that the talks were
"productive and focused." A source familiar with the bilateral negotiations in Saudi Arabia told
Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the Russian-US meeting on March 24 will consider the ceasefire agreements
that Ukraine agreed to on March 23. The source stated that the discussions focused on moratoriums on
strikes against energy facilities and civilian infrastructure and attacks in the Black Sea. Ukrainian
Presidential Office Advisor Serhii Leshchenko stated that the US–Ukrainian talks concerned a ceasefire
against strikes on Russian "facilities at seas and rivers" and against Ukrainian ports in Kherson,
Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts. Leshchenko stated that the Ukrainian delegation will hold additional
discussions with the US delegation following the US–Russian talks on March 24. Suspilne reported that the
US delegation in the US–Russian talks includes State Department Policy Planning Director Michael Anton,
US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg, and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and that the Russian
delegation includes Russian Federation Council International Affairs Committee Chairperson Grigory
Karasin and Advisor to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Colonel General Sergei Beseda.
Saudi Arabian state-owned outlet Al Arabiya reported that US National Security Council member Andrew Peek
is also participating in the US delegation in the US–Russian talks. Kremlin wire TASS reported that the
US and Russian delegations will release a joint statement on March 25. ISW will report on the details of
the various bilateral talks as information becomes available in the coming days.
Key
Takeaways
• US and Russian delegations met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on March 24 following
US–Ukrainian talks on March 23 about the details of temporary ceasefires on long-range strikes and in the
Black Sea.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Demidovka along the international border in
northwestern Belgorod Oblast amid ongoing Ukrainian attacks in the area.
• The Kremlin is
recirculating existing narratives aimed at undermining support for Ukraine amid the negotiations in
Riyadh and likely remains uninterested in conducting meaningful negotiations to end the war.
• Russia continues to persecute religious minorities, especially Evangelical Christian communities in
occupied Kherson Oblast as part of a wider campaign in occupied Ukraine aimed at destroying independent
Ukrainian national and religious identities.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod
Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk,
Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian forces are reportedly failing to adequately
provision first person view (FPV) drone units amid ongoing efforts to centralize Russian drone operations
under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached some agreements for temporary ceasefires on strikes against
energy infrastructure and in the Black Sea. The details of these ceasefires remain unclear and evaluating
the ceasefires’ specifics in the absence of officially published joint texts of the agreements signed by
Russia and Ukraine remains difficult. The White House issued one readout about the outcomes of the
US-Russian talks in Saudi Arabia from March 24 and another about the US-Ukrainian talks from March 25.
The Kremlin and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov each issued separate statements for Russia and
Ukraine. The American, Russian, and Ukrainian statements share some commonalities but differ from each
other significantly in other regards. The US readouts, the Kremlin readout, and Umerov commonly stated
that the United States, Ukraine, and Russia "agreed to develop measures for implementing" US President
Donald Trump's, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's, and Russian President Vladimir Putin's
"agreement to ban strikes against energy facilities of Russia and Ukraine." Zelensky stated that Ukraine
also gave the United States a list of "strategic infrastructure objects" that Ukraine would like
protected under a strikes ceasefire. This list is not explicitly mentioned in the US or Russian readouts.
The Kremlin later issued a list of Russian and Ukrainian facilities that Russian and American delegations
agreed fall under the temporary ceasefire on strikes on the energy system. The Kremlin stated that the
list includes oil refineries; oil and gas pipelines and storage facilities, including pumping stations;
electricity generation and transmission infrastructure, including power plants, substations,
transformers, and distributors; nuclear power plants; and hydroelectric dams. It is unclear if the
Russian list of objects is the same list of “strategic infrastructure objects” that Zelensky mentioned.
The Kremlin stated that the temporary ceasefire is valid for 30 days starting from March 18, 2025,
meaning that the ceasefire will by default expire on April 17, 2025, unless Russia and Ukraine mutually
agree to renew it. The Kremlin stated that Russia and Ukraine have the right to consider themselves free
from the obligations of the agreement if one of the parties violates the agreement. The mechanisms to
monitor and address allegations of violations remain unclear. The Kremlin's list notably only includes
energy infrastructure facilities, and it remains unclear whether discussions regarding Zelensky's list of
other non-energy facilities that he wants protected under the ceasefire are still ongoing or whether the
Kremlin has rejected Zelensky's proposal. Umerov also stated that Ukraine is ready to "ready to organize
a separate meeting at the technical level to begin work on implementation mechanisms" for the strikes and
Black Sea ceasefires and that "at this point, all parties are going to brief the relevant leadership, and
we will announce the dates and times soon." The Kremlin's and Umerov's statements suggest that Russia and
Ukraine may not yet be in agreement about whether the ceasefire has gone into effect or not as of March
25.
The US readouts of its bilateral meetings in Saudi Arabia and Umerov noted that the United
States, Ukraine, and Russia "agreed to ensure safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent
the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea." The Kremlin readout of the
US-Russian talks similarly stated that the United States and Russia agreed to such measures as part of a
"Black Sea Initiative," but added that there need to be "appropriate control measures through inspection
of such vessels." Umerov uniquely added that all Russian military vessels movement "outside of
eastern part of the Black Sea" will constitute a violation of the spirit of this agreement and that
Ukraine will regard such movement as a violation of the commitment to ensure the safe navigation of the
Black Sea and a threat Ukraine's national security. Umerov stated that Ukraine will be able to exercise
its right to self-defense in the event of such violations.
All readouts of the March 23 to 25
bilateral meetings noted that the parties "welcome the good offices of third countries with a view toward
supporting the implementation of the energy and maritime agreements" and that all parties "will continue
working toward achieving a durable and lasting peace." (Turkey notably helped facilitate the July 2022
grain deal by inspecting commercial vessels transporting foodstuffs in the Black Sea.) The White House
and Umerov stated that the United States and Ukraine "agreed that the United States remains committed to
helping achieve prisoners of war (POWs) exchanges, the release of civilian detainees, and the return of
forcibly transferred Ukrainian children."
Putin continues to reject Trump's and Zelensky's
proposed temporary frontline ceasefire, despite agreeing to some form of ceasefire for strikes on energy
infrastructure and in the Black Sea. Putin’s persistent stalling and intransigence are inhibiting Trump's
efforts to secure a lasting and stable peace settlement. The US readouts for both its meetings with
Russian and Ukrainian delegations noted that Trump's "imperative that the killing on both sides" of the
war must stop, "as the necessary step toward achieving an enduring peace settlement" — likely in
reference to the unconditional 30-day general ceasefire on the frontline that Trump and Zelensky have
already agreed upon, but that Putin rejected on March 18.
Key Takeaways
• US,
Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached some agreements for temporary ceasefires on strikes against
energy infrastructure and in the Black Sea. The details of these ceasefires remain unclear and evaluating
the ceasefires’ specifics in the absence of officially published joint texts of the agreements signed by
Russia and Ukraine remains difficult.
• The Kremlin's and Umerov's statements suggest that
Russia and Ukraine may not yet be in agreement about whether the ceasefire has gone into effect or not as
of March 25.
• Putin continues to reject Trump's and Zelensky's proposed temporary frontline
ceasefire, despite agreeing to some form of ceasefire for strikes on energy infrastructure and in the
Black Sea. Putin’s persistent stalling and intransigence are inhibiting Trump's efforts to secure a
lasting and stable peace settlement.
• The Kremlin stated that it will not implement the
agreed ceasefire in the Black Sea until the United States lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned
agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations involved in international
food and fertilizer trade.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border
area, near Toretsk, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian military continues to deny
rotations to soldiers who have been fighting in the war in Ukraine for years.
The details of the ceasefire agreements on energy strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea that
US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached on March 24 and 25 remain unclear. Russia and Ukraine appear
to agree that a ceasefire against strikes on energy infrastructure is active as of March 25, but US and
Ukrainian statements continue to make clear that technical negotiations are ongoing. Ukrainian
Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa stated on March 26 that Ukraine is still working to develop
monitoring mechanisms for the ceasefires, which is consistent with US, Russian, and Ukrainian statements
on March 25 jointly agreeing to develop measures to implement the energy infrastructure ceasefire. Palisa
stated that both ceasefires on Black Sea operations and strikes against energy infrastructure came into
force upon the publication of the joint US-Ukrainian statement on March 25. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry
Peskov claimed on March 26 that Russian forces are implementing Russian President Vladimir Putin's March
18 order to adhere to the ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes. The absence of officially published
joint texts of the agreements that Ukraine and Russia signed continues to make evaluating the specifics
of these ceasefires difficult, and the ceasefire terms remain unclear.
Russia and Ukraine
exchanged accusations of strikes and ceasefire violations, although the ceasefire terms remain unclear.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukrainian forces of attempting to strike energy
infrastructure in Kursk Oblast on March 25, gas infrastructure in occupied Crimea overnight on March 25
to 26, and electrical infrastructure in Bryansk Oblast on March 26. The Ukrainian General Staff responded
on March 26 and denied the Russian MoD's accusations. Kursk Oblast Acting Governor Alexander Khinshtein,
Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov, and Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz notably did not
report Ukrainian drone strikes in their respective regions. Russian governors and occupation officials
typically publicly announce when Ukrainian drones attempt to strike infrastructure in their regions.
Ukrainian Presidential Communications Advisor Dmytro Lytvyn stated on March 25 that Russian forces have
conducted eight strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities since March 18, when Putin claimed to have ordered
the Russian military to stop strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure facilities. Ukrainian
officials have reported that Russian overnight strike series have damaged civilian infrastructure across
Ukraine almost every night since March 18 but have not specified which strikes specifically damaged
energy infrastructure.
Russian officials explicitly rejected US President Donald Trump's
recent suggestion that the United States could be involved in operating the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia
Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Trump stated on March 19 during a phone call with Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky that the United States is interested in taking control of the ZNPP, which Russian
forces currently occupy — implying that Russia would have to cede this territory in Zaporizhia Oblast
before the United States can take control of the ZNPP. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
stated on March 26 that the transfer of the ZNPP's territory or control over it to Ukraine or any other
country is "impossible" and that the possibility of Russia jointly operating the ZNPP with any country is
"unacceptable." The Russian MFA added that it would be "absurd" to allow any international organization
to help operate the ZNPP. The Russian MFA attempted to justify Russia's illegal occupation of the ZNPP by
claiming that Russian President Vladimir Putin's October 2022 decree legally brought the ZNPP under
Russian jurisdiction. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak also stated on March 26 that Russia
is not considering jointly operating the ZNPP with the United States. The Kremlin routinely falsely
portrays itself as the only safe operator of the ZNPP, despite having endangered the ZNPP since Russian
forces occupied the area in March 2022. Russia has notably stored military equipment near the ZNPP
reactors and in the turbine halls and used ZNPP grounds to launch strike drones. The Kremlin also
routinely accuses Ukraine of endangering the ZNPP and may attempt to intensify these narratives to spoil
ongoing US-Ukrainian negotiations.
Key Takeaways
• The details of the ceasefire
agreements on energy strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea that US, Ukrainian, and Russian
officials reached on March 24 and 25 remain unclear.
• Russia and Ukraine exchanged
accusations of strikes and ceasefire violations, although the ceasefire terms remain unclear.
• Russian officials explicitly rejected US President Donald Trump's recent suggestion that the United
States could be involved in operating the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).
• The European Union (EU) will likely maintain sanctions on Russia despite Russian demands for
Western sanctions relief as preconditions for a temporary ceasefire with Ukraine in the Black Sea.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, near Toretsk, Velyka Novosilka, and in
western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast and near
Toretsk.
• Russia continues reorganize drone detachments into new units likely as part of an
ongoing effort to establish the Russian Unmanned Systems Force (USF).
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on March 26 that discussions are ongoing about the
details of the temporary ceasefire agreements on energy infrastructure strikes and maritime operations in
the Black Sea. Zelensky stated on March 26 that Ukraine, the United States, and Russia must still resolve
unspecified "technical" issues related to the temporary ceasefire agreements on energy infrastructure
strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea but did reach agreements on these ceasefires during
talks in Saudi Arabia on March 24 and 25. Zelensky added that that the Ukrainian, US, and Russian
technical teams have not yet determined the monitoring mechanisms for temporary ceasefires on energy
infrastructure strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea, which makes it difficult to assess
Russia's compliance. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on March 25 that Ukraine regards any
movement of Russian military vessels outside of the eastern part of the Black Sea as a violation of the
"commitment to ensure safe navigation of the Black Sea." The Kremlin, however, said on March 25 that it
will not implement the agreed ceasefire in the Black Sea until the United States lifts sanctions on
Russian state-owned agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations
involved in international food and fertilizer trade. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged on
March 26 that the European Union (EU) must be involved in lifting sanctions on Russia. European
Commission Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Anitta Hipper stated on March 26 that the EU would consider
lifting or amending sanctions against Russia only if Russia "ends its unprovoked aggression in Ukraine"
and "unconditonally withdraws" all Russian forces from Ukraine.
Russia continues to strike
Ukrainian critical and civilian infrastructure under the cover of the ceasefire on energy infrastructure
strikes — which is not in line with US President Donald Trump's goal of using the temporary ceasefire to
facilitate a lasting peace in Ukraine. Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhii
Tykhyi stated on March 27 that neither Ukraine nor Russia struck each other's energy facilities since
March 25, although the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukraine of violating the ceasefire
agreement on the nights of March 25 to 26 and 26 to 27. The temporary ceasefire does not include
protections for civilian or non-energy critical infrastructure, and Russian forces have intensified
strikes against these objects in recent days. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that on the night of March
26 to 27, Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile from Voronezh Oblast and 86 Shahed and
other drones from Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied
Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported Ukrainian forces downed 42 drones and that 26
drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference and Ukrainian officials
reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Dnipro, Sumy, and Kharkiv cities.
Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on March 24 that Russia is intentionally
targeting populated cities with drones in order to destroy infrastructure and terrorize the local
civilian population. Russian forces have repeatedly conducted large strikes against civilian areas in
Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; Dobropillya, Donetsk Oblast; and Zolochiv, Kharkiv Oblast and port
infrastructure in Odesa City since early March 2025 amid discussions of a temporary ceasefire. The Trump
administration has previously characterized a temporary general ceasefire (which Russian President
Vladimir Putin has repeatedly rejected) as a "necessary step" toward achieving an enduring peace
settlement. Continued Russian strikes on Ukraine's civilian infrastructure, even under the conditions of
an alleged ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes, will be detrimental to the establishment of a
sustainable peace in Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky reiterated on March 26 that discussions are ongoing about the details of the temporary ceasefire
agreements on energy infrastructure strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea.
• Russia
continues to strike Ukrainian critical and civilian infrastructure under the cover of the ceasefire on
energy infrastructure strikes — which is not in line with US President Donald Trump's goal of using the
temporary ceasefire to facilitate a lasting peace in Ukraine.
• The Ukrainian General Staff
reported that the March 19 to 20 Ukrainian drone strike against Russia's Engels Airbase destroyed a large
number of cruise missiles and strategic fuel reserves as Ukrainian officials reported that Russia is
prioritizing the production of high-precision missiles.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing for a spring offensive in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.
• Ukraine's European allies met in Paris for a Coalition of the Willing summit on March 27 to discuss
their ongoing support for Ukraine, a monitoring system to ensure ceasefire compliance, and the possible
deployment of a "deterrent force" in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near
Borova, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts;
near Lyman, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk; and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Volunteer Society
for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF), which promotes patriotic and military
education and has been involved in Russian volunteer recruitment efforts, elected Denis Dobraykov as the
new DOSAAF Chairperson on March 27.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is reintensifying efforts to portray the current Ukrainian government as
illegitimate and unable to engage in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Putin reiterated
longstanding boilerplate rhetoric during a visit to a Russian submarine command post in Murmansk Oblast
on March 27, claiming that "Nazis" and people with "neo-Nazi views" have significant influence in the
Ukrainian government and that "neo-Nazi groups" have the "actual power in their hands" in Ukraine. Putin
reiterated claims that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is illegitimate because Ukraine did not
hold presidential elections in 2024 and additionally alleged that all Ukrainian civil authorities are
therefore illegitimate since the president appoints regional officials. The Ukrainian Constitution
explicitly prohibits elections during periods of martial law and invasion by a hostile country, however.
Putin claimed that "neo-Nazi formations" are ruling Ukraine in the absence of a legitimate Ukrainian
government and questioned how Russia can negotiate with these groups. Putin has previously characterized
the Ukrainian government as illegitimate in an effort to justify Russia's unwillingness to engage in good
faith negotiations to end the war and has consistently identified "denazification" – a phrase the Kremlin
uses to make its demand for the removal of the Ukrainian government and the installation of a pro-Russian
puppet regime – as a goal of his full-scale invasion since February 2022.
Putin repeatedly
accused Zelensky of being the illegitimate leader of Ukraine ahead of Putin's February 12 phone call with
US President Donald Trump, but has made these accusations much less frequently in recent weeks. Putin
notably implicitly acknowledged Zelensky as the legitimate president of Ukraine and Russia's future
negotiating partner for the first time in late February 2025, and Putin's March 27 statement appears to
be a reintensification of his accusations designed to undermine Zelensky's legitimacy. ISW previously
noted that the Kremlin's ongoing effort to characterize the Ukrainian government as an illegitimate
negotiating partner casts serious doubt on the Kremlin's willingness to negotiate in good faith about a
settlement of the war and sets informational conditions for Russia to violate any agreement reached on
the grounds that the Ukrainian government had no legal right to conclude it.
Putin reiterated
his demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace
agreement – a reference to Russia’s initial war demands that directly contradict US, European, and
Ukrainian efforts to achieve a just and sustainable resolution to the war. Putin claimed that Russia is
committed to ending the war in Ukraine but only if a peace agreement addresses the "root causes" of the
war. Senior Russian officials have repeatedly defined these root causes as NATO's alleged violation of
obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking
minorities in Ukraine. The Kremlin's demands to address these so-called "root causes" amount to a demand
for full Ukrainian capitulation with the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine and
commitments of Ukrainian neutrality – the same demands Putin has made since before the full-scale
invasion.
Putin is attempting to inject a new demand aligned with the Kremlin's long-standing
efforts to undermine the Ukrainian government's legitimacy into discussions about the resolution of the
war. Putin proposed that the United Nations (UN), United States, and European countries install a
temporary administration in Ukraine that would hold democratic elections to bring to power "a viable
government that enjoys the people's trust." Putin claimed that a temporary Ukrainian government would
allow Russia to "begin negotiations on a peace treaty" and "sign
legitimate documents that will be recognized throughout the world." White House National Security Council
Spokesperson James Hewitt rightly dismissed Putin's proposal to impose a temporary administration over
Ukraine, stating that the Ukrainian Constitution and the Ukrainian people determine Ukraine's governance.
UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres also rejected Putin's proposal and stated that Ukraine has a
legitimate government that must be respected.
Putin's new demand for an interim government in
Ukraine as a precondition for peace negotiations demonstrates how the Kremlin continues to hold
negotiations hostage and is attempting to extract additional concessions from the West following the
progress made in the ongoing ceasefire negotiations. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin remains
committed to its goal to prolong any negotiations for a temporary frontline ceasefire or permanent peace
agreement in order to continue making incremental gains on the battlefield and establish favorable
conditions to pursue Ukraine's complete capitulation.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian
President Vladimir Putin is reintensifying efforts to portray the current Ukrainian government as
illegitimate and unable to engage in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
• Putin
reiterated his demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition
for a peace agreement – a reference to Russia’s initial war demands that directly contradict US,
European, and Ukrainian efforts to achieve a just and sustainable resolution to the war.
• Putin is attempting to inject a new demand aligned with the Kremlin's long-standing efforts to
undermine the Ukrainian government's legitimacy into discussions about the resolution of the war.
• The Kremlin appears to be renewing efforts to reorganize Russia's five naval infantry brigades
into divisions.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast. Russian forces
recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, near Toretsk and Kurakhove, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russia plans to expand its nuclear submarine fleet.
Ukrainian and US officials continue to negotiate the terms of temporary ceasefires on Black Sea
operations and energy infrastructure strikes, indicating the ceasefires are not yet fully codified.
Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy reported on March 26 that Ukraine and the United States agreed on a list of
energy facilities that Russia must stop striking during an energy infrastructure ceasefire but that the
US-Ukraine list is at odds with Russia's demands. The Ministry stated that Russia’s list does not
prohibit strikes on Ukrainian oil and gas facilities — although the Kremlin reported that the ceasefire
protects Russian oil and gas facilities from strikes. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on
March 28 that Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov will present US officials with evidence of Russian
ceasefire violations during Umerov's upcoming trip to the United States. The exact terms of the energy
infrastructure ceasefire remain unclear, as an official trilateral statement or agreement has not been
released.
Zelensky stated that Turkey, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States,
France, Romania, and Bulgaria could act as potential ceasefire monitors, including a Black Sea
moratorium, but stated that all sides “will” hold internal and international consultations regarding
“readiness” to conduct monitoring. US Vice President JD Vance stated on March 28 that the United States
and Ukraine have “obviously” achieved an energy infrastructure ceasefire and were “almost done”
negotiating a maritime ceasefire. US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials all appear to be under the
impression that an energy infrastructure ceasefire is currently active despite the lack of a formal
trilateral agreement or any apparent agreement on the exact terms of the ceasefire.
European
allies continue to provide financial and materiel support to Ukraine and agreed to expand intelligence
sharing with Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on March 28 that European
countries agreed at the "Coalition of the Willing" summit in Paris on March 27 to expand Ukraine's access
to European intelligence, relevant technologies, and satellites and that several unspecified European
countries agreed to grant Ukraine an unspecified degree of access to their ammunition stockpiles.
Zelensky noted that Ukraine also agreed with unspecified partners on air defense production licenses,
investments in Ukraine's production of drones and missiles, and to continue to work toward artillery
licensing. It remains unclear whether the agreed upon licenses stipulate domestic production in Ukraine
or foreign production elsewhere in Europe. Zelensky stated that the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany will
organize a Ramstein meeting in April 2025. French President Emmanuel Macron pledged on March 26 to
provide Ukraine with an additional military aid package valued at 2 billion euros (roughly $2.1 billion)
that will include anti-tank missiles, surface-to-air missiles, air defense missiles, armored vehicles,
drones, and additional Mirage fighter jets. Sweden instructed its armed forces on March 28 to allocate a
total of 80 million Swedish Kronor (roughly $7.5 million) to Ukraine's Demining and Drone coalitions. The
Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 27 that Denmark pledged an additional 300 million
Danish Kroner (roughly $43.5 million) to a Ukrainian innovation fund that will focus on, among other
things, further developing electronic warfare (EW) and drone capabilities.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian and US officials continue to negotiate the terms of temporary ceasefires on Black Sea
operations and energy infrastructure strikes, indicating the ceasefires are not yet fully codified.
• The Kremlin appears to be using the Black Sea ceasefire negotiations with the United States to
test the extent to which Russia can extract concessions from the West, as the implementation of a
maritime truce would not require any sanctions relief.
• European allies continue to provide
financial and materiel support to Ukraine and agreed to expand intelligence sharing with Ukraine.
• Russian forces are reportedly poised to intensify offensive operations in several areas of the
frontline in Spring and Summer 2025 in hopes of influencing ongoing ceasefire and peace negotiations.
• Russia continues to target civilian infrastructure in Ukraine amid reports of shifting and more
deadly Russian strike tactics.
• Russian forces are reportedly employing more advanced
long-range drones, complicating Ukrainian air defense operations and allowing more drones to penetrate
Ukraine's air defense umbrella.
• Zelensky ordered Ukraine's Ministry of Defense (MoD) and
General Staff to establish a new aviation chain of command within the Ukrainian General Staff and conduct
widespread aviation management reform to strengthen Ukraine's air capabilities.
• Ukrainian
forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast and near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near
Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the launch
of the "Indra Navy 2025" exercises in Chennai, India.
US President Donald Trump expressed willingness to introduce additional sanctions targeting Russian oil
and secondary sanctions against buyers of Russian oil if Russian President Vladimir Putin does not make
progress towards a general ceasefire, including a ceasefire for land warfare in the near future. Trump
stated during a phone call with NBC News on March 30 that he is "angry and pissed off" at Putin for
disparaging Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy as the leader of Ukraine. Trump stated
that if the United States and Russia are unable to "make a deal" – possibly referring to a general
ceasefire or long-term peace in Ukraine – then the United States will place secondary sanctions on all
"oil coming out of Russia." Trump stated that the United States will put a "25 percent tariff on all oil,
a 25- to 50-point tariff on all oil." Trump stated that the United States will not allow
companies or countries that purchase Russian oil to "do business" in the United States and that the
United States could begin imposing secondary sanctions within the next month if Russia, Ukraine, and the
United States do not conclude a ceasefire agreement. Trump stated that he will speak with Putin at an
unspecified time later this week. Putin reiterated long-standing Russian claims that Zelensky is the
illegitimate leader of Ukraine on March 28.
ISW previously noted that the Kremlin's ongoing
effort to characterize the Ukrainian government as an illegitimate negotiating partner casts serious
doubt on the Kremlin's willingness to negotiate in good faith about a settlement of the war and sets
informational conditions for Russia to violate any future peace agreement on the grounds that the
Ukrainian government had no legal right to conclude it.
A Russian diplomat provided additional
details following Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent thinly veiled demand for regime change in
Ukraine by having external parties establish a “temporary international administration” in Ukraine under
the auspices of the United Nations (UN). Russian Permanent Representative to the European Union Kirill
Logvinov presented a detailed plan to Kremlin newswire TASS on March 30 that supports Putin's recent
demand for the UN, United States, and European countries to establish a temporary government in Ukraine
in the near future. Logvinov argued that the UN should reach an agreement between the parties to the
conflict following the implementation of a ceasefire, either directly or indirectly through
intermediaries, on the appropriate transfer of power to the UN. Logvinov suggested that one of the
parties, mediators, or the UN Secretary General should submit an official appeal that the UN establish a
temporary internal administration in Ukraine. Logvinov specified that the UN Security Council (UNSC),
particularly its permanent members, must support the mandate and that any UNSC member can submit a draft
proposal on the composition and funding of the temporary government. Logvinov stated that the UN
Secretary General should then prepare a report on the temporary administration, particularly noting
staffing and budgetary guidelines, after which the UNSC should consider any proposals and submit a final
decision on the interim government. Logvinov noted that the final proposal must also "receive the support
of the members of the , namely the permanent ones." Logvinov's proposal would notably allow Russia
(a permanent member of the UNSC) to submit a proposal on the interim Ukrainian government and to veto any
proposal that Russia considers unfavorable and would bar Ukraine from any role in the final approval
process.
Logvinov and TASS are supporting Putin's recent effort to inject a new demand into
discussions about the resolution to the war that is consistent with the Kremlin's long-standing effort to
ensure the installation of a government friendly to Russia in Ukraine. The Kremlin is also attempting to
dictate the sequencing and processes surrounding the demand while holding the ceasefire negotiation
hostage to extract additional concessions from the West. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres rejected
Putin's proposal to establish a temporary administration in Ukraine and stated that Ukraine has a
legitimate government that must be respected on March 28.
Key Takeaways:
• US
President Donald Trump expressed willingness to introduce additional sanctions targeting Russian oil and
secondary sanctions against buyers of Russian oil if Russian President Vladimir Putin does not make
progress towards a general ceasefire, including a ceasefire for land warfare in the near future.
• A Russian diplomat provided additional details following Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent
thinly veiled demand for regime change in Ukraine by having external parties establish a “temporary
international administration” in Ukraine under the auspices of the United Nations (UN).
• Russian forces struck a military hospital and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City on the night of
March 29 to 30.
• The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 30 that it will
establish a Space Policy Department.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and
Pokrovsk.
US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that there is an unspecified "psychological deadline" for
Russia to agree to a general ceasefire amid continued Russian efforts to hold the temporary ceasefire in
the Black Sea hostage to stall efforts toward a general ceasefire and extract additional concessions from
the West. Trump responded to a question on March 30 about whether there is a deadline for Russian
President Vladimir Putin to agree to a ceasefire for land warfare and stated that "it's a psychological
deadline." Trump added that "if I think is tapping along, I will not be
happy about it." Finnish President Alexander Stubb stated on March 30 that he proposed April 20 as a
potential deadline for a "full ceasefire without any conditions" during his meeting with Trump on March
29. Russia is unlikely to agree to a "full ceasefire without any conditions" within three weeks given
that Russia has demanded that the West provide some sanctions relief as a precondition for a temporary
Black Sea ceasefire. The Kremlin stated on March 25 that it will not implement the agreed ceasefire in
the Black Sea until the United States lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned agricultural bank
Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations involved in international food and
fertilizer trade, and Bloomberg reported on March 28 that Russia is demanding that the European Union
(EU) reconnect the Rosselkhozbank to the SWIFT international banking system as a precondition to
implementing a Black Sea ceasefire as a test to determine whether the United States will engage with
Russia's demands and encourage European partners to support sanctions relief. The United States and
Ukraine proposed on March 11 temporary ceasefires on energy infrastructure strikes and in the Black Sea,
and Ukranian and US officials have continued to negotiate the terms of these ceasefires in the three
weeks since March 11 — indicating the ceasefires’ terms are not yet fully codified. It is also unlikely
that the United States, Ukraine, and Russia could negotiate the terms of a general ceasefire within the
next three weeks.
Key Takeaways:
• US President Donald Trump stated on March 30
that there is an unspecified "psychological deadline" for Russia to agree to a general ceasefire amid
continued Russian efforts to hold the temporary ceasefire in the Black Sea hostage to stall efforts
toward a general ceasefire and extract additional concessions from the West.
• Russian
officials continue efforts to undermine the proposed US-Ukrainian mineral deal by promoting potential
US-Russian rare earth mining projects.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to sow division between
the United States and Europe.
• Ukraine's European allies continue to provide financial and
military aid to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces
recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts and near Kupyansk, Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia is reportedly struggling to restore what few tanks remain in its stocks.
Russian forces are reportedly continuing to shell Ukrainian energy infrastructure amid ongoing
negotiations over details of the ceasefire agreement on energy infrastructure strikes, indicating that
Russia may be exploiting the ceasefire's vague or unfinalized terms to strike Ukrainian energy
infrastructure with shorter-range artillery, but not longer-range cruise missiles or one-way strike
drones. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha and Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head
Oleksandr Prokudin stated on April 1 that Russian forces shelled energy infrastructure in Kherson City on
the morning of April 1, leaving at least 45,000 Kherson residents without electricity. Sybiha stated on
April 1 that Russian forces have recently violated the energy infrastructure ceasefire several times. The
ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes is reportedly a moratorium on long-range strikes, but it
remains unclear whether the moratorium's terms prohibit striking energy infrastructure with shorter-range
tube or rocket artillery. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 11 that Ukraine proposed
a "temporary ceasefire in the sky" that would include "missile, bomb, and long-range drone" strikes. US,
Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached some agreements for a temporary ceasefire on strikes against
energy infrastructure on March 25 but not provide details on whether the ceasefire is exclusively limited
to longer-range weapons. Russian forces will likely continue to leverage their positions along the east
(left) bank of the Dnipro River and other frontline areas to shell and destroy Ukrainian energy
infrastructure in near rear areas unless the energy infrastructure ceasefire includes provisions against
such shelling. Russian shelling against Ukrainian energy infrastructure violates the spirit of the
ceasefire and US President Donald Trump's intention to utilize the energy infrastructure ceasefire as a
confidence-building measure to work towards a general ceasefire in the future. Ukrainian, Russian, and US
officials have yet to formalize the ceasefire or present its exact terms.
Senior Russian
officials continue to reiterate the Russian demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in
Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement — a reference to Russia's initial war demands that
directly contradict US President Donald Trump's goal to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on April 1 that the Trump administration is attempting
"some kind of scheme" to first achieve a ceasefire and then move to "other models and schemes" to end the
war. Ryabkov further claimed that the Trump administration's plan to resolve the war in Ukraine does not
address the "root causes" of the war and that Russia, therefore, cannot accept the US proposal. Senior
Russian officials have repeatedly defined these root causes as NATO's alleged violation of obligations
not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in
Ukraine. The Kremlin's demands to address these so-called "root causes" amount to a demand for the full
capitulation of Ukraine with the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine and long-term
commitments of Ukrainian neutrality — the same demands Putin has made since before the full-scale
invasion in February 2022. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently intensified efforts to portray the
current Ukrainian government as illegitimate and unable to engage in negotiations to end the war in
Ukraine in an effort to undermine Ukraine's role as a legitimate participant in discussions about the
resolution of the war. Putin and Russian diplomats made thinly veiled demands in late March 2025 for
regime change in Ukraine by having external parties establish a “temporary international administration”
in Ukraine under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce
stated on March 31 that Trump did not appreciate Russia's suggestion to establish a "temporary
administration" in Ukraine. Bruce also noted that Trump understands that negotiations will "require both
Russia and Ukraine to make tough decisions and compromises." Russia has so far refused to make any
concessions and rejected the US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire when Trump called Putin on March
18.
Russian forces are expanding their bridgehead northeast of Lyman as part of a mutually
reinforcing effort to create conditions for the seizure of Borova and Lyman in the coming months. Footage
published on March 28 and geolocated on April 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest
of Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman) and likely seized Novolyubivka itself. Russian forces recently made
confirmed advances southeast of Nove (west of Novolyubivka), and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn
Mashovets stated on March 31 that Russian forces advanced to the southern outskirts of Katerynivka
(northwest of Novolyubivka). Russian forces advanced across the Zherebets River onto the west (right)
bank in early January 2025 and have slowly expanded their bridgehead on the right bank over the last
three months. Russian forces began efforts to push Ukrainian forces from their positions on the east
(left) bank of the Zherebets River in late 2023 and have only recently established a relatively stable
bridgehead from which Russian forces can launch further offensive operations. Russian milbloggers and
Mashovets have consistently credited elements of the Russian 144th and 3rd motorized rifle divisions
(20th Combined Arms Army , Moscow Military District ) with making the initial advances onto the
west bank and then expanding this bridgehead.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces are
reportedly continuing to shell Ukrainian energy infrastructure amid ongoing negotiations over details of
the ceasefire agreement on energy infrastructure strikes, indicating that Russia may be exploiting the
ceasefire’s vague or unfinalized terms to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure with shorter-range
artillery but not longer-range cruise missiles or one-way strike drones.
• Senior Russian
officials continue to reiterate the Russian demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in
Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement – a reference to Russia's initial war demands that
directly contradict US President Donald Trump's goal to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine.
• Russian forces are expanding their bridgehead northeast of Lyman as part of a mutually reinforcing
effort to create conditions for the seizure of Borova and Lyman in the coming months.
• Russian forces can leverage their expanded bridgehead northeast of Lyman to support the seizure of
Borova or Lyman in the coming months.
• Russian forces may also leverage their bridgehead
northeast of Lyman to seize the remaining one percent of Luhansk Oblast under Ukrainian control and
complete Russia's long-standing goal of seizing the entirety of Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian
President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on April 1 to raise salaries for Russian governors starting
January 2026, aligning the pay with that of Russia's deputy prime ministers.
• Russian forces
recently advanced in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts and in the Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.
Russian officials are continuing to exploit the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire's vague or
unfinalized terms. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 2 that the temporary energy
infrastructure ceasefire is in effect and that Russia is adhering to the ceasefire. Peskov claimed that
Ukraine has "not joined" the temporary ceasefire "essentially" and that Russia intends to discuss this
with the United States. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on April 1 that Russia forwarded a
list of Ukraine's alleged ceasefire violations to US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, US Secretary
of State Marco Rubio, the United Nations (UN), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 2 that Ukrainian forces are
"systematically" conducting drone and artillery strikes against Russian energy infrastructure. The exact
contours of the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire remain unclear, and Ukraine and Russia do not
appear to have formally agreed on the list of objects covered in the ceasefire or the types of strikes
prohibited. ISW previously noted that it is unclear if the temporary ceasefire prohibits striking energy
infrastructure with shorter-range tube or rocket artillery. It is also unclear how Ukraine could violate
a temporary ceasefire that it has "not joined."
US officials reportedly continue to
acknowledge Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine.
Two US officials familiar with the matter told Reuters on April 1 that senior Trump administration
officials have discussed the likelihood that the United States will not be able to secure a long-term
peace agreement in Ukraine in the coming months and are preparing new plans to pressure Russia and
Ukraine into an agreement. The sources noted that Trump administration officials acknowledged that Putin
is actively resisting US efforts to accomplish a peace agreement in Ukraine and used a series of meetings
and calls over the weekend of March 29-30 to discuss possible mechanisms to bring Russia to the
negotiating table. A senior US official stated that the Trump administration is considering levying
additional tariffs and sanctions against Russia. Another source familiar with the discussions similarly
told Fox News on April 1 that US President Donald Trump believes that Putin is "slow-rolling"
negotiations on a general ceasefire in Ukraine and that the Trump administration is considering
increasing sanctions against Russia in order to force Putin to the negotiating table. Trump recently told
NBC News that he is considering additional sanctions against Russian oil and stated during a press
conference on March 30 that there is an unspecified "psychological deadline" for Russia to agree to a
general ceasefire agreement. ISW previously noted that it is not possible for the United States or the
wider West to exert maximum pressure against Russia with economic tools alone as Russia's ongoing and
forecasted future economic struggles are closely tied to Russian military losses on the battlefield. The
United States can leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger negotiating position by
continuing — or increasing — military aid to Ukraine such that Ukrainian forces can continue to inflict
significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.
CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund
(RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev will reportedly meet with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in
Washington, D.C. on April 2. Unnamed US officials and other unspecified sources familiar with Dmitriev's
trip told CNN on April 1 that Dmitriev will meet with Witkoff later this week in Washington, D.C., and
sources told CNN and CBS that the US government temporarily lifted sanctions against Dmitriev in order to
grant him a visa to visit the United States. Sources told CBS on April 2 that Dmitriev will meet with
Witkoff on April 2, but the Trump administration has not published information about the meeting. It is
unclear if the meeting has occurred as of this publication. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on
April 2 that Dmitriev's visit to Washington, D.C. is possible, and Dmitriev inconclusively responded to
US reporting on his possible visit with "maybe."
Key Takeaways:
• Russian officials
are continuing to exploit the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire's vague or unfinalized terms.
• US officials reportedly continue to acknowledge Russian President Vladimir Putin's
unwillingness to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine.
• CEO of the Russian Direct
Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev will reportedly meet with US Special Envoy for the Middle East
Steve Witkoff in Washington, D.C. on April 2.
• The Russian military command reportedly began
reorganizing the motorized rifle brigades of the 51st and 3rd combined arms armies (CAAs) such that each
army would have three rifle divisions or motorized rifle divisions, likely in an effort to improve the
CAAs' administrative structure, especially over larger numbers of unmechanized riflemen.
• The
Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 1 that Russian forces in Ukraine are continuing to use
ammunition equipped with chemical agents prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk,
Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian authorities continued efforts to solidify their
control over the Russian information space and discourage critique of the Russian military's conduct of
the war in Ukraine.
Russia seeks to leverage ongoing ceasefire and future peace negotiations to seize large amounts of
territory in Ukraine and install a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv but will likely continue
military operations in Ukraine if the Kremlin is unable to achieve a full Ukrainian surrender through
diplomacy. Bloomberg reported on April 3, according to sources in Moscow familiar with the matter, that
the Kremlin is "counting on US President Donald Trump to deliver an acceptable peace deal in Ukraine,"
but is prepared to continue the war if it is not able to secure its goals through negotiations with the
United States. The sources also claimed that the Kremlin is not concerned by Trump's recent statement
that the United States is willing to introduce additional sanctions targeting Russian oil and secondary
sanctions against buyers of Russian oil if Russian President Vladimir Putin does not make progress
towards a general ceasefire. The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence's (ODNI) 2025 Annual
Threat Assessment stated that Russia is leveraging its control of the theater-wide initiative and ongoing
political and information efforts amid negotiations to end the war in Ukraine to achieve significant
concessions from Ukraine and the West. The ODNI report assessed that Putin is "probably" more willing to
incur the risks of a longer war than to agree to an end to the war that is unfavorable to Russia. The
ODNI report further assessed that Putin "appears resolved and prepared to pay a very high price to
prevail in what he sees as a defining time in Russia’s strategic competition with the United States,
world history, and his personal legacy." The ODNI assessment that Putin remains committed to pursuing
Ukrainian surrender through both diplomatic and military means is consistent with ISW's assessment that
Putin is leveraging ongoing negotiations to secure additional concessions from Ukraine and the West as
part of its long-term pursuit of total Ukrainian surrender.
Russia is facing significant
military and economic challenges that could seriously compromise Russia's ability to wage its war in
Ukraine, factors that could increase the Kremlin's desire to accomplish its objectives in a mediated
ceasefire or peace negotiation in the short-term if possible. The ODNI report assessed that Russia has
suffered significant casualties in Ukraine and that Russia must contend with the poor quality of its new
recruits. The ODNI report assessed that the Russian economy is facing significant challenges as Russia
continues to balance resource allocation between defense industrial production and civilian sectors. US
European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher
Cavoli stated on April 3 that Russian forces have lost over 4,000 tanks in Ukraine. Cavoli stated that
Russia started the war with a total of 13,000 tanks and are "starting to approach near the end" of the
viable tanks in storage. Cavoli noted that Russia has expanded its capability to produce shells, cruise
missiles, and first-person view (FPV) drones and that Russia is preparing either to continue offensive
operations in Ukraine or to launch a future campaign against a NATO member state. Cavoli stated that the
war in Ukraine has "distorted" the Russian economy and "turbocharged" the Russian defense industry at the
expense of Russia's civilian economic sector and that it may be difficult for Russia to "unwind" this
imbalance. Cavoli assessed that Russia will be able to replace the significant personnel losses incurred
in Ukraine ahead of a future conflict in Europe but noted that Russia's ability to replace materiel
losses is contingent on Ukraine's ability to inflict greater losses. ISW previously noted that Russia's
ongoing and forecasted economic struggles are closely tied to Russian losses on the battlefield and that
it is not possible for the United States or the wider West to exert maximum pressure on Russia with
economic tools alone. The United States can leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger
negotiating position by continuing — or increasing — military aid to Ukraine such that Ukrainian forces
can continue to inflict significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia seeks to leverage ongoing ceasefire and future peace negotiations to seize large amounts
of territory in Ukraine and install a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv but will likely continue
military operations in Ukraine if the Kremlin is unable to achieve a full Ukrainian surrender through
diplomacy.
• Russia is facing significant military and economic challenges that could
seriously compromise Russia's ability to wage its war in Ukraine, factors that could increase the
Kremlin's desire to accomplish its objectives in a mediated ceasefire or peace negotiation in the
short-term if possible.
• The US Treasury Department announced on April 2 that the United
States lifted sanctions on Karina Rotenberg, the wife of Russian businessman and oligarch Boris
Rotenberg.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced in Kursk and
Belgorod and near Lyman, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• The Russian State Duma
adopted a bill on April 3 to grant veteran status to Russian military personnel and volunteer formations
that fought in Kursk Oblast.
CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev gave several interviews with American
news outlets on April 3 and presented views that contradict the current Kremlin line on Ukraine. The
Kremlin remains unwilling to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine, continuing to reject the ground
ceasefire that US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have offered.
Dmitriev spoke with Fox News and Newsmax while visiting Washington, DC, and attempted to paint Russia as
an attractive market for American investment, claiming that the Russian economy is strong and growing
despite Western sanctions. Dmitriev also claimed that Russia is ready to collaborate with the United
States on unspecified projects involving the Arctic, rare earth minerals, and liquified natural gas
(LNG). Dmitriev has recently been at the forefront of Kremlin efforts to undermine the proposed
US-Ukraine mineral deal by promoting potential US-Russia mining projects and other avenues of economic
and financial cooperation, as ISW previously reported. Dmitriev notably claimed that Russia "is not
asking for lifting of sanctions" and "not making any preconditions for specific sanction relief" in
response to a question about whether Russia considers sanctions relief a necessary precondition to a
ceasefire agreement. The Kremlin, in contrast, has explicitly demanded sanctions relief from the United
States as a precondition for entering into a Black Sea strikes ceasefire.
Dmitriev made
several other statements that diverge from recent statements by other Kremlin officials, for example,
saying that "some security guarantees may be possible" for Ukraine. ISW recently assessed that Russian
President Vladimir Putin will not accept Western-backed security guarantees for Ukraine because their
acceptance will represent a major concession, and the Kremlin has rejected the idea of making any
concessions on its maximalist territorial and security demands from Ukraine. Dmitriev's attempt to
present Russia's interests in Ukraine as predominantly economic and financial is also disingenuous.
Kremlin officials frequently make demands to address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine (NATO's
alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of
Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine) as preconditions for any sort of peace agreement. The Kremlin's
negotiating position has not changed despite Dmitriev's attempts to soften and deflect from Moscow's
demands, and Dmitriev is attempting to use the promise of financial benefits to distract from the
Kremlin's continued intransigence in negotiations about Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
• CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev gave several interviews with
American news outlets on April 3 and presented views that contradict the current Kremlin line on
Ukraine.
• The Kremlin remains unwilling to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine,
continuing to reject the ground ceasefire that US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky have offered.
• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on April 4 that
the US is closely monitoring Russia's actions in Ukraine and hopes that Russia is "serious" about
resolving the war rather than simply dragging out negotiations.
• A Russian ballistic missile
struck a residential area in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on April 4, killing at least 16 people,
including children.
• Russia continues to employ strike packages predominantly comprised of
drones amid reports that it is growing its missile stockpile.
• Ukrainian railway operator
Ukrzaliznytsia signed two contracts with Chinese rail producers in January 2025 as part of efforts to
support the development and repair of Ukrainian rail infrastructure.
• Russia is reinforcing
its strategic ties with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) juntas in a concerted effort to enhance
Russian influence in Africa.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and
Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
• The Russian
military reportedly continues to expand its conventional force end-strength.
European and NATO officials emphasized that a strong Ukrainian military backed by European security
guarantees remains the most effective deterrent against future Russian aggression to ensure long-term
peace in Ukraine and Europe. NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte gave an interview to Ukrainian outlet New
Voice on April 5 and stated that the "first level" of security guarantees for Ukraine should be the
Ukrainian military, which Rutte stated is the "first line of defense in deterrence." Rutte added that
Ukraine's European partners, including France, the United Kingdom, and Italy, are also looking for ways
to provide security guarantees to Ukraine following the conclusion of a peace agreement. The French
General Staff similarly emphasized that the Ukrainian military is Ukraine's primary security guarantee
for a lasting peace. The French General Staff added that France and the UK will work to define and
develop "reassurance operations" to deter Russia from future aggression after the implementation of a
peace deal. ISW continues to assess that a strong Ukrainian military backed by Western security
guarantees remains the most vital component of a post-war European security architecture, guaranteeing a
sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterring future Russian aggression. Russian demands for Ukraine's
"demilitarization" such that Ukraine is unable to defend itself against future Russian aggression are
counter to US President Donald Trump's efforts to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine.
Ukraine's European partners continue preliminary technical discussions about a possible future
peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine. Delegations from the British and French general staffs met with
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian military leaders on April 4 and 5 in Kyiv to discuss
details about how the first contingent of partner state forces could deploy to Ukraine. Zelensky stated
that the meetings resulted in "tangible details" about this possible deployment, established Ukraine's
needs, and identified geographical vulnerabilities that may require support. Zelensky stated that the
group still needs to decide where the forces would deploy, their responsibilities, and their authority to
respond in case of a breach of a future peace agreement. Zelensky stated that it might take one month or
longer to finalize additional details and that the group would meet weekly. NATO Secretary General Mark
Rutte stated to Ukrainian outlet New Voice on April 5 that it is best to wait to deploy peacekeepers to
Ukraine until after the conclusion of a peace agreement but that countries need to keep developing ideas
now to implement after peace is achieved.
Key Takeaways:
• European and NATO
officials emphasized that a strong Ukrainian military backed by European security guarantees remains the
most effective deterrent against future Russian aggression to ensure long-term peace in Ukraine and
Europe.
• Ukraine's European partners continue preliminary technical discussions about a
possible future peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the
only plant in Russia that produces fiber optic cables that are vital for Russian forces' fiber optic
drones.
• Ukraine's European partners continue to provide technical support to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, and Russian forces recently advanced near
Toretsk and Pokrovsk and in Kursk Oblast.
The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has been steadily declining since November 2024, in part due to
successful Ukrainian counterattacks in eastern Ukraine. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on
April 5 that Russian forces advanced 143 square kilometers in Ukraine in March 2025 as Ukrainian forces
conducted successful tactical counterattacks in the Pokrovsk direction. The UK MoD reported that the rate
of Russian advances in Ukraine has decreased each month since November 2024, as Russian forces seized
roughly 730 square kilometers in November 2024, 393 square kilometers in December 2024, 326 square
kilometers in January 2025, and 195 square kilometers in February 2025.
ISW has observed
geolocated footage to concur in the assessment that the monthly rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has
decreased since November 2024. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces in
Ukraine gained roughly 627 square kilometers in November 2024, 569 square kilometers in December 2024,
427 square kilometers in January 2025, 354 square kilometers in February 2025, and 203 square kilometers
in March 2025. The UK MoD likely uses a different methodology or sources to assess Russian advances in
Ukraine, but the UK MoD's report is consistent with evidence ISW has observed of decreasing monthly
Russian advances between November 2024 and March 2025. Ukrainian forces have conducted localized
counterattacks in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions in recent weeks, regaining lost positions in these
areas and contributing to slowing Russian advances in Ukraine.
Russian forces conducted the
largest series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine in nearly a month on the night of April 5 and
6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that preliminary data states that Russian forces launched nine
Kh-101/Kh-55SM cruise missiles from Tu-95MS aircraft from the airspace over Saratov Oblast; eight Kalibr
cruise missiles from the Black Sea; six Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast; and 109 Shahed
and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk,
Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces
downed six Kh-101/Kh-55SM cruise missiles, six Kalibr missiles, one Iskander-M ballistic missile, and 40
Shahed drones and that 53 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW)
interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and civilian
infrastructure in Kyiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, and Mykolaiv oblasts and that
five Iskander-M ballistic missiles struck Kyiv Oblast.
Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson
Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on April 6 that Russian forces are changing their strike tactics and
constantly modernizing their Shahed drones and ballistic missiles, complicating Ukrainian forces' ability
to shoot them down. Ihnat noted that the US Patriot air defense system is effective against ballistic
missiles. Russian forces have repeatedly experimented with different strike packages in order to
overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and ensure that Russian missiles – particularly the ballistic missiles
that are more difficult for Ukrainian air defenses to shoot down – are able to reach their intended
targets. Russian forces likely launched missiles and drones on the night of April 5 to 6 from various
locations in the Black Sea, Russia, and occupied Crimea, as part of these experimentation efforts.
Key Takeaways:
• The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has been steadily declining
since November 2024, in part due to successful Ukrainian counterattacks in eastern Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted the largest series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine in nearly a
month on the night of April 5 and 6.
• Ukrainian officials highlighted the fact that Russia is
leveraging its naval vessels in the Black Sea to conduct missile strikes against Ukraine as Russia
continues to stall the Black Sea moratorium on military operations that Ukraine and the United States
have jointly proposed.
• The Kremlin is attempting to portray Ukraine as consistently
violating the proposed temporary ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure without providing
evidence supporting these claims, in stark contrast to the pattern of Russian reporting about successful
Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure prior to the ceasefire proposal.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and
Sumy oblasts and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
The Kremlin continues to deny the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government as part of efforts to claim that
Ukraine is not a legitimate negotiating partner and to demand Ukrainian regime change and
demilitarization. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 7 that Russian President Vladimir
Putin supports the idea of a ceasefire in Ukraine but claimed that several issues "are hanging in the
air." Peskov claimed that these issues include the "lack of control" over the Ukrainian government and
the Ukrainian government's alleged inability to control the actions of unspecified extremist and
nationalist units that "simply do not obey" the Ukrainian government's orders. Peskov claimed that these
units are connected to "plans for the further militarization" of Ukraine. Peskov is promoting Putin's
March 28 narrative falsely claiming that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and incapable
of combatting neo-Nazi groups, which Putin claimed have the "actual power in their hands." These Kremlin
statements are part of a broader effort to undermine the Ukrainian government's legitimacy and repackage
Russia's long-standing demands for regime change and demilitarization in Ukraine. Putin and other Russian
officials previously temporarily paused promoting claims about Ukraine's alleged illegitimacy following
Putin's phone call with US President Donald Trump on February 12, but later resumed these claims on March
28. Trump recently expressed dissatisfaction with Putin's disparaging remarks attacking Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy and expressed a willingness to impose additional sanctions on
Russia if the United States and Russia are unable to "make a deal.
Key Takeaways:
• The Kremlin continues to deny the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government as part of efforts to claim
that Ukraine is not a legitimate negotiating partner and to demand Ukrainian regime change and
demilitarization.
• Ukrainian officials did not report any Russian long-range missile or drone
strikes on the night of April 6 to 7 or during the day on April 7 following Russia's largest strike
package in over a month on the night of April 5 to 6.
• Ukraine's European allies continue to
ramp up domestic materiel production and address shortages inhibiting artillery ammunition production.
• Russian authorities likely facilitated the removal of a prominent Russian insider source from
Telegram as part of continued efforts to crack down on the Russian information space.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Belogorod Oblast and near Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka
Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues to use its "Time of
Heroes" program to militarize regional governments and society in occupied Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces recently captured Chinese nationals fighting in the Russian military in several areas of
Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on April 8 that Ukrainian forces captured
several Chinese "fighters" who were fighting for Russia near Bilohorivka (east of Siversk) and Tarasivka
(northeast of Pokrovsk) in recent attacks and that Ukrainian intelligence indicated that there are
"significantly more Chinese nationals" in the Russian military. Zelensky noted that Ukrainian forces came
into contact with a group of six Chinese fighters during several recent attacks and captured two.
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated that the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
summoned the Chinese charge d'affairs in response to the incident. US Department of State Spokesperson
Tammy Bruce characterized the Chinese nationals' involvement as "disturbing" on April 8 and stated that
"China is a major enabler of Russia" that "provides nearly 80 percent of the dual use items Russia needs
to sustain the war."
ISW has observed reports of various unspecified Russian entities
recruiting vulnerable migrant workers into the Russian military to fight in Ukraine both in Russia and
abroad. Indian authorities revealed in 2024 that unspecified Russian entities were managing a human
trafficking network that lured Indian citizens to Russia under false pretenses and then coerced them into
signing military contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense to fight in Ukraine. Indian and Russian
authorities partnered to repatriate Indian citizens who had involuntarily joined the Russian military in
October 2024, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) could demonstrate that its government was not
involved in the participation of its citizens in this war by undertaking a similar effort in the future.
Beijing has not yet offered any formal response to these reports.
Russian and US authorities
announced a second round of US-Russia bilateral discussions focused on normalizing diplomatic missions
but not on discussing the ceasefire agreements offered jointly by the US and Ukraine will be held in
Istanbul on April 10. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on April 8 that Russian
Ambassador to the United States Alexander Darchiev and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European
and Eurasian Affairs Sonata Coulter will lead their respective delegations and that the meetings will
follow the same format as the February 27 meeting. Unnamed diplomatic sources told Russian outlet RBK
that the discussions will be held on April 10. US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce confirmed
that the bilateral discussions will occur on April 10 and will solely focus on normalizing US and Russian
diplomatic operations and that discussions about Ukraine are not on the agenda. The Kremlin continues to
demonstrate its refusal to substantively engage with the United States on proposed ceasefire agreements
and future peace negotiations in Ukraine.
Russian forces are currently pursuing three distinct
tactical objectives in the Pokrovsk direction, but Ukrainian drone operations and localized
counterattacks are continuing to complicate Russian advances in the area. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of
Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on April 7 that Russian forces are trying to cut the
T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway northeast of Pokrovsk, bypass Pokrovsk from the west, and attack
in the Novopavlivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) direction. Russian forces are making limited gains northeast
of Pokrovsk toward the T-0504 highway and southwest of Pokrovsk toward Novopavlivka but appear to be
struggling to advance immediately south and southwest of Pokrovsk — where Ukrainian forces have focused
most of their counterattacks in February, March, and early April 2025.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces recently captured Chinese nationals fighting in the Russian military in several
areas of Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian and US authorities announced a second round of US-Russia
bilateral discussions focused on normalizing diplomatic missions but not on discussing the ceasefire
agreements offered jointly by the US and Ukraine will be held in Istanbul on April 10.
• Russian forces are currently pursuing three distinct tactical objectives in the Pokrovsk direction,
but Ukrainian drone operations and localized counterattacks are continuing to complicate Russian advances
in the area.
• Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk support both the ongoing Russian effort
to envelop Pokrovsk from the east and west and the effort to pressure Kostyantynivka from the south by
advancing along the T-0504 highway and eliminating the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk.
• The situation immediately south and southwest of Pokrovsk remains extremely dynamic amid intensified
Russian offensive operations and localized Ukrainian counterattacks and drone operations in the area.
• Russian forces continue to deplete manpower and materiel in unsuccessful mechanized assaults
and ongoing infantry assaults with armored vehicle support further southwest of Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces have only made marginal advances throughout the Pokrovsk direction due to localized
Ukrainian counterattacks and improved integration of Ukrainian ground and drone forces.
• Russian forces have spent the last 13 months and lost over five divisions' worth of tanks and
thousands of troops attacking toward Pokrovsk and trying to seize the town. Ongoing Russian offensive
operations to seize Pokrovsk and attack Kostyantynivka highlight Russian President Vladimir Putin's
determination to seize all of Ukraine through military means at whatever cost if he cannot do so through
negotiations.
• Russian forces renewed long-range missile and drone strikes against Ukraine
overnight on April 7 to 8 following a brief pause on April 6 to 7.
• Russian forces continue
to innovate with long-range Shahed strike drone tactics to maximize the impact of strikes against
Ukraine.
• European states continue to provide financial and military aid to Ukraine.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced an initiative ostensibly aimed at securing medical
treatment and rehabilitation for wounded Russian troops, but the MoD may weaponize this initiative
against wounded servicemembers in practice.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk
and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts and near Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and
Velyka Novosilka.
• The Kremlin is considering passing a bill that may incentivize volunteer
recruitment for conscription-age men ages 18 to 30 years old.
Russian forces continue to marginally advance in the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border area, but the Russian force
grouping in the area will likely be unable to launch a major offensive operation against Sumy City in the
near term without receiving significant reinforcements. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr
Syrskyi stated during an interview with Ukrainian outlet LB UA published on April 9 that Russian forces
have intensified assaults in "all main directions" and begun offensive operations in Sumy and Kharkiv
oblasts. ISW has observed gradual but consistent Russian gains and attacks along the
Volodymyrivka-Zhuravka-Novenke line (north to northeast of Sumy City) in northern Sumy Oblast and ongoing
Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces from remaining positions south of Sudzha in southern Kursk
Oblast since early March 2025. Russian forces made rapid advances in Kursk Oblast in early March 2025 as
the United States temporarily paused intelligence sharing with Ukraine, but Russian gains slowed as
Ukrainian forces retreated into Sudzha and later resumed use of HIMARS long-range strike systems. Russian
forces pushed Ukrainian forces from Sudzha in mid-March 2025 but have continued to attack the remaining
Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast while starting attacks into northern Sumy Oblast over the past
month.
The Russian military command is likely attempting to form a buffer zone along the
international border in Sumy Oblast, although Russian commanders may intend to press further into Sumy
Oblast and towards Sumy City in the future. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces would not attempt
to advance further into northern Sumy Oblast or attack Sumy City so long as Ukrainian forces maintained
their salient in Kursk Oblast. Recent Russian attacks into northern Sumy Oblast indicate that the Russian
military command may attempt to capitalize on the collapse of the Ukrainian Kursk Oblast salient in order
to create a buffer zone in Sumy Oblast or launch an offensive on Sumy City. Russian President Vladimir
Putin asked Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov during a visit to a Russian
command post in Kursk Oblast on March 12 to "think in the future about creating a security zone" along
the Ukrainian-Russian international border. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov suggested that Russia
form a similar buffer zone in Kharkiv Oblast in order to justify the Russian offensive into northern
Kharkiv Oblast in March 2024, and Putin's statement indicates that the Russian military command is either
considering or actively working towards creating a buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast.
Putin
likely intends to use a buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast and an offensive towards Sumy City to justify
expanding his claims over Ukrainian territory. Russian officials are currently demanding that Ukraine
cede unoccupied territory in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as part of a future peace agreement
to end the war, and Russian officials have previously claimed that Mykolaiv Oblast (which Russia occupies
a miniscule part of on the Kinburn Spit) and Kharkiv Oblast (which Russian occupies limited areas of) are
"historically Russian lands." Putin may intend to leverage further advances in Sumy Oblast and pressure
on Sumy City to demand that Ukraine cede part of Sumy Oblast to Russia during future peace negotiations.
The Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast is unlikely to be sufficiently combat capable to seize a major
Ukrainian city after eight months of combat operations unless it receives significant reinforcements from
another frontline area — which would require Russia to abandon a major operational effort in another area
of Ukraine and possibly leave that area vulnerable to Ukrainian forces — and is therefore unlikely.
Russian forces likely intend to establish a limited and defensible "buffer zone" in northern Sumy Oblast
and advance within artillery range of Sumy City in order to pressure the city and make it uninhabitable
for civilians. The Russian military command may also intend to establish limited, defensible positions in
northern Sumy Oblast and then transfer these forces to reinforce other operational efforts in Ukraine,
although the informational and political pressure that a push on Sumy City could generate may be more
enticing for Putin than advances in other frontline areas.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian
forces continue to marginally advance in the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border area, but the Russian force
grouping in the area will likely be unable to launch a major offensive operation against Sumy City in the
near term without receiving significant reinforcements.
• The Russian military command is
likely attempting to form a buffer zone along the international border in Sumy Oblast, although Russian
commanders may intend to press further into Sumy Oblast and towards Sumy City in the future.
• Russia continues to utilize North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast, but ISW has not yet observed
indications that North Korean troops are operating as combat forces in Ukraine.
• Syrskyi
stated that there are currently 623,000 Russian military personnel fighting against Ukraine.
• Syrskyi also spoke about Ukraine's efforts to further develop its tactical and long-range drone
capabilities.
• The People's Republic of China (PRC) denied sending military personnel to
fight in Ukraine following Ukrainian reports of Chinese nationals fighting alongside Russian forces.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces advanced near
Kupyansk, Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian federal
government and Russian federal subjects are increasingly focused on veteran rehabilitation and
reintegration.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 9 that Ukraine is interested in purchasing a large
package of weapons from the United States, possibly within the framework of a future US-Ukraine mineral
deal, as part of Ukrainian efforts to obtain security guarantees that would deter a future Russian
invasion. Zelensky stated on April 9 that Ukraine recently proposed to the United States that Ukraine
purchase "30 to 50 billion" (likely USD) worth of air defense and weapons systems from the United States
and that Ukraine is prepared to purchase these systems itself — either through direct payment to the
United States or through the fund established by the potential US-Ukrainian minerals deal. Zelensky
stated that he recently told US President Donald Trump that Ukraine wants to buy at least 10 air defense
systems to "help after the end of the war" and that Ukraine will consider the provision of
these air defense and weapons systems as a "security guarantee." ISW continues to assess that a strong
Ukrainian military backed by Western security guarantees remains the most vital component of a stable
post-war European security architecture, guaranteeing a sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterring future
Russian aggression.
Russia’s continued unsubstantiated accusations of Ukrainian violations of
the energy strike ceasefire —despite the lack of any publicly available official ceasefire agreement —
demonstrate how Russia will likely act in the event that Russia accepts the ground ceasefire to which
Ukraine and the United States have already agreed. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson
Maria Zakharova claimed without evidence on April 9 that Ukrainian forces struck energy infrastructure in
"Russian regions" 32 times between April 4 and 7. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed
without evidence on April 10 that Ukraine conducted 11 strikes against energy facilities in occupied
Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts; Krasnodar Krai; and Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod
oblasts in the past day. The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces struck energy facilities in the
Russian near rear and rear in occupied Ukraine, including in Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast (roughly six
kilometers from the frontline) and Holoprystanskyi Raion, Kherson Oblast (just south of the Dnipro River
and inclusive of areas immediately on the east bank of the Dnipro River). It is unclear if
frontline energy infrastructure in the Russian near rear and rear are covered under the strikes ceasefire
as the terms of the agreement have not been published. ISW continues to assess that Russian officials are
using the lack of a clearly defined and public ceasefire agreement to cast Ukraine as a disingenuous
participant in the peace negotiation process. Russian officials’ continued insistence that Ukraine is
violating the ceasefire underscores the importance of a signed and publicly available ceasefire agreement
that includes monitoring and adjudication processes -elements that will be even more important in the
potential future ground ceasefire to which the United States and Ukraine have already agreed.
Russia continues to use bilateral talks with the United States to delay negotiations about the war in
Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin remains uninterested in serious peace negotiations to end the war.
The US Department of State (DoS) reported that US and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on April 10 to
discuss the finalization of "an understanding to ensure the stability of diplomatic banking for Russian
and US bilateral missions." The US DoS stated that the US delegation reiterated concerns about the
current Russian policy prohibiting the US Embassy in Moscow from employing local staff, which the United
States sees as a barrier to the embassy's stable and sustainable staffing. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry
Peskov stated on April 10 that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the US DoS would only
discuss bilateral relations and would not discuss Ukraine. Russian Ambassador to the United States
Alexander Darchiev stated on April 10 that the United States and Russia agreed to measures to facilitate
the movement of diplomats and accelerate the granting of diplomatic visas. Darchiev also stated that the
Russian delegation prioritized discussions about the return of confiscated Russian diplomatic property in
the United States. Russia continues to use bilateral talks with the United States to discuss issues
unrelated to the war in Ukraine, even as US President Donald Trump continues efforts to achieve the
temporary ground ceasefire upon which both the United States and Ukraine have agreed. The talks in
Istanbul suggest that Russia is using diplomatic engagements with the United States to distract from the
war and to obfuscate its own disinterest in productive peace negotiations.
Key Takeaways: • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 9 that Ukraine is interested in purchasing a
large package of weapons from the United States, possibly within the framework of a future US-Ukraine
mineral deal, as part of Ukrainian efforts to obtain security guarantees that would deter a future
Russian invasion.
• Russia’s continued unsubstantiated accusations of Ukrainian violations of
the energy strike ceasefire - despite the lack of any publicly available official ceasefire agreement –
demonstrate how Russia will likely act in the event that Russia accepts the ground ceasefire to which
Ukraine and the United States have already agreed.
• Russia continues to use bilateral talks
with the United States to delay negotiations about the war in Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin
remains uninterested in serious peace negotiations to end the war.
• Russia is reportedly
using social media and financial incentives to recruit Chinese nationals to voluntarily join the Russian
military.
• Russian forces reportedly recently executed a wounded Ukrainian prisoner of war
(POW) in the Lyman direction.
• The Kremlin continues to use narratives it has historically
used against Ukraine to set conditions to justify possible future aggression against Estonia.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces advanced near Toretsk and
Pokrovsk.
• A Russian insider source claimed that Russian authorities are preparing a
dedicated position in Russian regional governments that will oversee veterans' affairs, and the federal
government may include similar positions in the future.
Ukraine's European partners announced new military aid during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the
Ramstein format) meeting on April 11. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced on April 11 that
Germany will provide Ukraine with four IRIS-T air defense systems, 33 missiles for the systems, 120
man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), 25 Marder infantry fighting vehicles, 15 Leopard tanks, 14
artillery systems, and 130,000 155mm artillery shells. Pistorius stated that Germany recently provided 30
Patriot missiles to Ukraine as well. The German Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on April 11 that
Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) are establishing an electronic warfare (EW) coalition for Ukraine.
The UK MoD announced a military aid package worth 450 million pounds (about $588 million) drones, radars,
and anti-tank mines. Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur stated that Estonia will deliver 10,000 155mm
artillery shells and 750,000 rations packages to Ukraine; Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans stated
that the Netherland will provide 150 million euros (about $170 million) to strengthen Ukraine's air
defenses; and Lithuanian Defense Minister Dovilė Šakalienė announced that Lithuania will
allocate 20 million euros (about $22 million) to Ukraine for the purchase of ammunition.
US
Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and CEO of the
Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev in St. Petersburg on April 11 to discuss the war in
Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the Putin-Witkoff meeting would continue
discussions about the war in Ukraine, that Putin would listen to the points that Witkoff delivers from US
President Donald Trump, and that the meeting is a good chance for Russia to convey its "main concerns" to
Trump via Witkoff. Peskov claimed that the officials may discuss a future meeting between Trump and Putin
and that Trump and Putin could "theoretically" have a phone call following the Putin-Witkoff meeting.
Peskov claimed that one should not "expect any breakthroughs" during the Putin-Witkoff meeting and that
Russia and the United States are in the process of normalizing relations and "searching" for a way to
settle the war in Ukraine. Peskov claimed that the Putin-Witkoff meeting and the April 10 US-Russian
bilateral meeting in Istanbul are not related but are "two different tracks with one common process."
White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated on April 11 that the Putin-Witkoff meeting is another
step in the negotiating process toward a ceasefire and an "ultimate peace deal" in the war in Ukraine.
Dmitriev stated that his meeting with Witkoff was "productive."
Kremlin officials continue to
demonstrate Russia's unwillingness to make territorial compromises in Ukraine in a future peace
settlement. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on April 11, following a Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) foreign ministers meeting in Almaty, that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky
will have to accept territorial concessions and that it is "impossible" for Ukraine to return to its 1991
borders – Ukraine's internationally recognized borders. Lavrov attempted to deflect blame for Russia's
intransigence onto Zelensky and Ukraine's alleged mistreatment of Russian speakers in Ukraine. The
Kremlin continues to explicitly demonstrate its unwillingness to make compromises and cede
Russian-occupied territory in Ukraine as part of any future peace negotiations – in contrast to Ukrainian
officials who have expressed their willingness to make territorial compromises in a future peace
agreement. Russian President Vladimir Putin has even demanded that Ukraine cede territory in Donetsk,
Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy and claimed that Mykolaiv and
Kharkiv oblasts are "historically Russian lands."
Key Takeaways:
• Ukraine's
European partners announced new military aid during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein
format) meeting on April 11.
• US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with
Russian President Vladimir Putin and CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev in
St. Petersburg on April 11 to discuss the war in Ukraine.
• Kremlin officials continue to
demonstrate Russia's unwillingness to make territorial compromises in Ukraine in a future peace
settlement.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to extract concessions from the United
States as part of ongoing bilateral US-Russian negotiations while delaying progress towards peace in
Ukraine.
• Ukrainian sources continue to speculate about which directions Russian forces will
prioritize in Spring and Summer 2024. ISW is updating the axis sections in its Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment to reflect shifting Russian operational efforts along the frontline.
• Russian
President Vladimir Putin continues to emphasize Russia's large-scale and long-term investments in
Russia's navy and naval strategic nuclear forces.
• Russian forces recently executed
Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued reports of systematic
executions of Ukrainian POWs across the theater of war.
• Russian forces recently advanced
near Kupyansk, Siversk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian opposition media
provided additional details regarding Russia's efforts to recruit Chinese citizens to serve in Ukraine
following Ukrainian reports about Chinese nationals fighting in Ukraine.
US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg expressed support on April 11 for the deployment of an
allied "reassurance force" in rear areas of western Ukraine after a possible future ceasefire between
Ukraine and Russia. The Times reported on April 11 that Kellogg expressed support for a "partition" of
Ukraine between European, Ukrainian, and Russian forces; the deployment of a European "reassurance force"
in western Ukraine; and establishing an 18-mile-wide "demilitarized zone" along the current frontline.
Kellogg clarified later on April 11 that he supports the presence of a "reassurance force" that does not
include US troops to support Ukrainian sovereignty, but that none of his statements during the interview
suggested "a partitioning of Ukraine." Kellogg noted that the Times misrepresented some of his statements
referencing possible areas of responsibility (AORs) of a future European "reassurance force."
Kellogg's clarification regarding the deployment of a "reassurance force" in Ukraine's rear areas is
consistent with several statements from Ukrainian and European leaders about a possible future
peacekeeping contingent deployed to Ukraine. Ukrainian Commander in Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi
stated on April 9 that a putative peacekeeping contingent would not deploy to the frontline. European
Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas stated on April 10 that a future peacekeeping contingent would be
likely to deploy not to the frontline but rather deeper within Ukraine or even outside of Ukraine.
Bloomberg reported on April 10 that UK Defense Secretary John Healey and French Defense Minister
Sebastien Lecornu stated that the Coalition of the Willing aims to develop more detailed plans within the
next two weeks about how the coalition will help secure Ukrainian airspace, coastline, and land. People
familiar with the matter told Bloomberg that the coalition hopes that the United States will agree to
"backstop" any future European deployments to Ukraine with air power, border surveillance, and
intelligence.
Russian state-owned and pro-Kremlin media amplified a Russian official's blanket
rejection of any peacekeeping force in Ukraine on April 12. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
Ambassador-at-Large Rodion Miroshnik responded to Kellogg's statements on April 12 and reiterated the
Kremlin's objection to the presence of any peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine following a possible future
ceasefire or peace agreement because a peacekeeping force would preserve the "level of toxicity" that
supposedly prompted Russia to launch its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russian
state-owned and pro-state media widely amplified Miroshnik's statement. Kremlin officials have repeatedly
rejected the idea of a possible future peacekeeping force in Ukraine or any European involvement in
post-war Ukraine. Miroshnik's accusation of "toxicity" in Ukraine is an indirect reference to the
Kremlin's continued demands that any conclusion to the war in Ukraine must address Russia's so-called
"root causes" of the war. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov previously defined Russia's perceived
"root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the
Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and the Russian language, media,
and culture in Ukraine. Russian officials frequently directly invoke these "root causes" to justify
Russia's continued war effort and pre-war demands amounting to total Ukrainian capitulation, and
Miroshnik's April 12 statement is an indirect restatement of this concept.
Russian forces have
resumed a more typical strike pattern in late March and early April 2025 after a temporary spike in the
size of Russian long-range strike packages in mid-February and early March 2025. Russian forces conducted
notably larger strike packages in mid-February and early March 2025 but have launched strike packages
more comparable to trends last observed in January and early February 2025, albeit using fewer missiles,
in recent weeks. Russian forces notably conducted no strikes against Ukraine on April 7 - the day after
conducting their largest strike in over a month on April 6 — but have since resumed daily strikes.
Russian officials have thus far refused to engage with or have outright rejected the US-Ukrainian
temporary ceasefire that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff presumably proposed to
Russian President Vladimir Putin during a meeting on March 13. The proposed long-range strikes ceasefire
on energy infrastructure would not require Russia to cease all long-range drone and missile strikes, but
the proposed general ceasefire along the current frontline and in the air and sea would likely require
Russia to end all strikes on Ukraine. Russian forces are likely delaying negotiations on a general
ceasefire in order to continue making gains along the frontline in Ukraine and continue devastating
long-range strikes against Ukrainian defense industrial and civilian areas in order to intimidate
civilians and undermine Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.
Key Takeaways:
• US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg expressed support on
April 11 for the deployment of an allied "reassurance force" in the rear areas of western Ukraine after a
possible future ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia.
• Russian state-owned and pro-Kremlin
media amplified a Russian official's blanket rejection of any peacekeeping force in Ukraine on April
12.
• Russian forces have resumed a more typical strike pattern in late March and early April
2025 after a temporary spike in the size of Russian long-range strike packages in mid-February and early
March 2025.
• People's Republic of China (PRC) military officials reportedly visited the
frontline in Ukraine to glean insights for future warfare amid reports that at least 155 Chinese
nationals are fighting in Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s European partners announced additional military
aid packages within the context of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting on
April 11.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove, and Russian forces recently
advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that ongoing US-Russian negotiations are unlikely to result in
"lightning-fast results," contrary to US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a general
ceasefire and lasting peace agreement in Ukraine in the near future. Peskov told Kremlin journalist Pavel
Zarubin on April 13 that "everything is moving very well" regarding US-Russian bilateral talks and
discussions about the war in Ukraine but that there will likely not be immediate results. Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Second Department of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Director
Alexei Polishchuk gave an interview to Russian state media group Rossiya Today (RT) and stated that
Russia is willing to engage in negotiations that “take into account the modern realities” of the war and
eliminate the “root causes” of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that
any peace process in Ukraine must address these so-called “root causes." Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov previously defined "root causes" as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward
and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine. These so-called
”root causes” are a reference to Russia’s pre-war demands that effectively amount to Ukraine’s full
capitulation and the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine. Peskov's and Polishchuk's
comments also reflect the Kremlin's continued rejection of President Trump's stated approach of first
establishing a ceasefire and then negotiating a broader peace agreement and the Kremlin's commitment to
war aims that are incompatible with President Trump’s goal of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.
Any future general ceasefire or peace agreement must include robust monitoring mechanisms, given
the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to portray Ukraine as violating the long-range energy infrastructure
strikes ceasefire without providing evidence of these strikes and despite the lack of public details
about the ceasefire’s terms. It remains unclear what monitoring mechanisms the West could leverage to
enforce and monitor a future general ceasefire or if the Kremlin would accept any such mechanisms. Peskov
and Polishchuk reiterated ongoing Russian claims on April 13 that Ukraine is violating the temporary
moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure. Russian officials, led by the Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD), have accused Ukraine of violating the temporary ceasefire almost every day
since March 29 but have not provided evidence to substantiate most of these claims. Russian officials
have repeatedly claimed that Ukrainian forces are striking energy infrastructure along Ukraine's northern
border with Russia, although it remains unclear if strikes with tactical first-person view (FPV) drones
or routine shelling would be a violation of the energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire as the terms of
the ceasefire are publicly unclear. Russian officials appear to be weaponizing the vague conditions of
the ceasefire and exploiting the absence of independent monitoring mechanisms to flood the information
space with unsubstantiated claims about supposed Ukrainian ceasefire violations.
Russian
officials may attempt to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire
violations in the future if a general ceasefire does not include robust independent monitoring
mechanisms. Russian forces may conduct false flag attacks along the frontline in the event of a future
general ceasefire in order to accuse Ukraine of violating the ceasefire and justify reigniting the
conflict. ISW has previously assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin's claims that the current
Ukrainian government is illegitimate are setting conditions to legitimize future Russian ceasefire
violations. The Kremlin is weaponizing the lack of monitoring mechanisms for the temporary energy
infrastructure strikes ceasefire, and any future general ceasefire must have more robust monitoring
mechanisms to deter, adjudicate, or at least properly record future violations.
Key
Takeaways:
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that ongoing US-Russian negotiations are
unlikely to result in "lightning-fast results," contrary to US President Donald Trump's stated objective
of achieving a general ceasefire and lasting peace agreement in Ukraine in the near future.
• Any future general ceasefire or peace agreement must include robust monitoring mechanisms, given the
Kremlin's ongoing efforts to portray Ukraine as violating the long-range energy infrastructure strikes
ceasefire without providing evidence of these strikes and despite the lack of public details about the
ceasefire’s terms. It remains unclear what monitoring mechanisms the West could leverage to enforce and
monitor a future general ceasefire or if the Kremlin would accept any such mechanisms.
• Russian officials continue to weaponize the vague terms of the current ceasefire on long-range
strikes against energy infrastructure and ongoing ceasefire negotiations in an effort to falsely portray
Ukraine- and not Russia- as unwilling to engage in constructive dialogue.
• Russian forces
conducted a devastating ballistic missile strike against Sumy City on April 13, causing more than 100
casualties.
• Ongoing milblogger complaints about the Russian military's conduct of the war in
Ukraine reinforce ISW’s assessment that Russian tactics will degrade Russia’s manpower and materiel
resources and contribute to slowing Russian advances along the frontline.
• Ukrainian forces
recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Kharkiv City, Borova, and Chasiv
Yar.
Russian forces appear to be leveraging redeployed elements of the 8th Combined Arms Army to close the
Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk and level the frontline as part of ongoing Russian efforts to
attack Kostyantynivka from the south. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on April 14
that elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army , Southern
Military District ) recently seized Oleksandropil, Panteleymonivka, and Valentynivka (all southwest
of Toretsk) and pushed Ukrainian forces from positions east of the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynopil
highway. Russian milbloggers also claimed on April 13 and 14 that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces
from positions east of the H-20 highway, seized Valentynivka, and are attacking Sukha Balka (north of
Valentynivka). Mashovets stated that elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) continue to
attack north of Vozdvyzhenka (west of Oleksandropil and east of Pokrovsk) in the direction of Nova
Poltavka and Novoolenivka (both northeast of Pokrovsk and west of Toretsk). Russian milbloggers recently
credited elements of the 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) with seizing Panteleymonivka
and Oleksandropil and elements of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) with
seizing Kalynove (east of Pokrovsk).
The Russian military command redeployed elements of the
20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk
directions in February 2025 and likely intended to leverage these redeployments to break out of Toretsk
and advance towards Kostyantynivka along or parallel to the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway.
Elements of the Russian 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps , SMD)
previously operating in these two areas failed to break through Ukraine's defense in Fall 2024 and Winter
2024-2025 , likely prompting the Russian military command to introduce elements of the 20th and 150th
motorized rifle divisions – potentially prematurely – into combat in order to maintain the operational
tempo in these areas. Russian forces marginally advanced along the frontline between Vozdvyzhenka
(northeast of Pokrovsk) and Sukha Balka in February and March 2025, but have made more tactically
significant advances near Kalynove and along the Sukha Balka-Oleksandropil line since early April 2025.
ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may aim to eliminate the Ukrainian pocket southwest of
Toretsk in order to level out their southern flank ahead of a planned push on Kostyantynivka, and recent
Russian redeployments and tactical activity supports this assessment. Russian forces likely intend to
leverage advances southwest of Toretsk to push along the H-20 highway and facilitate deeper advances
northeast of Pokrovsk along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway toward Kostyantynivka. Russian
forces must break out of Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, advance toward Kostyantynivka broadly from the east, or
advance roughly 24 kilometers from Pokrovsk along the T-0504 highway to Kostyantynivka’s southwestern
flank before Russian forces will pose any notable threat to seizing Ukrainian positions in
Kostyantynivka, and a Russian offensive to seize the city or Ukraine's wider fortress belt in Donetsk
Oblast would likely be a years' long effort - assuming that the West continues to bolster Ukraine's
defense.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces appear to be leveraging redeployed
elements of the 8th Combined Arms Army to close the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk and level the
frontline as part of ongoing Russian efforts to attack Kostyantynivka from the south.
• Russian forces appear to be intensifying their use of armored vehicles throughout the theater after
mainly relegating armored vehicles to fire support roles and relying on infantry assaults to advance in
late 2024 and early 2025.
• A Russian military court recently decided to keep former 58th
Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov in custody after reports that Popov would
command a penal assault detachment in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near
Siversk and Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
Two high-ranking members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's inner circle reiterated Putin's June 2024
non-negotiable demands that any resolution of the war in Ukraine must result in regime change, extensive
territorial concessions, and long-term limitations on Ukraine's military after US Special Envoy for the
Middle East Steve Witkoff's April 11 meeting with Putin. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head
Sergey Naryshkin claimed on April 15 that any future peace agreement ending Russia's invasion of Ukraine
must include terms concerning Ukraine's neutrality; the demilitarization and "denazification" of the
Ukrainian state; the abolition of Ukrainian laws that allegedly discriminate against Russian-speakers in
Ukraine; and the recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and
Kherson oblasts. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed to Russian state business outlet
Kommersant on April 14 that the current Ukrainian government is "unconstitutional" and that Russia
"cannot give up" following the illegal and sham referendums
Russia conducted in the four oblasts to join Russia in Fall 2022. Lavrov reiterated that Putin "very
clearly outlined" Russia's demands for a future peace agreement to end the war during Putin's speech on
June 14, 2024, and stated that these June 2024 demands were "not some kind of request." Lavrov stated
that there are "no secrets" about Russia's demands and reiterated the importance of addressing the "root
causes" of the war in a future peace agreement.
Russian officials are using Putin's June 2024
speech as the Kremlin's current standing guidance on negotiations and the resolution of the war in
Ukraine. Putin demanded on June 14, 2024 that Ukrainian forces must "completely withdraw" from
Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Ukraine must
officially abandon its goal of joining NATO (by amending its constitution in which that goal is
enshrined) before Russia can agree to a future ceasefire and peace negotiations. Putin stated that Russia
is prepared to begin negotiations with Ukraine as soon as Ukraine agrees to withdraw from the entirety of
the four oblasts. Putin also demanded that the international community recognize the four illegally
annexed and occupied oblasts as part of Russia and lift all Western sanctions against Russia in the event
of a resolution to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin reiterated his calls for Ukraine to
agree to full demilitarization and "denazification" and abandon its aspirations to join any external
security blocs. These demands would preclude the bilateral security agreements Ukraine has negotiated and
is negotiating with several European states.
Putin and other Kremlin officials have routinely
issued these same demands, including by using vague language to obfuscate Russia's most extreme demands.
Russian officials, including Putin, use this language to articulate their overarching demand that the
West acknowledge Russia's illegal annexation of occupied Ukraine and force Ukraine to concede not only
territory but also its future sovereignty and ability to defend itself. Kremlin officials have
consistently demanded that:
• Ukraine must demilitarize. Putin named "demilitarization" as one
of the main goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and stated on July 4, 2024,
that Ukraine should undergo "irreversible" "demilitarization" in the event of a future ceasefire. Russia
demanded in the April 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft agreement that Ukraine shrink its military beyond
pre-2022 levels and commit to never fielding a military capable of defending the country against future
Russian aggression. Russia demanded in the protocol that the Ukrainian military should be confined to
fewer than 85,000 active-duty personnel, fewer than 15,000 National Guard personnel, and fewer than 1,400
tanks and armored vehicles. The pre-2022 Ukrainian military had 196,600 active-duty personnel, 60,000
National Guard personnel, and over 3,000 tanks and armored vehicles.
• Ukraine must
"denazify" and install a "legitimate" government. Putin named "denazification" as another of the main
goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and Russian officials have previously
defined "denazification" as the "liquidation of those who instill" Russophobia in other people. Russian
officials often invoke the term "denazification" to call for regime change in Ukraine and the
installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv. Putin has routinely labeled all Ukrainian
governments since 2014 as "illegitimate" and claimed on January 28 that Russia will not view any
agreements it concludes with the current Ukrainian government as binding.
• Ukraine must
abandon its aspirations to join NATO or any security bloc in the future. Putin's demand for Ukraine's
“neutrality” remains one of the central justifications for his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia
demanded in the Istanbul Protocol draft agreement that Ukraine amend its constitution to remove the
provision committing Ukraine to NATO membership and add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine
from joining any military alliances, concluding military agreements, or hosting foreign military
personnel or systems in Ukraine.
• Ukraine must concede occupied Ukrainian territory and
"Novorossiya" to Russia. Putin stated on June 14, 2024, that Russia will not be content with ending the
war on the lines it currently holds and explicitly called for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the
non-occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts as a prerequisite for any sort of
"peace" negotiations with Ukraine. Kremlin officials have indicated that they have territorial ambitions
beyond the administrative borders of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and often invoke
the term "Novorossiya" (an amorphous, invented region in Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed
includes all of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia) to lay claim to other
areas of eastern and southern Ukraine, including Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.
• Any resolution of the war must address the war's "root causes." Lavrov has repeatedly defined the
"root causes" of the war in Ukraine as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern
Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s and the Ukrainian government's alleged
discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine. Russian
officials have leveraged claims that Ukraine has mistreated Russian speakers to justify Russia's
occupation and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory.
Key Takeaways:
• Two
high-ranking members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's inner circle reiterated Putin's June 2024
non-negotiable demands that any resolution of the war in Ukraine must result in regime change, extensive
territorial concessions, and long-term limitations on Ukraine's military after US Special Envoy for the
Middle East Steve Witkoff's April 11 meeting with Putin.
• Kremlin officials continue to set
informational conditions to demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not currently occupy
and to justify Russia's ambitions of asserting control over independent countries, including NATO member
states.
• Naryshkin threatened a Russian attack against NATO states in response to NATO states
building up their defenses in line with US President Donald Trump's push for Europe to increase its own
defense capabilities.
• Lavrov reiterated Putin's rejection of Trump's proposal for a 30-day
full ceasefire.
• Russia may recognize the end of the 30-day energy infrastructure strikes
ceasefire soon and intensify its long-range strikes against Ukraine, but the exact parameters of the
ceasefire — including its end date — remain unclear.
• Ukraine's National Guard announced on
April 15 the formation of two new army corps on the basis of two existing brigades, amid Ukraine's
continued efforts to transition to a corps structure.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced
near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka and in western
Zaporizhia Oblast.
The White House reiterated that the United States will not engage in economic agreements with Russia
until Russia agrees to a ceasefire, amid continued Russian efforts to deflect blame onto Ukraine for the
Kremlin's rejection of such a ceasefire. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that Trump
made it "very clear" that US-Russian economic partnerships could be an incentive for Russia to end its
war against Ukraine, but that the United States "needs to see a ceasefire first" — likely in reference to
a temporary or permanent full ceasefire in Ukraine. The Trump administration has previously characterized
a temporary full ceasefire as a "necessary step" toward achieving an enduring peace settlement in
Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the joint US-Ukrainian 30-day full ceasefire proposal
when Trump called Putin on March 18, and senior Russian officials have reiterated Putin's rejection since
then by attempting to deflect blame onto Ukraine and secure additional bilateral concessions from the
United States. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 16 that Ukraine's decision to extend
martial law and continue general mobilization until August 6, 2025 is an attempt to preserve Ukraine's
"unstable structure" and implied that Ukraine's ban on negotiations with Russia is inhibiting progress
towards ending the war. The Ukrainian government is legally prohibited from lifting martial law while
Russia continues to attack Ukraine, however. Russian authorities also appear to be intensifying their
recruitment efforts, suggesting that the Kremlin intends to sustain its current force generation efforts
for some time, peace talks notwithstanding. The Kremlin is continuing efforts to blame Ukraine for the
lack of progress towards Trump's desired full ceasefire. Ukraine has already agreed to Trump's temporary
full ceasefire proposal, while Kremlin officials have consistently reiterated that Russian President
Vladimir Putin's non-negotiable demands for regime change in Ukraine, extensive territorial concessions,
and limitations on Ukraine's military that would render Ukraine defenseless as conditions must be met
before Russia can agree to a future ceasefire.
Russia is reportedly heavily dependent on North
Korean artillery ammunition as North Korea continues to learn lessons from Russia's war against Ukraine.
Reuters published a joint investigation with UK-based research organization Open Source Center (OSC) on
April 15 detailing the extent of Russia's dependence on North Korean artillery and the evolution of North
Korean forces' participation in fighting alongside Russian forces. Reuters and the OSC tracked 64
shipments from North Korea to Russia from September 2023 to March 2025 that involved 16,000 containers
carrying millions of North Korean artillery rounds and recorded a shipment from North Korea as recently
as March 17, 2025. Reuters and the OSC reported that four Russian-flagged ships — the Angara, Maria,
Maia-1, and Lady R cargo ships — transported the ammunition from North Korea's port of Rajin to the
Russian ports of Vostochny and Dunai. Reuters reviewed Russian military documents of everyday Russian
artillery usage that showed that some Russian units depended on North Korean artillery shells for half or
more of their shells used in daily fire missions. Reuters reported that an unspecified Russian unit
fighting in Zaporizhia Oblast reported that nearly 50 percent of its 152mm D-20 howitzer rounds and 100
percent of its 122mm rockets fired came from North Korea. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence
Directorate (GUR) told Reuters that North Korea has provided Russia with three million artillery rounds
and an unspecified number of mortar rounds since mid-2023 and that half of all of Russia's artillery
rounds come from North Korea. The GUR also stated that North Korea supplied Russia with 148 KN-23 and
KN-24 ballistic missiles as of January 2025.
Key Takeaways:
• The White House
reiterated that the United States will not engage in economic agreements with Russia until Russia agrees
to a ceasefire, amid continued Russian efforts to deflect blame onto Ukraine for the Kremlin's rejection
of such a ceasefire.
• Russia is reportedly heavily dependent on North Korean artillery
ammunition as North Korea continues to learn lessons from Russia's war against Ukraine.
• Russian authorities recently detained former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov, likely as part of
the Kremlin efforts to scapegoat Kursk Oblast officials for their failure in responding to Ukraine’s
August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces
recently executed at least one unarmed Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW) near Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka
Novosilka).
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka
Novosilka.
Russian forces recently conducted a roughly battalion-sized mechanized assault across a wide front in
western Zaporizhia Oblast, representing an inflection in recently observed Russian mechanized assault
tactics. Ukrainian military officials reported on April 17 that Ukrainian forces repelled a series of
mechanized assaults by elements of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District
) that consisted of roughly a battalion's worth of equipment, including 320 personnel, 40 armored
vehicles, three tanks, and about 10 buggies, along the Pyatykhatky-Stepove-Lobkove-Mali Shcherbaky-Mala
Tokmachka line (a frontage of roughly 40 kilometers) south and southwest of Orikhiv on the evening of
April 16. Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed all three Russian tanks
and 29 armored vehicles and killed or wounded 140 Russian soldiers. Geolocated footage of the assault
indicates that Russian forces advanced along the T-0515 Orikhiv-Polohy highway south of Mala Tokmachka
(southeast of Orikhiv). ISW has not observed any other geolocated footage as of this writing to indicate
any further advances along the wide front of attack. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson
Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Russian forces conducted a similar assault in western Zaporizhia
Oblast on April 13 — likely in reference to a recent Russian reinforced company-sized mechanized assault
in the Zaporizhia direction. Voloshyn reported that Russian forces spent months preparing for these
assaults and have concentrated additional assault groups for possible future assaults. Ukrainian
officials have warned of the possibility of intensified Russian offensive operations in western
Zaporizhia Oblast since November 2024.
Russian forces fighting in Ukraine since 2023 do not
usually conduct mechanized assaults spread out across a wide front. Russian forces typically conduct
mechanized assaults in singular frontal assaults in narrower and more limited areas, likely intending to
break through Ukrainian defenses with a greater concentration of forces in a single area, or as part of
turning movements to outflank and envelop Ukrainian positions. The tactical objective of this
battalion-sized attack remains unclear, and the available footage and Ukrainian reporting indicates that
Ukrainian forces defeated the attack. Russian forces may have intended for the April 16 mechanized
assault to probe Ukrainian defenses to gauge the Ukrainian reaction and to detect possible weak points in
Ukrainian positions ahead of future, more concentrated assaults. Elements of the 58th CAA may have been
testing a different tactic, alternatively. ISW has not observed evidence to suggest that Russian forces
elsewhere along the frontline recently have implemented similar mechanized assault tactics. The decision
to dedicate roughly a battalion's worth of armored vehicles to a broad mechanized assault with likely
minimal gains is notable given Russia's extensive armored vehicle losses in the war, dwindling Soviet-era
armored vehicle stockpiles, and limited capacity to produce, refurbish, and repair armored vehicles.
Russian forces continue to intensify their usage of armored vehicles across the frontline amid
continued negotiations to end the war. Commander of the Ukrainian National Guard, Brigadier General
Oleksandr Pivnenko, reported on April 17 that Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced company-sized
mechanized assault in the Pokrovsk direction and that preliminary information confirms that Ukrainian
forces destroyed 21 armored fighting vehicles, two other vehicles, and 96 motorcycles and killed and
wounded over 240 Russian soldiers. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on the evening of April
17 that Russian forces launched an attack in the Pokrovsk direction and that Ukrainian forces destroyed
the entire Russian grouping consisting of 115 pieces of equipment (likely including armored vehicles,
other vehicles, and motorcycles), killed 200 Russian soldiers, and wounded 30 more. ISW has recently
observed an increase in Russia's use of armored vehicles throughout the theater after mainly relegating
armored vehicles to fire support roles and relying on infantry assaults to advance in late 2024 and early
2025. This intensification may be related to changing weather conditions and hardening terrain as Ukraine
is coming out of its muddy rasputitsa season, the spring period in which melting frozen winter ground and
spring rains degrade conditions for mechanized movement. This intensification may also be related to the
Kremlin's continued insistence that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts
to Russia and that the four oblasts be recognized as Russian territory.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's non-negotiable
demands for extensive territorial concessions from Ukraine while noting that ongoing peace negotiations
are unlikely to achieve results quickly.
• Russian forces recently conducted a roughly
battalion-sized mechanized assault across a wide front in western Zaporizhia Oblast, representing an
inflection in recently observed Russian mechanized assault tactics.
• The Kremlin is adopting
increasingly threatening rhetoric towards Europe aimed at preventing Europe from supporting Ukraine and
defending itself.
• Russia is increasingly adapting its drones to facilitate chemical weapons
strikes against the frontline and rear areas of Ukraine — in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that
the United States and Ukraine are making progress towards signing a bilateral mineral deal. • European countries continue to increase their domestic defense production, including in support of
Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced
in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka and in western
Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya reiterated Russian President
Vladimir Putin's rejection of a general ceasefire in Ukraine. Nebenzya claimed on April 18 that
discussing a general ceasefire in Ukraine is "unrealistic" and accused Ukraine of not observing the
temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure over the last month. Putin
rejected the joint US-Ukrainian 30-day full ceasefire proposal during a phone call with US President
Donald Trump on March 18, and senior Russian officials have reiterated Putin's rejection since then,
attempting to deflect blame onto Ukraine and extract additional bilateral concessions from the United
States. ISW previously noted that any future general ceasefire agreement must include robust monitoring
mechanisms, given the Kremlin's efforts to claim that Ukraine was violating the temporary strikes
ceasefire without providing evidence, and that it is unclear if Russian officials will accept any
meaningful monitoring mechanisms.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced that the
temporary ceasefire on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure ended on April 18. Peskov
responded to a question about whether Russia will resume strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities and
claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin has not issued further instructions. Russian officials have
not expressed any interest in extending the temporary strikes ceasefire and the actual terms of the
ceasefire remain unclear due to the lack of formal, publicly available, joint ceasefire documents.
Russian officials accused Ukraine of violating the temporary strikes ceasefire almost daily over the last
month, but provided no evidence for most of these accusations.
ISW previously assessed that
Russia may intensify its long-range strikes against Ukraine following the end of the strikes moratorium,
and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned at an event for Ukrainian energy workers on April 17
that Russia may intensify strikes on Ukraine around Easter (April 20). It remains unclear how the ending
of the temporary strikes ceasefire may impact Russia's nightly strikes against Ukraine, as the specifics
of Putin's previous order to stop strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure also remain unclear. Putin
claimed to have issued an order to the Russian military immediately following his March 18 phone call
with President Trump to stop strikes on energy infrastructure facilities, but Russian officials have
provided no further context about the duration or other specifics of this supposed order.
Kremlin mouthpieces continue to reject all US proposals to end the war in Ukraine that do not concede
to all of Russia's demands for Ukraine, including regime change, demilitarization, and significant
territorial concessions. Russian propagandist and RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan responded on
April 18 to Bloomberg's report that the United States proposed freezing the war on the current
frontlines, leaving occupied Ukraine "under Moscow's control," and taking Ukraine's NATO membership "off
the table" as part of a plan to end the war and claimed that this plan is a "bad deal for Russia."
Simonyan claimed that Russia should reject this plan because the plan does not include terms for
Ukraine's "denazification" or a formal recognition of occupied Ukraine as part of Russia, and
additionally does not include assurances that Europe will not deploy a potential European peacekeeping
contingent to Ukraine. Simonyan also attempted to delegitimize Ukraine and the United States as
negotiating partners and claimed that "there can be no negotiating with the insane" in reference to the
plan and the Ukrainian government. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev urged the
United States to "wash its hands" of the war in Ukraine and let Russia "figure it out faster" in a social
media post on April 18.
Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have
repeatedly stated that they are unwilling to accept any agreement that does not concede to all of
Russia's territorial and political demands for Ukraine. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff
told the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) in an article published on April 17 that Russian President Vladimir
Putin has been "fixated" on territorial concessions during their bilateral meetings, indicating that
Russian officials likely continue to reiterate their territorial and political demands about Ukraine both
in public and in private. Russian officials have noted that Putin remains committed to accomplishing all
his goals in Ukraine, which Putin has explicitly defined in part as the "denazification" and
demilitarization of Ukraine. Russian officials often invoke the term "denazification" to call for regime
change in Ukraine and to demand the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv. ISW
previously noted that Russia demanded in the April 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft agreement that Ukraine
shrink its military beyond pre-2022 levels and commit to never fielding a military capable of defending
the country against future Russian aggression. Putin has also called for Ukraine to concede unoccupied
territory to Russia, and Russian officials appear to be considering these demands as the Kremlin's
standing guidance on negotiations.
Russian officials' continued insistence on these demands
has also set conditions for Russian society to expect these demands to be fulfilled in any conclusion of
the war in Ukraine, and Kremlin mouthpieces stating explicitly that these demands must be met even in a
peace deal favorable to Russia is a reflection of this long-term rhetorical line. ISW continues to assess
that the Kremlin maintains its long-standing goals in Ukraine, and Russian officials continue to indicate
and explicitly state that they are unwilling to compromise on these goals.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya reiterated Russian
President Vladimir Putin's rejection of a general ceasefire in Ukraine.
• Kremlin Spokesperson
Dmitry Peskov announced that the temporary ceasefire on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure
ended on April 18.
• Kremlin mouthpieces continue to reject all US proposals to end the war in
Ukraine that do not concede to all of Russia's demands for Ukraine, including regime change,
demilitarization, and significant territorial concessions.
• Russian officials continue to
reiterate Russian demands for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a
precondition for a peace agreement — a reference to Russia's initial war demands that directly contradict
US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian officials held bilateral talks with US officials and multilateral talks with Coalition of
the Willing partners in Paris, France, on April 16 to 18 regarding peace negotiations.
• Ukrainian officials announced on April 17 that the United States and Ukraine signed a memorandum of
intent to conclude a future bilateral mineral deal and enhance economic cooperation.
• Russian
forces conducted a ballistic missile strike against civilian areas in Kharkiv City on April 18, the
latest in a string of high-casualty Russian strikes against civilian areas in Ukraine in recent weeks.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on April 18 that the People's Republic of
China (PRC) is supplying Russia with weapons and military materials.
• Ukrainian forces
recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk,
Lyman, and Kurakhove.
The snap Russian-proposed Easter truce underscores the necessity that the text of any ceasefire or peace
agreement be publicly available, formally agreed to in advance by all parties, and include robust
monitoring mechanisms. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported at 2000 local time April 20 that
Russian forces in "all main frontline directions" conducted ground attacks and drone and artillery
strikes against Ukrainian forces in violation of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 30-hour unilateral
truce from 1800 Moscow time on April 19 to 0000 Moscow time on April 21. Zelensky also stated on April 20
that Russian forces conducted attacks in the Siversk, Toretsk, and Zaporizhia directions and are
conducting offensive operations most intensely in the Pokrovsk direction. Zelensky’s statement from 1600
local time April 20 also reported Russian truce violations in Kursk Oblast, although Zelensky stated
earlier at 0000 local time April 20 that Putin did not extend the truce to Kursk or Belgorod oblasts.
Zelensky reiterated that an effective ceasefire agreement must provide monitoring mechanisms of potential
violations and that Ukrainian forces will respond "symmetrically" to Russian assaults. The Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 20 that Russian forces had "strictly" observed the truce and
claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted drone and artillery strikes against Russian positions and
Russian-occupied settlements since the truce began. Ukrainian and Russian sources noted that fighting
abated but did not fully cease in some directions, including the Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Toretsk
directions, and that fighting in other directions temporarily ceased around 1800 on April 19 but has
since resumed with variable frequency and intensity. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management
(FIRMS) data shows satellite-detected heat anomalies along the frontline on April 20 that may suggest
military activity, but ISW is unable to independently verify the specific reports of violations made by
Russian or Ukrainian sources.
Zelensky reported that Russian forces did not conduct long-range
strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 19 to 20 and during the day on April 20 and proposed a
temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure. Zelensky stated that Ukraine
and Russia achieved a long-range strikes ceasefire between April 19 and 20 and during the day on April 20
and such a ceasefire is the easiest to extend. Zelensky proposed a temporary ceasefire on long-range
missile and drone strikes against civilian infrastructure for a minimum of 30 days, with the opportunity
to extend the ceasefire beyond 30 days. Russia and Ukraine repeatedly accused each other of violating the
temporary energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire, but Putin and other senior Russian officials have
repeatedly rejected the March 13 joint US-Ukrainian 30-day full ceasefire proposal over the last five
weeks. A temporary civilian infrastructure strikes ceasefire agreement — and especially a general
ceasefire agreement — would require robust monitoring mechanisms, public and formal terms, and a clearly
defined time frame. The Kremlin may continue to leverage any vague future ceasefire agreements to
obfuscate Russia's rejection of US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals and to accuse Ukraine of violating
such ceasefire terms.
Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Russia's systematic
persecution of religious communities throughout occupied Ukraine, including against Christians. Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on April 20 that Russian forces have killed or tortured 67
Ukrainian priests, pastors, and monks and destroyed 640 religious sites, most of which are Christian
sites, since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. ISW has previously reported on Russia's
religious oppression in occupied Ukraine, including arbitrary detention and assassinations of Ukrainian
clergy or religious leaders and the looting, desecration, and deliberate destruction of places of
worship. ISW has also reported at length on Russia's systematic repression of Orthodox Church of Ukraine
and other religious minorities, particularly Ukrainian Protestants and Baptists, who have faced Russian
brutality and other repressions throughout Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
• The snap
Russian-proposed Easter truce underscores the necessity that the text of any ceasefire or peace agreement
be publicly available, formally agreed to in advance by all parties, and include robust monitoring
mechanisms.
• Zelensky reported that Russian forces did not conduct long-range strikes against
Ukraine on the night of April 19 to 20 and during the day on April 20 and proposed a temporary moratorium
on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure.
• Ukrainian officials continue to
highlight Russia's systematic persecution of religious communities throughout occupied Ukraine, including
against Christians.
• The Kremlin continues to repurpose narratives that Russian officials
have repeatedly used to justify Russia's invasions of Ukraine in an effort to further militarize Russian
society in the long term, likely in preparation for a potential future protracted conflict with NATO.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk before the start of the
Easter truce.
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