Russian President Vladimir Putin is once again attempting to obfuscate his unwillingness to participate
in good-faith negotiations to end the war by blaming Ukraine for defending itself against Russia's
invasion and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. Putin claimed during a televised interview with
Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on January 24 that he is willing to negotiate "on the Ukraine issue,"
but that a 2022 Ukrainian presidential decree declaring the "impossibility of negotiating" with Putin is
a significant impediment to peace negotiations. Putin falsely claimed that Ukraine and Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky are not interested in peace negotiations and that it is impossible for
Russia and Ukraine to discuss "anything serious" with the decree in place. Putin claimed that any peace
agreements that result from negotiations between Russia and Ukraine before Ukraine repeals the 2022
decree will be "illegitimate" and claimed that the West must force Zelensky to repeal the 2022 decree.
Putin also once again questioned Zelensky's legitimacy as the current president of Ukraine and insinuated
that US President Donald Trump should negotiate exclusively with Putin about Ukraine's fate, as the two
leaders can "calmly" discuss their interests. Putin has previously called for Ukraine to repeal the 2022
decree, but Putin's intense focus on the decree during his January 24 interview marks yet another attempt
to distract from his unwillingness to engage in peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
Zelensky signed the September 2022 decree banning negotiations with Putin in direct response to Putin's
illegal annexation of four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine and after months of negotiations in
which Russia continued to demand Ukraine's full capitulation. The Ukrainian presidential decree
explicitly prohibits Ukraine from conducting negotiations with Putin. The context within which the decree
was signed is important, however. Zelensky signed the decree on the day that Putin illegally annexed four
Ukrainian oblasts (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts), including areas that Russian
forces did not then and still do not occupy. The decree states that the ban on negotiations with Putin is
a response to Russia's illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory and part of Ukraine's efforts to
"guarantee the security of the Euro-Atlantic space, Ukraine, and
territorial integrity." Zelensky signed the September 2022 decree after months of Russian-Ukrainian peace
talks in Istanbul in Spring 2022, during which Russia demanded that Ukraine be a permanently neutral
state that could not join NATO and that Ukraine submit to limitations on the size of the Ukrainian
military similar to those imposed by the Treaty of Versailles on Germany after World War I. These terms
would have restricted Ukraine's Armed Forces to 85,000 soldiers who would be unable to defend Ukraine
against a third Russian invasion.
However, Zelensky has consistently signaled his willingness
to negotiate with Russia and make certain compromises in pursuit of peace following the 2022 decree
banning formal negotiations with Putin. Zelensky has outlined clear conditions for potential talks with
Russia and emphasized the importance of preserving Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity,
developing Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB), and securing security guarantees from Ukraine's
Western allies. Zelensky has repeatedly advocated for a diplomatic solution to the war, proposing that
Ukraine should enter any peace negotiations from a "position of strength" – a strategy aimed at
compelling Russia to engage in good-faith negotiations and consider just compromises in such
negotiations. Zelensky has also invited Russian representatives to attend Ukraine's second Global Peace
Summit in the future.
Kremlin officials have consistently dismissed these overtures, labeling
Ukraine's proposed peace formula and platforms "unviable," and Putin even reportedly asked People's
Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping to "snub" the first Global Peace Conference in June 2024.
Zelensky has continued to express openness to direct negotiations and has acknowledged the possibility of
a diplomatic compromise as part of a broader solution to the war despite Russia's repeated rejections.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is once again attempting to
obfuscate his unwillingness to participate in good-faith negotiations to end the war by blaming Ukraine
for defending itself against Russia's invasion and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory.
• Zelensky signed the decree in September 2022 banning negotiations with Putin in direct response to
Putin's illegal annexation of four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine and after months of
negotiations in which Russia continued to demand Ukraine's full capitulation.
• However,
Zelensky has consistently signaled his willingness to negotiate with Russia and make certain compromises
in pursuit of peace following the 2022 decree banning formal negotiations with Putin.
• Putin
meanwhile continues to signal to both his domestic and global audiences that he is not interested in
peace short of his full demands and remains committed to Ukraine's complete capitulation.
• Putin is attempting to leverage the 2022 decree as a strawman to hide the reality of his disinterest
in negotiations and to sow discord between Ukraine and its Western allies.
• Putin also
attempted to position himself as Trump’s equal during his interview, reinforcing his long-held belief
that Russia is the great-power heir to the Soviet Union.
• Putin demonstrated that he is
worried about the effect that lower oil prices would have on his domestic stability and ability to wage
his war in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is attempting to revive its information operation aimed at
deterring the US and other Western states from providing further military assistance to Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is framing the new 2025 Union State Security Concept as completely superseding the
original 1999 Security Concept, indicating that this new agreement may be more expansive than the
original and will further forward the Kremlin's effort to annex Belarus.
• Ukrainian forces
conducted a large series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil
refineries on the night of January 23 to 24 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading
Russian military capacity.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv
Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Ukrainian forces recently
recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.
Ukraine and Moldova continue to offer solutions to Transnistria's energy crisis as Moldovan President
Maia Sandu met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on January 25. Zelensky stated at a
press conference with Sandu that Ukraine can supply Transnistria with coal at low prices or even free of
charge if Transnistria would supply Ukraine with electricity in return. Zelensky also stated that Ukraine
is ready to send a team of specialists to help increase the Transnistrian power plant's electricity
output such that it would far exceed Transnistria's domestic needs, allowing Transnistria to provide
electricity to all of Moldova and Ukraine. Zelensky noted that Transnistria's cooperation with Moldova
and Ukraine would help reduce electricity prices throughout all of Moldova by 30 percent. Transnistrian
authorities have previously refused Moldovan and Ukrainian offers of help, instead turning to schemes
that involve Moscow directly or indirectly providing enough gas to the breakaway republic to cover only
its domestic electricity needs. Ukrainian and Moldovan officials have noted that Russia is trying to
leverage its manufactured gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion before the Summer 2025 Moldovan
parliamentary elections.<3> Transnistria's possible acceptance of Ukrainian and Moldovan offers of aid
and Transnistria's subsequent supply of cheaper electricity to the rest of Moldova would disrupt Russian
efforts to use the energy crisis to strengthen Transnistria's economic dependence on Moscow, to posture
Russia as the breakaway republic's savior and benefactor, and to leverage Chisinau's turn to higher
priced European electricity as part of Moscow's anti-EU narratives.
The Kremlin is continuing
to leverage the prominent Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel to cultivate increased Russian influence
in Iraq. The Rybar channel claimed on January 25 that members of the Rybar team – including its founder
Mikhail Zvinchuk – visited Iraq over the last week and met with Iraqi officials, including Iraqi Prime
Minister Mohammad Shia Al Sudani. The channel claimed that Iraqi officials noted their openness to
increasing trade and foreign investments with Russian partners and their interest in further developing
Russian–Iraqi relations. The channel welcomed Russian businesses, media companies, bloggers, and
investors to begin exploring opportunities in Iraq. Member of the Rybar team visited Iraq in August 2024,
and ISW noted at the time that this was the first observed report of a Russian milblogger meeting with a
senior foreign official. ISW-CTP previously assessed that Russia may be setting conditions to supplant
the US as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the US possibly reducing its military presence
there. The recent fall of the Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria may be prompting the Kremlin to reconsider
the contours of its relations with Iraq.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukraine and Moldova
continue to offer solutions to Transnistria's energy crisis as Moldovan President Maia Sandu met with
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on January 25.
• The Kremlin is continuing to
leverage the prominent Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel to cultivate increased Russian influence in
Iraq.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka
Novosilka.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 25 that the Russian
government will allow veterans of volunteer formations (dobrovolcheskie formirovaniya) to receive "combat
veteran status" without submitting a formal application.
Russian forces recently made further advances within Velyka Novosilka amid official Russian claims that
Russian forces seized the entire settlement on January 26. Geolocated footage published on January 26
indicates that Russian forces advanced northward along Tsentralana Street in northern Velyka Novosilka.
Some Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on January 26 that Russian
forces completely seized Velyka Novosilka, whereas other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces had
seized most of the settlement. Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are still clearing
Ukrainian forces from the settlement, including the northern part, and that Ukrainian forces are still
counterattacking in the area. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces occupy
89 percent of the settlement, however. Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov
stated on January 26 that Russian forces have not occupied all of Velyka Novosilka and that Ukrainian
forces maintain positions in the settlement. A Ukrainian brigade operating within Velyka Novosilka stated
on January 26 that fighting continues within the settlement and that Russian forces do not pose a threat
of encircling the brigade's elements. ISW has not observed independent evidence of Russian forces
encircling Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka. The Ukrainian brigade also reported that neither Russian
nor Ukrainian forces can use heavy equipment due to parity of strikes near the contact line and that
Ukrainian and Russian forces have "approximate parity" in terms of artillery and first-person view (FPV)
drones but that Russian forces have a "huge" manpower advantage in the area. The brigade stated that
Ukrainian forces are conducting artillery and drone strikes against Russian forces within Velyka
Novosilka and that the Mokri Yaly River that flows through western Velyka Novosilka is an obstacle to
Russian advances. Russian forces continued offensive operations within and near Velyka Novosilka itself,
northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 25
and 26.
The Russian MoD notably is paying an abnormally high amount of fanfare to the claimed
Russian seizure of Velyka Novosilka, very likely as part of informational efforts to shape Western
perceptions of the battlefield situation in Ukraine and degrade international support for Ukraine. The
Russian MoD posted footage during the day of January 26 purportedly showing Russian forces conducting
thermobaric artillery strikes against Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka and claimed that Russian
assault groups were clearing Ukrainian positions. The Russian MoD later claimed that elements of the
Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army , Eastern Military District ) and the 40th
Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) seized all of Velyka Novosilka, and Russian Defense Minister
Andrei Belousov congratulated the command and personnel of the two brigades for the seizure. The Russian
MoD subsequently posted footage purportedly showing Russian flags in multiple areas of the settlement.
Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA) also
participated in the claimed seizure of Velyka Novosilka, and it is unclear why the Russian MoD did not
credit the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade in their announcements. The Russian MoD has not recently been
announcing the claimed seizures of settlements with so much fanfare and as quickly as they did on January
26. Russia is likely trying to leverage the claimed seizure of Velyka Novosilka in order to influence
Western perceptions of the situation on the battlefield in Donetsk Oblast, to advance narratives that
Russian battlefield gains are inevitable and that Ukrainian positions are rapidly deteriorating. Russian
gains in western Donetsk Oblast continue to be gradual and far below the pace that is normal for modern
mechanized warfare. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether Russian forces will be able to rapidly
advance beyond Velyka Novosilka, as it is unclear how much combat power elements of the EMD still retain
after several months of continuous offensive operations. Velyka Novosilka is located next to several
rivers which will likely complicate and hamper further Russian tactical advances in the area. Russian
forces have historically struggled with river crossings and tactical terrain features, such as rivers,
will likely complicate Russian forces' ability to leverage the seizure of Velyka Novosilka to make
operationally significant advances in western Donetsk Oblast.
The seizure and clearing of
Velyka Novosilka will likely present opportunities and a decision point to the Russian military command
on whether to redeploy elements of the Russian Eastern Military District from the Velyka Novosilka
area to other priority operational areas. Any redeployment of EMD elements from the Velyka Novosilka area
over the coming weeks will indicate the Russian military command’s priority operational areas for
offensive operations in Spring and Summer 2025. Elements of the Russian EMD have been the primary
fighting force in the Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka directions since at least early 2023, defended
against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Summer 2023, and later intensified offensive operations in the
area in Fall 2024. Elements of the EMD participated in the seizure of Vuhledar in September and October
2024 and successfully exploited the seizure of the settlement to advance north towards Kurakhove and west
towards and into Velyka Novosilka over the following three months. The seizure of Velyka Novosilka will
present the Russian military command with a decision point during which the Russian military command can
pursue several courses of action (COAs). Velyka Novosilka is protected from Ukrainian counterattack due
to the settlement’s disposition near the Mokri Yaly River. The Russian military command may opt to retain
elements of the EMD in the western Donetsk Oblast area and continue advancing towards the
Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary, which runs north and west of Velyka Novosilka.
This decision would indicate that the Russian military is prioritizing advances to the administrative
boundary as quickly as possible over other axes of advance in Donetsk Oblast or other frontline areas. It
remains unclear how much combat power the EMD elements still retain after having engaged in intense
operations for over six months, however. The Russian military command could also retain some EMD elements
in the Velyka Novosilka area to continue limited attacks and pin Ukrainian forces in the area but
redeploy the bulk of the EMD to another frontline area. Russian forces are currently intensifying
offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Borova, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk directions and are still
working to eliminate the remainder of the Ukrainian salients in the Kurakhove direction and Kursk Oblast.
Ukrainian officials have also recently warned that Russian forces may also renew offensive operations in
Zaporizhia Oblast in 2025. The Russian military command could redeploy EMD elements to any of these
directions, and the redeployment of elements of the EMD will be an indicator of the Russian military
command's priority areas for Spring and Summer 2025.
Russian forces are poised to seize
Toretsk in the coming days and a redeployment of elements of the EMD to reinforce the Russian force
grouping in the Toretsk direction would indicate a new Russian priority effort to resume attacks in the
direction of Kostyantynivka. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely intend to exploit the
seizure of Toretsk to push further west and along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway towards the
southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka. Russian advances in the Toretsk
direction have historically been slow as Russian forces fought through built up urban areas, but Russian
forces may begin to advance relatively more quickly once they break out of Toretsk into the more open
fields west of the settlement. Russian forces may also attempt to leverage tactical gains within and near
Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk and select Russian
milbloggers have recently speculated that Russian forces may be intensifying offensive operations
southwest of Toretsk for this purpose. Russian forces may want to eliminate the Ukrainian salient
southwest of Toretsk in order to firm up their southern flank ahead of a push on Kostyantynivka. The
Russian military command may redeploy elements of the EMD to reinforce offensive operations in the
Toretsk direction if it intends to prioritize pressuring the Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast in
the Spring and Summer 2025. Seizing Pokrovsk has been the Russian military command’s main operational
objective in Donetsk Oblast since February 2024. A Russian redeployment of EMD elements to the Toretsk or
Chasiv Yar directions - as opposed to retaining the EMD elements in western Donetsk Oblast, redeploying
them to the Zaporizhia direction, or redeploying them to the Pokrovsk direction - would therefore
indicate an inflection in Russian operational priorities.
Ukrainian forces conducted a second
strike on the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26. The Ukrainian
General Staff reported on January 26 that elements of Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate
(GUR) and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan City. Geolocated footage shows
a fire at a tank at the refinery. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 26 that
Russian forces downed eight drones over Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26. Ryazan Oblast
Governor Pavel Malkov claimed that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) systems destroyed
Ukrainian drones over Ryazan Oblast and that authorities were assessing material damage. Ukrainian
official sources noted that the Ryazan Oil Refinery is one of the four largest refineries in Russia and
produces fuel for military equipment; jet fuel; diesel fuel; and other petroleum products for tanks,
aircraft, and ships. Ukrainian forces last struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery on the night of January 23 to
24.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces recently made further advances within Velyka
Novosilka amid official Russian claims that Russian forces seized the entire settlement on January 26.
• The Russian MoD notably is paying an abnormally high amount of fanfare to the claimed Russian
seizure of Velyka Novosilka, very likely as part of informational efforts to shape Western perceptions of
the battlefield situation in Ukraine and degrade international support for Ukraine.
• The
seizure and clearing of Velyka Novosilka will likely present opportunities and a decision point to the
Russian military command on whether to redeploy elements of the Russian Eastern Military District
from the Velyka Novosilka area to other priority operational areas. Any redeployment of EMD elements from
the Velyka Novosilka area over the coming weeks will indicate the Russian military command’s priority
operational areas for offensive operations in Spring and Summer 2025.
• Russian forces are
poised to seize Toretsk in the coming days and a redeployment of elements of the EMD to reinforce the
Russian force grouping in the Toretsk direction would indicate a new Russian priority effort to resume
attacks in the direction of Kostyantynivka.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a second strike on
the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26.
• Ukrainian forces
advanced in Kursk Oblast and regained positions in Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced
near Borova, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian government
on January 25 for not prioritizing the recruitment and training of Russia's next generation of military
officers.
Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone storage facilities in Oryol Oblast again on January 26.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 26 that the Ukrainian forces struck drone and thermobaric
warhead storage warehouses, causing secondary detonations. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the
strike destroyed over 200 Shahed drones. Oryol Oblast Governor Andrei Klychkov claimed on January 26 that
Ukrainian forces repeatedly attempted to strike Oryol Oblast and that Russian electronic warfare (EW)
interference downed a Ukrainian drone in Oryol Oblast. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation
Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian forces struck the same drone storage facility at
the end of December 2024.
The European Union (EU) proposed an aid package on January 27 to
Moldova and Transnistria to help the ongoing gas crisis in the pro-Russian breakaway republic as part of
efforts to reduce Russia's ability to exploit Transnistria in its energy blackmail schemes targeting
Chisinau. The package includes an immediate loan of three million cubic meters of gas to Transnistria and
offers a grant of 30 million euros (about $31.4 million) for Moldova to purchase gas – presumably from
the European market – from February 1 to 10 to support Transnistria's electricity production for domestic
consumption and export to the rest of Moldova. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean noted that the EU
will continue to support Chisinau after February 10 in order to ensure that Transnistria can continue to
produce electricity for Transnistria and Moldova. The EU aid package offers to invest in Transnistrian
electricity production and distribution over the next two years. The EU stated that it is also
considering supporting coal deliveries from Ukraine to Transnistria and that it has supported the
allocation of transmission capacity along the gas delivery route from Bulgaria and Romania to Moldova.
The Transnistrian Energy Operational Headquarters stated on January 27 that Transnistrian gas reserves
are running out and will last only until early February 2025 "at most." Russian business outlet
Kommersant reported on January 27 that its sources stated that Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz is in
discussions with Hungarian oil and gas company MOL and Hungarian electricity company MVM about buying gas
for Transnistria, the delivery of which would begin in early February 2025 and continue until late March
or early April 2025. Recean confirmed on January 27 that MOL presented Moldovagaz with a draft contract
on the supply of gas for Transnistria but that Moldovan authorities must verify the legality and
compliance of the contract with national and international law. Transnistrian authorities have previously
rejected Moldovan and Ukrainian offers of aid. ISW continues to assess that Transnistria's possible
acceptance of aid from Moldova, Ukraine, or the EU and Transnistria's subsequent supply of cheaper
electricity to the rest of Moldova would disrupt Russian efforts to use the energy crisis to strengthen
Transnistria's economic dependence on Moscow, to posture Russia as the breakaway republic's savior and
benefactor, and to leverage Chisinau's turn to higher priced European electricity as part of Moscow's
anti-EU narratives.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Khortytsia Group of Forces
Commander Brigadier General Andrii Hnatov with Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi on
January 26. Zelensky stated that Drapatyi will also remain Ground Forces Commander and that Hnatov will
become Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff. Zelensky noted that Drapatyi's dual position will
help combine the Ukrainian military's combat operations with the proper training of brigades and that
Hnatov will work to improve coordination between headquarters and the front.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone storage facilities in Oryol Oblast again on
January 26.
• The European Union (EU) proposed an aid package on January 27 to Moldova and
Transnistria to help the ongoing gas crisis in the pro-Russian breakaway republic as part of efforts to
reduce Russia's ability to exploit Transnistria in its energy blackmail schemes targeting Chisinau.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Khortytsia Group of Forces Commander Brigadier
General Andrii Hnatov with Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi on January 26.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.
• Russian forces
recently advanced near Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, and Kurakhove.
• The Russian government continues
to expand the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into
government positions, by creating similar programs for Russian veterans across government, including at
the regional level.
The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28
to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria. The Russian delegation includes Deputy
Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Presidential Special Representative to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev.
Reuters reported that two Syrian sources stated that the delegation will meet with the new Syrian
government sometime this week. Bogdanov told Russian state media outlet RT that the visit aims to
strengthen Russian-Syrian historical relations based on common interests. Bloomberg reported that a
Russian source familiar with the matter stated that Russia is struggling to retain access to the Hmeimim
Air Base and Port of Tartus because negotiations with the new Syrian government are "stuck." Russian
milbloggers responded to the Russian delegation's arrival, claiming that Syria is "far from" Russia's
first or even second priority and cautioning against believing Russian or Syrian officials' "standard
phrases" about cooperation. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that there is no hope that
Russian-Syrian relations can return to their previous strength and that Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) holds
the upper hand in negotiations and can extract greater concessions from Russia.
The Russian
military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian
negotiations. Commercially available satellite imagery collected by Planet Labs PBC from January 18 and
27 shows that the Russian military loaded equipment onto the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships at
Tartus and that the Sparta II ship left the port while the Sparta remained. OSINT analyst MT Anderson
posted satellite imagery from January 23 showing the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler alongside the
port and possibly suggesting that the Russian military was loading vehicles onto the Sparta.<8> Bloomberg
reported on January 28 that a Russian source stated that two Russian transport ships — likely the Sparta
and Sparta II — had been waiting for weeks off Tartus before Syrian authorities allowed them to dock.
A senior NATO official acknowledged that Russia is escalating a sabotage and destabilization
campaign against European NATO member states to deter further military assistance to Ukraine. NATO Deputy
Assistant Secretary General James Appathurai stated at the European Parliament on January 28 that NATO
states have faced acts of sabotage in recent years, including train derailments, arson, attacks against
politicians' property, and assassination plots against defense industry figures, including a Kremlin plot
to assassinate Rheinmetall Head Armin Papperger. Appathurai emphasized that the Kremlin aims to "create
disquiet to undermine support for Ukraine" and called for NATO states to more assertively deter Russian
sabotage acts. The Kremlin has consistently attempted to use information operations to deter Western
states from providing additional military assistance to Ukraine. The Kremlin's sabotage and
destabilization campaign directly targeting NATO states supports ISW's assessment that Russian President
Vladimir Putin sees Russia as waging a hybrid war directly against NATO.
Key Takeaways:
• The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on
January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria.
• The Russian
military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian
negotiations.
• The Russian military likely formed a separate unmanned systems regiment at the
military district level in order to augment Russia's unmanned systems capabilities. The creation of this
regiment supports the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) recent coordinated effort to establish the
Unmanned Systems Forces within the Russian military and centralize control over informal drone
detachments.
• A senior NATO official acknowledged that Russia is escalating a sabotage and
destabilization campaign against European NATO member states in Europe to deter further military
assistance to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk and near Pokrovsk, and
Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and in western
Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian government continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to
appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine to federal government positions as part of wider Kremlin efforts
to militarize Russian society.
Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Western military assistance remains vital to Ukraine's
ability to maintain its defense against Russian aggression. Putin gave an interview to Kremlin journalist
Pavel Zarubin published on January 28 in which he claimed that the war in Ukraine could be over within
two months if the West stops providing Ukraine with military assistance and that Ukraine's dependence on
Western military aid indicates that Ukraine has "no sovereignty." Putin's claims about how quickly the
war will end without further Western military assistance and his explicit rejection of Ukrainian
sovereignty are a part of long-term Kremlin information operations aimed at undermining Western support
for Ukraine and deterring additional Western military assistance. Putin is correct, however, that
additional Western military assistance — particularly US military assistance — remains critical to
maintaining and further developing Ukraine's warfighting capabilities. Ukrainian forces have consistently
proven throughout the war that they can achieve operationally- and strategically significant battlefield
victories when armed with sufficient quantities of US and other Western-provided military assistance.
Ukrainian forces have also maintained stubborn defenses even when poorly provisioned and notably forced
Russian forces to withdraw from Kyiv Oblast in April 2022 before significant deliveries of Western aid
even arrived at the frontline and significantly slowed the pace of Russian offensive operations in
Ukraine in Summer 2022. Putin and other Kremlin officials aim to portray Ukraine as weak and incapable of
adequately leveraging Western-provided weapons at this critical moment in Western policy discussions
about Ukraine — even though Ukraine has proven that it is anything but weak after fending off Russia for
the almost three years of war.
Putin's longstanding theory of victory relies on the assumption
that the West will abandon Ukraine, and only unwavering Western support and consistent deliveries of
Western military assistance to Kyiv can force Putin to abandon his theory and accept the need to offer
the concessions necessary for any resolution to the conflict acceptable to the United States, Europe, and
Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that only the United States can provide Ukraine with some critical
weapons and military equipment at the scale, speed, and regularity necessary for Ukraine's defense
against Russia, and Western officials have recently proposed that European states increasingly assist in
funding US military assistance to Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike at the
Russian oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, and reportedly hit a Russian arsenal in Tver
Oblast on the night of January 28 to 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 29 that elements
of Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the
Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez oil refinery in Kstovo and caused a fire. Ukrainian Center for Countering
Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko posted footage of the oil refinery fire in Kstovo and
reported that the refinery produces gasoline, diesel, aviation kerosene, and bitumen; processes 15 to 17
million tons of oil per year; and supports the Russian military. Geolocated footage posted on January 28
and 29 shows a fire at the Nizhny Novgorod Oil Refinery. Russian petrochemicals company Sibur-Ksotvo
Enterprise reported on January 29 that Ukrainian drone debris struck the enterprise on the night of
January 28 to 29, and Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin acknowledged that drone debris started
a fire in an industrial area. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on January 29 that Ukrainian
drones also struck the Russian Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD)'s 23rd Arsenal near Oktyabrsky, Tver Oblast, reportedly damaging an empty weapons storage building
and three other buildings. Ukrainian forces previously struck the Russian 23rd Arsenal in September
2024.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Western
military assistance remains vital to Ukraine's ability to maintain its defense against Russian
aggression.
• Putin's longstanding theory of victory relies on the assumption that the West
will abandon Ukraine, and only unwavering Western support and consistent deliveries of Western military
assistance to Kyiv can force Putin to abandon his theory and accept the need to offer the concessions
necessary for any resolution to the conflict acceptable to the US, Europe, and Ukraine.
• Putin indicated that he will not view any peace agreement with Ukraine as binding by claiming that
the Ukrainian government is either unwilling or unable to rescind the 2022 Ukrainian presidential decree
banning negotiations with Putin.
• Putin's statements rejecting the legitimacy of the
Ukrainian government and of a possible future peace agreement set conditions for Russia to justify
violating any future agreements with Ukraine.
• Putin continues efforts to coerce US President
Donald Trump into bilateral negotiations that exclude Ukraine, impose his desired negotiations framework
on Trump, and compel Trump to inadvertently endorse ongoing Russian information operations about the
illegitimacy of the current Ukrainian government.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike
at the Russian oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and reportedly hit a Russian arsenal in
Tver Oblast on the night of January 28 to 29.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)
confirmed in a post on January 29 that Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik is the commander of the
Russian Southern Grouping of Forces.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and
near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove,
Velyka Novosilka, Robotnye, and in the Dnipro direction.
• Volunteer recruitment rates in in
Moscow have dropped sharply, as Russian citizens grow increasingly unwilling to serve in Ukraine.
Kremlin newswire TASS published an interview with Valdai Discussion Club Research Director Fyodor
Lukyanov on January 30 entitled "Don't count on big agreements," highlighting the Kremlin's ongoing
efforts to shape domestic and global expectations about future negotiations between Russian President
Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump. The Valdai Discussion Club is an international forum where
Kremlin officials, Russian scholars, and foreign officials and scholars meet to discuss international
issues and has proven to be a useful tool in the Kremlin's decades-long efforts to influence Western
policy in Russia's favor. Lukyanov is a senior member and scholar at the Valdai Club, has repeatedly
moderated Putin's annual speech at Valdai, and is considered a well-connected and authoritative voice on
the Kremlin's foreign policy goals and objectives -- though he holds no formal position in the Russian
government. ISW is not prepared to assess or argue that Lukyanov has intimate and personal knowledge
about Putin's state of mind or intentions in future peace negotiations, but Lukyanov's statements in this
interview are generally consistent with Putin's and other Kremlin officials' statements about Russia's
future negotiating positions. TASS’ decision to leverage Lukyanov's interview to dampen domestic
speculation about the possibility of a peace agreement in the near future also highlights the relevance
of this interview and Lukyanov's statements when considering Russia's possible negotiating positions
vis-a-vis Ukraine and the United States.
Lukyanov stated during the interview that the "main
thing" for future peace negotiations regarding Ukraine is "not the territories" but addressing the "root
causes" of the war, which Lukyanov defined as NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early
2000s. Lukyanov stated with respect to Ukrainian lands Russian forces now hold that "with the
territories, everything is clear: how much you take is yours," further indicating that the Kremlin has no
intention of compromising on its territorial gains in Ukraine in future peace negotiations. This position
suggests that the Kremlin likely means for any future peace negotiations with Trump to start with the
United States recognizing Russia's territorial claims over Ukraine, likely including areas that Russia
does not currently occupy, before actual negotiations can begin that should focus on these so-called
"root causes." Lukyanov stated that Russia's chief demand for future peace negotiations with Trump is "a
change in the security landscape in Eastern Europe" and the "abandoning a number of provisions on
which NATO's existence and functioning are based." Lukyanov stated that Russia may also want to discuss
the possibility of "reducing the level of military presence," presumably along Russia's borders,
but noted that this is unlikely to happen.
Kremlin officials have repeatedly alluded to the
need for future peace negotiations to address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov defined in December 2024 as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to
advance eastward and "aggressive absorption" of areas near Russia's borders. Putin issued a series of
demands to the United States in December 2021 ahead of his full-scale invasion of Ukraine that included
that: NATO commit to not accepting Ukraine or any other countries as new members; the United States
commit to upholding the alleged ban on NATO enlargement; NATO not deploy any military forces to states
that became NATO members after May 1997; and NATO ban any military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe,
the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, among other things. The Financial Times (FT) reported on January
10, citing a former senior Kremlin official and another source who discussed the topic with Putin, that
Putin will maintain his pre-war demands of preventing Ukraine from joining NATO and forcing NATO to
withdraw deployments in Eastern Europe in any future negotiations. Lukyanov's statements are yet another
indication that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United
States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this goal.
Lukyanov's statements
assume that Trump and his administration are weak and more susceptible to being intimidated by the
Kremlin's shows of force than the former Biden Administration. Lukyanov claimed that Trump wants to "dump
all further problems" concerning Ukraine on Europe and "does not respect" European states or NATO more
broadly. Lukyanov claimed that Trump may be willing to compromise NATO's foundational principles to
appease Putin's demand for a NATO withdrawal from Eastern Europe and suggested more broadly that Trump
will abandon Ukraine and NATO. Lukyanov claimed that "Trump only respects those who show steadfastness"
and called on the Kremlin to "never give in" and "to be prepared for a fairly tough conversation, even
including elements of bluff" -- calling on the Putin to strongarm Trump and demonstrate his resolve in
future negotiations with Trump. Lukyanov's interview supports the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to force
Trump into acquiescing to Putin's demands that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation and the weakening of
NATO and Putin's personal efforts to position himself as Trump's equal on the international stage.
Key Takeaways:
• Kremlin newswire TASS published an interview with Valdai Discussion
Club Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov on January 30 entitled "Don't count on big agreements,"
highlighting the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to shape domestic and global expectations about future
negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump.
• Lukyanov stated during the interview that the "main thing" for future peace negotiations regarding
Ukraine is "not the territories" but addressing the "root causes" of the war, which Lukyanov defined as
NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s.
• Lukyanov's statements
assume that Trump and his administration are weak and more susceptible to being intimidated by the
Kremlin's shows of force than the former Biden Administration.
• People's Republic of China
(PRC)-based companies continue to supply Russia with critical materials needed to sustain Russia's war
efforts in Ukraine.
• The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a
resolution on January 28 defining its position on peace in Ukraine, closely echoing the principle of
"peace through strength" that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky previously outlined.
• The US military reportedly recently transferred Patriot missiles from Israel to Poland and is
expected to deliver these missiles to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost
positions near Kharkiv and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and
Kurakhove and in the Dnipro direction.
The United Kingdom (UK), Finland, and Czechia announced several immediate and longer-term military
assistance packages for Ukraine on January 31. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on January
31 that the UK will provide Ukraine with a military assistance package valued at two billion GBP (about
$2.5 billion), primarily for the purchase of air defense systems and funding for the localization of
defense production in Ukraine. Finnish Defense Minister Antti Hakkanen announced on January 31 that
Finland will provide Ukraine with a new tranche of military assistance valued at almost 200 million euros
(about $207 million). Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky stated on January 31 that the Czech government
is considering creating a new initiative to purchase artillery ammunition for Ukraine.
Russian
forces are expanding their salient north of Kupyansk as part of long-term operational efforts to push
Ukrainian forces from the east (left) bank of the Oskil River. Russian offensive operations along the
Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna (Kupyansk-Borova-Lyman) line gradually intensified in September 2024 after a
relatively low tempo period in early and mid-2024 during which Russian forces primarily conducted
infantry assaults and occasional platoon-sized mechanized assaults in the area. Ukrainian forces repelled
a reinforced battalion-sized Russian mechanized assault near Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk) in late
September 2024 – the first large Russian mechanized assault in this direction since Winter 2023-2024.
Russian forces have recently intensified offensive operations north of Kupyansk, particularly near
Dvorichna, as part of this broader intensification in the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions.
Geolocated footage published on January 30 and 31 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally
advanced north of Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk and on the west bank of the Oskil River), advanced
in the southern outskirts of Zapadne (southwest of Dvorichna), and advanced northward along the west bank
of the Oskil River northwest of Novomlynsk (northeast of Dvorichna). The Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD) claimed on January 28 and 31 that Russian forces recently seized Dvorichna, and a Russian
milblogger claimed on January 31 that Russian forces seized Novomlynsk. ISW has not observed confirmation
of these claims, however.
Russian forces are also leveraging mechanized assaults to expand
their salient north of Kupyansk. Russian forces have conducted five company-sized mechanized assaults and
at least one reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction since late October
2024. The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on January
28 that Ukrainian forces have repelled four mechanized assaults of unspecified echelon since January 22
alone. The Russian military command has historically allocated armored vehicles to priority frontline
areas and intensified mechanized activity could indicate that the Kupyansk direction is becoming a
priority sector for Russian forces.
Key Takeaways:
• The United Kingdom (UK),
Finland, and Czechia announced several immediate and longer-term military assistance packages for Ukraine
on January 31.
• Russian forces are expanding their salient north of Kupyansk as part of
long-term operational efforts to push Ukrainian forces from the east (left) bank of the Oskil River.
• Elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Leningrad Military District ) are reportedly
leading the Russian effort to expand the salient north of Kupyansk.
• Elements of the Russian
1st Guards Tank Army (GTA) (Moscow Military District ) are also participating in the envelopment of
Kupyansk and are attempting to advance east of Kupyansk and to expand the Russian salient south of
Kupyansk near Kruhlyakivka likely in order to prepare for advances south of Kupyansk, cross the Oskil
River, and pressure Borova.
• Russian forces appear to be developing and disseminating a
doctrinal method for advances throughout the theater that aims to conduct slow envelopments of frontline
towns and settlements at a scale that is reasonable for Russian forces to conclude before culminating.
• The Russian military command has shown that it is willing to commit to operations that could
take six to nine months to conclude. Russian commanders are likely operating under the assumption or
direct knowledge that Russian President Vladimir Putin does not intend to end the war in Ukraine in the
near future.
• This Russian offensive method is bringing about slow operational maneuver on
the battlefield, but these envelopments require significant planning, foresight, manpower, and equipment
and do not restore rapid, mechanized maneuver to the battlefield.
• Russian forces are also
intensifying their efforts to close the remaining Ukrainian pocket west of Kurakhove.
• Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities agreed to accept a European Union (EU) package that includes
funding for gas purchases for Transnistria, further limiting Russia’s economic influence over the
pro-Russian breakaway republic.
• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil refinery in Volgograd
Oblast amid continued strikes against Russian energy and defense industrial infrastructure.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Western and Ukrainian officials continue to report that North Korean forces have withdrawn from
frontline positions in Kursk Oblast.
Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night
of January 31 to February 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven
Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast and occupied Crimea; seven Iskander-K cruise
missiles from occupied Crimea and Donetsk Oblast; eight Kh-22 cruise missiles from Tu-22M3 aircraft;
eight Kh-101/55 cruise missiles from Tu-95MS strategic bombers; 10 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from tactical
aircraft over Voronezh Oblast; two Kh-31P anti-radiation missiles from the Black Sea; and 123 Shahed and
decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk,
Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces
shot down 56 Shahed and decoy drones; that 61 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic
warfare (EW) interference; and that Ukrainian countermeasures prevented an unspecified but significant
number of Russian missiles from reaching their targets. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian
ballistic missiles had a higher success rate, and ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are likely
leveraging ballistic missiles in strike packages since Ukraine only has a few air defense systems
suitable for intercepting such missiles. Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky, reported that a Russian Kh-22 missile struck a residential building in Poltava City; that
Russian ballistic missiles struck the historical center of Odesa City, and damaged a United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) protected building; and that drones damaged
residential areas, warehouses, and private property in Kharkiv and Kyiv oblasts. The Norwegian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs confirmed that Russian forces struck an area near where Norwegian diplomats were
staying in Odesa City. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russia's overnight strikes
targeted Ukrainian gas and energy facilities that support the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).
A recent Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian naval drone suggests that Russian forces have
developed a new method to offset Ukrainian capabilities in the Black Sea. The Russian MoD reported on
February 1 that Russia's Black Sea Fleet (BSF) used a drone to destroy a Ukrainian naval drone in the
Black Sea. Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian BSF launched a Kronshtadt Orion missile-capable
drone from an unspecified naval asset and that this strike may be the first documented case of Russian
forces leveraging a naval asset to deploy drones capable of destroying Ukrainian naval drones. Another
Russian milblogger called on Russian authorities to increase the production of weapons similar to the
drone-launched X-UAV missiles (TKB-1030) to effectively combat Ukrainian forces' naval drone capabilities
as it is now too risky for Russia to operate helicopters near the Black Sea. Ukrainian forces have
demonstrated their ability to down Russian Mi-8 helicopters operating over the Black Sea using missiles
launched from Magura V5 naval strike drones, and the February 1 BSF strike suggests that Russian forces
have developed a new method to try to offset this Ukrainian naval drone adaptation.
Key
Takeaways:
• Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes
against Ukraine on the night of January 31 to February 1.
• A recent Russian drone strike on a
Ukrainian naval drone suggests that Russian forces have developed a new method to offset Ukrainian
capabilities in the Black Sea.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian
forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
Russian forces reportedly struck a dormitory holding Russian civilians in
Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 1 as Russian authorities widely attempted to deny Russian responsibility
for the strike and blame Ukraine.
Russia continues efforts to illegally deport Ukrainian
children to occupied Crimea and Russia under the guise of evacuation and rehabilitation programs.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman,
Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian forces continue to forcibly
mobilize civilians in occupied Ukraine into the Russian military in violation of the Geneva
Convention.
Russian forces continued to suffer high losses in January 2025 despite a slower rate of advance as
compared with previous months in late 2024. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on February
3 that Russian forces suffered 48,240 casualties – over three Russian motorized rifle divisions worth of
personnel – in January 2025, making January the second highest month of losses since Russia's full-scale
invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.<1> ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian
forces gained roughly 498 square kilometers in January in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, or roughly 16.1
square kilometers per day. The available figures suggest Russian forces suffered roughly 96 casualties
per square kilometer of territory seized. The Ukrainian MoD reported that Russian forces suffered 48,670
casualties in December 2024 – their highest monthly casualty rate since the start of Russia's full-scale
invasion – and ISW assessed that Russian forces gained a total of 593 square kilometers in December 2024.
The roughly 100-square-kilometer decrease in seized territory between December 2024 and January 2025,
coupled with a similar monthly casualty rate, indicates that Russian forces are taking the same high
level of losses despite achieving fewer territorial advances in the near term. ISW previously observed
that Russian advances slowed from November 2024 to December 2024. ISW previously assessed that the
Russian military command likely tolerated record levels of personnel casualties from September 2024
through November 2024 to facilitate larger territorial gains, but it remains unclear whether the Russian
military command will be willing to sustain such casualties if Russian forces' rate of advance continues
to decline as Russian forces are advancing on more heavily defended settlements such as Pokrovsk.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces continued to suffer high losses in January 2025
despite a slower rate of advance as compared with previous months in late 2024.
• Ukrainian
forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure in Volgograd and
Astrakhan oblasts on the night of February 2 to 3.
• Ukrainian forces continue to innovate
with drone operations to maintain their technological advantage over Russia and bring about battlefield
effects.
• The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU)
expressed concern about the "sharp rise" in reports of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of
war (POWs).
• Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on February 3 that
Ukraine has started implementing organizational reforms to transition the Ukrainian Armed Forces into a
"corps structure."
• Unspecified actors assassinated Armen Sargsyan, the founder of the
"Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion, who has been involved in Russia's hybrid activities and invasions of
Ukraine since 2014.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, and Russian forces
recently advanced near Kupyansk, Borova, Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and in the
Dnipro direction.
• The Russian government is expanding the federal "Time of Heroes" program,
which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into government positions, to occupied Ukraine as part of
long-term efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska
Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess damage to the substation as Russian
long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue to threaten Ukraine's nuclear power plants
(NPPs) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities. Grossi did not specify when Russian forces damaged
the Kyviska Electrical Substation but emphasized that a direct strike on the substation or a power supply
disruption could cause a nuclear accident. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne noted that the Kyivska Electrical
Substation is connected to the Rivne NPP and supplies Kyiv City and central and northern Ukraine with
power. Russian forces launched a large series of missile and drone strikes targeting Ukrainian energy
infrastructure connected to Ukrainian NPPs on the night of November 16 to 17, 2024. Grossi reported that
the November 2024 Russian strikes damaged several unspecified electrical substations that are connected
to the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs but that the strikes did not damage the NPPs
themselves. Russian strikes against Ukrainian electrical substations — not just NPPs — continue to
threaten Ukraine's energy generation abilities and can cause long-term damage. Artur Lorkowski, the
director of the Energy Community (an international organization that manages Ukraine’s energy
procurement), told Politico in November 2024 that repairing damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure may
require a significant amount of time because it can take up to one year for Ukraine to find and reinstall
specialized equipment, including auto transformers. Another Ukrainian energy expert told Politico that
Ukraine needs an expedited supply of spare parts for energy infrastructure.
Russian officials
continue to justify the Kremlin's decision to not conduct an involuntary reserve call up at this time
despite indications that the Russian military is struggling to recruit enough new personnel to replace
its high casualties. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed on
February 4 that Russia does not need to conduct another partial involuntary reserve call up because
Russia currently has the battlefield "advantage." Duma Defense Committee member Viktor Sobolev added that
740,000 people have signed Russian military service contracts — presumably since the start of Russia's
full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 — and claimed that mobilization would "only make things worse"
because it would send people without any previous military experience or specialized skills to the
frontline. Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Andrei Krasov also claimed that mobilization
is unnecessary because Russian military registration and enlistment officers are successfully recruiting
new personnel. These Russian Duma deputies are likely claiming that Russian recruitment rates are
sufficient in order to assuage fears among the Russian public of a widely unpopular potential new partial
involuntary reserve call up.
A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port
of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's
continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on
February 3 that Russian and Syrian authorities will continue contacts on "all issues," including about
Russia's continued access to the Port of Tartus. Data from MarineTraffic.com showed that the Russian
Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships were off the coast of Tunisia on February 4. OSINT analyst MT Anderson
posted satellite imagery from the morning of February 4 showing thе Sparta and Sparta II, as well
as potentially the Alexander Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship, the Admiral Golovko Admiral
Gorshkov-class frigate, and the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate off the coast of Tunisia.
Satellite imagery and reports from Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) indicated that
all these vessels had been at the Port of Tartus in December 2024 and January 2025. The departure of a
significant number of vessels from the Port of Tartus suggests that the Kremlin is not optimistic about
the results of ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. The location of the vessels off the coast of Tunisia
also suggests that these ships are not bound for Libya despite the fact that Russia sent some assets from
Syria to Libya by air in December 2024 and January 2025 - as the Critical Threats Project's (CTP) Africa
File previously reported. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's Resistance Center reported on February 4
that Russian ships began evacuating weapons from the Port of Tartus on January 27, and satellite imagery
collected on January 18 and 27 showed that the Russian military had loaded equipment onto the Sparta and
Sparta II at Tartus. The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that the Sparta II turned off its automatic
identification system (AIS) after leaving Syria - a common practice among ships in Russia's "shadow
fleet."
Key Takeaways:
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General
Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess
damage to the substation as Russian long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue threaten
Ukraine's nuclear power plants (NPPS) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities.
• Russian
officials continue to justify the Kremlin's decision to not conduct an involuntary reserve call up at
this time despite indications that the Russian military is struggling to recruit enough new personnel to
replace its high casualties.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to discuss Russia's
possible illegal annexation of Kharkiv Oblast but claimed that Ukraine's September 2022 counteroffensive
in Kharkiv Oblast spoiled Russia's plans to hold a "referendum" in the region at that time.
• A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have
left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in
Syria reportedly continue.
• Ukrainian naval drone strikes have likely forced Russia to
dramatically alter Russian ships' routes between Russia and Syria.
• Russia has also
reportedly used vessels belong to the MoD's Oboronlogistika company to monitor NATO vessels in the Baltic
Sea.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk.
• A Kremlin-affiliated
Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the Siversk direction continue to struggle with
systemic issues with field commanders filing false progress reports despite recent command changes.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his willingness to negotiate with Russia
from a principled position that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the long
run. Zelensky reiterated during an interview published on February 4 that Ukraine cannot and will not
compromise its sovereignty in future peace negotiations, but that Ukraine's partners are not currently
providing Ukraine with sufficient military assistance for Ukrainian forces to push Russian forces from
all occupied Ukrainian territory. Zelensky stated that he is willing to negotiate directly with Russian
President Vladimir Putin but warned that any peace agreement that significantly weakens Ukraine's ability
to defend itself in the future risks another Russian invasion of Ukraine. Zelensky stated that Ukraine
will never recognize Russia's illegal occupation of Ukrainian territory and emphasized that there can be
no compromise on Ukraine's sovereignty. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine will eventually retake all its
territory militarily and diplomatically but noted that the liberation of all Ukrainian territory from
Russian occupation will take time. Zelensky called on Ukraine's allies to pressure Putin and demand that
Russian forces withdraw from all Ukrainian territory. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine wants peace and
that the United States, Europe, Ukraine, and Russia must all be represented in future peace negotiations.
Zelensky's statements highlight that Putin's unwillingness to participate in good-faith negotiations is
the true impediment to the end of the war, despite Putin's recent efforts to falsely blame Zelensky and
Ukraine for the lack of progress towards peace in Ukraine.
Zelensky reiterated that the
Ukrainian Constitution bans Ukraine from holding elections during wartime, but that Ukraine remains
committed to holding elections in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution and laws after the war ends.
Zelensky stated that Ukraine would have to change its constitution to hold an election outside of peace
time and asked how Ukrainian servicemembers, citizens living in Russian-occupied Ukraine, and Ukrainian
refugees and expatriates living abroad would be able to vote in the election before the Ukrainian
government lifts martial law. Zelensky stated that Ukraine will "definitely" hold elections after the war
ends but that Ukraine currently must focus on defending itself from Russian aggression. Putin and other
Kremlin officials have repeatedly used deliberately false readings of Ukraine's law and constitution to
claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate president after Ukraine, adhering to the law and constitution, did
not hold elections under martial law in 2024. The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government from holding
elections or amending the Ukrainian constitution in times of martial law, and the Ukrainian government
legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.
Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Russian forces have suffered roughly 300,000 to
350,000 killed in action (KIA) and roughly 600,000 to 700,000 wounded in action (WIA) since the February
2022 start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Zelensky added that Russian military personnel
suffer a 2:1 wounded to killed ratio because Russian field medicine is poor, and Russian forces struggle
to evacuate wounded personnel from the battlefield. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr
Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 —
150,000 of which were KIA. Zelensky's and Syrskyi's figures indicate that the Russian military suffered
roughly 41 to 48 percent of its total casualties in Ukraine since 2022 in 2024 alone. The highest range
of Zelensky's estimates are notably larger than recent Russian casualty figures from the Ukrainian
General Staff and former US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. Zelensky also stated that roughly 50,000 to
70,000 Russian soldiers have been classified as missing in action (MIA) since February 2022.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his
willingness to negotiate with Russia from a principled position that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and
territorial integrity in the long run.
• Zelensky reiterated that the Ukrainian Constitution
bans Ukraine from holding elections during wartime, but that Ukraine remains committed to holding
elections in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution and laws after the war ends.
• Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Russian forces have suffered roughly 300,000 to
350,000 killed in action (KIA) and roughly 600,000 to 700,000 wounded in action (WIA) since the February
2022 start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a strike
against an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 4 to 5 as a part of an ongoing strike
campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.
• The Russian
military continues efforts to restructure Russia's peacetime military administrative control over
military services (вид; vid) and is apparently disaggregating administrative control
for Russia’s Air Force and Navy from Russia’s military districts.
• The Kremlin continues to
prioritize domestic political stability over efforts to mitigate economic pressure and labor
shortages.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange on
February 5.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and
Kurakhove.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.
Executive Summary: A small group of Ukrainian
troops in Kursk Oblast have complicated the Russian military's efforts to advance in Ukraine over the
last six months. Roughly a division's worth of Ukrainian troops have undermined the Russian military's
ability to launch or renew offensive operations in lower-priority areas of the frontline and to reinforce
priority efforts with elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units. The Ukrainian incursion in Kursk
Oblast is a partial proof of concept of how limited Ukrainian battlefield activity that leverages
vulnerabilities in Russia's warfighting capabilities and that integrates technological adaptations with
mechanized maneuver can have theater-wide impacts on operations. It showed that surprise is still
possible even on a partially transparent battlefield and that rapid maneuver is possible under the right
conditions. The war in Ukraine, in other words, is not permanently stalemated. Either side can
potentially restore maneuver and begin to gain or regain significant territory. Russia will be able to do
so if the West reduces or cuts off aid. Ukraine may be able to do so if Western support continues to
empower Ukrainian innovation.
The Russian military command has gathered around 78,000 troops,
including 11,000 North Koreans, in an attempt to expel Ukrainian forces from positions in Kursk Oblast
over the last six months. An estimated 11,000 Ukrainian forces advanced into Kursk Oblast in early August
2024, seizing the tactical initiative and complicating the Russian military's Fall 2024 offensive effort.
Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly delayed his deadlines for Russian forces to push Ukrainian
troops from Kursk Oblast first by mid-October 2024 then by January 2025 and repeatedly prioritized
Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast over regaining control of the Kursk salient, which Russian forces
still had not done at the end of January 2025. Putin has not been able fully to insulate Russian forces
in Donetsk Oblast from the theater-wide impacts of the incursion, however, and the Russian military has
simultaneously been pulling troops, armored vehicles, and artillery and air defense systems away from
other sectors in Ukraine to reinforce the Russian force grouping fighting in Kursk Oblast. Recent
Ukrainian estimates indicate that Putin has accumulated roughly 67,000 Russian troops and 11,000 North
Korean troops in Kursk Oblast expel a reinforced Ukrainian grouping in Kursk Oblast that now constitutes
at most 30,000 troops by the most generous Western estimations.
Ukraine conducted the
incursion at a critical moment to gain leverage in the battlespace and successfully inflicted asymmetric,
theater-wide impacts on the Russian military with this limited ground operation. The first seven months
of 2024 were characterized by the Russian seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024, continued Russian
offensive operations west of Avdiivka in Spring and Summer 2024, the Russian offensive operations in
northern Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024, and intensified Russian offensive operations in the Toretsk and
Kurakhove directions in June and July 2024. Critical delays in Western aid over the winter of 2023-2024
created shortages in Ukraine's air defense interceptors and Ukrainian artillery units and wider
vulnerabilities in Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian attacks. Western leaders and intelligence
agencies spent most of early 2024 advocating for Ukraine to maintain an "active defense" and focus on
repelling and slowing Russian advances before attempting another counteroffensive operation possibly in
2025. The Ukrainian incursion refocused the conversation and allowed Ukraine to seize the narrative and
tactical initiative. The Ukrainian incursion reportedly stymied a planned Russian offensive into Sumy
Oblast, prevented the Russian military from substantially reinforcing its offensive in northern Kharkiv
Oblast, and complicated but failed to stop Russian advances in priority sectors of Donetsk Oblast.
Ukrainian officials have never suggested that they intended to hold positions in Kursk Oblast in
perpetuity. Ukrainian officials have instead repeatedly characterized the incursion as an effort to
distract and pin Russian forces away from Russia's main operational objectives in Ukraine. ISW assesses
as of February 5 that Russian forces had retaken at least 57 percent (roughly 655 square kilometers) of
the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. The Russian military certainly can expel Ukrainian forces from
Russia whenever it chooses to allocate the necessary resources but has yet to prioritize this effort over
making further advances in eastern Ukraine. Russian authorities may prioritize pushing Ukrainian forces
from Russian territory in the coming months, however, particularly if Russian officials begin to
seriously consider peace negotiations and intend to enter such negotiations from the strongest possible
position. It is too early to determine the long-term impacts of the incursion on the resolution of the
war in Ukraine, and these impacts will almost certainly be affected by Ukraine's ability to capitalize on
the military and political pressures that the incursion has created for Russia. Ukraine may be able to
replicate and exploit the pressure that Kursk has inflicted on the Russian military if the West continues
to support Ukraine and if Ukraine can address its own manpower, morale, and materiel issues and identify
a key location and moment to conduct a similar such operation in the future.
Ukrainian forces launched a new series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in Kursk Oblast and
advanced up to five kilometers behind Russian lines southeast of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 6.
Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of
Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha) and north and east of Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha) along
the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway and seized Kolmakov (north of Cherkasskaya Konopelka) and Fanaseyevka
(just southeast of Cherkasskaya Konopelka). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian
forces attacked in several waves in the direction of Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Ulanok (southeast of
Cherkasskaya Konopelka along the 38K-028 highway) with up to two mechanized battalions' worth of armored
vehicles and that Russian forces repelled the attack. Russian milbloggers estimated that Ukrainian forces
attacked with 30 to 50 armored vehicles and claimed that one group of Ukrainian forces successfully
attacked from Makhnovka towards Cherkasskaya Konopelka, Fanaseyevka, and Ulanok and that Russian forces
repelled another Ukrainian group that attacked from Dmitriukov (just east of Makhnovka) towards Russkaya
Konopelka (east of Sudzha). A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized
Cherkasskaya Konopelka, but two other milbloggers denied this claim. Some Russian sources claimed that
Ukrainian forces broke through to or even seized Ulanok, but other sources also denied these claims. ISW
has not yet observed geolocated evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces are operating in Ulanok. The
Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 6 indicating that Russian forces recently marginally
advanced in a forested area southwest of Kurilovka.
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger
claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces also attacked near Kruglenkoye
(northwest of Sudzha), but ISW did not observe additional claims of Ukrainian activity in this area or
north of Sudzha near Berdin where Ukrainian forces attacked in early January 2025.<7> Russian milbloggers
claimed that Ukrainian forces launched the attacks southeast of Sudzha during poor weather conditions
that complicated Russian drone operations in the area. Some Russian milbloggers expressed concern that
further Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast could threaten rear areas of the Russian force grouping
attacking Guyevo (south of Sudzha) and complicate Russia's ability to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of
communication (GLOCs) within the Ukrainian salient. Russian sources acknowledged that elements of the
Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 30th Motorized Rifle
Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps , Leningrad Military District ), and
177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and Chechen Akhmat drone operators are the main forces
defending against the Ukrainian attacks southeast of Sudzha.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces launched a new series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in Kursk Oblast and
advanced up to five kilometers behind Russian lines southeast of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 6.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin praised elite Russian VDV and naval infantry formations
defending Kursk Oblast on February 5, highlighting the fact that the Ukrainian incursion has pinned about
a combined arms army’s worth of Russian troops in Kursk Oblast since August 6, 2024.
• Ukrainian officials provided additional details about Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast in honor of
the six-month anniversary of the incursion.
• A Russian state-run poll suggests that the
Russian public maintains a high level of support for the war in Ukraine despite mounting challenges.
• North Korea appears to be using its alliance with Russia to leverage the war in Ukraine as a
testing ground to refine its missile technology and broader military capabilities.
• Ukrainian
forces conducted a strike against an air base in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 5 to 6 as a part
of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.
• Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military assistance to Ukraine.
• Russian
President Vladimir Putin appointed Deputy Minister of Transport Dmitry Bakanov to replace Yuri Borisov as
head of the state-owned Russian space agency Roscosmos on February 6.
• Ukrainian forces
recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and recaptured lost positions near Kurakhove.
• Russian
forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, and Kurakhove.
• Russian authorities
continue efforts to increase social benefits for Russian military personnel likely to support ongoing
recruitment efforts.
Ukrainian forces marginally advanced during mechanized assaults in their salient in Kursk Oblast on
February 6, but Russian sources claimed on February 6 and 7 that Russian forces have at least temporarily
stalled Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha. Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that
Ukrainian forces marginally advanced along the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway and in the fields east of
Fanaseyevka (southeast of Sudzha) during the February 6 attacks. Russian sources widely claimed that
Russian forces repelled all Ukrainian attacks on February 6 and on the night of February 6 to 7 but
acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain some positions near Cherkasskaya Konopelka (north of
Fanaseyevka), Fanaseyevka, and Ulanok (east of Fanaseyevka). A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger
claimed that fighting is ongoing on the outskirts of Makhnovka (just southeast of Sudzha) but that
Ukrainian forces did not launch new attacks near Cherkasskaya Konopelka during the day on February 7.
Russian milbloggers continued to issue conflicting claims about the situation in Cherkasskaya Konopelka.
Some milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have seized the settlement, while others claimed that
Ukrainian forces bypassed the settlement or that Russian forces have retaken the settlement. ISW cannot
independently verify Russian claims about the situation in Cherkasskaya Konopelka. A Russian milblogger
claimed that Russian forces are effectively using fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones to counter
Ukrainian forces attacking in the area.
Russian sources provided additional information about
the Russian force grouping defending southeast of Sudzha. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported
that elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet),
40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), "Veterany"
Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps), "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army
, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps , SMD), and drone operators of the
Russian Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are defending in the area. Russian milbloggers
widely credited drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz forces with defending against the
Ukrainian attacks on February 6 and 7 and complained that the Russian MoD did not acknowledge the Chechen
drone operators. Russian milbloggers also claimed that the Russian military command reportedly removed
the 11th VDV Brigade's commander and that the MoD is blaming the commander for failing to sufficiently
man and defend Russian positions near Cherkasskaya Konopelka.
The Kremlin continues to conduct
an information campaign likely directed toward both domestic and international audiences that aims to
conceal the extent to which Russia's protracted war against Ukraine has negatively affected Russia's
economy. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin met on February 7 with Russian President Vladimir Putin
to discuss the state of the Russian economy. Mishustin claimed that Russia's gross domestic product (GDP)
rose in 2024 by 4.1 percent largely due to "intensive" growth in Russia's manufacturing industry – likely
referring to Russia's boost of its defense industrial base (DIB) since the start of its full-scale
invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Mishustin claimed that the main contributors to the growth in
Russia's manufacturing sector were the machine-building, transport engineering, automotive, and computer
and electronic equipment sectors.
Mishustin claimed that inflation in Russia reached 9.52
percent in 2024, and Putin claimed that inflation was already 9.9 percent as of February 3, 2025.
Russia's true inflation is quite higher than the official statistics the Kremlin is willing to publicize,
however. (Several studies indicate that Russia’s inflation rate is closer to 20 percent.) Mishustin
highlighted Russia's low 2024 unemployment rate of 2.5 percent but only briefly acknowledged Russia's
significant labor shortages, which are the reason for Russia's low unemployment.
Mishustin
noted that Russian economic growth might be less significant in 2025 as it is very important to stop
inflation and ensure long-term economic growth – likely a signal to prepare the Russian population to
expect economic hardships in 2025. Mishustin and Putin also attempted to posture Russia's economy as
stable in the face of international economic pressure. Mishustin claimed that Russia's fuel and energy
complex is adapting and finding new markets.
Mishustin claimed that Russia's economy has
"successfully managed" with "unprecedented sanctions pressure" in recent years and that anti-Russian
sanctions are hurting the states that imposed the sanctions more than the sanctions are hurting Russia.
Putin similarly attempted to posture Russia's economy as stronger and growing more rapidly than economies
in the West. Mishustin and Putin notably did not mention how the Russian Central Bank raised the interest
rate to 21 percent in October 2024 or how Russia has been drawing from its National Welfare Fund to
finance its war effort over the last three years. The liquidity portion of Russia’s National Welfare fund
may run out by Fall 2025.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces marginally advanced
during mechanized assaults in their salient in Kursk Oblast on February 6, but Russian sources claimed on
February 6 and 7 that Russian forces have at least temporarily stalled Ukrainian advances southeast of
Sudzha.
• The Kremlin continues to conduct an information campaign likely directed toward
both domestic and international audiences that aims to conceal the extent to which Russia's protracted
war against Ukraine has negatively affected Russia's economy.
• Ukrainian military officials
continue to highlight the country’s growing drone production capacity and its effectiveness on the
battlefield but acknowledged that Ukraine must address its force generation issues to fully stop Russian
advances in eastern Ukraine.
• Interim Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra stated in an
interview with the Washington Post that Syria is open to Russia retaining its air and naval bases in
Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.
• Azerbaijan-Russia relations continue to sour
following Russia’s refusal to take full responsibility for the December 25, 2024 downing of an
Azerbaijani Airlines (AZAL) passenger plane, likely shot mid-air by Russian air defense before crashing
in Aktau, Kazakhstan
• Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers appointed Lieutenant General Yevhen
Moysiuk and Captain Valeriy Churkin as Deputy Defense Ministers on February 7.
• Russian
forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk.
• The Russian government continues to use
its "Time of Heroes" program to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine to regional government
positions.
Russia may be providing drone and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops
fighting in Kursk Oblast. Japanese outlet NHK, citing multiple sources familiar with Russia–North Korea
relations, reported on February 8 that Russia has agreed to assist North Korea in developing and
mass-producing various types of drones in exchange for North Korean forces supporting Russia’s war effort
against Ukraine. NHK noted that Russia remains reluctant to help North Korea develop nuclear weapons,
fearing that North Korean nuclear tests could further strain relations with the United States and
complicate relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), however. Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky noted on February 8 that Russia is specifically spreading modern technology to North Korea,
including drone technology, and told Reuters on February 7 that thousands of North Korean troops have
returned to active combat in Kursk Oblast after a brief pause. A Ukrainian brigade operating in Kursk
Oblast published a video on February 8 reportedly showing North Korean forces conducting assaults
alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast. South Korean sources recently reported that Russia withdrew
North Korean troops from the battlefield in Kursk Oblast in mid-January 2025, possibly for rest and
reconstitution or to rethink how Russia is using these troops. ISW assesses that North Korea is using the
war in Ukraine as a testing ground for its own military capabilities. Reuters reported on February 6 that
North Korean ballistic missiles fired by Russian forces since December 2024 have demonstrated
significantly improved accuracy, likely an example of North Korean capability enhancement gained through
the North Korea-Russia alliance.
Russia continues to expand its military capabilities,
indicating that the Kremlin has no immediate interest in negotiations or a lasting peace with Ukraine.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, citing Ukrainian intelligence, reported on February 8 that
Russian forces are forming new military divisions, building additional defense-industrial base (DIB)
facilities, planning to increase military personnel by over 100,000 soldiers, and deepening military
cooperations with North Korea. Then–Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in January 2023 that
Russia would create 14 new military divisions, but ISW is unable to assess whether Zelensky is referring
to these previously announced plans or the creation of additional new divisions. ISW also cannot verify
the status of the formation of the 14 divisions Shoigu previously announced. Zelensky highlighted that
Russia's force-generation, restructuring, and defense-production efforts make it clear that Putin is not
interested in negotiations with Ukraine and seeks to continue Russia’s war. Such Russian plans suggest
that Russia, not Ukraine, is the party refusing good-faith negotiations and actively pushing for
protracted war rather than peace, while also setting conditions to prepare for a potential broader
conflict with NATO. Russian officials and information space have frequently framed the war in Ukraine as
a part of a larger confrontation with the West.
The Russian command may be redeploying forces
from the Kurakhove direction towards Toretsk in order to facilitate Russian offensive operations against
Kostyantynivka in Spring or Summer 2025. A Russian source claimed that the Russian military command is
redeploying elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments, 163rd Tank Regiment, and 381st
Artillery Regiment (all of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division) and elements of the 96th regiment
(possibly also part of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, although ISW has not previously observed
reports of this unit operating in Ukraine) from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction. ISW has
not observed confirmation or other reporting on this alleged redeployment. Another Russian source claimed
that elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments are operating near Dachne as of February
8, however. A redeployment of elements of the 8th CAA to the Toretsk direction- in conjunction with
intensified Russian efforts in the Chasiv Yar direction in recent weeks- would indicate that the Russian
command may intend to prioritize advances towards Kostyantynivka and pressuring Ukraine's fortress belt
in 2025, as ISW previously assessed.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia may be providing drone
and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops fighting in Kursk Oblast.
• Russia continues to expand its military capabilities, indicating that the Kremlin has no
immediate interest in negotiations or a lasting peace with Ukraine.
• The Russian command may
be redeploying forces from the Kurakhove direction towards Toretsk in order to facilitate Russian
offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in Spring or Summer 2025.
• The Baltic States cut
ties with the Soviet-era power grid that connected them to Belarus and Russia on February 8 as part of
efforts to achieve full energy independence from Russia and further integrate their energy infrastructure
with the European Union (EU).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, and
Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.
• The Kremlin continues
efforts to incentivize Russian citizens to serve in the military.
Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to offset the
resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency
reported on February 9, citing South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), that thousands of North
Korean workers arrived in Russia in 2024 to take construction jobs. Russian official data shows that
13,221 North Koreans entered Russia in 2024 — up to 12 times the number that entered Russia in 2023. Many
of the North Korean workers are reportedly entering Russia on student visas, with 7,887 North Koreans
having entered Russia in 2024 for alleged education purposes. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii
reported on February 4 that the number of North Koreans who came to Russia to study in 2024 was the
highest number since 2019. Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported in November 2024 that data from
the Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service showed that a record number of North Koreans entered
Russia for education between July and September 2024 — notably in the lead up to the reported start of
North Korea's deployment of troops to Russia in early October 2024.
Russia has been suffering
from significant labor shortages in both its civilian and defense industrial sectors since the start of
its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The arrival of several thousands of North Koreans to work in civilian
sectors is marginal and will not significantly alleviate Russia's labor shortages. Russia reportedly has
an estimated labor shortage of 1.5 million workers as of December 2024, for example. North Korea's
provisions of materiel and troops to Russia have significantly increased over the course of 2024,
however, and the several thousands of North Korean workers that arrived in Russia recently may be the
beginning of larger influxes in the future that could more significantly help Russia's labor shortage
issues. (Russian forces‘ initial use of small numbers of North Korean artillery and mortar shells grew
rapidly, with 60 percent of Russian forces‘ artillery ammunition fired now being sourced from North Korea
as of December 2024.) Russian enterprises are also likely not paying North Korean workers the same
salaries as Russian citizens, so a significant influx of North Korean workers into the Russian work force
in the future could also financially benefit Russian enterprises that are having to offer high salaries
to Russian citizens in order to compete against Russian military and defense industrial enterprises for
employees. Significant increases in the number of North Koreans working in Russia's civilian sectors in
the future could also free up Russian civilian sector employees to work in the Russian defense industrial
base (DIB) or fight in Ukraine.
The arrival of North Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how
Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution
2397. Russia voted for Resolution 2397 in 2017 in response to North Korea's intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) tests. The resolution explicitly prohibits North Korea from sending its citizens abroad
for work and mandated that all UN member states expel all North Koreans "earning income" abroad by
December 2019. Russia is likely using the guise of student visas to hide Russia's violation of the
resolution.
North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un continues to reiterate his support for Russia
and its war effort in Ukraine. Kim gave a speech at the North Korean Ministry of National Defense on
February 9 that heavily focused on the threats the US and the West allegedly pose to North Korean
security. Kim criticized the US for protracting the war in Ukraine and claimed that he is "seriously
concerned" about the West's alleged desire to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia. Kim notably claimed
that the North Korean military and people will "invariably support and encourage" Russia's "just cause"
to defend its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity "in the spirit of" the June 2024
Russian-North Korean comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to
offset the resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort.
• The arrival of
North Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution 2397.
• North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un
continues to reiterate his support for Russia and its war effort in Ukraine.
• German
authorities reportedly failed to down suspected Russian reconnaissance drones flying near a German
military facility in January 2025 where Ukrainian forces have undergone training.
• Russia
appears to be leveraging the technological innovations it is developing in its war in Ukraine directly
against NATO states.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near
Vovchansk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia continues efforts to recruit Russians and citizens of other Commonwealth of Independent
State (CIS) countries to sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced the Ukrainian "Drone Line" project on February 10 as
part of ongoing Ukrainian efforts to integrate drone and ground operations. Umerov stated that the
Ukrainian military will "scale up" five existing drone regiments and brigades in the Ukrainian military
and border guard service and will integrate infantry and drones into a single strike system, which will
enable Ukrainian forces to create kill zones 10 to 15 kilometers deep, will provide constant aerial
support and infantry cover, and will detect and destroy Russian forces before they can approach Ukrainian
positions. Ukraine's Ground Forces reported that the expansion of five such existing drone units is only
the first stage of the Drone Line project. This project likely formalizes and provides additional support
to ongoing Ukrainian efforts to expand drone units and increase their coordination with regiments and
brigades, while keeping regular units and drone units separate in order to support drone units' more
rapid combat and technological adaptations and innovations.
Ukraine's efforts to integrate
drone operations with ground operations significantly differ from Russian efforts to centralize drone
units. Russian efforts to centralize drone units have attempted to augment Russian drone capabilities by
expanding state control over drone operators and developers and increasing their incorporation into the
Russian military bureaucracy. The Russian military began efforts to centralize drone operators and
developers in Fall 2024, disbanding informal Russian drone detachments and removing drone specialists
from regular military units, then selectively reorganizing them to form new Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD)-controlled drone units and centralizing their assets. The Russian MoD also reportedly established
its first separate unmanned systems regiment at the military district level in January 2024, further
highlighting ongoing efforts to centralize and bureaucratize control over drone operations. ISW continues
to assess that the Russian MoD's efforts to centralize and reorganize drone units and monopolize drone
production and procurement processes may complicate Russian forces' ability to rapidly innovate and adapt
new technologies and combat techniques in the short- to medium-term.
Ukrainian forces continue
to target oil refineries in Russia as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense
industrial enterprises and oil refineries. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation
Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko implied on February 10 that Ukrainian drones struck Krasnodar City and the
Afipsky Oil Refinery in Neftekachka, Krasnodar Krai just south of Krasnodar City. Kovalenko noted that
the Afipsky refinery has a production capacity of 6.25 million tons of oil per year and plays a vital
role in providing fuel to the Russian military, particularly in southern Ukraine. Kovalenko highlighted
that the refinery's location in Krasnodar Krai makes it a significant logistical hub supplying diesel
fuel and jet fuel to Russian forces. The Afipsky Oil Refinery notably borders the base of the Russian
90th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army , Southern Military District ),
which has previously been armed with Buk-M2 and Buk-M3 air defense systems, although the base's current
air defense capabilities are unknown. Geolocated footage published on February 9 shows an explosion near
Krasnodar City. Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev claimed on February 10 that Russian forces
downed a Ukrainian drone over Krasnodar City, damaging a residential building. Kondratyev claimed that
Russian forces also downed a drone over Afipsky and that debris damaged a private residence. Krasnodar
City Mayor Evgeny Naumov claimed on February 10 that drone debris fell near a market.
Key
Takeaways:
• Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced the Ukrainian "Drone Line"
project on February 10 as part of ongoing Ukrainian efforts to integrate drone and ground operations.
• Ukraine's efforts to integrate drone operations with ground operations significantly differ
from Russian efforts to centralize drone units.
• Ukrainian forces continue to target oil
refineries in Russia as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises
and oil refineries.
• Russian authorities reportedly authorized the systematic torture of
Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) held in Russian prisons as early as March 2022.
• The
Kremlin may be setting informational conditions to justify an influx of North Korean citizens arriving in
Russia to join either the Russian workforce or the Russian military.
• A Russian official
claimed that Russia is sending experienced Russian military personnel to North Korea for medical
treatment.
• The pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway republic of Transnistria refused aid from the
EU to resolve its gas crisis, demonstrating Russia's continued economic influence over Transnistria and
the Kremlin's prioritization of the region.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near
Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and
Pokrovsk.
• Russian milbloggers continue to complain about the systemic issue of Russian
forces submitting false reports to Russian military authorities and of high-level Russian officers
micromanaging tactical-level units on the battlefield.
Russian officials are reportedly attempting to constrain Russian milblogger reporting about the current
frontline in Kursk Oblast, likely in response to concerns that the West will pressure Russia into trading
Russian territory for occupied Ukrainian territory. Several Russian milbloggers who regularly criticize
the Russian military's conduct of the war in Ukraine claimed on February 10 and 11 that unspecified
actors are calling for Russian authorities to charge the milbloggers with discrediting the Russian
military after the milbloggers reported about recent Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha. The
milbloggers claimed that the Russian military command is targeting them for publishing information about
successful Ukrainian attacks near Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka, and one milblogger claimed that
the recent Ukrainian attacks forced the Russian military command to delay plans for a future offensive
operation in the area. The latter claim indicates that the Russian military command may have been
planning to conduct an offensive operation to seize Sudzha, a prominent gas transit hub and the main town
that Ukrainian forces control in Kursk Oblast.
The Russian military appears increasingly
anxious to consolidate control over reporting about the situation in Kursk Oblast as Zelensky continues
to express his intent to leverage Russian territory in future peace negotiations. Zelensky stated during
his interview with The Guardian that he intends to use Ukrainian-held territory in Kursk Oblast to secure
the return of Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory or "something else" during future peace negotiations
with Russia. Zelensky noted that it is important to retake all of occupied Ukraine and did not speculate
on which area of occupied Ukraine he would consider trading Russian territory for. Russian President
Vladimir Putin likely intends to expel Ukraine from Kursk Oblast, or at least from Sudzha, before
beginning peace negotiations in order to avoid having to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for Russian
territory.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated
Ukraine's commitment to good faith peace negotiations with Russia and the particular importance of US
military assistance to Ukraine's security.
• Russian officials are reportedly attempting to
constrain Russian milblogger reporting about the current frontline in Kursk Oblast, likely in response to
concerns that the West will pressure Russia into trading Russian territory for occupied Ukrainian
territory.
• Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery and reportedly struck Engels Air Base in
Saratov Oblast on the night of February 10 to 11.
• The Russian State Duma voted to remove
Russian State Duma deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) retired
Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev from the Duma Defense Committee on February 11.
• The
Kremlin may be setting informational conditions for possible false flag attacks in the Baltic Sea and
against Russian opposition politicians living abroad in order to discredit Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near
Borova, Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and Hulyaipole.
• Russian
regional authorities are reportedly reducing payments due to regional budget deficits for Russian
soldiers who received minor injuries.