Ukraine and Moldova continue to offer solutions to Transnistria's energy crisis as Moldovan President Maia Sandu met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on January 25. Zelensky stated at a press conference with Sandu that Ukraine can supply Transnistria with coal at low prices or even free of charge if Transnistria would supply Ukraine with electricity in return. Zelensky also stated that Ukraine is ready to send a team of specialists to help increase the Transnistrian power plant's electricity output such that it would far exceed Transnistria's domestic needs, allowing Transnistria to provide electricity to all of Moldova and Ukraine. Zelensky noted that Transnistria's cooperation with Moldova and Ukraine would help reduce electricity prices throughout all of Moldova by 30 percent. Transnistrian authorities have previously refused Moldovan and Ukrainian offers of help, instead turning to schemes that involve Moscow directly or indirectly providing enough gas to the breakaway republic to cover only its domestic electricity needs. Ukrainian and Moldovan officials have noted that Russia is trying to leverage its manufactured gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion before the Summer 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections.<3> Transnistria's possible acceptance of Ukrainian and Moldovan offers of aid and Transnistria's subsequent supply of cheaper electricity to the rest of Moldova would disrupt Russian efforts to use the energy crisis to strengthen Transnistria's economic dependence on Moscow, to posture Russia as the breakaway republic's savior and benefactor, and to leverage Chisinau's turn to higher priced European electricity as part of Moscow's anti-EU narratives.

The Kremlin is continuing to leverage the prominent Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel to cultivate increased Russian influence in Iraq. The Rybar channel claimed on January 25 that members of the Rybar team – including its founder Mikhail Zvinchuk – visited Iraq over the last week and met with Iraqi officials, including Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia Al Sudani. The channel claimed that Iraqi officials noted their openness to increasing trade and foreign investments with Russian partners and their interest in further developing Russian–Iraqi relations. The channel welcomed Russian businesses, media companies, bloggers, and investors to begin exploring opportunities in Iraq. Member of the Rybar team visited Iraq in August 2024, and ISW noted at the time that this was the first observed report of a Russian milblogger meeting with a senior foreign official. ISW-CTP previously assessed that Russia may be setting conditions to supplant the US as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the US possibly reducing its military presence there. The recent fall of the Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria may be prompting the Kremlin to reconsider the contours of its relations with Iraq.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine and Moldova continue to offer solutions to Transnistria's energy crisis as Moldovan President Maia Sandu met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on January 25.

• The Kremlin is continuing to leverage the prominent Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel to cultivate increased Russian influence in Iraq.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 25 that the Russian government will allow veterans of volunteer formations (dobrovolcheskie formirovaniya) to receive "combat veteran status" without submitting a formal application.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces recently made further advances within Velyka Novosilka amid official Russian claims that Russian forces seized the entire settlement on January 26. Geolocated footage published on January 26 indicates that Russian forces advanced northward along Tsentralana Street in northern Velyka Novosilka. Some Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on January 26 that Russian forces completely seized Velyka Novosilka, whereas other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces had seized most of the settlement. Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are still clearing Ukrainian forces from the settlement, including the northern part, and that Ukrainian forces are still counterattacking in the area. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces occupy 89 percent of the settlement, however. Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on January 26 that Russian forces have not occupied all of Velyka Novosilka and that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the settlement. A Ukrainian brigade operating within Velyka Novosilka stated on January 26 that fighting continues within the settlement and that Russian forces do not pose a threat of encircling the brigade's elements. ISW has not observed independent evidence of Russian forces encircling Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka. The Ukrainian brigade also reported that neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces can use heavy equipment due to parity of strikes near the contact line and that Ukrainian and Russian forces have "approximate parity" in terms of artillery and first-person view (FPV) drones but that Russian forces have a "huge" manpower advantage in the area. The brigade stated that Ukrainian forces are conducting artillery and drone strikes against Russian forces within Velyka Novosilka and that the Mokri Yaly River that flows through western Velyka Novosilka is an obstacle to Russian advances. Russian forces continued offensive operations within and near Velyka Novosilka itself, northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 25 and 26.

The Russian MoD notably is paying an abnormally high amount of fanfare to the claimed Russian seizure of Velyka Novosilka, very likely as part of informational efforts to shape Western perceptions of the battlefield situation in Ukraine and degrade international support for Ukraine. The Russian MoD posted footage during the day of January 26 purportedly showing Russian forces conducting thermobaric artillery strikes against Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka and claimed that Russian assault groups were clearing Ukrainian positions. The Russian MoD later claimed that elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army , Eastern Military District ) and the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) seized all of Velyka Novosilka, and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov congratulated the command and personnel of the two brigades for the seizure. The Russian MoD subsequently posted footage purportedly showing Russian flags in multiple areas of the settlement. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA) also participated in the claimed seizure of Velyka Novosilka, and it is unclear why the Russian MoD did not credit the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade in their announcements. The Russian MoD has not recently been announcing the claimed seizures of settlements with so much fanfare and as quickly as they did on January 26. Russia is likely trying to leverage the claimed seizure of Velyka Novosilka in order to influence Western perceptions of the situation on the battlefield in Donetsk Oblast, to advance narratives that Russian battlefield gains are inevitable and that Ukrainian positions are rapidly deteriorating. Russian gains in western Donetsk Oblast continue to be gradual and far below the pace that is normal for modern mechanized warfare. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether Russian forces will be able to rapidly advance beyond Velyka Novosilka, as it is unclear how much combat power elements of the EMD still retain after several months of continuous offensive operations. Velyka Novosilka is located next to several rivers which will likely complicate and hamper further Russian tactical advances in the area. Russian forces have historically struggled with river crossings and tactical terrain features, such as rivers, will likely complicate Russian forces' ability to leverage the seizure of Velyka Novosilka to make operationally significant advances in western Donetsk Oblast.

The seizure and clearing of Velyka Novosilka will likely present opportunities and a decision point to the Russian military command on whether to redeploy elements of the Russian Eastern Military District from the Velyka Novosilka area to other priority operational areas. Any redeployment of EMD elements from the Velyka Novosilka area over the coming weeks will indicate the Russian military command’s priority operational areas for offensive operations in Spring and Summer 2025. Elements of the Russian EMD have been the primary fighting force in the Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka directions since at least early 2023, defended against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Summer 2023, and later intensified offensive operations in the area in Fall 2024. Elements of the EMD participated in the seizure of Vuhledar in September and October 2024 and successfully exploited the seizure of the settlement to advance north towards Kurakhove and west towards and into Velyka Novosilka over the following three months. The seizure of Velyka Novosilka will present the Russian military command with a decision point during which the Russian military command can pursue several courses of action (COAs). Velyka Novosilka is protected from Ukrainian counterattack due to the settlement’s disposition near the Mokri Yaly River. The Russian military command may opt to retain elements of the EMD in the western Donetsk Oblast area and continue advancing towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary, which runs north and west of Velyka Novosilka. This decision would indicate that the Russian military is prioritizing advances to the administrative boundary as quickly as possible over other axes of advance in Donetsk Oblast or other frontline areas. It remains unclear how much combat power the EMD elements still retain after having engaged in intense operations for over six months, however. The Russian military command could also retain some EMD elements in the Velyka Novosilka area to continue limited attacks and pin Ukrainian forces in the area but redeploy the bulk of the EMD to another frontline area. Russian forces are currently intensifying offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Borova, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk directions and are still working to eliminate the remainder of the Ukrainian salients in the Kurakhove direction and Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian officials have also recently warned that Russian forces may also renew offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast in 2025. The Russian military command could redeploy EMD elements to any of these directions, and the redeployment of elements of the EMD will be an indicator of the Russian military command's priority areas for Spring and Summer 2025.

Russian forces are poised to seize Toretsk in the coming days and a redeployment of elements of the EMD to reinforce the Russian force grouping in the Toretsk direction would indicate a new Russian priority effort to resume attacks in the direction of Kostyantynivka. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely intend to exploit the seizure of Toretsk to push further west and along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway towards the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka. Russian advances in the Toretsk direction have historically been slow as Russian forces fought through built up urban areas, but Russian forces may begin to advance relatively more quickly once they break out of Toretsk into the more open fields west of the settlement. Russian forces may also attempt to leverage tactical gains within and near Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk and select Russian milbloggers have recently speculated that Russian forces may be intensifying offensive operations southwest of Toretsk for this purpose. Russian forces may want to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk in order to firm up their southern flank ahead of a push on Kostyantynivka. The Russian military command may redeploy elements of the EMD to reinforce offensive operations in the Toretsk direction if it intends to prioritize pressuring the Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast in the Spring and Summer 2025. Seizing Pokrovsk has been the Russian military command’s main operational objective in Donetsk Oblast since February 2024. A Russian redeployment of EMD elements to the Toretsk or Chasiv Yar directions - as opposed to retaining the EMD elements in western Donetsk Oblast, redeploying them to the Zaporizhia direction, or redeploying them to the Pokrovsk direction - would therefore indicate an inflection in Russian operational priorities.

Ukrainian forces conducted a second strike on the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 26 that elements of Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan City. Geolocated footage shows a fire at a tank at the refinery. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 26 that Russian forces downed eight drones over Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26. Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov claimed that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) systems destroyed Ukrainian drones over Ryazan Oblast and that authorities were assessing material damage. Ukrainian official sources noted that the Ryazan Oil Refinery is one of the four largest refineries in Russia and produces fuel for military equipment; jet fuel; diesel fuel; and other petroleum products for tanks, aircraft, and ships. Ukrainian forces last struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery on the night of January 23 to 24.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently made further advances within Velyka Novosilka amid official Russian claims that Russian forces seized the entire settlement on January 26.

• The Russian MoD notably is paying an abnormally high amount of fanfare to the claimed Russian seizure of Velyka Novosilka, very likely as part of informational efforts to shape Western perceptions of the battlefield situation in Ukraine and degrade international support for Ukraine.

• The seizure and clearing of Velyka Novosilka will likely present opportunities and a decision point to the Russian military command on whether to redeploy elements of the Russian Eastern Military District from the Velyka Novosilka area to other priority operational areas. Any redeployment of EMD elements from the Velyka Novosilka area over the coming weeks will indicate the Russian military command’s priority operational areas for offensive operations in Spring and Summer 2025.

• Russian forces are poised to seize Toretsk in the coming days and a redeployment of elements of the EMD to reinforce the Russian force grouping in the Toretsk direction would indicate a new Russian priority effort to resume attacks in the direction of Kostyantynivka.

• Ukrainian forces conducted a second strike on the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26.

• Ukrainian forces advanced in Kursk Oblast and regained positions in Toretsk.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

• Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian government on January 25 for not prioritizing the recruitment and training of Russia's next generation of military officers.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone storage facilities in Oryol Oblast again on January 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 26 that the Ukrainian forces struck drone and thermobaric warhead storage warehouses, causing secondary detonations. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike destroyed over 200 Shahed drones. Oryol Oblast Governor Andrei Klychkov claimed on January 26 that Ukrainian forces repeatedly attempted to strike Oryol Oblast and that Russian electronic warfare (EW) interference downed a Ukrainian drone in Oryol Oblast. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian forces struck the same drone storage facility at the end of December 2024.

The European Union (EU) proposed an aid package on January 27 to Moldova and Transnistria to help the ongoing gas crisis in the pro-Russian breakaway republic as part of efforts to reduce Russia's ability to exploit Transnistria in its energy blackmail schemes targeting Chisinau. The package includes an immediate loan of three million cubic meters of gas to Transnistria and offers a grant of 30 million euros (about $31.4 million) for Moldova to purchase gas – presumably from the European market – from February 1 to 10 to support Transnistria's electricity production for domestic consumption and export to the rest of Moldova. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean noted that the EU will continue to support Chisinau after February 10 in order to ensure that Transnistria can continue to produce electricity for Transnistria and Moldova. The EU aid package offers to invest in Transnistrian electricity production and distribution over the next two years. The EU stated that it is also considering supporting coal deliveries from Ukraine to Transnistria and that it has supported the allocation of transmission capacity along the gas delivery route from Bulgaria and Romania to Moldova. The Transnistrian Energy Operational Headquarters stated on January 27 that Transnistrian gas reserves are running out and will last only until early February 2025 "at most." Russian business outlet Kommersant reported on January 27 that its sources stated that Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz is in discussions with Hungarian oil and gas company MOL and Hungarian electricity company MVM about buying gas for Transnistria, the delivery of which would begin in early February 2025 and continue until late March or early April 2025. Recean confirmed on January 27 that MOL presented Moldovagaz with a draft contract on the supply of gas for Transnistria but that Moldovan authorities must verify the legality and compliance of the contract with national and international law. Transnistrian authorities have previously rejected Moldovan and Ukrainian offers of aid. ISW continues to assess that Transnistria's possible acceptance of aid from Moldova, Ukraine, or the EU and Transnistria's subsequent supply of cheaper electricity to the rest of Moldova would disrupt Russian efforts to use the energy crisis to strengthen Transnistria's economic dependence on Moscow, to posture Russia as the breakaway republic's savior and benefactor, and to leverage Chisinau's turn to higher priced European electricity as part of Moscow's anti-EU narratives.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Khortytsia Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Andrii Hnatov with Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi on January 26. Zelensky stated that Drapatyi will also remain Ground Forces Commander and that Hnatov will become Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff. Zelensky noted that Drapatyi's dual position will help combine the Ukrainian military's combat operations with the proper training of brigades and that Hnatov will work to improve coordination between headquarters and the front.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone storage facilities in Oryol Oblast again on January 26.

• The European Union (EU) proposed an aid package on January 27 to Moldova and Transnistria to help the ongoing gas crisis in the pro-Russian breakaway republic as part of efforts to reduce Russia's ability to exploit Transnistria in its energy blackmail schemes targeting Chisinau.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Khortytsia Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Andrii Hnatov with Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi on January 26.

• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, and Kurakhove.

• The Russian government continues to expand the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into government positions, by creating similar programs for Russian veterans across government, including at the regional level.

Institute for the Study of War

The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria. The Russian delegation includes Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Presidential Special Representative to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev. Reuters reported that two Syrian sources stated that the delegation will meet with the new Syrian government sometime this week. Bogdanov told Russian state media outlet RT that the visit aims to strengthen Russian-Syrian historical relations based on common interests. Bloomberg reported that a Russian source familiar with the matter stated that Russia is struggling to retain access to the Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus because negotiations with the new Syrian government are "stuck." Russian milbloggers responded to the Russian delegation's arrival, claiming that Syria is "far from" Russia's first or even second priority and cautioning against believing Russian or Syrian officials' "standard phrases" about cooperation. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that there is no hope that Russian-Syrian relations can return to their previous strength and that Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) holds the upper hand in negotiations and can extract greater concessions from Russia.

The Russian military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. Commercially available satellite imagery collected by Planet Labs PBC from January 18 and 27 shows that the Russian military loaded equipment onto the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships at Tartus and that the Sparta II ship left the port while the Sparta remained. OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from January 23 showing the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler alongside the port and possibly suggesting that the Russian military was loading vehicles onto the Sparta.<8> Bloomberg reported on January 28 that a Russian source stated that two Russian transport ships — likely the Sparta and Sparta II — had been waiting for weeks off Tartus before Syrian authorities allowed them to dock.

A senior NATO official acknowledged that Russia is escalating a sabotage and destabilization campaign against European NATO member states to deter further military assistance to Ukraine. NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General James Appathurai stated at the European Parliament on January 28 that NATO states have faced acts of sabotage in recent years, including train derailments, arson, attacks against politicians' property, and assassination plots against defense industry figures, including a Kremlin plot to assassinate Rheinmetall Head Armin Papperger. Appathurai emphasized that the Kremlin aims to "create disquiet to undermine support for Ukraine" and called for NATO states to more assertively deter Russian sabotage acts. The Kremlin has consistently attempted to use information operations to deter Western states from providing additional military assistance to Ukraine. The Kremlin's sabotage and destabilization campaign directly targeting NATO states supports ISW's assessment that Russian President Vladimir Putin sees Russia as waging a hybrid war directly against NATO.

Key Takeaways:

• The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria.

• The Russian military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations.

• The Russian military likely formed a separate unmanned systems regiment at the military district level in order to augment Russia's unmanned systems capabilities. The creation of this regiment supports the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) recent coordinated effort to establish the Unmanned Systems Forces within the Russian military and centralize control over informal drone detachments.

• A senior NATO official acknowledged that Russia is escalating a sabotage and destabilization campaign against European NATO member states in Europe to deter further military assistance to Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk and near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

• The Russian government continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine to federal government positions as part of wider Kremlin efforts to militarize Russian society.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Western military assistance remains vital to Ukraine's ability to maintain its defense against Russian aggression. Putin gave an interview to Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin published on January 28 in which he claimed that the war in Ukraine could be over within two months if the West stops providing Ukraine with military assistance and that Ukraine's dependence on Western military aid indicates that Ukraine has "no sovereignty." Putin's claims about how quickly the war will end without further Western military assistance and his explicit rejection of Ukrainian sovereignty are a part of long-term Kremlin information operations aimed at undermining Western support for Ukraine and deterring additional Western military assistance. Putin is correct, however, that additional Western military assistance — particularly US military assistance — remains critical to maintaining and further developing Ukraine's warfighting capabilities. Ukrainian forces have consistently proven throughout the war that they can achieve operationally- and strategically significant battlefield victories when armed with sufficient quantities of US and other Western-provided military assistance. Ukrainian forces have also maintained stubborn defenses even when poorly provisioned and notably forced Russian forces to withdraw from Kyiv Oblast in April 2022 before significant deliveries of Western aid even arrived at the frontline and significantly slowed the pace of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine in Summer 2022. Putin and other Kremlin officials aim to portray Ukraine as weak and incapable of adequately leveraging Western-provided weapons at this critical moment in Western policy discussions about Ukraine — even though Ukraine has proven that it is anything but weak after fending off Russia for the almost three years of war.

Putin's longstanding theory of victory relies on the assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine, and only unwavering Western support and consistent deliveries of Western military assistance to Kyiv can force Putin to abandon his theory and accept the need to offer the concessions necessary for any resolution to the conflict acceptable to the United States, Europe, and Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that only the United States can provide Ukraine with some critical weapons and military equipment at the scale, speed, and regularity necessary for Ukraine's defense against Russia, and Western officials have recently proposed that European states increasingly assist in funding US military assistance to Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike at the Russian oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, and reportedly hit a Russian arsenal in Tver Oblast on the night of January 28 to 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 29 that elements of Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez oil refinery in Kstovo and caused a fire. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko posted footage of the oil refinery fire in Kstovo and reported that the refinery produces gasoline, diesel, aviation kerosene, and bitumen; processes 15 to 17 million tons of oil per year; and supports the Russian military. Geolocated footage posted on January 28 and 29 shows a fire at the Nizhny Novgorod Oil Refinery. Russian petrochemicals company Sibur-Ksotvo Enterprise reported on January 29 that Ukrainian drone debris struck the enterprise on the night of January 28 to 29, and Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin acknowledged that drone debris started a fire in an industrial area. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on January 29 that Ukrainian drones also struck the Russian Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s 23rd Arsenal near Oktyabrsky, Tver Oblast, reportedly damaging an empty weapons storage building and three other buildings. Ukrainian forces previously struck the Russian 23rd Arsenal in September 2024.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Western military assistance remains vital to Ukraine's ability to maintain its defense against Russian aggression.

• Putin's longstanding theory of victory relies on the assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine, and only unwavering Western support and consistent deliveries of Western military assistance to Kyiv can force Putin to abandon his theory and accept the need to offer the concessions necessary for any resolution to the conflict acceptable to the US, Europe, and Ukraine.

• Putin indicated that he will not view any peace agreement with Ukraine as binding by claiming that the Ukrainian government is either unwilling or unable to rescind the 2022 Ukrainian presidential decree banning negotiations with Putin.

• Putin's statements rejecting the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and of a possible future peace agreement set conditions for Russia to justify violating any future agreements with Ukraine.

• Putin continues efforts to coerce US President Donald Trump into bilateral negotiations that exclude Ukraine, impose his desired negotiations framework on Trump, and compel Trump to inadvertently endorse ongoing Russian information operations about the illegitimacy of the current Ukrainian government.

• Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike at the Russian oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and reportedly hit a Russian arsenal in Tver Oblast on the night of January 28 to 29.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed in a post on January 29 that Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik is the commander of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, Robotnye, and in the Dnipro direction.

• Volunteer recruitment rates in in Moscow have dropped sharply, as Russian citizens grow increasingly unwilling to serve in Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

Kremlin newswire TASS published an interview with Valdai Discussion Club Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov on January 30 entitled "Don't count on big agreements," highlighting the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to shape domestic and global expectations about future negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump. The Valdai Discussion Club is an international forum where Kremlin officials, Russian scholars, and foreign officials and scholars meet to discuss international issues and has proven to be a useful tool in the Kremlin's decades-long efforts to influence Western policy in Russia's favor. Lukyanov is a senior member and scholar at the Valdai Club, has repeatedly moderated Putin's annual speech at Valdai, and is considered a well-connected and authoritative voice on the Kremlin's foreign policy goals and objectives -- though he holds no formal position in the Russian government. ISW is not prepared to assess or argue that Lukyanov has intimate and personal knowledge about Putin's state of mind or intentions in future peace negotiations, but Lukyanov's statements in this interview are generally consistent with Putin's and other Kremlin officials' statements about Russia's future negotiating positions. TASS’ decision to leverage Lukyanov's interview to dampen domestic speculation about the possibility of a peace agreement in the near future also highlights the relevance of this interview and Lukyanov's statements when considering Russia's possible negotiating positions vis-a-vis Ukraine and the United States.

Lukyanov stated during the interview that the "main thing" for future peace negotiations regarding Ukraine is "not the territories" but addressing the "root causes" of the war, which Lukyanov defined as NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s. Lukyanov stated with respect to Ukrainian lands Russian forces now hold that "with the territories, everything is clear: how much you take is yours," further indicating that the Kremlin has no intention of compromising on its territorial gains in Ukraine in future peace negotiations. This position suggests that the Kremlin likely means for any future peace negotiations with Trump to start with the United States recognizing Russia's territorial claims over Ukraine, likely including areas that Russia does not currently occupy, before actual negotiations can begin that should focus on these so-called "root causes." Lukyanov stated that Russia's chief demand for future peace negotiations with Trump is "a change in the security landscape in Eastern Europe" and the "abandoning a number of provisions on which NATO's existence and functioning are based." Lukyanov stated that Russia may also want to discuss the possibility of "reducing the level of military presence," presumably along Russia's borders, but noted that this is unlikely to happen.

Kremlin officials have repeatedly alluded to the need for future peace negotiations to address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov defined in December 2024 as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward and "aggressive absorption" of areas near Russia's borders. Putin issued a series of demands to the United States in December 2021 ahead of his full-scale invasion of Ukraine that included that: NATO commit to not accepting Ukraine or any other countries as new members; the United States commit to upholding the alleged ban on NATO enlargement; NATO not deploy any military forces to states that became NATO members after May 1997; and NATO ban any military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, among other things. The Financial Times (FT) reported on January 10, citing a former senior Kremlin official and another source who discussed the topic with Putin, that Putin will maintain his pre-war demands of preventing Ukraine from joining NATO and forcing NATO to withdraw deployments in Eastern Europe in any future negotiations. Lukyanov's statements are yet another indication that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this goal.

Lukyanov's statements assume that Trump and his administration are weak and more susceptible to being intimidated by the Kremlin's shows of force than the former Biden Administration. Lukyanov claimed that Trump wants to "dump all further problems" concerning Ukraine on Europe and "does not respect" European states or NATO more broadly. Lukyanov claimed that Trump may be willing to compromise NATO's foundational principles to appease Putin's demand for a NATO withdrawal from Eastern Europe and suggested more broadly that Trump will abandon Ukraine and NATO. Lukyanov claimed that "Trump only respects those who show steadfastness" and called on the Kremlin to "never give in" and "to be prepared for a fairly tough conversation, even including elements of bluff" -- calling on the Putin to strongarm Trump and demonstrate his resolve in future negotiations with Trump. Lukyanov's interview supports the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to force Trump into acquiescing to Putin's demands that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation and the weakening of NATO and Putin's personal efforts to position himself as Trump's equal on the international stage.

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin newswire TASS published an interview with Valdai Discussion Club Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov on January 30 entitled "Don't count on big agreements," highlighting the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to shape domestic and global expectations about future negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump.

• Lukyanov stated during the interview that the "main thing" for future peace negotiations regarding Ukraine is "not the territories" but addressing the "root causes" of the war, which Lukyanov defined as NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s.

• Lukyanov's statements assume that Trump and his administration are weak and more susceptible to being intimidated by the Kremlin's shows of force than the former Biden Administration.

• People's Republic of China (PRC)-based companies continue to supply Russia with critical materials needed to sustain Russia's war efforts in Ukraine.

• The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a resolution on January 28 defining its position on peace in Ukraine, closely echoing the principle of "peace through strength" that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky previously outlined.

• The US military reportedly recently transferred Patriot missiles from Israel to Poland and is expected to deliver these missiles to Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kharkiv and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Kurakhove and in the Dnipro direction.

Institute for the Study of War

The United Kingdom (UK), Finland, and Czechia announced several immediate and longer-term military assistance packages for Ukraine on January 31. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on January 31 that the UK will provide Ukraine with a military assistance package valued at two billion GBP (about $2.5 billion), primarily for the purchase of air defense systems and funding for the localization of defense production in Ukraine. Finnish Defense Minister Antti Hakkanen announced on January 31 that Finland will provide Ukraine with a new tranche of military assistance valued at almost 200 million euros (about $207 million). Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky stated on January 31 that the Czech government is considering creating a new initiative to purchase artillery ammunition for Ukraine.

Russian forces are expanding their salient north of Kupyansk as part of long-term operational efforts to push Ukrainian forces from the east (left) bank of the Oskil River. Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna (Kupyansk-Borova-Lyman) line gradually intensified in September 2024 after a relatively low tempo period in early and mid-2024 during which Russian forces primarily conducted infantry assaults and occasional platoon-sized mechanized assaults in the area. Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced battalion-sized Russian mechanized assault near Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk) in late September 2024 – the first large Russian mechanized assault in this direction since Winter 2023-2024. Russian forces have recently intensified offensive operations north of Kupyansk, particularly near Dvorichna, as part of this broader intensification in the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions. Geolocated footage published on January 30 and 31 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk and on the west bank of the Oskil River), advanced in the southern outskirts of Zapadne (southwest of Dvorichna), and advanced northward along the west bank of the Oskil River northwest of Novomlynsk (northeast of Dvorichna). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 28 and 31 that Russian forces recently seized Dvorichna, and a Russian milblogger claimed on January 31 that Russian forces seized Novomlynsk. ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however.

Russian forces are also leveraging mechanized assaults to expand their salient north of Kupyansk. Russian forces have conducted five company-sized mechanized assaults and at least one reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction since late October 2024. The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on January 28 that Ukrainian forces have repelled four mechanized assaults of unspecified echelon since January 22 alone. The Russian military command has historically allocated armored vehicles to priority frontline areas and intensified mechanized activity could indicate that the Kupyansk direction is becoming a priority sector for Russian forces.

Key Takeaways:

• The United Kingdom (UK), Finland, and Czechia announced several immediate and longer-term military assistance packages for Ukraine on January 31.

• Russian forces are expanding their salient north of Kupyansk as part of long-term operational efforts to push Ukrainian forces from the east (left) bank of the Oskil River.

• Elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Leningrad Military District ) are reportedly leading the Russian effort to expand the salient north of Kupyansk.

• Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA) (Moscow Military District ) are also participating in the envelopment of Kupyansk and are attempting to advance east of Kupyansk and to expand the Russian salient south of Kupyansk near Kruhlyakivka likely in order to prepare for advances south of Kupyansk, cross the Oskil River, and pressure Borova.

• Russian forces appear to be developing and disseminating a doctrinal method for advances throughout the theater that aims to conduct slow envelopments of frontline towns and settlements at a scale that is reasonable for Russian forces to conclude before culminating.

• The Russian military command has shown that it is willing to commit to operations that could take six to nine months to conclude. Russian commanders are likely operating under the assumption or direct knowledge that Russian President Vladimir Putin does not intend to end the war in Ukraine in the near future.

• This Russian offensive method is bringing about slow operational maneuver on the battlefield, but these envelopments require significant planning, foresight, manpower, and equipment and do not restore rapid, mechanized maneuver to the battlefield.

• Russian forces are also intensifying their efforts to close the remaining Ukrainian pocket west of Kurakhove.

• Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities agreed to accept a European Union (EU) package that includes funding for gas purchases for Transnistria, further limiting Russia’s economic influence over the pro-Russian breakaway republic.

• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil refinery in Volgograd Oblast amid continued strikes against Russian energy and defense industrial infrastructure.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

• Western and Ukrainian officials continue to report that North Korean forces have withdrawn from frontline positions in Kursk Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 31 to February 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast and occupied Crimea; seven Iskander-K cruise missiles from occupied Crimea and Donetsk Oblast; eight Kh-22 cruise missiles from Tu-22M3 aircraft; eight Kh-101/55 cruise missiles from Tu-95MS strategic bombers; 10 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from tactical aircraft over Voronezh Oblast; two Kh-31P anti-radiation missiles from the Black Sea; and 123 Shahed and decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 56 Shahed and decoy drones; that 61 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference; and that Ukrainian countermeasures prevented an unspecified but significant number of Russian missiles from reaching their targets. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian ballistic missiles had a higher success rate, and ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are likely leveraging ballistic missiles in strike packages since Ukraine only has a few air defense systems suitable for intercepting such missiles. Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, reported that a Russian Kh-22 missile struck a residential building in Poltava City; that Russian ballistic missiles struck the historical center of Odesa City, and damaged a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) protected building; and that drones damaged residential areas, warehouses, and private property in Kharkiv and Kyiv oblasts. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that Russian forces struck an area near where Norwegian diplomats were staying in Odesa City. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russia's overnight strikes targeted Ukrainian gas and energy facilities that support the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).

A recent Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian naval drone suggests that Russian forces have developed a new method to offset Ukrainian capabilities in the Black Sea. The Russian MoD reported on February 1 that Russia's Black Sea Fleet (BSF) used a drone to destroy a Ukrainian naval drone in the Black Sea. Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian BSF launched a Kronshtadt Orion missile-capable drone from an unspecified naval asset and that this strike may be the first documented case of Russian forces leveraging a naval asset to deploy drones capable of destroying Ukrainian naval drones. Another Russian milblogger called on Russian authorities to increase the production of weapons similar to the drone-launched X-UAV missiles (TKB-1030) to effectively combat Ukrainian forces' naval drone capabilities as it is now too risky for Russia to operate helicopters near the Black Sea. Ukrainian forces have demonstrated their ability to down Russian Mi-8 helicopters operating over the Black Sea using missiles launched from Magura V5 naval strike drones, and the February 1 BSF strike suggests that Russian forces have developed a new method to try to offset this Ukrainian naval drone adaptation.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 31 to February 1.

• A recent Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian naval drone suggests that Russian forces have developed a new method to offset Ukrainian capabilities in the Black Sea.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

Institute for the Study of War

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces reportedly struck a dormitory holding Russian civilians in Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 1 as Russian authorities widely attempted to deny Russian responsibility for the strike and blame Ukraine.

Russia continues efforts to illegally deport Ukrainian children to occupied Crimea and Russia under the guise of evacuation and rehabilitation programs.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

Russian forces continue to forcibly mobilize civilians in occupied Ukraine into the Russian military in violation of the Geneva Convention.

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Russian forces continued to suffer high losses in January 2025 despite a slower rate of advance as compared with previous months in late 2024. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on February 3 that Russian forces suffered 48,240 casualties – over three Russian motorized rifle divisions worth of personnel – in January 2025, making January the second highest month of losses since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.<1> ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces gained roughly 498 square kilometers in January in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, or roughly 16.1 square kilometers per day. The available figures suggest Russian forces suffered roughly 96 casualties per square kilometer of territory seized. The Ukrainian MoD reported that Russian forces suffered 48,670 casualties in December 2024 – their highest monthly casualty rate since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion – and ISW assessed that Russian forces gained a total of 593 square kilometers in December 2024. The roughly 100-square-kilometer decrease in seized territory between December 2024 and January 2025, coupled with a similar monthly casualty rate, indicates that Russian forces are taking the same high level of losses despite achieving fewer territorial advances in the near term. ISW previously observed that Russian advances slowed from November 2024 to December 2024. ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command likely tolerated record levels of personnel casualties from September 2024 through November 2024 to facilitate larger territorial gains, but it remains unclear whether the Russian military command will be willing to sustain such casualties if Russian forces' rate of advance continues to decline as Russian forces are advancing on more heavily defended settlements such as Pokrovsk.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continued to suffer high losses in January 2025 despite a slower rate of advance as compared with previous months in late 2024.

• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure in Volgograd and Astrakhan oblasts on the night of February 2 to 3.

• Ukrainian forces continue to innovate with drone operations to maintain their technological advantage over Russia and bring about battlefield effects.

• The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) expressed concern about the "sharp rise" in reports of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).

• Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on February 3 that Ukraine has started implementing organizational reforms to transition the Ukrainian Armed Forces into a "corps structure."

• Unspecified actors assassinated Armen Sargsyan, the founder of the "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion, who has been involved in Russia's hybrid activities and invasions of Ukraine since 2014.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Borova, Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and in the Dnipro direction.

• The Russian government is expanding the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into government positions, to occupied Ukraine as part of long-term efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia.

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International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess damage to the substation as Russian long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue to threaten Ukraine's nuclear power plants (NPPs) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities. Grossi did not specify when Russian forces damaged the Kyviska Electrical Substation but emphasized that a direct strike on the substation or a power supply disruption could cause a nuclear accident. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne noted that the Kyivska Electrical Substation is connected to the Rivne NPP and supplies Kyiv City and central and northern Ukraine with power. Russian forces launched a large series of missile and drone strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure connected to Ukrainian NPPs on the night of November 16 to 17, 2024. Grossi reported that the November 2024 Russian strikes damaged several unspecified electrical substations that are connected to the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs but that the strikes did not damage the NPPs themselves. Russian strikes against Ukrainian electrical substations — not just NPPs — continue to threaten Ukraine's energy generation abilities and can cause long-term damage. Artur Lorkowski, the director of the Energy Community (an international organization that manages Ukraine’s energy procurement), told Politico in November 2024 that repairing damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure may require a significant amount of time because it can take up to one year for Ukraine to find and reinstall specialized equipment, including auto transformers. Another Ukrainian energy expert told Politico that Ukraine needs an expedited supply of spare parts for energy infrastructure.

Russian officials continue to justify the Kremlin's decision to not conduct an involuntary reserve call up at this time despite indications that the Russian military is struggling to recruit enough new personnel to replace its high casualties. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed on February 4 that Russia does not need to conduct another partial involuntary reserve call up because Russia currently has the battlefield "advantage." Duma Defense Committee member Viktor Sobolev added that 740,000 people have signed Russian military service contracts — presumably since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 — and claimed that mobilization would "only make things worse" because it would send people without any previous military experience or specialized skills to the frontline. Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Andrei Krasov also claimed that mobilization is unnecessary because Russian military registration and enlistment officers are successfully recruiting new personnel. These Russian Duma deputies are likely claiming that Russian recruitment rates are sufficient in order to assuage fears among the Russian public of a widely unpopular potential new partial involuntary reserve call up.

A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on February 3 that Russian and Syrian authorities will continue contacts on "all issues," including about Russia's continued access to the Port of Tartus. Data from MarineTraffic.com showed that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships were off the coast of Tunisia on February 4. OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from the morning of February 4 showing thе Sparta and Sparta II, as well as potentially the Alexander Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship, the Admiral Golovko Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate, and the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate off the coast of Tunisia. Satellite imagery and reports from Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) indicated that all these vessels had been at the Port of Tartus in December 2024 and January 2025. The departure of a significant number of vessels from the Port of Tartus suggests that the Kremlin is not optimistic about the results of ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. The location of the vessels off the coast of Tunisia also suggests that these ships are not bound for Libya despite the fact that Russia sent some assets from Syria to Libya by air in December 2024 and January 2025 - as the Critical Threats Project's (CTP) Africa File previously reported. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's Resistance Center reported on February 4 that Russian ships began evacuating weapons from the Port of Tartus on January 27, and satellite imagery collected on January 18 and 27 showed that the Russian military had loaded equipment onto the Sparta and Sparta II at Tartus. The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that the Sparta II turned off its automatic identification system (AIS) after leaving Syria - a common practice among ships in Russia's "shadow fleet."

Key Takeaways:

• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess damage to the substation as Russian long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue threaten Ukraine's nuclear power plants (NPPS) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities.

• Russian officials continue to justify the Kremlin's decision to not conduct an involuntary reserve call up at this time despite indications that the Russian military is struggling to recruit enough new personnel to replace its high casualties.

• Russian occupation authorities continue to discuss Russia's possible illegal annexation of Kharkiv Oblast but claimed that Ukraine's September 2022 counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast spoiled Russia's plans to hold a "referendum" in the region at that time.

• A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue.

• Ukrainian naval drone strikes have likely forced Russia to dramatically alter Russian ships' routes between Russia and Syria.

• Russia has also reportedly used vessels belong to the MoD's Oboronlogistika company to monitor NATO vessels in the Baltic Sea.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk.

• A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the Siversk direction continue to struggle with systemic issues with field commanders filing false progress reports despite recent command changes.

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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his willingness to negotiate with Russia from a principled position that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the long run. Zelensky reiterated during an interview published on February 4 that Ukraine cannot and will not compromise its sovereignty in future peace negotiations, but that Ukraine's partners are not currently providing Ukraine with sufficient military assistance for Ukrainian forces to push Russian forces from all occupied Ukrainian territory. Zelensky stated that he is willing to negotiate directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin but warned that any peace agreement that significantly weakens Ukraine's ability to defend itself in the future risks another Russian invasion of Ukraine. Zelensky stated that Ukraine will never recognize Russia's illegal occupation of Ukrainian territory and emphasized that there can be no compromise on Ukraine's sovereignty. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine will eventually retake all its territory militarily and diplomatically but noted that the liberation of all Ukrainian territory from Russian occupation will take time. Zelensky called on Ukraine's allies to pressure Putin and demand that Russian forces withdraw from all Ukrainian territory. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine wants peace and that the United States, Europe, Ukraine, and Russia must all be represented in future peace negotiations. Zelensky's statements highlight that Putin's unwillingness to participate in good-faith negotiations is the true impediment to the end of the war, despite Putin's recent efforts to falsely blame Zelensky and Ukraine for the lack of progress towards peace in Ukraine.

Zelensky reiterated that the Ukrainian Constitution bans Ukraine from holding elections during wartime, but that Ukraine remains committed to holding elections in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution and laws after the war ends. Zelensky stated that Ukraine would have to change its constitution to hold an election outside of peace time and asked how Ukrainian servicemembers, citizens living in Russian-occupied Ukraine, and Ukrainian refugees and expatriates living abroad would be able to vote in the election before the Ukrainian government lifts martial law. Zelensky stated that Ukraine will "definitely" hold elections after the war ends but that Ukraine currently must focus on defending itself from Russian aggression. Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly used deliberately false readings of Ukraine's law and constitution to claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate president after Ukraine, adhering to the law and constitution, did not hold elections under martial law in 2024. The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government from holding elections or amending the Ukrainian constitution in times of martial law, and the Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Russian forces have suffered roughly 300,000 to 350,000 killed in action (KIA) and roughly 600,000 to 700,000 wounded in action (WIA) since the February 2022 start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Zelensky added that Russian military personnel suffer a 2:1 wounded to killed ratio because Russian field medicine is poor, and Russian forces struggle to evacuate wounded personnel from the battlefield. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were KIA. Zelensky's and Syrskyi's figures indicate that the Russian military suffered roughly 41 to 48 percent of its total casualties in Ukraine since 2022 in 2024 alone. The highest range of Zelensky's estimates are notably larger than recent Russian casualty figures from the Ukrainian General Staff and former US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. Zelensky also stated that roughly 50,000 to 70,000 Russian soldiers have been classified as missing in action (MIA) since February 2022.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his willingness to negotiate with Russia from a principled position that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the long run.

• Zelensky reiterated that the Ukrainian Constitution bans Ukraine from holding elections during wartime, but that Ukraine remains committed to holding elections in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution and laws after the war ends.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Russian forces have suffered roughly 300,000 to 350,000 killed in action (KIA) and roughly 600,000 to 700,000 wounded in action (WIA) since the February 2022 start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 4 to 5 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.

• The Russian military continues efforts to restructure Russia's peacetime military administrative control over military services (вид; vid) and is apparently disaggregating administrative control for Russia’s Air Force and Navy from Russia’s military districts.

• The Kremlin continues to prioritize domestic political stability over efforts to mitigate economic pressure and labor shortages.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange on February 5.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukraine's Kursk Incursion: Six Month Assessment

Executive Summary: A small group of Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast have complicated the Russian military's efforts to advance in Ukraine over the last six months. Roughly a division's worth of Ukrainian troops have undermined the Russian military's ability to launch or renew offensive operations in lower-priority areas of the frontline and to reinforce priority efforts with elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units. The Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast is a partial proof of concept of how limited Ukrainian battlefield activity that leverages vulnerabilities in Russia's warfighting capabilities and that integrates technological adaptations with mechanized maneuver can have theater-wide impacts on operations. It showed that surprise is still possible even on a partially transparent battlefield and that rapid maneuver is possible under the right conditions. The war in Ukraine, in other words, is not permanently stalemated. Either side can potentially restore maneuver and begin to gain or regain significant territory. Russia will be able to do so if the West reduces or cuts off aid. Ukraine may be able to do so if Western support continues to empower Ukrainian innovation.

The Russian military command has gathered around 78,000 troops, including 11,000 North Koreans, in an attempt to expel Ukrainian forces from positions in Kursk Oblast over the last six months. An estimated 11,000 Ukrainian forces advanced into Kursk Oblast in early August 2024, seizing the tactical initiative and complicating the Russian military's Fall 2024 offensive effort. Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly delayed his deadlines for Russian forces to push Ukrainian troops from Kursk Oblast first by mid-October 2024 then by January 2025 and repeatedly prioritized Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast over regaining control of the Kursk salient, which Russian forces still had not done at the end of January 2025. Putin has not been able fully to insulate Russian forces in Donetsk Oblast from the theater-wide impacts of the incursion, however, and the Russian military has simultaneously been pulling troops, armored vehicles, and artillery and air defense systems away from other sectors in Ukraine to reinforce the Russian force grouping fighting in Kursk Oblast. Recent Ukrainian estimates indicate that Putin has accumulated roughly 67,000 Russian troops and 11,000 North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast expel a reinforced Ukrainian grouping in Kursk Oblast that now constitutes at most 30,000 troops by the most generous Western estimations.

Ukraine conducted the incursion at a critical moment to gain leverage in the battlespace and successfully inflicted asymmetric, theater-wide impacts on the Russian military with this limited ground operation. The first seven months of 2024 were characterized by the Russian seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024, continued Russian offensive operations west of Avdiivka in Spring and Summer 2024, the Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024, and intensified Russian offensive operations in the Toretsk and Kurakhove directions in June and July 2024. Critical delays in Western aid over the winter of 2023-2024 created shortages in Ukraine's air defense interceptors and Ukrainian artillery units and wider vulnerabilities in Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian attacks. Western leaders and intelligence agencies spent most of early 2024 advocating for Ukraine to maintain an "active defense" and focus on repelling and slowing Russian advances before attempting another counteroffensive operation possibly in 2025. The Ukrainian incursion refocused the conversation and allowed Ukraine to seize the narrative and tactical initiative. The Ukrainian incursion reportedly stymied a planned Russian offensive into Sumy Oblast, prevented the Russian military from substantially reinforcing its offensive in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and complicated but failed to stop Russian advances in priority sectors of Donetsk Oblast.

Ukrainian officials have never suggested that they intended to hold positions in Kursk Oblast in perpetuity. Ukrainian officials have instead repeatedly characterized the incursion as an effort to distract and pin Russian forces away from Russia's main operational objectives in Ukraine. ISW assesses as of February 5 that Russian forces had retaken at least 57 percent (roughly 655 square kilometers) of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. The Russian military certainly can expel Ukrainian forces from Russia whenever it chooses to allocate the necessary resources but has yet to prioritize this effort over making further advances in eastern Ukraine. Russian authorities may prioritize pushing Ukrainian forces from Russian territory in the coming months, however, particularly if Russian officials begin to seriously consider peace negotiations and intend to enter such negotiations from the strongest possible position. It is too early to determine the long-term impacts of the incursion on the resolution of the war in Ukraine, and these impacts will almost certainly be affected by Ukraine's ability to capitalize on the military and political pressures that the incursion has created for Russia. Ukraine may be able to replicate and exploit the pressure that Kursk has inflicted on the Russian military if the West continues to support Ukraine and if Ukraine can address its own manpower, morale, and materiel issues and identify a key location and moment to conduct a similar such operation in the future.

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Ukrainian forces launched a new series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in Kursk Oblast and advanced up to five kilometers behind Russian lines southeast of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 6. Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha) and north and east of Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha) along the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway and seized Kolmakov (north of Cherkasskaya Konopelka) and Fanaseyevka (just southeast of Cherkasskaya Konopelka). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in several waves in the direction of Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Ulanok (southeast of Cherkasskaya Konopelka along the 38K-028 highway) with up to two mechanized battalions' worth of armored vehicles and that Russian forces repelled the attack. Russian milbloggers estimated that Ukrainian forces attacked with 30 to 50 armored vehicles and claimed that one group of Ukrainian forces successfully attacked from Makhnovka towards Cherkasskaya Konopelka, Fanaseyevka, and Ulanok and that Russian forces repelled another Ukrainian group that attacked from Dmitriukov (just east of Makhnovka) towards Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha). A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Cherkasskaya Konopelka, but two other milbloggers denied this claim. Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces broke through to or even seized Ulanok, but other sources also denied these claims. ISW has not yet observed geolocated evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces are operating in Ulanok. The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 6 indicating that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in a forested area southwest of Kurilovka.

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces also attacked near Kruglenkoye (northwest of Sudzha), but ISW did not observe additional claims of Ukrainian activity in this area or north of Sudzha near Berdin where Ukrainian forces attacked in early January 2025.<7> Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces launched the attacks southeast of Sudzha during poor weather conditions that complicated Russian drone operations in the area. Some Russian milbloggers expressed concern that further Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast could threaten rear areas of the Russian force grouping attacking Guyevo (south of Sudzha) and complicate Russia's ability to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) within the Ukrainian salient. Russian sources acknowledged that elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps , Leningrad Military District ), and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and Chechen Akhmat drone operators are the main forces defending against the Ukrainian attacks southeast of Sudzha.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces launched a new series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in Kursk Oblast and advanced up to five kilometers behind Russian lines southeast of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 6.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin praised elite Russian VDV and naval infantry formations defending Kursk Oblast on February 5, highlighting the fact that the Ukrainian incursion has pinned about a combined arms army’s worth of Russian troops in Kursk Oblast since August 6, 2024.

• Ukrainian officials provided additional details about Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast in honor of the six-month anniversary of the incursion.

• A Russian state-run poll suggests that the Russian public maintains a high level of support for the war in Ukraine despite mounting challenges.

• North Korea appears to be using its alliance with Russia to leverage the war in Ukraine as a testing ground to refine its missile technology and broader military capabilities.

• Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against an air base in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 5 to 6 as a part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.

• Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military assistance to Ukraine.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Deputy Minister of Transport Dmitry Bakanov to replace Yuri Borisov as head of the state-owned Russian space agency Roscosmos on February 6.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and recaptured lost positions near Kurakhove.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, and Kurakhove.

• Russian authorities continue efforts to increase social benefits for Russian military personnel likely to support ongoing recruitment efforts.

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Ukrainian forces marginally advanced during mechanized assaults in their salient in Kursk Oblast on February 6, but Russian sources claimed on February 6 and 7 that Russian forces have at least temporarily stalled Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha. Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced along the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway and in the fields east of Fanaseyevka (southeast of Sudzha) during the February 6 attacks. Russian sources widely claimed that Russian forces repelled all Ukrainian attacks on February 6 and on the night of February 6 to 7 but acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain some positions near Cherkasskaya Konopelka (north of Fanaseyevka), Fanaseyevka, and Ulanok (east of Fanaseyevka). A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing on the outskirts of Makhnovka (just southeast of Sudzha) but that Ukrainian forces did not launch new attacks near Cherkasskaya Konopelka during the day on February 7. Russian milbloggers continued to issue conflicting claims about the situation in Cherkasskaya Konopelka. Some milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have seized the settlement, while others claimed that Ukrainian forces bypassed the settlement or that Russian forces have retaken the settlement. ISW cannot independently verify Russian claims about the situation in Cherkasskaya Konopelka. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are effectively using fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones to counter Ukrainian forces attacking in the area.

Russian sources provided additional information about the Russian force grouping defending southeast of Sudzha. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), "Veterany" Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps), "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army , formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps , SMD), and drone operators of the Russian Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are defending in the area. Russian milbloggers widely credited drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz forces with defending against the Ukrainian attacks on February 6 and 7 and complained that the Russian MoD did not acknowledge the Chechen drone operators. Russian milbloggers also claimed that the Russian military command reportedly removed the 11th VDV Brigade's commander and that the MoD is blaming the commander for failing to sufficiently man and defend Russian positions near Cherkasskaya Konopelka.

The Kremlin continues to conduct an information campaign likely directed toward both domestic and international audiences that aims to conceal the extent to which Russia's protracted war against Ukraine has negatively affected Russia's economy. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin met on February 7 with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss the state of the Russian economy. Mishustin claimed that Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) rose in 2024 by 4.1 percent largely due to "intensive" growth in Russia's manufacturing industry – likely referring to Russia's boost of its defense industrial base (DIB) since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Mishustin claimed that the main contributors to the growth in Russia's manufacturing sector were the machine-building, transport engineering, automotive, and computer and electronic equipment sectors.

Mishustin claimed that inflation in Russia reached 9.52 percent in 2024, and Putin claimed that inflation was already 9.9 percent as of February 3, 2025. Russia's true inflation is quite higher than the official statistics the Kremlin is willing to publicize, however. (Several studies indicate that Russia’s inflation rate is closer to 20 percent.) Mishustin highlighted Russia's low 2024 unemployment rate of 2.5 percent but only briefly acknowledged Russia's significant labor shortages, which are the reason for Russia's low unemployment.

Mishustin noted that Russian economic growth might be less significant in 2025 as it is very important to stop inflation and ensure long-term economic growth – likely a signal to prepare the Russian population to expect economic hardships in 2025. Mishustin and Putin also attempted to posture Russia's economy as stable in the face of international economic pressure. Mishustin claimed that Russia's fuel and energy complex is adapting and finding new markets.

Mishustin claimed that Russia's economy has "successfully managed" with "unprecedented sanctions pressure" in recent years and that anti-Russian sanctions are hurting the states that imposed the sanctions more than the sanctions are hurting Russia. Putin similarly attempted to posture Russia's economy as stronger and growing more rapidly than economies in the West. Mishustin and Putin notably did not mention how the Russian Central Bank raised the interest rate to 21 percent in October 2024 or how Russia has been drawing from its National Welfare Fund to finance its war effort over the last three years. The liquidity portion of Russia’s National Welfare fund may run out by Fall 2025.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces marginally advanced during mechanized assaults in their salient in Kursk Oblast on February 6, but Russian sources claimed on February 6 and 7 that Russian forces have at least temporarily stalled Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha.

• The Kremlin continues to conduct an information campaign likely directed toward both domestic and international audiences that aims to conceal the extent to which Russia's protracted war against Ukraine has negatively affected Russia's economy.

• Ukrainian military officials continue to highlight the country’s growing drone production capacity and its effectiveness on the battlefield but acknowledged that Ukraine must address its force generation issues to fully stop Russian advances in eastern Ukraine.

• Interim Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra stated in an interview with the Washington Post that Syria is open to Russia retaining its air and naval bases in Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.

• Azerbaijan-Russia relations continue to sour following Russia’s refusal to take full responsibility for the December 25, 2024 downing of an Azerbaijani Airlines (AZAL) passenger plane, likely shot mid-air by Russian air defense before crashing in Aktau, Kazakhstan

• Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers appointed Lieutenant General Yevhen Moysiuk and Captain Valeriy Churkin as Deputy Defense Ministers on February 7.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk.

• The Russian government continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine to regional government positions.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia may be providing drone and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops fighting in Kursk Oblast. Japanese outlet NHK, citing multiple sources familiar with Russia–North Korea relations, reported on February 8 that Russia has agreed to assist North Korea in developing and mass-producing various types of drones in exchange for North Korean forces supporting Russia’s war effort against Ukraine. NHK noted that Russia remains reluctant to help North Korea develop nuclear weapons, fearing that North Korean nuclear tests could further strain relations with the United States and complicate relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), however. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on February 8 that Russia is specifically spreading modern technology to North Korea, including drone technology, and told Reuters on February 7 that thousands of North Korean troops have returned to active combat in Kursk Oblast after a brief pause. A Ukrainian brigade operating in Kursk Oblast published a video on February 8 reportedly showing North Korean forces conducting assaults alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast. South Korean sources recently reported that Russia withdrew North Korean troops from the battlefield in Kursk Oblast in mid-January 2025, possibly for rest and reconstitution or to rethink how Russia is using these troops. ISW assesses that North Korea is using the war in Ukraine as a testing ground for its own military capabilities. Reuters reported on February 6 that North Korean ballistic missiles fired by Russian forces since December 2024 have demonstrated significantly improved accuracy, likely an example of North Korean capability enhancement gained through the North Korea-Russia alliance.

Russia continues to expand its military capabilities, indicating that the Kremlin has no immediate interest in negotiations or a lasting peace with Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, citing Ukrainian intelligence, reported on February 8 that Russian forces are forming new military divisions, building additional defense-industrial base (DIB) facilities, planning to increase military personnel by over 100,000 soldiers, and deepening military cooperations with North Korea. Then–Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in January 2023 that Russia would create 14 new military divisions, but ISW is unable to assess whether Zelensky is referring to these previously announced plans or the creation of additional new divisions. ISW also cannot verify the status of the formation of the 14 divisions Shoigu previously announced. Zelensky highlighted that Russia's force-generation, restructuring, and defense-production efforts make it clear that Putin is not interested in negotiations with Ukraine and seeks to continue Russia’s war. Such Russian plans suggest that Russia, not Ukraine, is the party refusing good-faith negotiations and actively pushing for protracted war rather than peace, while also setting conditions to prepare for a potential broader conflict with NATO. Russian officials and information space have frequently framed the war in Ukraine as a part of a larger confrontation with the West.

The Russian command may be redeploying forces from the Kurakhove direction towards Toretsk in order to facilitate Russian offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in Spring or Summer 2025. A Russian source claimed that the Russian military command is redeploying elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments, 163rd Tank Regiment, and 381st Artillery Regiment (all of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division) and elements of the 96th regiment (possibly also part of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, although ISW has not previously observed reports of this unit operating in Ukraine) from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction. ISW has not observed confirmation or other reporting on this alleged redeployment. Another Russian source claimed that elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments are operating near Dachne as of February 8, however. A redeployment of elements of the 8th CAA to the Toretsk direction- in conjunction with intensified Russian efforts in the Chasiv Yar direction in recent weeks- would indicate that the Russian command may intend to prioritize advances towards Kostyantynivka and pressuring Ukraine's fortress belt in 2025, as ISW previously assessed.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia may be providing drone and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops fighting in Kursk Oblast.

• Russia continues to expand its military capabilities, indicating that the Kremlin has no immediate interest in negotiations or a lasting peace with Ukraine.

• The Russian command may be redeploying forces from the Kurakhove direction towards Toretsk in order to facilitate Russian offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in Spring or Summer 2025.

• The Baltic States cut ties with the Soviet-era power grid that connected them to Belarus and Russia on February 8 as part of efforts to achieve full energy independence from Russia and further integrate their energy infrastructure with the European Union (EU).

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.

• The Kremlin continues efforts to incentivize Russian citizens to serve in the military.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to offset the resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on February 9, citing South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), that thousands of North Korean workers arrived in Russia in 2024 to take construction jobs. Russian official data shows that 13,221 North Koreans entered Russia in 2024 — up to 12 times the number that entered Russia in 2023. Many of the North Korean workers are reportedly entering Russia on student visas, with 7,887 North Koreans having entered Russia in 2024 for alleged education purposes. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on February 4 that the number of North Koreans who came to Russia to study in 2024 was the highest number since 2019. Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported in November 2024 that data from the Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service showed that a record number of North Koreans entered Russia for education between July and September 2024 — notably in the lead up to the reported start of North Korea's deployment of troops to Russia in early October 2024.

Russia has been suffering from significant labor shortages in both its civilian and defense industrial sectors since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The arrival of several thousands of North Koreans to work in civilian sectors is marginal and will not significantly alleviate Russia's labor shortages. Russia reportedly has an estimated labor shortage of 1.5 million workers as of December 2024, for example. North Korea's provisions of materiel and troops to Russia have significantly increased over the course of 2024, however, and the several thousands of North Korean workers that arrived in Russia recently may be the beginning of larger influxes in the future that could more significantly help Russia's labor shortage issues. (Russian forces‘ initial use of small numbers of North Korean artillery and mortar shells grew rapidly, with 60 percent of Russian forces‘ artillery ammunition fired now being sourced from North Korea as of December 2024.) Russian enterprises are also likely not paying North Korean workers the same salaries as Russian citizens, so a significant influx of North Korean workers into the Russian work force in the future could also financially benefit Russian enterprises that are having to offer high salaries to Russian citizens in order to compete against Russian military and defense industrial enterprises for employees. Significant increases in the number of North Koreans working in Russia's civilian sectors in the future could also free up Russian civilian sector employees to work in the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) or fight in Ukraine.

The arrival of North Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution 2397. Russia voted for Resolution 2397 in 2017 in response to North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests. The resolution explicitly prohibits North Korea from sending its citizens abroad for work and mandated that all UN member states expel all North Koreans "earning income" abroad by December 2019. Russia is likely using the guise of student visas to hide Russia's violation of the resolution.

North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un continues to reiterate his support for Russia and its war effort in Ukraine. Kim gave a speech at the North Korean Ministry of National Defense on February 9 that heavily focused on the threats the US and the West allegedly pose to North Korean security. Kim criticized the US for protracting the war in Ukraine and claimed that he is "seriously concerned" about the West's alleged desire to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia. Kim notably claimed that the North Korean military and people will "invariably support and encourage" Russia's "just cause" to defend its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity "in the spirit of" the June 2024 Russian-North Korean comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.


Key Takeaways:

• Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to offset the resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort.

• The arrival of North Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution 2397.

• North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un continues to reiterate his support for Russia and its war effort in Ukraine.

• German authorities reportedly failed to down suspected Russian reconnaissance drones flying near a German military facility in January 2025 where Ukrainian forces have undergone training.

• Russia appears to be leveraging the technological innovations it is developing in its war in Ukraine directly against NATO states.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Vovchansk.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

• Russia continues efforts to recruit Russians and citizens of other Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) countries to sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced the Ukrainian "Drone Line" project on February 10 as part of ongoing Ukrainian efforts to integrate drone and ground operations. Umerov stated that the Ukrainian military will "scale up" five existing drone regiments and brigades in the Ukrainian military and border guard service and will integrate infantry and drones into a single strike system, which will enable Ukrainian forces to create kill zones 10 to 15 kilometers deep, will provide constant aerial support and infantry cover, and will detect and destroy Russian forces before they can approach Ukrainian positions. Ukraine's Ground Forces reported that the expansion of five such existing drone units is only the first stage of the Drone Line project. This project likely formalizes and provides additional support to ongoing Ukrainian efforts to expand drone units and increase their coordination with regiments and brigades, while keeping regular units and drone units separate in order to support drone units' more rapid combat and technological adaptations and innovations.

Ukraine's efforts to integrate drone operations with ground operations significantly differ from Russian efforts to centralize drone units. Russian efforts to centralize drone units have attempted to augment Russian drone capabilities by expanding state control over drone operators and developers and increasing their incorporation into the Russian military bureaucracy. The Russian military began efforts to centralize drone operators and developers in Fall 2024, disbanding informal Russian drone detachments and removing drone specialists from regular military units, then selectively reorganizing them to form new Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)-controlled drone units and centralizing their assets. The Russian MoD also reportedly established its first separate unmanned systems regiment at the military district level in January 2024, further highlighting ongoing efforts to centralize and bureaucratize control over drone operations. ISW continues to assess that the Russian MoD's efforts to centralize and reorganize drone units and monopolize drone production and procurement processes may complicate Russian forces' ability to rapidly innovate and adapt new technologies and combat techniques in the short- to medium-term.

Ukrainian forces continue to target oil refineries in Russia as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko implied on February 10 that Ukrainian drones struck Krasnodar City and the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Neftekachka, Krasnodar Krai just south of Krasnodar City. Kovalenko noted that the Afipsky refinery has a production capacity of 6.25 million tons of oil per year and plays a vital role in providing fuel to the Russian military, particularly in southern Ukraine. Kovalenko highlighted that the refinery's location in Krasnodar Krai makes it a significant logistical hub supplying diesel fuel and jet fuel to Russian forces. The Afipsky Oil Refinery notably borders the base of the Russian 90th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army , Southern Military District ), which has previously been armed with Buk-M2 and Buk-M3 air defense systems, although the base's current air defense capabilities are unknown. Geolocated footage published on February 9 shows an explosion near Krasnodar City. Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev claimed on February 10 that Russian forces downed a Ukrainian drone over Krasnodar City, damaging a residential building. Kondratyev claimed that Russian forces also downed a drone over Afipsky and that debris damaged a private residence. Krasnodar City Mayor Evgeny Naumov claimed on February 10 that drone debris fell near a market.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced the Ukrainian "Drone Line" project on February 10 as part of ongoing Ukrainian efforts to integrate drone and ground operations.

• Ukraine's efforts to integrate drone operations with ground operations significantly differ from Russian efforts to centralize drone units.

• Ukrainian forces continue to target oil refineries in Russia as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.

• Russian authorities reportedly authorized the systematic torture of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) held in Russian prisons as early as March 2022.

• The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions to justify an influx of North Korean citizens arriving in Russia to join either the Russian workforce or the Russian military.

• A Russian official claimed that Russia is sending experienced Russian military personnel to North Korea for medical treatment.

• The pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway republic of Transnistria refused aid from the EU to resolve its gas crisis, demonstrating Russia's continued economic influence over Transnistria and the Kremlin's prioritization of the region.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk.

• Russian milbloggers continue to complain about the systemic issue of Russian forces submitting false reports to Russian military authorities and of high-level Russian officers micromanaging tactical-level units on the battlefield.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian officials are reportedly attempting to constrain Russian milblogger reporting about the current frontline in Kursk Oblast, likely in response to concerns that the West will pressure Russia into trading Russian territory for occupied Ukrainian territory. Several Russian milbloggers who regularly criticize the Russian military's conduct of the war in Ukraine claimed on February 10 and 11 that unspecified actors are calling for Russian authorities to charge the milbloggers with discrediting the Russian military after the milbloggers reported about recent Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha. The milbloggers claimed that the Russian military command is targeting them for publishing information about successful Ukrainian attacks near Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka, and one milblogger claimed that the recent Ukrainian attacks forced the Russian military command to delay plans for a future offensive operation in the area. The latter claim indicates that the Russian military command may have been planning to conduct an offensive operation to seize Sudzha, a prominent gas transit hub and the main town that Ukrainian forces control in Kursk Oblast.

The Russian military appears increasingly anxious to consolidate control over reporting about the situation in Kursk Oblast as Zelensky continues to express his intent to leverage Russian territory in future peace negotiations. Zelensky stated during his interview with The Guardian that he intends to use Ukrainian-held territory in Kursk Oblast to secure the return of Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory or "something else" during future peace negotiations with Russia. Zelensky noted that it is important to retake all of occupied Ukraine and did not speculate on which area of occupied Ukraine he would consider trading Russian territory for. Russian President Vladimir Putin likely intends to expel Ukraine from Kursk Oblast, or at least from Sudzha, before beginning peace negotiations in order to avoid having to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for Russian territory.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated Ukraine's commitment to good faith peace negotiations with Russia and the particular importance of US military assistance to Ukraine's security.

• Russian officials are reportedly attempting to constrain Russian milblogger reporting about the current frontline in Kursk Oblast, likely in response to concerns that the West will pressure Russia into trading Russian territory for occupied Ukrainian territory.

• Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery and reportedly struck Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast on the night of February 10 to 11.

• The Russian State Duma voted to remove Russian State Duma deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) retired Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev from the Duma Defense Committee on February 11.

• The Kremlin may be setting informational conditions for possible false flag attacks in the Baltic Sea and against Russian opposition politicians living abroad in order to discredit Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and Hulyaipole.

• Russian regional authorities are reportedly reducing payments due to regional budget deficits for Russian soldiers who received minor injuries.

Institute for the Study of War

US President Donald Trump held bilateral phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 12. Trump stated on February 12 that he discussed the war in Ukraine with Putin and that he and Putin agreed that their administrations will "immediately" begin negotiations. Trump added that he planned to "inform of the conversation" after his call with Putin. The official Kremlin readout of the call claimed that Putin emphasized the need to "eliminate the root causes" of the war and that Putin "agreed with" Trump that "a long-term settlement could be achieved through peaceful negotiations." Russian officials have explicitly defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward in areas near Russia's border, which indicates that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this demand. Trump confirmed his phone call with Zelensky and stated that they discussed the war and the upcoming February 14 meeting between Zelensky and US Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the Munich Security Conference. Zelensky stated that he and Trump discussed opportunities to achieve peace, readiness to work together, and Ukraine's technological capabilities — including drones. Zelensky stated that Trump shared the details of his conversation with Putin and that he and Trump agreed to plan future bilateral meetings.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev explicitly rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's proposal to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for territory held by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast during future peace negotiations. Medvedev stated that it would be "nonsense" to swap Russian and Ukrainian territory, and Peskov stated that Russia will "never discuss" exchanging its territory. Medvedev's and Peskov's statements further support ISW's assessment that Russian President Vladimir Putin is uninterested in making any compromises during future peace negotiations and will only comply with a peace agreement that fulfills all of Putin's maximalist demands in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump held bilateral phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 12.

• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev explicitly rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's proposal to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for territory held by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast during future peace negotiations.

• Denmark's Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) assessed that Russia may have the capabilities to launch a full-scale war against NATO in the next five years, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts to restructure and prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term.

• The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently launched the "Contract 18-24" voluntary recruitment program aimed a recruiting 18 to 24-year-old Ukrainians into the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin held his first official call with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara on February 12 since the fall of Russian-backed former Syrian President Bashar al Assad.

• The Armenian National Assembly approved a draft law in the first reading on February 12 to commence the process of joining the European Union (EU).

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova, Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

• Russia's Shahed drone production rate may be declining.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukraine's European partners announced new military assistance to Ukraine amid the February 12 Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting. The United Kingdom (UK) pledged 150 million pounds (about $188 million) in military support, including drones, "dozens" of battle tanks and armored vehicles, and air defense systems, and confirmed plans to provide Ukraine with an additional 4.5 billion pounds (about $5.6 billion) worth of military assistance in 2025. The UK stated that it will provide Ukraine will over 50 armored and protective vehicles, including modernized T-72 tanks, by the end of Spring 2025. Germany committed to supplying 100 IRIS-T air defense system missiles to Ukraine in the near future, and German defense company Helsing announced the delivery of 6,000 AI-equipped drones to Ukraine. Norway joined the Ukrainian Drone Coalition and revealed plans to establish and equip Ukraine's "Northern Brigade" as part of a broader Nordic initiative in which the Nordic countries will equip and train one Ukrainian battalion each. The Netherlands announced the delivery of 25 YPR armored infantry vehicles, Latvia announced the donation of 42 armored personnel carriers, and Estonia also pledged to allocate 0.25 percent of its GDP for military assistance to Ukraine in 2025.

Russia reportedly lost just over 5,000 tanks and armored vehicles during 2024 compared with 3,000 in 2023. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated on February 10 that Russia lost 1,400 main battle tanks (roughly four tank divisions' worth) and over 3,700 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs) — totaling 5,100 lost tanks and armored vehicles in 2024. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Ukrainian forces damaged or destroyed over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024, and IISS' estimates likely only account for destroyed tanks and armored vehicles. IISS assessed in February 2024 that Russia would be able to sustain its then-rate of vehicle losses (over 3,000 tanks, APCs, and IFVs annually as of 2023) until February 2026 or 2027 by refurbishing vehicles from Soviet-era storage facilities. It remains unclear if the Russian military command will remain willing or able to sustain this increased rate of armored vehicle losses in 2025, as Russian forces appear to be adapting their tactics to limit such losses.

Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian energy and military infrastructure as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) announced on February 13 that Ukrainian drones destroyed two Valdai radar complexes in Dolgoprudny, Moscow Oblast and noted that Russian forces used the radar complexes to detect and down drones over the airspace near Moscow City. Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed on February 13 that Ukrainian drones targeted the Lipetsk water aeration station in Lipetsk City, and a Russian source claimed that Ukrainian drones targeted the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant, which is located near the station and produces about 20 percent of Russia's steel output. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne, citing sources in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), reported on February 13 that the SBU struck the Andreapol oil pumping station in Tver Oblast, causing a fire at the boiler equipment warehouse and a closed switchgear.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's European partners announced new military assistance to Ukraine amid the February 12 Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting.

• Russia reportedly lost just over 5,000 tanks and armored vehicles during 2024 compared with 3,000 in 2023.

• IISS noted that Russia has adapted some of its tactics to address ongoing equipment shortages and is increasingly relying on infantry-led assaults to advance along the frontline.

• It remains unclear if Russia can repair and newly-produce a sufficient number of tanks and armored vehicles to replace losses in Ukraine and equip new Russian units.

• Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS) assessed that Russia is attempting to build its capabilities not only to support Russia's war effort in Ukraine but also to prepare for a potential future war with NATO, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about ongoing Russian efforts to prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term.

• Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian energy and military infrastructure as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises.

• The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on February 13 the termination of the Moldovan-Russian Intergovernmental Agreement on the establishment and functioning of Russian cultural centers in Moldova in response to ongoing reports of Russian drones violating Moldovan airspace.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Siversk.

• Russian officials continue efforts to increase recruitment for the "BARS-Bryansk" volunteer territorial defense detachment.

Institute for the Study of War

Lessons of the Minsk Deal: Breaking the Cycle of Russia's War in Ukraine

Some peace deals lead to peace, others to more war. The Minsk II deal aimed to end Russia’s limited invasion of Ukraine in 2015 but instead laid the groundwork for the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022. The United States must learn from the Minsk deal or risk a direct Russia-NATO conflict that puts American lives at risk.

Minsk II was a weak deal. It demanded nothing of the invader— Russia. It strengthened the Kremlin’s aggressive worldview that had driven the conflict to begin with. It masked Russian military weakness. It gave the Kremlin time and space to prepare for a larger invasion. The West could have helped Ukraine reach a stronger deal in 2015.

Minsk II gave Russian President Vladimir Putin hope that he could win in Ukraine without war. Russia sought and failed to control Ukraine in 2014 by military means. Minsk II gave Putin a way to demand that Ukraine — an independent state —give Russia control over its internal policies. Putin failed at that too and turned to the full-scale invasion in 2022.

Minsk II helped Putin mask his demands for Ukraine’s surrender behind false calls for peace. The West has repeatedly failed to call out and counter the real Russian demands since 2014. Minsk II reinforced Western delusions that Putin might simply settle if he received some land or if the West metered support to Ukraine or tried harder to negotiate with Putin. The deal also gave an excuse to those who understood the Kremlin’s goals but sought to restore ties with Russia anyway.

Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s close adviser in 2014, said in 2024 that Minsk II “legitimized the first partition of Ukraine.” Surkov’s words confirm Russia’s goal to destroy Ukraine as a state and to use the Minsk deal to do so. He added that “peace is nothing more than the continuation of war by other means.”

Another weak deal today would validate Putin’s 2022 full-scale invasion and give Putin hope to gain more over time. Hope for Putin means more war. More war means a larger war: An absolved Russia that bears little or no cost for its invasion will want more and will rebuild its capability to do more. A larger war would mean a higher cost for the United States, risk to American lives, and risk of a catastrophic escalation.

The Trump Administration has a historic opportunity to break Russia’s cycle of overt war and war through “peace” in Ukraine. To do so, the United States must learn the lessons from the Minsk deal:

• Russia will seek to transfer the responsibility and cost for its war onto someone else’s balance sheet.

• Putin’s demands are stand-ins for his goals – controlling Ukraine and making the United States bend to Putin’s demands to create a world order that favors Russia.

• Putin will fight as long as he believes he can outlast the West and Ukraine. Ending the war requires stripping Putin of hope that he can destroy Ukraine as a state in his lifetime — militarily or through a “peace deal.”

• Russia can accept failure.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US Vice President JD Vance met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference on February 14. Vance stated during a press conference following the meeting that the United States remains committed to ending the war and achieving a "durable, lasting peace" in Ukraine and not the "kind of peace that's going to have Eastern Europe in conflict just a couple years down the road." Vance noted the importance of dialogue between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, and declined to speculate on possible conditions of a future peace agreement in order to "preserve the optionality" for the delegations. Vance and Zelensky both noted that the conversation was productive and Zelensky thanked the United States for continued military support. Zelensky stated that the United States and Ukraine are preparing a plan to stop Russian President Vladimir Putin's aggression and finish the war in a just and lasting peace that provides tangible security guarantees for Ukraine. US President Donald Trump told reporters on February 14 that Ukraine would have a seat at the table during future peace negotiations with Russia to end the war.

Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak met with US Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg in Munich and discussed ongoing efforts to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine. Zelensky also met with a bipartisan delegation of US senators to discuss ongoing US military support for Ukraine, economic cooperation, and the future joint development of critical minerals and rare earth materials in Ukraine. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, British Deputy Defense Minister Luke Polland, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, and other European officials reiterated Europe's support for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity amid ongoing discussions about future peace negotiations with Russia.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US Vice President JD Vance met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference on February 14.

• The Kremlin reportedly ordered Russian government-linked media to reduce reporting about US President Donald Trump and portray Russian President Vladimir Putin as a strong and decisive leader after the February 12 Trump-Putin phone call.

• Russian officials and information space actors have notably not amplified the Russian information operation aimed at portraying Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the illegitimate leader of Ukraine since the February 12 Trump-Putin call.

• A Russian Shahed drone struck the protective structure of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) on February 14.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia may be preparing to launch intensified offensive operations into northern Ukraine or attack NATO's eastern flank in 2026.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kurakhove, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Vovchansk, Lyman, Kurakhove, and Pokrovsk.

• Russia is reportedly intensifying efforts to coerce Russian mobilized and conscripted personnel into signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to create conditions to frame Putin as the victor over US President Donald Trump in negotiations. Zelensky stated during his address at the Munich Security Conference on February 15 that Putin intends to cut Ukraine out of negotiations about the resolution of the war in Ukraine and conduct direct bilateral negotiations with the United States. ISW has previously noted that Putin has recently attempted to present himself as equal to Trump and to present Russia as a global power comparable to the United States and as an heir to the Soviet Union's "superpower" status. Zelensky stated that Putin wants to embarrass Trump and have Trump attend the Russian Victory Day Parade — which highlights Russia's role in defeating Nazi Germany during the Second World War — on May 9 as a "prop." Zelensky's warning aligns with a report from Russian opposition news outlet Meduza that the Kremlin instructed Russian state media to reduce reporting about Trump and instead portray Putin as a strong and decisive leader, as well as to frame the February 12 Putin-Trump phone call as a victory for Putin. Zelensky also stated that Trump has not discussed the prospect of having other European states participate in negotiations and that Ukraine and the rest of Europe need to present a united front to Putin and Europe needs to participate in decisions about its own future. The Kremlin has routinely attempted to portray the US as the only other relevant actor in Ukraine besides Russia to deny Ukraine's agency in future negotiations and set conditions to convince the US to ignore Ukraine's interests, all likely to demand significant concessions in Russia's favor. Zelensky also reiterated his warning that Russia will field 15 new divisions and use military exercises in Belarus to threaten NATO.

Ukrainian and US officials continue to provide details on upcoming peace negotiations to end the war. Zelensky told Newsmax on February 15 that Russian forces at "minimum" need to withdraw to the pre-full scale invasion frontline and reiterated his commitment to ending the war in 2025. US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated that the US aims to engage "all parties in a peace process" within 180 days (by roughly August 2025) and noted that other European states would not "be at the table" in peace negotiations but that the US will consider their points of view.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to create conditions to frame Putin as the victor over US President Donald Trump in negotiations.

• Ukraine's US and European partners continue to work to jointly develop Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).

• Kremlin-controlled state media used an interview with Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk to reiterate the Kremlin's false narrative about Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's illegitimacy and Russia's longstanding goal of destroying the Ukrainian state.

• Russian advances south and southwest of Pokrovsk have slowed over the last two weeks amid indications that the Russian military command may prioritize offensive operations against Kostyantynivka — the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast — in Spring and Summer 2025.

• Russian advances may be slowing south of Pokrovsk due to degradation among frontline Russian units and intensified Ukrainian drone operations in the area.

• The Russian military command may also intend to prioritize assaults on Kostyantynivka in 2025 and are thus reportedly not reinforcing the Russian force grouping south of Pokrovsk.

• Russian cargo vessels have continued to evacuate military assets from the port of Tartus as Russia negotiates its presence in Syria with the interim government.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Velyka Novosilka and in Kursk Oblast.

• Russian occupation authorities continue to create regional analogues to the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to place veterans of the war in Ukraine in government positions as part of Kremlin efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia and militarize society and government.

Institute for the Study of War

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov held a telephone call on February 16 to "open a channel of communication" for future talks about the war in Ukraine. US State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated that Rubio spoke with Lavrov as a follow up to US President Donald Trump's recent call with Russian President Vladimir Putin and that Rubio reaffirmed Trump's commitment to ending the war in Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that Rubio and Lavrov agreed to maintain a channel of communication to resolve issues in the US-Russian relationship; to remove barriers to trade, economic, and investment cooperation; to work together on ending the war in Ukraine and solving issues in the Middle East; and to organize future meetings to improve the work of foreign missions in the United States and Russia. The Russian MFA claimed that Rubio and Lavrov agreed to work to restore "mutually respectful" interstate dialogue and to hold regular contacts, including a Russian-American summit in the future. Rubio stated on CBS on February 16 that his phone call with Lavrov was meant to establish communications for future efforts aimed at reaching a peace agreement in Ukraine. Rubio noted that he discussed issues surrounding the operation of American and Russian embassies because it will be difficult to communicate with Russia if the embassies are not functioning.

US, Russian, and Ukrainian delegations are reportedly gathering in Saudi Arabia ahead of bilateral US-Russia and US-Ukraine negotiations in the coming weeks. US Special Presidential Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff stated on February 16 that he, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, and other unnamed US officials will travel to Saudi Arabia for bilateral negotiations with Russia. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told CBS that he will also travel to Saudi Arabia this week and will take advantage of "any opportunity" to further US President Donald Trump's goal of ending the war in Ukraine. It remains unclear who will represent Russia during the meeting, although a Russian insider source claimed on February 16 that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will arrive in Saudi Arabia in February 18. Ukrainian Economic Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated that a Ukrainian delegation has also arrived in Saudi Arabia on a working visit. It is unclear if US and Ukrainian officials will meet in Saudi Arabia, as US Special Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg will arrive in Ukraine in the coming days to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

US officials continue to outline their expectations for the peace negotiations. Witkoff noted that his initial meeting with Russian officials is about "trust building" and expressed hope that he will make progress during these initial meetings. Kellogg stated during the Munich Security Conference on February 15 that Russia must make territorial concessions during the negotiations and that Russia could also promise to not use force against Ukraine in the future or commit to "downsizing" the Russian military. Rubio stated during his interview with CBS that European officials must be involved in the peace negotiations in some capacity, but did not provide additional details. The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Brazil also released a statement on February 16 calling for major world powers to work together to promote peace in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov held a telephone call on February 16 to "open a channel of communication" for future talks about the war in Ukraine.

• US, Russian, and Ukrainian delegations are reportedly gathering in Saudi Arabia ahead of bilateral US-Russia and US-Ukraine negotiations in the coming weeks.

• Ukraine's European partners reiterated their support for Ukraine's war effort and domestic defense industry at the Munich Security Conference.

• The Kremlin officially reiterated its claim that Ukraine has no sovereignty, setting conditions for Moscow to claim that Ukraine has no standing to negotiate with Russia or that any agreements reached with Ukraine in the future are invalid.

• Medvedchuk's interview and Peskov's February 16 statements continue to cast doubt on Moscow's willingness to negotiate in good faith about a settlement of the war and set informational conditions for Russia to violate any agreement reached on the grounds that the Ukrainian government had no legal right to conclude it.

• The Kremlin extended an open invitation to US President Donald Trump to attend the May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow as part of efforts to posture Russia's strength and global power status.

• Western reporting suggests that the United States intends to ease sanctions on Belarus. Russia uses Belarus as a staging ground for its military against Ukraine and NATO and as a critical tool in its sanctions evasion schemes.

• The Russian military command reportedly redeployed additional elements of the Southern Military District's (SMD) 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) to the Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk directions, further indicating that the Russian military command intends to prioritize putting pressure on Kostyantynivka – the southernmost point of Ukraine's "fortress belt" – in 2025.

• The Russian military appears to be committing to a multi-year-long effort to seize Ukraine's "fortress belt" in Donetsk Oblast, further underscoring Russia's Putin's apparent disinterest in a lasting and enduring peace in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Siversk, and Kurakhove.

Institute for the Study of War

The Kremlin reiterated its demands that Ukraine cede additional territory in eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia and disband the Ukrainian military in the future while continuing to message that the Kremlin is unwilling to make territorial concessions itself in any future peace negotiations. Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya stated during a UN Security Council meeting on February 17 that Ukraine has "irrevocably lost" Crimea, the "Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics" (referring to occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts), and Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Nebenzya insinuated that peace negotiations should "correct" the situation in these oblasts and that Ukraine should cede the remaining parts of the four oblasts that Ukraine currently controls. Nebenzya is calling for Ukraine to cede the roughly 30 percent of the total area in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts that Russia does not currently occupy. (Russian forces currently occupy roughly 99 percent of Luhansk Oblast.) Nebenzya also demanded that Ukraine become a "demilitarized" neutral state in the future and that Ukraine not join any alliances or security blocs. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dismissed on February 17 the possibility of Russia making territorial concessions during future negotiations. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in June 2024 that Ukraine should withdraw its forces from and cede any unoccupied territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts to Russia, and Nebenzya appears to be resurrecting this demand ahead of bilateral US-Russia negotiations. US Special Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated during the Munich Security Conference on February 15 that Russia must make territorial concessions during negotiations, and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted on February 16 that US President Donald Trump wants to see the war end in a way that "protects Ukraine's sovereignty."

Lavrov and Nebenzya also categorically rejected European involvement in future peace negotiations and accused European countries of being aggressive toward Russia. Nebenzya claimed that European Union (EU) countries and the United Kingdom (UK) are "incapable" of reaching any agreement with Russia and cannot be party to any future agreements about the war in Ukraine. Nebenzya accused European countries of being "blinded" by Russophobia and unrealistic about peace negotiations. Lavrov questioned why European countries should participate in negotiations and insinuated that European leaders only want to prolong the war in Ukraine in order to defeat Russia and prepare for a future war between Russia and Europe. Russian authorities have previously focused their information operations against NATO, accusing the alliance of conspiring and preparing for a future war with Russia. Russian accusations that European countries and the EU more broadly (implicitly as distinct from the US) are acting aggressively towards Russia is a notable informational inflection and likely indicates a new Kremlin effort to drive a wedge between the US and Europe taking advantage of tensions evident at the recent Munich Security Conference.

The Kremlin also appears to be resurrecting Putin's previous demands and information operations aimed at delegitimizing Ukraine and its government in the eyes of the West — notably ahead of the February 18 Russia-US bilateral meeting in Saudi Arabia. Nebenzya reiterated Putin's demand that Ukraine must conduct elections before the implementation of any peace agreements, continuing the Kremlin's efforts to falsely portray the current Ukrainian government as illegitimate. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk have also recently repeated the Kremlin's false claims that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is "illegitimate" and implicitly that Russia thus is not obligated to honor agreements concluded with the current Ukrainian government. The Kremlin's apparent unwillingness to make territorial concessions, commit to honoring any future peace agreement with Ukraine, or involve any European leaders in these negotiations calls into question Putin's supposed willingness to engage in good faith negotiations that could bring about long-term peace in Ukraine and Europe more broadly.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin reiterated its demands that Ukraine cede additional territory in eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia and disband the Ukrainian military in the future while continuing to message that the Kremlin is unwilling to make territorial concessions itself in any future peace negotiations.

• Lavrov and Nebenzya also categorically rejected European involvement in future peace negotiations and accused European countries of being aggressive toward Russia.

• The Kremlin also appears to be resurrecting Putin's previous demands and information operations aimed at delegitimizing Ukraine and its government in the eyes of the West – notably ahead of the February 18 Russia-US bilateral meeting in Saudi Arabia.

• The Russian delegation participating in Russian-American talks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on February 18 does not include one of the members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's innermost circle who had been reported as a likely negotiator.

• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian energy facilities supplying the Russian military.

• Russian commanders continue to give orders for Russian forces to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on the frontline.

• Unspecified sources told Bloomberg that Russia appears to be nearing a deal with the Syrian interim government to maintain a “reduced” military presence in Syria.

• Russian forces advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

• Russian occupation authorities continue to violate the Geneva Convention by conscripting civilians in occupied Ukraine to serve in the Russian military.

Institute for the Study of War

>
>• The Kremlin reiterated its demands that Ukraine cede
>additional territory in eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia
>and disband the Ukrainian military in the future while
>continuing to message that the Kremlin is unwilling to make
>territorial concessions itself in any future peace
>negotiations.
>
>• Lavrov and Nebenzya also categorically rejected European
>involvement in future peace negotiations and accused European
>countries of being aggressive toward Russia.
>
>• The Kremlin also appears to be resurrecting Putin's previous
>demands and information operations aimed at delegitimizing
>Ukraine and its government in the eyes of the West – notably
>ahead of the February 18 Russia-US bilateral meeting in Saudi
>Arabia.
>

Kleiner Teaser für alle die glauben, dass die Nummer eh gleich durch ist.

Russian and American officials met in Saudi Arabia for bilateral talks about the war in Ukraine on February 18, but Russia continues to display no indications that it is prepared to make any meaningful concessions on Ukraine as assessed by Western intelligence and US officials in line with ISW's longstanding assessment. NBC reported on February 18 that four Western intelligence officials and two US congressional officials stated that intelligence from the United States and unspecified close American allies shows that Russian President Vladimir Putin still wants to control all of Ukraine and that his goals "remain maximalist." One congressional official stated that there is "zero" intelligence showing that Putin is interested in a "real peace deal right now." Intelligence officials stated that Putin has no plans to withdraw troops from Ukraine or to pull any personnel or equipment from western Russia. The six officials stated that Putin may agree to a ceasefire and peace deal in order to give the Russian military time to rest and reconstitute, and there is an idea among Western officials that Putin may "go through the motions" of negotiations in order to see what concessions he can get and to reintegrate Russia back into the global community. The two congressional officials and a former senior US administration official noted that Putin's "broad ambitions" have remained unchanged from the end of the Biden administration into the new Trump administration.

Western intelligence assessments suggest that Putin has not changed his theory of victory in Ukraine and still believes that Russia's military superiority is such that Russia can outlast the West and Ukraine on the battlefield. The six official sources told NBC that Putin still thinks that he can "wait out" Ukraine and Europe to eventually control all of Ukraine. A Western intelligence official noted that Putin "thinks he is winning" and does not feel pressure to stop hostilities due to Russian battlefield losses. Putin claimed in June 2024 that Russian forces aim to "squeeze" Ukrainian forces out "of those territories that should be under Russian control" and that Russia did not need to conduct another partial involuntary reserve call up similar to that in September 2022 because Russia is not trying to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine rapidly. Putin's theory of victory assumes that the Russian military can sustain slow, creeping advances on the battlefield longer than Ukrainian forces can defend and longer than the West is willing to support Ukraine.

Many recent Russian statements show that Putin remains uninterested in engaging in good faith negotiations and retains his objective of destroying the Ukrainian state while the Kremlin has offered no public indication that it would materially compromise. Kremlin officials have repeatedly denied Ukraine's sovereignty over its internationally recognized 1991 borders and the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov most recently claimed on February 16. Kremlin officials, including Putin, have promoted false narratives that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is "illegitimate" as part of efforts to claim that Zelensky does not have the authority to negotiate with Russia or that Russia does not have to honor any agreements that Zelensky may sign in the future. Putin and other Russian officials have also demanded that Ukraine cede additional territory in eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia, while denying that Russia will make any territorial concessions of its own.

Russia attempted to posture itself as on equal terms with the United States during the February 18 Russian-American talks in Saudi Arabia, focusing its official public rhetoric about the meeting on US-Russian relations and not the war in Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) published a boilerplate readout of the meeting, during which Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, National Security Adviser Michael Waltz, and Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff. Russian officials, including Peskov, Lavrov, and Ushakov, broadly stated that the talks went well, claiming that the discussions were the start of a long process and that Russia and the United States will continue dialogue on these issues. Lavrov claimed that the meeting was "useful" and that Russia and the United States began to "hear each other" and share a "determination to move forward." The Russian MFA's readout emphasized the Russian-American bilateral aspects of the talks, including normalizing bilateral relations, establishing a dialogue for future economic and energy cooperation, and resuming communications on international issues. The Russian MFA's readout also emphasized that Russia and the United States have a "special responsibility" as nuclear powers and members of the UN Security Council to resume communicating on international issues. ISW continues to note that Putin is trying to present himself as equal to US President Donald Trump and to present Russia as a global power comparable to the United States and as the heir to the Soviet Union's "superpower" status. The Russian MFA readout only briefly mentioned Ukraine, claiming that the delegations "exchanged views" on the situation "around Ukraine" and mutually committed to resolving the war.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian and American officials met in Saudi Arabia for bilateral talks about the war in Ukraine on February 18, but Russia continues to display no indications that it is prepared to make any meaningful concessions on Ukraine as assessed by Western intelligence and US officials in line with ISW's longstanding assessment.

• Many recent Russian statements show that the Kremlin remains uninterested in engaging in good faith negotiations and retains his objective of destroying the Ukrainian state while the Kremlin has offered no public indication that it would materially compromise.

• Russia attempted to posture itself as on equal terms with the United States during the February 18 Russian-American talks in Saudi Arabia, focusing its official public rhetoric about the meeting on US-Russian relations and not the war in Ukraine.

• Russian officials at the bilateral meeting continued to signal the Kremlin's unwillingness to negotiate on the war in Ukraine and determination to achieve its maximalist objectives in Ukraine.

• Zelensky, in contrast to Kremlin officials, continues to demonstrate Ukraine's willingness to compromise to bring about an enduring end to the war.

• Russian officials in Saudi Arabia began what will likely be an ongoing effort to push the United States into accepting Russian offers of economic and investment measures in lieu of any actual Russian concessions on Ukraine.

• Dmitriev attempted to frame Russian-offered economic incentives as more beneficial for the US than for Russia, but in reality Russia needs economic relief as soon as possible to stave off looming crises in 2025 and 2026.

• US officials continue to meet with European leaders about support for Ukraine.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

• A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor continued to complain that the Russian military command's lack of response to systemic issues is limiting Russian advances near Pokrovsk.

• Russian opposition outlet SOTA reported on February 18 that Republic of Mordovia Head Artyom Zdunov announced that regional authorities are raising one-time payments for recruits who sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) from 400,000 rubles ($4,369) to 1.1 million rubles ($12,015).

• Russian forces continue to deploy wounded and medically unfit soldiers to the frontline in an effort to address personnel shortages.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly trying to optimize the Russian negotiations delegation to be most effective with the specific individuals whom the United States chooses for its negotiation delegation, likely in an effort to extract maximum concessions from the United States. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 19 that Putin will appoint a negotiator for talks with the United States after the United States appoints its own negotiator. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on February 19, citing a source close to the Kremlin, that the United States was the first to select its delegation for the February 18 bilateral talks in Saudi Arabia, after which Russia attempted to "select relevant" counterparts for each of the selected US officials. The source claimed that Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev's appointment to the delegation appeared largely as a response to US demands that Russia appoint someone that would "understand" the United States. Another source close to the Kremlin told Meduza that Putin may appoint his aide Vladimir Medinsky to the Russian negotiations delegation if Ukrainian representatives join future negotiations because Medinsky took part in the Spring 2022 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul. The source claimed that the Kremlin does not need to include Medinsky in the Russian delegation so long as negotiations remain bilateral between the United States and Russia. The Moscow Times reported on February 19, citing a diplomatic source familiar with the February 18 US-Russia meeting, that the Kremlin seeks to restore access to roughly $6 billion worth of frozen Russian Central Bank reserves in the US. The source claimed that the Russian negotiations delegation in Saudi Arabia pushed for the United States to agree that both countries fully resume the operations of their diplomatic missions in the other country and to return Russian diplomatic property in the United States, which US authorities had previously seized on charges of being used for intelligence purposes. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 18 that the United States and Russia had agreed to restore "the functionality of respective missions in Washington and Moscow." The Kremlin appears to be attempting to push the United States to accept economic and diplomatic terms that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine, possibly in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions that are related to the war. US acceptance of these economic and diplomatic terms — without demanding any Russian concessions on Ukraine in return — would give away leverage that the United States will need to achieve US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a lasting and enduring peace that benefits the United States and Ukraine.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser Michael Waltz reiterated on February 18 that US President Donald Trump's position that the war in Ukraine must end in a way that is "fair, enduring, sustainable, and acceptable to all parties involved" remains unchanged. Rubio, Waltz, and Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff gave an interview to CNN and the Associated Press (AP) on February 18 following bilateral talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov in Saudi Arabia. Waltz stated that any future end to the war needs to be "permanent," not "temporary as we have seen in the past." Waltz stated that there is going to have to be "some discussion of territory...and security guarantees" and that future talks will discuss Russia's ability to retain any Ukrainian territory that Russia has illegally annexed since February 2022. Rubio answered a question about possible concessions from Russia, stating that these "kinds of things" will happen through "difficult diplomacy in closed rooms." Rubio later noted that there will have to be concessions "made by all sides" in order to bring about an end to the war. Rubio emphasized that a war can only end when "everyone involved" in the war — which Rubio explicitly defined as including Ukraine, Russia, and US partners in Europe — is "okay with" and accepts the end agreement. Rubio answered a question about his assessment of Russia's desire to achieve peace following the talks in Saudi Arabia, stating that Russia appears willing to "begin to engage in a serious process to determine" the mechanism to end the war, but that an outcome will ultimately depend on the willingness of every side in the war to "agree to certain things."

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on February 19 that Ukraine needs either NATO membership or a strong military and security guarantees for a sustainable peace. Zelensky emphasized that security guarantees do not necessarily mean deploying peacekeeping forces to Ukraine. Zelensky stated that it would be sufficient if the United States provided Ukraine with 20 Patriot air defense systems and the license to domestically produce Patriot missiles. Zelensky has repeatedly emphasized Ukraine's need for additional Patriot systems and missiles to defend against Russian missile strikes, particularly those with ballistic missiles targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure, and his February 19 statements are consistent with previous statements that Ukraine needs a strong military of its own to deter and defend against future Russian aggression.


Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly trying to optimize the Russian negotiations delegation to be most effective with the specific individuals whom the United States chooses for its negotiation delegation, likely in an effort to extract maximum concessions from the United States.

• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser Michael Waltz reiterated on February 18 that US President Donald Trump's position that the war in Ukraine must end in a way that is "fair, enduring, sustainable, and acceptable to all parties involved" remains unchanged.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on February 19 that Ukraine needs either NATO membership or a strong military and security guarantees for a sustainable peace.

• US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg arrived in Kyiv on February 19 for his first official visit to Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian energy facilities supplying the Russian military.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk and Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Siversk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

• Russian federal subjects are reportedly halting their recruitment of foreigners who do not speak Russian for service in the Russian military.

Institute for the Study of War

The Financial Times (FT) published an investigation on February 20 supporting ISW's long-held assessment that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law. The FT investigation provided additional details and analysis following a significant increase in the number of credible reports of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs in 2024 compared to the first two years of the war. FT and experts from the Center for Information Resilience analyzed footage of the executions and used the soldiers' uniforms to confirm that Russian forces were conducting the executions. FT conducted an investigation into footage of a Russian soldier shooting six unarmed Ukrainian POWs and identified the possible perpetrator as a soldier in a "Storm" penal detachment of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army , Central Military District ), but noted that the situation warrants further investigation to confirm this soldier's involvement. FT reported that the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade has been fighting near Pokrovsk since Fall 2024, which is consistent with ISW's observations. FT noted that Ukrainian frontline units are often the primary source of execution reports and drone footage of executions. FT noted, however, that tracking these executions is challenging because the Ukrainian units do not always relay reports of Ukrainian POW executions to their commanders. FT noted that Ukrainian prosecutors sometimes find out about the executions based on footage published online. FT interviewed the cofounders of a project reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence who stated that many Ukrainian units do not publish information about executions "because it has become routine" and that there are likely hundreds of instances of POW executions beyond the "dozens" recorded so far.

FT's investigation suggests that more senior Russian commanders may also be complicit in issuing orders to execute Ukrainian POWs. Ukrainian officials opened investigations into 43 executions with 109 victims in 2024, and FT analyzed footage of 30 of these instances with 133 victims. The FT investigation found that Russian forces across the frontline — particularly in eastern Ukraine and Zaporizhia Oblast - are executing Ukrainian POWs, not just a few isolated "rogue units." Global Rights Compliance President Wayne Jordash, who is assisting Ukrainian investigations into POW executions, told the FT that Russia is pursuing a "strategy of criminality" in Ukraine, including by torturing, sexually assaulting, and otherwise abusing residents in occupied Ukraine, and that the POW executions are also part of this criminality campaign. Jordash stated that Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs function to degrade Ukraine's military and security apparatus, leaving Ukraine more vulnerable to aggression.

Jordash noted that international law states that individuals who fail to prevent war crimes are also culpable for said war crimes and that government officials calling for POW executions are violating international law. Jordash mentioned specific instances of senior Russian leaders, including Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev and Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, explicitly calling for Russian forces to execute Ukrainian POWs. Jordash highlighted that Russian President Vladimir Putin praised the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) for its actions in combat, which is notable because the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade is has been linked to the beheading of Ukrainian POWs and execution of Ukrainian drone operators in October 2024. Forbes attributed beheadings of Ukrainian POWs in August 2024 and summary executions in October 2024 in Kursk Oblast to the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade. Putin awarded the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade the "Guards" honorific title in July 2024. FT reported that Putin held highly publicized meetings with two unspecified participants of the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" veterans program who reportedly executed POWs near Robotyne, Zaporizhia Oblast in May 2024. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) recently reported that there is a culture of torture and abuse of Ukrainian POWs detained in Russian penal colonies, and taken together these reports suggest that Russian decisionmakers in higher echelons of the chain of command may be implicitly encouraging, explicitly ordering, or failing to stop Russian executions and other abuses of Ukrainian POWs in a system that seems to incentivize such abuses.


Key Takeaways:

• The Financial Times (FT) published an investigation on February 20 supporting ISW's long-held assessment that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.

• FT's investigation suggests that more senior Russian commanders may also be complicit in issuing orders to execute Ukrainian POWs.

• Senior Ukrainian intelligence officials reported that North Korean forces are conducting joint operations with Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and are gaining new combat capabilities.

• US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on February 20.

• The Kremlin is likely attempting to portray the People's Republic of China (PRC) as more aligned with its stance on the war in Ukraine than the PRC is willing to publicly message.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velyka Novosilka.

• Russia is reportedly increasing its production of glide bombs and modernizing its cruise missiles.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian state media and Kremlin officials appear to be leveraging select statements from US officials alongside long-standing Russian narratives to create tension between the United States and Ukraine and undermine faith in America's commitment to Ukraine. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on February 21 that the Kremlin has ordered Russian state media personalities and other prominent voices in the Russian information space to intensify narratives aimed at creating discord in Ukrainian society and discrediting Ukraine among Western allies. The GUR stated that Russian actors intend to amplify narratives falsely alleging that the West has "betrayed" Ukraine, the United States is not concerned about Europe's and Ukraine's opinions, the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, the Ukrainian military is losing on the frontline, and "corrupt people" are stealing billions of dollars of US aid from Ukraine. The GUR reported that the Kremlin is also preparing to declare "victory" over Ukraine and possibly over NATO on the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion – February 24, 2025.

ISW has recently observed Kremlin officials and prominent voices in the Russian information space amplifying these narratives and other select statements from US officials aimed at sowing discord between Ukraine and its allies. ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory is built on the assumption that Russia can outlast Western support for Ukraine and that Putin is thus attempting to bring about the cessation of Western and particularly US support for Ukraine. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported that Russian actors also intend to incite protests in Ukraine via social media posts on February 24, 2025, and will offer to pay protestors if they attend rallies in Ukraine. The SBU asked Ukrainian citizens to be cautious of Russian efforts to manipulate Ukraine's information space ahead of the third anniversary of the war.

US officials continue to reiterate their support for Ukraine and a lasting and just resolution of the war. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 20 that the United States used the recent bilateral meeting with Russian officials in Saudi Arabia to gauge Russia's interest in good faith peace negotiations and to open a communication channel between the two countries. Rubio emphasized on February 18 that a war can only end when "everyone involved" in the war — which Rubio explicitly defined as including Ukraine, Russia, and US partners in Europe — is "okay with" and accepts the end agreement. Rubio reiterated on February 16 that Trump wants to see the war end in a way that "protects Ukraine's sovereignty," and US Special Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated on February 15 that Russia must make territorial concessions during negotiations.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian state media and Kremlin officials appear to be leveraging select statements from US officials alongside long-standing Russian narratives to create tension between the United States and Ukraine and undermine faith in America's commitment to Ukraine.

• US officials continue to reiterate their support for Ukraine and a lasting and just resolution of the war.

• Russian forces recently eliminated the Ukrainian pocket west of Kurakhove amid continued reports that the Russian military is redeploying elements of the Russian Southern Military District's (SMD) 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction.

• Russian forces are attempting to leverage the seizure of Velyka Novosilka to advance further north of the settlement toward the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border.

• Ukrainian officials continue to highlight the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) through significant expansion in the domestic production of key military equipment.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Commander Sergei Pinchuk to the rank of Admiral and Eastern Group of Forces Commander Andrei Ivanayev to the rank of Colonel General on February 21.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka and in Kursk Oblast.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly falsely designating former penal recruits as having abandoned their units without authorization (SOCH) to avoid paying them amid continued indicators that Russian authorities are concerned about the war's strain on the Russian economy.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukraine Fact Sheet

Key Takeaways:

• Zelensky does not imminently risk losing all of Ukraine.
• Most Ukrainian cities have not been destroyed.
• Ukrainian law prohibits holding elections in wartime (unlike the US
Constitution, which requires it).
• Ukraine has not suffered millions of losses.
• Europe provides about as much direct aid to Ukraine as the United States.
• European loans to Ukraine are backed by income from frozen Russian assets,
not Ukraine.
• Ukraine did not misuse or lose half of the aid the United States has provided.
• Ukraine repeatedly invited Putin to negotiate in early 2022.

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-fact-sheet-february-21-2025

Institute for the Study of War

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on February 22 that US and Russian officials are planning to meet within the next two weeks in an unspecified third country about bilateral relations. Ryabkov claimed that the United States and Russia are undertaking two "parallel" but "politically interconnected" negotiation tracks that will discuss the war in Ukraine and US-Russian bilateral relations. Ryabkov added that Russia is prioritizing its demand for the United States to return six Russian diplomatic properties, likely referring to properties US authorities previously seized on charges of being used for intelligence purposes. Ryabkov also stated that the United States and Russian delegations may discuss other international topics such as arms control and the situation in the Middle East. US and Russian officials met in Saudi Arabia for bilateral talks about the war in Ukraine on February 18.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on February 22 that US and Russian officials are planning to meet within the next two weeks in an unspecified third country about bilateral relations.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

• Russian forces continue to deploy wounded and medically unfit soldiers to the frontline in an effort to address personnel shortages.

Institute for the Study of War

US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff referred to the early 2022 Istanbul protocols as offering "guideposts" for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on February 23. An agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document. Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly identified the 2022 peace negotiations in Istanbul as their ideal framework for future peace negotiations to end Putin's war in Ukraine, as such a framework would force the West to concede to all of Russia's long-standing demands. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that both publications obtained several versions of the draft treaties from the March and April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul that indicate that both sides initially agreed that Ukraine would forgo its NATO membership aspirations and be a "permanently neutral state that doesn't participate in military blocs." The draft treaties also reportedly banned Ukraine from receiving any foreign weapons or hosting any foreign military personnel. The WSJ and NYT reported that Russia pushed for the Ukrainian military to be limited to 85,000 soldiers, 342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems. Russia also reportedly demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes. The draft treaties reportedly listed the United States, United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Russia as guarantors of the treaty, and Russia reportedly wanted to include Belarus as a guarantor. The guarantor states were supposed to “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent neutrality ," including military aid agreements. The draft treaties did not specify if other non-guarantor states would have to terminate their agreements with Ukraine as well, although this is likely considering that the treaty would ban Ukraine from having any foreign-supplied weapons. Russia insisted on these terms in the first and second months of the war when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv City and throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine and before Ukrainian forces conducted successful counteroffensives that liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts.

Ukraine is unlikely to accept any peace agreement based on the Istanbul negotiations as such terms are effectively a full Ukrainian surrender to Russia's long-term war goals. The Istanbul negotiations effectively conceded to Russia's long-standing demands to "denazify" — overthrow and replace the democratically elected Ukrainian government and install a pro-Russian puppet state — and "demilitarize" — constrain and shrink the Ukrainian military beyond the point of being able to defend itself against future Russian aggression — Ukraine. The Istanbul negotiations also conceded to Russia's demands that Ukraine abandon its aspirations to join NATO or any other security blocs in the future. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky walked away from the Istanbul negotiations with the backing of Europe and the United States in 2022 and will almost certainly reject such terms in 2025.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his commitment to preserving Ukraine's democracy and a just resolution to the war. Zelensky responded to a hypothetical question during the "Ukraine. Year 2025" Forum on February 23 about stepping down as president and stated that he is ready to step down in the event of or to facilitate peace or immediate NATO membership for Ukraine. Zelensky noted that he remains committed to holding elections after the war ends and has no interest in being in power "for a decade" and reiterated that Ukraine cannot hold elections until after Russia stops attacking Ukraine and after Ukraine lifts martial law. The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government from holding elections or amending the Ukrainian constitution in times of martial law, and the Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine. Zelensky has repeatedly noted Ukraine's commitment to holding fair and democratic elections in the future.

Key Takeaways:

• US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff referred to the early 2022 Istanbul protocols as offering "guideposts" for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on February 23. An agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document.

• Ukraine is unlikely to accept any peace agreement based on the Istanbul negotiations as such terms are effectively a full Ukrainian surrender to Russia's long-term war goals.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his commitment to preserving Ukraine's democracy and a just resolution to the war.

• Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's domestic defense industry and domestically produced strike capabilities.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev as Special Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries on February 23.

• Russian forces launched a record number of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 22 to 23, ahead of the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24.

• Russia appears to be relying more on Iran and North Korea to support its war in Ukraine.

• Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

• The Russian government continues efforts to increase its defense industrial output.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia has Failed to Break Ukraine

Executive Summary:

Russia dedicated staggering amounts of manpower and equipment to several major offensive efforts in Ukraine in 2024, intending to degrade Ukrainian defenses and seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. These Russian efforts included major operations in the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast area, Avdiivka, Chasiv Yar, northern Kharkiv Oblast, Toretsk, Marinka-Kurakhove, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar-Velyka Novosilka. Russia has achieved relatively faster gains in 2024 than throughout most of the war after the initial invasion and developed a blueprint for conducting slow, tactical envelopments to achieve these advances, but Russian forces have failed to restore the operational maneuver necessary to achieve operationally significant gains rapidly. Russia has thus paid an exorbitant price in manpower and equipment losses that Russia cannot sustain in the medium term for very limited gains.

Russian losses in massive efforts that have failed to break Ukrainian lines or even drive them back very far are exacerbating challenges that Russia will face in sustaining the war effort through 2025 and 2026, as ISW's Christina Harward has recently reported. Russia likely cannot sustain continued efforts along these lines indefinitely without a major mobilization effort that Russian President Vladimir Putin has so far refused to order. Ukraine, on the other hand, has shown its ability to fight off massive and determined Russian offensive efforts even during periods of restricted Western aid. The effective failure of these major and costly Russian offensive operations highlights the opportunities Ukraine has to inflict more serious battlefield defeats on Russia that could compel Putin to rethink his approach to the war and to negotiations if the United States and the West continue to provide essential support.

Institute for the Study of War

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine

>Russia has Failed to Break Ukraine
>

>Russian losses in massive efforts that have failed to break
>Ukrainian lines or even drive them back very far are
>exacerbating challenges that Russia will face in sustaining
>the war effort through 2025 and 2026, as ISW's Christina
>Harward has recently reported. Russia likely cannot sustain
>continued efforts along these lines indefinitely without a
>major mobilization effort that Russian President Vladimir
>Putin has so far refused to order. Ukraine, on the other hand,
>has shown its ability to fight off massive and determined
>Russian offensive efforts even during periods of restricted
>Western aid. The effective failure of these major and costly
>Russian offensive operations highlights the opportunities
>Ukraine has to inflict more serious battlefield defeats on
>Russia that could compel Putin to rethink his approach to the
>war and to negotiations if the United States and the West
>continue to provide essential support.
>
>Institute for the Study of War
>
>https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine

Denke ein Punkt der zu selten erwähnt wird (auch bei Reisner kaum).
Wenn man sich die Gebietsgewinne ansieht und dazu in Relation ihre Verluste ist das eine ganz miese Performance der Russen.
In manchen Bereichen (bspw. Panzermodelle) haben sie 80% ihres Equipments versenkt. Somit sehr beachtlich die Perf. der Ukraine

Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago on February 24, 2022. Ukraine has not been defeated or destroyed but remains resilient and innovative in the face of this unjustified Russian aggression. Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in a failed attempt to seize Kyiv City, overthrow Ukraine's democratically elected government, and forcibly install a pro-Russian proxy government in three days. Ukrainian forces, supported by a coalition of allies including the United States and European partners, have since successfully pushed Russian forces out of northern Ukraine and liberated significant territory in southern and northeastern Ukraine. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksander Syrskyi reported on February 24 that Ukrainian forces have regained more than 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces have occupied since February 24, 2022. ISW has observed confirmation that Ukrainian forces have regained 50.03 percent of the territory that Russian forces had seized since February 24, 2022. Russian forces have spent the last year making slow and incremental but steady advances in eastern Ukraine as a result of significant Russian manpower and materiel advantages and Russia's ability to leverage delays in Western aid to Ukraine. Ukrainian forces are using their technological advantages and integrating technological innovations with ground operations in order to slow Russian gains. Ukraine continues to improve and innovate its warfighting capabilities and is working to become self-sufficient in the long-term, but Western and international military support for Ukraine in the short- and medium-term remains crucial for Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian aggression. The defense of Ukraine and the preservation of Ukraine as an independent, sovereign, and democratic country capable of defending itself against Russia is a critical part of deterring broader Russian aggression against the West. The United States, Europe, and other Western allies must demonstrate commitment to Ukraine through timely and reliable military assistance, continue to enable Ukrainian forces to impose significant pressure on Russia, and force Putin to abandon his conquest of Ukraine and his wider ambitions in Europe in order to bring about sustainable peace.

Russia has accumulated unsustainable personnel and vehicle losses in the last three years since Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksander Syrskyi reported on February 24 that Russian forces have lost over 10,100 tanks, 21,100 armored combat vehicles, and 23,300 artillery systems presumably destroyed and damaged in the three years of Russia's full-scale invasion. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) recently estimated that Russia had lost about 14,000 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers since February 2022. (IISS's numbers likely differ from those from Syrskyi as IISS data likely only accounts for destroyed vehicles.) Syrskyi stated on February 24 that Russian forces have lost almost 870,000 personnel, including about 250,000 dead. Russian opposition outlets Meduza and Mediazona published a joint report on February 24 wherein they used the Russian Register of Inheritance Cases (RND) to estimate that at least 160,000 to 165,000 Russian servicemembers have died in the past three years of the war. Syrskyi previously reported that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 alone, and Meduza and Mediazone estimated in February 2024 that Russia had lost at least 66,000 to 88,000 personnel during the first two years of the war — suggesting that Russian loses significantly increased in 2024. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have suffered vehicle and artillery system losses on the battlefield that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term given the limitations of Russia's defense industrial capacity and Soviet-era weapons and equipment stocks, and that Russia's force generation apparatus is struggling to recruit enough soldiers to sustain Russia's current rate of offensive operations and loss rates.

The United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a Ukrainian- and European-backed resolution on February 24 commemorating the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine that recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war, called for a just peace in Ukraine, and supported Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The United States, Russia, Belarus, North Korea, and 14 other countries voted against the Ukrainian- and European-backed resolution, while 93 countries supported it. The People’s Republic of China and Iran abstained. The United States also abstained from a second resolution about the third anniversary of the war that it had proposed after European countries amended the resolution to add language supporting Ukraine's "sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity." The US-backed draft resolution — prior to the European amendments — reportedly did not acknowledge Russia's role as the aggressor and referred to Russia's war against Ukraine as the "Russian Federation-Ukraine conflict."

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago on February 24, 2022. Ukraine has not been defeated or destroyed but remains resilient and innovative in the face of this unjustified Russian aggression.

• Russia has accumulated unsustainable personnel and vehicles losses in the last three years since Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022.

• The United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a Ukrainian- and European-backed resolution on February 24 commemorating the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine that recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war, called for a just peace in Ukraine, and supported Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

• Recent polling indicates that Russians are increasingly supportive of Russia continuing the war in Ukraine until it achieves complete Ukrainian capitulation but are simultaneously starting to feel the economic toll of the three years of Russia's war – casting doubt on Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to continue to balance "butter and guns" at home in the medium- to long-term.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin currently remains committed to continuing his war in Ukraine despite rising domestic political and economic pressure and has shown no indication that he is rethinking his determination to compel Ukraine to surrender.

• Kremlin officials formally rejected the possibility of a ceasefire on any terms other than the complete capitulation of Ukraine and the West on February 24, further underscoring Russia's unwillingness to make compromises during future peace negotiations.

• European leaders announced a series of new aid packages during their visit to Kyiv on February 24 for the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion on February 24.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

• The Kremlin continues to use Muslim religious and cultural structures in Russia for military recruitment.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin implicitly acknowledged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate president of Ukraine and Russia's future negotiating partner while promoting a new information operation that aims to destabilize Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian military from within. Putin gave an interview with Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on February 24 in which Putin stated that "elections in Ukraine are not held under the pretext of martial law" — Putin's first acknowledgment that Ukrainian law prohibits elections during martial law. Putin claimed that Zelensky is "toxic" for Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian military and that Zelensky would lose any future presidential election to other Ukrainian political and military leaders. Putin's statements are likely aimed at Ukrainian and Russian audiences. Putin's claims that Zelensky is unpopular and harmful to Ukraine are attempts to drive a wedge between the legitimate government of Ukraine and the Ukrainian military and population. Putin has repeatedly claimed that Zelensky is not the legitimate leader of Ukraine after Ukraine did not hold elections in 2024 — in accordance with Ukrainian law — as part of Russian efforts to claim that Russia cannot negotiate with Zelensky. US President Donald Trump has stated that Putin and Zelensky must engage in negotiations, and Putin is likely shifting his rhetoric in order to explain to Russian domestic audiences his decision to engage in any future negotiations with Zelensky. Putin and other Kremlin officials will likely attempt to exploit any Ukrainian military setbacks or differing opinions among Ukrainian officials to intensify this information operation and sow discord in Ukraine.

Putin attempted to use new language to repackage the calls for regime change in Ukraine that he has demanded since 2021. Putin stated during the interview with Zarubin that Russia "has nothing against" the preservation of Ukrainian statehood but wants Ukraine to "turn into a friendly neighboring state" and for Ukrainian territory to "not be used as a springboard for an attack against Russia" in the future. Putin's calls for Ukraine to "turn" into a "friendly" state demonstrate that Putin is still calling for the removal of the democratically elected government in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Kremlin government. The Kremlin has previously used thinly veiled calls for "denazification" to demand regime change in Ukraine, and Putin appears to be using new language to make these same demands. Putin has demanded Ukrainian regime change since Summer 2021.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin implicitly acknowledged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate president of Ukraine and Russia's future negotiating partner while promoting a new information operation that aims to destabilize Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian military from within.

• Putin attempted to use new language to repackage the calls for regime change in Ukraine that he has demanded since 2021.

• Putin offered to make a deal with the United States on Russian rare earth minerals as part of efforts to outbid Ukraine on this matter and to push the United States to accept Russian offers of economic measures in lieu of any actual Russian concessions on Ukraine.

• Putin attempted to claim that he supports Europe's participation in negotiations on Ukraine while continuing to show his unwillingness to make concessions and seemingly proposing Russian allies as possible future negotiating parties.

• Kremlin officials continue to exploit diplomatic engagements with Russia's allies to reinforce Moscow's narrative that Russia invaded Ukraine to protect Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.

• A delegation from North Korea's Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) arrived in Moscow on February 25 at the invitation of Russia's ruling party, United Russia, amid reports that North Korea may be shipping more material to Russia.

• Western officials continue to highlight the scale of European military aid to Ukraine.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Velyka Novosilka, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk.

• Samara Oblast authorities reduced one-time payments to soldiers who sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) after temporarily increasing these payments in January 2025.

• The BBC Russian Service reported on February 25 that over 100 Russian government, military, and security officials accused and convicted of various corruption charges are fighting in Ukraine.

• The Kremlin continues efforts to use its "Time of Heroes" program, which places veterans of the war in Ukraine in government positions, to form a new Russian elite composed of loyal and ultranationalist veterans that will continue to militarize Russian society over the long term.

• Russia may be reopening a Soviet-era submarine base in occupied Crimea.


Institute for the Study of War

US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky are planning to meet at the White House on February 28, likely to sign a US-Ukraine mineral deal. A draft agreement of the deal published ahead of the meeting does not provide US security assistance or security guarantees to Ukraine, however. The Financial Times (FT) published a draft bilateral US-Ukrainian deal on February 26 that states that the United States wants to "invest alongside Ukraine in a free, sovereign and secure Ukraine" and supports "Ukraine’s efforts to obtain security guarantees needed to establish lasting peace" but does not include any concrete US provisions of security assistance or guarantees to Ukraine. Continued US security assistance to Ukraine is essential to help Ukraine set conditions for a lasting and just resolution of the war that is in the interests of Ukraine, the United States, and Europe.

Russian officials directly involved in negotiations with the United States continue to insist that any peace agreement to resolve the war in Ukraine must be based on Russia’s 2021 demands. They also insist on the surrender to Russia of territory that Ukrainian forces currently hold that is home to major cities and well over a million people. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who recently led the Russian delegation at the February 18 US-Russian negotiations in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, claimed on February 26 that negotiations that result in freezing the current frontlines in Ukraine are impossible because the Russian Constitution stipulates that Russia’s borders include all of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts. Russia currently does not occupy large parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts and a small part of western Luhansk Oblast. Lavrov also stated that Russia will reject any peace deal that involves continued Western arms provisions to Ukraine. Lavrov is repackaging the maximalist demands Russia has long made of Ukraine using a pseudo-legal facade, despite the illegitimacy of Russian annexations of Ukrainian territory under international law. Lavrov likely attempted to justify Russia's long-standing demands by framing the Russian Constitution as a legal and hence “necessary” element in future negotiations with the United States. Russian officials have previously invoked “denazification,” the alleged Ukrainian violations of Russian-speaking minorities’ rights, and the false historical narrative that Ukraine is inherently part of Russia to justify their territorial claims against Ukraine and to call for full Ukrainian capitulation.

Russia is demanding that Ukraine surrender several large cities that Russian forces do not currently occupy and have no prospect of seizing, handing over one million Ukrainians over to Russia. Russia’s occupation of the remainder of the four Ukrainian oblasts would include large cities such as Kherson City (pre-war population of about 275,000), Kramatorsk (147,00 people), and Zaporizhzhia City (706,000 people) — all of which remain under Ukrainian control. The Russian occupation of such large population centers would significantly escalate the humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine. Russian authorities would likely employ the same tactics of oppression, displacement, and forcible assimilation to Ukrainian civilians living in these areas as they have employed against the millions of Ukrainians who have been living under Russian occupation for over three years. Russian advances have recently stalled along the frontline, and Russian forces increasingly face unsustainable vehicle and personnel losses, indicating that Russian forces will likely be unable to occupy the full extent of these oblasts through military means in any short period of time if at all. Lavrov’s rhetoric is likely an attempt to achieve through negotiations what the Russian military cannot achieve by force. The Kremlin’s stated intent of seizing more of Ukraine's land and people directly contradicts US and European efforts to achieve a sustainable and lasting peace in Ukraine and reinforces Russia’s continued efforts to illegally occupy Ukrainian territory rather than to negotiate in good faith or offer concessions.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky are planning to meet at the White House on February 28, likely to sign a US-Ukraine mineral deal. A draft agreement of the deal published ahead of the meeting does not provide US security assistance or security guarantees to Ukraine, however.

• Russian officials directly involved in negotiations with the United States continue to insist that any peace agreement to resolve the war in Ukraine must be based on Russia’s 2021 demands. They also insist on the surrender to Russia of territory that Ukrainian forces currently hold that is home to major cities and well over a million people.

• Russia is demanding that Ukraine surrender several large cities that Russian forces do not currently occupy and have no prospect of seizing, handing over one million Ukrainians over to Russia.

• Lavrov's and other Kremlin officials' continued rejections of a ceasefire and other terms that US President Donald Trump and European leaders have identified as necessary to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine demonstrate that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains uninterested in meaningful negotiations and assesses that he can achieve his war objectives militarily in the medium- to long-term.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and Robotyne.

• Russian officials proposed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) assume control over all Russian pretrial detention facilities amid reports that the FSB is in charge of a pretrial detention facility linked to the abuse of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian officials continue to reject US negotiating terms and demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not occupy. Putin stated in his February 27 address to the Federal Security Service (FSB) board that Russia will continue to strengthen FSB operations in Donbas and "Novorossiya." Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly claimed on February 27 that Donbas and "Novorossiya" are an "integral" part of Russia. Putin and other Russian officials have previously defined "Novorossiya" as all of eastern and southern Ukraine (including Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts), although its precise borders are disputed among Russian ultranationalists. Putin has previously demanded that Ukraine surrender all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts even though Russian forces do not occupy large parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts. Putin and other Russian officials have routinely indicated that they aim for territorial conquest beyond the administrative boundaries of these four illegally annexed oblasts. Renewed official Russian statements that the invented region of "Novorossiya" is part of Russia indicate that Putin maintains his maximalist territorial ambitions and is unwilling to offer territorial concessions. Russian forces currently occupy a small portion of Kharkiv Oblast and the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast and are attempting to advance to the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border, and the Kremlin may use the Russian occupation of limited territory in these oblasts as a false premise to demand that Ukraine surrender even more territory. ISW continues to assess that Putin remains uninterested in good-faith negotiations that require compromises and thinks that he can achieve his war objectives militarily in the medium- to long-term. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 26 that if Russia is "making maximalist demands that knowscan’t be met," then the United States will know that Putin is not "serious" about engaging in negotiations. US President Donald Trump reiterated on February 26 that Russia will have to make concessions in peace negotiations and reiterated on February 27 that the United States will "certainly try to get as much as can back ."

Kremlin guidelines to Russian state media about coverage of recent US–Russian meetings indicate Russian President Vladimir Putin's determination to manipulate US President Donald Trump and divide the West. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on February 27 that sources in Russian state media who are close to the Russian presidential administration stated that the Kremlin has not given "strict" instructions to media about how to cover recent US–Russian contacts. A source who regularly participates in Kremlin meetings with major media editors reportedly stated that the Kremlin told media outlets to emphasize "in every way" that Russia is in contact "not with some abstract Americans, but with Trump's team" and to demonstrate that Trump is "a man who was oppressed in every way both at home and in Europe." Multiple sources reportedly told Verstka that they had received instructions to create an image of Trump as a man who "had the wisdom" to respond to the Kremlin's "outstretched" hand. Putin praised the Trump administration on February 27, claiming that Russia's first contacts with the administration "inspire certain hopes" and that the Trump team is displaying a "reciprocal determination" to restore US–Russian relations. Putin claimed that "ideological cliches" have started to "destroy the Western community ... from within," as evidenced by alleged problems in Western states' economies and domestic politics. Putin claimed that "some Western elites" are trying to "maintain instability" in the world and will try to "disrupt or compromise" the US–Russian dialogue that has begun. Putin's claim that "some Western elites" — but not the Trump administration — are against US–Russian talks is likely an attempt to drive wedges between Trump and other US actors and European leaders. The Kremlin has similarly recently framed European leaders as interested in prolonging the war in Ukraine as part of efforts to falsely portray the US and European positions on negotiations as significantly different and to discredit any possible European role in negotiations.

US and Russian delegations met in Istanbul, Turkey on February 27 to continue to discuss US–Russian bilateral diplomatic relations. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on February 27 that the Russian delegation in Istanbul is working to develop the agreements reached during the February 18 US–Russian talks in Saudi Arabia. Kremlin newswire TASS reported that the bilateral meeting would include discussions on the resumption of the work of the US and Russian embassies in each state. Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) correspondent Denis Davydov claimed that Director of the North American Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Alexander Darchiev headed the Russian delegation in Istanbul. Darchiev served as the Russian Ambassador to Canada from 2014 to 2021. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported in November 2024 that three informed sources stated that Darchiev is the most likely candidate to become the new Russian Ambassador to the United States. Peskov stated in November 2024 that the Kremlin had chosen a candidate and would announce the appointment "in the foreseeable future." The Russian State Duma reportedly held closed consultations in November 2024 with Darchiev about the appointments of Russian diplomats abroad. Reuters reported on February 27 that a US official stated that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Sonata Coulter led the US delegation in Istanbul.

The Kremlin is reportedly continuing to push the United States to accept economic benefits that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions that are related to the war. Bloomberg, citing a source familiar with the topic, reported on February 27 that CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and newly appointed Special Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev — who was part of the Russian delegation during the February 18 US–Russian talks in Saudi Arabia — convinced Putin to seek negotiations with the United States through business opportunities. The Kremlin reportedly viewed US President Donald Trump's interest in a mineral deal with Ukraine as a chance to initiate economic cooperation discussions between the United States and Russia, giving Dmitriev an opportunity to take the lead on such initiatives.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian officials continue to reject US negotiating terms and demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not occupy.

• Kremlin guidelines to Russian state media about coverage of recent US–Russian meetings indicate Russian President Vladimir Putin's determination to manipulate US President Donald Trump and divide the West.

• US and Russian delegations met in Istanbul, Turkey on February 27 to continue to discuss US–Russian bilateral diplomatic relations.

• The Kremlin is reportedly continuing to push the United States to accept economic benefits that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions that are related to the war.

• North Korea reportedly recently deployed additional troops to Kursk Oblast as North Korea continues to expand its military capabilities through cooperation with Russia.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump held a contentious meeting at the White House on February 28. Zelensky observed that Russia has repeatedly violated previous ceasefire agreements, as ISW has reported. Zelensky said that Ukraine will not accept a ceasefire agreement with Russia without sufficient external security guarantees, as such an agreement will fail to preserve Ukraine's sovereignty and prevent war in Europe in the long-term. Zelensky stated that Russian strikes have not "completely destroyed" Ukraine and that Ukraine is "alive" and continuing to defend itself against Russian aggression. Zelensky reiterated that no country wants to end the war more than Ukraine and that any negotiations to end the war will be between Ukraine and Russia with US and European mediation efforts. Trump declined to comment on the possibility of future US security guarantees for Ukraine and US troop deployments to Ukraine. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reportedly told Zelensky to leave the White House following the meeting, and the White House cancelled the afternoon press conference and the signing of the US-Ukraine mineral deal. ISW continues to assess that supporting Ukraine is a vital American national security interest, as is a strong bilateral relationship between the United States and Ukraine.

Russia continues to showcase its deepening relations with American adversaries despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's effort to posture Russia's receptiveness to negotiations with the United States. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu met separately with People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping and PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on February 28 to discuss bilateral security issues and international and regional matters. Shoigu and Xi also underlined the need to continue coordinating efforts at key international platforms including BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and diplomatic efforts about "solving the Ukrainian crisis." Shoigu claimed that the Russia-PRC relationship has reached "unprecedented" heights, and Russian state media highlighted statements from Xi and PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Lin Jian's praise of close bilateral relations.

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson and Chairperson of the ruling United Russia party Dmitry Medvedev met with North Korea's Workers' Party (WPK) Central Committee member Ri Hi-yong on February 26 in Moscow to express United Russia's desire "for closer cooperation with the WPK and for expanding contracts and exchanges in all areas." Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Ri on February 27, but the Kremlin's readout did not provide further details about the meeting. Representatives of the Kursk Oblast Chamber of Commerce signed a cooperation agreement with the Pyongyang Chamber of Commerce on February 27 to develop bilateral economic ties and expand municipal production opportunities between Kursk Oblast and North Korean enterprises. The agreement also includes trade and economic ties; cooperation in industry, agriculture, and processing; and joint logistical projects. Russia continues to range itself with adversaries of the United States, underscoring the importance of strengthening and supporting US allies and partners, including Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump held a contentious meeting at the White House on February 28.

• Russia continues to showcase its deepening relations with American adversaries despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's effort to posture Russia's receptiveness to negotiations with the United States.

• Russia continues to range itself with adversaries of the United States, underscoring the importance of strengthening and supporting US allies and partners, including Ukraine.

• Ukrainian officials are increasing cooperation with South Korea amid deepening Russia-North Korea ties and recent reports of a new wave of North Korean troop deployments to Kursk Oblast.

• Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against near-rear Russian military assets in occupied Ukraine.

• The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on February 28 that the United States approved current MFA North American Department Director Alexander Darchiev's appointment as Russia's Ambassador to the United States.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin tasked Crimea occupation head Sergey Aksyonov with establishing a "Kadry" ("Human Resources") national project to integrate Russian veterans into the Russian economy, likely in support of the Kremlin's efforts to prevent the emergence of subversive veteran civil societies.

Institute for the Study of War

Reisner:
https://oe1.orf.at/player/20250301/786075/1740827436300
"Europa hat keine Hosen an"

Lageeinschätzung Ukraine

Deutschlandfunk:
Militärexperte Gustav Gressel
"USA könnten auch zum Sicherheitsrisiko werden"
https://share.deutschlandradio.de/dlf-audiothek-audio-teilen.html?audio_id=dira_D305971AF 66F11EF72EFB883034C2FA0

"Siegreiches Russland wird nicht in der Ukraine halt machen, Kriegswahrscheinlichkeit in Europa sehr hoch"

Senior US officials are suggesting that the United States may cut all aid to Ukraine, although US President Donald Trump has not indicated any such intention. Cutting the current flow of aid to Ukraine would directly undermine President Trump’s stated goal of achieving a sustainable peace in Ukraine. The New York Times and Washington Post, citing unnamed senior Trump Administration officials, reported on February 28 that the Trump Administration is considering canceling all US military assistance to Ukraine, including any final aid shipments that former US President Joe Biden approved.

Ukrainian forces, enabled by essential US assistance, are inflicting unsustainable losses on Russian forces while holding them to marginal gains. This situation, combined with the severe challenges Russia will face in 2025, offers the United States great leverage in peace negotiations. A suspension of ongoing US military assistance to Ukraine would encourage Russian President Vladimir Putin to continue to increase his demands and fuel his conviction that he can achieve total victory through war. ISW has repeatedly highlighted the importance of continued and timely Western military assistance to Ukraine and observed a correlation between the magnitude of the Russian gains in Ukraine and delays or halts in Western military support. Ukrainian forces have leveraged US-supplied military systems, including Patriot air defense systems and HIMARS and ATACMS long-range strike systems, to defend against nightly Russian drone and missile strikes, enhance Ukraine's strike capabilities, complicate Russian logistics and command and control (C2), and disrupt Russia's defense industrial base (DIB). Ukrainian efforts, aided by the steady flow of Western aid, have significantly slowed Russian advances along the front, inflicted significant Russian personnel and equipment losses, and undermined Russia's efforts to project economic and domestic stability amid rising pressures from the war. Russia's economic, force generation, and defense industrial constraints provide key opportunities that Ukraine, the United States, and its Western allies could leverage to extract concessions from Putin in peace negotiations.

The cessation of US military assistance and monetary assistance aimed at strengthening Ukraine's defense industry could help tip the balance of the war and give Russia greater advantages on the battlefield in Ukraine, increasing the likelihood of a Russian victory in Ukraine. Russia would leverage the cessation of US aid to Ukraine to seize more territory in Ukraine and attempt to exhaust European support – the approach Putin has outlined in his theory of victory. Ending US aid to Ukraine and enabling further Russian gains would also embolden Putin and strengthen his belief that Russia can seize and control Ukraine and other former Soviet countries, including current NATO member states. The Kremlin will likely intensify its military campaign in Ukraine and attempt to exploit any delay or cessation of US military assistance to Ukraine - as the Kremlin did in Spring 2024.

Curtailing aid to Ukraine would risk diminishing US influence in the world and emboldening US adversaries. Russia, Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have formed a bloc aimed at defeating the United States and its allies around the world and are currently testing the limits of US commitment to its allies in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region. PRC President Xi Jinping stated during a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin in late February 2025 that the PRC and Russia are "true friends" who "cannot be moved away" from each other and will not be influenced by "any third party." Russia established bilateral comprehensive strategic partnership agreements since the start of the war with the PRC in May 2023, North Korea in October 2024, and Iran in January 2025. Putin continues to rely on Iranian drones and North Korean ballistic missiles and troops in his war against Ukraine. US aid to Ukraine is a demonstration of the United States' commitment to defending democracies against ongoing and future aggression around the world, including but not limited to Ukraine, Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan. The Russia-led bloc will likely see the United States abandoning Ukraine as an indicator that the United States will abandon its other allies and will seek to test the limits of US commitment around the world. The Russia-led bloc is searching for easily exploitable divisions between the United States and its allies to isolate and weaken the United States on the global stage, allowing adversaries to rise up and dictate where and how the United States can engage the world. Cutting US aid to Ukraine plays directly into these adversaries' goals and is a step toward curtailing US influence in the world.

Putin, not Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, remains the main obstacle to a lasting peace agreement on Ukraine. Zelensky has continuously reiterated his commitment to obtaining a just and lasting peace in Ukraine through negotiations. Zelensky has indicated several times — including in his February 28 Fox News interview — that he is willing to make concessions on territory, Ukraine's NATO membership, and even his own tenure in office to secure a just and sustainable peace. These concessions align with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio's February 26 statement that "what Ukraine really needs is deterrence...to make it costly for anyone to come after them again in the future" and that both the United States and Europe "can be involved" in such deterrence efforts.

Putin and other senior Kremlin officials have by contrast continuously reiterated their commitment to Putin's initial war aims in Ukraine, which amount to Ukraine's full capitulation, replacing the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government, and Ukrainian commitments to neutrality and demilitarization — all of which would leave Ukraine nearly helpless against future Russian aggression and destabilization efforts. Putin and other Kremlin officials are repackaging these demands in efforts to appear willing to negotiate in good faith with the United States, likely to extract concessions from the United States regarding Ukraine. Achieving a meaningful peace in Ukraine will require the United States and its allies to help Ukraine continue to inflict significant losses on Russia and to undertake a diplomatic and economic pressure campaign aimed at forcing Putin to abandon his insistence on full Ukrainian surrender and efforts to weaken Europe and the United States.

Key Takeaways:

• Senior US officials are suggesting that the United States may cut all aid to Ukraine, although US President Donald Trump has not indicated any such intention. Cutting the current flow of aid to Ukraine would directly undermine President Trump’s stated goal of achieving a sustainable peace in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces enabled by essential US assistance are inflicting unsustainable losses on Russian forces while holding them to marginal gains. This situation, combined with the severe challenges Russia will face in 2025, offers the US great leverage in peace negotiations. A suspension of ongoing US military assistance to Ukraine would encourage Russian President Vladimir Putin to continue to increase his demands and fuel his conviction that he can achieve total victory through war.

• Curtailing aid to Ukraine would risk diminishing US influence in the world and emboldening US adversaries.

• Putin, not Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, remains the main obstacle to a lasting peace agreement on Ukraine.

• The Kremlin launched another informational effort intended to discourage additional US and European military assistance to Ukraine by claiming that Russia has won the war in Ukraine.

• European countries remain committed to supporting the Ukrainian military and defense industry, however, amid preparations for a European defense summit about Ukraine on March 2.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to recruit medically unfit soldiers in an effort to address personnel shortages.

Institute for the Study of War

Recent Russian official statements in response to the proposed US-Ukraine mineral deal indicate that the Kremlin is trying to sabotage the deal through narratives targeting Ukrainian and American audiences. The Kremlin is claiming that this mineral deal does not benefit Ukraine while also claiming that Russia can make a better offer to the United States, indicating that Moscow sees the deal as harmful to its objectives. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on February 23 to a question about the US-Ukraine mineral deal and whether US pressure would push Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to "finally sell out all of Ukraine," including Russia's illegally annexed territories in Ukraine.<1> Peskov claimed that the people in occupied Ukraine decided "long ago" that they wanted to join Russia so "no one will ever sell off these territories" — implying that Zelensky may "sell out" other areas of Ukraine. Russian state television evening news program Vesti claimed on February 24 that the United States is "blackmailing" Ukraine with the mineral deal.<2> A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on February 22 that "there is nothing good for Kyiv" in a new version of the US-Ukraine mineral deal.<3> The milblogger claimed that the mineral deal is "humiliating" for Ukraine and that Zelensky would be "selling the benefits of his country for nothing" should he sign the deal.

Kremlin officials are also trying to prevent the United States and Ukraine from concluding a mineral deal by making competing offers. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed to Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on February 24 that Russia has an "order of magnitude" more rare earth materials than Ukraine and stated that Russia can cooperate with both the US government and US companies in capital investment projects for rare earth materials.<4> Putin referred to mineral reserves both within Russia and within occupied Ukraine in his attempts to appeal to the United States to invest in "Russian" rare earth minerals (claiming minerals in occupied Ukraine as Russia's own). Putin also offered to conclude deals with the United States on the supply of Russian aluminum. CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and newly appointed Special Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev told CNN on February 24 that Russia is open to economic cooperation with the United States, that the first stage of cooperation would be in the energy sphere, and that such cooperation is key for a "more resilient global economy."<5>

Russian state media is delaying coverage of select Kremlin statements in order to exploit changing dynamics in the US-Ukrainian relationship and drive wedges between Ukraine and the United States. Zarubin and Russian state media outlets TASS and RIA Novosti amplified on March 2 a previous statement from Peskov about the US decision on February 24 to vote alongside Russia against a Ukrainian- and European-backed UN resolution that recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war.<6> Peskov claimed on February 26 that the Trump administration is "rapidly changing" all of its foreign policies in ways that "largely coincide with vision," but TASS, RIA Novosti, and Zarubin only reported Peskov's statements on March 2.<7> Russian state media headlines on March 2 deliberately misrepresented Peskov's statements such that they appeared to be in response to the February 28 meeting between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.<8>

The Kremlin has a vested interest in preventing the United States and Ukraine from signing a mineral deal, as the deal will commit the United States to a long-term investment in Ukraine and Ukraine's sovereignty. The Kremlin is investing significant time and effort into undermining and misrepresenting the US-Ukrainian mineral deal, indicating that the Kremlin views the deal as an impediment to accomplishing Russian President Vladimir Putin's objectives in Ukraine.<9> The mineral deal, even one that does not include text about an American security guarantees for Ukraine, will represent a long-term US economic investment in Ukraine and could be a building block towards additional US assistance or military sales to Ukraine in the future, as US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent observed in an interview to CBS on March 2.<10> Any agreement that ties the United States to an independent and sovereign Ukraine is contrary to Russia's long-term goals of isolating and conquering Ukraine. Putin likely assesses that preventing the US-Ukrainian mineral deal is a necessary step towards pushing the United States into stopping military assistance to Ukraine and abandoning Ukraine altogether. Putin's articulated theory of victory in Ukraine — which assumes that Russia can continue slow, gradual advances in exchange for significant personnel and materiel losses — rests on the assumption that Russia can outlast and overcome US and European security assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainian efforts to mobilize its economy and population to support its defense.<11> Putin is likely attempting to undermine the US-Ukrainian mineral deal in order to prevent deepening US-Ukraine ties in the hope that Russia will be able to destroy or extract significant territorial concessions from Ukraine during future negotiations before Russia's own wartime economic and force generation issues begin to significantly impede Russia ability to advance on the battlefield in 2025 and beyond.<12>

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is attempting to exploit discussions between the United States and the EU about the possible deployment of European peacekeeping forces to Ukraine as part of a future peace settlement in order to reinvigorate the Kremlin's demands for regime change in Ukraine. Lavrov claimed on March 2 that plans to introduce European peacekeeping forces in Ukraine in the future are a continuation of European leaders' supposed efforts to "incite" Ukraine to "war against ."<13> Lavrov claimed that the West brought Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to power using "bayonets" and will use future peacekeeping forces as "bayonets" to "prop up" Zelensky. Lavrov claimed that Europe wants to continue the war in Ukraine through these peacekeeping forces whereas the United States is openly stating its desire to end the war.<14> Lavrov claimed that the introduction of peacekeepers to Ukraine would not eliminate the "root causes" of the war.<15> Lavrov has previously defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.<16> The Kremlin has recently attempted to use this phrase to justify its calls for regime change in Ukraine. Lavrov is exploiting the ongoing discussions in the West about the deployment of peacekeepers to Ukraine in the future to make yet another argument for Russia's longstanding demand for regime change. Lavrov and other Kremlin officials have recently engaged in rhetoric similarly attempting to exacerbate US-European divisions and falsely portraying European countries as wanting to continue the war in Ukraine.<17> The Kremlin is likely attempting to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe to extract concessions in Russia's favor in future peace negotiations and other talks.<18>

European leaders demonstrated their commitment to supporting Ukraine at a defense summit in London on March 2. The United Kingdom (UK) hosted leaders of Ukraine, France, Germany, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Canada, Finland, Sweden, Czechia, and Romania as well as the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Hakan Fidan, NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and President of the European Council Antonio Costa.<19> UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced at the summit that the UK and France, along with other unspecified countries, have expressed their commitment to develop a "coalition of the willing" that will deploy peacekeepers to defend a peace agreement in Ukraine.<20> Starmer revealed at the summit a plan aimed at assisting Ukraine: keeping military aid flowing while the war continues and increasing economic pressure on Russia; ensuring that any peace deal upholds Ukraine's sovereignty and security and that Ukraine is at the negotiating table; and committing European leaders to aim to deter any future invasion of Ukraine.<21> Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the defense summit was dedicated to Ukraine and a common European future and noted that "European unity is at an extremely high level."<22> Zelensky stated that Ukraine is continuing discussions about security guarantees and conditions for a just peace with partner states and is working with Europe to create a "reliable basis of cooperation" with the United States about Ukrainian peace and guaranteed security. Zelensky met with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni on the sidelines of the summit to discuss the development of a joint action plan to end the war in Ukraine.<23> Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov also met with UK Defense Secretary John Healey on the sidelines to discuss the UK's readiness to increase military assistance to Ukraine, the prospect of purchasing weapons with profits from frozen Russian assets, and the UK's role in the Ramstein format.<24>

European countries announced additional military assistance packages for Ukraine before and during the summit. The UK announced on March 1 a loan worth 2.6 billion pounds (roughly $3.2 billion) to bolster Ukraine's defense backed by profits from frozen Russian assets.<25> The UK stated that the first tranche of the loan will arrive later next week. Zelensky stated that the UK loan will fund Ukrainian weapons production.<26> Starmer announced on March 2 an additional 1.6 billion pound (roughly $2 billion) deal that will allow Ukraine to purchase 5,000 lightweight-multirole missiles from the UK.<27> The Lithuanian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 1 that it will allocate 20 million euros (roughly $20.7 million) to purchasing Ukrainian-produced weapons for Ukraine and to develop a joint weapons production facility in Lithuania.<28>

Key Takeaways:

Recent Russian official statements in response to the proposed US-Ukraine mineral deal indicate that the Kremlin is trying to sabotage the deal through narratives targeting Ukrainian and American audiences. The Kremlin is claiming that this mineral deal does not benefit Ukraine while also claiming that Russia can make a better offer to the United States, indicating that Moscow sees the deal as harmful to its objectives.
The Kremlin has a vested interest in preventing the United States and Ukraine from signing a mineral deal, as the deal will commit the United States to a long-term investment in Ukraine and Ukraine's sovereignty.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is attempting to exploit discussions between the United States and the EU about the possible deployment of European peacekeeping forces to Ukraine as part of a future peace settlement in order to reinvigorate the Kremlin's demands for regime change in Ukraine.
European leaders demonstrated their commitment to supporting Ukraine at a defense summit in London on March 2.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

https://www.msn.com/de-at/nachrichten/other/radikaler-wandel-in-der-au%C3%9Fenpolitik-mus k-will-us-austritt-aus-nato-und-un/ar-AA1A8fMV?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=ENTPSP&cvid=20e7e116e9934550bb8830c9f4b6c dbf&ei=9
Focus Online
Es wird ungemütlich in Europa. Trump würde den Russen damit Europa als leicht verdaulichen Leckerbissen servieren und bekommt dafür freie Hand in Kanada und Grönland?

Die Achse des Bösen wird man bald neu definieren müssen. Eigentlich kann man es eh schon.

Ich fühle mich überhaupt zurückerinnert an meinen Geschichtsunterricht in der Schule, als über die Kolonialisierungszeit vor dem 1. Weltkrieg gesprochen wurde. Ich hab das Gefühl, dass sich diese Geschichte in abgeänderter Form (anderer Technologiestandard, anderer Fokus bei Landeinnahme) wiederholt. Ukraine, Grönland, Panama, Gaza, vielleicht dann in weiterer Folge Moldawien, Georgien. China kolonialisiert Afrika und Teile Asiens mit wirtschaftlicher Totalabhängigkeit. Irgendwie gruselig.

>Es wird ungemütlich in Europa. Trump würde den Russen damit
>Europa als leicht verdaulichen Leckerbissen servieren und
>bekommt dafür freie Hand in Kanada und Grönland?

Ich dachte, er möchte, dass die Europäer (mehr) Waren aus den USA kaufen. Mit Europa unter Russland wird das nicht gelingen.

Ukrainian military intelligence indicated that about 620,000 Russian soldiers are operating in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, an increase of about 40,000 personnel compared to late 2024. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in an interview with RBK-Ukraine published on March 3 that there are 620,000 Russian soldiers in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, about 200,000 of whom are actively fighting on the frontline. Skibitskyi stated that there are roughly 35,000 additional Rosgvardia troops protecting rear areas and that these personnel can become a second line of defense if necessary. Skibitskyi stated in November 2024 there were about 580,000 Russian soldiers operating against Ukraine (presumably both within Ukraine and in Kursk Oblast), and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in January 2025 that the total Russian force grouping in Ukraine was about 600,000 troops.

Russian authorities reportedly exceeded their recruitment quotas in 2024 and January 2025, likely in part due to increased financial incentives for recruits and prison recruitment efforts that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term. Skibitskyi reported on March 3 that Russian authorities recruited 440,000 military personnel in 2024 — 10,000 more than their quota for the year — and fulfilled their January 2025 recruitment quota by 107 percent. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev also claimed in late December 2024 that 440,000 recruits signed military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in 2024. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree in July 2024 awarding 400,000 rubles (roughly $4,400) to anyone who signed a contract with the Russian MoD between August 1, 2024 and December 31, 2024 - more than double the previous federal award of 195,000 rubles (roughly $2,100). This increased federal reward likely contributed to Russia's successful recruitment drive in 2024. Russian federal subjects offered additional high regional bonuses to those who signed military service contracts in late 2024 and early 2025, but select federal subjects have started to reduce these regional payments following the expiration of these limited time offers, indicating that such measures are not sustainable indefinitely. Skibitskyi stated that 15 percent of Russian recruits in 2024 were people under criminal investigation, in prison, or serving suspended sentences and that this figure will increase to roughly 30 percent in 2025. Russian officials reported in 2024 that Russia was shutting down some prisons after Russia's prison population significantly dropped due to the Russian prison recruitment drives. Russia has recently been increasingly recruiting defendants in pretrial detention centers, likely as the pool of prison recruits has dwindled. ISW continues to assess that increased military spending, including large payments and benefits to Russian servicemembers, is hurting the Russian economy at the macro level and that the Kremlin is reducing this spending on military personnel as part of efforts to mitigate the impacts of such initiatives. Russian authorities are unlikely to sustain such high financial incentives as part of their recruitment drives in the medium- and long-term as the Russian economy continues to decline.

Skibitskyi noted that Russian authorities have previously adjusted their annual quotas throughout the year, having originally called for Russian authorities to recruit 375,000 to 380,000 personnel in 2024 before increasing this number to 430,000. Adjustments to the 2024 recruitment quotas were likely meant to account for Russia's increased tempo of offensive operations in the last few months of 2024 that resulted in the highest casualty rates Russia experienced since early 2022. Skibitskyi concluded that Russia's recruitment plans for 2025 will "mostly" allow the Russian military command to replace its battlefield losses should the current tempo of offensive operations and losses continue. Russian authorities will likely have to adjust their 2025 quotas as they did in 2024 should they want the current tempo of offensive operations to continue and should Russian forces continue to suffer high losses while advancing at a slower rate. Russian authorities are unlikely to generate enough forces to significantly increase the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine in the near future. Continued Western military aid would help Ukrainian forces inflict additional losses on the Russian military that would likely intensify Russia's economic and military issues and force Putin into making concessions during meaningful negotiations in 2025.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian military intelligence indicated that about 620,000 Russian soldiers are operating in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, an increase of about 40,000 personnel compared to late 2024.

• Russian authorities reportedly exceeded their recruitment quotas in 2024 and January 2025, likely in part due to increased financial incentives for recruits and prison recruitment efforts that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term.

• Russian forces continue to innovate their strike packages and leverage larger numbers of Shahed and decoy drones in an attempt to penetrate Ukraine's air defense umbrella.

• Russian missile production has reportedly not significantly increased, but Russian forces appear to be prioritizing production of missile and drone variants that are more effective against Ukrainian air defenses.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka and in Kursk Oblast.

• The Kremlin continues to promote its "Time of Heroes" veterans' program as part of efforts to militarize the Russian government and society.

Institute for the Study of War

US President Donald Trump ordered a pause on US military aid to Ukraine on March 3, suspending the delivery of critical warfighting materiel. An anonymous White House official told the Wall Street Journal on March 3 that the United States is "pausing and reviewing" military aid to Ukraine until Trump "determines that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is making a good-faith effort towards peace negotiations with Russia." The White House official did not provide clarification about what conditions the White House is expecting Zelensky to meet in order to resume aid.

The United States had been providing Ukraine with artillery ammunition, armored vehicles, towed howitzers, Patriot air defense batteries, and long-range rocket and missile systems such as HIMARS and ATACMS — many of which are sophisticated systems that only the United States can supply Pauses in this aid will harm Ukraine's warfighting capabilities, although it will likely take from weeks to months for the suspension of US aid to affect the frontline. Western officials estimated in late February 2025 that Ukraine will be able to sustain its current pace of operations until about mid-2025 (roughly June 2025) as long as the United States continues to provide the aid contracted under the Biden administration on the previously anticipated timelines. A Ukrainian official told CNN on March 4 following the suspension that Ukraine may run out of US-provided artillery shells by May or June 2025 but warned that Patriot air defense missiles could run out "in a matter of weeks." Ukraine relies heavily on US Patriot systems for its air defense umbrella to protect against Russian missile strikes against Ukraine's rear areas. The shortage and eventual lack of Patriot missiles is likely to have severe impacts on the safety of Ukraine's critical, industrial, and civilian infrastructure, as Ukraine's other supporters lack an analogous system that can protect against Russian missile strikes, particularly those including ballistic missiles. As Ukraine runs short on Patriot missiles, Kyiv will have to make difficult decisions about which population centers to prioritize in terms of air defense protection. If it runs out of Patriots entirely then Ukrainian cities will lie open to Russian ballistic missiles.

Key Takeaways:

• US President Donald Trump ordered a pause on US military aid to Ukraine on March 3, suspending the delivery of critical warfighting materiel.

• The United States had been providing Ukraine with artillery ammunition, armored vehicles, towed howitzers, Patriot air defense batteries, and long-range rocket and missile systems such as HIMARS and ATACMS — many of which are sophisticated systems that only the United States can supply.

• The frontline in Ukraine does not risk imminent collapse, but the effects of the US aid pause will become more acute over time.

• The European Commission proposed a plan on March 4 that would enable EU member states to increase defense spending to support Ukraine and strengthen European security. European rearmament is vital for Europe's short- and long-term security, and Europe should pursue these efforts regardless of the status of US aid to Ukraine.

• Ukraine has significantly expanded its defense industrial production capabilities throughout the war in an effort to eventually meet its military needs independently, but Ukraine's ability to become self-sufficient in the long-term is contingent on continued support from partner states in the short- and medium-term.

• The Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on March 4 Ukraine's commitment to work with the Trump Administration to achieve a sustainable and lasting peace in Ukraine.

• The high casualties in Russia's war in Ukraine are the direct result of Putin's determination to conquer all of Ukraine using horrific and costly tactics, and Putin can dramatically reduce this killing any time he chooses

• The Kremlin continues to express cautious optimism about the pausing of US military aid to Ukraine and advanced several narratives as part of efforts to impose additional demands on the United States.Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, and Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly developing a plan to partially demobilize a limited number of mobilized personnel no earlier than July 2025, likely to address growing societal backlash over the lack of rotations and demobilization of Russian mobilized troops for over two years.

Institute for the Study of War

>The shortage and eventual lack of Patriot missiles is likely to have
>severe impacts on the safety of Ukraine's critical, industrial, and
>civilian infrastructure, as Ukraine's other supporters lack an
>analogous system that can protect against Russian missile strikes

Patriots hat aber so ziemlich jeder NATO-Staat. Kurzfristig könnten die aus ihren Beständen liefern und beim Hersteller nachbestellen, solange die USA das nicht untersagen.

>>The shortage and eventual lack of Patriot missiles is
>likely to have
>>severe impacts on the safety of Ukraine's critical,
>industrial, and
>>civilian infrastructure, as Ukraine's other supporters
>lack an
>>analogous system that can protect against Russian missile
>strikes
>
>Patriots hat aber so ziemlich jeder NATO-Staat. Kurzfristig
>könnten die aus ihren Beständen liefern und beim Hersteller
>nachbestellen, solange die USA das nicht untersagen.


Aber die Frage ist halt Lieferzeit? Ganz auf Null Bestand werden die alle nicht gehen wollen.

>>Patriots hat aber so ziemlich jeder NATO-Staat.
>Kurzfristig
>>könnten die aus ihren Beständen liefern und beim
>Hersteller
>>nachbestellen, solange die USA das nicht untersagen.
>
>
>Aber die Frage ist halt Lieferzeit? Ganz auf Null Bestand
>werden die alle nicht gehen wollen.

Ich denke, dass man jetzt sowieso wieder mehr auf den Verhandlungstisch zurück muss und anstatt sich auf weitere Waffenlieferungen(ohne USA!) zu konzentrieren.

>Patriots hat aber so ziemlich jeder NATO-Staat. Kurzfristig
>könnten die aus ihren Beständen liefern und beim Hersteller
>nachbestellen, solange die USA das nicht untersagen.

Aber gibt ja keiner her, wie man sieht. In Zeiten wie diesen will keiner die eigene Verteidigung vernachlässigen.

Ok, Israel gibt einige her, die haben mittlerweile ihr eigenes, besseres System. Aber lange genug waren die Patriots unverzichtbar.

The Trump administration suspended intelligence sharing with Ukraine, one of many demands the Kremlin has made of the US, Ukraine, and Ukraine's other supporters. Details about the US suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine vary in different reports, but the Trump administration has suspended some level of intelligence sharing with Ukraine with some reporting indicating that the suspension affected all intelligence sharing. Western media reported that the Trump administration specifically suspended the sharing of intelligence that Ukraine uses for early warning systems to protect against Russian long-range missile and drone strikes, for target designation for HIMARS Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) strikes, and for target designation for long-range strikes within Russia. British outlet Daily Mail reported that the United States also prohibited the United Kingdom from sharing US intelligence with Ukraine. The Kremlin has repeatedly insisted on an end to the provision of all foreign assistance to Ukraine as part of any peace agreement, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov March 4 specifically stated on March 4 that the United States provides Ukraine with intelligence data such as satellite reconnaissance data.

The suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine will damage Ukraine's ability to defend itself against ongoing Russian attacks against military and civilian targets. Ukrainian forces have leveraged their ability to strike within Russia and destroy significant amounts of materiel in order to increase pressure on Russia. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian missile and ammunition storage facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast on the night of September 17 to 18, 2024, destroying two to three months of Russia’s ammunition supply. The Toropets facility also stored Iskander missiles, Tochka-U ballistic missiles, glide bombs, and artillery ammunition. Ukrainian forces struck the Tikhoretsk Arsenal just north of Kamenny, Krasnodar Krai on the night of September 20 to 21, 2024, which at the time contained at least 2,000 tons of munitions, including munitions from North Korea. Russian forces previously leveraged their quantitative artillery ammunition advantage and glide bomb strikes to facilitate battlefield gains by destroying settlements before deploying infantry to attack the area — most notably near Avdiivka in February 2024 during delays in US military aid to Ukraine. Ukrainian strikes on Russian missile and ammunition storage facilities have previously relieved pressure on Ukrainian forces across the frontline by preventing Russian forces from leveraging their artillery advantage to secure gains. Ukrainian strikes against military targets in Russia also pushed Russian aviation operations further from Ukraine into Russia's rear areas, hindering Russia's ability to conduct glide bomb and missile strikes against Ukrainian frontline positions from Russian airspace. Ukraine's inability to conduct ATACMS and HIMARS strikes against Russian air defense systems within Russia and occupied Ukraine will likely impact how close to the frontline Russian pilots are willing to operate and expand Russia's ability to effectively use glide bombs against both frontline areas and near rear Ukrainian cities.

The suspension of all US intelligence sharing with Ukraine would also allow Russian forces to intensify their drone and missile strikes against the Ukrainian rear, affecting millions of Ukrainian civilians and the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB). US intelligence has contributed to Ukraine's early warning system against Russian strikes against Ukrainian cities, allowing Ukrainian authorities and civilians to prepare once Russian forces launch missiles and drones. The suspension of US intelligence on Russian strikes against the Ukrainian rear, coupled with the US suspension of supplies of Patriot air defense missiles that Ukraine relies upon to defend against Russian ballistic missiles, would have severe impacts on the safety of Ukrainian rear areas.

Russian drone and missile strikes have heavily targeted Ukraine's energy infrastructure and DIB. The likely intensification of these strikes following the US suspension of military aid and intelligence sharing to Ukraine will hinder Ukraine's ongoing progress towards expanding its DIB to be able to supply the Ukrainian military with all of its materiel needs. A self-sufficient Ukrainian DIB would allow Ukraine to defend itself over the long-term with dramatically reduced foreign military assistance, and it is in America's core national security interests that Ukraine be able to continue its efforts towards self-sufficiency.

The Trump administration has been applying considerable pressure on Ukraine, whose leaders continue to offer concessions and publicly declare their interest in achieving a lasting end to the war. These Trump administration policies are undermining the leverage that the United States needs to get Russian President Vladimir Putin to accept any peace agreement that is in the interests of the United States, Ukraine, and Europe. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 4 that "Ukraine is ready to come to the negotiating table as soon as possible to bring lasting peace closer." Zelensky also offered to exchange Ukrainian and Russian prisoners of war (POWs), to ban missile and long-range drone strikes against energy and civilian infrastructure, and to reach an immediate truce in the Black Sea. Zelensky has indicated several times — including in his February 28 Fox News interview — that he is willing to make concessions on territory, Ukraine's NATO membership, and his own tenure in office in order to secure a just and sustainable peace. Russian President Vladimir Putin and numerous Kremlin officials have, in contrast, offered no meaningful concessions. They continuously repeat demands that amount to complete Ukrainian capitulation as well as the rolling back of NATO from Eastern Europe.

Russia's war effort in Ukraine has brought about a series of materiel, manpower, and economic challenges for Moscow that will worsen in the coming months if Ukraine is able to sustain its defensive military operations. The United States should leverage these Russian challenges in order to secure concessions necessary to achieve a just and sustainable peace. US policies suspending military aid and intelligence sharing to Ukraine reduce the leverage US President Donald Trump's needs to achieve his stated policy objective of bringing about an end to the war in Ukraine on acceptable terms, a task that requires increasing pressure on Russia, not Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• The Trump administration suspended intelligence sharing with Ukraine, one of many demands the Kremlin has made of the US, Ukraine, and Ukraine's other supporters.

• The suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine will damage Ukraine's ability to defend itself against ongoing Russian attacks against military and civilian targets.

• The suspension of all US intelligence sharing with Ukraine would also allow Russian forces to intensify their drone and missile strikes against the Ukrainian rear, affecting millions of Ukrainian civilians and the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).

• The Trump administration has been applying considerable pressure on Ukraine, whose leaders continue to offer concessions and publicly declare their interest in achieving a lasting end to the war. These Trump administration policies are undermining the leverage that the United States needs to get Russian President Vladimir Putin to accept any peace agreement that is in the interests of the United States, Ukraine, and Europe.

• Kremlin officials announced their intention of taking advantage of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing to make additional battlefield gains.

• Russian officials continue inaccurately to place the blame on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky — and not Russian President Vladimir Putin — for the lack of meaningful peace negotiations.

• Kremlin officials continue to use business incentives to make further demands of the United States and to push the United States to de facto recognize Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territory.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

• Over 50,000 Russian servicemembers are reportedly listed as having abandoned their units and are absent without leave (AWOL) between February 2022 and mid-December 2024.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials explicitly rejected making any concessions in future peace negotiations or accepting any US, European, or Ukrainian peace proposals and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) rejected the possibility of a negotiated ceasefire on March 6. Putin stated during a visit to the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation's Moscow branch on March 6 that Russia does not intend to "give in to anyone" or make any compromises in future peace negotiations. Putin stated that Russia must choose a peace option that best suits Russia and will ensure peace in the long-term. Putin noted that Russian societal unity is critical for Russian victory in Ukraine. Putin alluded to the Russian Revolution, noted that Russian society collapsed during the First World War, and urged Russians to maintain support and unity as the war continues. Putin stated that Russia "will not give up" its "own" territory in future peace negotiations — likely referring to illegally annexed territory in occupied Ukraine. The Kremlin launched the Defenders of the Fatherland State Fund in April 2023 to oversee social support for veterans, elevate veterans within Russian society, and monopolize control over veterans activities in Russia. Putin has also declared 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" — underlining Putin's efforts to prioritize militarizing Russian society and rallying support behind Russia's war effort in Ukraine in 2025.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed during a press conference on March 6 that Russia will reject any proposals to station European peacekeeping forces in Ukraine to enforce a future ceasefire agreement. Lavrov stated that Russia sees "no room for compromise" on this issue and will consider the presence of a European peacekeeping force in Ukraine as akin to a NATO deployment in Ukraine. Lavrov stated that Russia will consider the deployment of any European peacekeepers to Ukraine as the "direct, official, undisguised involvement of NATO countries" in the war and that Russia will reject such a deployment. Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova rejected the possibility of a negotiated ceasefire and the deployment of European troops to Ukraine on March 6 and claimed that Russia considers any proposal that gives Ukraine a "respite" along the frontline as unacceptable. Lavrov and Zakharova are explicitly rejecting US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's February 12 suggestion that European and non-European countries should station troops in Ukraine to enforce any future peace agreement.

Lavrov said that any peace agreement must account for the alleged "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, including guarantees that NATO will stop expanding, trying to "swallow" Ukraine, and developing threats against Russia. Lavrov claimed that US President Donald Trump "understands" the need to eliminate these "root causes" while European countries are attempting to ignore the "root causes." Lavrov previously identified the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine. Russian officials often invoke the concept of "root causes" to allude to their demands for NATO to abandon its open-door policy and to blame the West and Ukraine for Putin's decision to invade Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials explicitly rejected making any concessions in future peace negotiations or accepting any US, European, or Ukrainian peace proposals and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) rejected the possibility of a negotiated ceasefire on March 6.

• Russian officials will likely take advantage of the suspension of US military aid to and intelligence sharing with Ukraine to spread a longstanding Russian information operation meant to falsely portray Russian victory as inevitable.

• The Kremlin welcomed a Trump administration official's recent comments mischaracterizing Russia's illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine as a "proxy war," and Russian media portrayed the statement as an admission that the United States is a participant in the war.

• US and Ukrainian delegations will conduct bilateral meetings in Saudi Arabia next week.

• Ukrainian opposition politicians rejected the possibility of holding elections in Ukraine before the end of the war.

• European countries continue to announce new military assistance packages and other measures to support the Ukrainian military.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk, Borova, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to assuage Russian fears about conscripts going to war amid continued reports that Russian military units are forcing conscripts to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted one of the largest ever missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 6 to 7 as Russian forces continue to adapt strike packages to overwhelm Ukraine's air defense umbrella by increasing the total number of Shahed and decoy drones in each strike. Russian forces launched the largest combined strike package against Ukraine since November 2024 on the night of March 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 67 missiles including 35 Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles, eight Kalibr cruise missiles, three Iskander-M/Kn-23 ballistic missiles, four S-300 air defense missiles, eight Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 194 Shahed and decoy drones. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 25 Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles, all eight Kalibr cruise missiles, one Kh-59/69 cruise missile, and 100 Shahed and decoy drones and that 86 decoy drones and up to 10 missiles did not reach their targets, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference.

The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed Russian targets using F-16 and Mirage-2000 aircraft and that this was the first instance of Ukrainian forces using Mirage-2000s, which arrived one month ago, to defend against Russian strikes. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian forces targeted Ukrainian gas production facilities during the strike. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other official Ukrainian sources stated that Russian strikes damaged energy facilities in Odesa, Poltava, Chernihiv, and Ternopil oblasts. Ternopil Oblast Military Administration reported that two Russian missiles struck a critical infrastructure facility, causing a fire. Ukraine's largest private energy company DTEK stated that the strikes damaged an energy facility in Odesa Oblast.

Russian forces began increasing the number of Shahed and decoy drones in strike packages in Fall 2024, likely to adapt to successful Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) innovations. ISW observed reports that Russian forces began launching between 80 and 100 (or more) Shahed and decoy drones as part of their larger strike packages in October and November 2024, and reports indicate that Russia has increased the production of Shahed drone airframes while continuing to rely on Iranian or Chinese imports for other drone components in December 2024. Russia has likely leveraged the increased production of Shahed drones to increase the total number of drones launched in each strike package. Russian forces launched an average 83.4 drones per strike package in January 2025, an average of 139.3 drones per strike package in February 2024, and an average of 128.8 drones per strike package from March 1 through 7. Russian forces have only sporadically included missiles in the January, February, and March 2025 strike packages, and the 67 missiles launched in the March 6 to 7 strike series is a larger amount than in previous missile strikes this year. Russian forces likely increased the combined number of Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles in the March 6 to 7 strike packages to inflict maximum damage on select targets in Ukraine while using the large number of Shahed drones, decoy drones, and Kalibr cruise missiles to detect and overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and mobile fire groups.

Russia will likely take advantage of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine to intensify its long-range strike campaign and deplete Ukrainian air defense missiles. US intelligence has contributed to Ukraine's early warning system against Russian strikes and its suspension will likely impact Ukraine's ability to rapidly respond to adapting Russian strike packages. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) recently reported that Russia is modernizing and increasing its production of Shahed-136 drones and producing a new Geran-3 drone variant. Russan forces will likely attempt to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems by increasing the number of Shahed and decoy drones per strike package in addition to increasing the number of missiles in select strike packages to destroy Ukrainian energy and defense industrial base (DIB) infrastructure. Russia also likely intends to force Ukraine into quickly depleting its supply of Patriot air defense interceptors - which Ukraine relies on to defend against Russian ballistic missiles - during the pause in US military aid and intelligence sharing to maximize the damage of subsequent strikes. Ukrainian forces will likely have to be more selective in intercepting strikes as their stock of interceptors decreases with no resupply on the horizon, and successful Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities will likely have lasting effects on Ukraine's ability to generate power for DIB and civilian use.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted one of the largest ever missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 6 to 7 as Russian forces continue to adapt strike packages to overwhelm Ukraine's air defense umbrella by increasing the total number of Shahed and decoy drones in each strike.

• Russian forces began increasing the number of Shahed and decoy drones in strike packages in Fall 2024, likely to adapt to successful Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) innovations.

• Russia will likely take advantage of the suspension of US military aid to and intelligence sharing with Ukraine to intensify its long-range strike campaign and deplete Ukrainian air defense missiles.

• Russian forces are further intensifying offensive operations in select frontline areas likely in order to capitalize on any immediate and longer-term battlefield impacts of the cessation of US aid to Ukraine.

• Russian forces recently advanced into northern Sumy Oblast for the first time since 2022 – when Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces from significant swathes of Ukrainian territory following the initial months of Russian advances. Russian forces likely intend to leverage limited advances into Sumy Oblast to completely expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast among other objectives.

• Russian forces also recently intensified offensive operations aimed at seizing Chasiv Yar and attacking Kostyantynivka – the southernmost settlement of Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast.

• Russian officials continue to explicitly reject making any concessions in future peace negotiations or accepting any US, European, or Ukrainian peace proposals.

• Lithuania's intelligence services assessed that Russia may have the capabilities to conduct a limited campaign against one or several NATO countries within three to five years, an assessment that is consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts to restructure and prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term.

• The United Kingdom (UK) issued Ukraine's first tranche of revenue generated from frozen Russian assets. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Borova, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

• The Kremlin continues to leverage its "Time of Heroes" program to fill government positions with veterans of its war in Ukraine as part of a long-term effort to militarize Russian society and form a new cadre of loyal Russian officials.

Institute for the Study of War

The extent of the US suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine remains unclear. The Washington Post reported on March 7 that a statement by the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) noted that the NGA "temporarily suspended access" to the system that provides Ukraine with commercial satellite imagery that the United States has purchased. Ukraine can reportedly still access imagery that it has purchased with its own accounts. A Ukrainian servicemember told the Washington Post that satellite service near Pokrovsk "simply disappeared" but that Ukrainian forces will "use own plans." CNN reported on March 7 that two US defense officials stated that the United States is still sharing intelligence with Ukraine that can help Ukrainian forces "defend" themselves but has "scaled back" the sharing of intelligence that Ukrainian forces could use for offensive targeting of Russian forces. Politico reported on March 8 that a European official familiar with the intelligence capabilities of allies was "still puzzling" over the extent of the US intelligence sharing suspension and stated that European states may not be able to "bridge the gap." A source familiar with talks among the NATO allies about how to handle the US suspension reportedly stated that NATO members are not prohibited from sharing some US intelligence with Ukraine but that such sharing could be very limited as the NATO allies are trying to avoid "jeopardizing" their relationships with the United States or with each other. Politico reported that one NATO official stated that there is no pressure from the Trump administration to reduce or curtail allies' intelligence sharing or weapons deliveries to Ukraine.

Western and Ukrainian officials indicated that the US suspension of intelligence sharing is generating battlefield effects. Time reported on March 8 that five senior Western and Ukrainian officials and military officers stated that the suspension of US intelligence to Ukraine has helped Russian forces advance on the battlefield. An unspecified officer told Time that the suspension has left Ukrainian forces unable to use "some of their best weapons systems." A source in the Ukrainian government stated that the suspension has impacted Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast the most and that Ukrainian forces have lost the ability to detect Russian aircraft approaching Ukraine — compromising Ukrainian authorities' ability to warn civilians and military personnel about incoming Russian strikes. CNN reported on March 8 that a Ukrainian official stated that Ukrainian forces may run out of artillery shells by May or June 2025 — likely referring only to stockpiles of US-supplied ammunition. A Ukrainian official also told CNN that Ukraine may exhaust its stockpile of Patriot air defense missiles, upon which Ukraine relies to shoot down Russian ballistic missiles, "in a matter of weeks." ISW cannot independently verify statements about the effects on the ground of the US intelligence sharing suspension. ISW continues to assess, however, that the complete suspension of US intelligence sharing would damage Ukraine's ability to use long-range strikes to generate battlefield effects and defend against Russian offensive operations and would allow Russian forces to intensify their drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian rear areas, affecting millions of Ukrainian civilians and the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).

European states continue efforts to supplement intelligence sharing with Ukraine following the US suspension. French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Christophe Lemonde stated on March 8 that European states discussed how to try to compensate for the intelligence that the United States "may stop providing" during that March 6 EU summit. French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu stated on March 6 that France would continue to provide intelligence to Ukraine. French outlet Intelligence Online reported on March 7 that Safran.AI, a subsidiary of French defense corporation Safran, will provide Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) with a data fusion platform to analyze French satellite imagery and that Safran.AI and the GUR signed the agreement at the end of February 2025 — before the US suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine. Two Ukrainian officers told Time that some European intelligence agencies are trying to fill the gap following the US suspension of intelligence sharing to Ukraine but that it will take time for European authorities to deploy these capabilities and that Europe is unlikely to entirely make up for the US intelligence capability "any time soon."

Russian forces intensified their multi-directional campaign to eliminate the remaining Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on March 7 and 8. Geolocated footage published on March 8 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha). Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps , Leningrad Military District ) and 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call up) are advancing near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian airborne (VDV) units seized Lebedevka (west of Sudzha), and another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Kubatkin (north of Sudzha) and advanced up to eight kilometers into the Ukrainian salient. A Russian source claimed that fighting is ongoing along the Lebedevka-Kubatkin-Bondarevka line (northwest and east of Sudzha), but that the situation in this area is unclear.

Key Takeaways:

• The extent of the US suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine remains unclear.

• Western and Ukrainian officials indicated that the US suspension of intelligence sharing is generating battlefield effects.

• European states continue efforts to supplement intelligence sharing with Ukraine following the US suspension.

• Russian forces intensified their multi-directional campaign to eliminate the remaining Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on March 7 and 8.

• Russian forces appear to be destroying bridges in Kursk Oblast and along the international border, likely as part of efforts to prevent Ukrainian forces from withdrawing from Kursk Oblast into Ukraine.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, announced the intensified Russian effort in Kursk Oblast on March 8.

• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian rear and near rear areas on the night of March 7 and 8 and during the day on March 8, and Ukrainian forces notably did not shoot down any Russian ballistic missiles.

• The Kremlin continues to promote the false narrative that European Union (EU) member states and Ukraine seek to protract and escalate the war in Ukraine in order to distract from Russia's own long-term preparations for a war with the West.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 8 that Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, and Deputy Head of the Ukrainian President's Office Colonel Pavlo Palisa will participate in the US-Ukrainian talks on March 11 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces are collapsing the northern part of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast following several days of intensified Russian activity in the area. Geolocated footage published on March 8 indicates that Russian forces seized Novaya Sorochina (northwest of Sudzha), Malaya Loknya (just south of Novaya Sorochina), and Lebedevka (south of Malaya Loknya), and the fields between the settlements. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army , Southern Military District ) seized Malaya Loknya and that elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) seized Lebedevka. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Pravda and Ivashkovshyi (both north of Sudzha) and positions along an unspecified area of the railway line between Malaya Loknya and Sudzha.<3> Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps , Leningrad Military District ) participated in the seizure of Kubatkin (north of Sudzha) and Pravda and that additional elements of the Russian 106th VDV Division are advancing into Kazachya Loknya (north of Sudzha) from Lebedevka. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops hold limited positions in Malaya Loknya, Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha), and Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha) but that most Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from positions in the northern part of the salient towards Kazachya Loknya and Sudzha. Russian milbloggers claimed that preparatory Russian efforts to destroy the bridges north and south of Sudzha have significantly complicated Ukraine's ability to withdraw back to Sudzha. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Malaya Loknya.

The temporal correlation between the suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine and the start of Russia's collapse of the Ukrainian Kursk salient is noteworthy. Russia has been attempting to push Ukrainian forces from the salient in Kursk Oblast through slow, grinding advances since the incursion began in August 2024. Russia later deployed roughly 12,000 North Korean military personnel in October 2024 to assist in repelling the incursion, but Russian forces continued to make only gradual gains. The Trump administration suspended US intelligence sharing with Ukraine on March 5, although there continue to be conflicting reports about the details about the US suspension. Russian forces intensified offensive operations to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast on March 6 and 7. A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence started reporting more rapid Russian advances in Kursk Oblast on March 5. A source in the Ukrainian government stated in a March 8 Time article that the US intelligence sharing suspension has impacted Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast the most. The Russian military has not previously prioritized the effort to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast over making further advances in eastern Ukraine despite concentrating a sufficient force grouping to do so in late 2024. A direct link between the suspension of US intelligence sharing and the start of the collapse of Ukraine's salient in Kursk Oblast is unclear, although Kremlin officials have recently announced their intention to take advantage of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing to "inflict maximum damage" to Ukrainian forces "on the ground" during the limited time frame before the possible future resumption of US intelligence sharing and military aid to Ukraine.

Reports about the extent of the suspension of US military aid to Ukraine continue to indicate that the suspension will likely affect Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russia. Forbes stated on March 7 that the Trump administration has halted US support for Ukraine's F-16 fighter jet radar jammers. The Wall Street Journal reported on March 8 that a source familiar with the matter stated that Ukraine is currently able to fire one artillery shell for every three that Russian forces fire – even with Ukraine's current supplies of US shells. The suspension of US support to Ukrainian F-16 radar jammers will likely hamper Ukraine's ability to continue to use the aircraft to defend against Russian strikes into Ukraine's rear. Ukrainian officials indicated in December 2024 that Ukrainian forces had been able to gain an artillery advantage of 1.5 to one or three-to-one in some areas of the front, and Russia's current artillery advantage over Ukraine will likely continue to grow as Ukraine's stockpiles of US ammunition decrease further following the US suspension of military aid.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces are collapsing the northern part of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast following several days of intensified Russian activity in the area.

• The temporal correlation between the suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine and the start of Russia's collapse of the Ukrainian Kursk salient is noteworthy.

• Reports about the extent of the suspension of US military aid to Ukraine continue to indicate that the suspension will likely affect Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russia.

• Ukraine's European allies continue to provide material and financial aid to Ukraine.

• Russia continues to showcase its deepening relations with American adversaries despite ongoing bilateral talks between the United States and Russia.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Kursk oblasts and near Siversk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Robotyne.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia continues to publicly claim that it wants peace while offering no concessions of its own in sharp contrast with the concessions Ukraine has already offered. Reuters reported on March 9 that two US officials stated that the US is planning to use the March 11 US-Ukrainian talks in Saudi Arabia "in part to determine whether Ukraine is willing to make material concessions to Russia to end the war." One US official stated that Ukraine cannot say both "I want peace" and "I refuse to compromise on anything" at the upcoming talks. The other US official stated that the US wants "to see if the Ukrainians are interested not just in peace, but in a realistic peace." The Financial Times reported on March 9 that unspecified officials briefed on the upcoming US-Ukrainian negotiations stated that Ukraine will propose a partial ceasefire with Russia for long-range drone and missile strikes and combat operations in the Black Sea. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on March 10 that a source familiar with the Ukrainian delegation's position stated that Ukraine will also propose a prisoner of war (POW) exchange. The Ukrainian source noted that these proposals are "realistic to implement quickly" and to "control." Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky first suggested a ceasefire in the air and sea on March 5, and Ukraine is offering the kind of ceasefires that are more straightforward and do not require extended negotiations or a complex monitoring process. A ceasefire along the thousand kilometers of complex front line characterized by multiple “gray zones” where the lines of opposing forces are blurred would be extremely difficult to negotiate and monitor. Zelensky has also indicated several times — including in his February 28 Fox News interview — that he is willing to make concessions on territory, Ukraine's NATO membership, and his own tenure in office in order to secure a just and sustainable peace.

Russian officials, in contrast, continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's 2021 and 2022 demands. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed in an interview to "New Regions of Russia" magazine published on March 10 that any future peace settlement must "eradicate" the "root causes" of the war. Lavrov defined the "root causes" of the war as the alleged "threats to Russia's security from the Ukrainian and Western directions in general" that are due to NATO's eastward expansion and the Ukrainian government's alleged "extermination" of everything that is "connected with Russia and the Russian World ," including Russian language, culture, Orthodoxy, and media. Lavrov similarly defined the alleged "root causes" of the war in late December 2024, and the Kremlin's rhetoric on this topic has not changed in the over two months, even after the start of US-Russian bilateral talks in February 2024. Russia's repeated rhetoric about the "root causes" of the war and constant reiteration of its specific unchanged demands contrast sharply with the flexibility Ukraine has shown.

Russian officials continue to capitalize on the Trump administration's statements and actions in an attempt to divide the United States and Europe. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed in an interview to the "New Regions of Russia" magazine published on March 10 that US and Russian diplomats voted the same way for the first time in three years against the Ukrainian- and European-backed United Nations (UN) resolution on February 24. This resolution commemorated the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war, called for a just peace in Ukraine, and supported Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Lavrov claimed that the "ultraliberal ruling elites of the West," support Ukraine and that European Union (EU) countries and the United Kingdom (UK) maintain "predatory, colonial habits." Lavrov notably did not mention the United States, likely in an attempt to drive a perceived ideological wedge between the United States and Europe. Lavrov's use of the "ruling elites" narrative echoes Russian President Vladimir Putin's February 27 claim that "some Western elites" are trying to "maintain instability" in the world and will try to "disrupt or compromise" the US–Russian dialogue that has begun. Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed on March 10 that the UK government is prioritizing "undermining Trump's peace efforts" and has tasked non-governmental organizations with "demonizing" Trump. The SVR notably made such claims ahead of the UK’s hosting of a virtual meeting on March 15 with mainly European and British commonwealth countries to support a ceasefire agreement. Russian officials are likely attempting to leverage Trump administration statements and actions to divide the United States and Europe and will likely continue such efforts to secure maximum concessions on Ukraine from the US, Europe, and Ukraine as well as to fracture the US-Europe relationship to Russia’s benefit.


Key Takeaways

• Russia continues to publicly claim that it wants peace while offering no concessions of its own in sharp contrast with the concessions Ukraine has already offered.

• Russian officials continue to capitalize on the Trump administration's statements and actions in an attempt to divide the United States and Europe.

• Russian forces are consolidating their gains in Kursk Oblast and likely preparing to attack Sudzha in the coming days.

• Ukraine continues to expand its domestic production of drones and air defense systems to support its war effort.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a list on March 10 of instructions for the Russian government and the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation aimed at increasing social benefits to Russian veterans, which will likely put further strain on the Russian budget and economy.

Institute for the Study of War

"Pax mongolica", wie es der Papst mal hoffnungsfroh erwähnt hat.
Zuerst alles zamhaun, und wenn sich nichts mehr regt, ist Friede.

The United States and Ukraine agreed on March 11 to an immediate 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine contingent on Russia's agreement, and the United States reportedly restarted intelligence sharing and military aid. US and Ukrainian representatives met in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on March 11 for bilateral talks and agreed to the ceasefire proposal, which the United States will soon propose to Russia. The US-Ukrainian joint statement emphasized that Russia's reciprocity to this ceasefire proposal is the key to achieving peace and noted that the ceasefire can be extended if all parties agree. The joint statement noted that the United States will immediately lift its suspension on intelligence sharing and military assistance to Ukraine. The United States and Ukraine also agreed to finalize a deal on minerals as soon as possible. Ukraine reiterated in the joint statement that European partners will be involved in the peace process. The United States and Ukraine also discussed humanitarian relief to Ukraine, especially during the ceasefire, including the return of prisoners of war (POWs), detained civilians, and forcibly deported Ukrainian children to Ukraine. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa confirmed on March 11 that the United States has already resumed the flow of military assistance to Ukraine. A source close to the Ukrainian government told CNN that the United States also fully restored intelligence sharing to Ukraine on March 11.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the ceasefire would encompass a cease in combat operations along the entire frontline, a moratorium on long-range missile and drone strikes, and the cessation of operations in the Black Sea and would begin as soon as Russia agrees to the US proposal. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio responded during a press conference on March 11 to a question about a deadline for Russia to respond, stating that the deadline is "as quickly as possible," that the United States will inform Russia about the ceasefire proposal through multiple diplomatic channels, and that the "ball is now in court." US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz stated that he will speak with his Russian counterpart in the coming days and clarified that the resumed US military assistance to Ukraine includes the provision of material authorized under the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA). European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and French President Emmanuel Macron expressed support for the 30-day ceasefire proposal and emphasized that the onus to respond is now on Russia.

Russian ultranationalist voices, including a Russian State Duma deputy, largely rejected the ceasefire proposal on March 11. Russian milbloggers, including Kremlin-coopted milbloggers, rejected the ceasefire proposal because the United States and Ukraine will allegedly "abandon" peace "at the first opportunity" and the war in Ukraine is existential for Russia. One milblogger claimed that accepting the ceasefire would be "pure betrayal and sabotage," and another milblogger questioned the purpose of accepting this ceasefire proposal without achieving Russia's war aims. Russian State Duma Deputy and former 58th Combined Arms Army Commander Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev stated after the publication of the joint statement that Russia should not agree to the "unacceptable" 30-day ceasefire proposal because it would allow Ukraine to rearm and regroup.

The Kremlin has not officially responded to the ceasefire proposal as of this publication, and Russian state media is attempting to frame earlier official Russian statements about bilateral US-Russian negotiations as responses to the ceasefire proposal. Following the publication of the ceasefire proposal, Russian state media largely amplified a statement from Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova from earlier in the day on March 11 saying that Russia "does not rule out" contacts with the United States in the next few days. Russian State Duma Security Committee member Mikhail Sheremet stated before the joint statement was released that Russia is interested in a settlement in Ukraine but will not allow itself to be deceived, and Russian state media only amplified Sheremet's statement after the ceasefire proposal. Russian state media is likely attempting to portray the immediate Russian reaction as moderate for domestic audiences until Kremlin officials make public statements and provide a framing for broader Russian media coverage of the proposal.

Ukraine's allies and partners from Europe, Asia, and Oceania continue efforts to strengthen the Ukrainian military and back Ukraine with security guarantees — the most effective deterrent against future Russian aggression against Ukraine following a potential future peace agreement. French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu stated on March 11 that France "will refuse any form of demilitarization of Ukraine" and that the "first guarantee of security remains the Ukrainian army." Reuters reported that 34 military officials from European NATO states, EU states, Asia, and Oceania, met on March 11 in Paris to assess their militaries' capabilities to maintain Ukraine's long-term military strength and to guarantee Ukrainian security in the event of a permanent ceasefire in the war. French President Emmanuel Macron stated after the meeting that Ukraine's partners must "define credible security guarantees" for Ukraine. A French military official told the Associated Press on March 10 that the meeting would discuss a French and British plan for the creation of a multinational force that would aim to reassure Ukraine and deter another large-scale Russian offensive. The official stated that the envisaged force could include heavy weaponry and weapons stockpiles that participating militaries could deploy to help Ukraine defend itself in "hours or days" in the event of a renewed Russian attack. A strong Ukrainian military backed by Western security guarantees continues to be the strongest deterrent against another Russian invasion in the future, and Russia has been repeatedly insisting on Ukraine's "demilitarization" and disarmament in order to deny Ukraine this deterrent and allow Russia to renew attacks against Ukraine at a time of Moscow's choosing in the future.

Bloomberg reported on March 11 that Western security officials stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin has "no intention" of making compromises on territory, peacekeepers, or Ukrainian neutrality and that Putin is prepared to continue fighting if he doesn't achieve his objectives in his war in Ukraine. The officials stated that Putin has deliberately made "maximalist" demands, knowing that Ukraine and Europe would likely find these demands unacceptable. Western security officials' reports of the Kremlin's intention to achieve its "maximalist" goals in Ukraine are consistent with Putin's and other Russian officials' public statements, even as the Kremlin has attempted to posture itself as open to negotiations and ending the war.

Key Takeaways

• The United States and Ukraine agreed on March 11 to an immediate 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine contingent on Russia's agreement, and the US reportedly restarted intelligence sharing and military aid.

• Ukraine's allies and partners from Europe, Asia, and Oceania continue efforts to strengthen the Ukrainian military and back Ukraine with security guarantees – the most effective deterrent against future Russian aggression against Ukraine following a potential future peace agreement.

• Russian forces continue to make confirmed advances in Kursk Oblast and have likely begun attacking Sudzha.

• Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone strikes against Russia on the night of March 10 to 11, largely targeting Moscow Oblast.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Robotyne and in Kursk Oblast.

• The Kremlin continues to expand social benefits for Russian soldiers who fought in Ukraine, including soldiers who have fought for the militias of the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics (DNR and LNR) since 2014.

Institute for the Study of War

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov offered a vague response on March 12 to the US-Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposal. Peskov responded to a question about Russia's response to the joint temporary ceasefire proposal, stating that "we don't want to get ahead of ourselves." Peskov stated that Russia expects US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz to inform the Kremlin about the details of the US-Ukrainian negotiations. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on March 12 that its sources in the Russian government stated that the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal surprised the Kremlin, and a source close to the Russian presidential administration stated that the Kremlin expected the United States to discuss such a proposal with Russia in private before publicly announcing it, thereby providing the Kremlin time to formulate a prepared response.

Russian President Vladimir Putin may hold hostage the ceasefire proposal to which Ukraine has agreed in order to extract preemptive concessions before formal negotiations to end the war have started. Reuters reported on March 12 that senior Russian sources stated that a deal on the temporary ceasefire would have to "take into account" Russia's advances on the battlefield and "address concerns." Bloomberg reported on March 12 that sources familiar with the Kremlin's thinking and the situation stated that Putin will "stretch the timeline" for agreeing to the temporary ceasefire in order to ensure that his stipulations "are taken into account." A source close to the Kremlin stated that Russia may demand a halt to weapons supplies to Ukraine as a condition of agreeing to the temporary ceasefire, but did not specify whether such a halt would include all international weapons provisions to Ukraine or only those from select countries. Suspending US or other military assistance to Ukraine during a ceasefire would be extremely advantageous to Russia, which continues to receive critical supplies and assistance from Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China. Such an enormous concession would also destroy US leverage in future negotiations, in addition to violating the conditions under which Ukraine agreed to the ceasefire in the first place.

Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on March 12 that a source close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the Kremlin would "formally" give a "positive response" to the temporary ceasefire proposal but would also demand "impossible conditions" to which Ukraine cannot agree. The source stated that Putin wants to remove Ukraine from talks so that Russia can engage in negotiations with the United States alone while also "correcting the situation on the front" to strengthen Russia's negotiating position. The source added that the conditions of the temporary ceasefire "must suit Russia" and that Russia's agreement to a temporary ceasefire during which Ukraine continues to receive weapons and financing from its partners and allies is "stupid." These leaks may be intentional and part of a Russian negotiating strategy that aims to push the United States to renegotiate its deal with Ukraine on the temporary ceasefire.

Key Takeaways

• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov offered a vague response on March 12 to the US-Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposal.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin may hold hostage the ceasefire proposal to which Ukraine has agreed in order to extract preemptive concessions before formal negotiations to end the war have started.

• Senior US and Ukrainian officials have said that the purpose of the temporary ceasefire is for Russia and Ukraine to demonstrate their willingness for peace and that the temporary ceasefire and negotiations to end the war are separate matters, whereas the Kremlin may intend to conjoin them.

• Russian insider reports about the demands that the Kremlin may make before agreeing to the temporary ceasefire are in line with Russian officials' public statements in the past months.

• US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director John Ratcliffe and Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergey Naryshkin had a phone call on March 11 amid talks about the war in Ukraine.

• Russian forces recently seized Sudzha amid continued Russian assaults in Kursk Oblast on March 12.

• Russan President Vladimir Putin visited a Russian military command post in Kursk Oblast for the first time since Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 — demonstrating Putin's desire to use Russia's seizure of Sudzha to project military success and strength against the backdrop of the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the ceasefire proposal that the United States and Ukraine recently agreed upon in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and offered an alternative proposal that undermines US President Donald Trump's stated goal of securing a lasting peace in Ukraine. Putin claimed on March 13 that he "agrees" with the temporary ceasefire proposal and that the "idea itself is correct" but that the cessation of hostilities "should be such that it would lead to long-term peace and eliminate the initial causes" of the war. Putin thus rejected one of the main principles of the US-Ukrainian proposal — that the temporary ceasefire precede formal negotiations to end the war. Putin also claimed that there are questions that "require painstaking research from both sides." Putin questioned several aspects of the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal. Putin asked what would happen to the remaining Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and whether Ukraine would be allowed to continue to mobilize forces, train newly mobilized soldiers, and receive military aid from its partners and allies. Putin questioned the control and verification measures of a temporary ceasefire and who would give the orders to stop fighting. Putin suggested that he may call President Trump to discuss the "issues" involved in the ceasefire proposal. Putin postured military strength during his rejection of the ceasefire proposal, highlighting recent Russian successes in pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast and claiming that Russian forces are advancing in "almost all areas of combat."

Putin is offering an alternative ceasefire agreement that is contrary to the intentions and goals of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal. The US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal calls for a renewable 30-day cessation of combat operations along the entire frontline, a moratorium on long-range missile and drone strikes, and a cessation of operations in the Black Sea. The proposal allows for Russia and Ukraine to extend the ceasefire and assumes the continuation of US intelligence sharing and US and other military assistance to Ukraine. The US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal was explicitly aimed at allowing Russia and Ukraine to demonstrate their willingness to make peace and separates the temporary ceasefire from future negotiations to end the war.

Putin is holding the ceasefire proposal hostage and is attempting to extract preemptive concessions ahead of formal negotiations to end the war. Putin refused to accept the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal on its own terms and is instead demanding additional conditions that would contribute directly to the Kremlin's war aims. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on March 11 that the US will "know what the impediment is to peace" in Ukraine if Putin rejected the ceasefire proposal. ISW continues to assess that Putin is disinterested in good faith peace negotiations to end the war. Putin remains committed to accomplishing his long-term goals of installing a pro-Russian puppet regime in Ukraine, undermining Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression and preventing Ukraine's accession to NATO. Putin's rejection of the ceasefire proposal underscores Putin's commitment to securing his objectives in Ukraine, particularly Ukraine's demilitarization, and disinterest in any pause in fighting that does not result in Ukrainian capitulation or at least set conditions for a successful renewal of Russian offensive operations in the future.

Key Takeaways

• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the ceasefire proposal that the United States and Ukraine recently agreed upon in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and offered an alternative proposal that undermines US President Donald Trump's stated goal of securing a lasting peace in Ukraine.

• Putin is offering an alternative ceasefire agreement that is contrary to the intentions and goals of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal.

• Putin's envisioned ceasefire agreement would grant Russia greatly disproportionate advantages and set conditions for the Kremlin to renew hostilities on terms extremely favorable to Russia.

• Putin is holding the ceasefire proposal hostage and is attempting to extract preemptive concessions ahead of formal negotiations to end the war.

• Russian forces continue to clear Ukrainian forces from Sudzha and its environs as Russian troops advance closer to the border in Kursk Oblast slowed on March 13 compared to recent days.

• Russian milbloggers theorized on March 13 that Russian forces may launch an organized offensive operation into northern Sumy Oblast in the coming weeks and months and may also attack into Chernihiv Oblast — in line with Russian President Vladimir Putin's March 12 statements.

• Kremlin officials continue to use narratives similar to those that the Kremlin has used to justify its invasions of Ukraine to set informational conditions to justify future aggression against NATO member states.

• Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) in violation of international law.

• Russia will likely expand its permanent military basing in Belarus to enhance Russia’s force posture against NATO’s eastern flank.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Siversk, and Toretsk.

• Russia continues its crypto-mobilization efforts against the backdrop of US efforts to start the negotiation process to end the war.

Institute for the Study of War

>• Putin is holding the ceasefire proposal hostage and is
>attempting to extract preemptive concessions ahead of formal
>negotiations to end the war.
>
>

Die Amis werden (leider) bzgl. Putin Paktfähigkeit auch noch die Lernkurve machen...

ISW has observed no geolocated evidence to indicate that Russian forces have encircled a significant number of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast or elsewhere along the frontline in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during a press conference on March 13 that Russian forces have "isolated" Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and that it is "impossible" for small groups of Ukrainian forces to withdraw from positions in Kursk Oblast. Putin claimed that Ukrainian forces will not be able to leave Kursk at all "if" Russian forces can conduct a "physical blockade" in the coming days. Putin stated during a Russian Security Council meeting on March 14 that Russian forces have "blocked" unspecified Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 14 that Russian authorities are fabricating claims about the alleged "encirclement" of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast in order to influence the political and informational scene. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces have regrouped and withdrawn to more advantageous defensive positions in Kursk Oblast and that Ukrainian forces are not under threat of encirclement.

Russian milbloggers have also not coalesced around claims that Russian forces have encircled or "blocked" a significant number of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast in recent days, but milbloggers may alter their reporting to mirror Putin's claims in the coming days. Some Russian milbloggers claimed on March 12 and 13 that Russian forces encircled an unspecified number of Ukrainian forces in an unspecified area of Kursk Oblast, but many Russian milbloggers published maps on March 13 and 14 acknowledging that Ukrainian forces have viable egress routes into Sumy Oblast from their remaining positions in Kursk Oblast. At least one Russian milblogger explicitly questioned claims that Russian forces encircled Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast on March 12, and another complained on March 12 that Russian forces are unable to encircle Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast because Russian forces cannot conduct rapid, mechanized breakthroughs into rear Ukrainian areas.

Putin claimed in October 2024 that Russian forces "encircled" 2,000 Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast, but ISW never observed any Russian milblogger claims or geolocated footage to substantiate Putin's October 2024 claim. Putin has repeatedly failed to acknowledge that the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast extends from the Ukrainian-Russian international border and that Ukrainian forces can transit the sections of the border under Ukrainian control.

Putin seized on a statement by US President Donald Trump about the supposed encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast to distract from his recent rejection of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal. President Trump stated in a post on Truth Social on March 14 that Russian forces have "completely surrounded" "thousands" of Ukrainian forces, presumably in Kursk Oblast, and called on Putin to "spare" their lives. Putin responded directly to Trump's request during the March 14 security council meeting and claimed that Russian forces will guarantee the "life and decent treatment" of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast if Ukrainian forces surrender. Putin reiterated unsubstantiated claims that Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast have committed crimes against Russian civilians in the area and said that Russia considers the Ukrainian incursion an act of "terrorism." Putin claimed that Ukrainian authorities must order Ukrainian forces to surrender in order for Russia to implement Trump's request. Putin is attempting to present himself as a reasonable and merciful leader whom President Trump can engage with and to generate a new narrative to distract from Putin's decision to reject the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal on March 13.

Key Takeaways

• ISW has observed no geolocated evidence to indicate that Russian forces have encircled a significant number of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast or elsewhere along the frontline in Ukraine.

• Putin seized on a statement by US President Donald Trump about the supposed encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast to distract from his recent rejection of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal.

• Kremlin statements following Putin's meeting with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff on March 13 underscore Putin's rejection of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal and continued unwillingness to engage in good faith negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.

• Russian forces marginally advanced towards the international border in Kursk Oblast on March 14, but Ukrainian forces still maintain limited positions in Kursk Oblast.

• Consistent Ukrainian strikes against Russian air defense assets are reportedly allowing Ukrainian long-range drones to increasingly penetrate the Russian air defense umbrella in deep rear areas, including in Moscow Oblast.

• The Ukrainian military reorganized the Ukrainian 3rd Separate Assault Brigade into the 3rd Army Corps, further showcasing Ukraine's force efforts to transition to a corps structure.

• Ukraine's European allies continue to provide military assistance and technical support and demonstrate interest in strengthening bilateral cooperation.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Toretsk and near Siversk and Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian officials continue to deny Russian President Vladimir Putin's unsubstantiated claim that Russian forces have encircled a significant number of Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers published maps on March 14 and 15 showing Russian and Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast that do not indicate Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces, and two Russian milbloggers explicitly denied Putin's claim that Russian forces encircled a significant number of Ukrainian forces in the area on March 13 and 14. One milblogger characterized Putin's claims as a narrative intended to influence US President Donald Trump ahead of peace negotiations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attempting to encircle Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast, that no encirclement currently exists, and stated that Putin is attempting to delay discussion of the US-Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposal by spreading these claims.Independent Ukrainian sources also denied Putin's claims about Russian encirclements of Ukrainian forces and noted that Ukrainian forces maintain the ability to maneuver from their remaining positions in Kursk Oblast despite a difficult tactical situation. ISW has still not observed any Russian milblogger claims or geolocated footage suggesting that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian forces appear to maintain egress routes across the international border from their positions in Kursk Oblast as of this publication.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast but have not completely pushed Ukrainian forces out of the area as of this publication. Geolocated footage published on March 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Basivka (northeast of Sumy City in Sumy Oblast). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed on March 15 that Russian forces seized Zaoleshenka (immediately west of Sudzha) and Rubanshchina (west of Sudzha), but ISW has not observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized the entirety of these settlements. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Gogolevka (west of Sudzha) and are clearing Guyevo (south of Sudzha). Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near Oleshnya and Gornal (both southwest of Sudzha). Russian forces continued attacking near Rubanshchina, Gogolevka, and Guyevo. Elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Gogolevka, and elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Guyevo.

Key Takeaways

• Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian officials continue to deny Russian President Vladimir Putin's unsubstantiated claim that Russian forces have encircled a significant number of Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast.

• Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast but have not completely pushed Ukrainian forces out of the area as of this publication.

• Ukrainian officials expressed concern about Russian ground operations in northern Sumy Oblast but doubt Russia's ability to conduct an effective concerted offensive operation against Sumy City.

• The Kremlin is likely preparing to intensify a narrative that accuses Ukrainian forces of war crimes in Kursk Oblast in an attempt to discredit the Ukrainian military, erode Western support for Ukraine, and spoil or delay straightforward discussions about the 30-day ceasefire that US President Donald Trump proposed to Putin.

• Russian forces conducted drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 14 to 15, including conducting their third double-tap strike against Ukraine in the past week.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed the official Ukrainian delegation to "engage with Ukraine's international partners" in the negotiation process to end the war on March 15.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk.

Institute for the Study of War

https://orf.at/stories/3387770/

>https://orf.at/stories/3387770/

Ein Träumer:

Mit Blick auf die von ihm geforderte „Kriegswirtschaft“ sagte Weber, das bedeute zum Beispiel beschleunigte Genehmigungsverfahren bei Rüstungsgütern und mehr Zusammenarbeit zwischen den europäischen Rüstungsherstellern. Aber auch, dass Unternehmen von der Produktion ziviler auf militärische Produkte umgestellt werden.

„Klare Ansagen bei Beschaffung“
Zudem brauche Europa ein gemeinsames europäisches Führungskommando, sagte Weber. Ein europäischer Generalstabschef solle dann „die aufgerüsteten nationalen Armeen befehligen und klare Ansagen bei der Beschaffung machen können“, verlangte der EVP-Fraktionschef.

>Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian officials continue to deny
>Russian President Vladimir Putin's unsubstantiated claim that
>Russian forces have encircled a significant number of
>Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast.


Eine Seite sagt so, die andere so, wenn man nicht direkt selbst vor Ort ist bleibt eine Einschätzung schwierig.

US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz stated on March 16 that Ukraine will receive unspecified security guarantees in exchange for unspecified territorial concessions. Waltz also stated that the United States is considering "the reality of the situation on the ground" in diplomatic talks when discussing an end to the war in Ukraine. It is not clear exactly what Waltz meant by "the reality of the situation on the ground." Russian officials have frequently used the narrative that any negotiations must consider the "realities on the ground" to refer to the current frontline in Ukraine and their claims of the inevitability of further Russian battlefield gains. Waltz's acknowledgement that Ukraine will receive unspecified security guarantees is a key aspect of achieving US President Donald Trump's stated goal of securing a lasting peace in Ukraine, but stopping hostilities on indefensible lines would limit the effectiveness of security guarantees.

The current frontlines do not provide the strategic depth that Ukraine will need to reliably defend against renewed Russian aggression. Russian forces are just across the Dnipro River from Kherson City, roughly 25 kilometers from Zaporizhzhia City, and 30 kilometers from Kharkiv City. Russian troops on the Dnipro River could use a ceasefire to prepare for the extremely difficult task of conducting an opposed river crossing undisturbed, significantly increasing the likelihood of success in such an endeavor. Stopping a well-prepared, major mechanized offensive cold is extremely rare in war, which means that a renewed Russian assault would likely threaten both Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia cities, as well as key cities in the Donetsk "fortress belt," almost immediately. Russia is constructing a large highway and railway aimed at connecting major cities in occupied Ukraine and Russia, which will reinforce Russia's hold on occupied Ukraine and Russia's ability to transport and supply Russian forces operating in Ukraine in the event of a future Russian offensive in southern Ukraine.

The US and Europe would likely need to provide military aid to Ukraine more rapidly, in much larger volumes, and at higher cost the closer the ultimate ceasefire lines are to the current frontline. Ukraine would likely need an even larger military with greater capabilities to play its critical role in deterring and, if necessary, defeating future aggression along current frontline (both within Ukraine and along Ukraine’s international border with Russia) that is over 2,100 kilometers long. Enforcing a ceasefire along the current frontline would also require the commitment of large numbers of Western forces. Helping Ukraine regain strategically critical territory, as Trump has suggested he intends to do, could significantly reduce the cost and difficulty of securing a future peace. A ceasefire along more defensible positions would also place Russian forces in a more disadvantaged position for renewed offensive operations, making future Russian aggression less likely.

Russian officials maintain their maximalist territorial claims over all occupied Ukraine and significant parts of unoccupied Ukraine, however. Senior Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have consistently demanded that Ukraine surrender the entirety of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, including areas that Russian forces do not already occupy, and have reiterated these claims in recent weeks. Russian state media has also recently amplified similar sentiments from Kremlin-affiliated mouthpieces. Putin recently claimed that "Novorossiya" is an integral part of Russia, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov defined "Novorossiya" as all of eastern and southern Ukraine including Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts. Russia currently occupies a small portion of Kharkiv Oblast and the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast, and Russian forces are advancing towards the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border. Continued Kremlin statements demanding that Ukraine cede unoccupied Ukrainian territory indicate that the Kremlin and Putin remain committed to these territorial goals despite ongoing negotiations.

Russian officials have given no public indications that they are willing to make concessions on their territorial or security demands of Ukraine. Accepting Western-backed security guarantees for Ukraine would be a significant concession for Putin. Putin has repeatedly called for Ukraine to permanently abandon its goals of joining NATO or any security bloc and to reject future offers of foreign military assistance, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently claimed that Russia will reject the future deployment of any European peacekeepers to Ukraine and consider any such deployment as the "direct, official, undisguised involvement of NATO countries" in the war. Russian officials also appear to be generating increased support for their demands in Russian society despite the costs of Russia's protracted war effort, and Putin likely remains committed to securing a return for Russia's investment in the war he regards as sufficient. Putin and Kremlin officials have been regularly broadcasting their demands for Ukrainian territorial and security concessions beyond the current frontlines to the Russian people, underscoring how unlikely Putin is to abandon his ambitions in Ukraine even after a ceasefire.

Key Takeaways

• US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz stated on March 16 that Ukraine will receive unspecified security guarantees in exchange for unspecified territorial concessions.

• The current frontlines do not provide the strategic depth that Ukraine will need to reliably defend against renewed Russian aggression.

• Russian officials maintain their maximalist territorial claims over all occupied Ukraine and significant parts of unoccupied Ukraine, however.

• Russian officials have given no public indications that they are willing to make concessions on their territorial or security demands of Ukraine.

• Russia continues to seize on diplomatic engagements with the United States to normalize its war demands.

• The United Kingdom (UK) convened a virtual Coalition of the Willing summit on March 15 to reiterate support for Ukraine and discuss plans for peace.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Russian forces advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Velyka Novosilka.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues efforts to posture as solving issues with the Russian military.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have been partially successful in holding the ceasefire proposal hostage as part of his efforts to extract preemptive concessions from US President Donald Trump in negotiations to end the war. Trump stated on March 17 that he plans to speak with Putin on March 18 and "wants] to see if he and Putin can bring the war to an end." Trump added that he and Putin will "be talking about land," "power plants," and "dividing up certain assets." The United States and Ukraine agreed on March 11 to a 30-day ceasefire proposal that is contingent on Russia's "acceptance and concurrent implementation." The proposal stated that Ukraine and the United States intend to name their negotiating teams and immediately begin negotiations toward an enduring peace — noting the distinction between the temporary ceasefire and future negotiations on a peace settlement. Putin rejected the temporary ceasefire proposal on March 13 and claimed that the cessation of hostilities "should be such that it would lead to long-term peace and eliminate the initial causes" of the war. Putin thus rejected one of the main principles of the US-Ukrainian proposal — that the temporary ceasefire precedes formal negotiations to end the war. The US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal noted that the United States and Ukraine discussed the return of prisoners of war (POWs), detained civilians, and forcibly deported Ukrainian children — all of which will require future talks with Russia. The US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal did not mention talks with Russia about Ukrainian territory, energy infrastructure, or assets. Putin also suggested on March 13 that he may call Trump to discuss "issues" involved in the ceasefire proposal, such as Ukraine's continued ability to mobilize forces and receive military aid from partners and allies — issues notably not included in the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal. Putin is attempting to change the sequence of talks in order to push Trump into making preemptive concessions on issues that are not part of the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire but are part of Russia's war aims. The acceptance of these Russian demands in the context of negotiations for an immediate ceasefire would cede valuable US and Ukrainian leverage during future negotiations to secure a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Russian officials continue to demonstrate that Russia's aim of destroying Ukrainian sovereignty remains unchanged since before Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko claimed in an interview with Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestiya on March 17 that Russia continues to demand that Ukraine be a neutral state and that NATO states refuse to accept Ukraine as a member. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated to RBK Ukraine on March 17 that no country should have a "veto" over Ukraine's choice to participate in alliances, including the EU or NATO. Syhiba noted that Ukraine's NATO aspirations are enshrined in the Ukrainian Constitution and reflect a "strategic choice of the Ukrainian people." A Russian "veto" of Ukraine's choices about these matters would amount to a denial of Ukraine's ability to make choices about its alliances and security arrangements as a sovereign and independent state. Grushko acknowledged during his interview that Russia's demands for Ukrainian neutrality and NATO's refusal to allow Ukraine into the alliance are the same demands that Russia made in 2021 before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine — demonstrating how Russia's demands to destroy Ukraine as an independent, sovereign state have remained unchanged.

The Kremlin continues to reject the prospect of European peacekeepers in Ukraine, in opposition to US and Ukrainian positions on the matter and impeding the establishment of a stable, lasting peace to end the war. Grushko stated on March 17 that Russia will not accept peacekeepers from the EU, NATO, or individual Western states in post-war Ukraine as Russia considers all of these possible peacekeeping contingents to be "NATO contingents." Grushko claimed that any talks about future international peacekeeping missions in Ukraine should only occur after the conclusion of the final peace agreement to end the war and only if parties to the peace agreement agree that the peace agreement requires international support. The Kremlin appears to be trying to dictate the timing and sequence of talks, demanding that final peace talks precede any discussions about peacekeeping missions in post-war Ukraine. Russia continues to make clear its rejection of any European involvement in post-war Ukraine — in contradiction to US and Ukrainian positions on the matter. Trump stated on February 26 that Europe should be responsible for security guarantees for Ukraine, and the joint US-Ukrainian March 11 statement outlining the temporary ceasefire proposal stated that Ukraine reiterated its positions that European partners should be involved in the peace process. Sybiha stressed the importance of European support to assist in monitoring and enforcing the terms of a permanent ceasefire in Ukraine and noted that Ukraine is already discussing specific details with those European countries willing to deploy peacekeeping forces to Ukraine. Significant European involvement in post-war Ukraine is critical for any peace settlement that aims to establish an enduring peace in Ukraine.

A strong Ukrainian military backed by security guarantees remains the most important component of a sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterrence of future Russian aggression. Sybiha emphasized that there can be no restriction on Ukraine's defensive capabilities or military strength in any future peace agreement and that Ukraine must keep working towards a self-sufficient defense industrial sector to deter further Russian aggression. Sybiha, responding to a question about Ukraine's fundamental stipulations in "any" future negotiations, stated that Ukraine will not compromise its territorial integrity and sovereignty and "will never recognize occupied territories." Discussions on the permanent status of occupied Ukrainian territory should properly only be a part of negotiations on a permanent settlement of the war.

Key Takeaways

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have been partially successful in holding the ceasefire proposal hostage as part of his efforts to extract preemptive concessions from US President Donald Trump in negotiations to end the war.

• Russian officials continue to demonstrate that Russia's aim of destroying Ukrainian sovereignty remains unchanged since before Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022.

• The Kremlin continues to reject the prospect of European peacekeepers in Ukraine, in opposition to US and Ukrainian positions on the matter and impeding the establishment of a stable, lasting peace to end the war.

• A strong Ukrainian military backed by security guarantees remains the most important component of a sustainable peace in Ukraine and deterrence of future Russian aggression.

• The United States announced its withdrawal from war crimes monitoring agencies related to the war in Ukraine – essentially a unilateral concession to Russia with no Russian concessions in return.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Anatoliy Barhylevych with Major General Andriy Hnatov on March 16.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

• Russian occupation officials continue to develop analogues to the federal "Time of Heroes" programming in occupied Ukraine as part of long-term efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia and militarize society in occupied Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin did not accept the US-Ukrainian proposal for a temporary ceasefire along the frontline and reiterated his demands for a resolution to the war that amount to Ukrainian capitulation. Putin and US President Donald Trump held a phone call on March 18. The Kremlin's official readout of the call stated that Putin emphasized the need to address the "root causes" of the war. Russian officials have repeatedly defined these root causes as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine. Russian officials’ calls for the elimination of these "root causes" amount to Russian demands for Ukraine's permanent neutrality and the installation of a pro-Russian government in Kyiv.

Putin demanded on March 18 that Ukraine stop mobilizing (i.e. recruiting and training) forces during a potential temporary ceasefire. Putin also called for a halt to all foreign military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine but did not discuss Russia's military support from North Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Iran. Putin claimed that Russia and the United States should continue their efforts toward a peace settlement in "bilateral mode," excluding Ukraine or Europe from future negotiations about the war in Ukraine. Putin's demands on the March 18 call parallel the demands he made on March 13.

ISW continues to assess that Putin is attempting to hold the temporary ceasefire proposal hostage in order to extract preemptive concessions ahead of formal negotiations to end the war. ISW also continues to assess that Putin's demands for the removal of the legitimate government of Ukraine, the weakening of the Ukrainian military such that it cannot defend against future Russian aggression, and the denial of Ukraine's sovereignty and independence remain unchanged. The persistence of Putin's demands for Ukraine's capitulation demonstrates that Putin is not interested in good-faith negotiations to pursue Trump's stated goal of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Trump and Putin agreed on a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure, but the exact contours of the moratorium remain unclear at this time. The Kremlin stated that Putin accepted Trump's proposal for a 30-day moratorium on strikes against "energy infrastructure" and that Putin "immediately gave the Russian military the corresponding order," whereas the White House stated that Putin and Trump agreed to "an energy and infrastructure ceasefire." It is unclear which targets are explicitly prohibited under the 30-day moratorium given the difference in language between the two readouts of the call.

The Kremlin also stated that Putin "informed" Trump that Russia and Ukraine will each exchange 175 prisoners of war (POWs) on March 19 and that Russia will also transfer 23 seriously wounded Ukrainian soldiers, whom Putin claimed are currently undergoing medical treatment in Russian hospitals, as a "gesture of goodwill." The March 11 US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal stated that Ukrainian and American delegations discussed POW exchanges as part of the peace process, particularly during a potential temporary ceasefire on the frontline. The White House stated on March 18 that Russia and the United States will "immediately" begin negotiations in an unspecified country in the Middle East about a temporary maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea, a "full ceasefire," and a permanent peace settlement. The Kremlin stated that the United States and Russia are creating "expert groups" to continue efforts to achieve a peace settlement "in bilateral mode."

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky endorsed the Trump-Putin energy strikes moratorium agreement on March 18 and said that Ukraine expects to receive additional information from Trump about the proposal. Zelensky stated that Ukraine would not accept a situation in which Russia strikes Ukrainian energy infrastructure and Ukraine is unable to respond.

Key Takeaways

• Russian President Vladimir Putin did not accept the US-Ukrainian proposal for a temporary ceasefire along the frontline and reiterated his demands for a resolution to the war that amount to Ukrainian capitulation.

• Trump and Putin agreed on a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure, but the exact contours of the moratorium remain unclear at this time.

• Putin continues to hold the temporary ceasefire hostage, likely to extract further concessions from US President Donald Trump and delay or spoil negotiations for an enduring peace in Ukraine.

• Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid intensified Russian offensive operations in the area, likely as part of efforts to leverage Russia's deliberate stalling of the temporary ceasefire proposal to make battlefield gains.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova.

• The Russian military is reportedly increasing the number of its information and psychological operations units.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia and Ukraine have not formally announced the implementation of the temporary long-range strikes ceasefire. Ceasefires take time to negotiate, execute, and monitor and require both sides to agree to cease attacks on specified targets at a specific time and date. Ceasefires also require both sides to agree to mechanisms to monitor the ceasefire and to address allegations of violations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 19 that if Russia and Ukraine come to a temporary strikes ceasefire agreement, then Ukraine will prepare a list of "civilian objects, energy objects, infrastructure objects" to give to Ukraine's partners — indicating that Russia and Ukraine have not finalized the details of which targets would be off limits or agreed on an implementation date.

Official American, Ukrainian, and Russian statements indicate that the parties to the ceasefire have not yet finalized the details of the agreement. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on March 19 that the temporary ceasefire only applies to "energy infrastructure facilities," and Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Peskov declined to comment on the White House statement — likely referring to the March 18 White House statement following the call between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin — that the ceasefire applied to "energy and infrastructure." Trump told the Washington Examiner on March 18 after his call with Putin that Russia agreed to "an immediate ceasefire on energy and infrastructure." US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff similarly stated on March 18 after the call that the temporary ceasefire covers "energy and infrastructure in general." The Trump administration's statement following Trump's March 19 call with Zelensky stated that Trump and Zelensky "agreed on a partial ceasefire against energy." Zelensky stated on March 19 that Ukraine is "ready to implement" a ceasefire on strikes against "energy and civilian infrastructure."

Russian President Vladimir Putin is adding confusion about the timing and details of the ceasefire in an attempt to falsely blame Ukraine for violating the ceasefire before both countries have officially implemented the agreement. The Kremlin is attempting to posture Russia as already adhering to the temporary ceasefire while claiming that Ukraine is violating the ceasefire — even though both parties have not agreed on the details of the agreement or officially implemented the ceasefire. The Kremlin readout of the March 18 phone call between Putin and Trump stated that Putin "immediately gave the Russian military" an order that "corresponded" with his "positive response" to Trump's temporary ceasefire proposal. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that seven Russian drones were en route to striking Ukrainian energy facilities connected to defense industrial enterprises in Mykolaiv Oblast when Putin issued the order to the Russian military. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces received orders to "neutralize" the drones and that Russian forces used Pantsir air defense systems to down six drones and that a Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) fighter jet destroyed the other. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 18 to 19, and Zelensky noted on March 19 that Russian drones had struck a hospital in Sumy Oblast and unspecified areas in Donetsk Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian drones struck an oil transshipment facility in Krasnodar Krai following the Trump-Putin call and attempted to frame the Ukrainian strike as a violation of the ceasefire agreement. Russian claims that Russia adhered to the ceasefire by abstaining from conducting strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and that Ukraine violated the ceasefire are inaccurate as Russia and Ukraine have not yet officially implemented the agreement. Such Russian claims are attempts to take advantage of the lack of clarity about the details of the ceasefire that the Kremlin is injecting. Putin's attempt to confuse and manipulate the temporary strikes ceasefire and blame Ukraine for violations even before the agreement has come into effect is an indicator of how Putin will likely exploit any future agreements.

Key Takeaways

• Russia and Ukraine have not formally announced the implementation of the temporary long-range strikes ceasefire.

• Official American, Ukrainian, and Russian statements indicate that the parties to the ceasefire have not yet finalized the details of the agreement.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is adding confusion about the timing and details of the ceasefire in an attempt to falsely blame Ukraine for violating the ceasefire before both countries have officially implemented the agreement.

• The Kremlin continues to contradict Trump's report of his call with Putin on March 18.

• The Kremlin continues to demand that Ukraine cede Ukrainian territory that Russia does not currently occupy and to set conditions to make further territorial demands.

• The United States, Ukraine, and Europe continue to agree that Ukraine and Europe must be involved in peace negotiations to end the war, despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to exclude Ukraine and Europe from such negotiations.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on March 19.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, described recent Russian deception tactics that may amount to acts of perfidy — a war crime under the Geneva Convention.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast and near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

• Russian milbloggers argued that the Russian government should give military awards and social benefits to military instructors and Russian defense industrial base (DIB) employees.

Institute for the Study of War

>• The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main
>Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz
>Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, described recent
>Russian deception tactics that may amount to acts of perfidy —
>a war crime under the Geneva Convention.


Acts of perfidy?

Man lernt. In Praxis wohl das Tragen ukrainischer Uniformen.


Article 37 - Prohibition of perfidy

(d) the feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict. 2. Ruses of war are not prohibited.

"Als ich 2018 mit ihm beim NATO-Gipfel in Brüssel war, wäre das fast passiert. Kurz vor seiner Rede rief er mich an den Tisch, an dem alle Staats- und Regierungschefs saßen, und fragte mich: 'John, sollen wir es tun?'". Damit habe Trump einen NATO-Austritt gemeint. Damals habe er den Präsidenten gedrängt, dies nicht zu tun, "aber er hat es sich seitdem in den Kopf gesetzt"
https://www.msn.com/de-at/nachrichten/ausland/ex-berater-trumps-rechnet-mit-nato-austritt -der-usa/ar-AA1Bil7N?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=63938f5def464753a20198338d1f6ced&ei=12

>"Als ich 2018 mit ihm beim NATO-Gipfel in Brüssel war, wäre
>das fast passiert. Kurz vor seiner Rede rief er mich an den
>Tisch, an dem alle Staats- und Regierungschefs saßen, und
>fragte mich: 'John, sollen wir es tun?'". Damit habe Trump
>einen NATO-Austritt gemeint. Damals habe er den Präsidenten
>gedrängt, dies nicht zu tun, "aber er hat es sich seitdem in
>den Kopf gesetzt"
>https://www.msn.com/de-at/nachrichten/ausland/ex-berater-trumps-rechnet-mit-nato-austritt -der-usa/ar-AA1Bil7N?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=63938f5def464753a20198338d1f6ced&ei=12


Die Aussagen von John Bolten würde ich nicht allzu ernst nehmen. Der ist noch immer sauer, weil ihn Trump, während der 1. Amtszeit, als Berater rausgeschmissen hat. Bolton, einer der für mehr Krieg, als weniger Krieg eintritt..

"The U.S. leader called Bolton “a disgruntled boring fool who only wanted to go to war. Never had a clue, was ostracized & happily dumped. What a dope!”

Bis zum Sommer soll jeder Haushalt in Frankreich ein 20-seitiges Überlebenshandbuch erhalten – eine Maßnahme, die Bürger auf eine Invasion oder andere „unmittelbare Bedrohungen“ vorbereiten soll.
https://www.msn.com/de-at/nachrichten/politik/vorbereitung-auf-krieg-frankreich-verteilt- %C3%BCberlebenshandbuch/ar-AA1BiKzw?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=ENTPSP&cvid=e4962edc624f475fc911b5300d98287e&ei=9