The Financial Times (FT) published an investigation on February 20 supporting ISW's long-held assessment
that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute
Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law. The FT investigation provided
additional details and analysis following a significant increase in the number of credible reports of
Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs in 2024 compared to the first two years of the war. FT and
experts from the Center for Information Resilience analyzed footage of the executions and used the
soldiers' uniforms to confirm that Russian forces were conducting the executions. FT conducted an
investigation into footage of a Russian soldier shooting six unarmed Ukrainian POWs and identified the
possible perpetrator as a soldier in a "Storm" penal detachment of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd
Combined Arms Army , Central Military District ), but noted that the situation warrants further
investigation to confirm this soldier's involvement. FT reported that the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade
has been fighting near Pokrovsk since Fall 2024, which is consistent with ISW's observations. FT noted
that Ukrainian frontline units are often the primary source of execution reports and drone footage of
executions. FT noted, however, that tracking these executions is challenging because the Ukrainian units
do not always relay reports of Ukrainian POW executions to their commanders. FT noted that Ukrainian
prosecutors sometimes find out about the executions based on footage published online. FT interviewed the
cofounders of a project reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence who stated that many
Ukrainian units do not publish information about executions "because it has become routine" and that
there are likely hundreds of instances of POW executions beyond the "dozens" recorded so far.
FT's investigation suggests that more senior Russian commanders may also be complicit in issuing orders
to execute Ukrainian POWs. Ukrainian officials opened investigations into 43 executions with 109 victims
in 2024, and FT analyzed footage of 30 of these instances with 133 victims. The FT investigation found
that Russian forces across the frontline — particularly in eastern Ukraine and Zaporizhia Oblast - are
executing Ukrainian POWs, not just a few isolated "rogue units." Global Rights Compliance
President Wayne Jordash, who is assisting Ukrainian investigations into POW executions, told the FT that
Russia is pursuing a "strategy of criminality" in Ukraine, including by torturing, sexually assaulting,
and otherwise abusing residents in occupied Ukraine, and that the POW executions are also part of this
criminality campaign. Jordash stated that Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs function to degrade
Ukraine's military and security apparatus, leaving Ukraine more vulnerable to aggression.
Jordash noted that international law states that individuals who fail to prevent war crimes are also
culpable for said war crimes and that government officials calling for POW executions are violating
international law. Jordash mentioned specific instances of senior Russian leaders, including Security
Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev and Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, explicitly calling
for Russian forces to execute Ukrainian POWs. Jordash highlighted that Russian President Vladimir Putin
praised the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) for its actions in combat, which is
notable because the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade is has been linked to the beheading of Ukrainian POWs
and execution of Ukrainian drone operators in October 2024. Forbes attributed beheadings of Ukrainian
POWs in August 2024 and summary executions in October 2024 in Kursk Oblast to the 155th Naval Infantry
Brigade. Putin awarded the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade the "Guards" honorific title in July 2024. FT
reported that Putin held highly publicized meetings with two unspecified participants of the Kremlin's
"Time of Heroes" veterans program who reportedly executed POWs near Robotyne, Zaporizhia Oblast in May
2024. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) recently reported that there is a culture of torture and abuse of
Ukrainian POWs detained in Russian penal colonies, and taken together these reports suggest that Russian
decisionmakers in higher echelons of the chain of command may be implicitly encouraging, explicitly
ordering, or failing to stop Russian executions and other abuses of Ukrainian POWs in a system that seems
to incentivize such abuses.
Key Takeaways:
• The Financial Times (FT)
published an investigation on February 20 supporting ISW's long-held assessment that Russian military
commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of
war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.
• FT's investigation suggests that more
senior Russian commanders may also be complicit in issuing orders to execute Ukrainian POWs.
• Senior Ukrainian intelligence officials reported that North Korean forces are conducting joint
operations with Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and are gaining new combat capabilities.
• US
Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky in Kyiv on February 20.
• The Kremlin is likely attempting to portray the People's
Republic of China (PRC) as more aligned with its stance on the war in Ukraine than the PRC is willing to
publicly message.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces
recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia is reportedly increasing its
production of glide bombs and modernizing its cruise missiles.
Russian state media and Kremlin officials appear to be leveraging select statements from US officials
alongside long-standing Russian narratives to create tension between the United States and Ukraine and
undermine faith in America's commitment to Ukraine. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate
(GUR) reported on February 21 that the Kremlin has ordered Russian state media personalities and other
prominent voices in the Russian information space to intensify narratives aimed at creating discord in
Ukrainian society and discrediting Ukraine among Western allies. The GUR stated that Russian actors
intend to amplify narratives falsely alleging that the West has "betrayed" Ukraine, the United States is
not concerned about Europe's and Ukraine's opinions, the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, the
Ukrainian military is losing on the frontline, and "corrupt people" are stealing billions of dollars of
US aid from Ukraine. The GUR reported that the Kremlin is also preparing to declare "victory" over
Ukraine and possibly over NATO on the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion – February 24,
2025.
ISW has recently observed Kremlin officials and prominent voices in the Russian
information space amplifying these narratives and other select statements from US officials aimed at
sowing discord between Ukraine and its allies. ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir
Putin's theory of victory is built on the assumption that Russia can outlast Western support for Ukraine
and that Putin is thus attempting to bring about the cessation of Western and particularly US support for
Ukraine. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported that Russian actors also intend to incite protests in
Ukraine via social media posts on February 24, 2025, and will offer to pay protestors if they attend
rallies in Ukraine. The SBU asked Ukrainian citizens to be cautious of Russian efforts to manipulate
Ukraine's information space ahead of the third anniversary of the war.
US officials continue
to reiterate their support for Ukraine and a lasting and just resolution of the war. US Secretary of
State Marco Rubio stated on February 20 that the United States used the recent bilateral meeting with
Russian officials in Saudi Arabia to gauge Russia's interest in good faith peace negotiations and to open
a communication channel between the two countries. Rubio emphasized on February 18 that a war can only
end when "everyone involved" in the war — which Rubio explicitly defined as including Ukraine, Russia,
and US partners in Europe — is "okay with" and accepts the end agreement. Rubio reiterated on February 16
that Trump wants to see the war end in a way that "protects Ukraine's sovereignty," and US Special
Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated on February 15 that Russia must make
territorial concessions during negotiations.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian state media
and Kremlin officials appear to be leveraging select statements from US officials alongside long-standing
Russian narratives to create tension between the United States and Ukraine and undermine faith in
America's commitment to Ukraine.
• US officials continue to reiterate their support for
Ukraine and a lasting and just resolution of the war.
• Russian forces recently eliminated the
Ukrainian pocket west of Kurakhove amid continued reports that the Russian military is redeploying
elements of the Russian Southern Military District's (SMD) 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) from the
Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction.
• Russian forces are attempting to leverage the
seizure of Velyka Novosilka to advance further north of the settlement toward the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk
Oblast administrative border.
• Ukrainian officials continue to highlight the growth of
Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) through significant expansion in the domestic production of key
military equipment.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF)
Commander Sergei Pinchuk to the rank of Admiral and Eastern Group of Forces Commander Andrei Ivanayev to
the rank of Colonel General on February 21.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove
and Velyka Novosilka and in Kursk Oblast.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is
reportedly falsely designating former penal recruits as having abandoned their units without
authorization (SOCH) to avoid paying them amid continued indicators that Russian authorities are
concerned about the war's strain on the Russian economy.
• Zelensky does not imminently risk losing all of
Ukraine. • Most Ukrainian cities have not been destroyed. • Ukrainian law prohibits holding
elections in wartime (unlike the US Constitution, which requires it). • Ukraine has not
suffered millions of losses. • Europe provides about as much direct aid to Ukraine as the United
States. • European loans to Ukraine are backed by income from frozen Russian assets, not
Ukraine. • Ukraine did not misuse or lose half of the aid the United States has provided. •
Ukraine repeatedly invited Putin to negotiate in early 2022.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on February 22 that US and Russian officials are
planning to meet within the next two weeks in an unspecified third country about bilateral relations.
Ryabkov claimed that the United States and Russia are undertaking two "parallel" but "politically
interconnected" negotiation tracks that will discuss the war in Ukraine and US-Russian bilateral
relations. Ryabkov added that Russia is prioritizing its demand for the United States to return six
Russian diplomatic properties, likely referring to properties US authorities previously seized on charges
of being used for intelligence purposes. Ryabkov also stated that the United States and Russian
delegations may discuss other international topics such as arms control and the situation in the Middle
East. US and Russian officials met in Saudi Arabia for bilateral talks about the war in Ukraine on
February 18.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov
claimed on February 22 that US and Russian officials are planning to meet within the next two weeks in an
unspecified third country about bilateral relations.
• Russian forces recently advanced in
Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Russian forces continue
to deploy wounded and medically unfit soldiers to the frontline in an effort to address personnel
shortages.
US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff referred to the early 2022 Istanbul protocols as
offering "guideposts" for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on February 23. An agreement based on
those protocols would be a capitulation document. Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior
Russian officials have repeatedly identified the 2022 peace negotiations in Istanbul as their ideal
framework for future peace negotiations to end Putin's war in Ukraine, as such a framework would force
the West to concede to all of Russia's long-standing demands. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New
York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that both publications obtained several versions of the
draft treaties from the March and April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul that
indicate that both sides initially agreed that Ukraine would forgo its NATO membership aspirations and be
a "permanently neutral state that doesn't participate in military blocs." The draft treaties also
reportedly banned Ukraine from receiving any foreign weapons or hosting any foreign military personnel.
The WSJ and NYT reported that Russia pushed for the Ukrainian military to be limited to 85,000 soldiers,
342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems. Russia also reportedly demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited
to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical
systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes. The draft treaties reportedly listed the
United States, United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Russia as
guarantors of the treaty, and Russia reportedly wanted to include Belarus as a guarantor. The guarantor
states were supposed to “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent
neutrality ," including military aid agreements. The draft treaties did not specify if other
non-guarantor states would have to terminate their agreements with Ukraine as well, although this is
likely considering that the treaty would ban Ukraine from having any foreign-supplied weapons. Russia
insisted on these terms in the first and second months of the war when Russian troops were advancing on
Kyiv City and throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine and before Ukrainian forces
conducted successful counteroffensives that liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and
Kherson oblasts.
Ukraine is unlikely to accept any peace agreement based on the Istanbul
negotiations as such terms are effectively a full Ukrainian surrender to Russia's long-term war goals.
The Istanbul negotiations effectively conceded to Russia's long-standing demands to "denazify" —
overthrow and replace the democratically elected Ukrainian government and install a pro-Russian puppet
state — and "demilitarize" — constrain and shrink the Ukrainian military beyond the point of being able
to defend itself against future Russian aggression — Ukraine. The Istanbul negotiations also conceded to
Russia's demands that Ukraine abandon its aspirations to join NATO or any other security blocs in the
future. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky walked away from the Istanbul negotiations with the
backing of Europe and the United States in 2022 and will almost certainly reject such terms in 2025.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his commitment to preserving
Ukraine's democracy and a just resolution to the war. Zelensky responded to a hypothetical question
during the "Ukraine. Year 2025" Forum on February 23 about stepping down as president and stated that he
is ready to step down in the event of or to facilitate peace or immediate NATO membership for Ukraine.
Zelensky noted that he remains committed to holding elections after the war ends and has no interest in
being in power "for a decade" and reiterated that Ukraine cannot hold elections until after Russia stops
attacking Ukraine and after Ukraine lifts martial law. The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government
from holding elections or amending the Ukrainian constitution in times of martial law, and the Ukrainian
government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine. Zelensky has
repeatedly noted Ukraine's commitment to holding fair and democratic elections in the future.
Key Takeaways:
• US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff referred to the early
2022 Istanbul protocols as offering "guideposts" for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on February
23. An agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document.
• Ukraine is
unlikely to accept any peace agreement based on the Istanbul negotiations as such terms are effectively a
full Ukrainian surrender to Russia's long-term war goals.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky continues to demonstrate his commitment to preserving Ukraine's democracy and a just resolution
to the war.
• Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's domestic defense industry
and domestically produced strike capabilities.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed
Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev as Special Presidential Representative for
Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries on February 23.
• Russian forces
launched a record number of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 22 to 23, ahead of the
third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24.
• Russia appears
to be relying more on Iran and North Korea to support its war in Ukraine.
• Russian forces
continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk,
Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• The Russian government continues efforts to increase its
defense industrial output.
Russia dedicated staggering
amounts of manpower and equipment to several major offensive efforts in Ukraine in 2024, intending to
degrade Ukrainian defenses and seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. These Russian efforts
included major operations in the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast area, Avdiivka, Chasiv Yar, northern Kharkiv
Oblast, Toretsk, Marinka-Kurakhove, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar-Velyka Novosilka. Russia has achieved
relatively faster gains in 2024 than throughout most of the war after the initial invasion and developed
a blueprint for conducting slow, tactical envelopments to achieve these advances, but Russian forces have
failed to restore the operational maneuver necessary to achieve operationally significant gains rapidly.
Russia has thus paid an exorbitant price in manpower and equipment losses that Russia cannot sustain in
the medium term for very limited gains.
Russian losses in massive efforts that have failed to
break Ukrainian lines or even drive them back very far are exacerbating challenges that Russia will face
in sustaining the war effort through 2025 and 2026, as ISW's Christina Harward has recently reported.
Russia likely cannot sustain continued efforts along these lines indefinitely without a major
mobilization effort that Russian President Vladimir Putin has so far refused to order. Ukraine, on the
other hand, has shown its ability to fight off massive and determined Russian offensive efforts even
during periods of restricted Western aid. The effective failure of these major and costly Russian
offensive operations highlights the opportunities Ukraine has to inflict more serious battlefield defeats
on Russia that could compel Putin to rethink his approach to the war and to negotiations if the United
States and the West continue to provide essential support.
>Russian losses in massive efforts that
have failed to break >Ukrainian lines or even drive them back very far are >exacerbating
challenges that Russia will face in sustaining >the war effort through 2025 and 2026, as ISW's
Christina >Harward has recently reported. Russia likely cannot sustain >continued efforts
along these lines indefinitely without a >major mobilization effort that Russian President
Vladimir >Putin has so far refused to order. Ukraine, on the other hand, >has shown its
ability to fight off massive and determined >Russian offensive efforts even during periods of
restricted >Western aid. The effective failure of these major and costly >Russian
offensive operations highlights the opportunities >Ukraine has to inflict more serious
battlefield defeats on >Russia that could compel Putin to rethink his approach to the >war and to negotiations if the United States and the West >continue to provide essential
support. > >Institute for the Study of War > >https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine
Denke ein Punkt der zu selten erwähnt wird (auch bei Reisner kaum). Wenn man sich die
Gebietsgewinne ansieht und dazu in Relation ihre Verluste ist das eine ganz miese Performance der
Russen. In manchen Bereichen (bspw. Panzermodelle) haben sie 80% ihres Equipments versenkt. Somit
sehr beachtlich die Perf. der Ukraine
Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago on
February 24, 2022. Ukraine has not been defeated or destroyed but remains resilient and innovative in the
face of this unjustified Russian aggression. Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in a
failed attempt to seize Kyiv City, overthrow Ukraine's democratically elected government, and forcibly
install a pro-Russian proxy government in three days. Ukrainian forces, supported by a coalition of
allies including the United States and European partners, have since successfully pushed Russian forces
out of northern Ukraine and liberated significant territory in southern and northeastern Ukraine.
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksander Syrskyi reported on February 24 that Ukrainian forces
have regained more than 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces have occupied since February 24,
2022. ISW has observed confirmation that Ukrainian forces have regained 50.03 percent of the territory
that Russian forces had seized since February 24, 2022. Russian forces have spent the last year making
slow and incremental but steady advances in eastern Ukraine as a result of significant Russian manpower
and materiel advantages and Russia's ability to leverage delays in Western aid to Ukraine. Ukrainian
forces are using their technological advantages and integrating technological innovations with ground
operations in order to slow Russian gains. Ukraine continues to improve and innovate its warfighting
capabilities and is working to become self-sufficient in the long-term, but Western and international
military support for Ukraine in the short- and medium-term remains crucial for Ukraine's ability to
defend against Russian aggression. The defense of Ukraine and the preservation of Ukraine as an
independent, sovereign, and democratic country capable of defending itself against Russia is a critical
part of deterring broader Russian aggression against the West. The United States, Europe, and other
Western allies must demonstrate commitment to Ukraine through timely and reliable military assistance,
continue to enable Ukrainian forces to impose significant pressure on Russia, and force Putin to abandon
his conquest of Ukraine and his wider ambitions in Europe in order to bring about sustainable peace.
Russia has accumulated unsustainable personnel and vehicle losses in the last three years since
Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksander
Syrskyi reported on February 24 that Russian forces have lost over 10,100 tanks, 21,100 armored combat
vehicles, and 23,300 artillery systems presumably destroyed and damaged in the three years of Russia's
full-scale invasion. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) recently estimated
that Russia had lost about 14,000 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers since
February 2022. (IISS's numbers likely differ from those from Syrskyi as IISS data likely only accounts
for destroyed vehicles.) Syrskyi stated on February 24 that Russian forces have lost almost 870,000
personnel, including about 250,000 dead. Russian opposition outlets Meduza and Mediazona published a
joint report on February 24 wherein they used the Russian Register of Inheritance Cases (RND) to estimate
that at least 160,000 to 165,000 Russian servicemembers have died in the past three years of the war.
Syrskyi previously reported that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 alone, and
Meduza and Mediazone estimated in February 2024 that Russia had lost at least 66,000 to 88,000 personnel
during the first two years of the war — suggesting that Russian loses significantly increased in 2024.
ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have suffered vehicle and artillery system losses on the
battlefield that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term given the limitations of Russia's defense
industrial capacity and Soviet-era weapons and equipment stocks, and that Russia's force generation
apparatus is struggling to recruit enough soldiers to sustain Russia's current rate of offensive
operations and loss rates.
The United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a Ukrainian- and
European-backed resolution on February 24 commemorating the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale
invasion of Ukraine that recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war, called for a just peace in
Ukraine, and supported Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The United States, Russia,
Belarus, North Korea, and 14 other countries voted against the Ukrainian- and European-backed resolution,
while 93 countries supported it. The People’s Republic of China and Iran abstained. The United States
also abstained from a second resolution about the third anniversary of the war that it had proposed after
European countries amended the resolution to add language supporting Ukraine's "sovereignty,
independence, unity, and territorial integrity." The US-backed draft resolution — prior to the European
amendments — reportedly did not acknowledge Russia's role as the aggressor and referred to Russia's war
against Ukraine as the "Russian Federation-Ukraine conflict."
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years
ago on February 24, 2022. Ukraine has not been defeated or destroyed but remains resilient and innovative
in the face of this unjustified Russian aggression.
• Russia has accumulated unsustainable
personnel and vehicles losses in the last three years since Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24,
2022.
• The United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a Ukrainian- and European-backed
resolution on February 24 commemorating the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine
that recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war, called for a just peace in Ukraine, and supported
Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
• Recent polling indicates that Russians are
increasingly supportive of Russia continuing the war in Ukraine until it achieves complete Ukrainian
capitulation but are simultaneously starting to feel the economic toll of the three years of Russia's war
– casting doubt on Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to continue to balance "butter and guns" at
home in the medium- to long-term.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin currently remains
committed to continuing his war in Ukraine despite rising domestic political and economic pressure and
has shown no indication that he is rethinking his determination to compel Ukraine to surrender.
• Kremlin officials formally rejected the possibility of a ceasefire on any terms other than the
complete capitulation of Ukraine and the West on February 24, further underscoring Russia's unwillingness
to make compromises during future peace negotiations.
• European leaders announced a series of
new aid packages during their visit to Kyiv on February 24 for the third anniversary of the full-scale
invasion on February 24.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv
Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• The Kremlin continues to use Muslim religious and
cultural structures in Russia for military recruitment.
Russian President Vladimir Putin implicitly acknowledged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the
legitimate president of Ukraine and Russia's future negotiating partner while promoting a new information
operation that aims to destabilize Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian military from within. Putin gave
an interview with Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on February 24 in which Putin stated that "elections
in Ukraine are not held under the pretext of martial law" — Putin's first acknowledgment that Ukrainian
law prohibits elections during martial law. Putin claimed that Zelensky is "toxic" for Ukrainian society
and the Ukrainian military and that Zelensky would lose any future presidential election to other
Ukrainian political and military leaders. Putin's statements are likely aimed at Ukrainian and Russian
audiences. Putin's claims that Zelensky is unpopular and harmful to Ukraine are attempts to drive a wedge
between the legitimate government of Ukraine and the Ukrainian military and population. Putin has
repeatedly claimed that Zelensky is not the legitimate leader of Ukraine after Ukraine did not hold
elections in 2024 — in accordance with Ukrainian law — as part of Russian efforts to claim that Russia
cannot negotiate with Zelensky. US President Donald Trump has stated that Putin and Zelensky must engage
in negotiations, and Putin is likely shifting his rhetoric in order to explain to Russian domestic
audiences his decision to engage in any future negotiations with Zelensky. Putin and other Kremlin
officials will likely attempt to exploit any Ukrainian military setbacks or differing opinions among
Ukrainian officials to intensify this information operation and sow discord in Ukraine.
Putin
attempted to use new language to repackage the calls for regime change in Ukraine that he has demanded
since 2021. Putin stated during the interview with Zarubin that Russia "has nothing against" the
preservation of Ukrainian statehood but wants Ukraine to "turn into a friendly neighboring state" and for
Ukrainian territory to "not be used as a springboard for an attack against Russia" in the future. Putin's
calls for Ukraine to "turn" into a "friendly" state demonstrate that Putin is still calling for the
removal of the democratically elected government in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Kremlin
government. The Kremlin has previously used thinly veiled calls for "denazification" to demand regime
change in Ukraine, and Putin appears to be using new language to make these same demands. Putin has
demanded Ukrainian regime change since Summer 2021.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian
President Vladimir Putin implicitly acknowledged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate
president of Ukraine and Russia's future negotiating partner while promoting a new information operation
that aims to destabilize Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian military from within.
• Putin
attempted to use new language to repackage the calls for regime change in Ukraine that he has demanded
since 2021.
• Putin offered to make a deal with the United States on Russian rare earth
minerals as part of efforts to outbid Ukraine on this matter and to push the United States to accept
Russian offers of economic measures in lieu of any actual Russian concessions on Ukraine.
• Putin attempted to claim that he supports Europe's participation in negotiations on Ukraine while
continuing to show his unwillingness to make concessions and seemingly proposing Russian allies as
possible future negotiating parties.
• Kremlin officials continue to exploit diplomatic
engagements with Russia's allies to reinforce Moscow's narrative that Russia invaded Ukraine to protect
Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.
• A delegation from North Korea's Workers' Party of
Korea (WPK) arrived in Moscow on February 25 at the invitation of Russia's ruling party, United Russia,
amid reports that North Korea may be shipping more material to Russia.
• Western officials
continue to highlight the scale of European military aid to Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently
advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Velyka Novosilka, and Ukrainian forces recently
advanced near Kupyansk.
• Samara Oblast authorities reduced one-time payments to soldiers who
sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) after temporarily increasing
these payments in January 2025.
• The BBC Russian Service reported on February 25 that over
100 Russian government, military, and security officials accused and convicted of various corruption
charges are fighting in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to use its "Time of Heroes"
program, which places veterans of the war in Ukraine in government positions, to form a new Russian elite
composed of loyal and ultranationalist veterans that will continue to militarize Russian society over the
long term.
• Russia may be reopening a Soviet-era submarine base in occupied Crimea.
US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky are planning to meet at the White
House on February 28, likely to sign a US-Ukraine mineral deal. A draft agreement of the deal published
ahead of the meeting does not provide US security assistance or security guarantees to Ukraine, however.
The Financial Times (FT) published a draft bilateral US-Ukrainian deal on February 26 that states that
the United States wants to "invest alongside Ukraine in a free, sovereign and secure Ukraine" and
supports "Ukraine’s efforts to obtain security guarantees needed to establish lasting peace" but does not
include any concrete US provisions of security assistance or guarantees to Ukraine. Continued US security
assistance to Ukraine is essential to help Ukraine set conditions for a lasting and just resolution of
the war that is in the interests of Ukraine, the United States, and Europe.
Russian officials
directly involved in negotiations with the United States continue to insist that any peace agreement to
resolve the war in Ukraine must be based on Russia’s 2021 demands. They also insist on the surrender to
Russia of territory that Ukrainian forces currently hold that is home to major cities and well over a
million people. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who recently led the Russian delegation at the
February 18 US-Russian negotiations in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, claimed on February 26 that negotiations
that result in freezing the current frontlines in Ukraine are impossible because the Russian Constitution
stipulates that Russia’s borders include all of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia
oblasts. Russia currently does not occupy large parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts and a
small part of western Luhansk Oblast. Lavrov also stated that Russia will reject any peace deal that
involves continued Western arms provisions to Ukraine. Lavrov is repackaging the maximalist demands
Russia has long made of Ukraine using a pseudo-legal facade, despite the illegitimacy of Russian
annexations of Ukrainian territory under international law. Lavrov likely attempted to justify Russia's
long-standing demands by framing the Russian Constitution as a legal and hence “necessary” element in
future negotiations with the United States. Russian officials have previously invoked “denazification,”
the alleged Ukrainian violations of Russian-speaking minorities’ rights, and the false historical
narrative that Ukraine is inherently part of Russia to justify their territorial claims against Ukraine
and to call for full Ukrainian capitulation.
Russia is demanding that Ukraine surrender
several large cities that Russian forces do not currently occupy and have no prospect of seizing, handing
over one million Ukrainians over to Russia. Russia’s occupation of the remainder of the four Ukrainian
oblasts would include large cities such as Kherson City (pre-war population of about 275,000), Kramatorsk
(147,00 people), and Zaporizhzhia City (706,000 people) — all of which remain under Ukrainian control.
The Russian occupation of such large population centers would significantly escalate the humanitarian
catastrophe in Ukraine. Russian authorities would likely employ the same tactics of oppression,
displacement, and forcible assimilation to Ukrainian civilians living in these areas as they have
employed against the millions of Ukrainians who have been living under Russian occupation for over three
years. Russian advances have recently stalled along the frontline, and Russian forces increasingly face
unsustainable vehicle and personnel losses, indicating that Russian forces will likely be unable to
occupy the full extent of these oblasts through military means in any short period of time if at all.
Lavrov’s rhetoric is likely an attempt to achieve through negotiations what the Russian military cannot
achieve by force. The Kremlin’s stated intent of seizing more of Ukraine's land and people directly
contradicts US and European efforts to achieve a sustainable and lasting peace in Ukraine and reinforces
Russia’s continued efforts to illegally occupy Ukrainian territory rather than to negotiate in good faith
or offer concessions.
Key Takeaways:
• US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky are planning to meet at the White House on February 28, likely to sign a
US-Ukraine mineral deal. A draft agreement of the deal published ahead of the meeting does not provide US
security assistance or security guarantees to Ukraine, however.
• Russian officials directly
involved in negotiations with the United States continue to insist that any peace agreement to resolve
the war in Ukraine must be based on Russia’s 2021 demands. They also insist on the surrender to Russia of
territory that Ukrainian forces currently hold that is home to major cities and well over a million
people.
• Russia is demanding that Ukraine surrender several large cities that Russian forces
do not currently occupy and have no prospect of seizing, handing over one million Ukrainians over to
Russia.
• Lavrov's and other Kremlin officials' continued rejections of a ceasefire and other
terms that US President Donald Trump and European leaders have identified as necessary to achieve a
lasting peace in Ukraine demonstrate that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains uninterested in
meaningful negotiations and assesses that he can achieve his war objectives militarily in the medium- to
long-term.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces
recently advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and Robotyne.
• Russian officials proposed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) assume control over all
Russian pretrial detention facilities amid reports that the FSB is in charge of a pretrial detention
facility linked to the abuse of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).
Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian officials continue to reject US negotiating terms and
demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not occupy. Putin stated in his February 27
address to the Federal Security Service (FSB) board that Russia will continue to strengthen FSB
operations in Donbas and "Novorossiya." Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly claimed on February
27 that Donbas and "Novorossiya" are an "integral" part of Russia. Putin and other Russian officials have
previously defined "Novorossiya" as all of eastern and southern Ukraine (including Kharkiv,
Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts), although its precise borders are disputed among Russian
ultranationalists. Putin has previously demanded that Ukraine surrender all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson,
and Zaporizhia oblasts even though Russian forces do not occupy large parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and
Zaporizhia oblasts. Putin and other Russian officials have routinely indicated that they aim for
territorial conquest beyond the administrative boundaries of these four illegally annexed oblasts.
Renewed official Russian statements that the invented region of "Novorossiya" is part of Russia indicate
that Putin maintains his maximalist territorial ambitions and is unwilling to offer territorial
concessions. Russian forces currently occupy a small portion of Kharkiv Oblast and the Kinburn Spit in
Mykolaiv Oblast and are attempting to advance to the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border, and the Kremlin may
use the Russian occupation of limited territory in these oblasts as a false premise to demand that
Ukraine surrender even more territory. ISW continues to assess that Putin remains uninterested in
good-faith negotiations that require compromises and thinks that he can achieve his war objectives
militarily in the medium- to long-term. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 26 that if
Russia is "making maximalist demands that knowscan’t be met," then the United States will know
that Putin is not "serious" about engaging in negotiations. US President Donald Trump reiterated on
February 26 that Russia will have to make concessions in peace negotiations and reiterated on February 27
that the United States will "certainly try to get as much as can back ."
Kremlin guidelines to Russian state media about coverage of recent US–Russian meetings indicate
Russian President Vladimir Putin's determination to manipulate US President Donald Trump and divide the
West. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on February 27 that sources in Russian state media who
are close to the Russian presidential administration stated that the Kremlin has not given "strict"
instructions to media about how to cover recent US–Russian contacts. A source who regularly participates
in Kremlin meetings with major media editors reportedly stated that the Kremlin told media outlets to
emphasize "in every way" that Russia is in contact "not with some abstract Americans, but with Trump's
team" and to demonstrate that Trump is "a man who was oppressed in every way both at home and in Europe."
Multiple sources reportedly told Verstka that they had received instructions to create an image of Trump
as a man who "had the wisdom" to respond to the Kremlin's "outstretched" hand. Putin praised the Trump
administration on February 27, claiming that Russia's first contacts with the administration "inspire
certain hopes" and that the Trump team is displaying a "reciprocal determination" to restore US–Russian
relations. Putin claimed that "ideological cliches" have started to "destroy the Western community ...
from within," as evidenced by alleged problems in Western states' economies and domestic politics. Putin
claimed that "some Western elites" are trying to "maintain instability" in the world and will try to
"disrupt or compromise" the US–Russian dialogue that has begun. Putin's claim that "some Western elites"
— but not the Trump administration — are against US–Russian talks is likely an attempt to drive wedges
between Trump and other US actors and European leaders. The Kremlin has similarly recently framed
European leaders as interested in prolonging the war in Ukraine as part of efforts to falsely portray the
US and European positions on negotiations as significantly different and to discredit any possible
European role in negotiations.
US and Russian delegations met in Istanbul, Turkey on February
27 to continue to discuss US–Russian bilateral diplomatic relations. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov
claimed on February 27 that the Russian delegation in Istanbul is working to develop the agreements
reached during the February 18 US–Russian talks in Saudi Arabia. Kremlin newswire TASS reported that the
bilateral meeting would include discussions on the resumption of the work of the US and Russian embassies
in each state. Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) correspondent Denis
Davydov claimed that Director of the North American Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) Alexander Darchiev headed the Russian delegation in Istanbul. Darchiev served as the Russian
Ambassador to Canada from 2014 to 2021. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported in November 2024 that
three informed sources stated that Darchiev is the most likely candidate to become the new Russian
Ambassador to the United States. Peskov stated in November 2024 that the Kremlin had chosen a candidate
and would announce the appointment "in the foreseeable future." The Russian State Duma reportedly held
closed consultations in November 2024 with Darchiev about the appointments of Russian diplomats abroad.
Reuters reported on February 27 that a US official stated that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Eurasian Affairs Sonata Coulter led the US delegation in Istanbul.
The Kremlin is
reportedly continuing to push the United States to accept economic benefits that are unrelated to the war
in Ukraine in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions that are related to the war. Bloomberg, citing
a source familiar with the topic, reported on February 27 that CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund
(RDIF) and newly appointed Special Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation
with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev — who was part of the Russian delegation during the February 18
US–Russian talks in Saudi Arabia — convinced Putin to seek negotiations with the United States through
business opportunities. The Kremlin reportedly viewed US President Donald Trump's interest in a mineral
deal with Ukraine as a chance to initiate economic cooperation discussions between the United States and
Russia, giving Dmitriev an opportunity to take the lead on such initiatives.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian officials continue to reject US negotiating
terms and demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not occupy.
• Kremlin
guidelines to Russian state media about coverage of recent US–Russian meetings indicate Russian President
Vladimir Putin's determination to manipulate US President Donald Trump and divide the West.
• US and Russian delegations met in Istanbul, Turkey on February 27 to continue to discuss US–Russian
bilateral diplomatic relations.
• The Kremlin is reportedly continuing to push the United
States to accept economic benefits that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine in return for Ukrainian and
Western concessions that are related to the war.
• North Korea reportedly recently deployed
additional troops to Kursk Oblast as North Korea continues to expand its military capabilities through
cooperation with Russia.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and
Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump held a contentious meeting at the
White House on February 28. Zelensky observed that Russia has repeatedly violated previous ceasefire
agreements, as ISW has reported. Zelensky said that Ukraine will not accept a ceasefire agreement with
Russia without sufficient external security guarantees, as such an agreement will fail to preserve
Ukraine's sovereignty and prevent war in Europe in the long-term. Zelensky stated that Russian strikes
have not "completely destroyed" Ukraine and that Ukraine is "alive" and continuing to defend itself
against Russian aggression. Zelensky reiterated that no country wants to end the war more than Ukraine
and that any negotiations to end the war will be between Ukraine and Russia with US and European
mediation efforts. Trump declined to comment on the possibility of future US security guarantees for
Ukraine and US troop deployments to Ukraine. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reportedly told Zelensky to
leave the White House following the meeting, and the White House cancelled the afternoon press conference
and the signing of the US-Ukraine mineral deal. ISW continues to assess that supporting Ukraine is a
vital American national security interest, as is a strong bilateral relationship between the United
States and Ukraine.
Russia continues to showcase its deepening relations with American
adversaries despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's effort to posture Russia's receptiveness to
negotiations with the United States. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu met separately with
People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping and PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on
February 28 to discuss bilateral security issues and international and regional matters. Shoigu and Xi
also underlined the need to continue coordinating efforts at key international platforms including BRICS
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and diplomatic efforts about "solving the Ukrainian
crisis." Shoigu claimed that the Russia-PRC relationship has reached "unprecedented" heights, and Russian
state media highlighted statements from Xi and PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Lin
Jian's praise of close bilateral relations.
Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson and
Chairperson of the ruling United Russia party Dmitry Medvedev met with North Korea's Workers' Party (WPK)
Central Committee member Ri Hi-yong on February 26 in Moscow to express United Russia's desire "for
closer cooperation with the WPK and for expanding contracts and exchanges in all areas." Russian
President Vladimir Putin met with Ri on February 27, but the Kremlin's readout did not provide further
details about the meeting. Representatives of the Kursk Oblast Chamber of Commerce signed a cooperation
agreement with the Pyongyang Chamber of Commerce on February 27 to develop bilateral economic ties and
expand municipal production opportunities between Kursk Oblast and North Korean enterprises. The
agreement also includes trade and economic ties; cooperation in industry, agriculture, and processing;
and joint logistical projects. Russia continues to range itself with adversaries of the United States,
underscoring the importance of strengthening and supporting US allies and partners, including Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump
held a contentious meeting at the White House on February 28.
• Russia continues to showcase
its deepening relations with American adversaries despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's effort to
posture Russia's receptiveness to negotiations with the United States.
• Russia continues to
range itself with adversaries of the United States, underscoring the importance of strengthening and
supporting US allies and partners, including Ukraine.
• Ukrainian officials are increasing
cooperation with South Korea amid deepening Russia-North Korea ties and recent reports of a new wave of
North Korean troop deployments to Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against
near-rear Russian military assets in occupied Ukraine.
• The Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) announced on February 28 that the United States approved current MFA North American
Department Director Alexander Darchiev's appointment as Russia's Ambassador to the United States.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka and in western
Zaporizhia.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin tasked Crimea occupation head Sergey Aksyonov
with establishing a "Kadry" ("Human Resources") national project to integrate Russian veterans into the
Russian economy, likely in support of the Kremlin's efforts to prevent the emergence of subversive
veteran civil societies.
Senior US officials are suggesting that the United States may cut all aid to Ukraine, although US
President Donald Trump has not indicated any such intention. Cutting the current flow of aid to Ukraine
would directly undermine President Trump’s stated goal of achieving a sustainable peace in Ukraine. The
New York Times and Washington Post, citing unnamed senior Trump Administration officials, reported on
February 28 that the Trump Administration is considering canceling all US military assistance to Ukraine,
including any final aid shipments that former US President Joe Biden approved.
Ukrainian
forces, enabled by essential US assistance, are inflicting unsustainable losses on Russian forces while
holding them to marginal gains. This situation, combined with the severe challenges Russia will face in
2025, offers the United States great leverage in peace negotiations. A suspension of ongoing US military
assistance to Ukraine would encourage Russian President Vladimir Putin to continue to increase his
demands and fuel his conviction that he can achieve total victory through war. ISW has repeatedly
highlighted the importance of continued and timely Western military assistance to Ukraine and observed a
correlation between the magnitude of the Russian gains in Ukraine and delays or halts in Western military
support. Ukrainian forces have leveraged US-supplied military systems, including Patriot air defense
systems and HIMARS and ATACMS long-range strike systems, to defend against nightly Russian drone and
missile strikes, enhance Ukraine's strike capabilities, complicate Russian logistics and command and
control (C2), and disrupt Russia's defense industrial base (DIB). Ukrainian efforts, aided by the steady
flow of Western aid, have significantly slowed Russian advances along the front, inflicted significant
Russian personnel and equipment losses, and undermined Russia's efforts to project economic and domestic
stability amid rising pressures from the war. Russia's economic, force generation, and defense industrial
constraints provide key opportunities that Ukraine, the United States, and its Western allies could
leverage to extract concessions from Putin in peace negotiations.
The cessation of US military
assistance and monetary assistance aimed at strengthening Ukraine's defense industry could help tip the
balance of the war and give Russia greater advantages on the battlefield in Ukraine, increasing the
likelihood of a Russian victory in Ukraine. Russia would leverage the cessation of US aid to Ukraine to
seize more territory in Ukraine and attempt to exhaust European support – the approach Putin has outlined
in his theory of victory. Ending US aid to Ukraine and enabling further Russian gains would also embolden
Putin and strengthen his belief that Russia can seize and control Ukraine and other former Soviet
countries, including current NATO member states. The Kremlin will likely intensify its military campaign
in Ukraine and attempt to exploit any delay or cessation of US military assistance to Ukraine - as the
Kremlin did in Spring 2024.
Curtailing aid to Ukraine would risk diminishing US influence in
the world and emboldening US adversaries. Russia, Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China
(PRC) have formed a bloc aimed at defeating the United States and its allies around the world and are
currently testing the limits of US commitment to its allies in Europe, the Middle East, and the
Asia-Pacific region. PRC President Xi Jinping stated during a phone call with Russian President Vladimir
Putin in late February 2025 that the PRC and Russia are "true friends" who "cannot be moved away" from
each other and will not be influenced by "any third party." Russia established bilateral comprehensive
strategic partnership agreements since the start of the war with the PRC in May 2023, North Korea in
October 2024, and Iran in January 2025. Putin continues to rely on Iranian drones and North Korean
ballistic missiles and troops in his war against Ukraine. US aid to Ukraine is a demonstration of the
United States' commitment to defending democracies against ongoing and future aggression around the
world, including but not limited to Ukraine, Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan. The Russia-led bloc will
likely see the United States abandoning Ukraine as an indicator that the United States will abandon its
other allies and will seek to test the limits of US commitment around the world. The Russia-led bloc is
searching for easily exploitable divisions between the United States and its allies to isolate and weaken
the United States on the global stage, allowing adversaries to rise up and dictate where and how the
United States can engage the world. Cutting US aid to Ukraine plays directly into these adversaries'
goals and is a step toward curtailing US influence in the world.
Putin, not Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky, remains the main obstacle to a lasting peace agreement on Ukraine. Zelensky
has continuously reiterated his commitment to obtaining a just and lasting peace in Ukraine through
negotiations. Zelensky has indicated several times — including in his February 28 Fox News interview —
that he is willing to make concessions on territory, Ukraine's NATO membership, and even his own tenure
in office to secure a just and sustainable peace. These concessions align with US Secretary of State
Marco Rubio's February 26 statement that "what Ukraine really needs is deterrence...to make it costly for
anyone to come after them again in the future" and that both the United States and Europe "can be
involved" in such deterrence efforts.
Putin and other senior Kremlin officials have by
contrast continuously reiterated their commitment to Putin's initial war aims in Ukraine, which amount to
Ukraine's full capitulation, replacing the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet
government, and Ukrainian commitments to neutrality and demilitarization — all of which would leave
Ukraine nearly helpless against future Russian aggression and destabilization efforts. Putin and other
Kremlin officials are repackaging these demands in efforts to appear willing to negotiate in good faith
with the United States, likely to extract concessions from the United States regarding Ukraine. Achieving
a meaningful peace in Ukraine will require the United States and its allies to help Ukraine continue to
inflict significant losses on Russia and to undertake a diplomatic and economic pressure campaign aimed
at forcing Putin to abandon his insistence on full Ukrainian surrender and efforts to weaken Europe and
the United States.
Key Takeaways:
• Senior US officials are suggesting that the
United States may cut all aid to Ukraine, although US President Donald Trump has not indicated any such
intention. Cutting the current flow of aid to Ukraine would directly undermine President Trump’s stated
goal of achieving a sustainable peace in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces enabled by essential US
assistance are inflicting unsustainable losses on Russian forces while holding them to marginal gains.
This situation, combined with the severe challenges Russia will face in 2025, offers the US great
leverage in peace negotiations. A suspension of ongoing US military assistance to Ukraine would encourage
Russian President Vladimir Putin to continue to increase his demands and fuel his conviction that he can
achieve total victory through war.
• Curtailing aid to Ukraine would risk diminishing US
influence in the world and emboldening US adversaries.
• Putin, not Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky, remains the main obstacle to a lasting peace agreement on Ukraine.
• The
Kremlin launched another informational effort intended to discourage additional US and European military
assistance to Ukraine by claiming that Russia has won the war in Ukraine.
• European countries
remain committed to supporting the Ukrainian military and defense industry, however, amid preparations
for a European defense summit about Ukraine on March 2.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced
near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka.
• The Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to recruit medically unfit soldiers in an effort to address personnel
shortages.
Recent Russian official statements in response to the proposed US-Ukraine mineral deal indicate that the
Kremlin is trying to sabotage the deal through narratives targeting Ukrainian and American audiences. The
Kremlin is claiming that this mineral deal does not benefit Ukraine while also claiming that Russia can
make a better offer to the United States, indicating that Moscow sees the deal as harmful to its
objectives. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on February 23 to a question about the
US-Ukraine mineral deal and whether US pressure would push Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to
"finally sell out all of Ukraine," including Russia's illegally annexed territories in Ukraine.<1> Peskov
claimed that the people in occupied Ukraine decided "long ago" that they wanted to join Russia so "no one
will ever sell off these territories" — implying that Zelensky may "sell out" other areas of Ukraine.
Russian state television evening news program Vesti claimed on February 24 that the United States is
"blackmailing" Ukraine with the mineral deal.<2> A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on
February 22 that "there is nothing good for Kyiv" in a new version of the US-Ukraine mineral deal.<3> The
milblogger claimed that the mineral deal is "humiliating" for Ukraine and that Zelensky would be "selling
the benefits of his country for nothing" should he sign the deal.
Kremlin officials are also
trying to prevent the United States and Ukraine from concluding a mineral deal by making competing
offers. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed to Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on February 24 that
Russia has an "order of magnitude" more rare earth materials than Ukraine and stated that Russia can
cooperate with both the US government and US companies in capital investment projects for rare earth
materials.<4> Putin referred to mineral reserves both within Russia and within occupied Ukraine in his
attempts to appeal to the United States to invest in "Russian" rare earth minerals (claiming minerals in
occupied Ukraine as Russia's own). Putin also offered to conclude deals with the United States on the
supply of Russian aluminum. CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and newly appointed Special
Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill
Dmitriev told CNN on February 24 that Russia is open to economic cooperation with the United States, that
the first stage of cooperation would be in the energy sphere, and that such cooperation is key for a
"more resilient global economy."<5>
Russian state media is delaying coverage of select Kremlin
statements in order to exploit changing dynamics in the US-Ukrainian relationship and drive wedges
between Ukraine and the United States. Zarubin and Russian state media outlets TASS and RIA Novosti
amplified on March 2 a previous statement from Peskov about the US decision on February 24 to vote
alongside Russia against a Ukrainian- and European-backed UN resolution that recognized Russia as the
aggressor in the war.<6> Peskov claimed on February 26 that the Trump administration is "rapidly
changing" all of its foreign policies in ways that "largely coincide with vision," but TASS,
RIA Novosti, and Zarubin only reported Peskov's statements on March 2.<7> Russian state media headlines
on March 2 deliberately misrepresented Peskov's statements such that they appeared to be in response to
the February 28 meeting between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky.<8>
The Kremlin has a vested interest in preventing the United States and Ukraine
from signing a mineral deal, as the deal will commit the United States to a long-term investment in
Ukraine and Ukraine's sovereignty. The Kremlin is investing significant time and effort into undermining
and misrepresenting the US-Ukrainian mineral deal, indicating that the Kremlin views the deal as an
impediment to accomplishing Russian President Vladimir Putin's objectives in Ukraine.<9> The mineral
deal, even one that does not include text about an American security guarantees for Ukraine, will
represent a long-term US economic investment in Ukraine and could be a building block towards additional
US assistance or military sales to Ukraine in the future, as US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent
observed in an interview to CBS on March 2.<10> Any agreement that ties the United States to an
independent and sovereign Ukraine is contrary to Russia's long-term goals of isolating and conquering
Ukraine. Putin likely assesses that preventing the US-Ukrainian mineral deal is a necessary step towards
pushing the United States into stopping military assistance to Ukraine and abandoning Ukraine altogether.
Putin's articulated theory of victory in Ukraine — which assumes that Russia can continue slow, gradual
advances in exchange for significant personnel and materiel losses — rests on the assumption that Russia
can outlast and overcome US and European security assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainian efforts to mobilize
its economy and population to support its defense.<11> Putin is likely attempting to undermine the
US-Ukrainian mineral deal in order to prevent deepening US-Ukraine ties in the hope that Russia will be
able to destroy or extract significant territorial concessions from Ukraine during future negotiations
before Russia's own wartime economic and force generation issues begin to significantly impede Russia
ability to advance on the battlefield in 2025 and beyond.<12>
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov is attempting to exploit discussions between the United States and the EU about the possible
deployment of European peacekeeping forces to Ukraine as part of a future peace settlement in order to
reinvigorate the Kremlin's demands for regime change in Ukraine. Lavrov claimed on March 2 that plans to
introduce European peacekeeping forces in Ukraine in the future are a continuation of European leaders'
supposed efforts to "incite" Ukraine to "war against ."<13> Lavrov claimed that the West brought
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to power using "bayonets" and will use future peacekeeping forces
as "bayonets" to "prop up" Zelensky. Lavrov claimed that Europe wants to continue the war in Ukraine
through these peacekeeping forces whereas the United States is openly stating its desire to end the
war.<14> Lavrov claimed that the introduction of peacekeepers to Ukraine would not eliminate the "root
causes" of the war.<15> Lavrov has previously defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged
violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination
against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.<16> The Kremlin has recently
attempted to use this phrase to justify its calls for regime change in Ukraine. Lavrov is exploiting the
ongoing discussions in the West about the deployment of peacekeepers to Ukraine in the future to make yet
another argument for Russia's longstanding demand for regime change. Lavrov and other Kremlin officials
have recently engaged in rhetoric similarly attempting to exacerbate US-European divisions and falsely
portraying European countries as wanting to continue the war in Ukraine.<17> The Kremlin is likely
attempting to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe to extract concessions in Russia's favor
in future peace negotiations and other talks.<18>
European leaders demonstrated their
commitment to supporting Ukraine at a defense summit in London on March 2. The United Kingdom (UK) hosted
leaders of Ukraine, France, Germany, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Canada,
Finland, Sweden, Czechia, and Romania as well as the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Hakan Fidan, NATO
General Secretary Mark Rutte, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and President of
the European Council Antonio Costa.<19> UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced at the summit that the
UK and France, along with other unspecified countries, have expressed their commitment to develop a
"coalition of the willing" that will deploy peacekeepers to defend a peace agreement in Ukraine.<20>
Starmer revealed at the summit a plan aimed at assisting Ukraine: keeping military aid flowing while the
war continues and increasing economic pressure on Russia; ensuring that any peace deal upholds Ukraine's
sovereignty and security and that Ukraine is at the negotiating table; and committing European leaders to
aim to deter any future invasion of Ukraine.<21> Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the
defense summit was dedicated to Ukraine and a common European future and noted that "European unity is at
an extremely high level."<22> Zelensky stated that Ukraine is continuing discussions about security
guarantees and conditions for a just peace with partner states and is working with Europe to create a
"reliable basis of cooperation" with the United States about Ukrainian peace and guaranteed security.
Zelensky met with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni on the sidelines of the summit to discuss the
development of a joint action plan to end the war in Ukraine.<23> Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem
Umerov also met with UK Defense Secretary John Healey on the sidelines to discuss the UK's readiness to
increase military assistance to Ukraine, the prospect of purchasing weapons with profits from frozen
Russian assets, and the UK's role in the Ramstein format.<24>
European countries announced
additional military assistance packages for Ukraine before and during the summit. The UK announced on
March 1 a loan worth 2.6 billion pounds (roughly $3.2 billion) to bolster Ukraine's defense backed by
profits from frozen Russian assets.<25> The UK stated that the first tranche of the loan will arrive
later next week. Zelensky stated that the UK loan will fund Ukrainian weapons production.<26> Starmer
announced on March 2 an additional 1.6 billion pound (roughly $2 billion) deal that will allow Ukraine to
purchase 5,000 lightweight-multirole missiles from the UK.<27> The Lithuanian Ministry of Defense (MoD)
announced on March 1 that it will allocate 20 million euros (roughly $20.7 million) to purchasing
Ukrainian-produced weapons for Ukraine and to develop a joint weapons production facility in
Lithuania.<28>
Key Takeaways:
Recent Russian official statements in response to the
proposed US-Ukraine mineral deal indicate that the Kremlin is trying to sabotage the deal through
narratives targeting Ukrainian and American audiences. The Kremlin is claiming that this mineral deal
does not benefit Ukraine while also claiming that Russia can make a better offer to the United States,
indicating that Moscow sees the deal as harmful to its objectives. The Kremlin has a vested interest
in preventing the United States and Ukraine from signing a mineral deal, as the deal will commit the
United States to a long-term investment in Ukraine and Ukraine's sovereignty. Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov is attempting to exploit discussions between the United States and the EU about
the possible deployment of European peacekeeping forces to Ukraine as part of a future peace settlement
in order to reinvigorate the Kremlin's demands for regime change in Ukraine. European leaders
demonstrated their commitment to supporting Ukraine at a defense summit in London on March 2. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka
Novosilka.
Ich fühle mich überhaupt zurückerinnert an meinen Geschichtsunterricht in der Schule, als über die
Kolonialisierungszeit vor dem 1. Weltkrieg gesprochen wurde. Ich hab das Gefühl, dass sich diese
Geschichte in abgeänderter Form (anderer Technologiestandard, anderer Fokus bei Landeinnahme) wiederholt.
Ukraine, Grönland, Panama, Gaza, vielleicht dann in weiterer Folge Moldawien, Georgien. China
kolonialisiert Afrika und Teile Asiens mit wirtschaftlicher Totalabhängigkeit. Irgendwie gruselig.
>Es wird ungemütlich in Europa. Trump würde den Russen damit >Europa als leicht verdaulichen
Leckerbissen servieren und >bekommt dafür freie Hand in Kanada und Grönland?
Ich
dachte, er möchte, dass die Europäer (mehr) Waren aus den USA kaufen. Mit Europa unter Russland wird das
nicht gelingen.
Ukrainian military intelligence indicated that about 620,000 Russian soldiers are operating in Ukraine
and Kursk Oblast, an increase of about 40,000 personnel compared to late 2024. Ukrainian Main Military
Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in an interview with
RBK-Ukraine published on March 3 that there are 620,000 Russian soldiers in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast,
about 200,000 of whom are actively fighting on the frontline. Skibitskyi stated that there are roughly
35,000 additional Rosgvardia troops protecting rear areas and that these personnel can become a second
line of defense if necessary. Skibitskyi stated in November 2024 there were about 580,000 Russian
soldiers operating against Ukraine (presumably both within Ukraine and in Kursk Oblast), and Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in January 2025 that the total Russian force grouping in Ukraine was
about 600,000 troops.
Russian authorities reportedly exceeded their recruitment quotas in 2024
and January 2025, likely in part due to increased financial incentives for recruits and prison
recruitment efforts that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term. Skibitskyi reported on March 3
that Russian authorities recruited 440,000 military personnel in 2024 — 10,000 more than their quota for
the year — and fulfilled their January 2025 recruitment quota by 107 percent. Russian Security Council
Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev also claimed in late December 2024 that 440,000 recruits signed
military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in 2024. Russian President Vladimir
Putin signed a decree in July 2024 awarding 400,000 rubles (roughly $4,400) to anyone who signed a
contract with the Russian MoD between August 1, 2024 and December 31, 2024 - more than double the
previous federal award of 195,000 rubles (roughly $2,100). This increased federal reward likely
contributed to Russia's successful recruitment drive in 2024. Russian federal subjects offered additional
high regional bonuses to those who signed military service contracts in late 2024 and early 2025, but
select federal subjects have started to reduce these regional payments following the expiration of these
limited time offers, indicating that such measures are not sustainable indefinitely. Skibitskyi stated
that 15 percent of Russian recruits in 2024 were people under criminal investigation, in prison, or
serving suspended sentences and that this figure will increase to roughly 30 percent in 2025. Russian
officials reported in 2024 that Russia was shutting down some prisons after Russia's prison population
significantly dropped due to the Russian prison recruitment drives. Russia has recently been increasingly
recruiting defendants in pretrial detention centers, likely as the pool of prison recruits has dwindled.
ISW continues to assess that increased military spending, including large payments and benefits to
Russian servicemembers, is hurting the Russian economy at the macro level and that the Kremlin is
reducing this spending on military personnel as part of efforts to mitigate the impacts of such
initiatives. Russian authorities are unlikely to sustain such high financial incentives as part of their
recruitment drives in the medium- and long-term as the Russian economy continues to decline.
Skibitskyi noted that Russian authorities have previously adjusted their annual quotas throughout the
year, having originally called for Russian authorities to recruit 375,000 to 380,000 personnel in 2024
before increasing this number to 430,000. Adjustments to the 2024 recruitment quotas were likely meant to
account for Russia's increased tempo of offensive operations in the last few months of 2024 that resulted
in the highest casualty rates Russia experienced since early 2022. Skibitskyi concluded that Russia's
recruitment plans for 2025 will "mostly" allow the Russian military command to replace its battlefield
losses should the current tempo of offensive operations and losses continue. Russian authorities will
likely have to adjust their 2025 quotas as they did in 2024 should they want the current tempo of
offensive operations to continue and should Russian forces continue to suffer high losses while advancing
at a slower rate. Russian authorities are unlikely to generate enough forces to significantly increase
the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine in the near future. Continued Western military aid
would help Ukrainian forces inflict additional losses on the Russian military that would likely intensify
Russia's economic and military issues and force Putin into making concessions during meaningful
negotiations in 2025.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian military intelligence indicated
that about 620,000 Russian soldiers are operating in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, an increase of about
40,000 personnel compared to late 2024.
• Russian authorities reportedly exceeded their
recruitment quotas in 2024 and January 2025, likely in part due to increased financial incentives for
recruits and prison recruitment efforts that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term.
• Russian forces continue to innovate their strike packages and leverage larger numbers of Shahed and
decoy drones in an attempt to penetrate Ukraine's air defense umbrella.
• Russian missile
production has reportedly not significantly increased, but Russian forces appear to be prioritizing
production of missile and drone variants that are more effective against Ukrainian air defenses.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka
Novosilka and in Kursk Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues to promote its "Time of Heroes"
veterans' program as part of efforts to militarize the Russian government and society.
US President Donald Trump ordered a pause on US military aid to Ukraine on March 3, suspending the
delivery of critical warfighting materiel. An anonymous White House official told the Wall Street Journal
on March 3 that the United States is "pausing and reviewing" military aid to Ukraine until Trump
"determines that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is making a good-faith effort towards peace
negotiations with Russia." The White House official did not provide clarification about what conditions
the White House is expecting Zelensky to meet in order to resume aid.
The United States had
been providing Ukraine with artillery ammunition, armored vehicles, towed howitzers, Patriot air defense
batteries, and long-range rocket and missile systems such as HIMARS and ATACMS — many of which are
sophisticated systems that only the United States can supply Pauses in this aid will harm Ukraine's
warfighting capabilities, although it will likely take from weeks to months for the suspension of US aid
to affect the frontline. Western officials estimated in late February 2025 that Ukraine will be able to
sustain its current pace of operations until about mid-2025 (roughly June 2025) as long as the United
States continues to provide the aid contracted under the Biden administration on the previously
anticipated timelines. A Ukrainian official told CNN on March 4 following the suspension that Ukraine may
run out of US-provided artillery shells by May or June 2025 but warned that Patriot air defense missiles
could run out "in a matter of weeks." Ukraine relies heavily on US Patriot systems for its air defense
umbrella to protect against Russian missile strikes against Ukraine's rear areas. The shortage and
eventual lack of Patriot missiles is likely to have severe impacts on the safety of Ukraine's critical,
industrial, and civilian infrastructure, as Ukraine's other supporters lack an analogous system that can
protect against Russian missile strikes, particularly those including ballistic missiles. As Ukraine runs
short on Patriot missiles, Kyiv will have to make difficult decisions about which population centers to
prioritize in terms of air defense protection. If it runs out of Patriots entirely then Ukrainian cities
will lie open to Russian ballistic missiles.
Key Takeaways:
• US President Donald
Trump ordered a pause on US military aid to Ukraine on March 3, suspending the delivery of critical
warfighting materiel.
• The United States had been providing Ukraine with artillery
ammunition, armored vehicles, towed howitzers, Patriot air defense batteries, and long-range rocket and
missile systems such as HIMARS and ATACMS — many of which are sophisticated systems that only the United
States can supply.
• The frontline in Ukraine does not risk imminent collapse, but the
effects of the US aid pause will become more acute over time.
• The European Commission
proposed a plan on March 4 that would enable EU member states to increase defense spending to support
Ukraine and strengthen European security. European rearmament is vital for Europe's short- and long-term
security, and Europe should pursue these efforts regardless of the status of US aid to Ukraine.
• Ukraine has significantly expanded its defense industrial production capabilities throughout the war
in an effort to eventually meet its military needs independently, but Ukraine's ability to become
self-sufficient in the long-term is contingent on continued support from partner states in the short- and
medium-term.
• The Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky reiterated on March 4 Ukraine's commitment to work with the Trump Administration to achieve a
sustainable and lasting peace in Ukraine.
• The high casualties in Russia's war in Ukraine
are the direct result of Putin's determination to conquer all of Ukraine using horrific and costly
tactics, and Putin can dramatically reduce this killing any time he chooses
• The Kremlin
continues to express cautious optimism about the pausing of US military aid to Ukraine and advanced
several narratives as part of efforts to impose additional demands on the United States.Russian forces
recently advanced near Lyman, and Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces
recently advanced near Pokrovsk.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly
developing a plan to partially demobilize a limited number of mobilized personnel no earlier than July
2025, likely to address growing societal backlash over the lack of rotations and demobilization of
Russian mobilized troops for over two years.
>The shortage and eventual lack of Patriot missiles is likely to have >severe impacts on the
safety of Ukraine's critical, industrial, and >civilian infrastructure, as Ukraine's other
supporters lack an >analogous system that can protect against Russian missile strikes
Patriots hat aber so ziemlich jeder NATO-Staat. Kurzfristig könnten die aus ihren Beständen liefern und
beim Hersteller nachbestellen, solange die USA das nicht untersagen.
>>The shortage and eventual lack of Patriot missiles is >likely to have >>severe impacts on the safety of Ukraine's critical, >industrial, and >>civilian infrastructure, as Ukraine's other supporters >lack an >>analogous
system that can protect against Russian missile >strikes > >Patriots hat aber so
ziemlich jeder NATO-Staat. Kurzfristig >könnten die aus ihren Beständen liefern und beim
Hersteller >nachbestellen, solange die USA das nicht untersagen.
Aber die Frage
ist halt Lieferzeit? Ganz auf Null Bestand werden die alle nicht gehen wollen.
>>Patriots hat aber so ziemlich jeder NATO-Staat. >Kurzfristig >>könnten
die aus ihren Beständen liefern und beim >Hersteller >>nachbestellen, solange die USA
das nicht untersagen. > > >Aber die Frage ist halt Lieferzeit? Ganz auf Null
Bestand >werden die alle nicht gehen wollen.
Ich denke, dass man jetzt sowieso wieder
mehr auf den Verhandlungstisch zurück muss und anstatt sich auf weitere Waffenlieferungen(ohne USA!) zu
konzentrieren.
>Patriots hat aber so ziemlich jeder NATO-Staat. Kurzfristig >könnten die aus ihren Beständen
liefern und beim Hersteller >nachbestellen, solange die USA das nicht untersagen.
Aber
gibt ja keiner her, wie man sieht. In Zeiten wie diesen will keiner die eigene Verteidigung
vernachlässigen.
Ok, Israel gibt einige her, die haben mittlerweile ihr eigenes, besseres
System. Aber lange genug waren die Patriots unverzichtbar.
The Trump administration suspended intelligence sharing with Ukraine, one of many demands the Kremlin has
made of the US, Ukraine, and Ukraine's other supporters. Details about the US suspension of intelligence
sharing with Ukraine vary in different reports, but the Trump administration has suspended some level of
intelligence sharing with Ukraine with some reporting indicating that the suspension affected all
intelligence sharing. Western media reported that the Trump administration specifically suspended the
sharing of intelligence that Ukraine uses for early warning systems to protect against Russian long-range
missile and drone strikes, for target designation for HIMARS Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems
(GMLRS) strikes, and for target designation for long-range strikes within Russia. British outlet Daily
Mail reported that the United States also prohibited the United Kingdom from sharing US intelligence with
Ukraine. The Kremlin has repeatedly insisted on an end to the provision of all foreign assistance to
Ukraine as part of any peace agreement, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov March 4 specifically
stated on March 4 that the United States provides Ukraine with intelligence data such as satellite
reconnaissance data.
The suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine will damage
Ukraine's ability to defend itself against ongoing Russian attacks against military and civilian targets.
Ukrainian forces have leveraged their ability to strike within Russia and destroy significant amounts of
materiel in order to increase pressure on Russia. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian missile and
ammunition storage facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast on the night of September 17 to 18, 2024,
destroying two to three months of Russia’s ammunition supply. The Toropets facility also stored Iskander
missiles, Tochka-U ballistic missiles, glide bombs, and artillery ammunition. Ukrainian forces struck the
Tikhoretsk Arsenal just north of Kamenny, Krasnodar Krai on the night of September 20 to 21, 2024, which
at the time contained at least 2,000 tons of munitions, including munitions from North Korea. Russian
forces previously leveraged their quantitative artillery ammunition advantage and glide bomb strikes to
facilitate battlefield gains by destroying settlements before deploying infantry to attack the area —
most notably near Avdiivka in February 2024 during delays in US military aid to Ukraine. Ukrainian
strikes on Russian missile and ammunition storage facilities have previously relieved pressure on
Ukrainian forces across the frontline by preventing Russian forces from leveraging their artillery
advantage to secure gains. Ukrainian strikes against military targets in Russia also pushed Russian
aviation operations further from Ukraine into Russia's rear areas, hindering Russia's ability to conduct
glide bomb and missile strikes against Ukrainian frontline positions from Russian airspace. Ukraine's
inability to conduct ATACMS and HIMARS strikes against Russian air defense systems within Russia and
occupied Ukraine will likely impact how close to the frontline Russian pilots are willing to operate and
expand Russia's ability to effectively use glide bombs against both frontline areas and near rear
Ukrainian cities.
The suspension of all US intelligence sharing with Ukraine would also allow
Russian forces to intensify their drone and missile strikes against the Ukrainian rear, affecting
millions of Ukrainian civilians and the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB). US
intelligence has contributed to Ukraine's early warning system against Russian strikes against Ukrainian
cities, allowing Ukrainian authorities and civilians to prepare once Russian forces launch missiles and
drones. The suspension of US intelligence on Russian strikes against the Ukrainian rear, coupled with the
US suspension of supplies of Patriot air defense missiles that Ukraine relies upon to defend against
Russian ballistic missiles, would have severe impacts on the safety of Ukrainian rear areas.
Russian drone and missile strikes have heavily targeted Ukraine's energy infrastructure and DIB. The
likely intensification of these strikes following the US suspension of military aid and intelligence
sharing to Ukraine will hinder Ukraine's ongoing progress towards expanding its DIB to be able to supply
the Ukrainian military with all of its materiel needs. A self-sufficient Ukrainian DIB would allow
Ukraine to defend itself over the long-term with dramatically reduced foreign military assistance, and it
is in America's core national security interests that Ukraine be able to continue its efforts towards
self-sufficiency.
The Trump administration has been applying considerable pressure on Ukraine,
whose leaders continue to offer concessions and publicly declare their interest in achieving a lasting
end to the war. These Trump administration policies are undermining the leverage that the United States
needs to get Russian President Vladimir Putin to accept any peace agreement that is in the interests of
the United States, Ukraine, and Europe. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 4 that
"Ukraine is ready to come to the negotiating table as soon as possible to bring lasting peace closer."
Zelensky also offered to exchange Ukrainian and Russian prisoners of war (POWs), to ban missile and
long-range drone strikes against energy and civilian infrastructure, and to reach an immediate truce in
the Black Sea. Zelensky has indicated several times — including in his February 28 Fox News interview —
that he is willing to make concessions on territory, Ukraine's NATO membership, and his own tenure in
office in order to secure a just and sustainable peace. Russian President Vladimir Putin and numerous
Kremlin officials have, in contrast, offered no meaningful concessions. They continuously repeat demands
that amount to complete Ukrainian capitulation as well as the rolling back of NATO from Eastern
Europe.
Russia's war effort in Ukraine has brought about a series of materiel, manpower, and
economic challenges for Moscow that will worsen in the coming months if Ukraine is able to sustain its
defensive military operations. The United States should leverage these Russian challenges in order to
secure concessions necessary to achieve a just and sustainable peace. US policies suspending military aid
and intelligence sharing to Ukraine reduce the leverage US President Donald Trump's needs to achieve his
stated policy objective of bringing about an end to the war in Ukraine on acceptable terms, a task that
requires increasing pressure on Russia, not Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
• The Trump
administration suspended intelligence sharing with Ukraine, one of many demands the Kremlin has made of
the US, Ukraine, and Ukraine's other supporters.
• The suspension of US intelligence sharing
with Ukraine will damage Ukraine's ability to defend itself against ongoing Russian attacks against
military and civilian targets.
• The suspension of all US intelligence sharing with Ukraine
would also allow Russian forces to intensify their drone and missile strikes against the Ukrainian rear,
affecting millions of Ukrainian civilians and the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).
• The Trump administration has been applying considerable pressure on Ukraine, whose leaders
continue to offer concessions and publicly declare their interest in achieving a lasting end to the war.
These Trump administration policies are undermining the leverage that the United States needs to get
Russian President Vladimir Putin to accept any peace agreement that is in the interests of the United
States, Ukraine, and Europe.
• Kremlin officials announced their intention of taking advantage
of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing to make additional battlefield gains.
• Russian officials continue inaccurately to place the blame on Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky — and not Russian President Vladimir Putin — for the lack of meaningful peace negotiations.
• Kremlin officials continue to use business incentives to make further demands of the United
States and to push the United States to de facto recognize Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territory.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
• Over 50,000 Russian
servicemembers are reportedly listed as having abandoned their units and are absent without leave (AWOL)
between February 2022 and mid-December 2024.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials explicitly rejected making any concessions
in future peace negotiations or accepting any US, European, or Ukrainian peace proposals and the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) rejected the possibility of a negotiated ceasefire on March 6. Putin
stated during a visit to the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation's Moscow branch on March 6 that
Russia does not intend to "give in to anyone" or make any compromises in future peace negotiations. Putin
stated that Russia must choose a peace option that best suits Russia and will ensure peace in the
long-term. Putin noted that Russian societal unity is critical for Russian victory in Ukraine. Putin
alluded to the Russian Revolution, noted that Russian society collapsed during the First World War, and
urged Russians to maintain support and unity as the war continues. Putin stated that Russia "will not
give up" its "own" territory in future peace negotiations — likely referring to illegally annexed
territory in occupied Ukraine. The Kremlin launched the Defenders of the Fatherland State Fund in April
2023 to oversee social support for veterans, elevate veterans within Russian society, and monopolize
control over veterans activities in Russia. Putin has also declared 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the
Fatherland" — underlining Putin's efforts to prioritize militarizing Russian society and rallying support
behind Russia's war effort in Ukraine in 2025.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed
during a press conference on March 6 that Russia will reject any proposals to station European
peacekeeping forces in Ukraine to enforce a future ceasefire agreement. Lavrov stated that Russia sees
"no room for compromise" on this issue and will consider the presence of a European peacekeeping force in
Ukraine as akin to a NATO deployment in Ukraine. Lavrov stated that Russia will consider the deployment
of any European peacekeepers to Ukraine as the "direct, official, undisguised involvement of NATO
countries" in the war and that Russia will reject such a deployment. Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria
Zakharova rejected the possibility of a negotiated ceasefire and the deployment of European troops to
Ukraine on March 6 and claimed that Russia considers any proposal that gives Ukraine a "respite" along
the frontline as unacceptable. Lavrov and Zakharova are explicitly rejecting US Defense Secretary Pete
Hegseth's February 12 suggestion that European and non-European countries should station troops in
Ukraine to enforce any future peace agreement.
Lavrov said that any peace agreement must
account for the alleged "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, including guarantees that NATO will stop
expanding, trying to "swallow" Ukraine, and developing threats against Russia. Lavrov claimed that US
President Donald Trump "understands" the need to eliminate these "root causes" while European countries
are attempting to ignore the "root causes." Lavrov previously identified the "root causes" of the war as
NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged
discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine. Russian
officials often invoke the concept of "root causes" to allude to their demands for NATO to abandon its
open-door policy and to blame the West and Ukraine for Putin's decision to invade Ukraine.
Key
Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials explicitly rejected
making any concessions in future peace negotiations or accepting any US, European, or Ukrainian peace
proposals and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) rejected the possibility of a negotiated
ceasefire on March 6.
• Russian officials will likely take advantage of the suspension of US
military aid to and intelligence sharing with Ukraine to spread a longstanding Russian information
operation meant to falsely portray Russian victory as inevitable.
• The Kremlin welcomed a
Trump administration official's recent comments mischaracterizing Russia's illegal and unprovoked
invasion of Ukraine as a "proxy war," and Russian media portrayed the statement as an admission that the
United States is a participant in the war.
• US and Ukrainian delegations will conduct
bilateral meetings in Saudi Arabia next week.
• Ukrainian opposition politicians rejected the
possibility of holding elections in Ukraine before the end of the war.
• European countries
continue to announce new military assistance packages and other measures to support the Ukrainian
military.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction and Russian forces
recently advanced in the Kupyansk, Borova, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to assuage Russian fears about conscripts going to war
amid continued reports that Russian military units are forcing conscripts to sign contracts with the
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
Russian forces conducted one of the largest ever missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night
of March 6 to 7 as Russian forces continue to adapt strike packages to overwhelm Ukraine's air defense
umbrella by increasing the total number of Shahed and decoy drones in each strike. Russian forces
launched the largest combined strike package against Ukraine since November 2024 on the night of March 6
to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 67 missiles including 35 Kh-101/Kh-55
cruise missiles, eight Kalibr cruise missiles, three Iskander-M/Kn-23 ballistic missiles, four S-300 air
defense missiles, eight Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 194 Shahed and decoy drones. The Ukrainian Air
Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 25 Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles, all eight Kalibr cruise
missiles, one Kh-59/69 cruise missile, and 100 Shahed and decoy drones and that 86 decoy drones and up to
10 missiles did not reach their targets, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference.
The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed Russian targets using F-16 and
Mirage-2000 aircraft and that this was the first instance of Ukrainian forces using Mirage-2000s, which
arrived one month ago, to defend against Russian strikes. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian
forces targeted Ukrainian gas production facilities during the strike. Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky and other official Ukrainian sources stated that Russian strikes damaged energy facilities in
Odesa, Poltava, Chernihiv, and Ternopil oblasts. Ternopil Oblast Military Administration reported that
two Russian missiles struck a critical infrastructure facility, causing a fire. Ukraine's largest private
energy company DTEK stated that the strikes damaged an energy facility in Odesa Oblast.
Russian forces began increasing the number of Shahed and decoy drones in strike packages in Fall 2024,
likely to adapt to successful Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) innovations. ISW observed reports that
Russian forces began launching between 80 and 100 (or more) Shahed and decoy drones as part of their
larger strike packages in October and November 2024, and reports indicate that Russia has increased the
production of Shahed drone airframes while continuing to rely on Iranian or Chinese imports for other
drone components in December 2024. Russia has likely leveraged the increased production of Shahed drones
to increase the total number of drones launched in each strike package. Russian forces launched an
average 83.4 drones per strike package in January 2025, an average of 139.3 drones per strike package in
February 2024, and an average of 128.8 drones per strike package from March 1 through 7. Russian forces
have only sporadically included missiles in the January, February, and March 2025 strike packages, and
the 67 missiles launched in the March 6 to 7 strike series is a larger amount than in previous missile
strikes this year. Russian forces likely increased the combined number of Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic
missiles and Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles in the March 6 to 7 strike packages to inflict maximum damage
on select targets in Ukraine while using the large number of Shahed drones, decoy drones, and Kalibr
cruise missiles to detect and overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and mobile fire groups.
Russia
will likely take advantage of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine to
intensify its long-range strike campaign and deplete Ukrainian air defense missiles. US intelligence has
contributed to Ukraine's early warning system against Russian strikes and its suspension will likely
impact Ukraine's ability to rapidly respond to adapting Russian strike packages. Ukraine's Main Military
Intelligence Directorate (GUR) recently reported that Russia is modernizing and increasing its production
of Shahed-136 drones and producing a new Geran-3 drone variant. Russan forces will likely attempt to
overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems by increasing the number of Shahed and decoy drones per strike
package in addition to increasing the number of missiles in select strike packages to destroy Ukrainian
energy and defense industrial base (DIB) infrastructure. Russia also likely intends to force Ukraine into
quickly depleting its supply of Patriot air defense interceptors - which Ukraine relies on to defend
against Russian ballistic missiles - during the pause in US military aid and intelligence sharing to
maximize the damage of subsequent strikes. Ukrainian forces will likely have to be more selective in
intercepting strikes as their stock of interceptors decreases with no resupply on the horizon, and
successful Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities will likely have lasting effects on
Ukraine's ability to generate power for DIB and civilian use.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces conducted one of the largest ever missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the
night of March 6 to 7 as Russian forces continue to adapt strike packages to overwhelm Ukraine's air
defense umbrella by increasing the total number of Shahed and decoy drones in each strike.
• Russian forces began increasing the number of Shahed and decoy drones in strike packages in Fall
2024, likely to adapt to successful Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) innovations.
• Russia
will likely take advantage of the suspension of US military aid to and intelligence sharing with Ukraine
to intensify its long-range strike campaign and deplete Ukrainian air defense missiles.
• Russian forces are further intensifying offensive operations in select frontline areas likely in
order to capitalize on any immediate and longer-term battlefield impacts of the cessation of US aid to
Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced into northern Sumy Oblast for the first time
since 2022 – when Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces from significant swathes of Ukrainian territory
following the initial months of Russian advances. Russian forces likely intend to leverage limited
advances into Sumy Oblast to completely expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast among other
objectives.
• Russian forces also recently intensified offensive operations aimed at seizing
Chasiv Yar and attacking Kostyantynivka – the southernmost settlement of Ukraine's fortress belt in
Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian officials continue to explicitly reject making any concessions in
future peace negotiations or accepting any US, European, or Ukrainian peace proposals.
• Lithuania's intelligence services assessed that Russia may have the capabilities to conduct a limited
campaign against one or several NATO countries within three to five years, an assessment that is
consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts to restructure and prepare its military and
society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term.
• The United Kingdom (UK)
issued Ukraine's first tranche of revenue generated from frozen Russian assets. Russian forces recently
advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Borova, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
• The Kremlin
continues to leverage its "Time of Heroes" program to fill government positions with veterans of its war
in Ukraine as part of a long-term effort to militarize Russian society and form a new cadre of loyal
Russian officials.
The extent of the US suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine remains unclear. The Washington Post
reported on March 7 that a statement by the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) noted that
the NGA "temporarily suspended access" to the system that provides Ukraine with commercial
satellite imagery that the United States has purchased. Ukraine can reportedly still access imagery that
it has purchased with its own accounts. A Ukrainian servicemember told the Washington Post that satellite
service near Pokrovsk "simply disappeared" but that Ukrainian forces will "use own plans." CNN
reported on March 7 that two US defense officials stated that the United States is still sharing
intelligence with Ukraine that can help Ukrainian forces "defend" themselves but has "scaled back" the
sharing of intelligence that Ukrainian forces could use for offensive targeting of Russian forces.
Politico reported on March 8 that a European official familiar with the intelligence capabilities of
allies was "still puzzling" over the extent of the US intelligence sharing suspension and stated that
European states may not be able to "bridge the gap." A source familiar with talks among the NATO allies
about how to handle the US suspension reportedly stated that NATO members are not prohibited from sharing
some US intelligence with Ukraine but that such sharing could be very limited as the NATO allies are
trying to avoid "jeopardizing" their relationships with the United States or with each other. Politico
reported that one NATO official stated that there is no pressure from the Trump administration to reduce
or curtail allies' intelligence sharing or weapons deliveries to Ukraine.
Western and
Ukrainian officials indicated that the US suspension of intelligence sharing is generating battlefield
effects. Time reported on March 8 that five senior Western and Ukrainian officials and military officers
stated that the suspension of US intelligence to Ukraine has helped Russian forces advance on the
battlefield. An unspecified officer told Time that the suspension has left Ukrainian forces unable to use
"some of their best weapons systems." A source in the Ukrainian government stated that the suspension has
impacted Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast the most and that Ukrainian forces have lost the ability to
detect Russian aircraft approaching Ukraine — compromising Ukrainian authorities' ability to warn
civilians and military personnel about incoming Russian strikes. CNN reported on March 8 that a Ukrainian
official stated that Ukrainian forces may run out of artillery shells by May or June 2025 — likely
referring only to stockpiles of US-supplied ammunition. A Ukrainian official also told CNN that Ukraine
may exhaust its stockpile of Patriot air defense missiles, upon which Ukraine relies to shoot down
Russian ballistic missiles, "in a matter of weeks." ISW cannot independently verify statements about the
effects on the ground of the US intelligence sharing suspension. ISW continues to assess, however, that
the complete suspension of US intelligence sharing would damage Ukraine's ability to use long-range
strikes to generate battlefield effects and defend against Russian offensive operations and would allow
Russian forces to intensify their drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian rear areas, affecting
millions of Ukrainian civilians and the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).
European states continue efforts to supplement intelligence sharing with Ukraine following the US
suspension. French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Christophe Lemonde stated on March 8
that European states discussed how to try to compensate for the intelligence that the United States "may
stop providing" during that March 6 EU summit. French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu stated on March
6 that France would continue to provide intelligence to Ukraine. French outlet Intelligence Online
reported on March 7 that Safran.AI, a subsidiary of French defense corporation Safran, will provide
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) with a data fusion platform to analyze French
satellite imagery and that Safran.AI and the GUR signed the agreement at the end of February 2025 —
before the US suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine. Two Ukrainian officers told Time that some
European intelligence agencies are trying to fill the gap following the US suspension of intelligence
sharing to Ukraine but that it will take time for European authorities to deploy these capabilities and
that Europe is unlikely to entirely make up for the US intelligence capability "any time soon."
Russian forces intensified their multi-directional campaign to eliminate the remaining Ukrainian
salient in Kursk Oblast on March 7 and 8. Geolocated footage published on March 8 indicates that Russian
forces recently seized Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha). Russian milbloggers claimed that
elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps ,
Leningrad Military District ) and 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial
reserve call up) are advancing near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that
Russian airborne (VDV) units seized Lebedevka (west of Sudzha), and another Russian milblogger claimed
that Russian forces seized Kubatkin (north of Sudzha) and advanced up to eight kilometers into the
Ukrainian salient. A Russian source claimed that fighting is ongoing along the
Lebedevka-Kubatkin-Bondarevka line (northwest and east of Sudzha), but that the situation in this area is
unclear.
Key Takeaways:
• The extent of the US suspension of intelligence sharing
with Ukraine remains unclear.
• Western and Ukrainian officials indicated that the US
suspension of intelligence sharing is generating battlefield effects.
• European states
continue efforts to supplement intelligence sharing with Ukraine following the US suspension.
• Russian forces intensified their multi-directional campaign to eliminate the remaining Ukrainian
salient in Kursk Oblast on March 7 and 8.
• Russian forces appear to be destroying bridges in
Kursk Oblast and along the international border, likely as part of efforts to prevent Ukrainian forces
from withdrawing from Kursk Oblast into Ukraine.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD)
Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Major General Apti
Alaudinov, announced the intensified Russian effort in Kursk Oblast on March 8.
• Russian
forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian rear and near rear areas on the
night of March 7 and 8 and during the day on March 8, and Ukrainian forces notably did not shoot down any
Russian ballistic missiles.
• The Kremlin continues to promote the false narrative that
European Union (EU) member states and Ukraine seek to protract and escalate the war in Ukraine in order
to distract from Russia's own long-term preparations for a war with the West.
• Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 8 that Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff
Andriy Yermak, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, and
Deputy Head of the Ukrainian President's Office Colonel Pavlo Palisa will participate in the US-Ukrainian
talks on March 11 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk
and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
Russian forces are collapsing the northern part of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast following
several days of intensified Russian activity in the area. Geolocated footage published on March 8
indicates that Russian forces seized Novaya Sorochina (northwest of Sudzha), Malaya Loknya (just south of
Novaya Sorochina), and Lebedevka (south of Malaya Loknya), and the fields between the settlements.
Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms
Army , Southern Military District ) seized Malaya Loknya and that elements of the Russian 51st
Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) seized Lebedevka. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces seized Pravda and Ivashkovshyi (both north of Sudzha) and positions along an unspecified area of
the railway line between Malaya Loknya and Sudzha.<3> Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the
Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps
, Leningrad Military District ) participated in the seizure of Kubatkin (north of Sudzha) and
Pravda and that additional elements of the Russian 106th VDV Division are advancing into Kazachya Loknya
(north of Sudzha) from Lebedevka. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops hold limited
positions in Malaya Loknya, Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha), and Martynovka (northeast of
Sudzha) but that most Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from positions in the northern part of the salient
towards Kazachya Loknya and Sudzha. Russian milbloggers claimed that preparatory Russian efforts to
destroy the bridges north and south of Sudzha have significantly complicated Ukraine's ability to
withdraw back to Sudzha. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully
counterattacked near Malaya Loknya.
The temporal correlation between the suspension of US
intelligence sharing with Ukraine and the start of Russia's collapse of the Ukrainian Kursk salient is
noteworthy. Russia has been attempting to push Ukrainian forces from the salient in Kursk Oblast through
slow, grinding advances since the incursion began in August 2024. Russia later deployed roughly 12,000
North Korean military personnel in October 2024 to assist in repelling the incursion, but Russian forces
continued to make only gradual gains. The Trump administration suspended US intelligence sharing with
Ukraine on March 5, although there continue to be conflicting reports about the details about the US
suspension. Russian forces intensified offensive operations to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast
on March 6 and 7. A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence started reporting
more rapid Russian advances in Kursk Oblast on March 5. A source in the Ukrainian government stated in a
March 8 Time article that the US intelligence sharing suspension has impacted Ukrainian operations in
Kursk Oblast the most. The Russian military has not previously prioritized the effort to push Ukrainian
forces out of Kursk Oblast over making further advances in eastern Ukraine despite concentrating a
sufficient force grouping to do so in late 2024. A direct link between the suspension of US intelligence
sharing and the start of the collapse of Ukraine's salient in Kursk Oblast is unclear, although Kremlin
officials have recently announced their intention to take advantage of the suspension of US military aid
and intelligence sharing to "inflict maximum damage" to Ukrainian forces "on the ground" during the
limited time frame before the possible future resumption of US intelligence sharing and military aid to
Ukraine.
Reports about the extent of the suspension of US military aid to Ukraine continue to
indicate that the suspension will likely affect Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russia. Forbes
stated on March 7 that the Trump administration has halted US support for Ukraine's F-16 fighter jet
radar jammers. The Wall Street Journal reported on March 8 that a source familiar with the matter stated
that Ukraine is currently able to fire one artillery shell for every three that Russian forces fire –
even with Ukraine's current supplies of US shells. The suspension of US support to Ukrainian F-16 radar
jammers will likely hamper Ukraine's ability to continue to use the aircraft to defend against Russian
strikes into Ukraine's rear. Ukrainian officials indicated in December 2024 that Ukrainian forces had
been able to gain an artillery advantage of 1.5 to one or three-to-one in some areas of the front, and
Russia's current artillery advantage over Ukraine will likely continue to grow as Ukraine's stockpiles of
US ammunition decrease further following the US suspension of military aid.
Key Takeaways
• Russian forces are collapsing the northern part of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast
following several days of intensified Russian activity in the area.
• The temporal correlation
between the suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine and the start of Russia's collapse of the
Ukrainian Kursk salient is noteworthy.
• Reports about the extent of the suspension of US
military aid to Ukraine continue to indicate that the suspension will likely affect Ukraine's ability to
defend itself against Russia.
• Ukraine's European allies continue to provide material and
financial aid to Ukraine.
• Russia continues to showcase its deepening relations with American
adversaries despite ongoing bilateral talks between the United States and Russia.
• Ukrainian
forces advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Kursk oblasts
and near Siversk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Robotyne.
Russia continues to publicly claim that it wants peace while offering no concessions of its own in sharp
contrast with the concessions Ukraine has already offered. Reuters reported on March 9 that two US
officials stated that the US is planning to use the March 11 US-Ukrainian talks in Saudi Arabia "in part
to determine whether Ukraine is willing to make material concessions to Russia to end the war." One US
official stated that Ukraine cannot say both "I want peace" and "I refuse to compromise on anything" at
the upcoming talks. The other US official stated that the US wants "to see if the Ukrainians are
interested not just in peace, but in a realistic peace." The Financial Times reported on
March 9 that unspecified officials briefed on the upcoming US-Ukrainian negotiations stated that Ukraine
will propose a partial ceasefire with Russia for long-range drone and missile strikes and combat
operations in the Black Sea. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on March 10 that a source familiar with
the Ukrainian delegation's position stated that Ukraine will also propose a prisoner of war (POW)
exchange. The Ukrainian source noted that these proposals are "realistic to implement quickly" and to
"control." Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky first suggested a ceasefire in the air and sea on March
5, and Ukraine is offering the kind of ceasefires that are more straightforward and do not require
extended negotiations or a complex monitoring process. A ceasefire along the thousand kilometers of
complex front line characterized by multiple “gray zones” where the lines of opposing forces are blurred
would be extremely difficult to negotiate and monitor. Zelensky has also indicated several times —
including in his February 28 Fox News interview — that he is willing to make concessions on territory,
Ukraine's NATO membership, and his own tenure in office in order to secure a just and sustainable
peace.
Russian officials, in contrast, continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir
Putin's 2021 and 2022 demands. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed in an interview to "New
Regions of Russia" magazine published on March 10 that any future peace settlement must "eradicate" the
"root causes" of the war. Lavrov defined the "root causes" of the war as the alleged "threats to Russia's
security from the Ukrainian and Western directions in general" that are due to NATO's eastward expansion
and the Ukrainian government's alleged "extermination" of everything that is "connected with Russia and
the Russian World ," including Russian language, culture, Orthodoxy, and media. Lavrov
similarly defined the alleged "root causes" of the war in late December 2024, and the Kremlin's rhetoric
on this topic has not changed in the over two months, even after the start of US-Russian bilateral talks
in February 2024. Russia's repeated rhetoric about the "root causes" of the war and constant reiteration
of its specific unchanged demands contrast sharply with the flexibility Ukraine has shown.
Russian officials continue to capitalize on the Trump administration's statements and actions in an
attempt to divide the United States and Europe. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed in an
interview to the "New Regions of Russia" magazine published on March 10 that US and Russian diplomats
voted the same way for the first time in three years against the Ukrainian- and European-backed United
Nations (UN) resolution on February 24. This resolution commemorated the third anniversary of Russia's
full-scale invasion of Ukraine, recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war, called for a just peace in
Ukraine, and supported Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Lavrov claimed that the
"ultraliberal ruling elites of the West," support Ukraine and that European Union (EU) countries and the
United Kingdom (UK) maintain "predatory, colonial habits." Lavrov notably did not mention the United
States, likely in an attempt to drive a perceived ideological wedge between the United States and Europe.
Lavrov's use of the "ruling elites" narrative echoes Russian President Vladimir Putin's February 27 claim
that "some Western elites" are trying to "maintain instability" in the world and will try to "disrupt or
compromise" the US–Russian dialogue that has begun. Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed
on March 10 that the UK government is prioritizing "undermining Trump's peace efforts" and has tasked
non-governmental organizations with "demonizing" Trump. The SVR notably made such claims ahead of the
UK’s hosting of a virtual meeting on March 15 with mainly European and British commonwealth countries to
support a ceasefire agreement. Russian officials are likely attempting to leverage Trump administration
statements and actions to divide the United States and Europe and will likely continue such efforts to
secure maximum concessions on Ukraine from the US, Europe, and Ukraine as well as to fracture the
US-Europe relationship to Russia’s benefit.
Key Takeaways
• Russia continues
to publicly claim that it wants peace while offering no concessions of its own in sharp contrast with the
concessions Ukraine has already offered.
• Russian officials continue to capitalize on the
Trump administration's statements and actions in an attempt to divide the United States and Europe.
• Russian forces are consolidating their gains in Kursk Oblast and likely preparing to attack
Sudzha in the coming days.
• Ukraine continues to expand its domestic production of drones and
air defense systems to support its war effort.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near
Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a list on March 10 of instructions for the
Russian government and the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation aimed at increasing social benefits to
Russian veterans, which will likely put further strain on the Russian budget and economy.
The United States and Ukraine agreed on March 11 to an immediate 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine contingent
on Russia's agreement, and the United States reportedly restarted intelligence sharing and military aid.
US and Ukrainian representatives met in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on March 11 for bilateral talks and agreed
to the ceasefire proposal, which the United States will soon propose to Russia. The US-Ukrainian joint
statement emphasized that Russia's reciprocity to this ceasefire proposal is the key to achieving peace
and noted that the ceasefire can be extended if all parties agree. The joint statement noted that the
United States will immediately lift its suspension on intelligence sharing and military assistance to
Ukraine. The United States and Ukraine also agreed to finalize a deal on minerals as soon as possible.
Ukraine reiterated in the joint statement that European partners will be involved in the peace process.
The United States and Ukraine also discussed humanitarian relief to Ukraine, especially during the
ceasefire, including the return of prisoners of war (POWs), detained civilians, and forcibly deported
Ukrainian children to Ukraine. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa confirmed on March
11 that the United States has already resumed the flow of military assistance to Ukraine. A source close
to the Ukrainian government told CNN that the United States also fully restored intelligence sharing to
Ukraine on March 11.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the ceasefire would
encompass a cease in combat operations along the entire frontline, a moratorium on long-range missile and
drone strikes, and the cessation of operations in the Black Sea and would begin as soon as Russia agrees
to the US proposal. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio responded during a press conference on March 11 to
a question about a deadline for Russia to respond, stating that the deadline is "as quickly as possible,"
that the United States will inform Russia about the ceasefire proposal through multiple diplomatic
channels, and that the "ball is now in court." US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz stated
that he will speak with his Russian counterpart in the coming days and clarified that the resumed US
military assistance to Ukraine includes the provision of material authorized under the Presidential
Drawdown Authority (PDA). European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, UK Prime Minister Keir
Starmer, and French President Emmanuel Macron expressed support for the 30-day ceasefire proposal and
emphasized that the onus to respond is now on Russia.
Russian ultranationalist voices,
including a Russian State Duma deputy, largely rejected the ceasefire proposal on March 11. Russian
milbloggers, including Kremlin-coopted milbloggers, rejected the ceasefire proposal because the United
States and Ukraine will allegedly "abandon" peace "at the first opportunity" and the war in Ukraine is
existential for Russia. One milblogger claimed that accepting the ceasefire would be "pure betrayal and
sabotage," and another milblogger questioned the purpose of accepting this ceasefire proposal without
achieving Russia's war aims. Russian State Duma Deputy and former 58th Combined Arms Army Commander
Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev stated after the publication of the joint statement that Russia should
not agree to the "unacceptable" 30-day ceasefire proposal because it would allow Ukraine to rearm and
regroup.
The Kremlin has not officially responded to the ceasefire proposal as of this
publication, and Russian state media is attempting to frame earlier official Russian statements about
bilateral US-Russian negotiations as responses to the ceasefire proposal. Following the publication of
the ceasefire proposal, Russian state media largely amplified a statement from Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova from earlier in the day on March 11 saying that Russia "does
not rule out" contacts with the United States in the next few days. Russian State Duma Security Committee
member Mikhail Sheremet stated before the joint statement was released that Russia is interested in a
settlement in Ukraine but will not allow itself to be deceived, and Russian state media only amplified
Sheremet's statement after the ceasefire proposal. Russian state media is likely attempting to portray
the immediate Russian reaction as moderate for domestic audiences until Kremlin officials make public
statements and provide a framing for broader Russian media coverage of the proposal.
Ukraine's
allies and partners from Europe, Asia, and Oceania continue efforts to strengthen the Ukrainian military
and back Ukraine with security guarantees — the most effective deterrent against future Russian
aggression against Ukraine following a potential future peace agreement. French Defense Minister
Sebastien Lecornu stated on March 11 that France "will refuse any form of demilitarization of Ukraine"
and that the "first guarantee of security remains the Ukrainian army." Reuters reported that 34 military
officials from European NATO states, EU states, Asia, and Oceania, met on March 11 in Paris to assess
their militaries' capabilities to maintain Ukraine's long-term military strength and to guarantee
Ukrainian security in the event of a permanent ceasefire in the war. French President Emmanuel Macron
stated after the meeting that Ukraine's partners must "define credible security guarantees" for Ukraine.
A French military official told the Associated Press on March 10 that the meeting would discuss a French
and British plan for the creation of a multinational force that would aim to reassure Ukraine and deter
another large-scale Russian offensive. The official stated that the envisaged force could include heavy
weaponry and weapons stockpiles that participating militaries could deploy to help Ukraine defend itself
in "hours or days" in the event of a renewed Russian attack. A strong Ukrainian military backed by
Western security guarantees continues to be the strongest deterrent against another Russian invasion in
the future, and Russia has been repeatedly insisting on Ukraine's "demilitarization" and disarmament in
order to deny Ukraine this deterrent and allow Russia to renew attacks against Ukraine at a time of
Moscow's choosing in the future.
Bloomberg reported on March 11 that Western security
officials stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin has "no intention" of making compromises on
territory, peacekeepers, or Ukrainian neutrality and that Putin is prepared to continue fighting if he
doesn't achieve his objectives in his war in Ukraine. The officials stated that Putin has deliberately
made "maximalist" demands, knowing that Ukraine and Europe would likely find these demands unacceptable.
Western security officials' reports of the Kremlin's intention to achieve its "maximalist" goals in
Ukraine are consistent with Putin's and other Russian officials' public statements, even as the Kremlin
has attempted to posture itself as open to negotiations and ending the war.
Key Takeaways
• The United States and Ukraine agreed on March 11 to an immediate 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine
contingent on Russia's agreement, and the US reportedly restarted intelligence sharing and military
aid.
• Ukraine's allies and partners from Europe, Asia, and Oceania continue efforts to
strengthen the Ukrainian military and back Ukraine with security guarantees – the most effective
deterrent against future Russian aggression against Ukraine following a potential future peace
agreement.
• Russian forces continue to make confirmed advances in Kursk Oblast and have
likely begun attacking Sudzha.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone
strikes against Russia on the night of March 10 to 11, largely targeting Moscow Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced
near Siversk and Robotyne and in Kursk Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues to expand social
benefits for Russian soldiers who fought in Ukraine, including soldiers who have fought for the militias
of the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics (DNR and LNR) since 2014.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov offered a vague response on March 12 to the US-Ukrainian 30-day
ceasefire proposal. Peskov responded to a question about Russia's response to the joint temporary
ceasefire proposal, stating that "we don't want to get ahead of ourselves." Peskov stated that Russia
expects US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz to inform the
Kremlin about the details of the US-Ukrainian negotiations. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on
March 12 that its sources in the Russian government stated that the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire
proposal surprised the Kremlin, and a source close to the Russian presidential administration stated that
the Kremlin expected the United States to discuss such a proposal with Russia in private before publicly
announcing it, thereby providing the Kremlin time to formulate a prepared response.
Russian
President Vladimir Putin may hold hostage the ceasefire proposal to which Ukraine has agreed in order to
extract preemptive concessions before formal negotiations to end the war have started. Reuters reported
on March 12 that senior Russian sources stated that a deal on the temporary ceasefire would have to "take
into account" Russia's advances on the battlefield and "address concerns." Bloomberg reported
on March 12 that sources familiar with the Kremlin's thinking and the situation stated that Putin will
"stretch the timeline" for agreeing to the temporary ceasefire in order to ensure that his stipulations
"are taken into account." A source close to the Kremlin stated that Russia may demand a halt to weapons
supplies to Ukraine as a condition of agreeing to the temporary ceasefire, but did not specify whether
such a halt would include all international weapons provisions to Ukraine or only those from select
countries. Suspending US or other military assistance to Ukraine during a ceasefire would be extremely
advantageous to Russia, which continues to receive critical supplies and assistance from Iran, North
Korea, and the People's Republic of China. Such an enormous concession would also destroy US leverage in
future negotiations, in addition to violating the conditions under which Ukraine agreed to the ceasefire
in the first place.
Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on March 12 that a source close
to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the Kremlin would "formally" give a "positive
response" to the temporary ceasefire proposal but would also demand "impossible conditions" to which
Ukraine cannot agree. The source stated that Putin wants to remove Ukraine from talks so that Russia can
engage in negotiations with the United States alone while also "correcting the situation on the front" to
strengthen Russia's negotiating position. The source added that the conditions of the temporary ceasefire
"must suit Russia" and that Russia's agreement to a temporary ceasefire during which Ukraine continues to
receive weapons and financing from its partners and allies is "stupid." These leaks may be intentional
and part of a Russian negotiating strategy that aims to push the United States to renegotiate its deal
with Ukraine on the temporary ceasefire.
Key Takeaways
• Kremlin Spokesperson
Dmitry Peskov offered a vague response on March 12 to the US-Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposal.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin may hold hostage the ceasefire proposal to which Ukraine has
agreed in order to extract preemptive concessions before formal negotiations to end the war have
started.
• Senior US and Ukrainian officials have said that the purpose of the temporary
ceasefire is for Russia and Ukraine to demonstrate their willingness for peace and that the temporary
ceasefire and negotiations to end the war are separate matters, whereas the Kremlin may intend to conjoin
them.
• Russian insider reports about the demands that the Kremlin may make before agreeing to
the temporary ceasefire are in line with Russian officials' public statements in the past months.
• US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director John Ratcliffe and Russian Foreign Intelligence
Service (SVR) Head Sergey Naryshkin had a phone call on March 11 amid talks about the war in Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently seized Sudzha amid continued Russian assaults in Kursk Oblast on March
12.
• Russan President Vladimir Putin visited a Russian military command post in Kursk Oblast
for the first time since Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 — demonstrating Putin's
desire to use Russia's seizure of Sudzha to project military success and strength against the backdrop of
the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near
Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova, Toretsk, and
Velyka Novosilka.
Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the ceasefire proposal that the United States and Ukraine
recently agreed upon in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and offered an alternative proposal that undermines US
President Donald Trump's stated goal of securing a lasting peace in Ukraine. Putin claimed on March 13
that he "agrees" with the temporary ceasefire proposal and that the "idea itself is correct" but that the
cessation of hostilities "should be such that it would lead to long-term peace and eliminate the initial
causes" of the war. Putin thus rejected one of the main principles of the US-Ukrainian proposal — that
the temporary ceasefire precede formal negotiations to end the war. Putin also claimed that there are
questions that "require painstaking research from both sides." Putin questioned several aspects of the
US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal. Putin asked what would happen to the remaining Ukrainian
salient in Kursk Oblast and whether Ukraine would be allowed to continue to mobilize forces, train newly
mobilized soldiers, and receive military aid from its partners and allies. Putin questioned the control
and verification measures of a temporary ceasefire and who would give the orders to stop fighting. Putin
suggested that he may call President Trump to discuss the "issues" involved in the ceasefire proposal.
Putin postured military strength during his rejection of the ceasefire proposal, highlighting recent
Russian successes in pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast and claiming that Russian forces are
advancing in "almost all areas of combat."
Putin is offering an alternative ceasefire
agreement that is contrary to the intentions and goals of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal. The
US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal calls for a renewable 30-day cessation of combat operations along the
entire frontline, a moratorium on long-range missile and drone strikes, and a cessation of operations in
the Black Sea. The proposal allows for Russia and Ukraine to extend the ceasefire and assumes the
continuation of US intelligence sharing and US and other military assistance to Ukraine. The US-Ukrainian
ceasefire proposal was explicitly aimed at allowing Russia and Ukraine to demonstrate their willingness
to make peace and separates the temporary ceasefire from future negotiations to end the war.
Putin is holding the ceasefire proposal hostage and is attempting to extract preemptive concessions
ahead of formal negotiations to end the war. Putin refused to accept the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal
on its own terms and is instead demanding additional conditions that would contribute directly to the
Kremlin's war aims. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on March 11 that the US will "know what the
impediment is to peace" in Ukraine if Putin rejected the ceasefire proposal. ISW continues to assess that
Putin is disinterested in good faith peace negotiations to end the war. Putin remains committed to
accomplishing his long-term goals of installing a pro-Russian puppet regime in Ukraine, undermining
Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression and preventing Ukraine's accession
to NATO. Putin's rejection of the ceasefire proposal underscores Putin's commitment to securing his
objectives in Ukraine, particularly Ukraine's demilitarization, and disinterest in any pause in fighting
that does not result in Ukrainian capitulation or at least set conditions for a successful renewal of
Russian offensive operations in the future.
Key Takeaways
• Russian President
Vladimir Putin rejected the ceasefire proposal that the United States and Ukraine recently agreed upon in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and offered an alternative proposal that undermines US President Donald Trump's
stated goal of securing a lasting peace in Ukraine.
• Putin is offering an alternative
ceasefire agreement that is contrary to the intentions and goals of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire
proposal.
• Putin's envisioned ceasefire agreement would grant Russia greatly disproportionate
advantages and set conditions for the Kremlin to renew hostilities on terms extremely favorable to
Russia.
• Putin is holding the ceasefire proposal hostage and is attempting to extract
preemptive concessions ahead of formal negotiations to end the war.
• Russian forces continue
to clear Ukrainian forces from Sudzha and its environs as Russian troops advance closer to the border in
Kursk Oblast slowed on March 13 compared to recent days.
• Russian milbloggers theorized on
March 13 that Russian forces may launch an organized offensive operation into northern Sumy Oblast in the
coming weeks and months and may also attack into Chernihiv Oblast — in line with Russian President
Vladimir Putin's March 12 statements.
• Kremlin officials continue to use narratives similar
to those that the Kremlin has used to justify its invasions of Ukraine to set informational conditions to
justify future aggression against NATO member states.
• Russian forces continue to execute
Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) in violation of international law.
• Russia will likely
expand its permanent military basing in Belarus to enhance Russia’s force posture against NATO’s eastern
flank.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently
advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Siversk, and Toretsk.
• Russia continues its
crypto-mobilization efforts against the backdrop of US efforts to start the negotiation process to end
the war.
>• Putin is holding the ceasefire proposal hostage and is >attempting to extract
preemptive concessions ahead of formal >negotiations to end the war. > >
Die Amis werden (leider) bzgl. Putin Paktfähigkeit auch noch die Lernkurve machen...
ISW has observed no geolocated evidence to indicate that Russian forces have encircled a significant
number of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast or elsewhere along the frontline in Ukraine. Russian President
Vladimir Putin claimed during a press conference on March 13 that Russian forces have "isolated"
Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and that it is "impossible" for small groups of Ukrainian forces to
withdraw from positions in Kursk Oblast. Putin claimed that Ukrainian forces will not be able to leave
Kursk at all "if" Russian forces can conduct a "physical blockade" in the coming days. Putin stated
during a Russian Security Council meeting on March 14 that Russian forces have "blocked" unspecified
Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 14 that Russian
authorities are fabricating claims about the alleged "encirclement" of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast
in order to influence the political and informational scene. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that
Ukrainian forces have regrouped and withdrawn to more advantageous defensive positions in Kursk Oblast
and that Ukrainian forces are not under threat of encirclement.
Russian milbloggers have also
not coalesced around claims that Russian forces have encircled or "blocked" a significant number of
Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast in recent days, but milbloggers may alter their reporting to mirror
Putin's claims in the coming days. Some Russian milbloggers claimed on March 12 and 13 that Russian
forces encircled an unspecified number of Ukrainian forces in an unspecified area of Kursk Oblast, but
many Russian milbloggers published maps on March 13 and 14 acknowledging that Ukrainian forces have
viable egress routes into Sumy Oblast from their remaining positions in Kursk Oblast. At least one
Russian milblogger explicitly questioned claims that Russian forces encircled Ukrainian forces in Kursk
Oblast on March 12, and another complained on March 12 that Russian forces are unable to encircle
Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast because Russian forces cannot conduct rapid, mechanized breakthroughs
into rear Ukrainian areas.
Putin claimed in October 2024 that Russian forces "encircled" 2,000
Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast, but ISW never observed any Russian milblogger claims or geolocated
footage to substantiate Putin's October 2024 claim. Putin has repeatedly failed to acknowledge that the
Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast extends from the Ukrainian-Russian international border and that
Ukrainian forces can transit the sections of the border under Ukrainian control.
Putin seized
on a statement by US President Donald Trump about the supposed encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Kursk
Oblast to distract from his recent rejection of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal. President Trump
stated in a post on Truth Social on March 14 that Russian forces have "completely surrounded" "thousands"
of Ukrainian forces, presumably in Kursk Oblast, and called on Putin to "spare" their lives. Putin
responded directly to Trump's request during the March 14 security council meeting and claimed that
Russian forces will guarantee the "life and decent treatment" of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast if
Ukrainian forces surrender. Putin reiterated unsubstantiated claims that Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast
have committed crimes against Russian civilians in the area and said that Russia considers the Ukrainian
incursion an act of "terrorism." Putin claimed that Ukrainian authorities must order Ukrainian forces to
surrender in order for Russia to implement Trump's request. Putin is attempting to present himself as a
reasonable and merciful leader whom President Trump can engage with and to generate a new narrative to
distract from Putin's decision to reject the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal on March 13.
Key
Takeaways
• ISW has observed no geolocated evidence to indicate that Russian forces have
encircled a significant number of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast or elsewhere along the frontline in
Ukraine.
• Putin seized on a statement by US President Donald Trump about the supposed
encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast to distract from his recent rejection of the
US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal.
• Kremlin statements following Putin's meeting with US
Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff on March 13 underscore Putin's rejection of the
US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal and continued unwillingness to engage in good faith negotiations to end
the war in Ukraine.
• Russian forces marginally advanced towards the international border in
Kursk Oblast on March 14, but Ukrainian forces still maintain limited positions in Kursk Oblast.
• Consistent Ukrainian strikes against Russian air defense assets are reportedly allowing Ukrainian
long-range drones to increasingly penetrate the Russian air defense umbrella in deep rear areas,
including in Moscow Oblast.
• The Ukrainian military reorganized the Ukrainian 3rd Separate
Assault Brigade into the 3rd Army Corps, further showcasing Ukraine's force efforts to transition to a
corps structure.
• Ukraine's European allies continue to provide military assistance and
technical support and demonstrate interest in strengthening bilateral cooperation.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Toretsk and
near Siversk and Pokrovsk.
Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian officials continue to deny Russian President Vladimir Putin's
unsubstantiated claim that Russian forces have encircled a significant number of Ukrainian troops in
Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers published maps on March 14 and 15 showing Russian and Ukrainian
positions in Kursk Oblast that do not indicate Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces, and two
Russian milbloggers explicitly denied Putin's claim that Russian forces encircled a significant number of
Ukrainian forces in the area on March 13 and 14. One milblogger characterized Putin's claims as a
narrative intended to influence US President Donald Trump ahead of peace negotiations. Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky noted that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attempting to encircle
Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast, that no encirclement currently exists, and stated that Putin is
attempting to delay discussion of the US-Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposal by spreading these
claims.Independent Ukrainian sources also denied Putin's claims about Russian encirclements of Ukrainian
forces and noted that Ukrainian forces maintain the ability to maneuver from their remaining positions in
Kursk Oblast despite a difficult tactical situation. ISW has still not observed any Russian milblogger
claims or geolocated footage suggesting that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian troops in Kursk
Oblast. Ukrainian forces appear to maintain egress routes across the international border from their
positions in Kursk Oblast as of this publication.
Russian forces continued offensive
operations in Kursk Oblast but have not completely pushed Ukrainian forces out of the area as of this
publication. Geolocated footage published on March 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in
western Basivka (northeast of Sumy City in Sumy Oblast). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other
Russian sources claimed on March 15 that Russian forces seized Zaoleshenka (immediately west of Sudzha)
and Rubanshchina (west of Sudzha), but ISW has not observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have
seized the entirety of these settlements. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized
Gogolevka (west of Sudzha) and are clearing Guyevo (south of Sudzha). Russian milbloggers claimed that
Ukrainian forces maintain positions near Oleshnya and Gornal (both southwest of Sudzha). Russian forces
continued attacking near Rubanshchina, Gogolevka, and Guyevo. Elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV)
Brigade are reportedly operating near Gogolevka, and elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black
Sea Fleet) and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Guyevo.
Key Takeaways
• Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian officials continue to deny Russian
President Vladimir Putin's unsubstantiated claim that Russian forces have encircled a significant number
of Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk
Oblast but have not completely pushed Ukrainian forces out of the area as of this publication.
• Ukrainian officials expressed concern about Russian ground operations in northern Sumy Oblast but
doubt Russia's ability to conduct an effective concerted offensive operation against Sumy City.
• The Kremlin is likely preparing to intensify a narrative that accuses Ukrainian forces of war crimes
in Kursk Oblast in an attempt to discredit the Ukrainian military, erode Western support for Ukraine, and
spoil or delay straightforward discussions about the 30-day ceasefire that US President Donald Trump
proposed to Putin.
• Russian forces conducted drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the
night of March 14 to 15, including conducting their third double-tap strike against Ukraine in the past
week.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed the official Ukrainian delegation to
"engage with Ukraine's international partners" in the negotiation process to end the war on March 15.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy
Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk.
Mit Blick auf die von ihm geforderte „Kriegswirtschaft“ sagte Weber, das
bedeute zum Beispiel beschleunigte Genehmigungsverfahren bei Rüstungsgütern und mehr Zusammenarbeit
zwischen den europäischen Rüstungsherstellern. Aber auch, dass Unternehmen von der Produktion ziviler auf
militärische Produkte umgestellt werden.
„Klare Ansagen bei Beschaffung“ Zudem brauche
Europa ein gemeinsames europäisches Führungskommando, sagte Weber. Ein europäischer Generalstabschef
solle dann „die aufgerüsteten nationalen Armeen befehligen und klare Ansagen bei der Beschaffung machen
können“, verlangte der EVP-Fraktionschef.
>Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian officials continue to deny >Russian President Vladimir
Putin's unsubstantiated claim that >Russian forces have encircled a significant number of >Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast.
Eine Seite sagt so, die andere so, wenn man
nicht direkt selbst vor Ort ist bleibt eine Einschätzung schwierig.
US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz stated on March 16 that Ukraine will receive unspecified security
guarantees in exchange for unspecified territorial concessions. Waltz also stated that the United States
is considering "the reality of the situation on the ground" in diplomatic talks when discussing an end to
the war in Ukraine. It is not clear exactly what Waltz meant by "the reality of the situation on the
ground." Russian officials have frequently used the narrative that any negotiations must consider the
"realities on the ground" to refer to the current frontline in Ukraine and their claims of the
inevitability of further Russian battlefield gains. Waltz's acknowledgement that Ukraine will receive
unspecified security guarantees is a key aspect of achieving US President Donald Trump's stated goal of
securing a lasting peace in Ukraine, but stopping hostilities on indefensible lines would limit the
effectiveness of security guarantees.
The current frontlines do not provide the strategic
depth that Ukraine will need to reliably defend against renewed Russian aggression. Russian forces are
just across the Dnipro River from Kherson City, roughly 25 kilometers from Zaporizhzhia City, and 30
kilometers from Kharkiv City. Russian troops on the Dnipro River could use a ceasefire to prepare for the
extremely difficult task of conducting an opposed river crossing undisturbed, significantly increasing
the likelihood of success in such an endeavor. Stopping a well-prepared, major mechanized offensive cold
is extremely rare in war, which means that a renewed Russian assault would likely threaten both Kharkiv
and Zaporizhzhia cities, as well as key cities in the Donetsk "fortress belt," almost immediately. Russia
is constructing a large highway and railway aimed at connecting major cities in occupied Ukraine and
Russia, which will reinforce Russia's hold on occupied Ukraine and Russia's ability to transport and
supply Russian forces operating in Ukraine in the event of a future Russian offensive in southern
Ukraine.
The US and Europe would likely need to provide military aid to Ukraine more rapidly,
in much larger volumes, and at higher cost the closer the ultimate ceasefire lines are to the current
frontline. Ukraine would likely need an even larger military with greater capabilities to play its
critical role in deterring and, if necessary, defeating future aggression along current frontline (both
within Ukraine and along Ukraine’s international border with Russia) that is over 2,100 kilometers long.
Enforcing a ceasefire along the current frontline would also require the commitment of large numbers of
Western forces. Helping Ukraine regain strategically critical territory, as Trump has suggested he
intends to do, could significantly reduce the cost and difficulty of securing a future peace. A ceasefire
along more defensible positions would also place Russian forces in a more disadvantaged position for
renewed offensive operations, making future Russian aggression less likely.
Russian officials
maintain their maximalist territorial claims over all occupied Ukraine and significant parts of
unoccupied Ukraine, however. Senior Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have
consistently demanded that Ukraine surrender the entirety of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson
oblasts, including areas that Russian forces do not already occupy, and have reiterated these claims in
recent weeks. Russian state media has also recently amplified similar sentiments from Kremlin-affiliated
mouthpieces. Putin recently claimed that "Novorossiya" is an integral part of Russia, and Kremlin
Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov defined "Novorossiya" as all of eastern and southern Ukraine including
Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts. Russia currently occupies a small portion of
Kharkiv Oblast and the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast, and Russian forces are advancing towards the
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border. Continued Kremlin statements demanding that Ukraine cede
unoccupied Ukrainian territory indicate that the Kremlin and Putin remain committed to these territorial
goals despite ongoing negotiations.
Russian officials have given no public indications that
they are willing to make concessions on their territorial or security demands of Ukraine. Accepting
Western-backed security guarantees for Ukraine would be a significant concession for Putin. Putin has
repeatedly called for Ukraine to permanently abandon its goals of joining NATO or any security bloc and
to reject future offers of foreign military assistance, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
recently claimed that Russia will reject the future deployment of any European peacekeepers to Ukraine
and consider any such deployment as the "direct, official, undisguised involvement of NATO countries" in
the war. Russian officials also appear to be generating increased support for their demands in Russian
society despite the costs of Russia's protracted war effort, and Putin likely remains committed to
securing a return for Russia's investment in the war he regards as sufficient. Putin and Kremlin
officials have been regularly broadcasting their demands for Ukrainian territorial and security
concessions beyond the current frontlines to the Russian people, underscoring how unlikely Putin is to
abandon his ambitions in Ukraine even after a ceasefire.
Key Takeaways
• US
National Security Advisor Mike Waltz stated on March 16 that Ukraine will receive unspecified security
guarantees in exchange for unspecified territorial concessions.
• The current frontlines do
not provide the strategic depth that Ukraine will need to reliably defend against renewed Russian
aggression.
• Russian officials maintain their maximalist territorial claims over all
occupied Ukraine and significant parts of unoccupied Ukraine, however.
• Russian officials
have given no public indications that they are willing to make concessions on their territorial or
security demands of Ukraine.
• Russia continues to seize on diplomatic engagements with the
United States to normalize its war demands.
• The United Kingdom (UK) convened a virtual
Coalition of the Willing summit on March 15 to reiterate support for Ukraine and discuss plans for
peace.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Russian forces advanced in Sumy
Oblast and near Velyka Novosilka.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues efforts
to posture as solving issues with the Russian military.
Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have been partially successful in holding the ceasefire
proposal hostage as part of his efforts to extract preemptive concessions from US President Donald Trump
in negotiations to end the war. Trump stated on March 17 that he plans to speak with Putin on March 18
and "wants] to see if he and Putin can bring the war to an end." Trump added that he and Putin will "be
talking about land," "power plants," and "dividing up certain assets." The United States and Ukraine
agreed on March 11 to a 30-day ceasefire proposal that is contingent on Russia's "acceptance and
concurrent implementation." The proposal stated that Ukraine and the United States intend to name their
negotiating teams and immediately begin negotiations toward an enduring peace — noting the distinction
between the temporary ceasefire and future negotiations on a peace settlement. Putin rejected the
temporary ceasefire proposal on March 13 and claimed that the cessation of hostilities "should be such
that it would lead to long-term peace and eliminate the initial causes" of the war. Putin thus rejected
one of the main principles of the US-Ukrainian proposal — that the temporary ceasefire precedes formal
negotiations to end the war. The US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal noted that the United States
and Ukraine discussed the return of prisoners of war (POWs), detained civilians, and forcibly deported
Ukrainian children — all of which will require future talks with Russia. The US-Ukrainian temporary
ceasefire proposal did not mention talks with Russia about Ukrainian territory, energy infrastructure, or
assets. Putin also suggested on March 13 that he may call Trump to discuss "issues" involved in the
ceasefire proposal, such as Ukraine's continued ability to mobilize forces and receive military aid from
partners and allies — issues notably not included in the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal. Putin
is attempting to change the sequence of talks in order to push Trump into making preemptive concessions
on issues that are not part of the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire but are part of Russia's war aims.
The acceptance of these Russian demands in the context of negotiations for an immediate ceasefire would
cede valuable US and Ukrainian leverage during future negotiations to secure a lasting peace in Ukraine.
Russian officials continue to demonstrate that Russia's aim of destroying Ukrainian
sovereignty remains unchanged since before Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022. Russian
Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko claimed in an interview with Kremlin-affiliated outlet
Izvestiya on March 17 that Russia continues to demand that Ukraine be a neutral state and that NATO
states refuse to accept Ukraine as a member. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated to RBK
Ukraine on March 17 that no country should have a "veto" over Ukraine's choice to participate in
alliances, including the EU or NATO. Syhiba noted that Ukraine's NATO aspirations are enshrined in the
Ukrainian Constitution and reflect a "strategic choice of the Ukrainian people." A Russian "veto" of
Ukraine's choices about these matters would amount to a denial of Ukraine's ability to make choices about
its alliances and security arrangements as a sovereign and independent state. Grushko acknowledged during
his interview that Russia's demands for Ukrainian neutrality and NATO's refusal to allow Ukraine into the
alliance are the same demands that Russia made in 2021 before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine —
demonstrating how Russia's demands to destroy Ukraine as an independent, sovereign state have remained
unchanged.
The Kremlin continues to reject the prospect of European peacekeepers in Ukraine,
in opposition to US and Ukrainian positions on the matter and impeding the establishment of a stable,
lasting peace to end the war. Grushko stated on March 17 that Russia will not accept peacekeepers from
the EU, NATO, or individual Western states in post-war Ukraine as Russia considers all of these possible
peacekeeping contingents to be "NATO contingents." Grushko claimed that any talks about future
international peacekeeping missions in Ukraine should only occur after the conclusion of the final peace
agreement to end the war and only if parties to the peace agreement agree that the peace agreement
requires international support. The Kremlin appears to be trying to dictate the timing and sequence of
talks, demanding that final peace talks precede any discussions about peacekeeping missions in post-war
Ukraine. Russia continues to make clear its rejection of any European involvement in post-war Ukraine —
in contradiction to US and Ukrainian positions on the matter. Trump stated on February 26 that Europe
should be responsible for security guarantees for Ukraine, and the joint US-Ukrainian March 11 statement
outlining the temporary ceasefire proposal stated that Ukraine reiterated its positions that European
partners should be involved in the peace process. Sybiha stressed the importance of European support to
assist in monitoring and enforcing the terms of a permanent ceasefire in Ukraine and noted that Ukraine
is already discussing specific details with those European countries willing to deploy peacekeeping
forces to Ukraine. Significant European involvement in post-war Ukraine is critical for any peace
settlement that aims to establish an enduring peace in Ukraine.
A strong Ukrainian military
backed by security guarantees remains the most important component of a sustainable peace in Ukraine and
deterrence of future Russian aggression. Sybiha emphasized that there can be no restriction on Ukraine's
defensive capabilities or military strength in any future peace agreement and that Ukraine must keep
working towards a self-sufficient defense industrial sector to deter further Russian aggression. Sybiha,
responding to a question about Ukraine's fundamental stipulations in "any" future negotiations, stated
that Ukraine will not compromise its territorial integrity and sovereignty and "will never recognize
occupied territories." Discussions on the permanent status of occupied Ukrainian territory should
properly only be a part of negotiations on a permanent settlement of the war.
Key Takeaways
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have been partially successful in holding the
ceasefire proposal hostage as part of his efforts to extract preemptive concessions from US President
Donald Trump in negotiations to end the war.
• Russian officials continue to demonstrate that
Russia's aim of destroying Ukrainian sovereignty remains unchanged since before Russia launched its
full-scale invasion in 2022.
• The Kremlin continues to reject the prospect of European
peacekeepers in Ukraine, in opposition to US and Ukrainian positions on the matter and impeding the
establishment of a stable, lasting peace to end the war.
• A strong Ukrainian military backed
by security guarantees remains the most important component of a sustainable peace in Ukraine and
deterrence of future Russian aggression.
• The United States announced its withdrawal from war
crimes monitoring agencies related to the war in Ukraine – essentially a unilateral concession to Russia
with no Russian concessions in return.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Chief
of General Staff Lieutenant General Anatoliy Barhylevych with Major General Andriy Hnatov on March 16.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near
Toretsk and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian occupation officials
continue to develop analogues to the federal "Time of Heroes" programming in occupied Ukraine as part of
long-term efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia and militarize society in occupied
Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin did not accept the US-Ukrainian proposal for a temporary ceasefire along
the frontline and reiterated his demands for a resolution to the war that amount to Ukrainian
capitulation. Putin and US President Donald Trump held a phone call on March 18. The Kremlin's official
readout of the call stated that Putin emphasized the need to address the "root causes" of the war.
Russian officials have repeatedly defined these root causes as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's
alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine. Russian officials’ calls for
the elimination of these "root causes" amount to Russian demands for Ukraine's permanent neutrality and
the installation of a pro-Russian government in Kyiv.
Putin demanded on March 18 that Ukraine
stop mobilizing (i.e. recruiting and training) forces during a potential temporary ceasefire. Putin also
called for a halt to all foreign military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine but did not discuss
Russia's military support from North Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Iran. Putin claimed
that Russia and the United States should continue their efforts toward a peace settlement in "bilateral
mode," excluding Ukraine or Europe from future negotiations about the war in Ukraine. Putin's demands on
the March 18 call parallel the demands he made on March 13.
ISW continues to assess that Putin
is attempting to hold the temporary ceasefire proposal hostage in order to extract preemptive concessions
ahead of formal negotiations to end the war. ISW also continues to assess that Putin's demands for the
removal of the legitimate government of Ukraine, the weakening of the Ukrainian military such that it
cannot defend against future Russian aggression, and the denial of Ukraine's sovereignty and independence
remain unchanged. The persistence of Putin's demands for Ukraine's capitulation demonstrates that Putin
is not interested in good-faith negotiations to pursue Trump's stated goal of achieving a lasting peace
in Ukraine.
Trump and Putin agreed on a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against
energy infrastructure, but the exact contours of the moratorium remain unclear at this time. The Kremlin
stated that Putin accepted Trump's proposal for a 30-day moratorium on strikes against "energy
infrastructure" and that Putin "immediately gave the Russian military the corresponding order," whereas
the White House stated that Putin and Trump agreed to "an energy and infrastructure ceasefire." It is
unclear which targets are explicitly prohibited under the 30-day moratorium given the difference in
language between the two readouts of the call.
The Kremlin also stated that Putin "informed"
Trump that Russia and Ukraine will each exchange 175 prisoners of war (POWs) on March 19 and that Russia
will also transfer 23 seriously wounded Ukrainian soldiers, whom Putin claimed are currently undergoing
medical treatment in Russian hospitals, as a "gesture of goodwill." The March 11 US-Ukrainian temporary
ceasefire proposal stated that Ukrainian and American delegations discussed POW exchanges as part of the
peace process, particularly during a potential temporary ceasefire on the frontline. The White House
stated on March 18 that Russia and the United States will "immediately" begin negotiations in an
unspecified country in the Middle East about a temporary maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea, a "full
ceasefire," and a permanent peace settlement. The Kremlin stated that the United States and Russia are
creating "expert groups" to continue efforts to achieve a peace settlement "in bilateral mode."
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky endorsed the Trump-Putin energy strikes moratorium agreement on
March 18 and said that Ukraine expects to receive additional information from Trump about the proposal.
Zelensky stated that Ukraine would not accept a situation in which Russia strikes Ukrainian energy
infrastructure and Ukraine is unable to respond.
Key Takeaways
• Russian President
Vladimir Putin did not accept the US-Ukrainian proposal for a temporary ceasefire along the frontline and
reiterated his demands for a resolution to the war that amount to Ukrainian capitulation.
• Trump and Putin agreed on a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure,
but the exact contours of the moratorium remain unclear at this time.
• Putin continues to
hold the temporary ceasefire hostage, likely to extract further concessions from US President Donald
Trump and delay or spoil negotiations for an enduring peace in Ukraine.
• Russian forces
recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid intensified Russian offensive operations in the area,
likely as part of efforts to leverage Russia's deliberate stalling of the temporary ceasefire proposal to
make battlefield gains.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove, and Russian
forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova.
• The Russian military is reportedly
increasing the number of its information and psychological operations units.
Russia and Ukraine have not formally announced the implementation of the temporary long-range strikes
ceasefire. Ceasefires take time to negotiate, execute, and monitor and require both sides to agree to
cease attacks on specified targets at a specific time and date. Ceasefires also require both sides to
agree to mechanisms to monitor the ceasefire and to address allegations of violations. Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 19 that if Russia and Ukraine come to a temporary strikes
ceasefire agreement, then Ukraine will prepare a list of "civilian objects, energy objects,
infrastructure objects" to give to Ukraine's partners — indicating that Russia and Ukraine have not
finalized the details of which targets would be off limits or agreed on an implementation date.
Official American, Ukrainian, and Russian statements indicate that the parties to the ceasefire have
not yet finalized the details of the agreement. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on March 19
that the temporary ceasefire only applies to "energy infrastructure facilities," and Kremlin newswire
TASS reported that Peskov declined to comment on the White House statement — likely referring to the
March 18 White House statement following the call between US President Donald Trump and Russian President
Vladimir Putin — that the ceasefire applied to "energy and infrastructure." Trump told the Washington
Examiner on March 18 after his call with Putin that Russia agreed to "an immediate ceasefire on energy
and infrastructure." US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff similarly stated on March 18 after
the call that the temporary ceasefire covers "energy and infrastructure in general." The Trump
administration's statement following Trump's March 19 call with Zelensky stated that Trump and Zelensky
"agreed on a partial ceasefire against energy." Zelensky stated on March 19 that Ukraine is "ready to
implement" a ceasefire on strikes against "energy and civilian infrastructure."
Russian
President Vladimir Putin is adding confusion about the timing and details of the ceasefire in an attempt
to falsely blame Ukraine for violating the ceasefire before both countries have officially implemented
the agreement. The Kremlin is attempting to posture Russia as already adhering to the temporary ceasefire
while claiming that Ukraine is violating the ceasefire — even though both parties have not agreed on the
details of the agreement or officially implemented the ceasefire. The Kremlin readout of the March 18
phone call between Putin and Trump stated that Putin "immediately gave the Russian military" an order
that "corresponded" with his "positive response" to Trump's temporary ceasefire proposal. The Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that seven Russian drones were en route to striking Ukrainian energy
facilities connected to defense industrial enterprises in Mykolaiv Oblast when Putin issued the order to
the Russian military. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces received orders to "neutralize" the
drones and that Russian forces used Pantsir air defense systems to down six drones and that a Russian
Aerospace Forces (VKS) fighter jet destroyed the other. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces
launched a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 18 to 19, and
Zelensky noted on March 19 that Russian drones had struck a hospital in Sumy Oblast and unspecified areas
in Donetsk Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian drones struck an oil transshipment facility in
Krasnodar Krai following the Trump-Putin call and attempted to frame the Ukrainian strike as a violation
of the ceasefire agreement. Russian claims that Russia adhered to the ceasefire by abstaining from
conducting strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and that Ukraine violated the ceasefire are
inaccurate as Russia and Ukraine have not yet officially implemented the agreement. Such Russian claims
are attempts to take advantage of the lack of clarity about the details of the ceasefire that the Kremlin
is injecting. Putin's attempt to confuse and manipulate the temporary strikes ceasefire and blame Ukraine
for violations even before the agreement has come into effect is an indicator of how Putin will likely
exploit any future agreements.
Key Takeaways
• Russia and Ukraine have not formally
announced the implementation of the temporary long-range strikes ceasefire.
• Official
American, Ukrainian, and Russian statements indicate that the parties to the ceasefire have not yet
finalized the details of the agreement.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is adding confusion
about the timing and details of the ceasefire in an attempt to falsely blame Ukraine for violating the
ceasefire before both countries have officially implemented the agreement.
• The Kremlin
continues to contradict Trump's report of his call with Putin on March 18.
• The Kremlin
continues to demand that Ukraine cede Ukrainian territory that Russia does not currently occupy and to
set conditions to make further territorial demands.
• The United States, Ukraine, and Europe
continue to agree that Ukraine and Europe must be involved in peace negotiations to end the war, despite
Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to exclude Ukraine and Europe from such negotiations.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on March 19.
• The Russian
Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz
Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, described recent Russian deception tactics that may amount to
acts of perfidy — a war crime under the Geneva Convention.
• Ukrainian forces recently
advanced in Belgorod Oblast and near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar,
Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian milbloggers argued that the Russian
government should give military awards and social benefits to military instructors and Russian defense
industrial base (DIB) employees.
>• The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main >Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head
and Akhmat Spetsnaz >Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, described recent >Russian
deception tactics that may amount to acts of perfidy — >a war crime under the Geneva
Convention.
Acts of perfidy?
Man lernt. In Praxis wohl das Tragen
ukrainischer Uniformen.
Article 37 - Prohibition of perfidy
(d) the feigning
of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral or other
States not Parties to the conflict. 2. Ruses of war are not prohibited.
Die Aussagen von John Bolten würde ich nicht allzu ernst nehmen. Der ist noch immer sauer, weil ihn
Trump, während der 1. Amtszeit, als Berater rausgeschmissen hat. Bolton, einer der für mehr Krieg, als
weniger Krieg eintritt..
"The U.S. leader called Bolton “a disgruntled boring fool who only
wanted to go to war. Never had a clue, was ostracized & happily dumped. What a dope!”
Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against Engels Airbase in Saratov Oblast on the night of March
19 to 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 20 that elements of Ukraine's Security Service
(SBU), Unmanned Systems Forces, Special Operations Forces (SSO), and other Ukrainian forces struck the
Engels Airbase in Saratov Oblast causing a fire, explosions, and a secondary detonation of ammunition in
the vicinity of the airfield. Geolocated footage and other footage published on March 20 show an
explosion and fire at the Engels Airbase. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces use
Engels Airbase to conduct missile strikes against Ukraine, and an SBU source told Ukrainian news outlet
Suspilne that Engels is a key base for Russian strategic aviation, housing Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3, and Tu-160
strategic bombers as well as FAB and KAB glide bombs and cruise missiles storage facilities. Ukrainian
Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that the Ukrainian strike
destroyed a large number of Russian Kh-101 cruise missiles that Russian forces use in nightly strikes
against Ukraine. Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed on March 20 that Ukrainian forces
conducted the "most massive drone strike of all time" against Saratov Oblast and that Ukrainian drones
struck civilian infrastructure near Engels and caused a fire near the base.
Russia, Ukraine,
and the United States have not yet concluded the details of the moratorium against energy infrastructure
strikes. The Ukrainian strike against Engels Airbase would not have been subject to this moratorium in
any event because it is a military target. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria
Zakharova absurdly accused Ukraine of violating the Russia-Ukraine 30-day moratorium on strikes against
"energy infrastructure" by targeting the Engels Air Base. Russian forces notably conducted strikes
against Ukrainian energy and other infrastructure on both nights since Russian President Vladimir Putin's
March 18 statements agreeing to the moratorium.
The Kremlin announced that Russia and the
United States will hold another round of talks in Riyadh, Saudia Arabia on March 24, and it is unclear
whether these talks will include Ukraine. Russian Presidential Aide for International Affairs Yuriy
Ushakov announced on March 20 that Russian Federation Council International Affairs Committee Chairperson
Grigory Karasin and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Director's advisor, Colonel General Sergei
Beseda, will lead the Russian delegation in bilateral discussions on the technical details of a possible
maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea with US officials in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on March 24. Beseda served
as the Director of the FSB's Fifth Directorate, which is officially tasked with overseeing operational
information and international relations, from 2009 to 2024. Karasin worked in Russia's MFA from the 1970s
to 2019 and served as a Deputy Foreign Minister in 1996 and from 2005 to 2019, when Karasin joined the
Federation Council. Karasin has headed the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs since
2021. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated on March 20 that
Russian MFA representatives will not participate in the March 24 talks in Riyadh. US State Department
Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on March 19 in response to a question about whether these talks will be
bilateral or trilateral that it is "still being discussed or arranged."
Key Takeaways
Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against Engels Airbase in Saratov Oblast on the night of
March 19 to 20.
Russia, Ukraine, and the United States have not yet concluded the details of
the moratorium against energy infrastructure strikes. The Ukrainian strike against Engels Airbase would
not have been subject to this moratorium in any event because it is a military target.
The
Kremlin announced that Russia and the United States will hold another round of talks in Riyadh, Saudia
Arabia on March 24, and it is unclear whether these talks will include Ukraine.
Kremlin
officials continue to amplify narratives indicating that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains
committed to his long-standing goal of conquering Ukraine and is attempting to leverage upcoming
ceasefire negotiations to secure preemptive concessions from Ukraine and the United States.
Kremlin officials are also working to exacerbate tension between the United States and its European
allies in order to break Western support for Ukraine and undermine the NATO alliance.
Putin
continues to condition domestic Russian audiences to prepare for a protracted war in Ukraine rather than
a sustainable peace built on compromise.
The Kremlin is intensifying efforts to change the
demographic makeup of occupied Ukraine in order to legitimize Putin's claim over occupied areas.
The Kremlin also continues Russifying Ukrainian children in occupied areas to further the destruction
of Ukrainian national and cultural identity and to portray Russia as the humane governor of occupied
Ukraine.
Kremlin officials continue advertising the possibility of future economic cooperation
with the United States, likely to extract preemptive concessions from the United States in ceasefire or
peace negotiations.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump spoke
about investments in Ukraine's energy infrastructure during their call on March 19.
US State
Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce condemned North Korea's involvement in Russia's war against Ukraine
on March 19 and expressed concern about Russian support to North Korea.
Ukraine’s allies
continue to provide financial and material military assistance to Ukraine, including funds from frozen
Russian assets in Europe.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast and Russian
forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russia may extend military veteran status to Russian milbloggers and military correspondents covering
the war in Ukraine, likely in an effort to further coopt and appease the Russian ultranationalist
milblogger community.
The Kremlin is weaponizing ongoing ceasefire negotiations and deliberately misrepresenting the status and
terms of a future ceasefire agreement in order to delay and undermine negotiations for a settlement to
the war. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 21 that Ukrainian forces blew up the
Sudzha gas distribution station in Kursk Oblast while withdrawing on the night of March 20 to 21 in order
to discredit Russian President Vladimir Putin's "peace initiatives" and to provoke Russia. The Ukrainian
General Staff denied the Russian MoD's claim and stated that Russian forces shelled the station, causing
a fire. The Ukrainian General Staff warned that Russian authorities are attempting to mislead the
international community and discredit Ukraine. Footage published on March 21 shows a fire at the station,
although ISW cannot independently verify the cause of the fire. Russian officials seized on the fire to
claim falsely that Ukrainian forces violated the proposed 30-day ceasefire banning Russian and Ukrainian
strikes on civilian and energy facilities, which is not yet formally in effect and terms of which remain
disputed. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russian forces are "implementing" an order from
Putin to refrain from striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure in accordance with the US ceasefire
proposal. Russian milbloggers observed that the ceasefire proposal has not come into force yet, however,
and acknowledged that Russia has continued nightly strikes on Ukraine, including Ukraine's port
infrastructure in Odesa Oblast, in recent days. Founder of the Kremlin-awarded Rybar telegram channel,
Mikhail Zvinchuk, recently published a video of himself mocking US officials for believing that Russia is
currently or intends to commit to the proposed temporary ceasefire in the area. The exact contours of
Putin's supposed order or a future moratorium on energy and infrastructure strikes between Russia and
Ukraine remain unclear as of this report.
Kremlin officials are leveraging narratives about
Ukrainian strikes and combat operations in Russian territory to justify rejecting peace negotiations with
Ukraine and continuing the war to a domestic Russian audience. Peskov claimed in reaction to the Sudzha
gas distribution station fire that Ukraine's denial of blowing up the station "shows how much one can
believe and trust" Ukrainian officials. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria
Zakharova asked how the United States will "manage" Ukraine given Ukraine's alleged violation of the
moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes (that has yet to be finalized and implemented). Zakharova's
and Peskov's comments are an effort to revive the narrative that Ukraine is the aggressor in this war,
that Ukraine only acts under guidance or pressure from the West, and that the war in Ukraine is an
existential risk to the Russian state to which Russia must respond. Russian authorities have also revived
narratives accusing Ukrainian forces of targeting Russian nuclear power plants and committing war crimes
against Russian civilians to undermine Ukraine's credibility and heighten the invented existential threat
to domestic audiences. The Russian Investigative Committee published a summary on March 21 of ongoing
criminal investigations, cases, and convictions of Ukrainian soldiers and high-level commanders for
allegedly targeting the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and civilians in strikes. ISW recently assessed
that the Kremlin was preparing to intensify narratives accusing Ukrainian forces of war crimes in Kursk
Oblast to discredit the Ukrainian military, erode Western support for Ukraine, and spoil or delay talks
about temporary ceasefire proposals.
Key Takeaways
The Kremlin is weaponizing
ongoing ceasefire negotiations and deliberately misrepresenting the status and terms of a future
ceasefire agreement in order to delay and undermine negotiations for a settlement to the war.
Kremlin officials are leveraging narratives about Ukrainian strikes and combat operations in Russian
territory to justify rejecting peace negotiations with Ukraine and continuing the war to a domestic
Russian audience.
US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated that US officials will
conduct "shuttle diplomacy" to engage bilaterally with both Ukrainian and Russian delegations in Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia.
Russia continues to strengthen its bilateral relations with North Korea, despite
growing warnings from the US against deeper Russian-North Korean cooperation.
Russian
officials also continue to deepen ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Ukraine's
European allies continue efforts to provide Ukraine with military assistance and bolster Ukraine's
defense industrial base (DIB).
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast. Russian
forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
Ukrainian
and Western defense officials estimated that the Russian monthly casualty rate is between 20,000 and
35,000 servicemembers.
US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff uncritically amplified a number of Russian demands,
claims, and justifications regarding the war in Ukraine during an interview on March 21. Witkoff told
American media personality Tucker Carlson in an interview published on March 21 that Russia "100 percent"
does not want to invade Europe and that Russia "does not need to absorb Ukraine." Witkoff stated that
Russia "reclaimed" five regions in Ukraine — Crimea and Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts
— and that Russia "has gotten what wants" and will not want more. The Kremlin has repeatedly and
falsely claimed that Crimea and these four oblasts are Russian territory contrary to international law,
and Witkoff's statement about Russia "reclaiming" these areas (which Russia has illegally occupied and
annexed) amplifies the Kremlin's justifications for its expansionist territorial demands and multiple
invasions of Ukraine.
Vladislav Surkov, a former close adviser to Russian President Vladimir
Putin, recently reiterated a number of longstanding Kremlin claims and ambitions that directly contradict
Witkoff's assertions in an interview with French media aimed at Western audiences. Surkov previously
served as a long-time close advisor to Putin and organized protests in Crimea against the Ukrainian
government in 2014. Surkov also oversaw the Kremlin's 2014-2015 project to promote the creation of
"Novorossiya" (an amorphous, invented region in Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all
of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia) in eastern Ukraine. Putin relieved
Surkov of his duties as Presidential Aide in February 2020. Surkov stated in an interview with French
outlet L'Express on March 19 that a Russian victory in Ukraine would be the "military or military and
diplomatic crushing of Ukraine" and the "division of this artificial quasi-state into its natural
fragments." Surkov stated that Russia will achieve this strategic objective — which Surkov stated has not
changed since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 — even if there are
"maneuvers, slowdowns, and pauses along the way." Surkov stated that the return of Ukraine to Russia's
desired and self-defined sphere of influence has been a Russian objective since the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Surkov claimed that "Ukraine is an artificial political entity" consisting of "at least"
three regions — the "Russian" southern and eastern Ukraine, the "Russian-non-Russian" central area, and
the "anti-Russian" west. Surkov claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine "will separate the Russians and the
anti-Russians" and will "confine" the "anti-Russians" to their "historical territory" such that they
"stop spreading across Russian soil." Surkov claimed that "perhaps" Ukraine will exist as a "real state"
in the future but as a much smaller entity. Surkov implied that Europe will be involved in the future
partitioning of Ukraine, claiming that "a balanced division of Ukraine will have to include a share for
Brussels." Surkov responded to a question about how he sees Russian borders, stating that the ideology of
the Russian World (Russkiy Mir) "has no borders" and exists "everywhere there is Russian influence,"
including cultural, military, economic, ideological, or humanitarian influence. Surkov claimed that
Russia's influence varies across regions in the world, but "is never zero." Surkov claimed that Russia
"will spread out in all directions." The Kremlin has repeatedly used the idea of the Russian World to
justify Russian military interventions into former Soviet states and to claim that areas of the former
Soviet Union and Russian Empire are historical Russian territories. Surkov's statements about Russia's
claims over southern and eastern Ukraine and the future expansion of Russkiy Mir are in direct contrast
to Witkoff's statement that Russia has no territorial ambitions beyond Crimea and Luhansk, Donetsk,
Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.
Witkoff's statements undermine US President Donald Trump's
stated desired end state for the war in Ukraine that achieves an enduring peace and is in the best
interests of the United States, Ukraine, and Europe. Trump has said that the United States will try to
return as much territory to Ukraine as possible. Trump also recently stated that the United States is
interested in taking control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), which Russian forces
currently occupy — implying that Russia would have to cede this territory in Zaporizhia Oblast before the
United States can take control of the ZNPP. Witkoff's March 21 presentation of Russia's territorial
demands for the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — including areas of these
four oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy — undermines Trump's efforts to achieve a
resolution to the war favorable to US interests. Ceding territory in these four oblasts to Russia —
either along the current frontlines or along the oblasts' administrative boundaries – would not provide
Ukraine with the defensible lines required to reliably defend against renewed Russian aggression in the
future, hindering Trump's stated objective of securing a lasting, sustainable peace in Ukraine. Witkoff
also claimed that Ukrainian officials have "conceded" that Ukraine will not be a member of NATO — a
preemptive US concession to Russia on one of the Kremlin's main demands as Russia continues to make no
concessions in return. Witkoff's statements appear to yield to multiple Kremlin demands before the start
of official negotiations for a peace settlement, ceding valuable US and Ukrainian leverage over Russia in
future negotiations that the United States will need in order to achieve Trump's desired end to the
war.
Key Takeaways
US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff uncritically
amplified a number of Russian demands, claims, and justifications regarding the war in Ukraine during an
interview on March 21.
Vladislav Surkov, a former close adviser to Russian President Vladimir
Putin, recently reiterated a number of longstanding Kremlin claims and ambitions that directly contradict
Witkoff's assertions in an interview with French media aimed at Western audiences.
Surkov's
statements are consistent with those made by Putin and senior Russian officials, who have recently and
repeatedly stated that Russia intends to bring Ukraine under Russian control and establish suzerainty
over neighboring countries in order to weaken the West and strengthen Russia's global influence.
Witkoff uncritically repeated several inaccurate Russian claims regarding the status of the Ukrainian
territories that Russia illegally occupies.
Witkoff's statements undermine US President Donald
Trump's stated desired end state for the war in Ukraine that achieves an enduring peace and is in the
best interests of the United States, Ukraine, and Europe.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced
near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia
Oblast.
The Kremlin continues to innovate new ways to leverage conscripts to increase the pool
of servicemembers eligible for military service in the future.
US and Ukrainian officials are meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on the evening of March 23 to discuss the
contours of the temporary moratorium on long-range strikes and a possible temporary maritime ceasefire in
the Black Sea. An unnamed US official told the Financial Times (FT) on March 23 that the talks will cover
the technical aspects of the temporary strikes moratorium, including monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms, and Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhiy Tykhyi added that the
talks will define the scope of this ceasefire. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov is leading the
Ukrainian delegation, which also includes Ukrainian Presidential Office deputy heads Pavlo Palisa and
Ihor Zhovka, Deputy Energy Minister Mykola Kolisnyk, MFA State Secretary Oleksandr Karasevich, and
several unspecified military officers. FT reported that the US delegation includes US National Security
Council member Andrew Peek and State Department Policy Planning Director Michael Anton. A Ukrainian
official told the New York Times (NYT) that the US and Ukrainian delegations may hold additional talks on
March 24 depending on the progress of negotiations. The US-Ukrainian meeting is ongoing as of this
publication and ISW will report on the details of the talks in-depth on March 24.
Unconfirmed
reports suggest that there is tension between Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina and the
Kremlin over Russia's high interest rate and wartime monetary policies. A Russian insider source claimed
on March 23 that the Russian Federation Council Accounts Chamber (the Russian Federation’s highest audit
body) recently initiated an audit of the Russian Central Bank to investigate its monetary policy from
2022 to 2024 and the impact of the interest rate on inflation, budget expenditures, and investment. The
source claimed that the investigation is "effectively" an attack on Nabiullina. The insider source
claimed that a group of lobbyists from large Russian businesses seek interest rate reductions. ISW cannot
independently verify this insider source's claim and has not observed other reporting about the alleged
audit.
Russian inflation has been rising due to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and
the Russian Central Bank decided in December 2024 to maintain the key interest rate at 21 percent – the
highest Russian interest rate since 2003 – as part of efforts to curb growing inflation rates. The
Russian Central Bank‘s interest rate through 2025 has remained relatively conservative despite
significant and growing inflationary pressures. The Kremlin has claimed in recent months that the
inflation rate is about nine to 10 percent, but these figures are likely far below the actual inflation
rate, which is likely closer to 20 to 25 percent. Russia's current interest rate should likely be higher,
and the Kremlin likely pressured the Central Bank to keep the rate at 21 percent when the Central Bank
should have increased it to curb inflation.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has also
attempted to shift blame for the rising inflation rate on the Central Bank, and on Nabiullina in
particular. This was likely in an effort to draw the ire of the Russian business community away from the
Kremlin and onto her, although Nabiullina likely has not been able to exercise fully independent monetary
policy. The audit on the Central Bank may be part of the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to apply political
pressure on the bank to prevent further interest rate hikes beyond the current rate of 21 percent, manage
the expectations and frustrations of the Russian business community, and further the Kremlin's narrative
about Russia's economic stability. The Kremlin’s continued manipulation of the Central Bank's decisions
is likely hampering the Russian government's ability to enact sound wartime monetary policies.
Key Takeaways
US and Ukrainian officials are meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on the evening
of March 23 to discuss the contours of the temporary moratorium on long-range strikes and a possible
temporary maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea.
Unconfirmed reports suggest that there is
tension between Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina and the Kremlin over Russia's high
interest rate and wartime monetary policies.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova,
and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
US and Russian delegations met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on March 24 following US–Ukrainian talks on March
23 about the details of temporary ceasefires on long-range strikes and in the Black Sea. Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 23 that the US–Ukrainian talks are "more technical in
nature." Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on March 23 that the US–Ukrainian talks
discussed proposals for the safety of energy and infrastructure facilities and that the talks were
"productive and focused." A source familiar with the bilateral negotiations in Saudi Arabia told
Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the Russian-US meeting on March 24 will consider the ceasefire agreements
that Ukraine agreed to on March 23. The source stated that the discussions focused on moratoriums on
strikes against energy facilities and civilian infrastructure and attacks in the Black Sea. Ukrainian
Presidential Office Advisor Serhii Leshchenko stated that the US–Ukrainian talks concerned a ceasefire
against strikes on Russian "facilities at seas and rivers" and against Ukrainian ports in Kherson,
Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts. Leshchenko stated that the Ukrainian delegation will hold additional
discussions with the US delegation following the US–Russian talks on March 24. Suspilne reported that the
US delegation in the US–Russian talks includes State Department Policy Planning Director Michael Anton,
US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg, and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and that the Russian
delegation includes Russian Federation Council International Affairs Committee Chairperson Grigory
Karasin and Advisor to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Colonel General Sergei Beseda.
Saudi Arabian state-owned outlet Al Arabiya reported that US National Security Council member Andrew Peek
is also participating in the US delegation in the US–Russian talks. Kremlin wire TASS reported that the
US and Russian delegations will release a joint statement on March 25. ISW will report on the details of
the various bilateral talks as information becomes available in the coming days.
Key
Takeaways
• US and Russian delegations met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on March 24 following
US–Ukrainian talks on March 23 about the details of temporary ceasefires on long-range strikes and in the
Black Sea.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Demidovka along the international border in
northwestern Belgorod Oblast amid ongoing Ukrainian attacks in the area.
• The Kremlin is
recirculating existing narratives aimed at undermining support for Ukraine amid the negotiations in
Riyadh and likely remains uninterested in conducting meaningful negotiations to end the war.
• Russia continues to persecute religious minorities, especially Evangelical Christian communities in
occupied Kherson Oblast as part of a wider campaign in occupied Ukraine aimed at destroying independent
Ukrainian national and religious identities.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod
Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk,
Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian forces are reportedly failing to adequately
provision first person view (FPV) drone units amid ongoing efforts to centralize Russian drone operations
under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached some agreements for temporary ceasefires on strikes against
energy infrastructure and in the Black Sea. The details of these ceasefires remain unclear and evaluating
the ceasefires’ specifics in the absence of officially published joint texts of the agreements signed by
Russia and Ukraine remains difficult. The White House issued one readout about the outcomes of the
US-Russian talks in Saudi Arabia from March 24 and another about the US-Ukrainian talks from March 25.
The Kremlin and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov each issued separate statements for Russia and
Ukraine. The American, Russian, and Ukrainian statements share some commonalities but differ from each
other significantly in other regards. The US readouts, the Kremlin readout, and Umerov commonly stated
that the United States, Ukraine, and Russia "agreed to develop measures for implementing" US President
Donald Trump's, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's, and Russian President Vladimir Putin's
"agreement to ban strikes against energy facilities of Russia and Ukraine." Zelensky stated that Ukraine
also gave the United States a list of "strategic infrastructure objects" that Ukraine would like
protected under a strikes ceasefire. This list is not explicitly mentioned in the US or Russian readouts.
The Kremlin later issued a list of Russian and Ukrainian facilities that Russian and American delegations
agreed fall under the temporary ceasefire on strikes on the energy system. The Kremlin stated that the
list includes oil refineries; oil and gas pipelines and storage facilities, including pumping stations;
electricity generation and transmission infrastructure, including power plants, substations,
transformers, and distributors; nuclear power plants; and hydroelectric dams. It is unclear if the
Russian list of objects is the same list of “strategic infrastructure objects” that Zelensky mentioned.
The Kremlin stated that the temporary ceasefire is valid for 30 days starting from March 18, 2025,
meaning that the ceasefire will by default expire on April 17, 2025, unless Russia and Ukraine mutually
agree to renew it. The Kremlin stated that Russia and Ukraine have the right to consider themselves free
from the obligations of the agreement if one of the parties violates the agreement. The mechanisms to
monitor and address allegations of violations remain unclear. The Kremlin's list notably only includes
energy infrastructure facilities, and it remains unclear whether discussions regarding Zelensky's list of
other non-energy facilities that he wants protected under the ceasefire are still ongoing or whether the
Kremlin has rejected Zelensky's proposal. Umerov also stated that Ukraine is ready to "ready to organize
a separate meeting at the technical level to begin work on implementation mechanisms" for the strikes and
Black Sea ceasefires and that "at this point, all parties are going to brief the relevant leadership, and
we will announce the dates and times soon." The Kremlin's and Umerov's statements suggest that Russia and
Ukraine may not yet be in agreement about whether the ceasefire has gone into effect or not as of March
25.
The US readouts of its bilateral meetings in Saudi Arabia and Umerov noted that the United
States, Ukraine, and Russia "agreed to ensure safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent
the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea." The Kremlin readout of the
US-Russian talks similarly stated that the United States and Russia agreed to such measures as part of a
"Black Sea Initiative," but added that there need to be "appropriate control measures through inspection
of such vessels." Umerov uniquely added that all Russian military vessels movement "outside of
eastern part of the Black Sea" will constitute a violation of the spirit of this agreement and that
Ukraine will regard such movement as a violation of the commitment to ensure the safe navigation of the
Black Sea and a threat Ukraine's national security. Umerov stated that Ukraine will be able to exercise
its right to self-defense in the event of such violations.
All readouts of the March 23 to 25
bilateral meetings noted that the parties "welcome the good offices of third countries with a view toward
supporting the implementation of the energy and maritime agreements" and that all parties "will continue
working toward achieving a durable and lasting peace." (Turkey notably helped facilitate the July 2022
grain deal by inspecting commercial vessels transporting foodstuffs in the Black Sea.) The White House
and Umerov stated that the United States and Ukraine "agreed that the United States remains committed to
helping achieve prisoners of war (POWs) exchanges, the release of civilian detainees, and the return of
forcibly transferred Ukrainian children."
Putin continues to reject Trump's and Zelensky's
proposed temporary frontline ceasefire, despite agreeing to some form of ceasefire for strikes on energy
infrastructure and in the Black Sea. Putin’s persistent stalling and intransigence are inhibiting Trump's
efforts to secure a lasting and stable peace settlement. The US readouts for both its meetings with
Russian and Ukrainian delegations noted that Trump's "imperative that the killing on both sides" of the
war must stop, "as the necessary step toward achieving an enduring peace settlement" — likely in
reference to the unconditional 30-day general ceasefire on the frontline that Trump and Zelensky have
already agreed upon, but that Putin rejected on March 18.
Key Takeaways
• US,
Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached some agreements for temporary ceasefires on strikes against
energy infrastructure and in the Black Sea. The details of these ceasefires remain unclear and evaluating
the ceasefires’ specifics in the absence of officially published joint texts of the agreements signed by
Russia and Ukraine remains difficult.
• The Kremlin's and Umerov's statements suggest that
Russia and Ukraine may not yet be in agreement about whether the ceasefire has gone into effect or not as
of March 25.
• Putin continues to reject Trump's and Zelensky's proposed temporary frontline
ceasefire, despite agreeing to some form of ceasefire for strikes on energy infrastructure and in the
Black Sea. Putin’s persistent stalling and intransigence are inhibiting Trump's efforts to secure a
lasting and stable peace settlement.
• The Kremlin stated that it will not implement the
agreed ceasefire in the Black Sea until the United States lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned
agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations involved in international
food and fertilizer trade.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border
area, near Toretsk, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian military continues to deny
rotations to soldiers who have been fighting in the war in Ukraine for years.
The details of the ceasefire agreements on energy strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea that
US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached on March 24 and 25 remain unclear. Russia and Ukraine appear
to agree that a ceasefire against strikes on energy infrastructure is active as of March 25, but US and
Ukrainian statements continue to make clear that technical negotiations are ongoing. Ukrainian
Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa stated on March 26 that Ukraine is still working to develop
monitoring mechanisms for the ceasefires, which is consistent with US, Russian, and Ukrainian statements
on March 25 jointly agreeing to develop measures to implement the energy infrastructure ceasefire. Palisa
stated that both ceasefires on Black Sea operations and strikes against energy infrastructure came into
force upon the publication of the joint US-Ukrainian statement on March 25. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry
Peskov claimed on March 26 that Russian forces are implementing Russian President Vladimir Putin's March
18 order to adhere to the ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes. The absence of officially published
joint texts of the agreements that Ukraine and Russia signed continues to make evaluating the specifics
of these ceasefires difficult, and the ceasefire terms remain unclear.
Russia and Ukraine
exchanged accusations of strikes and ceasefire violations, although the ceasefire terms remain unclear.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukrainian forces of attempting to strike energy
infrastructure in Kursk Oblast on March 25, gas infrastructure in occupied Crimea overnight on March 25
to 26, and electrical infrastructure in Bryansk Oblast on March 26. The Ukrainian General Staff responded
on March 26 and denied the Russian MoD's accusations. Kursk Oblast Acting Governor Alexander Khinshtein,
Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov, and Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz notably did not
report Ukrainian drone strikes in their respective regions. Russian governors and occupation officials
typically publicly announce when Ukrainian drones attempt to strike infrastructure in their regions.
Ukrainian Presidential Communications Advisor Dmytro Lytvyn stated on March 25 that Russian forces have
conducted eight strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities since March 18, when Putin claimed to have ordered
the Russian military to stop strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure facilities. Ukrainian
officials have reported that Russian overnight strike series have damaged civilian infrastructure across
Ukraine almost every night since March 18 but have not specified which strikes specifically damaged
energy infrastructure.
Russian officials explicitly rejected US President Donald Trump's
recent suggestion that the United States could be involved in operating the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia
Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Trump stated on March 19 during a phone call with Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky that the United States is interested in taking control of the ZNPP, which Russian
forces currently occupy — implying that Russia would have to cede this territory in Zaporizhia Oblast
before the United States can take control of the ZNPP. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
stated on March 26 that the transfer of the ZNPP's territory or control over it to Ukraine or any other
country is "impossible" and that the possibility of Russia jointly operating the ZNPP with any country is
"unacceptable." The Russian MFA added that it would be "absurd" to allow any international organization
to help operate the ZNPP. The Russian MFA attempted to justify Russia's illegal occupation of the ZNPP by
claiming that Russian President Vladimir Putin's October 2022 decree legally brought the ZNPP under
Russian jurisdiction. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak also stated on March 26 that Russia
is not considering jointly operating the ZNPP with the United States. The Kremlin routinely falsely
portrays itself as the only safe operator of the ZNPP, despite having endangered the ZNPP since Russian
forces occupied the area in March 2022. Russia has notably stored military equipment near the ZNPP
reactors and in the turbine halls and used ZNPP grounds to launch strike drones. The Kremlin also
routinely accuses Ukraine of endangering the ZNPP and may attempt to intensify these narratives to spoil
ongoing US-Ukrainian negotiations.
Key Takeaways
• The details of the ceasefire
agreements on energy strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea that US, Ukrainian, and Russian
officials reached on March 24 and 25 remain unclear.
• Russia and Ukraine exchanged
accusations of strikes and ceasefire violations, although the ceasefire terms remain unclear.
• Russian officials explicitly rejected US President Donald Trump's recent suggestion that the United
States could be involved in operating the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).
• The European Union (EU) will likely maintain sanctions on Russia despite Russian demands for
Western sanctions relief as preconditions for a temporary ceasefire with Ukraine in the Black Sea.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, near Toretsk, Velyka Novosilka, and in
western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast and near
Toretsk.
• Russia continues reorganize drone detachments into new units likely as part of an
ongoing effort to establish the Russian Unmanned Systems Force (USF).
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on March 26 that discussions are ongoing about the
details of the temporary ceasefire agreements on energy infrastructure strikes and maritime operations in
the Black Sea. Zelensky stated on March 26 that Ukraine, the United States, and Russia must still resolve
unspecified "technical" issues related to the temporary ceasefire agreements on energy infrastructure
strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea but did reach agreements on these ceasefires during
talks in Saudi Arabia on March 24 and 25. Zelensky added that that the Ukrainian, US, and Russian
technical teams have not yet determined the monitoring mechanisms for temporary ceasefires on energy
infrastructure strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea, which makes it difficult to assess
Russia's compliance. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on March 25 that Ukraine regards any
movement of Russian military vessels outside of the eastern part of the Black Sea as a violation of the
"commitment to ensure safe navigation of the Black Sea." The Kremlin, however, said on March 25 that it
will not implement the agreed ceasefire in the Black Sea until the United States lifts sanctions on
Russian state-owned agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations
involved in international food and fertilizer trade. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged on
March 26 that the European Union (EU) must be involved in lifting sanctions on Russia. European
Commission Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Anitta Hipper stated on March 26 that the EU would consider
lifting or amending sanctions against Russia only if Russia "ends its unprovoked aggression in Ukraine"
and "unconditonally withdraws" all Russian forces from Ukraine.
Russia continues to strike
Ukrainian critical and civilian infrastructure under the cover of the ceasefire on energy infrastructure
strikes — which is not in line with US President Donald Trump's goal of using the temporary ceasefire to
facilitate a lasting peace in Ukraine. Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhii
Tykhyi stated on March 27 that neither Ukraine nor Russia struck each other's energy facilities since
March 25, although the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukraine of violating the ceasefire
agreement on the nights of March 25 to 26 and 26 to 27. The temporary ceasefire does not include
protections for civilian or non-energy critical infrastructure, and Russian forces have intensified
strikes against these objects in recent days. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that on the night of March
26 to 27, Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile from Voronezh Oblast and 86 Shahed and
other drones from Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied
Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported Ukrainian forces downed 42 drones and that 26
drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference and Ukrainian officials
reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Dnipro, Sumy, and Kharkiv cities.
Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on March 24 that Russia is intentionally
targeting populated cities with drones in order to destroy infrastructure and terrorize the local
civilian population. Russian forces have repeatedly conducted large strikes against civilian areas in
Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; Dobropillya, Donetsk Oblast; and Zolochiv, Kharkiv Oblast and port
infrastructure in Odesa City since early March 2025 amid discussions of a temporary ceasefire. The Trump
administration has previously characterized a temporary general ceasefire (which Russian President
Vladimir Putin has repeatedly rejected) as a "necessary step" toward achieving an enduring peace
settlement. Continued Russian strikes on Ukraine's civilian infrastructure, even under the conditions of
an alleged ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes, will be detrimental to the establishment of a
sustainable peace in Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky reiterated on March 26 that discussions are ongoing about the details of the temporary ceasefire
agreements on energy infrastructure strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea.
• Russia
continues to strike Ukrainian critical and civilian infrastructure under the cover of the ceasefire on
energy infrastructure strikes — which is not in line with US President Donald Trump's goal of using the
temporary ceasefire to facilitate a lasting peace in Ukraine.
• The Ukrainian General Staff
reported that the March 19 to 20 Ukrainian drone strike against Russia's Engels Airbase destroyed a large
number of cruise missiles and strategic fuel reserves as Ukrainian officials reported that Russia is
prioritizing the production of high-precision missiles.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing for a spring offensive in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.
• Ukraine's European allies met in Paris for a Coalition of the Willing summit on March 27 to discuss
their ongoing support for Ukraine, a monitoring system to ensure ceasefire compliance, and the possible
deployment of a "deterrent force" in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near
Borova, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts;
near Lyman, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk; and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Volunteer Society
for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF), which promotes patriotic and military
education and has been involved in Russian volunteer recruitment efforts, elected Denis Dobraykov as the
new DOSAAF Chairperson on March 27.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is reintensifying efforts to portray the current Ukrainian government as
illegitimate and unable to engage in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Putin reiterated
longstanding boilerplate rhetoric during a visit to a Russian submarine command post in Murmansk Oblast
on March 27, claiming that "Nazis" and people with "neo-Nazi views" have significant influence in the
Ukrainian government and that "neo-Nazi groups" have the "actual power in their hands" in Ukraine. Putin
reiterated claims that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is illegitimate because Ukraine did not
hold presidential elections in 2024 and additionally alleged that all Ukrainian civil authorities are
therefore illegitimate since the president appoints regional officials. The Ukrainian Constitution
explicitly prohibits elections during periods of martial law and invasion by a hostile country, however.
Putin claimed that "neo-Nazi formations" are ruling Ukraine in the absence of a legitimate Ukrainian
government and questioned how Russia can negotiate with these groups. Putin has previously characterized
the Ukrainian government as illegitimate in an effort to justify Russia's unwillingness to engage in good
faith negotiations to end the war and has consistently identified "denazification" – a phrase the Kremlin
uses to make its demand for the removal of the Ukrainian government and the installation of a pro-Russian
puppet regime – as a goal of his full-scale invasion since February 2022.
Putin repeatedly
accused Zelensky of being the illegitimate leader of Ukraine ahead of Putin's February 12 phone call with
US President Donald Trump, but has made these accusations much less frequently in recent weeks. Putin
notably implicitly acknowledged Zelensky as the legitimate president of Ukraine and Russia's future
negotiating partner for the first time in late February 2025, and Putin's March 27 statement appears to
be a reintensification of his accusations designed to undermine Zelensky's legitimacy. ISW previously
noted that the Kremlin's ongoing effort to characterize the Ukrainian government as an illegitimate
negotiating partner casts serious doubt on the Kremlin's willingness to negotiate in good faith about a
settlement of the war and sets informational conditions for Russia to violate any agreement reached on
the grounds that the Ukrainian government had no legal right to conclude it.
Putin reiterated
his demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace
agreement – a reference to Russia’s initial war demands that directly contradict US, European, and
Ukrainian efforts to achieve a just and sustainable resolution to the war. Putin claimed that Russia is
committed to ending the war in Ukraine but only if a peace agreement addresses the "root causes" of the
war. Senior Russian officials have repeatedly defined these root causes as NATO's alleged violation of
obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking
minorities in Ukraine. The Kremlin's demands to address these so-called "root causes" amount to a demand
for full Ukrainian capitulation with the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine and
commitments of Ukrainian neutrality – the same demands Putin has made since before the full-scale
invasion.
Putin is attempting to inject a new demand aligned with the Kremlin's long-standing
efforts to undermine the Ukrainian government's legitimacy into discussions about the resolution of the
war. Putin proposed that the United Nations (UN), United States, and European countries install a
temporary administration in Ukraine that would hold democratic elections to bring to power "a viable
government that enjoys the people's trust." Putin claimed that a temporary Ukrainian government would
allow Russia to "begin negotiations on a peace treaty" and "sign
legitimate documents that will be recognized throughout the world." White House National Security Council
Spokesperson James Hewitt rightly dismissed Putin's proposal to impose a temporary administration over
Ukraine, stating that the Ukrainian Constitution and the Ukrainian people determine Ukraine's governance.
UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres also rejected Putin's proposal and stated that Ukraine has a
legitimate government that must be respected.
Putin's new demand for an interim government in
Ukraine as a precondition for peace negotiations demonstrates how the Kremlin continues to hold
negotiations hostage and is attempting to extract additional concessions from the West following the
progress made in the ongoing ceasefire negotiations. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin remains
committed to its goal to prolong any negotiations for a temporary frontline ceasefire or permanent peace
agreement in order to continue making incremental gains on the battlefield and establish favorable
conditions to pursue Ukraine's complete capitulation.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian
President Vladimir Putin is reintensifying efforts to portray the current Ukrainian government as
illegitimate and unable to engage in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
• Putin
reiterated his demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition
for a peace agreement – a reference to Russia’s initial war demands that directly contradict US,
European, and Ukrainian efforts to achieve a just and sustainable resolution to the war.
• Putin is attempting to inject a new demand aligned with the Kremlin's long-standing efforts to
undermine the Ukrainian government's legitimacy into discussions about the resolution of the war.
• The Kremlin appears to be renewing efforts to reorganize Russia's five naval infantry brigades
into divisions.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast. Russian forces
recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, near Toretsk and Kurakhove, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russia plans to expand its nuclear submarine fleet.
Ukrainian and US officials continue to negotiate the terms of temporary ceasefires on Black Sea
operations and energy infrastructure strikes, indicating the ceasefires are not yet fully codified.
Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy reported on March 26 that Ukraine and the United States agreed on a list of
energy facilities that Russia must stop striking during an energy infrastructure ceasefire but that the
US-Ukraine list is at odds with Russia's demands. The Ministry stated that Russia’s list does not
prohibit strikes on Ukrainian oil and gas facilities — although the Kremlin reported that the ceasefire
protects Russian oil and gas facilities from strikes. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on
March 28 that Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov will present US officials with evidence of Russian
ceasefire violations during Umerov's upcoming trip to the United States. The exact terms of the energy
infrastructure ceasefire remain unclear, as an official trilateral statement or agreement has not been
released.
Zelensky stated that Turkey, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States,
France, Romania, and Bulgaria could act as potential ceasefire monitors, including a Black Sea
moratorium, but stated that all sides “will” hold internal and international consultations regarding
“readiness” to conduct monitoring. US Vice President JD Vance stated on March 28 that the United States
and Ukraine have “obviously” achieved an energy infrastructure ceasefire and were “almost done”
negotiating a maritime ceasefire. US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials all appear to be under the
impression that an energy infrastructure ceasefire is currently active despite the lack of a formal
trilateral agreement or any apparent agreement on the exact terms of the ceasefire.
European
allies continue to provide financial and materiel support to Ukraine and agreed to expand intelligence
sharing with Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on March 28 that European
countries agreed at the "Coalition of the Willing" summit in Paris on March 27 to expand Ukraine's access
to European intelligence, relevant technologies, and satellites and that several unspecified European
countries agreed to grant Ukraine an unspecified degree of access to their ammunition stockpiles.
Zelensky noted that Ukraine also agreed with unspecified partners on air defense production licenses,
investments in Ukraine's production of drones and missiles, and to continue to work toward artillery
licensing. It remains unclear whether the agreed upon licenses stipulate domestic production in Ukraine
or foreign production elsewhere in Europe. Zelensky stated that the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany will
organize a Ramstein meeting in April 2025. French President Emmanuel Macron pledged on March 26 to
provide Ukraine with an additional military aid package valued at 2 billion euros (roughly $2.1 billion)
that will include anti-tank missiles, surface-to-air missiles, air defense missiles, armored vehicles,
drones, and additional Mirage fighter jets. Sweden instructed its armed forces on March 28 to allocate a
total of 80 million Swedish Kronor (roughly $7.5 million) to Ukraine's Demining and Drone coalitions. The
Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 27 that Denmark pledged an additional 300 million
Danish Kroner (roughly $43.5 million) to a Ukrainian innovation fund that will focus on, among other
things, further developing electronic warfare (EW) and drone capabilities.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian and US officials continue to negotiate the terms of temporary ceasefires on Black Sea
operations and energy infrastructure strikes, indicating the ceasefires are not yet fully codified.
• The Kremlin appears to be using the Black Sea ceasefire negotiations with the United States to
test the extent to which Russia can extract concessions from the West, as the implementation of a
maritime truce would not require any sanctions relief.
• European allies continue to provide
financial and materiel support to Ukraine and agreed to expand intelligence sharing with Ukraine.
• Russian forces are reportedly poised to intensify offensive operations in several areas of the
frontline in Spring and Summer 2025 in hopes of influencing ongoing ceasefire and peace negotiations.
• Russia continues to target civilian infrastructure in Ukraine amid reports of shifting and more
deadly Russian strike tactics.
• Russian forces are reportedly employing more advanced
long-range drones, complicating Ukrainian air defense operations and allowing more drones to penetrate
Ukraine's air defense umbrella.
• Zelensky ordered Ukraine's Ministry of Defense (MoD) and
General Staff to establish a new aviation chain of command within the Ukrainian General Staff and conduct
widespread aviation management reform to strengthen Ukraine's air capabilities.
• Ukrainian
forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast and near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near
Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the launch
of the "Indra Navy 2025" exercises in Chennai, India.
US President Donald Trump expressed willingness to introduce additional sanctions targeting Russian oil
and secondary sanctions against buyers of Russian oil if Russian President Vladimir Putin does not make
progress towards a general ceasefire, including a ceasefire for land warfare in the near future. Trump
stated during a phone call with NBC News on March 30 that he is "angry and pissed off" at Putin for
disparaging Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy as the leader of Ukraine. Trump stated
that if the United States and Russia are unable to "make a deal" – possibly referring to a general
ceasefire or long-term peace in Ukraine – then the United States will place secondary sanctions on all
"oil coming out of Russia." Trump stated that the United States will put a "25 percent tariff on all oil,
a 25- to 50-point tariff on all oil." Trump stated that the United States will not allow
companies or countries that purchase Russian oil to "do business" in the United States and that the
United States could begin imposing secondary sanctions within the next month if Russia, Ukraine, and the
United States do not conclude a ceasefire agreement. Trump stated that he will speak with Putin at an
unspecified time later this week. Putin reiterated long-standing Russian claims that Zelensky is the
illegitimate leader of Ukraine on March 28.
ISW previously noted that the Kremlin's ongoing
effort to characterize the Ukrainian government as an illegitimate negotiating partner casts serious
doubt on the Kremlin's willingness to negotiate in good faith about a settlement of the war and sets
informational conditions for Russia to violate any future peace agreement on the grounds that the
Ukrainian government had no legal right to conclude it.
A Russian diplomat provided additional
details following Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent thinly veiled demand for regime change in
Ukraine by having external parties establish a “temporary international administration” in Ukraine under
the auspices of the United Nations (UN). Russian Permanent Representative to the European Union Kirill
Logvinov presented a detailed plan to Kremlin newswire TASS on March 30 that supports Putin's recent
demand for the UN, United States, and European countries to establish a temporary government in Ukraine
in the near future. Logvinov argued that the UN should reach an agreement between the parties to the
conflict following the implementation of a ceasefire, either directly or indirectly through
intermediaries, on the appropriate transfer of power to the UN. Logvinov suggested that one of the
parties, mediators, or the UN Secretary General should submit an official appeal that the UN establish a
temporary internal administration in Ukraine. Logvinov specified that the UN Security Council (UNSC),
particularly its permanent members, must support the mandate and that any UNSC member can submit a draft
proposal on the composition and funding of the temporary government. Logvinov stated that the UN
Secretary General should then prepare a report on the temporary administration, particularly noting
staffing and budgetary guidelines, after which the UNSC should consider any proposals and submit a final
decision on the interim government. Logvinov noted that the final proposal must also "receive the support
of the members of the , namely the permanent ones." Logvinov's proposal would notably allow Russia
(a permanent member of the UNSC) to submit a proposal on the interim Ukrainian government and to veto any
proposal that Russia considers unfavorable and would bar Ukraine from any role in the final approval
process.
Logvinov and TASS are supporting Putin's recent effort to inject a new demand into
discussions about the resolution to the war that is consistent with the Kremlin's long-standing effort to
ensure the installation of a government friendly to Russia in Ukraine. The Kremlin is also attempting to
dictate the sequencing and processes surrounding the demand while holding the ceasefire negotiation
hostage to extract additional concessions from the West. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres rejected
Putin's proposal to establish a temporary administration in Ukraine and stated that Ukraine has a
legitimate government that must be respected on March 28.
Key Takeaways:
• US
President Donald Trump expressed willingness to introduce additional sanctions targeting Russian oil and
secondary sanctions against buyers of Russian oil if Russian President Vladimir Putin does not make
progress towards a general ceasefire, including a ceasefire for land warfare in the near future.
• A Russian diplomat provided additional details following Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent
thinly veiled demand for regime change in Ukraine by having external parties establish a “temporary
international administration” in Ukraine under the auspices of the United Nations (UN).
• Russian forces struck a military hospital and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City on the night of
March 29 to 30.
• The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 30 that it will
establish a Space Policy Department.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and
Pokrovsk.
US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that there is an unspecified "psychological deadline" for
Russia to agree to a general ceasefire amid continued Russian efforts to hold the temporary ceasefire in
the Black Sea hostage to stall efforts toward a general ceasefire and extract additional concessions from
the West. Trump responded to a question on March 30 about whether there is a deadline for Russian
President Vladimir Putin to agree to a ceasefire for land warfare and stated that "it's a psychological
deadline." Trump added that "if I think is tapping along, I will not be
happy about it." Finnish President Alexander Stubb stated on March 30 that he proposed April 20 as a
potential deadline for a "full ceasefire without any conditions" during his meeting with Trump on March
29. Russia is unlikely to agree to a "full ceasefire without any conditions" within three weeks given
that Russia has demanded that the West provide some sanctions relief as a precondition for a temporary
Black Sea ceasefire. The Kremlin stated on March 25 that it will not implement the agreed ceasefire in
the Black Sea until the United States lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned agricultural bank
Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations involved in international food and
fertilizer trade, and Bloomberg reported on March 28 that Russia is demanding that the European Union
(EU) reconnect the Rosselkhozbank to the SWIFT international banking system as a precondition to
implementing a Black Sea ceasefire as a test to determine whether the United States will engage with
Russia's demands and encourage European partners to support sanctions relief. The United States and
Ukraine proposed on March 11 temporary ceasefires on energy infrastructure strikes and in the Black Sea,
and Ukranian and US officials have continued to negotiate the terms of these ceasefires in the three
weeks since March 11 — indicating the ceasefires’ terms are not yet fully codified. It is also unlikely
that the United States, Ukraine, and Russia could negotiate the terms of a general ceasefire within the
next three weeks.
Key Takeaways:
• US President Donald Trump stated on March 30
that there is an unspecified "psychological deadline" for Russia to agree to a general ceasefire amid
continued Russian efforts to hold the temporary ceasefire in the Black Sea hostage to stall efforts
toward a general ceasefire and extract additional concessions from the West.
• Russian
officials continue efforts to undermine the proposed US-Ukrainian mineral deal by promoting potential
US-Russian rare earth mining projects.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to sow division between
the United States and Europe.
• Ukraine's European allies continue to provide financial and
military aid to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces
recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts and near Kupyansk, Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia is reportedly struggling to restore what few tanks remain in its stocks.
Russian forces are reportedly continuing to shell Ukrainian energy infrastructure amid ongoing
negotiations over details of the ceasefire agreement on energy infrastructure strikes, indicating that
Russia may be exploiting the ceasefire's vague or unfinalized terms to strike Ukrainian energy
infrastructure with shorter-range artillery, but not longer-range cruise missiles or one-way strike
drones. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha and Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head
Oleksandr Prokudin stated on April 1 that Russian forces shelled energy infrastructure in Kherson City on
the morning of April 1, leaving at least 45,000 Kherson residents without electricity. Sybiha stated on
April 1 that Russian forces have recently violated the energy infrastructure ceasefire several times. The
ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes is reportedly a moratorium on long-range strikes, but it
remains unclear whether the moratorium's terms prohibit striking energy infrastructure with shorter-range
tube or rocket artillery. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 11 that Ukraine proposed
a "temporary ceasefire in the sky" that would include "missile, bomb, and long-range drone" strikes. US,
Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached some agreements for a temporary ceasefire on strikes against
energy infrastructure on March 25 but not provide details on whether the ceasefire is exclusively limited
to longer-range weapons. Russian forces will likely continue to leverage their positions along the east
(left) bank of the Dnipro River and other frontline areas to shell and destroy Ukrainian energy
infrastructure in near rear areas unless the energy infrastructure ceasefire includes provisions against
such shelling. Russian shelling against Ukrainian energy infrastructure violates the spirit of the
ceasefire and US President Donald Trump's intention to utilize the energy infrastructure ceasefire as a
confidence-building measure to work towards a general ceasefire in the future. Ukrainian, Russian, and US
officials have yet to formalize the ceasefire or present its exact terms.
Senior Russian
officials continue to reiterate the Russian demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in
Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement — a reference to Russia's initial war demands that
directly contradict US President Donald Trump's goal to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on April 1 that the Trump administration is attempting
"some kind of scheme" to first achieve a ceasefire and then move to "other models and schemes" to end the
war. Ryabkov further claimed that the Trump administration's plan to resolve the war in Ukraine does not
address the "root causes" of the war and that Russia, therefore, cannot accept the US proposal. Senior
Russian officials have repeatedly defined these root causes as NATO's alleged violation of obligations
not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in
Ukraine. The Kremlin's demands to address these so-called "root causes" amount to a demand for the full
capitulation of Ukraine with the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine and long-term
commitments of Ukrainian neutrality — the same demands Putin has made since before the full-scale
invasion in February 2022. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently intensified efforts to portray the
current Ukrainian government as illegitimate and unable to engage in negotiations to end the war in
Ukraine in an effort to undermine Ukraine's role as a legitimate participant in discussions about the
resolution of the war. Putin and Russian diplomats made thinly veiled demands in late March 2025 for
regime change in Ukraine by having external parties establish a “temporary international administration”
in Ukraine under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce
stated on March 31 that Trump did not appreciate Russia's suggestion to establish a "temporary
administration" in Ukraine. Bruce also noted that Trump understands that negotiations will "require both
Russia and Ukraine to make tough decisions and compromises." Russia has so far refused to make any
concessions and rejected the US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire when Trump called Putin on March
18.
Russian forces are expanding their bridgehead northeast of Lyman as part of a mutually
reinforcing effort to create conditions for the seizure of Borova and Lyman in the coming months. Footage
published on March 28 and geolocated on April 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest
of Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman) and likely seized Novolyubivka itself. Russian forces recently made
confirmed advances southeast of Nove (west of Novolyubivka), and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn
Mashovets stated on March 31 that Russian forces advanced to the southern outskirts of Katerynivka
(northwest of Novolyubivka). Russian forces advanced across the Zherebets River onto the west (right)
bank in early January 2025 and have slowly expanded their bridgehead on the right bank over the last
three months. Russian forces began efforts to push Ukrainian forces from their positions on the east
(left) bank of the Zherebets River in late 2023 and have only recently established a relatively stable
bridgehead from which Russian forces can launch further offensive operations. Russian milbloggers and
Mashovets have consistently credited elements of the Russian 144th and 3rd motorized rifle divisions
(20th Combined Arms Army , Moscow Military District ) with making the initial advances onto the
west bank and then expanding this bridgehead.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces are
reportedly continuing to shell Ukrainian energy infrastructure amid ongoing negotiations over details of
the ceasefire agreement on energy infrastructure strikes, indicating that Russia may be exploiting the
ceasefire’s vague or unfinalized terms to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure with shorter-range
artillery but not longer-range cruise missiles or one-way strike drones.
• Senior Russian
officials continue to reiterate the Russian demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in
Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement – a reference to Russia's initial war demands that
directly contradict US President Donald Trump's goal to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine.
• Russian forces are expanding their bridgehead northeast of Lyman as part of a mutually reinforcing
effort to create conditions for the seizure of Borova and Lyman in the coming months.
• Russian forces can leverage their expanded bridgehead northeast of Lyman to support the seizure of
Borova or Lyman in the coming months.
• Russian forces may also leverage their bridgehead
northeast of Lyman to seize the remaining one percent of Luhansk Oblast under Ukrainian control and
complete Russia's long-standing goal of seizing the entirety of Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian
President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on April 1 to raise salaries for Russian governors starting
January 2026, aligning the pay with that of Russia's deputy prime ministers.
• Russian forces
recently advanced in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts and in the Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.
Russian officials are continuing to exploit the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire's vague or
unfinalized terms. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 2 that the temporary energy
infrastructure ceasefire is in effect and that Russia is adhering to the ceasefire. Peskov claimed that
Ukraine has "not joined" the temporary ceasefire "essentially" and that Russia intends to discuss this
with the United States. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on April 1 that Russia forwarded a
list of Ukraine's alleged ceasefire violations to US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, US Secretary
of State Marco Rubio, the United Nations (UN), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 2 that Ukrainian forces are
"systematically" conducting drone and artillery strikes against Russian energy infrastructure. The exact
contours of the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire remain unclear, and Ukraine and Russia do not
appear to have formally agreed on the list of objects covered in the ceasefire or the types of strikes
prohibited. ISW previously noted that it is unclear if the temporary ceasefire prohibits striking energy
infrastructure with shorter-range tube or rocket artillery. It is also unclear how Ukraine could violate
a temporary ceasefire that it has "not joined."
US officials reportedly continue to
acknowledge Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine.
Two US officials familiar with the matter told Reuters on April 1 that senior Trump administration
officials have discussed the likelihood that the United States will not be able to secure a long-term
peace agreement in Ukraine in the coming months and are preparing new plans to pressure Russia and
Ukraine into an agreement. The sources noted that Trump administration officials acknowledged that Putin
is actively resisting US efforts to accomplish a peace agreement in Ukraine and used a series of meetings
and calls over the weekend of March 29-30 to discuss possible mechanisms to bring Russia to the
negotiating table. A senior US official stated that the Trump administration is considering levying
additional tariffs and sanctions against Russia. Another source familiar with the discussions similarly
told Fox News on April 1 that US President Donald Trump believes that Putin is "slow-rolling"
negotiations on a general ceasefire in Ukraine and that the Trump administration is considering
increasing sanctions against Russia in order to force Putin to the negotiating table. Trump recently told
NBC News that he is considering additional sanctions against Russian oil and stated during a press
conference on March 30 that there is an unspecified "psychological deadline" for Russia to agree to a
general ceasefire agreement. ISW previously noted that it is not possible for the United States or the
wider West to exert maximum pressure against Russia with economic tools alone as Russia's ongoing and
forecasted future economic struggles are closely tied to Russian military losses on the battlefield. The
United States can leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger negotiating position by
continuing — or increasing — military aid to Ukraine such that Ukrainian forces can continue to inflict
significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.
CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund
(RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev will reportedly meet with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in
Washington, D.C. on April 2. Unnamed US officials and other unspecified sources familiar with Dmitriev's
trip told CNN on April 1 that Dmitriev will meet with Witkoff later this week in Washington, D.C., and
sources told CNN and CBS that the US government temporarily lifted sanctions against Dmitriev in order to
grant him a visa to visit the United States. Sources told CBS on April 2 that Dmitriev will meet with
Witkoff on April 2, but the Trump administration has not published information about the meeting. It is
unclear if the meeting has occurred as of this publication. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on
April 2 that Dmitriev's visit to Washington, D.C. is possible, and Dmitriev inconclusively responded to
US reporting on his possible visit with "maybe."
Key Takeaways:
• Russian officials
are continuing to exploit the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire's vague or unfinalized terms.
• US officials reportedly continue to acknowledge Russian President Vladimir Putin's
unwillingness to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine.
• CEO of the Russian Direct
Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev will reportedly meet with US Special Envoy for the Middle East
Steve Witkoff in Washington, D.C. on April 2.
• The Russian military command reportedly began
reorganizing the motorized rifle brigades of the 51st and 3rd combined arms armies (CAAs) such that each
army would have three rifle divisions or motorized rifle divisions, likely in an effort to improve the
CAAs' administrative structure, especially over larger numbers of unmechanized riflemen.
• The
Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 1 that Russian forces in Ukraine are continuing to use
ammunition equipped with chemical agents prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk,
Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian authorities continued efforts to solidify their
control over the Russian information space and discourage critique of the Russian military's conduct of
the war in Ukraine.
Russia seeks to leverage ongoing ceasefire and future peace negotiations to seize large amounts of
territory in Ukraine and install a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv but will likely continue
military operations in Ukraine if the Kremlin is unable to achieve a full Ukrainian surrender through
diplomacy. Bloomberg reported on April 3, according to sources in Moscow familiar with the matter, that
the Kremlin is "counting on US President Donald Trump to deliver an acceptable peace deal in Ukraine,"
but is prepared to continue the war if it is not able to secure its goals through negotiations with the
United States. The sources also claimed that the Kremlin is not concerned by Trump's recent statement
that the United States is willing to introduce additional sanctions targeting Russian oil and secondary
sanctions against buyers of Russian oil if Russian President Vladimir Putin does not make progress
towards a general ceasefire. The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence's (ODNI) 2025 Annual
Threat Assessment stated that Russia is leveraging its control of the theater-wide initiative and ongoing
political and information efforts amid negotiations to end the war in Ukraine to achieve significant
concessions from Ukraine and the West. The ODNI report assessed that Putin is "probably" more willing to
incur the risks of a longer war than to agree to an end to the war that is unfavorable to Russia. The
ODNI report further assessed that Putin "appears resolved and prepared to pay a very high price to
prevail in what he sees as a defining time in Russia’s strategic competition with the United States,
world history, and his personal legacy." The ODNI assessment that Putin remains committed to pursuing
Ukrainian surrender through both diplomatic and military means is consistent with ISW's assessment that
Putin is leveraging ongoing negotiations to secure additional concessions from Ukraine and the West as
part of its long-term pursuit of total Ukrainian surrender.
Russia is facing significant
military and economic challenges that could seriously compromise Russia's ability to wage its war in
Ukraine, factors that could increase the Kremlin's desire to accomplish its objectives in a mediated
ceasefire or peace negotiation in the short-term if possible. The ODNI report assessed that Russia has
suffered significant casualties in Ukraine and that Russia must contend with the poor quality of its new
recruits. The ODNI report assessed that the Russian economy is facing significant challenges as Russia
continues to balance resource allocation between defense industrial production and civilian sectors. US
European Command (EUCOM) Commander and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Christopher
Cavoli stated on April 3 that Russian forces have lost over 4,000 tanks in Ukraine. Cavoli stated that
Russia started the war with a total of 13,000 tanks and are "starting to approach near the end" of the
viable tanks in storage. Cavoli noted that Russia has expanded its capability to produce shells, cruise
missiles, and first-person view (FPV) drones and that Russia is preparing either to continue offensive
operations in Ukraine or to launch a future campaign against a NATO member state. Cavoli stated that the
war in Ukraine has "distorted" the Russian economy and "turbocharged" the Russian defense industry at the
expense of Russia's civilian economic sector and that it may be difficult for Russia to "unwind" this
imbalance. Cavoli assessed that Russia will be able to replace the significant personnel losses incurred
in Ukraine ahead of a future conflict in Europe but noted that Russia's ability to replace materiel
losses is contingent on Ukraine's ability to inflict greater losses. ISW previously noted that Russia's
ongoing and forecasted economic struggles are closely tied to Russian losses on the battlefield and that
it is not possible for the United States or the wider West to exert maximum pressure on Russia with
economic tools alone. The United States can leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger
negotiating position by continuing — or increasing — military aid to Ukraine such that Ukrainian forces
can continue to inflict significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia seeks to leverage ongoing ceasefire and future peace negotiations to seize large amounts
of territory in Ukraine and install a pro-Russian puppet government in Kyiv but will likely continue
military operations in Ukraine if the Kremlin is unable to achieve a full Ukrainian surrender through
diplomacy.
• Russia is facing significant military and economic challenges that could
seriously compromise Russia's ability to wage its war in Ukraine, factors that could increase the
Kremlin's desire to accomplish its objectives in a mediated ceasefire or peace negotiation in the
short-term if possible.
• The US Treasury Department announced on April 2 that the United
States lifted sanctions on Karina Rotenberg, the wife of Russian businessman and oligarch Boris
Rotenberg.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced in Kursk and
Belgorod and near Lyman, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• The Russian State Duma
adopted a bill on April 3 to grant veteran status to Russian military personnel and volunteer formations
that fought in Kursk Oblast.
CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev gave several interviews with American
news outlets on April 3 and presented views that contradict the current Kremlin line on Ukraine. The
Kremlin remains unwilling to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine, continuing to reject the ground
ceasefire that US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have offered.
Dmitriev spoke with Fox News and Newsmax while visiting Washington, DC, and attempted to paint Russia as
an attractive market for American investment, claiming that the Russian economy is strong and growing
despite Western sanctions. Dmitriev also claimed that Russia is ready to collaborate with the United
States on unspecified projects involving the Arctic, rare earth minerals, and liquified natural gas
(LNG). Dmitriev has recently been at the forefront of Kremlin efforts to undermine the proposed
US-Ukraine mineral deal by promoting potential US-Russia mining projects and other avenues of economic
and financial cooperation, as ISW previously reported. Dmitriev notably claimed that Russia "is not
asking for lifting of sanctions" and "not making any preconditions for specific sanction relief" in
response to a question about whether Russia considers sanctions relief a necessary precondition to a
ceasefire agreement. The Kremlin, in contrast, has explicitly demanded sanctions relief from the United
States as a precondition for entering into a Black Sea strikes ceasefire.
Dmitriev made
several other statements that diverge from recent statements by other Kremlin officials, for example,
saying that "some security guarantees may be possible" for Ukraine. ISW recently assessed that Russian
President Vladimir Putin will not accept Western-backed security guarantees for Ukraine because their
acceptance will represent a major concession, and the Kremlin has rejected the idea of making any
concessions on its maximalist territorial and security demands from Ukraine. Dmitriev's attempt to
present Russia's interests in Ukraine as predominantly economic and financial is also disingenuous.
Kremlin officials frequently make demands to address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine (NATO's
alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of
Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine) as preconditions for any sort of peace agreement. The Kremlin's
negotiating position has not changed despite Dmitriev's attempts to soften and deflect from Moscow's
demands, and Dmitriev is attempting to use the promise of financial benefits to distract from the
Kremlin's continued intransigence in negotiations about Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
• CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev gave several interviews with
American news outlets on April 3 and presented views that contradict the current Kremlin line on
Ukraine.
• The Kremlin remains unwilling to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine,
continuing to reject the ground ceasefire that US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky have offered.
• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on April 4 that
the US is closely monitoring Russia's actions in Ukraine and hopes that Russia is "serious" about
resolving the war rather than simply dragging out negotiations.
• A Russian ballistic missile
struck a residential area in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on April 4, killing at least 16 people,
including children.
• Russia continues to employ strike packages predominantly comprised of
drones amid reports that it is growing its missile stockpile.
• Ukrainian railway operator
Ukrzaliznytsia signed two contracts with Chinese rail producers in January 2025 as part of efforts to
support the development and repair of Ukrainian rail infrastructure.
• Russia is reinforcing
its strategic ties with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) juntas in a concerted effort to enhance
Russian influence in Africa.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and
Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
• The Russian
military reportedly continues to expand its conventional force end-strength.
European and NATO officials emphasized that a strong Ukrainian military backed by European security
guarantees remains the most effective deterrent against future Russian aggression to ensure long-term
peace in Ukraine and Europe. NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte gave an interview to Ukrainian outlet New
Voice on April 5 and stated that the "first level" of security guarantees for Ukraine should be the
Ukrainian military, which Rutte stated is the "first line of defense in deterrence." Rutte added that
Ukraine's European partners, including France, the United Kingdom, and Italy, are also looking for ways
to provide security guarantees to Ukraine following the conclusion of a peace agreement. The French
General Staff similarly emphasized that the Ukrainian military is Ukraine's primary security guarantee
for a lasting peace. The French General Staff added that France and the UK will work to define and
develop "reassurance operations" to deter Russia from future aggression after the implementation of a
peace deal. ISW continues to assess that a strong Ukrainian military backed by Western security
guarantees remains the most vital component of a post-war European security architecture, guaranteeing a
sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterring future Russian aggression. Russian demands for Ukraine's
"demilitarization" such that Ukraine is unable to defend itself against future Russian aggression are
counter to US President Donald Trump's efforts to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine.
Ukraine's European partners continue preliminary technical discussions about a possible future
peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine. Delegations from the British and French general staffs met with
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian military leaders on April 4 and 5 in Kyiv to discuss
details about how the first contingent of partner state forces could deploy to Ukraine. Zelensky stated
that the meetings resulted in "tangible details" about this possible deployment, established Ukraine's
needs, and identified geographical vulnerabilities that may require support. Zelensky stated that the
group still needs to decide where the forces would deploy, their responsibilities, and their authority to
respond in case of a breach of a future peace agreement. Zelensky stated that it might take one month or
longer to finalize additional details and that the group would meet weekly. NATO Secretary General Mark
Rutte stated to Ukrainian outlet New Voice on April 5 that it is best to wait to deploy peacekeepers to
Ukraine until after the conclusion of a peace agreement but that countries need to keep developing ideas
now to implement after peace is achieved.
Key Takeaways:
• European and NATO
officials emphasized that a strong Ukrainian military backed by European security guarantees remains the
most effective deterrent against future Russian aggression to ensure long-term peace in Ukraine and
Europe.
• Ukraine's European partners continue preliminary technical discussions about a
possible future peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the
only plant in Russia that produces fiber optic cables that are vital for Russian forces' fiber optic
drones.
• Ukraine's European partners continue to provide technical support to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, and Russian forces recently advanced near
Toretsk and Pokrovsk and in Kursk Oblast.
The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has been steadily declining since November 2024, in part due to
successful Ukrainian counterattacks in eastern Ukraine. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on
April 5 that Russian forces advanced 143 square kilometers in Ukraine in March 2025 as Ukrainian forces
conducted successful tactical counterattacks in the Pokrovsk direction. The UK MoD reported that the rate
of Russian advances in Ukraine has decreased each month since November 2024, as Russian forces seized
roughly 730 square kilometers in November 2024, 393 square kilometers in December 2024, 326 square
kilometers in January 2025, and 195 square kilometers in February 2025.
ISW has observed
geolocated footage to concur in the assessment that the monthly rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has
decreased since November 2024. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces in
Ukraine gained roughly 627 square kilometers in November 2024, 569 square kilometers in December 2024,
427 square kilometers in January 2025, 354 square kilometers in February 2025, and 203 square kilometers
in March 2025. The UK MoD likely uses a different methodology or sources to assess Russian advances in
Ukraine, but the UK MoD's report is consistent with evidence ISW has observed of decreasing monthly
Russian advances between November 2024 and March 2025. Ukrainian forces have conducted localized
counterattacks in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions in recent weeks, regaining lost positions in these
areas and contributing to slowing Russian advances in Ukraine.
Russian forces conducted the
largest series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine in nearly a month on the night of April 5 and
6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that preliminary data states that Russian forces launched nine
Kh-101/Kh-55SM cruise missiles from Tu-95MS aircraft from the airspace over Saratov Oblast; eight Kalibr
cruise missiles from the Black Sea; six Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast; and 109 Shahed
and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk,
Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces
downed six Kh-101/Kh-55SM cruise missiles, six Kalibr missiles, one Iskander-M ballistic missile, and 40
Shahed drones and that 53 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW)
interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and civilian
infrastructure in Kyiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, and Mykolaiv oblasts and that
five Iskander-M ballistic missiles struck Kyiv Oblast.
Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson
Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on April 6 that Russian forces are changing their strike tactics and
constantly modernizing their Shahed drones and ballistic missiles, complicating Ukrainian forces' ability
to shoot them down. Ihnat noted that the US Patriot air defense system is effective against ballistic
missiles. Russian forces have repeatedly experimented with different strike packages in order to
overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and ensure that Russian missiles – particularly the ballistic missiles
that are more difficult for Ukrainian air defenses to shoot down – are able to reach their intended
targets. Russian forces likely launched missiles and drones on the night of April 5 to 6 from various
locations in the Black Sea, Russia, and occupied Crimea, as part of these experimentation efforts.
Key Takeaways:
• The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has been steadily declining
since November 2024, in part due to successful Ukrainian counterattacks in eastern Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted the largest series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine in nearly a
month on the night of April 5 and 6.
• Ukrainian officials highlighted the fact that Russia is
leveraging its naval vessels in the Black Sea to conduct missile strikes against Ukraine as Russia
continues to stall the Black Sea moratorium on military operations that Ukraine and the United States
have jointly proposed.
• The Kremlin is attempting to portray Ukraine as consistently
violating the proposed temporary ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure without providing
evidence supporting these claims, in stark contrast to the pattern of Russian reporting about successful
Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure prior to the ceasefire proposal.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and
Sumy oblasts and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
The Kremlin continues to deny the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government as part of efforts to claim that
Ukraine is not a legitimate negotiating partner and to demand Ukrainian regime change and
demilitarization. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 7 that Russian President Vladimir
Putin supports the idea of a ceasefire in Ukraine but claimed that several issues "are hanging in the
air." Peskov claimed that these issues include the "lack of control" over the Ukrainian government and
the Ukrainian government's alleged inability to control the actions of unspecified extremist and
nationalist units that "simply do not obey" the Ukrainian government's orders. Peskov claimed that these
units are connected to "plans for the further militarization" of Ukraine. Peskov is promoting Putin's
March 28 narrative falsely claiming that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and incapable
of combatting neo-Nazi groups, which Putin claimed have the "actual power in their hands." These Kremlin
statements are part of a broader effort to undermine the Ukrainian government's legitimacy and repackage
Russia's long-standing demands for regime change and demilitarization in Ukraine. Putin and other Russian
officials previously temporarily paused promoting claims about Ukraine's alleged illegitimacy following
Putin's phone call with US President Donald Trump on February 12, but later resumed these claims on March
28. Trump recently expressed dissatisfaction with Putin's disparaging remarks attacking Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy and expressed a willingness to impose additional sanctions on
Russia if the United States and Russia are unable to "make a deal.
Key Takeaways:
• The Kremlin continues to deny the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government as part of efforts to claim
that Ukraine is not a legitimate negotiating partner and to demand Ukrainian regime change and
demilitarization.
• Ukrainian officials did not report any Russian long-range missile or drone
strikes on the night of April 6 to 7 or during the day on April 7 following Russia's largest strike
package in over a month on the night of April 5 to 6.
• Ukraine's European allies continue to
ramp up domestic materiel production and address shortages inhibiting artillery ammunition production.
• Russian authorities likely facilitated the removal of a prominent Russian insider source from
Telegram as part of continued efforts to crack down on the Russian information space.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Belogorod Oblast and near Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka
Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues to use its "Time of
Heroes" program to militarize regional governments and society in occupied Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces recently captured Chinese nationals fighting in the Russian military in several areas of
Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on April 8 that Ukrainian forces captured
several Chinese "fighters" who were fighting for Russia near Bilohorivka (east of Siversk) and Tarasivka
(northeast of Pokrovsk) in recent attacks and that Ukrainian intelligence indicated that there are
"significantly more Chinese nationals" in the Russian military. Zelensky noted that Ukrainian forces came
into contact with a group of six Chinese fighters during several recent attacks and captured two.
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated that the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
summoned the Chinese charge d'affairs in response to the incident. US Department of State Spokesperson
Tammy Bruce characterized the Chinese nationals' involvement as "disturbing" on April 8 and stated that
"China is a major enabler of Russia" that "provides nearly 80 percent of the dual use items Russia needs
to sustain the war."
ISW has observed reports of various unspecified Russian entities
recruiting vulnerable migrant workers into the Russian military to fight in Ukraine both in Russia and
abroad. Indian authorities revealed in 2024 that unspecified Russian entities were managing a human
trafficking network that lured Indian citizens to Russia under false pretenses and then coerced them into
signing military contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense to fight in Ukraine. Indian and Russian
authorities partnered to repatriate Indian citizens who had involuntarily joined the Russian military in
October 2024, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) could demonstrate that its government was not
involved in the participation of its citizens in this war by undertaking a similar effort in the future.
Beijing has not yet offered any formal response to these reports.
Russian and US authorities
announced a second round of US-Russia bilateral discussions focused on normalizing diplomatic missions
but not on discussing the ceasefire agreements offered jointly by the US and Ukraine will be held in
Istanbul on April 10. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on April 8 that Russian
Ambassador to the United States Alexander Darchiev and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European
and Eurasian Affairs Sonata Coulter will lead their respective delegations and that the meetings will
follow the same format as the February 27 meeting. Unnamed diplomatic sources told Russian outlet RBK
that the discussions will be held on April 10. US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce confirmed
that the bilateral discussions will occur on April 10 and will solely focus on normalizing US and Russian
diplomatic operations and that discussions about Ukraine are not on the agenda. The Kremlin continues to
demonstrate its refusal to substantively engage with the United States on proposed ceasefire agreements
and future peace negotiations in Ukraine.
Russian forces are currently pursuing three distinct
tactical objectives in the Pokrovsk direction, but Ukrainian drone operations and localized
counterattacks are continuing to complicate Russian advances in the area. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of
Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on April 7 that Russian forces are trying to cut the
T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway northeast of Pokrovsk, bypass Pokrovsk from the west, and attack
in the Novopavlivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) direction. Russian forces are making limited gains northeast
of Pokrovsk toward the T-0504 highway and southwest of Pokrovsk toward Novopavlivka but appear to be
struggling to advance immediately south and southwest of Pokrovsk — where Ukrainian forces have focused
most of their counterattacks in February, March, and early April 2025.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces recently captured Chinese nationals fighting in the Russian military in several
areas of Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian and US authorities announced a second round of US-Russia
bilateral discussions focused on normalizing diplomatic missions but not on discussing the ceasefire
agreements offered jointly by the US and Ukraine will be held in Istanbul on April 10.
• Russian forces are currently pursuing three distinct tactical objectives in the Pokrovsk direction,
but Ukrainian drone operations and localized counterattacks are continuing to complicate Russian advances
in the area.
• Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk support both the ongoing Russian effort
to envelop Pokrovsk from the east and west and the effort to pressure Kostyantynivka from the south by
advancing along the T-0504 highway and eliminating the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk.
• The situation immediately south and southwest of Pokrovsk remains extremely dynamic amid intensified
Russian offensive operations and localized Ukrainian counterattacks and drone operations in the area.
• Russian forces continue to deplete manpower and materiel in unsuccessful mechanized assaults
and ongoing infantry assaults with armored vehicle support further southwest of Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces have only made marginal advances throughout the Pokrovsk direction due to localized
Ukrainian counterattacks and improved integration of Ukrainian ground and drone forces.
• Russian forces have spent the last 13 months and lost over five divisions' worth of tanks and
thousands of troops attacking toward Pokrovsk and trying to seize the town. Ongoing Russian offensive
operations to seize Pokrovsk and attack Kostyantynivka highlight Russian President Vladimir Putin's
determination to seize all of Ukraine through military means at whatever cost if he cannot do so through
negotiations.
• Russian forces renewed long-range missile and drone strikes against Ukraine
overnight on April 7 to 8 following a brief pause on April 6 to 7.
• Russian forces continue
to innovate with long-range Shahed strike drone tactics to maximize the impact of strikes against
Ukraine.
• European states continue to provide financial and military aid to Ukraine.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced an initiative ostensibly aimed at securing medical
treatment and rehabilitation for wounded Russian troops, but the MoD may weaponize this initiative
against wounded servicemembers in practice.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk
and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts and near Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and
Velyka Novosilka.
• The Kremlin is considering passing a bill that may incentivize volunteer
recruitment for conscription-age men ages 18 to 30 years old.
Russian forces continue to marginally advance in the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border area, but the Russian force
grouping in the area will likely be unable to launch a major offensive operation against Sumy City in the
near term without receiving significant reinforcements. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr
Syrskyi stated during an interview with Ukrainian outlet LB UA published on April 9 that Russian forces
have intensified assaults in "all main directions" and begun offensive operations in Sumy and Kharkiv
oblasts. ISW has observed gradual but consistent Russian gains and attacks along the
Volodymyrivka-Zhuravka-Novenke line (north to northeast of Sumy City) in northern Sumy Oblast and ongoing
Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces from remaining positions south of Sudzha in southern Kursk
Oblast since early March 2025. Russian forces made rapid advances in Kursk Oblast in early March 2025 as
the United States temporarily paused intelligence sharing with Ukraine, but Russian gains slowed as
Ukrainian forces retreated into Sudzha and later resumed use of HIMARS long-range strike systems. Russian
forces pushed Ukrainian forces from Sudzha in mid-March 2025 but have continued to attack the remaining
Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast while starting attacks into northern Sumy Oblast over the past
month.
The Russian military command is likely attempting to form a buffer zone along the
international border in Sumy Oblast, although Russian commanders may intend to press further into Sumy
Oblast and towards Sumy City in the future. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces would not attempt
to advance further into northern Sumy Oblast or attack Sumy City so long as Ukrainian forces maintained
their salient in Kursk Oblast. Recent Russian attacks into northern Sumy Oblast indicate that the Russian
military command may attempt to capitalize on the collapse of the Ukrainian Kursk Oblast salient in order
to create a buffer zone in Sumy Oblast or launch an offensive on Sumy City. Russian President Vladimir
Putin asked Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov during a visit to a Russian
command post in Kursk Oblast on March 12 to "think in the future about creating a security zone" along
the Ukrainian-Russian international border. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov suggested that Russia
form a similar buffer zone in Kharkiv Oblast in order to justify the Russian offensive into northern
Kharkiv Oblast in March 2024, and Putin's statement indicates that the Russian military command is either
considering or actively working towards creating a buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast.
Putin
likely intends to use a buffer zone in northern Sumy Oblast and an offensive towards Sumy City to justify
expanding his claims over Ukrainian territory. Russian officials are currently demanding that Ukraine
cede unoccupied territory in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as part of a future peace agreement
to end the war, and Russian officials have previously claimed that Mykolaiv Oblast (which Russia occupies
a miniscule part of on the Kinburn Spit) and Kharkiv Oblast (which Russian occupies limited areas of) are
"historically Russian lands." Putin may intend to leverage further advances in Sumy Oblast and pressure
on Sumy City to demand that Ukraine cede part of Sumy Oblast to Russia during future peace negotiations.
The Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast is unlikely to be sufficiently combat capable to seize a major
Ukrainian city after eight months of combat operations unless it receives significant reinforcements from
another frontline area — which would require Russia to abandon a major operational effort in another area
of Ukraine and possibly leave that area vulnerable to Ukrainian forces — and is therefore unlikely.
Russian forces likely intend to establish a limited and defensible "buffer zone" in northern Sumy Oblast
and advance within artillery range of Sumy City in order to pressure the city and make it uninhabitable
for civilians. The Russian military command may also intend to establish limited, defensible positions in
northern Sumy Oblast and then transfer these forces to reinforce other operational efforts in Ukraine,
although the informational and political pressure that a push on Sumy City could generate may be more
enticing for Putin than advances in other frontline areas.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian
forces continue to marginally advance in the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border area, but the Russian force
grouping in the area will likely be unable to launch a major offensive operation against Sumy City in the
near term without receiving significant reinforcements.
• The Russian military command is
likely attempting to form a buffer zone along the international border in Sumy Oblast, although Russian
commanders may intend to press further into Sumy Oblast and towards Sumy City in the future.
• Russia continues to utilize North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast, but ISW has not yet observed
indications that North Korean troops are operating as combat forces in Ukraine.
• Syrskyi
stated that there are currently 623,000 Russian military personnel fighting against Ukraine.
• Syrskyi also spoke about Ukraine's efforts to further develop its tactical and long-range drone
capabilities.
• The People's Republic of China (PRC) denied sending military personnel to
fight in Ukraine following Ukrainian reports of Chinese nationals fighting alongside Russian forces.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces advanced near
Kupyansk, Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian federal
government and Russian federal subjects are increasingly focused on veteran rehabilitation and
reintegration.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 9 that Ukraine is interested in purchasing a large
package of weapons from the United States, possibly within the framework of a future US-Ukraine mineral
deal, as part of Ukrainian efforts to obtain security guarantees that would deter a future Russian
invasion. Zelensky stated on April 9 that Ukraine recently proposed to the United States that Ukraine
purchase "30 to 50 billion" (likely USD) worth of air defense and weapons systems from the United States
and that Ukraine is prepared to purchase these systems itself — either through direct payment to the
United States or through the fund established by the potential US-Ukrainian minerals deal. Zelensky
stated that he recently told US President Donald Trump that Ukraine wants to buy at least 10 air defense
systems to "help after the end of the war" and that Ukraine will consider the provision of
these air defense and weapons systems as a "security guarantee." ISW continues to assess that a strong
Ukrainian military backed by Western security guarantees remains the most vital component of a stable
post-war European security architecture, guaranteeing a sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterring future
Russian aggression.
Russia’s continued unsubstantiated accusations of Ukrainian violations of
the energy strike ceasefire —despite the lack of any publicly available official ceasefire agreement —
demonstrate how Russia will likely act in the event that Russia accepts the ground ceasefire to which
Ukraine and the United States have already agreed. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson
Maria Zakharova claimed without evidence on April 9 that Ukrainian forces struck energy infrastructure in
"Russian regions" 32 times between April 4 and 7. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed
without evidence on April 10 that Ukraine conducted 11 strikes against energy facilities in occupied
Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts; Krasnodar Krai; and Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod
oblasts in the past day. The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces struck energy facilities in the
Russian near rear and rear in occupied Ukraine, including in Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast (roughly six
kilometers from the frontline) and Holoprystanskyi Raion, Kherson Oblast (just south of the Dnipro River
and inclusive of areas immediately on the east bank of the Dnipro River). It is unclear if
frontline energy infrastructure in the Russian near rear and rear are covered under the strikes ceasefire
as the terms of the agreement have not been published. ISW continues to assess that Russian officials are
using the lack of a clearly defined and public ceasefire agreement to cast Ukraine as a disingenuous
participant in the peace negotiation process. Russian officials’ continued insistence that Ukraine is
violating the ceasefire underscores the importance of a signed and publicly available ceasefire agreement
that includes monitoring and adjudication processes -elements that will be even more important in the
potential future ground ceasefire to which the United States and Ukraine have already agreed.
Russia continues to use bilateral talks with the United States to delay negotiations about the war in
Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin remains uninterested in serious peace negotiations to end the war.
The US Department of State (DoS) reported that US and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on April 10 to
discuss the finalization of "an understanding to ensure the stability of diplomatic banking for Russian
and US bilateral missions." The US DoS stated that the US delegation reiterated concerns about the
current Russian policy prohibiting the US Embassy in Moscow from employing local staff, which the United
States sees as a barrier to the embassy's stable and sustainable staffing. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry
Peskov stated on April 10 that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the US DoS would only
discuss bilateral relations and would not discuss Ukraine. Russian Ambassador to the United States
Alexander Darchiev stated on April 10 that the United States and Russia agreed to measures to facilitate
the movement of diplomats and accelerate the granting of diplomatic visas. Darchiev also stated that the
Russian delegation prioritized discussions about the return of confiscated Russian diplomatic property in
the United States. Russia continues to use bilateral talks with the United States to discuss issues
unrelated to the war in Ukraine, even as US President Donald Trump continues efforts to achieve the
temporary ground ceasefire upon which both the United States and Ukraine have agreed. The talks in
Istanbul suggest that Russia is using diplomatic engagements with the United States to distract from the
war and to obfuscate its own disinterest in productive peace negotiations.
Key Takeaways: • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 9 that Ukraine is interested in purchasing a
large package of weapons from the United States, possibly within the framework of a future US-Ukraine
mineral deal, as part of Ukrainian efforts to obtain security guarantees that would deter a future
Russian invasion.
• Russia’s continued unsubstantiated accusations of Ukrainian violations of
the energy strike ceasefire - despite the lack of any publicly available official ceasefire agreement –
demonstrate how Russia will likely act in the event that Russia accepts the ground ceasefire to which
Ukraine and the United States have already agreed.
• Russia continues to use bilateral talks
with the United States to delay negotiations about the war in Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin
remains uninterested in serious peace negotiations to end the war.
• Russia is reportedly
using social media and financial incentives to recruit Chinese nationals to voluntarily join the Russian
military.
• Russian forces reportedly recently executed a wounded Ukrainian prisoner of war
(POW) in the Lyman direction.
• The Kremlin continues to use narratives it has historically
used against Ukraine to set conditions to justify possible future aggression against Estonia.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces advanced near Toretsk and
Pokrovsk.
• A Russian insider source claimed that Russian authorities are preparing a
dedicated position in Russian regional governments that will oversee veterans' affairs, and the federal
government may include similar positions in the future.
Ukraine's European partners announced new military aid during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the
Ramstein format) meeting on April 11. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced on April 11 that
Germany will provide Ukraine with four IRIS-T air defense systems, 33 missiles for the systems, 120
man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), 25 Marder infantry fighting vehicles, 15 Leopard tanks, 14
artillery systems, and 130,000 155mm artillery shells. Pistorius stated that Germany recently provided 30
Patriot missiles to Ukraine as well. The German Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on April 11 that
Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) are establishing an electronic warfare (EW) coalition for Ukraine.
The UK MoD announced a military aid package worth 450 million pounds (about $588 million) drones, radars,
and anti-tank mines. Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur stated that Estonia will deliver 10,000 155mm
artillery shells and 750,000 rations packages to Ukraine; Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans stated
that the Netherland will provide 150 million euros (about $170 million) to strengthen Ukraine's air
defenses; and Lithuanian Defense Minister Dovilė Šakalienė announced that Lithuania will
allocate 20 million euros (about $22 million) to Ukraine for the purchase of ammunition.
US
Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and CEO of the
Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev in St. Petersburg on April 11 to discuss the war in
Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the Putin-Witkoff meeting would continue
discussions about the war in Ukraine, that Putin would listen to the points that Witkoff delivers from US
President Donald Trump, and that the meeting is a good chance for Russia to convey its "main concerns" to
Trump via Witkoff. Peskov claimed that the officials may discuss a future meeting between Trump and Putin
and that Trump and Putin could "theoretically" have a phone call following the Putin-Witkoff meeting.
Peskov claimed that one should not "expect any breakthroughs" during the Putin-Witkoff meeting and that
Russia and the United States are in the process of normalizing relations and "searching" for a way to
settle the war in Ukraine. Peskov claimed that the Putin-Witkoff meeting and the April 10 US-Russian
bilateral meeting in Istanbul are not related but are "two different tracks with one common process."
White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated on April 11 that the Putin-Witkoff meeting is another
step in the negotiating process toward a ceasefire and an "ultimate peace deal" in the war in Ukraine.
Dmitriev stated that his meeting with Witkoff was "productive."
Kremlin officials continue to
demonstrate Russia's unwillingness to make territorial compromises in Ukraine in a future peace
settlement. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated on April 11, following a Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) foreign ministers meeting in Almaty, that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky
will have to accept territorial concessions and that it is "impossible" for Ukraine to return to its 1991
borders – Ukraine's internationally recognized borders. Lavrov attempted to deflect blame for Russia's
intransigence onto Zelensky and Ukraine's alleged mistreatment of Russian speakers in Ukraine. The
Kremlin continues to explicitly demonstrate its unwillingness to make compromises and cede
Russian-occupied territory in Ukraine as part of any future peace negotiations – in contrast to Ukrainian
officials who have expressed their willingness to make territorial compromises in a future peace
agreement. Russian President Vladimir Putin has even demanded that Ukraine cede territory in Donetsk,
Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy and claimed that Mykolaiv and
Kharkiv oblasts are "historically Russian lands."
Key Takeaways:
• Ukraine's
European partners announced new military aid during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein
format) meeting on April 11.
• US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with
Russian President Vladimir Putin and CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev in
St. Petersburg on April 11 to discuss the war in Ukraine.
• Kremlin officials continue to
demonstrate Russia's unwillingness to make territorial compromises in Ukraine in a future peace
settlement.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to extract concessions from the United
States as part of ongoing bilateral US-Russian negotiations while delaying progress towards peace in
Ukraine.
• Ukrainian sources continue to speculate about which directions Russian forces will
prioritize in Spring and Summer 2024. ISW is updating the axis sections in its Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment to reflect shifting Russian operational efforts along the frontline.
• Russian
President Vladimir Putin continues to emphasize Russia's large-scale and long-term investments in
Russia's navy and naval strategic nuclear forces.
• Russian forces recently executed
Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued reports of systematic
executions of Ukrainian POWs across the theater of war.
• Russian forces recently advanced
near Kupyansk, Siversk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian opposition media
provided additional details regarding Russia's efforts to recruit Chinese citizens to serve in Ukraine
following Ukrainian reports about Chinese nationals fighting in Ukraine.
US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg expressed support on April 11 for the deployment of an
allied "reassurance force" in rear areas of western Ukraine after a possible future ceasefire between
Ukraine and Russia. The Times reported on April 11 that Kellogg expressed support for a "partition" of
Ukraine between European, Ukrainian, and Russian forces; the deployment of a European "reassurance force"
in western Ukraine; and establishing an 18-mile-wide "demilitarized zone" along the current frontline.
Kellogg clarified later on April 11 that he supports the presence of a "reassurance force" that does not
include US troops to support Ukrainian sovereignty, but that none of his statements during the interview
suggested "a partitioning of Ukraine." Kellogg noted that the Times misrepresented some of his statements
referencing possible areas of responsibility (AORs) of a future European "reassurance force."
Kellogg's clarification regarding the deployment of a "reassurance force" in Ukraine's rear areas is
consistent with several statements from Ukrainian and European leaders about a possible future
peacekeeping contingent deployed to Ukraine. Ukrainian Commander in Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi
stated on April 9 that a putative peacekeeping contingent would not deploy to the frontline. European
Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas stated on April 10 that a future peacekeeping contingent would be
likely to deploy not to the frontline but rather deeper within Ukraine or even outside of Ukraine.
Bloomberg reported on April 10 that UK Defense Secretary John Healey and French Defense Minister
Sebastien Lecornu stated that the Coalition of the Willing aims to develop more detailed plans within the
next two weeks about how the coalition will help secure Ukrainian airspace, coastline, and land. People
familiar with the matter told Bloomberg that the coalition hopes that the United States will agree to
"backstop" any future European deployments to Ukraine with air power, border surveillance, and
intelligence.
Russian state-owned and pro-Kremlin media amplified a Russian official's blanket
rejection of any peacekeeping force in Ukraine on April 12. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
Ambassador-at-Large Rodion Miroshnik responded to Kellogg's statements on April 12 and reiterated the
Kremlin's objection to the presence of any peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine following a possible future
ceasefire or peace agreement because a peacekeeping force would preserve the "level of toxicity" that
supposedly prompted Russia to launch its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russian
state-owned and pro-state media widely amplified Miroshnik's statement. Kremlin officials have repeatedly
rejected the idea of a possible future peacekeeping force in Ukraine or any European involvement in
post-war Ukraine. Miroshnik's accusation of "toxicity" in Ukraine is an indirect reference to the
Kremlin's continued demands that any conclusion to the war in Ukraine must address Russia's so-called
"root causes" of the war. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov previously defined Russia's perceived
"root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the
Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and the Russian language, media,
and culture in Ukraine. Russian officials frequently directly invoke these "root causes" to justify
Russia's continued war effort and pre-war demands amounting to total Ukrainian capitulation, and
Miroshnik's April 12 statement is an indirect restatement of this concept.
Russian forces have
resumed a more typical strike pattern in late March and early April 2025 after a temporary spike in the
size of Russian long-range strike packages in mid-February and early March 2025. Russian forces conducted
notably larger strike packages in mid-February and early March 2025 but have launched strike packages
more comparable to trends last observed in January and early February 2025, albeit using fewer missiles,
in recent weeks. Russian forces notably conducted no strikes against Ukraine on April 7 - the day after
conducting their largest strike in over a month on April 6 — but have since resumed daily strikes.
Russian officials have thus far refused to engage with or have outright rejected the US-Ukrainian
temporary ceasefire that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff presumably proposed to
Russian President Vladimir Putin during a meeting on March 13. The proposed long-range strikes ceasefire
on energy infrastructure would not require Russia to cease all long-range drone and missile strikes, but
the proposed general ceasefire along the current frontline and in the air and sea would likely require
Russia to end all strikes on Ukraine. Russian forces are likely delaying negotiations on a general
ceasefire in order to continue making gains along the frontline in Ukraine and continue devastating
long-range strikes against Ukrainian defense industrial and civilian areas in order to intimidate
civilians and undermine Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression.
Key Takeaways:
• US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg expressed support on
April 11 for the deployment of an allied "reassurance force" in the rear areas of western Ukraine after a
possible future ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia.
• Russian state-owned and pro-Kremlin
media amplified a Russian official's blanket rejection of any peacekeeping force in Ukraine on April
12.
• Russian forces have resumed a more typical strike pattern in late March and early April
2025 after a temporary spike in the size of Russian long-range strike packages in mid-February and early
March 2025.
• People's Republic of China (PRC) military officials reportedly visited the
frontline in Ukraine to glean insights for future warfare amid reports that at least 155 Chinese
nationals are fighting in Ukraine.
• Ukraine’s European partners announced additional military
aid packages within the context of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting on
April 11.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove, and Russian forces recently
advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that ongoing US-Russian negotiations are unlikely to result in
"lightning-fast results," contrary to US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a general
ceasefire and lasting peace agreement in Ukraine in the near future. Peskov told Kremlin journalist Pavel
Zarubin on April 13 that "everything is moving very well" regarding US-Russian bilateral talks and
discussions about the war in Ukraine but that there will likely not be immediate results. Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Second Department of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Director
Alexei Polishchuk gave an interview to Russian state media group Rossiya Today (RT) and stated that
Russia is willing to engage in negotiations that “take into account the modern realities” of the war and
eliminate the “root causes” of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that
any peace process in Ukraine must address these so-called “root causes." Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov previously defined "root causes" as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward
and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine. These so-called
”root causes” are a reference to Russia’s pre-war demands that effectively amount to Ukraine’s full
capitulation and the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine. Peskov's and Polishchuk's
comments also reflect the Kremlin's continued rejection of President Trump's stated approach of first
establishing a ceasefire and then negotiating a broader peace agreement and the Kremlin's commitment to
war aims that are incompatible with President Trump’s goal of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.
Any future general ceasefire or peace agreement must include robust monitoring mechanisms, given
the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to portray Ukraine as violating the long-range energy infrastructure
strikes ceasefire without providing evidence of these strikes and despite the lack of public details
about the ceasefire’s terms. It remains unclear what monitoring mechanisms the West could leverage to
enforce and monitor a future general ceasefire or if the Kremlin would accept any such mechanisms. Peskov
and Polishchuk reiterated ongoing Russian claims on April 13 that Ukraine is violating the temporary
moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure. Russian officials, led by the Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD), have accused Ukraine of violating the temporary ceasefire almost every day
since March 29 but have not provided evidence to substantiate most of these claims. Russian officials
have repeatedly claimed that Ukrainian forces are striking energy infrastructure along Ukraine's northern
border with Russia, although it remains unclear if strikes with tactical first-person view (FPV) drones
or routine shelling would be a violation of the energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire as the terms of
the ceasefire are publicly unclear. Russian officials appear to be weaponizing the vague conditions of
the ceasefire and exploiting the absence of independent monitoring mechanisms to flood the information
space with unsubstantiated claims about supposed Ukrainian ceasefire violations.
Russian
officials may attempt to flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire
violations in the future if a general ceasefire does not include robust independent monitoring
mechanisms. Russian forces may conduct false flag attacks along the frontline in the event of a future
general ceasefire in order to accuse Ukraine of violating the ceasefire and justify reigniting the
conflict. ISW has previously assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin's claims that the current
Ukrainian government is illegitimate are setting conditions to legitimize future Russian ceasefire
violations. The Kremlin is weaponizing the lack of monitoring mechanisms for the temporary energy
infrastructure strikes ceasefire, and any future general ceasefire must have more robust monitoring
mechanisms to deter, adjudicate, or at least properly record future violations.
Key
Takeaways:
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that ongoing US-Russian negotiations are
unlikely to result in "lightning-fast results," contrary to US President Donald Trump's stated objective
of achieving a general ceasefire and lasting peace agreement in Ukraine in the near future.
• Any future general ceasefire or peace agreement must include robust monitoring mechanisms, given the
Kremlin's ongoing efforts to portray Ukraine as violating the long-range energy infrastructure strikes
ceasefire without providing evidence of these strikes and despite the lack of public details about the
ceasefire’s terms. It remains unclear what monitoring mechanisms the West could leverage to enforce and
monitor a future general ceasefire or if the Kremlin would accept any such mechanisms.
• Russian officials continue to weaponize the vague terms of the current ceasefire on long-range
strikes against energy infrastructure and ongoing ceasefire negotiations in an effort to falsely portray
Ukraine- and not Russia- as unwilling to engage in constructive dialogue.
• Russian forces
conducted a devastating ballistic missile strike against Sumy City on April 13, causing more than 100
casualties.
• Ongoing milblogger complaints about the Russian military's conduct of the war in
Ukraine reinforce ISW’s assessment that Russian tactics will degrade Russia’s manpower and materiel
resources and contribute to slowing Russian advances along the frontline.
• Ukrainian forces
recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Kharkiv City, Borova, and Chasiv
Yar.
Russian forces appear to be leveraging redeployed elements of the 8th Combined Arms Army to close the
Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk and level the frontline as part of ongoing Russian efforts to
attack Kostyantynivka from the south. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on April 14
that elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army , Southern
Military District ) recently seized Oleksandropil, Panteleymonivka, and Valentynivka (all southwest
of Toretsk) and pushed Ukrainian forces from positions east of the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynopil
highway. Russian milbloggers also claimed on April 13 and 14 that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces
from positions east of the H-20 highway, seized Valentynivka, and are attacking Sukha Balka (north of
Valentynivka). Mashovets stated that elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) continue to
attack north of Vozdvyzhenka (west of Oleksandropil and east of Pokrovsk) in the direction of Nova
Poltavka and Novoolenivka (both northeast of Pokrovsk and west of Toretsk). Russian milbloggers recently
credited elements of the 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) with seizing Panteleymonivka
and Oleksandropil and elements of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) with
seizing Kalynove (east of Pokrovsk).
The Russian military command redeployed elements of the
20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk
directions in February 2025 and likely intended to leverage these redeployments to break out of Toretsk
and advance towards Kostyantynivka along or parallel to the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway.
Elements of the Russian 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps , SMD)
previously operating in these two areas failed to break through Ukraine's defense in Fall 2024 and Winter
2024-2025 , likely prompting the Russian military command to introduce elements of the 20th and 150th
motorized rifle divisions – potentially prematurely – into combat in order to maintain the operational
tempo in these areas. Russian forces marginally advanced along the frontline between Vozdvyzhenka
(northeast of Pokrovsk) and Sukha Balka in February and March 2025, but have made more tactically
significant advances near Kalynove and along the Sukha Balka-Oleksandropil line since early April 2025.
ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may aim to eliminate the Ukrainian pocket southwest of
Toretsk in order to level out their southern flank ahead of a planned push on Kostyantynivka, and recent
Russian redeployments and tactical activity supports this assessment. Russian forces likely intend to
leverage advances southwest of Toretsk to push along the H-20 highway and facilitate deeper advances
northeast of Pokrovsk along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway toward Kostyantynivka. Russian
forces must break out of Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, advance toward Kostyantynivka broadly from the east, or
advance roughly 24 kilometers from Pokrovsk along the T-0504 highway to Kostyantynivka’s southwestern
flank before Russian forces will pose any notable threat to seizing Ukrainian positions in
Kostyantynivka, and a Russian offensive to seize the city or Ukraine's wider fortress belt in Donetsk
Oblast would likely be a years' long effort - assuming that the West continues to bolster Ukraine's
defense.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces appear to be leveraging redeployed
elements of the 8th Combined Arms Army to close the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk and level the
frontline as part of ongoing Russian efforts to attack Kostyantynivka from the south.
• Russian forces appear to be intensifying their use of armored vehicles throughout the theater after
mainly relegating armored vehicles to fire support roles and relying on infantry assaults to advance in
late 2024 and early 2025.
• A Russian military court recently decided to keep former 58th
Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov in custody after reports that Popov would
command a penal assault detachment in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near
Siversk and Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
Two high-ranking members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's inner circle reiterated Putin's June 2024
non-negotiable demands that any resolution of the war in Ukraine must result in regime change, extensive
territorial concessions, and long-term limitations on Ukraine's military after US Special Envoy for the
Middle East Steve Witkoff's April 11 meeting with Putin. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head
Sergey Naryshkin claimed on April 15 that any future peace agreement ending Russia's invasion of Ukraine
must include terms concerning Ukraine's neutrality; the demilitarization and "denazification" of the
Ukrainian state; the abolition of Ukrainian laws that allegedly discriminate against Russian-speakers in
Ukraine; and the recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and
Kherson oblasts. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed to Russian state business outlet
Kommersant on April 14 that the current Ukrainian government is "unconstitutional" and that Russia
"cannot give up" following the illegal and sham referendums
Russia conducted in the four oblasts to join Russia in Fall 2022. Lavrov reiterated that Putin "very
clearly outlined" Russia's demands for a future peace agreement to end the war during Putin's speech on
June 14, 2024, and stated that these June 2024 demands were "not some kind of request." Lavrov stated
that there are "no secrets" about Russia's demands and reiterated the importance of addressing the "root
causes" of the war in a future peace agreement.
Russian officials are using Putin's June 2024
speech as the Kremlin's current standing guidance on negotiations and the resolution of the war in
Ukraine. Putin demanded on June 14, 2024 that Ukrainian forces must "completely withdraw" from
Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Ukraine must
officially abandon its goal of joining NATO (by amending its constitution in which that goal is
enshrined) before Russia can agree to a future ceasefire and peace negotiations. Putin stated that Russia
is prepared to begin negotiations with Ukraine as soon as Ukraine agrees to withdraw from the entirety of
the four oblasts. Putin also demanded that the international community recognize the four illegally
annexed and occupied oblasts as part of Russia and lift all Western sanctions against Russia in the event
of a resolution to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin reiterated his calls for Ukraine to
agree to full demilitarization and "denazification" and abandon its aspirations to join any external
security blocs. These demands would preclude the bilateral security agreements Ukraine has negotiated and
is negotiating with several European states.
Putin and other Kremlin officials have routinely
issued these same demands, including by using vague language to obfuscate Russia's most extreme demands.
Russian officials, including Putin, use this language to articulate their overarching demand that the
West acknowledge Russia's illegal annexation of occupied Ukraine and force Ukraine to concede not only
territory but also its future sovereignty and ability to defend itself. Kremlin officials have
consistently demanded that:
• Ukraine must demilitarize. Putin named "demilitarization" as one
of the main goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and stated on July 4, 2024,
that Ukraine should undergo "irreversible" "demilitarization" in the event of a future ceasefire. Russia
demanded in the April 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft agreement that Ukraine shrink its military beyond
pre-2022 levels and commit to never fielding a military capable of defending the country against future
Russian aggression. Russia demanded in the protocol that the Ukrainian military should be confined to
fewer than 85,000 active-duty personnel, fewer than 15,000 National Guard personnel, and fewer than 1,400
tanks and armored vehicles. The pre-2022 Ukrainian military had 196,600 active-duty personnel, 60,000
National Guard personnel, and over 3,000 tanks and armored vehicles.
• Ukraine must
"denazify" and install a "legitimate" government. Putin named "denazification" as another of the main
goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and Russian officials have previously
defined "denazification" as the "liquidation of those who instill" Russophobia in other people. Russian
officials often invoke the term "denazification" to call for regime change in Ukraine and the
installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv. Putin has routinely labeled all Ukrainian
governments since 2014 as "illegitimate" and claimed on January 28 that Russia will not view any
agreements it concludes with the current Ukrainian government as binding.
• Ukraine must
abandon its aspirations to join NATO or any security bloc in the future. Putin's demand for Ukraine's
“neutrality” remains one of the central justifications for his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia
demanded in the Istanbul Protocol draft agreement that Ukraine amend its constitution to remove the
provision committing Ukraine to NATO membership and add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine
from joining any military alliances, concluding military agreements, or hosting foreign military
personnel or systems in Ukraine.
• Ukraine must concede occupied Ukrainian territory and
"Novorossiya" to Russia. Putin stated on June 14, 2024, that Russia will not be content with ending the
war on the lines it currently holds and explicitly called for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the
non-occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts as a prerequisite for any sort of
"peace" negotiations with Ukraine. Kremlin officials have indicated that they have territorial ambitions
beyond the administrative borders of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and often invoke
the term "Novorossiya" (an amorphous, invented region in Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed
includes all of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia) to lay claim to other
areas of eastern and southern Ukraine, including Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.
• Any resolution of the war must address the war's "root causes." Lavrov has repeatedly defined the
"root causes" of the war in Ukraine as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern
Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s and the Ukrainian government's alleged
discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine. Russian
officials have leveraged claims that Ukraine has mistreated Russian speakers to justify Russia's
occupation and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory.
Key Takeaways:
• Two
high-ranking members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's inner circle reiterated Putin's June 2024
non-negotiable demands that any resolution of the war in Ukraine must result in regime change, extensive
territorial concessions, and long-term limitations on Ukraine's military after US Special Envoy for the
Middle East Steve Witkoff's April 11 meeting with Putin.
• Kremlin officials continue to set
informational conditions to demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not currently occupy
and to justify Russia's ambitions of asserting control over independent countries, including NATO member
states.
• Naryshkin threatened a Russian attack against NATO states in response to NATO states
building up their defenses in line with US President Donald Trump's push for Europe to increase its own
defense capabilities.
• Lavrov reiterated Putin's rejection of Trump's proposal for a 30-day
full ceasefire.
• Russia may recognize the end of the 30-day energy infrastructure strikes
ceasefire soon and intensify its long-range strikes against Ukraine, but the exact parameters of the
ceasefire — including its end date — remain unclear.
• Ukraine's National Guard announced on
April 15 the formation of two new army corps on the basis of two existing brigades, amid Ukraine's
continued efforts to transition to a corps structure.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced
near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka and in western
Zaporizhia Oblast.
The White House reiterated that the United States will not engage in economic agreements with Russia
until Russia agrees to a ceasefire, amid continued Russian efforts to deflect blame onto Ukraine for the
Kremlin's rejection of such a ceasefire. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that Trump
made it "very clear" that US-Russian economic partnerships could be an incentive for Russia to end its
war against Ukraine, but that the United States "needs to see a ceasefire first" — likely in reference to
a temporary or permanent full ceasefire in Ukraine. The Trump administration has previously characterized
a temporary full ceasefire as a "necessary step" toward achieving an enduring peace settlement in
Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the joint US-Ukrainian 30-day full ceasefire proposal
when Trump called Putin on March 18, and senior Russian officials have reiterated Putin's rejection since
then by attempting to deflect blame onto Ukraine and secure additional bilateral concessions from the
United States. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 16 that Ukraine's decision to extend
martial law and continue general mobilization until August 6, 2025 is an attempt to preserve Ukraine's
"unstable structure" and implied that Ukraine's ban on negotiations with Russia is inhibiting progress
towards ending the war. The Ukrainian government is legally prohibited from lifting martial law while
Russia continues to attack Ukraine, however. Russian authorities also appear to be intensifying their
recruitment efforts, suggesting that the Kremlin intends to sustain its current force generation efforts
for some time, peace talks notwithstanding. The Kremlin is continuing efforts to blame Ukraine for the
lack of progress towards Trump's desired full ceasefire. Ukraine has already agreed to Trump's temporary
full ceasefire proposal, while Kremlin officials have consistently reiterated that Russian President
Vladimir Putin's non-negotiable demands for regime change in Ukraine, extensive territorial concessions,
and limitations on Ukraine's military that would render Ukraine defenseless as conditions must be met
before Russia can agree to a future ceasefire.
Russia is reportedly heavily dependent on North
Korean artillery ammunition as North Korea continues to learn lessons from Russia's war against Ukraine.
Reuters published a joint investigation with UK-based research organization Open Source Center (OSC) on
April 15 detailing the extent of Russia's dependence on North Korean artillery and the evolution of North
Korean forces' participation in fighting alongside Russian forces. Reuters and the OSC tracked 64
shipments from North Korea to Russia from September 2023 to March 2025 that involved 16,000 containers
carrying millions of North Korean artillery rounds and recorded a shipment from North Korea as recently
as March 17, 2025. Reuters and the OSC reported that four Russian-flagged ships — the Angara, Maria,
Maia-1, and Lady R cargo ships — transported the ammunition from North Korea's port of Rajin to the
Russian ports of Vostochny and Dunai. Reuters reviewed Russian military documents of everyday Russian
artillery usage that showed that some Russian units depended on North Korean artillery shells for half or
more of their shells used in daily fire missions. Reuters reported that an unspecified Russian unit
fighting in Zaporizhia Oblast reported that nearly 50 percent of its 152mm D-20 howitzer rounds and 100
percent of its 122mm rockets fired came from North Korea. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence
Directorate (GUR) told Reuters that North Korea has provided Russia with three million artillery rounds
and an unspecified number of mortar rounds since mid-2023 and that half of all of Russia's artillery
rounds come from North Korea. The GUR also stated that North Korea supplied Russia with 148 KN-23 and
KN-24 ballistic missiles as of January 2025.
Key Takeaways:
• The White House
reiterated that the United States will not engage in economic agreements with Russia until Russia agrees
to a ceasefire, amid continued Russian efforts to deflect blame onto Ukraine for the Kremlin's rejection
of such a ceasefire.
• Russia is reportedly heavily dependent on North Korean artillery
ammunition as North Korea continues to learn lessons from Russia's war against Ukraine.
• Russian authorities recently detained former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov, likely as part of
the Kremlin efforts to scapegoat Kursk Oblast officials for their failure in responding to Ukraine’s
August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces
recently executed at least one unarmed Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW) near Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka
Novosilka).
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka
Novosilka.
Russian forces recently conducted a roughly battalion-sized mechanized assault across a wide front in
western Zaporizhia Oblast, representing an inflection in recently observed Russian mechanized assault
tactics. Ukrainian military officials reported on April 17 that Ukrainian forces repelled a series of
mechanized assaults by elements of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District
) that consisted of roughly a battalion's worth of equipment, including 320 personnel, 40 armored
vehicles, three tanks, and about 10 buggies, along the Pyatykhatky-Stepove-Lobkove-Mali Shcherbaky-Mala
Tokmachka line (a frontage of roughly 40 kilometers) south and southwest of Orikhiv on the evening of
April 16. Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed all three Russian tanks
and 29 armored vehicles and killed or wounded 140 Russian soldiers. Geolocated footage of the assault
indicates that Russian forces advanced along the T-0515 Orikhiv-Polohy highway south of Mala Tokmachka
(southeast of Orikhiv). ISW has not observed any other geolocated footage as of this writing to indicate
any further advances along the wide front of attack. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson
Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Russian forces conducted a similar assault in western Zaporizhia
Oblast on April 13 — likely in reference to a recent Russian reinforced company-sized mechanized assault
in the Zaporizhia direction. Voloshyn reported that Russian forces spent months preparing for these
assaults and have concentrated additional assault groups for possible future assaults. Ukrainian
officials have warned of the possibility of intensified Russian offensive operations in western
Zaporizhia Oblast since November 2024.
Russian forces fighting in Ukraine since 2023 do not
usually conduct mechanized assaults spread out across a wide front. Russian forces typically conduct
mechanized assaults in singular frontal assaults in narrower and more limited areas, likely intending to
break through Ukrainian defenses with a greater concentration of forces in a single area, or as part of
turning movements to outflank and envelop Ukrainian positions. The tactical objective of this
battalion-sized attack remains unclear, and the available footage and Ukrainian reporting indicates that
Ukrainian forces defeated the attack. Russian forces may have intended for the April 16 mechanized
assault to probe Ukrainian defenses to gauge the Ukrainian reaction and to detect possible weak points in
Ukrainian positions ahead of future, more concentrated assaults. Elements of the 58th CAA may have been
testing a different tactic, alternatively. ISW has not observed evidence to suggest that Russian forces
elsewhere along the frontline recently have implemented similar mechanized assault tactics. The decision
to dedicate roughly a battalion's worth of armored vehicles to a broad mechanized assault with likely
minimal gains is notable given Russia's extensive armored vehicle losses in the war, dwindling Soviet-era
armored vehicle stockpiles, and limited capacity to produce, refurbish, and repair armored vehicles.
Russian forces continue to intensify their usage of armored vehicles across the frontline amid
continued negotiations to end the war. Commander of the Ukrainian National Guard, Brigadier General
Oleksandr Pivnenko, reported on April 17 that Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced company-sized
mechanized assault in the Pokrovsk direction and that preliminary information confirms that Ukrainian
forces destroyed 21 armored fighting vehicles, two other vehicles, and 96 motorcycles and killed and
wounded over 240 Russian soldiers. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on the evening of April
17 that Russian forces launched an attack in the Pokrovsk direction and that Ukrainian forces destroyed
the entire Russian grouping consisting of 115 pieces of equipment (likely including armored vehicles,
other vehicles, and motorcycles), killed 200 Russian soldiers, and wounded 30 more. ISW has recently
observed an increase in Russia's use of armored vehicles throughout the theater after mainly relegating
armored vehicles to fire support roles and relying on infantry assaults to advance in late 2024 and early
2025. This intensification may be related to changing weather conditions and hardening terrain as Ukraine
is coming out of its muddy rasputitsa season, the spring period in which melting frozen winter ground and
spring rains degrade conditions for mechanized movement. This intensification may also be related to the
Kremlin's continued insistence that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts
to Russia and that the four oblasts be recognized as Russian territory.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's non-negotiable
demands for extensive territorial concessions from Ukraine while noting that ongoing peace negotiations
are unlikely to achieve results quickly.
• Russian forces recently conducted a roughly
battalion-sized mechanized assault across a wide front in western Zaporizhia Oblast, representing an
inflection in recently observed Russian mechanized assault tactics.
• The Kremlin is adopting
increasingly threatening rhetoric towards Europe aimed at preventing Europe from supporting Ukraine and
defending itself.
• Russia is increasingly adapting its drones to facilitate chemical weapons
strikes against the frontline and rear areas of Ukraine — in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that
the United States and Ukraine are making progress towards signing a bilateral mineral deal. • European countries continue to increase their domestic defense production, including in support of
Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced
in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka and in western
Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya reiterated Russian President
Vladimir Putin's rejection of a general ceasefire in Ukraine. Nebenzya claimed on April 18 that
discussing a general ceasefire in Ukraine is "unrealistic" and accused Ukraine of not observing the
temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure over the last month. Putin
rejected the joint US-Ukrainian 30-day full ceasefire proposal during a phone call with US President
Donald Trump on March 18, and senior Russian officials have reiterated Putin's rejection since then,
attempting to deflect blame onto Ukraine and extract additional bilateral concessions from the United
States. ISW previously noted that any future general ceasefire agreement must include robust monitoring
mechanisms, given the Kremlin's efforts to claim that Ukraine was violating the temporary strikes
ceasefire without providing evidence, and that it is unclear if Russian officials will accept any
meaningful monitoring mechanisms.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced that the
temporary ceasefire on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure ended on April 18. Peskov
responded to a question about whether Russia will resume strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities and
claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin has not issued further instructions. Russian officials have
not expressed any interest in extending the temporary strikes ceasefire and the actual terms of the
ceasefire remain unclear due to the lack of formal, publicly available, joint ceasefire documents.
Russian officials accused Ukraine of violating the temporary strikes ceasefire almost daily over the last
month, but provided no evidence for most of these accusations.
ISW previously assessed that
Russia may intensify its long-range strikes against Ukraine following the end of the strikes moratorium,
and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned at an event for Ukrainian energy workers on April 17
that Russia may intensify strikes on Ukraine around Easter (April 20). It remains unclear how the ending
of the temporary strikes ceasefire may impact Russia's nightly strikes against Ukraine, as the specifics
of Putin's previous order to stop strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure also remain unclear. Putin
claimed to have issued an order to the Russian military immediately following his March 18 phone call
with President Trump to stop strikes on energy infrastructure facilities, but Russian officials have
provided no further context about the duration or other specifics of this supposed order.
Kremlin mouthpieces continue to reject all US proposals to end the war in Ukraine that do not concede
to all of Russia's demands for Ukraine, including regime change, demilitarization, and significant
territorial concessions. Russian propagandist and RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan responded on
April 18 to Bloomberg's report that the United States proposed freezing the war on the current
frontlines, leaving occupied Ukraine "under Moscow's control," and taking Ukraine's NATO membership "off
the table" as part of a plan to end the war and claimed that this plan is a "bad deal for Russia."
Simonyan claimed that Russia should reject this plan because the plan does not include terms for
Ukraine's "denazification" or a formal recognition of occupied Ukraine as part of Russia, and
additionally does not include assurances that Europe will not deploy a potential European peacekeeping
contingent to Ukraine. Simonyan also attempted to delegitimize Ukraine and the United States as
negotiating partners and claimed that "there can be no negotiating with the insane" in reference to the
plan and the Ukrainian government. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev urged the
United States to "wash its hands" of the war in Ukraine and let Russia "figure it out faster" in a social
media post on April 18.
Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have
repeatedly stated that they are unwilling to accept any agreement that does not concede to all of
Russia's territorial and political demands for Ukraine. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff
told the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) in an article published on April 17 that Russian President Vladimir
Putin has been "fixated" on territorial concessions during their bilateral meetings, indicating that
Russian officials likely continue to reiterate their territorial and political demands about Ukraine both
in public and in private. Russian officials have noted that Putin remains committed to accomplishing all
his goals in Ukraine, which Putin has explicitly defined in part as the "denazification" and
demilitarization of Ukraine. Russian officials often invoke the term "denazification" to call for regime
change in Ukraine and to demand the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv. ISW
previously noted that Russia demanded in the April 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft agreement that Ukraine
shrink its military beyond pre-2022 levels and commit to never fielding a military capable of defending
the country against future Russian aggression. Putin has also called for Ukraine to concede unoccupied
territory to Russia, and Russian officials appear to be considering these demands as the Kremlin's
standing guidance on negotiations.
Russian officials' continued insistence on these demands
has also set conditions for Russian society to expect these demands to be fulfilled in any conclusion of
the war in Ukraine, and Kremlin mouthpieces stating explicitly that these demands must be met even in a
peace deal favorable to Russia is a reflection of this long-term rhetorical line. ISW continues to assess
that the Kremlin maintains its long-standing goals in Ukraine, and Russian officials continue to indicate
and explicitly state that they are unwilling to compromise on these goals.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya reiterated Russian
President Vladimir Putin's rejection of a general ceasefire in Ukraine.
• Kremlin Spokesperson
Dmitry Peskov announced that the temporary ceasefire on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure
ended on April 18.
• Kremlin mouthpieces continue to reject all US proposals to end the war in
Ukraine that do not concede to all of Russia's demands for Ukraine, including regime change,
demilitarization, and significant territorial concessions.
• Russian officials continue to
reiterate Russian demands for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a
precondition for a peace agreement — a reference to Russia's initial war demands that directly contradict
US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian officials held bilateral talks with US officials and multilateral talks with Coalition of
the Willing partners in Paris, France, on April 16 to 18 regarding peace negotiations.
• Ukrainian officials announced on April 17 that the United States and Ukraine signed a memorandum of
intent to conclude a future bilateral mineral deal and enhance economic cooperation.
• Russian
forces conducted a ballistic missile strike against civilian areas in Kharkiv City on April 18, the
latest in a string of high-casualty Russian strikes against civilian areas in Ukraine in recent weeks.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on April 18 that the People's Republic of
China (PRC) is supplying Russia with weapons and military materials.
• Ukrainian forces
recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk,
Lyman, and Kurakhove.
The snap Russian-proposed Easter truce underscores the necessity that the text of any ceasefire or peace
agreement be publicly available, formally agreed to in advance by all parties, and include robust
monitoring mechanisms. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported at 2000 local time April 20 that
Russian forces in "all main frontline directions" conducted ground attacks and drone and artillery
strikes against Ukrainian forces in violation of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 30-hour unilateral
truce from 1800 Moscow time on April 19 to 0000 Moscow time on April 21. Zelensky also stated on April 20
that Russian forces conducted attacks in the Siversk, Toretsk, and Zaporizhia directions and are
conducting offensive operations most intensely in the Pokrovsk direction. Zelensky’s statement from 1600
local time April 20 also reported Russian truce violations in Kursk Oblast, although Zelensky stated
earlier at 0000 local time April 20 that Putin did not extend the truce to Kursk or Belgorod oblasts.
Zelensky reiterated that an effective ceasefire agreement must provide monitoring mechanisms of potential
violations and that Ukrainian forces will respond "symmetrically" to Russian assaults. The Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 20 that Russian forces had "strictly" observed the truce and
claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted drone and artillery strikes against Russian positions and
Russian-occupied settlements since the truce began. Ukrainian and Russian sources noted that fighting
abated but did not fully cease in some directions, including the Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Toretsk
directions, and that fighting in other directions temporarily ceased around 1800 on April 19 but has
since resumed with variable frequency and intensity. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management
(FIRMS) data shows satellite-detected heat anomalies along the frontline on April 20 that may suggest
military activity, but ISW is unable to independently verify the specific reports of violations made by
Russian or Ukrainian sources.
Zelensky reported that Russian forces did not conduct long-range
strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 19 to 20 and during the day on April 20 and proposed a
temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure. Zelensky stated that Ukraine
and Russia achieved a long-range strikes ceasefire between April 19 and 20 and during the day on April 20
and such a ceasefire is the easiest to extend. Zelensky proposed a temporary ceasefire on long-range
missile and drone strikes against civilian infrastructure for a minimum of 30 days, with the opportunity
to extend the ceasefire beyond 30 days. Russia and Ukraine repeatedly accused each other of violating the
temporary energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire, but Putin and other senior Russian officials have
repeatedly rejected the March 13 joint US-Ukrainian 30-day full ceasefire proposal over the last five
weeks. A temporary civilian infrastructure strikes ceasefire agreement — and especially a general
ceasefire agreement — would require robust monitoring mechanisms, public and formal terms, and a clearly
defined time frame. The Kremlin may continue to leverage any vague future ceasefire agreements to
obfuscate Russia's rejection of US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals and to accuse Ukraine of violating
such ceasefire terms.
Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Russia's systematic
persecution of religious communities throughout occupied Ukraine, including against Christians. Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on April 20 that Russian forces have killed or tortured 67
Ukrainian priests, pastors, and monks and destroyed 640 religious sites, most of which are Christian
sites, since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. ISW has previously reported on Russia's
religious oppression in occupied Ukraine, including arbitrary detention and assassinations of Ukrainian
clergy or religious leaders and the looting, desecration, and deliberate destruction of places of
worship. ISW has also reported at length on Russia's systematic repression of Orthodox Church of Ukraine
and other religious minorities, particularly Ukrainian Protestants and Baptists, who have faced Russian
brutality and other repressions throughout Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
• The snap
Russian-proposed Easter truce underscores the necessity that the text of any ceasefire or peace agreement
be publicly available, formally agreed to in advance by all parties, and include robust monitoring
mechanisms.
• Zelensky reported that Russian forces did not conduct long-range strikes against
Ukraine on the night of April 19 to 20 and during the day on April 20 and proposed a temporary moratorium
on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure.
• Ukrainian officials continue to
highlight Russia's systematic persecution of religious communities throughout occupied Ukraine, including
against Christians.
• The Kremlin continues to repurpose narratives that Russian officials
have repeatedly used to justify Russia's invasions of Ukraine in an effort to further militarize Russian
society in the long term, likely in preparation for a potential future protracted conflict with NATO.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk before the start of the
Easter truce.
Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's April 20 proposal for
a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure, declined Zelensky's offer
to extend Putin's own 30-hour Easter truce, and attempted to justify recent Russian strikes against
civilian targets in Ukraine. Zelensky stated on April 20 that Ukraine and Russia achieved a long-range
strikes ceasefire between April 19 and 20 and during the day on April 20 and proposed a temporary
ceasefire on long-range missile and drone strikes against civilian infrastructure for a minimum of 30
days, with the opportunity to extend the ceasefire beyond 30 days. Putin announced the end of the Easter
truce on April 21 and rejected Zelensky's proposed temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against
civilian infrastructure while speaking to journalists, stating that Russia would need to "sort out" the
proposed civilian infrastructure strikes moratorium. Putin attempted to soften his rejection of
Zelensky's ceasefire proposal by claiming that Russia and other unspecified actors need to study strikes
against civilian targets where military personnel are operating and "make appropriate decisions." Putin
did not suggest the possibility of creating independent monitoring mechanisms to determine the legitimacy
of such strikes, and Russian officials have previously expressed disinterest in Western-led monitoring
mechanisms as a condition of future ceasefires in Ukraine. Putin also attempted to justify Russia's
recent missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and to obfuscate his ongoing rejection
of US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals. Putin acknowledged that Russian forces recently struck civilian
infrastructure in Sumy City — likely referring to the April 13 Russian missile strike against Sumy City —
but suggested that the reported presence of Ukrainian military personnel in Sumy City constituted a
legitimate military target. Putin claimed that Russian forces also targeted Ukrainian military personnel
during a recent Russian strike against Odesa City.
Putin reiterated his rejection of the full
ceasefire that Zelensky and the US have offered. Zelensky reiterated on April 20 Ukraine's readiness to
agree to a full and unconditional ceasefire for a minimum of 30 days. Putin rejected the full ceasefire
proposal on April 21, claiming that Ukraine was attempting to "seize the initiative and talk about
expan" the ceasefire, and alleging that Russia would need to "carefully evaluate everything."
Ukraine and the United States initially proposed a full ceasefire on March 13, and Putin and other
Russian officials have repeatedly rejected the proposal over the past five weeks. The US Department of
State told Reuters on April 20 that the United States would welcome the extension of the Easter truce,
however. US President Donald Trump expressed hope on April 20 that Russia and Ukraine would make a deal
this week, possibly referring to a general ceasefire agreement that would precede future peace
negotiations. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov appeared to respond to Trump's statement by stating that
the Kremlin is not ready to discuss a time frame to end the war. Putin's continued rejection of the
US-Ukrainian March 2025 proposed general ceasefire and the Kremlin's refusal to commit to any time frame
to end the war highlight Putin's disinterest in ending the war via peace negotiations in the near term.
Putin's continued rejection of US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals runs counter to Trump's stated
approach of first establishing a ceasefire and then negotiating a broader peace agreement and to Trump's
goal of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.
Russian state media amplified Kherson Oblast
occupation head Vladimir Saldo's calls for additional territorial concessions from Ukraine in areas to
which Russia has not yet laid formal claim. Saldo stated on April 21 to Kremlin newswire TASS that the
"return" of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River is "fundamentally important" and an "absolute
priority" for Russia. Saldo claimed that Ukrainian forces will continue efforts to use the east (left)
bank of the river as a "lever of pressure" against Russia and that the presence of Ukrainian forces on
the west bank hinders the resumption of shipping along the river. Saldo concluded that "the segment of
the that passes through Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts must be completely
under control" so as to guarantee the development of infrastructure "associated with the
river." Russian forces only currently occupy positions on the east bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson
and Zaporizhia oblasts, yet Russian President Vladimir Putin has consistently demanded since June 2024
that Ukraine cede all of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts to Russia. Saldo appears to be calling for
additional Russian territorial claims along the river in central Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — an oblast that
Russia has not formally claimed or illegally annexed. It is unclear how much territory along the banks of
the river in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Saldo is claiming must be under Russian control or if Saldo is
implying that Russian forces must occupy extensive territory east and northeast of the river such that
Russia "completely control" the river and its immediate surrounding areas. Russian forces may want to
control a minimum 25 kilometers of territory on both banks of the Dnipro River so as to prevent Ukrainian
forces from conducting tube artillery strikes against the area.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's April 20 proposal
for a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure, declined Zelensky's
offer to extend Putin's own 30-hour Easter truce, and attempted to justify recent Russian strikes against
civilian targets in Ukraine.
• Putin reiterated his rejection of the full ceasefire that
Zelensky and the US have offered.
• Russian state media amplified Kherson Oblast occupation
head Vladimir Saldo's calls for additional territorial concessions from Ukraine in areas to which Russia
has not yet laid formal claim.
• Saldo's call for additional Russian territorial claims along
the Dnipro River is consistent with other Kremlin official statements, as Russia continues to make
extensive territorial demands of Ukraine while offering no concessions of its own.
• Russian
forces recently advanced near Lyman and Toretsk.
The Financial Times (FT) reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin is willing to end the war in
Ukraine on the current frontlines. Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly and explicitly
emphasized that Russia maintains its territorial demands over all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and
Kherson oblasts, however, while also publicly signaling that Russia has greater territorial ambitions in
Ukraine beyond these four oblasts. The FT reported on April 22 that sources familiar with the matter
stated that Putin told US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff during their April 11 meeting
that Russia could relinquish its claims to the Ukrainian-controlled parts of the four oblasts that Russia
has formally laid claim to and illegally annexed. European officials briefed on the US efforts to end the
war stated that Putin would probably use this to lure US President Donald Trump into accepting Russia's
other demands and force these demands onto Ukraine as a fait accompli. Russia's "other demands"
referenced by FT likely include Russia’s public demands for Ukrainian neutrality, regime change, and
demilitarization — Putin's pre-war demands that Kremlin officials have consistently reiterated throughout
the war and during negotiations about possible ceasefires and a peace deal.
Russian officials
have recently repeated Putin's June 2024 demand that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia,
and Kherson oblasts before Russia can agree to a ceasefire and peace negotiations. Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov explicitly cited Putin's June 2024 speech on April 14, and Russian Foreign
Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergey Naryshkin claimed on April 15 that any future peace agreement must
include the recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of the entirety of these four oblasts. Russia
passed constitutional amendments in October 2022 that defined the four oblasts as Russian territory, and
Russian officials have recently reiterated how the Russian Constitution holds primacy over international
law. Russian officials have also repeatedly invoked the term "Novorossiya" when talking about
Russian-occupied and Russian-claimed territory in southern Ukraine, with Putin most recently using the
term on April 21. Novorossiya is an invented region in Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed
includes all of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia. A senior Russian
occupation official, recently on April 21, called for Russia to control areas of southern Ukraine near
the Dnipro River, including territory in oblasts that Russia has not formally claimed or illegally
annexed. Russian officials. including Putin, have also labelled Odesa City a "Russian city" that has
nothing to do with Ukraine." Kremlin newswire TASS has notably begun, as of April 2025, to characterize
any Kremlin statements about Russian-claimed territory in Ukraine as about "Donbas and Novorossiya,"
likely as part of Kremlin efforts to set conditions for Russian society to expect Russia to achieve
extensive territorial concessions in Ukraine.
The Moscow Times reported that the Kremlin is
attempting to use economic incentives to sway US-Russian talks about the war in Ukraine, as the Kremlin
is not sincerely interested in US President Donald Trump's efforts to end the war. ISW cannot
independently verify Kremlin sources' statements, but recent Kremlin behavior is consistent with the
Moscow Times' insider reporting. Independent Russian outlet the Moscow Times reported on April 21 that
five current Russian government officials, including two diplomats and three sources close to the Kremlin
who are employees of three major state-owned companies, stated that the Kremlin is looking for incentives
to "hold...Trump's attention." One current Russian government official stated that Russian authorities
are working "in full swing" to prepare proposals for Trump across "key economic sectors." One source who
has participated in the Kremlin discussions on the matter stated that Russia "needs to milk Trump as much
as possible, dangling the possibility of a ceasefire like a carrot before him." A Russian diplomat stated
that the Kremlin's priority is to "recalibrate" relations with the United States while keeping dialogue
about the war in Ukraine "alive." The Moscow Times reported that the official Russian sources see two
main scenarios that could unfold: either Russia agrees to a Trump-brokered ceasefire in exchange for
concessions, such as limitations on US weapons supplies to Ukraine, or Russia will blame Ukraine should
talks collapse.
Russia has recently offered the United States economic incentives that are
unrelated to Russia’s war in Ukraine, likely as part of efforts to extract concessions from the United
States about Russia’s war in Ukraine. Russian Presidential Aide Nikolai Patrushev, for example, called
for the United States and Russia to jointly work to solve problems in the Arctic in an April 21 article
in Russian business outlet Kommersant. This Russian effort goes against the Trump administration's
desired timeline of events, as the White House has stated that the United States "needs to see a
ceasefire first" before developing US-Russian economic partnerships. Kremlin officials have claimed that
Russia is willing to negotiate to end the war in Ukraine while attempting to blame Ukraine for the lack
of progress towards ending the war. Putin, however, has rejected multiple full or temporary ceasefire
offers that the United States and Ukraine have proposed. Putin rejected the March 18 US-Ukrainian
proposed temporary ceasefire along the entire frontline; refused to extend the unilateral Russian Easter
truce on April 21, despite both US and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's support for such an
extension; and rejected Zelensky's recent proposal for a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes
against civilian infrastructure. Putin has already started to question whether Ukraine would be able to
receive military aid from its allies in the event of a temporary full ceasefire — possibly to set
conditions to demand the cessation of United States and likely also European weapons supplies to Ukraine
as a condition for accepting a full ceasefire.
Any potential future Russian agreement to
freeze the front short of Russia's full control of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts does
not preclude future Russian aggression to achieve Russia's more extensive territorial demands, especially
if the agreement stipulates a moratorium on Ukraine receiving Western military aid. A Russian diplomat
reportedly told the Moscow Times that "the situation on the ground will dictate the next moves" in
US-Russian talks about the war and that "it is all about time, patience, and staying the course." The
current frontlines do not provide the strategic depth that Ukraine will need to reliably defend against
renewed Russian aggression, as Russian forces are just across the Dnipro River from Kherson City, roughly
25 kilometers from Zaporizhzhia City, and 20 kilometers from Kharkiv City. Russia has notably intensified
its use of armored vehicles across the frontline and appears to have started a likely years' long effort
to seize Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast - likely as part of efforts to gain as much territory
as possible in eastern and southern Ukraine, particularly in the four oblasts to which Russia has
formally laid claim. Russia may tactically and temporarily stop pushing for Putin's demands for the
Ukrainian-controlled areas of the four illegally annexed oblasts in southern and eastern Ukraine in order
to extract other concessions from the United States under the rubric of negotiations. Such concessions
could be Russia's "other demands" of installing a pro-Russian government in Kyiv and drastically
shrinking the Ukrainian military in order to decrease resistance against renewed Russian aggression. The
Kremlin will likely exploit any ceasefire predicated on limitations on US weapons supplies to Ukraine to
prepare for renewed aggression.
Key Takeaways:
• The Financial Times (FT) reported
that Russian President Vladimir Putin is willing to end the war in Ukraine on the current frontlines.
Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly and explicitly emphasized that Russia maintains its
territorial demands over all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, however, while also
publicly signaling that Russia has greater territorial ambitions in Ukraine beyond these four oblasts.
• The Moscow Times reported that the Kremlin is attempting to use economic incentives to sway
US-Russian talks about the war in Ukraine as the Kremlin is not sincerely interested in US President
Donald Trump's efforts to end the war. ISW cannot independently verify Kremlin sources' statements, but
recent Kremlin behavior is consistent with the Moscow Times' insider reporting.
• Any
potential future Russian agreement to freeze the front short of Russia's full control of Luhansk,
Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts does not preclude future Russian aggression to achieve Russia's
more extensive territorial demands, especially if the agreement stipulates a moratorium on Ukraine
receiving Western military aid.
• Kremlin officials continued efforts on April 22 to blame
Ukraine for the lack of progress towards Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's proposed temporary
ceasefire on strikes against civilian infrastructure.
• The Kremlin continues to reject
Trump's stated goal of achieving a ceasefire in Ukraine before a full peace settlement to end the war –
in contrast to Ukraine's continued support for a general ceasefire.
• Russian forces continue
to innovate their long-range drone strike tactics in order to offset the effectiveness of Ukrainian
mobile defense units.
• Russia is reportedly recruiting North Korean citizens to compensate
for labor shortages in Russia, indicating that Russian-North Korean cooperation continues to deepen.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk.
The United States reportedly recently presented Ukraine with a seven-point proposal to end the war in
Ukraine in which the United States would recognize Crimea as part of Russia and allow Russian forces to
continue to occupy significant parts of southern and eastern Ukraine. Available reporting about the
contents of the US proposal suggests that it marks a sudden and substantial change in the Trump
administration's strategy for ending the war in Ukraine. The Telegraph and Axios reported on April 22 and
23 that sources familiar with the matter stated that the United States presented Ukraine with a proposal
to end the war during the April 17 meeting in Paris and that the United States expected that the April 23
multilateral talks in London would discuss the proposal. There have been no official statements about the
reported US proposal. The Telegraph reported that the document contains seven points about an immediate
ceasefire, Ukrainian-Russian talks, Ukraine's inability to join NATO, territory, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear
Power Plant (ZNPP), the US-Ukrainian mineral deal, and US-Russian relations. Axios and The Telegraph
reported that the plan calls for the United States to "de jure" recognize Russian control of Crimea and
"de facto" recognize Russia's occupation of most of the areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and
Zaporizhia oblasts that Russian forces currently occupy. Russia would also reportedly have to withdraw
from the parts of Kharkiv Oblast that Russian forces currently occupy. Axios stated that the plan would
grant Ukraine "unimpeded passage" along the Dnipro River, with The Telegraph reporting that Ukraine would
gain “unhindered access to the mouth” of the river. The Telegraph noted that the proposal states that
Russian forces would withdraw from another unspecified area of Kherson Oblast. The proposal calls for the
ZNPP, which Russian forces currently occupy, to be "considered as Ukrainian territory" but under US
operation. The US-operated ZNPP would reportedly supply both Ukraine and Russia with electricity. The US
proposal reportedly states that the United States would promise that Ukraine would not become a member of
NATO, while Ukraine could still join the European Union (EU). The proposal would give Ukraine "a robust
security guarantee" involving a group of European states and possibly non-European states, but the
document does not offer details about how this "peacekeeping operation" would operate, nor mention US
participation in this peacekeeping force. The United States would also reportedly lift all US sanctions
imposed on Russia since 2014 and would enhance US-Russian economic cooperation, especially in the energy
and industrial sectors. The proposal reportedly calls for Ukraine to receive compensation and assistance
for reconstruction from an unspecified funding source.
The reported US proposal suggests that
the Trump administration is seeking to simultaneously achieve a full ceasefire in Ukraine, conclude a
peace settlement to end the war, and develop US-Russian economic relations – a sharp contrast to the
timeline of events that the administration has called for in recent weeks. The White House stated on
March 25 that Trump's "imperative that the killing on both sides of the must stop" is a "necessary
step toward achieving an enduring peace settlement" — demonstrating how the Trump administration viewed a
full ceasefire as the first step toward securing a peace settlement. Ukraine agreed to the March 18
US-proposed full ceasefire along the frontline and agreed to the US-supported extension of the unilateral
Russian Easter truce on April 21 — in sharp contrast to Russia, which refused to accept or extend these
US-proposed and US-supported ceasefires. The White House also stated on April 15 that the United States
"needs to see a ceasefire first" before developing US-Russian economic partnerships, and US Secretary of
State Marco Rubio reportedly stated in February 2025 that US sanctions on Russia would remain in place
until Russia and Ukraine had reached a peace deal to end the war — in contrast to the reported US
proposal that would simultaneously put a ceasefire in place in Ukraine, lift US sanctions against Russia,
and develop US-Russian economic cooperation.
Significant details about the territorial swaps
in the US proposal are unclear from the available reporting. Russian forces currently occupy a small part
of Mykolaiv Oblast — the Kinburn Spit — and recently began conducting offensive operations into northern
Sumy Oblast — two oblasts which the available reporting about the US proposal does not address. It is
unclear whether Ukraine would gain access only to the mouth of the Dnipro River or a wider littoral area
along the river‘s left bank given differences between reporting from Axios and The Telegraph. Details
about the extent of the territory near the ZNPP on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River that would be
considered Ukrainian are also unspecified, but Russian forces would have to withdraw from some territory
in the area according to the US plan as Russian forces currently occupy significant portions of
Zaporizhia Oblast behind the Dnipro River’s east bank. The Dnipro River would nevertheless present itself
as a significant barrier between the Ukrainian-controlled and US-operated ZNPP from the rest of the
territory under Ukraine's control under the reported US plan, assuming Russian forces do not withdraw
from territory around the Kakhovka Reservoir to permit a land bridge from Ukrainian-controlled Zaporizhia
Oblast to the ZNPP. The location of such a strategically important facility close to the frozen frontline
would greatly complicate Ukraine's ability to defend the ZNPP due to the lack of defensive depth. ISW
previously conduced a terrain study and assessed that freezing the Russian war in Ukraine on anything
like the current lines — particularly those in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts — enormously advantages
Russia and increases the risks and costs to Ukraine and the West of deterring, let alone defeating, a
future Russian operations against war against Ukraine.
Ukrainian officials reiterated
Ukraine's continued commitment to the United States' March 2025 proposal for a full ceasefire as part of
efforts to achieve a lasting peace. Zelensky recalled on April 22 that Ukraine supported and continues to
support Trump's March 18 unconditional ceasefire proposal. Zelensky stated that Ukraine is ready to hold
discussions "in any format" after the implementation of a ceasefire. Ukrainian Presidential
Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov similarly stated
on April 23 that the Ukrainian delegation in London discussed ways to achieve a full and unconditional
ceasefire as a "first step" toward a peace settlement and that Ukraine is committed to Trump's peace
efforts. Ukrainian Economic Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated on April 23 that Ukraine is ready to
negotiate and that a full ground, air, and sea ceasefire is a necessary first step toward peace.
Zelensky stated on April 22 that Ukraine does not legally recognize Russia's occupation of Crimea in
accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution, which ensures Ukraine's territorial integrity and recognizes
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea as part of Ukraine. Svyrydenko also noted that Ukraine cannot agree to
a settlement that grants Russia a "stronger foundation" to regroup and renew its aggression in the
future. ISW continues to assess that freezing the front along the current lines enormously advantages
Russia and increases the risks and costs to Ukraine and the West of deterring and defeating future
Russian aggression. Russia's occupation of Crimea and Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts will continue to
threaten Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa cities, the Ukrainian southwestern coast, and Ukrainian ships
attempting to transit the western Black Sea.
Key Takeaways:
• The United States
reportedly recently presented Ukraine with a seven-point proposal to end the war in Ukraine in which the
United States would recognize Crimea as part of Russia and allow Russian forces to continue to occupy
significant parts of southern and eastern Ukraine. Available reporting about the contents of the US
proposal suggests that it marks a sudden and substantial change in the Trump administration's strategy
for ending the war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian officials reiterated Ukraine's continued commitment
to the United States' March 2025 proposal for a full ceasefire as part of efforts to achieve a lasting
peace.
• Russian officials rejected aspects of Trump's reported peace plan.
• Senior US, Ukrainian, and European officials held bilateral and multilateral talks about support for
Ukraine and ending the war in London on April 23, but officials cancelled the scheduled multilateral
talks at the foreign minister level.
• The US and Ukraine continue to take steps toward
signing a joint mineral deal.
• Ukrainian forces likely conducted a drone strike against the
Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan, where Russia assembles Iranian-provided
Shahed drones.
• Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and
civilians in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk
Oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
Russia is extracting economic benefits from occupied Ukraine by exploiting Ukrainian infrastructure and
logistics networks. The Russian Federal Agency for Railway Transport (Roszheldor) announced on April 21
that the first container train carrying unspecified cargo travelled along the Russian “Novorossiya
Railways” network through occupied Ukraine and arrived in occupied Sevastopol. The train’s cargo will be
unloaded at Sevastopol and exported via ship through Russian-occupied Black Sea ports to unspecified
final destinations. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin signed an order in May 2023 creating
“Novorossiya Railways” to unite rail lines in occupied Ukraine and Russia by merging them under the
auspices of Roszheldor. “Novorossiya Railways” currently operates three lines in occupied Ukraine: the
Donetsk branch, the Luhansk branch, and the Kherson-Melitopol branch (linking occupied Kherson and
Zaporizhia oblasts), all operated on the basis of railways that Ukraine controlled before the full-scale
invasion in 2022. Russia’s use of railways in occupied Ukraine supports two Russian objectives—first, to
provide logistical support for Russian troops fighting in Ukraine via rail, which can be quicker and
safer than logistical support by vehicles, and second, to transport various goods to Black Sea ports for
maritime export. Russia can use these railways to transport goods from Russia to ports in occupied Crimea
without having to rely on the Kerch Strait Railway Bridge, which in recent years has been routinely
non-operational due to Ukrainian long-range strikes, or to directly take resources from occupied Ukraine
and export them to international markets. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Crimea service Krym
Realii reported on April 21, for example, that Russia is using ports in occupied Kerch to export stolen
Ukrainian liquified natural gas (LNG) and grain. The Wall Street Journal found that Russia had sold
nearly $1 billion in stolen Ukrainian grain as of September 2024, using railway lines and roads in
occupied Ukraine to bring massive amounts of grain to occupied Black Sea ports for export. Ukrainian
Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko similarly reported that Russia exported over 12,000 tons of
coal via occupied Mariupol during the week of April 14-20 alone.
Despite Russia’s drive to
exploit economic resources in occupied Ukraine, some Russian companies are struggling to properly manage
coal mines in occupied Ukraine, likely putting residents of occupied areas near these mines at risk.
Russian business-focused state outlet RBK reported on April 21 that Russian companies Impex-Don LLC and
Donskie Ugli Trading House LLC are ending their leases on nine coal mines in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk
oblasts and returning them to the occupation administrations due to high operating costs and low profits.
Both these companies began their leases for the nine mines in 2024. The Russian Federal State Budgetary
Institution for the Reorganization and Liquidation of Unprofitable Mines (GURSH) will now oversee
liquidating (in effect, shutting down) the nine mines. Russia has gone to great lengths to exploit
Ukraine’s coal industry and the coal-rich Donetsk Basin, and reportedly exported over $288 million worth
of coal from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts between 2014 and 2022. This number has likely
significantly increased since 2022, as Russia now has access to additional mines in Donetsk and Luhansk
oblasts. Russia was in the process of liquidating 114 coal mines in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
as of September 2023. Russia is likely liquidating these mines in part due to the mismanagement of coal
mine infrastructure, and also due to volatile international markets. If GURSH fails to close down these
coal mines properly, they may degrade in a way that will pose health and environmental risks to nearby
communities, namely the Ukrainian residents of these occupied areas.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia is extracting economic benefits from occupied Ukraine by exploiting Ukrainian
infrastructure and logistics networks.
• Despite Russia’s drive to exploit economic resources
in occupied Ukraine, some Russian companies are struggling to properly manage coal mines in occupied
Ukraine, likely putting residents of occupied areas near these mines at risk.
• Russia is
actively recruiting teachers from throughout the Russian Federation to teach in occupied Luhansk Oblast
as part of the “Zemskyi Uchitel” (“Rural Teacher”) program.
Russian forces conducted a large series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on April
23 to 24, the largest strike series against Kyiv City thus far in 2025. The Ukrainian Air Force reported
that Russian forces launched 215 drones and missiles at Ukraine, including 11 Iskander-M ballistic
missiles from Bryansk, Voronezh, and Kursk oblasts; 37 Kh-101 cruise missiles from airspace over Saratov
Oblast; six Iskander-K cruise missiles from occupied Donetsk Oblast; 12 Kalibr cruise missiles from the
Black Sea; four Kh-59/Kh-69 cruise missiles from airspace over Belgorod Oblast; and 145 Shahed and decoy
drones from Bryansk and Kursk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast: Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and
occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 7
Iskander-M missiles, 31 Kh-101 missiles, 6 Kalibr missiles, 4 Kh-59/Kh-69 missiles, and 64 Shahed drones,
and that 68 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian officials reported that Russia’s strike series
injured at least 80 Ukrainians and killed 9 people in Kyiv City alone, and damaged residential areas,
energy infrastructure, and other buildings in five raions of the city. Ukrainian officials stated that
Russian strikes also damaged civilian, industrial, rail, and energy infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City,
and Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Poltava, Khmelnytskyi, and Sumy oblasts.
Russian
forces have adjusted their long-range strike tactics and weapons in recent weeks, likely to mitigate
Ukrainian air defenses and inflict significant damage even when Ukrainian forces intercept some Russian
drones and missiles. Such adaptations disproportionately affect civilians, as ISW has previously noted.
US President Donald Trump stated in a post on Truth Social on April 24 that he is "not happy" with
Russia's overnight strikes against Kyiv City, calling them "not necessary" and stating that Russia has
"very bad timing." Trump called on Russian President Vladimir Putin to stop such strikes and agree to his
proposal to end the war.
Key Takeaways:
• The official Kremlin spokesperson and the
Russian Security Council secretary repeated a series of long-standing Russian demands that purposely
preclude the establishment of a stable and enduring peace in Ukraine and set conditions for future
Russian aggression from an advantaged position.
• Kremlin officials continue to baselessly
threaten NATO states for adhering to US President Donald Trump's objective that Europe take on more of
its own defense requirements.
• Russian forces conducted a large series of drone and missile
strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 23 to 24, the largest strike series against Kyiv City thus far
in 2025.
• Denmark announced a new military aid package to Ukraine for artillery ammunition
procurement on April 23.
• A Russian military court sentenced former 58th Combined Arms Army
(CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov to imprisonment, likely as part of an ongoing Kremlin effort to
punish Russian military commanders who weaponized the information space to advance their political goals
that undermine Putin’s power vertical.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.
Russian forces recently advanced in Belgorod and Sumy oblasts and near Toretsk.
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