Russian forces recently cut the T-0405 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway east of Pokrovsk and the T-0406
Pokrovsk-Mezhova highway southwest of Pokrovsk as part of their efforts to envelop Pokrovsk and
Myrnohrad. Geolocated footage published on January 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced
east of Myrne (east of Pokrovsk) and seized positions along the T-0504 highway. Ukrainian military
observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 13 that elements of the Russian 55th and 74th motorized
rifle brigades (41st Combined Arms Army , Central Military District ) recently advanced to and
cut the T-0406 highway between Kotlyne and Udachne (both southwest of Pokrovsk), and Russian milbloggers
claimed that Russian forces seized a section of both highways. ISW assesses that Russian forces likely
seized the remainder of Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk) as part of this advance. Mashovets stated that
Russian forces are deploying the 55th and 74th motorized rifle brigades in a two-echelon formation and
that elements of the 74th Brigade conduct the initial attacks and elements of the 55th Brigade follow
behind to consolidate positions. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 239th Tank Regiment, 228th
Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 67th Rifle Regiment (all 90th Tank Division, CMD) are operating in the
Novovasylivka-Uspenivka-Novooleksandriivka area (southwest of Pokrovsk). Mashovets acknowledged that the
Russian military command recently redeployed elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st
CAA, formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps ) from the Kurakhove direction to
offensive operations near Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk), further substantiating previous milblogger
claims that the 5th Brigade was redeployed to the Vozdvyzhenka area Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle
Brigade may have participated in the interdiction of the T-0405 highway near Myrne, and the Russian
military command's decision to redeploy the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade suggests that it is prioritizing
efforts to advance in this area and envelop Pokrovsk from the east over further advances west of
Kurakhove. ISW previously noted that Russian forces could also leverage advances east of Pokrovsk near
Vozdvyzhenka and Myrne to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk along the H-20 Donetsk
City-Kostyantynivka highway.
Russian forces also advanced in other areas southwest of Pokrovsk
amid ongoing efforts to envelop the town on January 12. Geolocated footage published on January 13
indicates that Russian forces seized Pishchane (southwest of Pokrovsk), and the Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) credited elements of the 55th, 35th, and 74th motorized rifle brigades (all 41st CAA, CMD)
with the seizure of the settlement. Russian forces continued attacking near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of
Pokrovsk near Baranivka, Zelene Pole, Nova Poltavka, and Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske,
Novooleksandrivka, Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near
Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novyi Trud, Zelene, and Shevchenko; southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne,
Uspenivka, Novovasylivka, Novoandriivka, Sribne, and Yasenove; and west of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne on
January 12 and 13.
Russian forces likely intend to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of
communications (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in order to force Ukrainian units to withdraw from the
towns in future months. The T-0405 and T-0406 highways are two of the three main east-west GLOCs
supporting the Ukrainian force grouping in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area. Russian advances east and west of
Pokrovsk may complicate Ukrainian logistics and Ukraine's ability to resupply and redeploy troops to
defend Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. The Russian military command may intend to make further advances north of
the T-0405 and T-0406 highways in an effort to force Ukrainian forces to eventually withdraw to the north
(rather than to the east or west) to support Russia's envelopment of both settlements and further
advances west towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border. The Russian military
command likely also hopes to avoid conducting infantry-heavy frontal assaults through the urban areas of
Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad and likely assesses that interdicting these GLOCs increases the likelihood that
Ukrainian forces will withdraw from these towns and that Russian forces will be able to avoid conducting
costly urban combat operations to take the towns.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces
recently cut the T-0405 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway east of Pokrovsk and the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezhova
highway southwest of Pokrovsk as part of their efforts to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.
• Russian forces likely intend to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) into
Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in order to force Ukrainian units to withdraw from the towns in future months.
• Russian state-owned energy corporation Gazprom acknowledged that it is considering reducing the
size of its central office staff by 40 percent, indicating that Gazprom may be concerned about the
long-term effects that the war in Ukraine and the reduction in Russian gas exports to Europe will have on
the Russian gas industry.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kharkiv, Borova, Pokrovsk,
Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions.
• South Korea's National Intelligence Service
(NIS) reportedly announced that North Korean casualties in Kursk Oblast total roughly 3,000 killed and
wounded.
The Kremlin remains committed to achieving the original goals of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in
any future peace negotiations — namely the destruction of the Ukrainian state, dissolution of the current
Ukrainian government, demilitarization of Ukraine, and a permanent ban on Ukraine's future membership in
NATO. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev rejected the
suggestion that Russia could be willing to cede any occupied territory to Ukraine in future negotiations
during an interview with Russian outlet Komsomolskaya Pravda published on January 14 and stated that this
idea is "not even up for discussion." Patrushev falsely claimed that sham referendums in occupied Ukraine
in September 2022 legitimized Russia's claim to occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson
oblasts and insinuated that international recognition of Russia's illegal occupation and annexation of
the four oblasts and occupied Crimea is a non-negotiable condition for a future peace agreement.
Patrushev stated that Russia's goals in Ukraine remain unchanged and that Russia remains committed to
achieving all of the goals that Russian President Vladimir Putin used to justify the full-scale invasion.
Putin identified the "demilitarization" and "denazification" of Ukraine as the key goals of the
full-scale invasion during a speech on February 23, 2022 — and these goals amount to the destruction of
Ukraine's ability to defend itself and replacement of the legitimate Ukrainian government with a
pro-Russian puppet government. Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and Zaporizhia Oblast
occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin stated during an interview with Russian outlet Gazeta.Ru on January 14
that the Russian government continues to pursue "denazification" in Ukraine, which Rogozin defined as the
"liquidation of those who instill a misanthropic Russophobic spirit" in people. Putin has consistently
demanded that the Ukrainian people concede their right to determine their own government, the right to
defend themselves against ongoing and future aggression, and the right to choose their own security
alliances before and throughout the full-scale invasion. ISW continues to assess that Putin's goals in
Ukraine are to break up NATO and seize full control over Ukraine and that Putin remains committed to
these goals, and ISW has not observed any indication that Putin is willing to concede on such goals in
future negotiations.
Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile
strikes against military and defense industrial targets in Russia on the night of January 13 to 14. The
Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces targeted Russian military facilities between 200
and 1,110 kilometers deep in the Russian rear in Bryansk, Saratov, and Tula oblasts and the Republic of
Tatarstan. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and Ukraine's Main
Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) struck the Russian state-owned Kombinat Kristal oil storage
facility near Engels, Saratov Oblast, which provides fuel for the strategic bombers at Russia's Engels-2
Air Base, and that the GUR and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) also struck the Saratov Oil Refinery. The
Ukrainian Unmanned System Forces' 14th Drone Regiment reported that Ukrainian drones struck tanks with
aviation fuel for Tu-160 bomber aircraft at the Kristal oil facility at the Engels-2 Air Base. Sources
within the SBU told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that Ukrainian forces struck glide bomb and cruise missile
warehouses at the Engels-2 Air Base. Geolocated footage published on January 14 shows a fire at the
Saratov Oil Refinery. Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike
damaged unspecified industrial enterprises in Engels and Saratov City. Ukrainian forces notably struck
the Kristal oil facility on the night of January 7 to 8, causing a fire that Russian authorities did not
put out until January 13 — likely several hours before Ukrainian forces struck the facility again.
The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reported that Ukrainian forces,
including elements of the Unmanned Systems Force, Special Operations Forces (SSO), SBU, missile troops,
and GUR, struck the Bryansk Chemical Plant in Seltso, Bryansk Oblast, which produces components for Kh-59
cruise missiles and ammunition for tube artillery, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), and TOS
thermobaric artillery systems and repairs Russian MLRS systems. The Unmanned Systems Forces reported that
Ukrainian forces used drones to overwhelm Russian air defense systems, allowing missiles to strike their
targets and that Ukrainian drones hit substations and other infrastructure after the missile strike. The
Ukrainian General Staff reported that there were secondary explosions at the plant and that Ukrainian
forces also destroyed a Tor and a Buk air defense system during the strike. Ukrainian Center for
Combatting Disinformation Head Andriy Kovalenko noted that the Bryansk Chemical Plant is important for
Russian artillery ammunition and missile production and specializes in the production of gunpowder, solid
propellant components for rocket fuel, and explosives. Kovalenko also stated that Ukrainian forces struck
the "Kremniy El" microelectronics plant in Bryansk City, which Ukrainian forces previously struck in
October 2024 and that produces microelectronics for missile systems, Pantsir air defense systems, and
Iskander missiles; radars, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and drones. Geolocated footage shows drone
strikes and explosions in Seltso. Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed on January 13 that
Ukrainian forces conducted a large combined missile strike against Bryansk Oblast and that Russian air
defense systems destroyed all targets. Bogomaz later claimed on January 14 that a falling missile
fragment damaged civilian property in Bryansk Oblast, including in Seltso. The Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted Bryansk Oblast with six ATACMS missiles, six Storm
Shadow missiles, and 31 drones.
Key Takeaways:
• The Kremlin remains committed to
achieving the original goals of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in any future peace negotiations —
namely the destruction of the Ukrainian state, dissolution of the current Ukrainian government,
demilitarization of Ukraine, and a permanent ban on Ukraine's future membership in NATO.
• Patrushev stated that Russia's goals in Ukraine remain unchanged and that Russia remains committed to
achieving all of the goals that Russian President Vladimir Putin used to justify the full-scale
invasion.
• Russian officials continue to deny the existence of a Ukrainian identity and state
that is independent of Russia as part of ongoing Russian efforts to justify the destruction of the
Ukrainian state.
• Patrushev stated that he believes that only Russia and the United States
should engage in negotiations to end Russia's war in Ukraine, and senior Kremlin officials are also
questioning the role that European countries could play in such negotiations.
• The Kremlin
will likely attempt to seize on potential future Russian advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast for
informational purposes, but these advances, if they occur, are unlikely to have significant operational
impact.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against
military and defense industrial targets in Russia on the night of January 13 to 14.
• Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities continue efforts to find a solution to the gas crisis in Moldova
as the pro-Russian breakaway republic Transnistria continues to refuse help from Ukraine or Moldova.
• Kremlin officials are attempting to exploit the energy crisis in Moldova to set conditions to
justify future Russian aggression against Moldova.
• Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor
reportedly caused a brief but widespread internet outage in Russia while operating restriction systems of
its Sovereign Internet on January 14.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk and
Pokrovsk directions.
• Russia continues efforts to bolster military recruitment efforts by
offering financial incentives to those who sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD).
Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian energy
infrastructure on the night of January 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces
launched 74 Shahed and other strike drones and 43 missiles at Ukraine, including one Iskander-M ballistic
missile from Belgorod Oblast, seven Kh-22/32 cruise missiles from airspace over Tula Oblast, four Kalibr
cruise missiles from ships in the Black Sea, 27 Kh-101/55SM cruise missiles from airspace over Volgograd
Oblast, and four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from airspace over Belgorod Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force
reported that Ukrainian forces downed 23 Kh-101/55SM missiles, three Kalibr missiles, four Kh-59/69
missiles, and 47 drones, and that 27 drones became "lost" and did not hit their targets. Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the Russian strikes targeted Ukrainian gas facilities and
other energy infrastructure. Ukrainian officials reported damage to energy and critical infrastructure
facilities in Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, and Lviv oblasts and residential areas in Kirovohrad Oblast.
Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko and Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator
Ukrenergo reported temporary emergency shutdowns in Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava, Donetsk, Zaporizhia,
Dnipropetrovsk, and Kirovohrad oblasts on the morning of January 15 due to the strikes. Ukrenergo has
since lifted the emergency shutdowns but noted that Ukrainians still need to limit their energy
consumption following the strikes. Russia has regularly targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure in large
strike series since the Winter of 2022–2023 likely in an attempt to collapse Ukraine's energy grid, limit
its defense industrial capacity, and degrade Ukrainians' will to fight.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian energy
infrastructure on the night of January 14 to 15.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one
prisoner of war (POW) exchange on January 15, their first POW exchange in 2025.
• A Russian
source claimed that Ukrainian drone and artillery capabilities are providing Ukrainian tanks with
tactical advantages over Russian tanks in unspecified, select areas of the frontline.
• Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky announced on January 15 that Russia will soon provide
Transnistria with gas as "humanitarian aid" but did not specify the delivery date or method.
• Armenia continues to enhance its relations with Western partners amid waning relations with
Russia.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk
directions.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 15 that about 600,000
Russian soldiers are currently operating in Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the
night of January 15 to 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 16 that Ukrainian Special
Operation Forces (SSO) and other Ukrainian forces struck the Lisinskaya Oil Refinery in Voronezh Oblast
with at least three drones, causing a fire. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the oil refinery
stored fuel for Russian military uses. Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on January 16
that Ukrainian forces launched over 10 drones against three raions in Voronezh Oblast and that most of
the drones hit the oil depot in Liski Raion. Geolocated footage and footage posted by Russian milbloggers
show a fire at the Lisinskaya Oil Refinery. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head
Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on January 16 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Tambov Gunpowder
Plant in Kuzmino-Gat, Tambov Oblast, noting that the plant produces gunpowder for various arms,
artillery, and rocket systems; nitrocellulose used to produce explosives; and other specialized products.
Russian news aggregator SHOT reported on January 15 that locals reported sounds of drones over Kotovsk
(directly north of Kuzmino-Gat) and that Russian forces downed three drones near Kotovsk and
Kuzmino-Gat.
The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk
Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer
from their current high loss rate in the future. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in early
January 2025 that 3,800 North Korean personnel had been killed or wounded in Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian
Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on November 5, 2024 that North Korean forces were engaged in
"small-scale" clashes in Kursk Oblast, but Russian milbloggers began claiming on December 6 that North
Korean forces were participating in more significant combat operations. North Korean have therefore
likely suffered roughly 92 casualties per day since starting to participate in significant fighting in
early December 2024. North Korea reportedly transferred roughly 12,000 North Korean personnel to Kursk
Oblast, and the entirety of this North Korean contingent in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in
roughly 12 weeks (about mid-April 2025) should North Korean forces continue to suffer similarly high
casualty rates in the future. South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) stated on January 13 that
so far 300 North Koreans have been killed in action and 2,700 have been wounded in action in Kursk
Oblast. North Korean forces will likely continue to suffer a larger ratio of wounded to killed in action
- as is typical for armed conflict - and it is unclear if or when injured North Korean soldiers return to
combat.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast
and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the night of January 15 to 16.
• The entire North
Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in
action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate
in the future.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer
signed a landmark "Centennial Partnership Agreement" on January 16 outlining Ukrainian-British
cooperation for the next 100 years and continued UK support to Ukraine.
• Russian and
Transnistrian authorities are reportedly discussing Russian purchases of European gas for Transnistria
through an intermediary, likely to avoid having to gain various states' permission to use the TurkStream
and Trans-Balkan pipelines to supply Russian gas to the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced
near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the Russia-Iran
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement on January 17. The agreement addresses issues spanning
enhanced defense cooperation, intelligence sharing, nuclear energy use and cooperation, transportation
support and development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and a clause
stipulating that neither party shall allow third parties to use their territory to threaten the security
of the other among other economic and social areas of partnership. The agreement notably includes the
unspecified development of "military-technical cooperation" between the two countries, which could allude
to Iran's extensive export of domestically-produced Shahed drones and other military equipment for
Russia's use in Ukraine, Iran's assistance in Russia's domestic production of Shahed drones, and possible
efforts to expand Russia's use and production of Shaheds.
The bilateral agreement could also
lay the groundwork for Russia to establish aircraft refueling hubs and a naval presence in Iran,
particularly as the fall of Russian ally Bashar al-Assad's regime and overall waning of Russian influence
in the Middle East threatens the presence of key Russian bases and assets in Syria. Russia could use
Iranian territory to support some of its operations in North Africa and the Middle East despite Iran's
suboptimal geographic location when compared to Syria's proximity to Russia's basing in Libya and the
Mediterranean Sea. Russia may also use the agreement to establish a more permanent military presence in
Iran in the long term. However, Iran may be reluctant to such efforts due to the possibility of further
Western sanctions and retaliation.
Russia may leverage enhanced economic and transportation
ties with Iran to further Western sanctions evasion efforts and mitigate economic challenges brought
about by sanctions - a broader strategy Russia has established with multiple international partners to
circumvent restrictions and alleviate domestic economic pressures.
The Russia-Iran
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement lacks a mutual defense clause, however, indicating that
Russia likely lacks the bandwidth to support significant operations outside of Ukraine and is
prioritizing its manpower needs through its mutual defense treaty with North Korea. Russia likely does
not have the military and defense industrial capacity to support any significant military operations
apart from its war in Ukraine, especially as Russia continues to suffer high personnel losses and is
reportedly struggling to produce and refurbish enough armored vehicles to replace destroyed vehicles.
Putin is likely wary of intensified Russian engagements in the Middle East after Russia's strategic
political defeat in Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime and is likely to focus on
negotiations with the interim Syrian government to maintain the Russian military presence at the Hmeimim
Air Base and the Port of Tartus.
Russia appears to be valuing its ability to mitigate its
manpower constraints by leveraging the mutual defense clause within its Strategic Partnership agreement
with North Korea to deploy North Korean forces to Kursk Oblast over further military-technical
cooperation with Iran. ISW previously assessed that Russia is deploying North Korean forces to operations
in Kursk Oblast in order to free up Russian military personnel for operations in Ukraine. Russia is
likely to prioritize addressing its manpower issues through defense agreements with North Korea, as Iran
is unlikely to provide military personnel to support Russia's war in Ukraine, and Russia has been
leveraging its military-technical ties with Iran since 2022 without a strategic partnership agreement.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud
Pezeshkian signed the Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement on January 17.
• The Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement lacks a mutual defense clause, however,
indicating that Russia likely lacks the bandwidth to support significant operations outside of Ukraine
and is prioritizing its manpower needs through its mutual defense treaty with North Korea.
• Russian forces seized Vremivka on January 17 as part of their efforts to envelop Velyka Novosilka and
force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the settlement.
• Armenian Prime Minister Nikol
Pashinyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin had a phone call on January 17 indicating the Kremlin's
growing concerns over Armenia's deepening ties with the West.
• Recently declassified US
documents highlight the integral role of US monetary and technical assistance in expanding Ukraine's
domestic drone production capabilities and how US national security is directly benefiting by integrating
lessons learned from Ukraine in America’s defense industry.
• Russian forces recently advanced
in Kursk Oblast and the Kharkiv, Kupyansk, Borova, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on January 17 authorizing calling up Russian
reservists (“personnel mobilization resource” or zapas) for training in 2025.
Ukrainian forces struck two Russian oil depots in Kaluga and Tula oblasts on the night of January 17 to
18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO)
units and other Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot of the Kaluganeftprodukt joint-stock company (JSC)
near Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast, causing a fire at the facility on the night of January 17 to 18. Kaluga
Oblast Governor Vladislav Shapsha claimed on January 17 and 18 that a drone strike caused a fire at an
unspecified industrial enterprise in Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast, and later added that Russian forces downed
seven drones over the region. Russian sources posted footage purportedly showing the fire at the oil
depot. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on January 18 that units of Ukraine's Main Military
Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and other Ukrainian forces struck the state-owned "March 8" oil depot in
Tula Oblast and noted that there were reports of a fire at the facility. Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry
Milyaev claimed on January 18 that drone debris struck an unspecified enterprise in Tula Oblast, causing
a fuel tank to catch on fire. Geolocated footage and other footage published by Russian milbloggers
showed a fire at an oil depot near Didilovo, Tula Oblast.
The Russian Central Grouping of
Forces appears to have assembled a strike group comprised of units of the 2nd and 41st combined arms
armies (CAAs) south of Pokrovsk, likely as part of ongoing Russian efforts to intensify offensive
operations south and southwest of the town. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on
January 18 that the Russian military command has consolidated elements of four brigades - the 2nd CAA's
30th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 41st CAA's 35th, 55th, and 74th motorized rifle brigades — and three
regiments — the 243rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly subordinated to 27th Motorized Rifle Division,
2nd CAA) and the 239th Tank Regiment and the 87th Rifle Regiment (both of the 90th Tank Division, 41st
CAA) — south and southwest of Pokrovsk between Dachenske and Novotroitske. Mashovets stated that elements
of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade recently interdicted the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezheva Highway and
are attacking between Udachne and Kotlyne (both southwest of Pokrovsk). Mashovets stated that elements of
the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade maintain positions on the outskirts of Zvirove (east of Kotlyne)
and attacking in the area while elements of the Russian 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment with support from
the 239th Tank Regiment and 87th Rifle Regiment are attacking along the banks of the Solone River toward
Solone-Novoserhiivka and Novovasylivka-Uspenivka (south to southwest of Kotlyne). Mashovets stated that
elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade are attacking towards Dachenske-Chyushchyne and
Zelene-Chyushchyne (all south of Pokrovsk) and are making marginal advances. ISW has observed reports
that all the brigades and regiments referenced by Mashovets are operating south and southwest of Pokrovsk
except for elements of the 243rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, which ISW has not previously observed involved
in combat operations in Ukraine.
The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the
Pokrovsk direction stated on January 17 that the Russian military command is accumulating forces to
advance west of Pokrovsk as part of ongoing Russian efforts to envelop the town but noted that Russian
forces are not advancing immediately south of the town. The Ukrainian commander noted that Russian forces
are currently focused on interdicting the railway line between Kotlyne and Udachne. Russian milbloggers
similarly claimed on January 17 and 18 that Russian forces are advancing southwest of Pokrovsk near
Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, Novooleksandrivka, Novoserhiivka, and Sribne and attempting to interdict the
E-50 Pavlohrad-Pokrovsk highway west of the town. ISW previously observed indications that the Russian
military command defined the 2nd CAA's area of responsibility (AoR) as south and southwest of Pokrovsk
and the 41st CAA's AoR as east of Pokrovsk. The Russian military command's decision to establish a strike
group comprised of units of both the 2nd and 41st CAAs south of Pokrovsk indicates that Russian forces
may be reprioritizing tactical objectives in the Pokrovsk direction to set conditions to exploit more
opportunistic avenues of advance closer to Pokrovsk’s immediate flanks. Mashovets noted that elements of
the 15th and 30th motorized rifle brigades (2nd CAA) and the 348th Motorized Rifle Regiment (41st CAA)
are currently resting and reconstituting in rear areas of the Pokrovsk direction and that it is unclear
which sector of this direction the Russian military command will choose to redeploy these forces. The
Russian military command may redeploy these units to areas south of Pokrovsk if the Russian command
continues to prioritize tactical advances in the direction of Pokrovsk’s southern flanks in the coming
weeks and months.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces struck two Russian oil depots
in Kaluga and Tula oblasts on the night of January 17 to 18.
• Ukrainian forces also struck a
Russian air defense system and radars in occupied Ukraine on the night of January 17 to 18.
• The Russian Central Grouping of Forces appears to have assembled a strike group comprised of units of
the 2nd and 41st combined arms armies (CAAs) south of Pokrovsk, likely as part of ongoing Russian efforts
to intensify offensive operations south and southwest of the town.
• The Russian military
command also reportedly redeployed elements of a second unit of the 51st CAA from the Kurakhove direction
to offensive operations east of Pokrovsk amid ongoing efforts to intensify activity in this area.
• NATO officials are reportedly preparing for a joint NATO-Georgia exercise scheduled for March
2025.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and in the Chasiv Yar and Velyka
Novosilka directions.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions in the Kharkiv
direction.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Russian forces used ammunition equipped with
chemical agents banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 434 times in Ukraine in December 2024,
contributing to a total of 5,389 documented cases since February 2023. Ukraine's radiation, chemical, and
biological intelligence units are monitoring Russia's use of banned chemical agents, which include using
regulated K-51 and RG-VO grenade launchers to launch munitions containing chemical agents and ammunition
containing unspecified hazardous chemicals that are banned in warfare under the 1925 Geneva Protocol and
CWC. Ukrainian officials have previously reported on increasingly common instances of Russian forces
using chemical substances in combat that are banned by the CWC, to which Russia is a signatory, and the
Ukrainian General Staff noted that such violations have been systematic in the Russian military since
February 2023.
Both Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Chasiv Yar amid
continued offensive operations in the area on January 19. Geolocated footage published on January 18
indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in the Refractory Plant in central
Chasiv Yar. Geolocated footage published on January 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced
along Tolstoho Street in western Chasiv Yar. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 19 that Russian
forces captured the Novopivnichnyi and Desyata microraions in Chasiv Yar, advanced in the workshop area
of the Refractory Plant, and in northern Chasiv Yar. ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims,
however. Russian forces continued ground attacks within Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near
Predtechyne, Stupochky, and Bila Hora on January 18 and 19. Ukraine's Luhansk Group of Forces
Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on January 18 that Ukrainian forces repelled
Russian small and medium-sized assaults on the grounds of the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar.
Elements of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th VDV Division), drone operators of the
Russian "Terek" Cossack Reconnaissance Brigade (reportedly of the volunteer Cossack Assault Corps), and
drone operators of the Russian "Sever-V" Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are all reportedly operating
in the Chasiv Yar direction; additional elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division and elements of the
200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps , Leningrad Military District ) are reportedly
operating in Chasiv Yar itself.
Key Takeaways:
• The Ukrainian General Staff
reported on January 18 that Russian forces used ammunition equipped with chemical agents banned by the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 434 times in Ukraine in December 2024, contributing to a total of 5,389
documented cases since February 2023.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and
near Kupyansk, Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Ukrainian forces
recently recaptured lost positions near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.
• Russian volunteer military
detachments continue efforts to boost manpower by recruiting women into the Russian Armed Forces.
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces
suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were personnel killed in action. Syrskyi
stated on December 30, 2024, that Russian forces suffered 427,000 casualties in 2024, and Syrskyi's
January 20 number likely reflects additional losses that Russian forces incurred in the final days of
2024. ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command was likely willing to accept record
levels of casualties in Fall–Winter 2024, especially from September to November 2024, in order to achieve
relatively larger territorial gains from continued infantry-led, attritional assaults.
Russian
President Vladimir Putin reiterated on January 20 that the Kremlin is willing to negotiate with the
United States about the war in Ukraine but indicated that he maintains his demands for Ukraine's full
capitulation. Putin convened a meeting of the Russian Security Council on January 20, at which he and
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Russia's willingness to engage in peace negotiations
with the new US presidential administration under President Donald Trump. Putin caveated that any peace
settlement should "eliminate the root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Lavrov defined these root causes on
December 26 as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian
government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture
within Ukraine. Senior Kremlin officials, including Putin and Lavrov, have been reiterating in recent
weeks that the Kremlin refuses to consider any compromises to Putin's late 2021 and early 2022 demands,
which include demands that Ukraine remain permanently "neutral" and not join NATO, impose severe
limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military, and remove the current Ukrainian government. Putin
himself stated on December 26 that then US President Joe Biden suggested to him in 2021 that Ukraine's
NATO membership be postponed by 10 to 15 years — further demonstrating that alleged threats from NATO
expansion did not actually drive Putin to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January
20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were personnel
killed in action.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated on January 20 that the Kremlin
is willing to negotiate with the US about the war in Ukraine but indicated that he maintains his demands
for Ukraine's full capitulation.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an aircraft production
plant in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on January 20 as a part of an ongoing series of strikes aimed at
degrading Russian military capacity.
• Ukrainian strikes against Russian defense industrial
base (DIB) targets are reportedly affecting Russian forces' combat capabilities.
• Moldovan
and Transnistrian authorities continue efforts to supply Transnistria with European gas.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• A Russian
milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor repeated on January 20 complaints that Russian milbloggers first
issued in May 2024 about insufficient quality controls on Russian artillery shells.
Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and
oil refineries in Russia on the night of January 20 to 21 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at
degrading Russian military capacity. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Special
Operation Forces (SSO) elements and other Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against Rosneft's
Lisinskaya Oil Refinery in Voronezh Oblast for the second time this week following successful strikes on
the night of January 15 to 16. The January 20 to 21 strike caused a fire at fuel and lubricant tanks, and
the Ukrainian General Staff noted that the oil refinery supplies the Russian military. Voronezh Oblast
Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on January 20 that Russian forces destroyed several drones in Voronezh
Oblast but that a drone fell on an oil depot in Liskinsky Raion, starting a fire. A Kremlin-affiliated
Russian milblogger noted that the oil depot was still burning from the January 15-16 strike and the
second strike started another fire at the facility. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that
Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and SSO struck the Smolensk Aviation Plant in Smolensk Oblast.
Geolocated footage shows fires at the production building of the Smolensk Aviation Plant. Ukrainian
Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that the plant produces and
modernizes Su-25 attack aircraft and maintains aviation equipment. Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily
Anokhin claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike against Smolensk Oblast but that
falling drone debris caused fires. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces struck
Lukoil's Saratovorgsintez Chemical Plant in Saratov City overnight that produces acrylonitrile,
acetonitrile, and sodium cyanide. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces
destroyed 10 drones over Smolensk Oblast, six over Voronezh Oblast, and four over Saratov Oblast on the
night of January 20 to 21.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also
continue to conduct strikes against Russian command posts in the Russian rear. The Ukrainian General
Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the command post of the Russian 29th Combined Arms Army (CAA)
(Eastern Military District ) in occupied Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast on the night of January 20 to
21. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that there are reports of explosions and smoke after the strike
and that Ukrainian authorities are clarifying the results of the strike. ISW has not observed footage or
other reporting of this command post strike. ISW has observed reports that elements of the 29th CAA are
currently operating along the Yantarne-Zelenivka line southwest of Kurakhove. The Ukrainian General Staff
reported in early and mid-January 2025 that Ukrainian forces struck the command posts of the Russian 2nd
CAA (Central Military District ), 8th CAA (Southern Military District), and 3rd Army Corps (AC)
(CMD) in occupied Donetsk Oblast. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian strikes against main command
posts further in the Russian rear are likely aimed at degrading broader Russian logistics and operational
planning efforts, which could impact Russia's ability to conduct its military operations in western
Donetsk Oblast.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC)
President Xi Jinping held a phone call on January 21 and emphasized deepening cooperation. Putin and Xi
reiterated boilerplate narratives emphasizing increasing Russian-PRC foreign policy, energy, and economic
cooperation. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov claimed that Putin and Xi discussed Russia's war in
Ukraine and Russia's and the PRC's relations with the United States, although the official Kremlin
readout of the call did not mention these topics. Ushakov also claimed that Xi gave Putin an overview of
Xi's recent call with US President Donald Trump.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces
conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries in
Russia on the night of January 20 to 21 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading Russian
military capacity.
• The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also continue
to conduct strikes against Russian command posts in the Russian rear.
• Russian President
Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping held a phone call on January 21
and emphasized deepening cooperation.
• Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein's
recent appointment has thus far failed to solve or distract from Russia's failure to adequately respond
to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast
and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove. Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near
Pokrovsk.
• Russian ultranationalist milbloggers renewed complaints against the Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) for failing to hold the Russian military command accountable for military
failures.
The Kremlin has launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the
Russian economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.
Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during a meeting on economic issues on January 22 that 2024 was
a "strong year" for the Russian economy. Putin claimed that Russia has a manageable budget deficit of 1.7
percent and achieved a 26 percent increase in non-oil-and-gas revenue to 25.6 trillion rubles
(approximately $257.9 billion) in 2024 and announced a retroactive 9.5 percent increase in insurance and
military pensions to address rising Russian inflation. Bloomberg reported on January 21 that the Russian
Finance Ministry released a report projecting economic strength and suggesting that Russian budget
revenue in December 2024 reached a record high of over 4 trillion rubles (about $40 billion) — a 28
percent increase compared to December 2023 and the highest level recorded since 2011. The data fails to
account for Russia's unsustainable levels of defense spending, rampant inflation, a growing deficit and
the erosion of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, however. ISW continues to observe macroeconomic data that
directly contradict the Kremlin's claims that the Russian economy is performing well. The Kremlin has
recently adopted policies aimed at increasing defense spending all while Russian society faces labor
shortages, broader demographic issues, declining savings, and increasing reliance on bailouts as the
Russian economy faces rising interest rates, inflated salaries, and deteriorating production capacity.
These economic realities suggest that the Kremlin's efforts to posture economic strength are largely an
information operation aimed at reassuring domestic audiences and posturing Russian strength abroad while
masking the true challenges Russia's economy is facing, particularly heightened due to its war against
Ukraine.
North Korea will reportedly deploy new military personnel to Russia by mid-March
2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of attritional, infantry-led assaults in Kursk
Oblast. The New York Times (NYT) reported on January 22 that a US senior defense official stated that
additional North Korean forces will arrive in Russia "within the next two months," (roughly mid-March
2025). The NYT did not specify the number of troops or whether North Korea is rotating forces or
increasing the size of its total force grouping in Russia, however. The South Korean Joint Chiefs of
Staff reported on December 23 that North Korea may be preparing to deploy an unspecified number of
additional forces to Ukraine and military equipment to Russia, either as a rotation or additional
deployment of forces. Western officials told the BBC on January 22 that North Korean forces have suffered
roughly 1,000 killed in action and 3,000 missing or wounded in action as of mid-January 2025, roughly 33
to 40 percent of the 11,000 to 12,000 total North Korean personnel already in Russia] ISW recently
assessed that the entirety of the North Korean contingent in Russia may be killed or wounded in action by
about mid-April 2025 at their current casualty rate, and a new North Korean deployment — whether intended
to increase the current grouping or rotate out existing forces — is likely intended to sustain Russia’s
tempo of operations despite heavy losses of about 30,000 - 45,000 causalities (combined killed and
wounded) per month. North Korean forces reportedly spent at least a month training in eastern Russia
before deploying to Kursk Oblast for further training in near rear areas in November 2024 and joining
combat operations at least as of early December 2024. This timeline roughly coheres with the possibility
that a fresh contingent of North Korean forces could undergo training and replace the shrinking North
Korean group in Kursk Oblast by mid-April 2025, assuming the reported next batch of North Korean troops
will train for the same duration as their predecessors, and deploy to Russia imminently in late January
or early February 2025.
These fresh North Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve
Russian operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and complications operating with
Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent, provided the Russian command continues to use
North Korean forces the same way as it has thus far. US officials and Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT
that North Korean and Russian forces continue to struggle with communications and cohesion and that
Russian and North Korean forces have "clashed" at least twice due to troop identification errors. A
Ukrainian commander told the NYT that North Korean assault groups now include a translator who speaks
Russian but that these groups are still not very effective. Ukrainian soldiers reported that North Korean
forces continue conducting mass infantry assaults and that North Korean soldiers do not retreat even if
injured. Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) published footage on January 22 of North Korean forces
massing for an infantry assault and reported that Ukrainian forces killed 21 and wounded 40 North Korean
soldiers during the eight-hour long combat engagement. Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT that Russian
forces are still attempting to conceal the presence of North Koreans on the battlefield by conducting
drone strikes against wounded North Korean troops as Ukrainian forces attempt to take them prisoner. ISW
continues to assess that North Korea's high casualty rate and interoperability difficulties with Russian
forces will affect the lessons that the North Korean military command will learn from fighting in
Russia's war.
Key Takeaways:
• The Kremlin has launched an information operation
that seeks to create the false impression that the Russian economy is performing well despite numerous
continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.
• Russia continues long-term efforts to build
out its manpower reserve with All-Russian Cossack Society organizations and create a willing and
well-trained prioritized pool designed to buffer the Kremlin from potential blowback in the event of a
possible future partial call up of Russian reservists.
• North Korea will reportedly deploy
new military personnel to Russia by mid-March 2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of
attritional, infantry-led assaults in Kursk Oblast.
• These fresh North Korean forces are
unlikely to decisively improve Russian operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and
complications operating with Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent, provided the Russian
command continues to use North Korean forces the same way as it has thus far.
• Russian
milbloggers complained and expressed concern over recent claims that the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led
interim government in Syria suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus
as Russia's long-term military presence in Syria remains unclear.
• A Russian state media
outlet reported that Russia may resume direct gas deliveries to Transnistria despite recent discussions
about sourcing non-Russian gas to the region.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost
positions near Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk,
Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia and Uzbekistan are deepening military cooperation.
Russia is reportedly planning to deploy additional North Korean forces, missiles, artillery systems, and
multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Kursk Oblast to support Russian long-range fire operations.
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told The
War Zone in an article published on January 22 that North Korea will deploy an unspecified number of
additional missile and artillery troops to Kursk Oblast at an unspecified future time. Budanov reported
that North Korea is unlikely to deploy a large number of additional ground combat troops, however.
Budanov stated that North Korea has provided Russia with roughly 120 M-1989 Koksan 170mm self-propelled
artillery systems and 120 M-1991 240mm MLRS since November 2024 and will likely send at least 120 more of
each system in the future. The GUR previously reported in November 2024 that North Korea had provided
Russia with roughly 100 of each of these systems as of October 2024. Budanov stated that North Korea
plans to provide Russia with 150 additional KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles in 2025 and sent Russia
148 KN-23 missiles in 2024. Budanov noted that North Korean troops typically operate North
Korean-provided weapons in Kursk Oblast and are also training Russian forces on these systems. A US
senior defense official recently told the New York Times (NYT) that additional North Korean forces will
arrive in Russian "within the next two months (roughly mid-March 2025)."
The Kremlin appears
to be growing increasingly concerned about perceptions of Russia's economic instability. Reuters, citing
five sources with knowledge of the situation, reported on January 23 that Russian President Vladimir
Putin is growing increasingly concerned about "distortions" in the Russian economy due to the war in
Ukraine. Two sources familiar with "thinking in the Kremlin" told Reuters that there is a camp within the
Russian elite that views a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine as desirable and key to addressing
Russia's economic issues. One source claimed that Putin recognizes the strain that the war is placing on
the Russian economy and assesses that he has achieved his "key war goals" in Ukraine, including seizing
land in southern Ukraine to connect Russia within occupied Crimea and weakening the Ukrainian military.
The source did not speculate on Putin's willingness to end the war, however. Russian opposition outlet
Meduza reported on January 9 — citing sources in the Russian presidential administration, State Duma, and
wider Russian federal government and regional governments — that Russian elites are growing increasingly
dissatisfied with the impact of the war on the Russian economy. ISW noted on January 22 that the Kremlin
recently launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russia
economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.
Russian forces recently executed at least six unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk
Oblast. Ukrainian sources circulated footage on January 23 of Russian soldiers shooting unarmed Ukrainian
POWs in an unspecified area of Ukraine. Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets and the
Ukrainian Attorney General's Office reported on January 23 that Ukrainian officials are investigating
social media footage of Russian forces executing six captured and unarmed Ukrainian servicemembers in an
unspecified area of Donetsk Oblast. Lyubinets noted that the footage shows a seventh Ukrainian POW in
this group but that it is unclear what happened to the seventh POW based on the footage. ISW has
frequently reported that Russian forces are conducting frontline executions of Ukrainian POWs and
continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or enabling their
subordinates to conduct these executions.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia is reportedly
planning to deploy additional North Korean forces, missiles, artillery systems, and multiple launch
rocket systems (MLRS) to Kursk Oblast to support Russian long-range fire operations.
• The
Kremlin appears to be growing increasingly concerned about perceptions of Russia's economic
instability.
• Russian forces recently executed at least six unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of
war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near
Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
• The Kremlin is reportedly taking measures to protect industrial
facilities in Russian border regions from Ukrainian strikes.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is once again attempting to obfuscate his unwillingness to participate
in good-faith negotiations to end the war by blaming Ukraine for defending itself against Russia's
invasion and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. Putin claimed during a televised interview with
Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on January 24 that he is willing to negotiate "on the Ukraine issue,"
but that a 2022 Ukrainian presidential decree declaring the "impossibility of negotiating" with Putin is
a significant impediment to peace negotiations. Putin falsely claimed that Ukraine and Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky are not interested in peace negotiations and that it is impossible for
Russia and Ukraine to discuss "anything serious" with the decree in place. Putin claimed that any peace
agreements that result from negotiations between Russia and Ukraine before Ukraine repeals the 2022
decree will be "illegitimate" and claimed that the West must force Zelensky to repeal the 2022 decree.
Putin also once again questioned Zelensky's legitimacy as the current president of Ukraine and insinuated
that US President Donald Trump should negotiate exclusively with Putin about Ukraine's fate, as the two
leaders can "calmly" discuss their interests. Putin has previously called for Ukraine to repeal the 2022
decree, but Putin's intense focus on the decree during his January 24 interview marks yet another attempt
to distract from his unwillingness to engage in peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
Zelensky signed the September 2022 decree banning negotiations with Putin in direct response to Putin's
illegal annexation of four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine and after months of negotiations in
which Russia continued to demand Ukraine's full capitulation. The Ukrainian presidential decree
explicitly prohibits Ukraine from conducting negotiations with Putin. The context within which the decree
was signed is important, however. Zelensky signed the decree on the day that Putin illegally annexed four
Ukrainian oblasts (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts), including areas that Russian
forces did not then and still do not occupy. The decree states that the ban on negotiations with Putin is
a response to Russia's illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory and part of Ukraine's efforts to
"guarantee the security of the Euro-Atlantic space, Ukraine, and
territorial integrity." Zelensky signed the September 2022 decree after months of Russian-Ukrainian peace
talks in Istanbul in Spring 2022, during which Russia demanded that Ukraine be a permanently neutral
state that could not join NATO and that Ukraine submit to limitations on the size of the Ukrainian
military similar to those imposed by the Treaty of Versailles on Germany after World War I. These terms
would have restricted Ukraine's Armed Forces to 85,000 soldiers who would be unable to defend Ukraine
against a third Russian invasion.
However, Zelensky has consistently signaled his willingness
to negotiate with Russia and make certain compromises in pursuit of peace following the 2022 decree
banning formal negotiations with Putin. Zelensky has outlined clear conditions for potential talks with
Russia and emphasized the importance of preserving Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity,
developing Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB), and securing security guarantees from Ukraine's
Western allies. Zelensky has repeatedly advocated for a diplomatic solution to the war, proposing that
Ukraine should enter any peace negotiations from a "position of strength" – a strategy aimed at
compelling Russia to engage in good-faith negotiations and consider just compromises in such
negotiations. Zelensky has also invited Russian representatives to attend Ukraine's second Global Peace
Summit in the future.
Kremlin officials have consistently dismissed these overtures, labeling
Ukraine's proposed peace formula and platforms "unviable," and Putin even reportedly asked People's
Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping to "snub" the first Global Peace Conference in June 2024.
Zelensky has continued to express openness to direct negotiations and has acknowledged the possibility of
a diplomatic compromise as part of a broader solution to the war despite Russia's repeated rejections.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is once again attempting to
obfuscate his unwillingness to participate in good-faith negotiations to end the war by blaming Ukraine
for defending itself against Russia's invasion and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory.
• Zelensky signed the decree in September 2022 banning negotiations with Putin in direct response to
Putin's illegal annexation of four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine and after months of
negotiations in which Russia continued to demand Ukraine's full capitulation.
• However,
Zelensky has consistently signaled his willingness to negotiate with Russia and make certain compromises
in pursuit of peace following the 2022 decree banning formal negotiations with Putin.
• Putin
meanwhile continues to signal to both his domestic and global audiences that he is not interested in
peace short of his full demands and remains committed to Ukraine's complete capitulation.
• Putin is attempting to leverage the 2022 decree as a strawman to hide the reality of his disinterest
in negotiations and to sow discord between Ukraine and its Western allies.
• Putin also
attempted to position himself as Trump’s equal during his interview, reinforcing his long-held belief
that Russia is the great-power heir to the Soviet Union.
• Putin demonstrated that he is
worried about the effect that lower oil prices would have on his domestic stability and ability to wage
his war in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is attempting to revive its information operation aimed at
deterring the US and other Western states from providing further military assistance to Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is framing the new 2025 Union State Security Concept as completely superseding the
original 1999 Security Concept, indicating that this new agreement may be more expansive than the
original and will further forward the Kremlin's effort to annex Belarus.
• Ukrainian forces
conducted a large series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil
refineries on the night of January 23 to 24 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading
Russian military capacity.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv
Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Ukrainian forces recently
recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.
Ukraine and Moldova continue to offer solutions to Transnistria's energy crisis as Moldovan President
Maia Sandu met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on January 25. Zelensky stated at a
press conference with Sandu that Ukraine can supply Transnistria with coal at low prices or even free of
charge if Transnistria would supply Ukraine with electricity in return. Zelensky also stated that Ukraine
is ready to send a team of specialists to help increase the Transnistrian power plant's electricity
output such that it would far exceed Transnistria's domestic needs, allowing Transnistria to provide
electricity to all of Moldova and Ukraine. Zelensky noted that Transnistria's cooperation with Moldova
and Ukraine would help reduce electricity prices throughout all of Moldova by 30 percent. Transnistrian
authorities have previously refused Moldovan and Ukrainian offers of help, instead turning to schemes
that involve Moscow directly or indirectly providing enough gas to the breakaway republic to cover only
its domestic electricity needs. Ukrainian and Moldovan officials have noted that Russia is trying to
leverage its manufactured gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion before the Summer 2025 Moldovan
parliamentary elections.<3> Transnistria's possible acceptance of Ukrainian and Moldovan offers of aid
and Transnistria's subsequent supply of cheaper electricity to the rest of Moldova would disrupt Russian
efforts to use the energy crisis to strengthen Transnistria's economic dependence on Moscow, to posture
Russia as the breakaway republic's savior and benefactor, and to leverage Chisinau's turn to higher
priced European electricity as part of Moscow's anti-EU narratives.
The Kremlin is continuing
to leverage the prominent Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel to cultivate increased Russian influence
in Iraq. The Rybar channel claimed on January 25 that members of the Rybar team – including its founder
Mikhail Zvinchuk – visited Iraq over the last week and met with Iraqi officials, including Iraqi Prime
Minister Mohammad Shia Al Sudani. The channel claimed that Iraqi officials noted their openness to
increasing trade and foreign investments with Russian partners and their interest in further developing
Russian–Iraqi relations. The channel welcomed Russian businesses, media companies, bloggers, and
investors to begin exploring opportunities in Iraq. Member of the Rybar team visited Iraq in August 2024,
and ISW noted at the time that this was the first observed report of a Russian milblogger meeting with a
senior foreign official. ISW-CTP previously assessed that Russia may be setting conditions to supplant
the US as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the US possibly reducing its military presence
there. The recent fall of the Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria may be prompting the Kremlin to reconsider
the contours of its relations with Iraq.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukraine and Moldova
continue to offer solutions to Transnistria's energy crisis as Moldovan President Maia Sandu met with
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on January 25.
• The Kremlin is continuing to
leverage the prominent Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel to cultivate increased Russian influence in
Iraq.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka
Novosilka.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 25 that the Russian
government will allow veterans of volunteer formations (dobrovolcheskie formirovaniya) to receive "combat
veteran status" without submitting a formal application.
Russian forces recently made further advances within Velyka Novosilka amid official Russian claims that
Russian forces seized the entire settlement on January 26. Geolocated footage published on January 26
indicates that Russian forces advanced northward along Tsentralana Street in northern Velyka Novosilka.
Some Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on January 26 that Russian
forces completely seized Velyka Novosilka, whereas other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces had
seized most of the settlement. Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are still clearing
Ukrainian forces from the settlement, including the northern part, and that Ukrainian forces are still
counterattacking in the area. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces occupy
89 percent of the settlement, however. Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov
stated on January 26 that Russian forces have not occupied all of Velyka Novosilka and that Ukrainian
forces maintain positions in the settlement. A Ukrainian brigade operating within Velyka Novosilka stated
on January 26 that fighting continues within the settlement and that Russian forces do not pose a threat
of encircling the brigade's elements. ISW has not observed independent evidence of Russian forces
encircling Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka. The Ukrainian brigade also reported that neither Russian
nor Ukrainian forces can use heavy equipment due to parity of strikes near the contact line and that
Ukrainian and Russian forces have "approximate parity" in terms of artillery and first-person view (FPV)
drones but that Russian forces have a "huge" manpower advantage in the area. The brigade stated that
Ukrainian forces are conducting artillery and drone strikes against Russian forces within Velyka
Novosilka and that the Mokri Yaly River that flows through western Velyka Novosilka is an obstacle to
Russian advances. Russian forces continued offensive operations within and near Velyka Novosilka itself,
northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 25
and 26.
The Russian MoD notably is paying an abnormally high amount of fanfare to the claimed
Russian seizure of Velyka Novosilka, very likely as part of informational efforts to shape Western
perceptions of the battlefield situation in Ukraine and degrade international support for Ukraine. The
Russian MoD posted footage during the day of January 26 purportedly showing Russian forces conducting
thermobaric artillery strikes against Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka and claimed that Russian
assault groups were clearing Ukrainian positions. The Russian MoD later claimed that elements of the
Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army , Eastern Military District ) and the 40th
Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) seized all of Velyka Novosilka, and Russian Defense Minister
Andrei Belousov congratulated the command and personnel of the two brigades for the seizure. The Russian
MoD subsequently posted footage purportedly showing Russian flags in multiple areas of the settlement.
Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA) also
participated in the claimed seizure of Velyka Novosilka, and it is unclear why the Russian MoD did not
credit the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade in their announcements. The Russian MoD has not recently been
announcing the claimed seizures of settlements with so much fanfare and as quickly as they did on January
26. Russia is likely trying to leverage the claimed seizure of Velyka Novosilka in order to influence
Western perceptions of the situation on the battlefield in Donetsk Oblast, to advance narratives that
Russian battlefield gains are inevitable and that Ukrainian positions are rapidly deteriorating. Russian
gains in western Donetsk Oblast continue to be gradual and far below the pace that is normal for modern
mechanized warfare. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether Russian forces will be able to rapidly
advance beyond Velyka Novosilka, as it is unclear how much combat power elements of the EMD still retain
after several months of continuous offensive operations. Velyka Novosilka is located next to several
rivers which will likely complicate and hamper further Russian tactical advances in the area. Russian
forces have historically struggled with river crossings and tactical terrain features, such as rivers,
will likely complicate Russian forces' ability to leverage the seizure of Velyka Novosilka to make
operationally significant advances in western Donetsk Oblast.
The seizure and clearing of
Velyka Novosilka will likely present opportunities and a decision point to the Russian military command
on whether to redeploy elements of the Russian Eastern Military District from the Velyka Novosilka
area to other priority operational areas. Any redeployment of EMD elements from the Velyka Novosilka area
over the coming weeks will indicate the Russian military command’s priority operational areas for
offensive operations in Spring and Summer 2025. Elements of the Russian EMD have been the primary
fighting force in the Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka directions since at least early 2023, defended
against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Summer 2023, and later intensified offensive operations in the
area in Fall 2024. Elements of the EMD participated in the seizure of Vuhledar in September and October
2024 and successfully exploited the seizure of the settlement to advance north towards Kurakhove and west
towards and into Velyka Novosilka over the following three months. The seizure of Velyka Novosilka will
present the Russian military command with a decision point during which the Russian military command can
pursue several courses of action (COAs). Velyka Novosilka is protected from Ukrainian counterattack due
to the settlement’s disposition near the Mokri Yaly River. The Russian military command may opt to retain
elements of the EMD in the western Donetsk Oblast area and continue advancing towards the
Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary, which runs north and west of Velyka Novosilka.
This decision would indicate that the Russian military is prioritizing advances to the administrative
boundary as quickly as possible over other axes of advance in Donetsk Oblast or other frontline areas. It
remains unclear how much combat power the EMD elements still retain after having engaged in intense
operations for over six months, however. The Russian military command could also retain some EMD elements
in the Velyka Novosilka area to continue limited attacks and pin Ukrainian forces in the area but
redeploy the bulk of the EMD to another frontline area. Russian forces are currently intensifying
offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Borova, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk directions and are still
working to eliminate the remainder of the Ukrainian salients in the Kurakhove direction and Kursk Oblast.
Ukrainian officials have also recently warned that Russian forces may also renew offensive operations in
Zaporizhia Oblast in 2025. The Russian military command could redeploy EMD elements to any of these
directions, and the redeployment of elements of the EMD will be an indicator of the Russian military
command's priority areas for Spring and Summer 2025.
Russian forces are poised to seize
Toretsk in the coming days and a redeployment of elements of the EMD to reinforce the Russian force
grouping in the Toretsk direction would indicate a new Russian priority effort to resume attacks in the
direction of Kostyantynivka. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely intend to exploit the
seizure of Toretsk to push further west and along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway towards the
southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka. Russian advances in the Toretsk
direction have historically been slow as Russian forces fought through built up urban areas, but Russian
forces may begin to advance relatively more quickly once they break out of Toretsk into the more open
fields west of the settlement. Russian forces may also attempt to leverage tactical gains within and near
Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk and select Russian
milbloggers have recently speculated that Russian forces may be intensifying offensive operations
southwest of Toretsk for this purpose. Russian forces may want to eliminate the Ukrainian salient
southwest of Toretsk in order to firm up their southern flank ahead of a push on Kostyantynivka. The
Russian military command may redeploy elements of the EMD to reinforce offensive operations in the
Toretsk direction if it intends to prioritize pressuring the Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast in
the Spring and Summer 2025. Seizing Pokrovsk has been the Russian military command’s main operational
objective in Donetsk Oblast since February 2024. A Russian redeployment of EMD elements to the Toretsk or
Chasiv Yar directions - as opposed to retaining the EMD elements in western Donetsk Oblast, redeploying
them to the Zaporizhia direction, or redeploying them to the Pokrovsk direction - would therefore
indicate an inflection in Russian operational priorities.
Ukrainian forces conducted a second
strike on the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26. The Ukrainian
General Staff reported on January 26 that elements of Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate
(GUR) and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan City. Geolocated footage shows
a fire at a tank at the refinery. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 26 that
Russian forces downed eight drones over Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26. Ryazan Oblast
Governor Pavel Malkov claimed that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) systems destroyed
Ukrainian drones over Ryazan Oblast and that authorities were assessing material damage. Ukrainian
official sources noted that the Ryazan Oil Refinery is one of the four largest refineries in Russia and
produces fuel for military equipment; jet fuel; diesel fuel; and other petroleum products for tanks,
aircraft, and ships. Ukrainian forces last struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery on the night of January 23 to
24.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces recently made further advances within Velyka
Novosilka amid official Russian claims that Russian forces seized the entire settlement on January 26.
• The Russian MoD notably is paying an abnormally high amount of fanfare to the claimed Russian
seizure of Velyka Novosilka, very likely as part of informational efforts to shape Western perceptions of
the battlefield situation in Ukraine and degrade international support for Ukraine.
• The
seizure and clearing of Velyka Novosilka will likely present opportunities and a decision point to the
Russian military command on whether to redeploy elements of the Russian Eastern Military District
from the Velyka Novosilka area to other priority operational areas. Any redeployment of EMD elements from
the Velyka Novosilka area over the coming weeks will indicate the Russian military command’s priority
operational areas for offensive operations in Spring and Summer 2025.
• Russian forces are
poised to seize Toretsk in the coming days and a redeployment of elements of the EMD to reinforce the
Russian force grouping in the Toretsk direction would indicate a new Russian priority effort to resume
attacks in the direction of Kostyantynivka.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a second strike on
the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26.
• Ukrainian forces
advanced in Kursk Oblast and regained positions in Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced
near Borova, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian government
on January 25 for not prioritizing the recruitment and training of Russia's next generation of military
officers.
Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone storage facilities in Oryol Oblast again on January 26.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 26 that the Ukrainian forces struck drone and thermobaric
warhead storage warehouses, causing secondary detonations. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the
strike destroyed over 200 Shahed drones. Oryol Oblast Governor Andrei Klychkov claimed on January 26 that
Ukrainian forces repeatedly attempted to strike Oryol Oblast and that Russian electronic warfare (EW)
interference downed a Ukrainian drone in Oryol Oblast. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation
Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian forces struck the same drone storage facility at
the end of December 2024.
The European Union (EU) proposed an aid package on January 27 to
Moldova and Transnistria to help the ongoing gas crisis in the pro-Russian breakaway republic as part of
efforts to reduce Russia's ability to exploit Transnistria in its energy blackmail schemes targeting
Chisinau. The package includes an immediate loan of three million cubic meters of gas to Transnistria and
offers a grant of 30 million euros (about $31.4 million) for Moldova to purchase gas – presumably from
the European market – from February 1 to 10 to support Transnistria's electricity production for domestic
consumption and export to the rest of Moldova. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean noted that the EU
will continue to support Chisinau after February 10 in order to ensure that Transnistria can continue to
produce electricity for Transnistria and Moldova. The EU aid package offers to invest in Transnistrian
electricity production and distribution over the next two years. The EU stated that it is also
considering supporting coal deliveries from Ukraine to Transnistria and that it has supported the
allocation of transmission capacity along the gas delivery route from Bulgaria and Romania to Moldova.
The Transnistrian Energy Operational Headquarters stated on January 27 that Transnistrian gas reserves
are running out and will last only until early February 2025 "at most." Russian business outlet
Kommersant reported on January 27 that its sources stated that Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz is in
discussions with Hungarian oil and gas company MOL and Hungarian electricity company MVM about buying gas
for Transnistria, the delivery of which would begin in early February 2025 and continue until late March
or early April 2025. Recean confirmed on January 27 that MOL presented Moldovagaz with a draft contract
on the supply of gas for Transnistria but that Moldovan authorities must verify the legality and
compliance of the contract with national and international law. Transnistrian authorities have previously
rejected Moldovan and Ukrainian offers of aid. ISW continues to assess that Transnistria's possible
acceptance of aid from Moldova, Ukraine, or the EU and Transnistria's subsequent supply of cheaper
electricity to the rest of Moldova would disrupt Russian efforts to use the energy crisis to strengthen
Transnistria's economic dependence on Moscow, to posture Russia as the breakaway republic's savior and
benefactor, and to leverage Chisinau's turn to higher priced European electricity as part of Moscow's
anti-EU narratives.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Khortytsia Group of Forces
Commander Brigadier General Andrii Hnatov with Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi on
January 26. Zelensky stated that Drapatyi will also remain Ground Forces Commander and that Hnatov will
become Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff. Zelensky noted that Drapatyi's dual position will
help combine the Ukrainian military's combat operations with the proper training of brigades and that
Hnatov will work to improve coordination between headquarters and the front.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone storage facilities in Oryol Oblast again on
January 26.
• The European Union (EU) proposed an aid package on January 27 to Moldova and
Transnistria to help the ongoing gas crisis in the pro-Russian breakaway republic as part of efforts to
reduce Russia's ability to exploit Transnistria in its energy blackmail schemes targeting Chisinau.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Khortytsia Group of Forces Commander Brigadier
General Andrii Hnatov with Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi on January 26.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.
• Russian forces
recently advanced near Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, and Kurakhove.
• The Russian government continues
to expand the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into
government positions, by creating similar programs for Russian veterans across government, including at
the regional level.
The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28
to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria. The Russian delegation includes Deputy
Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Presidential Special Representative to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev.
Reuters reported that two Syrian sources stated that the delegation will meet with the new Syrian
government sometime this week. Bogdanov told Russian state media outlet RT that the visit aims to
strengthen Russian-Syrian historical relations based on common interests. Bloomberg reported that a
Russian source familiar with the matter stated that Russia is struggling to retain access to the Hmeimim
Air Base and Port of Tartus because negotiations with the new Syrian government are "stuck." Russian
milbloggers responded to the Russian delegation's arrival, claiming that Syria is "far from" Russia's
first or even second priority and cautioning against believing Russian or Syrian officials' "standard
phrases" about cooperation. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that there is no hope that
Russian-Syrian relations can return to their previous strength and that Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) holds
the upper hand in negotiations and can extract greater concessions from Russia.
The Russian
military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian
negotiations. Commercially available satellite imagery collected by Planet Labs PBC from January 18 and
27 shows that the Russian military loaded equipment onto the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships at
Tartus and that the Sparta II ship left the port while the Sparta remained. OSINT analyst MT Anderson
posted satellite imagery from January 23 showing the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler alongside the
port and possibly suggesting that the Russian military was loading vehicles onto the Sparta.<8> Bloomberg
reported on January 28 that a Russian source stated that two Russian transport ships — likely the Sparta
and Sparta II — had been waiting for weeks off Tartus before Syrian authorities allowed them to dock.
A senior NATO official acknowledged that Russia is escalating a sabotage and destabilization
campaign against European NATO member states to deter further military assistance to Ukraine. NATO Deputy
Assistant Secretary General James Appathurai stated at the European Parliament on January 28 that NATO
states have faced acts of sabotage in recent years, including train derailments, arson, attacks against
politicians' property, and assassination plots against defense industry figures, including a Kremlin plot
to assassinate Rheinmetall Head Armin Papperger. Appathurai emphasized that the Kremlin aims to "create
disquiet to undermine support for Ukraine" and called for NATO states to more assertively deter Russian
sabotage acts. The Kremlin has consistently attempted to use information operations to deter Western
states from providing additional military assistance to Ukraine. The Kremlin's sabotage and
destabilization campaign directly targeting NATO states supports ISW's assessment that Russian President
Vladimir Putin sees Russia as waging a hybrid war directly against NATO.
Key Takeaways:
• The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on
January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria.
• The Russian
military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian
negotiations.
• The Russian military likely formed a separate unmanned systems regiment at the
military district level in order to augment Russia's unmanned systems capabilities. The creation of this
regiment supports the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) recent coordinated effort to establish the
Unmanned Systems Forces within the Russian military and centralize control over informal drone
detachments.
• A senior NATO official acknowledged that Russia is escalating a sabotage and
destabilization campaign against European NATO member states in Europe to deter further military
assistance to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk and near Pokrovsk, and
Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and in western
Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian government continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to
appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine to federal government positions as part of wider Kremlin efforts
to militarize Russian society.
Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Western military assistance remains vital to Ukraine's
ability to maintain its defense against Russian aggression. Putin gave an interview to Kremlin journalist
Pavel Zarubin published on January 28 in which he claimed that the war in Ukraine could be over within
two months if the West stops providing Ukraine with military assistance and that Ukraine's dependence on
Western military aid indicates that Ukraine has "no sovereignty." Putin's claims about how quickly the
war will end without further Western military assistance and his explicit rejection of Ukrainian
sovereignty are a part of long-term Kremlin information operations aimed at undermining Western support
for Ukraine and deterring additional Western military assistance. Putin is correct, however, that
additional Western military assistance — particularly US military assistance — remains critical to
maintaining and further developing Ukraine's warfighting capabilities. Ukrainian forces have consistently
proven throughout the war that they can achieve operationally- and strategically significant battlefield
victories when armed with sufficient quantities of US and other Western-provided military assistance.
Ukrainian forces have also maintained stubborn defenses even when poorly provisioned and notably forced
Russian forces to withdraw from Kyiv Oblast in April 2022 before significant deliveries of Western aid
even arrived at the frontline and significantly slowed the pace of Russian offensive operations in
Ukraine in Summer 2022. Putin and other Kremlin officials aim to portray Ukraine as weak and incapable of
adequately leveraging Western-provided weapons at this critical moment in Western policy discussions
about Ukraine — even though Ukraine has proven that it is anything but weak after fending off Russia for
the almost three years of war.
Putin's longstanding theory of victory relies on the assumption
that the West will abandon Ukraine, and only unwavering Western support and consistent deliveries of
Western military assistance to Kyiv can force Putin to abandon his theory and accept the need to offer
the concessions necessary for any resolution to the conflict acceptable to the United States, Europe, and
Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that only the United States can provide Ukraine with some critical
weapons and military equipment at the scale, speed, and regularity necessary for Ukraine's defense
against Russia, and Western officials have recently proposed that European states increasingly assist in
funding US military assistance to Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike at the
Russian oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, and reportedly hit a Russian arsenal in Tver
Oblast on the night of January 28 to 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 29 that elements
of Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the
Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez oil refinery in Kstovo and caused a fire. Ukrainian Center for Countering
Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko posted footage of the oil refinery fire in Kstovo and
reported that the refinery produces gasoline, diesel, aviation kerosene, and bitumen; processes 15 to 17
million tons of oil per year; and supports the Russian military. Geolocated footage posted on January 28
and 29 shows a fire at the Nizhny Novgorod Oil Refinery. Russian petrochemicals company Sibur-Ksotvo
Enterprise reported on January 29 that Ukrainian drone debris struck the enterprise on the night of
January 28 to 29, and Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin acknowledged that drone debris started
a fire in an industrial area. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on January 29 that Ukrainian
drones also struck the Russian Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD)'s 23rd Arsenal near Oktyabrsky, Tver Oblast, reportedly damaging an empty weapons storage building
and three other buildings. Ukrainian forces previously struck the Russian 23rd Arsenal in September
2024.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Western
military assistance remains vital to Ukraine's ability to maintain its defense against Russian
aggression.
• Putin's longstanding theory of victory relies on the assumption that the West
will abandon Ukraine, and only unwavering Western support and consistent deliveries of Western military
assistance to Kyiv can force Putin to abandon his theory and accept the need to offer the concessions
necessary for any resolution to the conflict acceptable to the US, Europe, and Ukraine.
• Putin indicated that he will not view any peace agreement with Ukraine as binding by claiming that
the Ukrainian government is either unwilling or unable to rescind the 2022 Ukrainian presidential decree
banning negotiations with Putin.
• Putin's statements rejecting the legitimacy of the
Ukrainian government and of a possible future peace agreement set conditions for Russia to justify
violating any future agreements with Ukraine.
• Putin continues efforts to coerce US President
Donald Trump into bilateral negotiations that exclude Ukraine, impose his desired negotiations framework
on Trump, and compel Trump to inadvertently endorse ongoing Russian information operations about the
illegitimacy of the current Ukrainian government.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike
at the Russian oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and reportedly hit a Russian arsenal in
Tver Oblast on the night of January 28 to 29.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)
confirmed in a post on January 29 that Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik is the commander of the
Russian Southern Grouping of Forces.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and
near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove,
Velyka Novosilka, Robotnye, and in the Dnipro direction.
• Volunteer recruitment rates in in
Moscow have dropped sharply, as Russian citizens grow increasingly unwilling to serve in Ukraine.
Kremlin newswire TASS published an interview with Valdai Discussion Club Research Director Fyodor
Lukyanov on January 30 entitled "Don't count on big agreements," highlighting the Kremlin's ongoing
efforts to shape domestic and global expectations about future negotiations between Russian President
Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump. The Valdai Discussion Club is an international forum where
Kremlin officials, Russian scholars, and foreign officials and scholars meet to discuss international
issues and has proven to be a useful tool in the Kremlin's decades-long efforts to influence Western
policy in Russia's favor. Lukyanov is a senior member and scholar at the Valdai Club, has repeatedly
moderated Putin's annual speech at Valdai, and is considered a well-connected and authoritative voice on
the Kremlin's foreign policy goals and objectives -- though he holds no formal position in the Russian
government. ISW is not prepared to assess or argue that Lukyanov has intimate and personal knowledge
about Putin's state of mind or intentions in future peace negotiations, but Lukyanov's statements in this
interview are generally consistent with Putin's and other Kremlin officials' statements about Russia's
future negotiating positions. TASS’ decision to leverage Lukyanov's interview to dampen domestic
speculation about the possibility of a peace agreement in the near future also highlights the relevance
of this interview and Lukyanov's statements when considering Russia's possible negotiating positions
vis-a-vis Ukraine and the United States.
Lukyanov stated during the interview that the "main
thing" for future peace negotiations regarding Ukraine is "not the territories" but addressing the "root
causes" of the war, which Lukyanov defined as NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early
2000s. Lukyanov stated with respect to Ukrainian lands Russian forces now hold that "with the
territories, everything is clear: how much you take is yours," further indicating that the Kremlin has no
intention of compromising on its territorial gains in Ukraine in future peace negotiations. This position
suggests that the Kremlin likely means for any future peace negotiations with Trump to start with the
United States recognizing Russia's territorial claims over Ukraine, likely including areas that Russia
does not currently occupy, before actual negotiations can begin that should focus on these so-called
"root causes." Lukyanov stated that Russia's chief demand for future peace negotiations with Trump is "a
change in the security landscape in Eastern Europe" and the "abandoning a number of provisions on
which NATO's existence and functioning are based." Lukyanov stated that Russia may also want to discuss
the possibility of "reducing the level of military presence," presumably along Russia's borders,
but noted that this is unlikely to happen.
Kremlin officials have repeatedly alluded to the
need for future peace negotiations to address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov defined in December 2024 as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to
advance eastward and "aggressive absorption" of areas near Russia's borders. Putin issued a series of
demands to the United States in December 2021 ahead of his full-scale invasion of Ukraine that included
that: NATO commit to not accepting Ukraine or any other countries as new members; the United States
commit to upholding the alleged ban on NATO enlargement; NATO not deploy any military forces to states
that became NATO members after May 1997; and NATO ban any military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe,
the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, among other things. The Financial Times (FT) reported on January
10, citing a former senior Kremlin official and another source who discussed the topic with Putin, that
Putin will maintain his pre-war demands of preventing Ukraine from joining NATO and forcing NATO to
withdraw deployments in Eastern Europe in any future negotiations. Lukyanov's statements are yet another
indication that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United
States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this goal.
Lukyanov's statements
assume that Trump and his administration are weak and more susceptible to being intimidated by the
Kremlin's shows of force than the former Biden Administration. Lukyanov claimed that Trump wants to "dump
all further problems" concerning Ukraine on Europe and "does not respect" European states or NATO more
broadly. Lukyanov claimed that Trump may be willing to compromise NATO's foundational principles to
appease Putin's demand for a NATO withdrawal from Eastern Europe and suggested more broadly that Trump
will abandon Ukraine and NATO. Lukyanov claimed that "Trump only respects those who show steadfastness"
and called on the Kremlin to "never give in" and "to be prepared for a fairly tough conversation, even
including elements of bluff" -- calling on the Putin to strongarm Trump and demonstrate his resolve in
future negotiations with Trump. Lukyanov's interview supports the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to force
Trump into acquiescing to Putin's demands that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation and the weakening of
NATO and Putin's personal efforts to position himself as Trump's equal on the international stage.
Key Takeaways:
• Kremlin newswire TASS published an interview with Valdai Discussion
Club Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov on January 30 entitled "Don't count on big agreements,"
highlighting the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to shape domestic and global expectations about future
negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump.
• Lukyanov stated during the interview that the "main thing" for future peace negotiations regarding
Ukraine is "not the territories" but addressing the "root causes" of the war, which Lukyanov defined as
NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s.
• Lukyanov's statements
assume that Trump and his administration are weak and more susceptible to being intimidated by the
Kremlin's shows of force than the former Biden Administration.
• People's Republic of China
(PRC)-based companies continue to supply Russia with critical materials needed to sustain Russia's war
efforts in Ukraine.
• The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a
resolution on January 28 defining its position on peace in Ukraine, closely echoing the principle of
"peace through strength" that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky previously outlined.
• The US military reportedly recently transferred Patriot missiles from Israel to Poland and is
expected to deliver these missiles to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost
positions near Kharkiv and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and
Kurakhove and in the Dnipro direction.
The United Kingdom (UK), Finland, and Czechia announced several immediate and longer-term military
assistance packages for Ukraine on January 31. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on January
31 that the UK will provide Ukraine with a military assistance package valued at two billion GBP (about
$2.5 billion), primarily for the purchase of air defense systems and funding for the localization of
defense production in Ukraine. Finnish Defense Minister Antti Hakkanen announced on January 31 that
Finland will provide Ukraine with a new tranche of military assistance valued at almost 200 million euros
(about $207 million). Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky stated on January 31 that the Czech government
is considering creating a new initiative to purchase artillery ammunition for Ukraine.
Russian
forces are expanding their salient north of Kupyansk as part of long-term operational efforts to push
Ukrainian forces from the east (left) bank of the Oskil River. Russian offensive operations along the
Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna (Kupyansk-Borova-Lyman) line gradually intensified in September 2024 after a
relatively low tempo period in early and mid-2024 during which Russian forces primarily conducted
infantry assaults and occasional platoon-sized mechanized assaults in the area. Ukrainian forces repelled
a reinforced battalion-sized Russian mechanized assault near Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk) in late
September 2024 – the first large Russian mechanized assault in this direction since Winter 2023-2024.
Russian forces have recently intensified offensive operations north of Kupyansk, particularly near
Dvorichna, as part of this broader intensification in the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions.
Geolocated footage published on January 30 and 31 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally
advanced north of Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk and on the west bank of the Oskil River), advanced
in the southern outskirts of Zapadne (southwest of Dvorichna), and advanced northward along the west bank
of the Oskil River northwest of Novomlynsk (northeast of Dvorichna). The Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD) claimed on January 28 and 31 that Russian forces recently seized Dvorichna, and a Russian
milblogger claimed on January 31 that Russian forces seized Novomlynsk. ISW has not observed confirmation
of these claims, however.
Russian forces are also leveraging mechanized assaults to expand
their salient north of Kupyansk. Russian forces have conducted five company-sized mechanized assaults and
at least one reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction since late October
2024. The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on January
28 that Ukrainian forces have repelled four mechanized assaults of unspecified echelon since January 22
alone. The Russian military command has historically allocated armored vehicles to priority frontline
areas and intensified mechanized activity could indicate that the Kupyansk direction is becoming a
priority sector for Russian forces.
Key Takeaways:
• The United Kingdom (UK),
Finland, and Czechia announced several immediate and longer-term military assistance packages for Ukraine
on January 31.
• Russian forces are expanding their salient north of Kupyansk as part of
long-term operational efforts to push Ukrainian forces from the east (left) bank of the Oskil River.
• Elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Leningrad Military District ) are reportedly
leading the Russian effort to expand the salient north of Kupyansk.
• Elements of the Russian
1st Guards Tank Army (GTA) (Moscow Military District ) are also participating in the envelopment of
Kupyansk and are attempting to advance east of Kupyansk and to expand the Russian salient south of
Kupyansk near Kruhlyakivka likely in order to prepare for advances south of Kupyansk, cross the Oskil
River, and pressure Borova.
• Russian forces appear to be developing and disseminating a
doctrinal method for advances throughout the theater that aims to conduct slow envelopments of frontline
towns and settlements at a scale that is reasonable for Russian forces to conclude before culminating.
• The Russian military command has shown that it is willing to commit to operations that could
take six to nine months to conclude. Russian commanders are likely operating under the assumption or
direct knowledge that Russian President Vladimir Putin does not intend to end the war in Ukraine in the
near future.
• This Russian offensive method is bringing about slow operational maneuver on
the battlefield, but these envelopments require significant planning, foresight, manpower, and equipment
and do not restore rapid, mechanized maneuver to the battlefield.
• Russian forces are also
intensifying their efforts to close the remaining Ukrainian pocket west of Kurakhove.
• Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities agreed to accept a European Union (EU) package that includes
funding for gas purchases for Transnistria, further limiting Russia’s economic influence over the
pro-Russian breakaway republic.
• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil refinery in Volgograd
Oblast amid continued strikes against Russian energy and defense industrial infrastructure.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Western and Ukrainian officials continue to report that North Korean forces have withdrawn from
frontline positions in Kursk Oblast.
Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night
of January 31 to February 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven
Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast and occupied Crimea; seven Iskander-K cruise
missiles from occupied Crimea and Donetsk Oblast; eight Kh-22 cruise missiles from Tu-22M3 aircraft;
eight Kh-101/55 cruise missiles from Tu-95MS strategic bombers; 10 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from tactical
aircraft over Voronezh Oblast; two Kh-31P anti-radiation missiles from the Black Sea; and 123 Shahed and
decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk,
Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces
shot down 56 Shahed and decoy drones; that 61 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic
warfare (EW) interference; and that Ukrainian countermeasures prevented an unspecified but significant
number of Russian missiles from reaching their targets. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian
ballistic missiles had a higher success rate, and ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are likely
leveraging ballistic missiles in strike packages since Ukraine only has a few air defense systems
suitable for intercepting such missiles. Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky, reported that a Russian Kh-22 missile struck a residential building in Poltava City; that
Russian ballistic missiles struck the historical center of Odesa City, and damaged a United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) protected building; and that drones damaged
residential areas, warehouses, and private property in Kharkiv and Kyiv oblasts. The Norwegian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs confirmed that Russian forces struck an area near where Norwegian diplomats were
staying in Odesa City. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russia's overnight strikes
targeted Ukrainian gas and energy facilities that support the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).
A recent Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian naval drone suggests that Russian forces have
developed a new method to offset Ukrainian capabilities in the Black Sea. The Russian MoD reported on
February 1 that Russia's Black Sea Fleet (BSF) used a drone to destroy a Ukrainian naval drone in the
Black Sea. Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian BSF launched a Kronshtadt Orion missile-capable
drone from an unspecified naval asset and that this strike may be the first documented case of Russian
forces leveraging a naval asset to deploy drones capable of destroying Ukrainian naval drones. Another
Russian milblogger called on Russian authorities to increase the production of weapons similar to the
drone-launched X-UAV missiles (TKB-1030) to effectively combat Ukrainian forces' naval drone capabilities
as it is now too risky for Russia to operate helicopters near the Black Sea. Ukrainian forces have
demonstrated their ability to down Russian Mi-8 helicopters operating over the Black Sea using missiles
launched from Magura V5 naval strike drones, and the February 1 BSF strike suggests that Russian forces
have developed a new method to try to offset this Ukrainian naval drone adaptation.
Key
Takeaways:
• Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes
against Ukraine on the night of January 31 to February 1.
• A recent Russian drone strike on a
Ukrainian naval drone suggests that Russian forces have developed a new method to offset Ukrainian
capabilities in the Black Sea.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian
forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
Russian forces reportedly struck a dormitory holding Russian civilians in
Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 1 as Russian authorities widely attempted to deny Russian responsibility
for the strike and blame Ukraine.
Russia continues efforts to illegally deport Ukrainian
children to occupied Crimea and Russia under the guise of evacuation and rehabilitation programs.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman,
Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian forces continue to forcibly
mobilize civilians in occupied Ukraine into the Russian military in violation of the Geneva
Convention.
Russian forces continued to suffer high losses in January 2025 despite a slower rate of advance as
compared with previous months in late 2024. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on February
3 that Russian forces suffered 48,240 casualties – over three Russian motorized rifle divisions worth of
personnel – in January 2025, making January the second highest month of losses since Russia's full-scale
invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.<1> ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian
forces gained roughly 498 square kilometers in January in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, or roughly 16.1
square kilometers per day. The available figures suggest Russian forces suffered roughly 96 casualties
per square kilometer of territory seized. The Ukrainian MoD reported that Russian forces suffered 48,670
casualties in December 2024 – their highest monthly casualty rate since the start of Russia's full-scale
invasion – and ISW assessed that Russian forces gained a total of 593 square kilometers in December 2024.
The roughly 100-square-kilometer decrease in seized territory between December 2024 and January 2025,
coupled with a similar monthly casualty rate, indicates that Russian forces are taking the same high
level of losses despite achieving fewer territorial advances in the near term. ISW previously observed
that Russian advances slowed from November 2024 to December 2024. ISW previously assessed that the
Russian military command likely tolerated record levels of personnel casualties from September 2024
through November 2024 to facilitate larger territorial gains, but it remains unclear whether the Russian
military command will be willing to sustain such casualties if Russian forces' rate of advance continues
to decline as Russian forces are advancing on more heavily defended settlements such as Pokrovsk.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces continued to suffer high losses in January 2025
despite a slower rate of advance as compared with previous months in late 2024.
• Ukrainian
forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure in Volgograd and
Astrakhan oblasts on the night of February 2 to 3.
• Ukrainian forces continue to innovate
with drone operations to maintain their technological advantage over Russia and bring about battlefield
effects.
• The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU)
expressed concern about the "sharp rise" in reports of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of
war (POWs).
• Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on February 3 that
Ukraine has started implementing organizational reforms to transition the Ukrainian Armed Forces into a
"corps structure."
• Unspecified actors assassinated Armen Sargsyan, the founder of the
"Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion, who has been involved in Russia's hybrid activities and invasions of
Ukraine since 2014.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, and Russian forces
recently advanced near Kupyansk, Borova, Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and in the
Dnipro direction.
• The Russian government is expanding the federal "Time of Heroes" program,
which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into government positions, to occupied Ukraine as part of
long-term efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska
Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess damage to the substation as Russian
long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue to threaten Ukraine's nuclear power plants
(NPPs) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities. Grossi did not specify when Russian forces damaged
the Kyviska Electrical Substation but emphasized that a direct strike on the substation or a power supply
disruption could cause a nuclear accident. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne noted that the Kyivska Electrical
Substation is connected to the Rivne NPP and supplies Kyiv City and central and northern Ukraine with
power. Russian forces launched a large series of missile and drone strikes targeting Ukrainian energy
infrastructure connected to Ukrainian NPPs on the night of November 16 to 17, 2024. Grossi reported that
the November 2024 Russian strikes damaged several unspecified electrical substations that are connected
to the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs but that the strikes did not damage the NPPs
themselves. Russian strikes against Ukrainian electrical substations — not just NPPs — continue to
threaten Ukraine's energy generation abilities and can cause long-term damage. Artur Lorkowski, the
director of the Energy Community (an international organization that manages Ukraine’s energy
procurement), told Politico in November 2024 that repairing damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure may
require a significant amount of time because it can take up to one year for Ukraine to find and reinstall
specialized equipment, including auto transformers. Another Ukrainian energy expert told Politico that
Ukraine needs an expedited supply of spare parts for energy infrastructure.
Russian officials
continue to justify the Kremlin's decision to not conduct an involuntary reserve call up at this time
despite indications that the Russian military is struggling to recruit enough new personnel to replace
its high casualties. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed on
February 4 that Russia does not need to conduct another partial involuntary reserve call up because
Russia currently has the battlefield "advantage." Duma Defense Committee member Viktor Sobolev added that
740,000 people have signed Russian military service contracts — presumably since the start of Russia's
full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 — and claimed that mobilization would "only make things worse"
because it would send people without any previous military experience or specialized skills to the
frontline. Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Andrei Krasov also claimed that mobilization
is unnecessary because Russian military registration and enlistment officers are successfully recruiting
new personnel. These Russian Duma deputies are likely claiming that Russian recruitment rates are
sufficient in order to assuage fears among the Russian public of a widely unpopular potential new partial
involuntary reserve call up.
A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port
of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's
continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on
February 3 that Russian and Syrian authorities will continue contacts on "all issues," including about
Russia's continued access to the Port of Tartus. Data from MarineTraffic.com showed that the Russian
Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships were off the coast of Tunisia on February 4. OSINT analyst MT Anderson
posted satellite imagery from the morning of February 4 showing thе Sparta and Sparta II, as well
as potentially the Alexander Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship, the Admiral Golovko Admiral
Gorshkov-class frigate, and the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate off the coast of Tunisia.
Satellite imagery and reports from Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) indicated that
all these vessels had been at the Port of Tartus in December 2024 and January 2025. The departure of a
significant number of vessels from the Port of Tartus suggests that the Kremlin is not optimistic about
the results of ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. The location of the vessels off the coast of Tunisia
also suggests that these ships are not bound for Libya despite the fact that Russia sent some assets from
Syria to Libya by air in December 2024 and January 2025 - as the Critical Threats Project's (CTP) Africa
File previously reported. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's Resistance Center reported on February 4
that Russian ships began evacuating weapons from the Port of Tartus on January 27, and satellite imagery
collected on January 18 and 27 showed that the Russian military had loaded equipment onto the Sparta and
Sparta II at Tartus. The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that the Sparta II turned off its automatic
identification system (AIS) after leaving Syria - a common practice among ships in Russia's "shadow
fleet."
Key Takeaways:
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General
Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess
damage to the substation as Russian long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue threaten
Ukraine's nuclear power plants (NPPS) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities.
• Russian
officials continue to justify the Kremlin's decision to not conduct an involuntary reserve call up at
this time despite indications that the Russian military is struggling to recruit enough new personnel to
replace its high casualties.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to discuss Russia's
possible illegal annexation of Kharkiv Oblast but claimed that Ukraine's September 2022 counteroffensive
in Kharkiv Oblast spoiled Russia's plans to hold a "referendum" in the region at that time.
• A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have
left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in
Syria reportedly continue.
• Ukrainian naval drone strikes have likely forced Russia to
dramatically alter Russian ships' routes between Russia and Syria.
• Russia has also
reportedly used vessels belong to the MoD's Oboronlogistika company to monitor NATO vessels in the Baltic
Sea.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk.
• A Kremlin-affiliated
Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the Siversk direction continue to struggle with
systemic issues with field commanders filing false progress reports despite recent command changes.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his willingness to negotiate with Russia
from a principled position that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the long
run. Zelensky reiterated during an interview published on February 4 that Ukraine cannot and will not
compromise its sovereignty in future peace negotiations, but that Ukraine's partners are not currently
providing Ukraine with sufficient military assistance for Ukrainian forces to push Russian forces from
all occupied Ukrainian territory. Zelensky stated that he is willing to negotiate directly with Russian
President Vladimir Putin but warned that any peace agreement that significantly weakens Ukraine's ability
to defend itself in the future risks another Russian invasion of Ukraine. Zelensky stated that Ukraine
will never recognize Russia's illegal occupation of Ukrainian territory and emphasized that there can be
no compromise on Ukraine's sovereignty. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine will eventually retake all its
territory militarily and diplomatically but noted that the liberation of all Ukrainian territory from
Russian occupation will take time. Zelensky called on Ukraine's allies to pressure Putin and demand that
Russian forces withdraw from all Ukrainian territory. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine wants peace and
that the United States, Europe, Ukraine, and Russia must all be represented in future peace negotiations.
Zelensky's statements highlight that Putin's unwillingness to participate in good-faith negotiations is
the true impediment to the end of the war, despite Putin's recent efforts to falsely blame Zelensky and
Ukraine for the lack of progress towards peace in Ukraine.
Zelensky reiterated that the
Ukrainian Constitution bans Ukraine from holding elections during wartime, but that Ukraine remains
committed to holding elections in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution and laws after the war ends.
Zelensky stated that Ukraine would have to change its constitution to hold an election outside of peace
time and asked how Ukrainian servicemembers, citizens living in Russian-occupied Ukraine, and Ukrainian
refugees and expatriates living abroad would be able to vote in the election before the Ukrainian
government lifts martial law. Zelensky stated that Ukraine will "definitely" hold elections after the war
ends but that Ukraine currently must focus on defending itself from Russian aggression. Putin and other
Kremlin officials have repeatedly used deliberately false readings of Ukraine's law and constitution to
claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate president after Ukraine, adhering to the law and constitution, did
not hold elections under martial law in 2024. The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government from holding
elections or amending the Ukrainian constitution in times of martial law, and the Ukrainian government
legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.
Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Russian forces have suffered roughly 300,000 to
350,000 killed in action (KIA) and roughly 600,000 to 700,000 wounded in action (WIA) since the February
2022 start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Zelensky added that Russian military personnel
suffer a 2:1 wounded to killed ratio because Russian field medicine is poor, and Russian forces struggle
to evacuate wounded personnel from the battlefield. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr
Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 —
150,000 of which were KIA. Zelensky's and Syrskyi's figures indicate that the Russian military suffered
roughly 41 to 48 percent of its total casualties in Ukraine since 2022 in 2024 alone. The highest range
of Zelensky's estimates are notably larger than recent Russian casualty figures from the Ukrainian
General Staff and former US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. Zelensky also stated that roughly 50,000 to
70,000 Russian soldiers have been classified as missing in action (MIA) since February 2022.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his
willingness to negotiate with Russia from a principled position that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and
territorial integrity in the long run.
• Zelensky reiterated that the Ukrainian Constitution
bans Ukraine from holding elections during wartime, but that Ukraine remains committed to holding
elections in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution and laws after the war ends.
• Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Russian forces have suffered roughly 300,000 to
350,000 killed in action (KIA) and roughly 600,000 to 700,000 wounded in action (WIA) since the February
2022 start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a strike
against an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 4 to 5 as a part of an ongoing strike
campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.
• The Russian
military continues efforts to restructure Russia's peacetime military administrative control over
military services (вид; vid) and is apparently disaggregating administrative control
for Russia’s Air Force and Navy from Russia’s military districts.
• The Kremlin continues to
prioritize domestic political stability over efforts to mitigate economic pressure and labor
shortages.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange on
February 5.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and
Kurakhove.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.
Executive Summary: A small group of Ukrainian
troops in Kursk Oblast have complicated the Russian military's efforts to advance in Ukraine over the
last six months. Roughly a division's worth of Ukrainian troops have undermined the Russian military's
ability to launch or renew offensive operations in lower-priority areas of the frontline and to reinforce
priority efforts with elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units. The Ukrainian incursion in Kursk
Oblast is a partial proof of concept of how limited Ukrainian battlefield activity that leverages
vulnerabilities in Russia's warfighting capabilities and that integrates technological adaptations with
mechanized maneuver can have theater-wide impacts on operations. It showed that surprise is still
possible even on a partially transparent battlefield and that rapid maneuver is possible under the right
conditions. The war in Ukraine, in other words, is not permanently stalemated. Either side can
potentially restore maneuver and begin to gain or regain significant territory. Russia will be able to do
so if the West reduces or cuts off aid. Ukraine may be able to do so if Western support continues to
empower Ukrainian innovation.
The Russian military command has gathered around 78,000 troops,
including 11,000 North Koreans, in an attempt to expel Ukrainian forces from positions in Kursk Oblast
over the last six months. An estimated 11,000 Ukrainian forces advanced into Kursk Oblast in early August
2024, seizing the tactical initiative and complicating the Russian military's Fall 2024 offensive effort.
Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly delayed his deadlines for Russian forces to push Ukrainian
troops from Kursk Oblast first by mid-October 2024 then by January 2025 and repeatedly prioritized
Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast over regaining control of the Kursk salient, which Russian forces
still had not done at the end of January 2025. Putin has not been able fully to insulate Russian forces
in Donetsk Oblast from the theater-wide impacts of the incursion, however, and the Russian military has
simultaneously been pulling troops, armored vehicles, and artillery and air defense systems away from
other sectors in Ukraine to reinforce the Russian force grouping fighting in Kursk Oblast. Recent
Ukrainian estimates indicate that Putin has accumulated roughly 67,000 Russian troops and 11,000 North
Korean troops in Kursk Oblast expel a reinforced Ukrainian grouping in Kursk Oblast that now constitutes
at most 30,000 troops by the most generous Western estimations.
Ukraine conducted the
incursion at a critical moment to gain leverage in the battlespace and successfully inflicted asymmetric,
theater-wide impacts on the Russian military with this limited ground operation. The first seven months
of 2024 were characterized by the Russian seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024, continued Russian
offensive operations west of Avdiivka in Spring and Summer 2024, the Russian offensive operations in
northern Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024, and intensified Russian offensive operations in the Toretsk and
Kurakhove directions in June and July 2024. Critical delays in Western aid over the winter of 2023-2024
created shortages in Ukraine's air defense interceptors and Ukrainian artillery units and wider
vulnerabilities in Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian attacks. Western leaders and intelligence
agencies spent most of early 2024 advocating for Ukraine to maintain an "active defense" and focus on
repelling and slowing Russian advances before attempting another counteroffensive operation possibly in
2025. The Ukrainian incursion refocused the conversation and allowed Ukraine to seize the narrative and
tactical initiative. The Ukrainian incursion reportedly stymied a planned Russian offensive into Sumy
Oblast, prevented the Russian military from substantially reinforcing its offensive in northern Kharkiv
Oblast, and complicated but failed to stop Russian advances in priority sectors of Donetsk Oblast.
Ukrainian officials have never suggested that they intended to hold positions in Kursk Oblast in
perpetuity. Ukrainian officials have instead repeatedly characterized the incursion as an effort to
distract and pin Russian forces away from Russia's main operational objectives in Ukraine. ISW assesses
as of February 5 that Russian forces had retaken at least 57 percent (roughly 655 square kilometers) of
the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. The Russian military certainly can expel Ukrainian forces from
Russia whenever it chooses to allocate the necessary resources but has yet to prioritize this effort over
making further advances in eastern Ukraine. Russian authorities may prioritize pushing Ukrainian forces
from Russian territory in the coming months, however, particularly if Russian officials begin to
seriously consider peace negotiations and intend to enter such negotiations from the strongest possible
position. It is too early to determine the long-term impacts of the incursion on the resolution of the
war in Ukraine, and these impacts will almost certainly be affected by Ukraine's ability to capitalize on
the military and political pressures that the incursion has created for Russia. Ukraine may be able to
replicate and exploit the pressure that Kursk has inflicted on the Russian military if the West continues
to support Ukraine and if Ukraine can address its own manpower, morale, and materiel issues and identify
a key location and moment to conduct a similar such operation in the future.
Ukrainian forces launched a new series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in Kursk Oblast and
advanced up to five kilometers behind Russian lines southeast of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 6.
Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of
Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha) and north and east of Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha) along
the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway and seized Kolmakov (north of Cherkasskaya Konopelka) and Fanaseyevka
(just southeast of Cherkasskaya Konopelka). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian
forces attacked in several waves in the direction of Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Ulanok (southeast of
Cherkasskaya Konopelka along the 38K-028 highway) with up to two mechanized battalions' worth of armored
vehicles and that Russian forces repelled the attack. Russian milbloggers estimated that Ukrainian forces
attacked with 30 to 50 armored vehicles and claimed that one group of Ukrainian forces successfully
attacked from Makhnovka towards Cherkasskaya Konopelka, Fanaseyevka, and Ulanok and that Russian forces
repelled another Ukrainian group that attacked from Dmitriukov (just east of Makhnovka) towards Russkaya
Konopelka (east of Sudzha). A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized
Cherkasskaya Konopelka, but two other milbloggers denied this claim. Some Russian sources claimed that
Ukrainian forces broke through to or even seized Ulanok, but other sources also denied these claims. ISW
has not yet observed geolocated evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces are operating in Ulanok. The
Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 6 indicating that Russian forces recently marginally
advanced in a forested area southwest of Kurilovka.
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger
claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces also attacked near Kruglenkoye
(northwest of Sudzha), but ISW did not observe additional claims of Ukrainian activity in this area or
north of Sudzha near Berdin where Ukrainian forces attacked in early January 2025.<7> Russian milbloggers
claimed that Ukrainian forces launched the attacks southeast of Sudzha during poor weather conditions
that complicated Russian drone operations in the area. Some Russian milbloggers expressed concern that
further Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast could threaten rear areas of the Russian force grouping
attacking Guyevo (south of Sudzha) and complicate Russia's ability to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of
communication (GLOCs) within the Ukrainian salient. Russian sources acknowledged that elements of the
Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 30th Motorized Rifle
Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps , Leningrad Military District ), and
177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and Chechen Akhmat drone operators are the main forces
defending against the Ukrainian attacks southeast of Sudzha.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces launched a new series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in Kursk Oblast and
advanced up to five kilometers behind Russian lines southeast of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 6.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin praised elite Russian VDV and naval infantry formations
defending Kursk Oblast on February 5, highlighting the fact that the Ukrainian incursion has pinned about
a combined arms army’s worth of Russian troops in Kursk Oblast since August 6, 2024.
• Ukrainian officials provided additional details about Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast in honor of
the six-month anniversary of the incursion.
• A Russian state-run poll suggests that the
Russian public maintains a high level of support for the war in Ukraine despite mounting challenges.
• North Korea appears to be using its alliance with Russia to leverage the war in Ukraine as a
testing ground to refine its missile technology and broader military capabilities.
• Ukrainian
forces conducted a strike against an air base in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 5 to 6 as a part
of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.
• Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military assistance to Ukraine.
• Russian
President Vladimir Putin appointed Deputy Minister of Transport Dmitry Bakanov to replace Yuri Borisov as
head of the state-owned Russian space agency Roscosmos on February 6.
• Ukrainian forces
recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and recaptured lost positions near Kurakhove.
• Russian
forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, and Kurakhove.
• Russian authorities
continue efforts to increase social benefits for Russian military personnel likely to support ongoing
recruitment efforts.
Ukrainian forces marginally advanced during mechanized assaults in their salient in Kursk Oblast on
February 6, but Russian sources claimed on February 6 and 7 that Russian forces have at least temporarily
stalled Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha. Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that
Ukrainian forces marginally advanced along the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway and in the fields east of
Fanaseyevka (southeast of Sudzha) during the February 6 attacks. Russian sources widely claimed that
Russian forces repelled all Ukrainian attacks on February 6 and on the night of February 6 to 7 but
acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain some positions near Cherkasskaya Konopelka (north of
Fanaseyevka), Fanaseyevka, and Ulanok (east of Fanaseyevka). A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger
claimed that fighting is ongoing on the outskirts of Makhnovka (just southeast of Sudzha) but that
Ukrainian forces did not launch new attacks near Cherkasskaya Konopelka during the day on February 7.
Russian milbloggers continued to issue conflicting claims about the situation in Cherkasskaya Konopelka.
Some milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have seized the settlement, while others claimed that
Ukrainian forces bypassed the settlement or that Russian forces have retaken the settlement. ISW cannot
independently verify Russian claims about the situation in Cherkasskaya Konopelka. A Russian milblogger
claimed that Russian forces are effectively using fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones to counter
Ukrainian forces attacking in the area.
Russian sources provided additional information about
the Russian force grouping defending southeast of Sudzha. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported
that elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet),
40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), "Veterany"
Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps), "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army
, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps , SMD), and drone operators of the
Russian Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are defending in the area. Russian milbloggers
widely credited drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz forces with defending against the
Ukrainian attacks on February 6 and 7 and complained that the Russian MoD did not acknowledge the Chechen
drone operators. Russian milbloggers also claimed that the Russian military command reportedly removed
the 11th VDV Brigade's commander and that the MoD is blaming the commander for failing to sufficiently
man and defend Russian positions near Cherkasskaya Konopelka.
The Kremlin continues to conduct
an information campaign likely directed toward both domestic and international audiences that aims to
conceal the extent to which Russia's protracted war against Ukraine has negatively affected Russia's
economy. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin met on February 7 with Russian President Vladimir Putin
to discuss the state of the Russian economy. Mishustin claimed that Russia's gross domestic product (GDP)
rose in 2024 by 4.1 percent largely due to "intensive" growth in Russia's manufacturing industry – likely
referring to Russia's boost of its defense industrial base (DIB) since the start of its full-scale
invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Mishustin claimed that the main contributors to the growth in
Russia's manufacturing sector were the machine-building, transport engineering, automotive, and computer
and electronic equipment sectors.
Mishustin claimed that inflation in Russia reached 9.52
percent in 2024, and Putin claimed that inflation was already 9.9 percent as of February 3, 2025.
Russia's true inflation is quite higher than the official statistics the Kremlin is willing to publicize,
however. (Several studies indicate that Russia’s inflation rate is closer to 20 percent.) Mishustin
highlighted Russia's low 2024 unemployment rate of 2.5 percent but only briefly acknowledged Russia's
significant labor shortages, which are the reason for Russia's low unemployment.
Mishustin
noted that Russian economic growth might be less significant in 2025 as it is very important to stop
inflation and ensure long-term economic growth – likely a signal to prepare the Russian population to
expect economic hardships in 2025. Mishustin and Putin also attempted to posture Russia's economy as
stable in the face of international economic pressure. Mishustin claimed that Russia's fuel and energy
complex is adapting and finding new markets.
Mishustin claimed that Russia's economy has
"successfully managed" with "unprecedented sanctions pressure" in recent years and that anti-Russian
sanctions are hurting the states that imposed the sanctions more than the sanctions are hurting Russia.
Putin similarly attempted to posture Russia's economy as stronger and growing more rapidly than economies
in the West. Mishustin and Putin notably did not mention how the Russian Central Bank raised the interest
rate to 21 percent in October 2024 or how Russia has been drawing from its National Welfare Fund to
finance its war effort over the last three years. The liquidity portion of Russia’s National Welfare fund
may run out by Fall 2025.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces marginally advanced
during mechanized assaults in their salient in Kursk Oblast on February 6, but Russian sources claimed on
February 6 and 7 that Russian forces have at least temporarily stalled Ukrainian advances southeast of
Sudzha.
• The Kremlin continues to conduct an information campaign likely directed toward
both domestic and international audiences that aims to conceal the extent to which Russia's protracted
war against Ukraine has negatively affected Russia's economy.
• Ukrainian military officials
continue to highlight the country’s growing drone production capacity and its effectiveness on the
battlefield but acknowledged that Ukraine must address its force generation issues to fully stop Russian
advances in eastern Ukraine.
• Interim Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra stated in an
interview with the Washington Post that Syria is open to Russia retaining its air and naval bases in
Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.
• Azerbaijan-Russia relations continue to sour
following Russia’s refusal to take full responsibility for the December 25, 2024 downing of an
Azerbaijani Airlines (AZAL) passenger plane, likely shot mid-air by Russian air defense before crashing
in Aktau, Kazakhstan
• Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers appointed Lieutenant General Yevhen
Moysiuk and Captain Valeriy Churkin as Deputy Defense Ministers on February 7.
• Russian
forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk.
• The Russian government continues to use
its "Time of Heroes" program to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine to regional government
positions.
Russia may be providing drone and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops
fighting in Kursk Oblast. Japanese outlet NHK, citing multiple sources familiar with Russia–North Korea
relations, reported on February 8 that Russia has agreed to assist North Korea in developing and
mass-producing various types of drones in exchange for North Korean forces supporting Russia’s war effort
against Ukraine. NHK noted that Russia remains reluctant to help North Korea develop nuclear weapons,
fearing that North Korean nuclear tests could further strain relations with the United States and
complicate relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), however. Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky noted on February 8 that Russia is specifically spreading modern technology to North Korea,
including drone technology, and told Reuters on February 7 that thousands of North Korean troops have
returned to active combat in Kursk Oblast after a brief pause. A Ukrainian brigade operating in Kursk
Oblast published a video on February 8 reportedly showing North Korean forces conducting assaults
alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast. South Korean sources recently reported that Russia withdrew
North Korean troops from the battlefield in Kursk Oblast in mid-January 2025, possibly for rest and
reconstitution or to rethink how Russia is using these troops. ISW assesses that North Korea is using the
war in Ukraine as a testing ground for its own military capabilities. Reuters reported on February 6 that
North Korean ballistic missiles fired by Russian forces since December 2024 have demonstrated
significantly improved accuracy, likely an example of North Korean capability enhancement gained through
the North Korea-Russia alliance.
Russia continues to expand its military capabilities,
indicating that the Kremlin has no immediate interest in negotiations or a lasting peace with Ukraine.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, citing Ukrainian intelligence, reported on February 8 that
Russian forces are forming new military divisions, building additional defense-industrial base (DIB)
facilities, planning to increase military personnel by over 100,000 soldiers, and deepening military
cooperations with North Korea. Then–Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in January 2023 that
Russia would create 14 new military divisions, but ISW is unable to assess whether Zelensky is referring
to these previously announced plans or the creation of additional new divisions. ISW also cannot verify
the status of the formation of the 14 divisions Shoigu previously announced. Zelensky highlighted that
Russia's force-generation, restructuring, and defense-production efforts make it clear that Putin is not
interested in negotiations with Ukraine and seeks to continue Russia’s war. Such Russian plans suggest
that Russia, not Ukraine, is the party refusing good-faith negotiations and actively pushing for
protracted war rather than peace, while also setting conditions to prepare for a potential broader
conflict with NATO. Russian officials and information space have frequently framed the war in Ukraine as
a part of a larger confrontation with the West.
The Russian command may be redeploying forces
from the Kurakhove direction towards Toretsk in order to facilitate Russian offensive operations against
Kostyantynivka in Spring or Summer 2025. A Russian source claimed that the Russian military command is
redeploying elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments, 163rd Tank Regiment, and 381st
Artillery Regiment (all of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division) and elements of the 96th regiment
(possibly also part of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, although ISW has not previously observed
reports of this unit operating in Ukraine) from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction. ISW has
not observed confirmation or other reporting on this alleged redeployment. Another Russian source claimed
that elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments are operating near Dachne as of February
8, however. A redeployment of elements of the 8th CAA to the Toretsk direction- in conjunction with
intensified Russian efforts in the Chasiv Yar direction in recent weeks- would indicate that the Russian
command may intend to prioritize advances towards Kostyantynivka and pressuring Ukraine's fortress belt
in 2025, as ISW previously assessed.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia may be providing drone
and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops fighting in Kursk Oblast.
• Russia continues to expand its military capabilities, indicating that the Kremlin has no
immediate interest in negotiations or a lasting peace with Ukraine.
• The Russian command may
be redeploying forces from the Kurakhove direction towards Toretsk in order to facilitate Russian
offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in Spring or Summer 2025.
• The Baltic States cut
ties with the Soviet-era power grid that connected them to Belarus and Russia on February 8 as part of
efforts to achieve full energy independence from Russia and further integrate their energy infrastructure
with the European Union (EU).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, and
Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.
• The Kremlin continues
efforts to incentivize Russian citizens to serve in the military.
Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to offset the
resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency
reported on February 9, citing South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), that thousands of North
Korean workers arrived in Russia in 2024 to take construction jobs. Russian official data shows that
13,221 North Koreans entered Russia in 2024 — up to 12 times the number that entered Russia in 2023. Many
of the North Korean workers are reportedly entering Russia on student visas, with 7,887 North Koreans
having entered Russia in 2024 for alleged education purposes. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii
reported on February 4 that the number of North Koreans who came to Russia to study in 2024 was the
highest number since 2019. Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported in November 2024 that data from
the Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service showed that a record number of North Koreans entered
Russia for education between July and September 2024 — notably in the lead up to the reported start of
North Korea's deployment of troops to Russia in early October 2024.
Russia has been suffering
from significant labor shortages in both its civilian and defense industrial sectors since the start of
its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The arrival of several thousands of North Koreans to work in civilian
sectors is marginal and will not significantly alleviate Russia's labor shortages. Russia reportedly has
an estimated labor shortage of 1.5 million workers as of December 2024, for example. North Korea's
provisions of materiel and troops to Russia have significantly increased over the course of 2024,
however, and the several thousands of North Korean workers that arrived in Russia recently may be the
beginning of larger influxes in the future that could more significantly help Russia's labor shortage
issues. (Russian forces‘ initial use of small numbers of North Korean artillery and mortar shells grew
rapidly, with 60 percent of Russian forces‘ artillery ammunition fired now being sourced from North Korea
as of December 2024.) Russian enterprises are also likely not paying North Korean workers the same
salaries as Russian citizens, so a significant influx of North Korean workers into the Russian work force
in the future could also financially benefit Russian enterprises that are having to offer high salaries
to Russian citizens in order to compete against Russian military and defense industrial enterprises for
employees. Significant increases in the number of North Koreans working in Russia's civilian sectors in
the future could also free up Russian civilian sector employees to work in the Russian defense industrial
base (DIB) or fight in Ukraine.
The arrival of North Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how
Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution
2397. Russia voted for Resolution 2397 in 2017 in response to North Korea's intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) tests. The resolution explicitly prohibits North Korea from sending its citizens abroad
for work and mandated that all UN member states expel all North Koreans "earning income" abroad by
December 2019. Russia is likely using the guise of student visas to hide Russia's violation of the
resolution.
North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un continues to reiterate his support for Russia
and its war effort in Ukraine. Kim gave a speech at the North Korean Ministry of National Defense on
February 9 that heavily focused on the threats the US and the West allegedly pose to North Korean
security. Kim criticized the US for protracting the war in Ukraine and claimed that he is "seriously
concerned" about the West's alleged desire to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia. Kim notably claimed
that the North Korean military and people will "invariably support and encourage" Russia's "just cause"
to defend its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity "in the spirit of" the June 2024
Russian-North Korean comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to
offset the resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort.
• The arrival of
North Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution 2397.
• North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un
continues to reiterate his support for Russia and its war effort in Ukraine.
• German
authorities reportedly failed to down suspected Russian reconnaissance drones flying near a German
military facility in January 2025 where Ukrainian forces have undergone training.
• Russia
appears to be leveraging the technological innovations it is developing in its war in Ukraine directly
against NATO states.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near
Vovchansk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia continues efforts to recruit Russians and citizens of other Commonwealth of Independent
State (CIS) countries to sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced the Ukrainian "Drone Line" project on February 10 as
part of ongoing Ukrainian efforts to integrate drone and ground operations. Umerov stated that the
Ukrainian military will "scale up" five existing drone regiments and brigades in the Ukrainian military
and border guard service and will integrate infantry and drones into a single strike system, which will
enable Ukrainian forces to create kill zones 10 to 15 kilometers deep, will provide constant aerial
support and infantry cover, and will detect and destroy Russian forces before they can approach Ukrainian
positions. Ukraine's Ground Forces reported that the expansion of five such existing drone units is only
the first stage of the Drone Line project. This project likely formalizes and provides additional support
to ongoing Ukrainian efforts to expand drone units and increase their coordination with regiments and
brigades, while keeping regular units and drone units separate in order to support drone units' more
rapid combat and technological adaptations and innovations.
Ukraine's efforts to integrate
drone operations with ground operations significantly differ from Russian efforts to centralize drone
units. Russian efforts to centralize drone units have attempted to augment Russian drone capabilities by
expanding state control over drone operators and developers and increasing their incorporation into the
Russian military bureaucracy. The Russian military began efforts to centralize drone operators and
developers in Fall 2024, disbanding informal Russian drone detachments and removing drone specialists
from regular military units, then selectively reorganizing them to form new Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD)-controlled drone units and centralizing their assets. The Russian MoD also reportedly established
its first separate unmanned systems regiment at the military district level in January 2024, further
highlighting ongoing efforts to centralize and bureaucratize control over drone operations. ISW continues
to assess that the Russian MoD's efforts to centralize and reorganize drone units and monopolize drone
production and procurement processes may complicate Russian forces' ability to rapidly innovate and adapt
new technologies and combat techniques in the short- to medium-term.
Ukrainian forces continue
to target oil refineries in Russia as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense
industrial enterprises and oil refineries. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation
Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko implied on February 10 that Ukrainian drones struck Krasnodar City and the
Afipsky Oil Refinery in Neftekachka, Krasnodar Krai just south of Krasnodar City. Kovalenko noted that
the Afipsky refinery has a production capacity of 6.25 million tons of oil per year and plays a vital
role in providing fuel to the Russian military, particularly in southern Ukraine. Kovalenko highlighted
that the refinery's location in Krasnodar Krai makes it a significant logistical hub supplying diesel
fuel and jet fuel to Russian forces. The Afipsky Oil Refinery notably borders the base of the Russian
90th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army , Southern Military District ),
which has previously been armed with Buk-M2 and Buk-M3 air defense systems, although the base's current
air defense capabilities are unknown. Geolocated footage published on February 9 shows an explosion near
Krasnodar City. Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev claimed on February 10 that Russian forces
downed a Ukrainian drone over Krasnodar City, damaging a residential building. Kondratyev claimed that
Russian forces also downed a drone over Afipsky and that debris damaged a private residence. Krasnodar
City Mayor Evgeny Naumov claimed on February 10 that drone debris fell near a market.
Key
Takeaways:
• Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced the Ukrainian "Drone Line"
project on February 10 as part of ongoing Ukrainian efforts to integrate drone and ground operations.
• Ukraine's efforts to integrate drone operations with ground operations significantly differ
from Russian efforts to centralize drone units.
• Ukrainian forces continue to target oil
refineries in Russia as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises
and oil refineries.
• Russian authorities reportedly authorized the systematic torture of
Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) held in Russian prisons as early as March 2022.
• The
Kremlin may be setting informational conditions to justify an influx of North Korean citizens arriving in
Russia to join either the Russian workforce or the Russian military.
• A Russian official
claimed that Russia is sending experienced Russian military personnel to North Korea for medical
treatment.
• The pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway republic of Transnistria refused aid from the
EU to resolve its gas crisis, demonstrating Russia's continued economic influence over Transnistria and
the Kremlin's prioritization of the region.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near
Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and
Pokrovsk.
• Russian milbloggers continue to complain about the systemic issue of Russian
forces submitting false reports to Russian military authorities and of high-level Russian officers
micromanaging tactical-level units on the battlefield.
Russian officials are reportedly attempting to constrain Russian milblogger reporting about the current
frontline in Kursk Oblast, likely in response to concerns that the West will pressure Russia into trading
Russian territory for occupied Ukrainian territory. Several Russian milbloggers who regularly criticize
the Russian military's conduct of the war in Ukraine claimed on February 10 and 11 that unspecified
actors are calling for Russian authorities to charge the milbloggers with discrediting the Russian
military after the milbloggers reported about recent Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha. The
milbloggers claimed that the Russian military command is targeting them for publishing information about
successful Ukrainian attacks near Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka, and one milblogger claimed that
the recent Ukrainian attacks forced the Russian military command to delay plans for a future offensive
operation in the area. The latter claim indicates that the Russian military command may have been
planning to conduct an offensive operation to seize Sudzha, a prominent gas transit hub and the main town
that Ukrainian forces control in Kursk Oblast.
The Russian military appears increasingly
anxious to consolidate control over reporting about the situation in Kursk Oblast as Zelensky continues
to express his intent to leverage Russian territory in future peace negotiations. Zelensky stated during
his interview with The Guardian that he intends to use Ukrainian-held territory in Kursk Oblast to secure
the return of Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory or "something else" during future peace negotiations
with Russia. Zelensky noted that it is important to retake all of occupied Ukraine and did not speculate
on which area of occupied Ukraine he would consider trading Russian territory for. Russian President
Vladimir Putin likely intends to expel Ukraine from Kursk Oblast, or at least from Sudzha, before
beginning peace negotiations in order to avoid having to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for Russian
territory.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated
Ukraine's commitment to good faith peace negotiations with Russia and the particular importance of US
military assistance to Ukraine's security.
• Russian officials are reportedly attempting to
constrain Russian milblogger reporting about the current frontline in Kursk Oblast, likely in response to
concerns that the West will pressure Russia into trading Russian territory for occupied Ukrainian
territory.
• Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery and reportedly struck Engels Air Base in
Saratov Oblast on the night of February 10 to 11.
• The Russian State Duma voted to remove
Russian State Duma deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) retired
Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev from the Duma Defense Committee on February 11.
• The
Kremlin may be setting informational conditions for possible false flag attacks in the Baltic Sea and
against Russian opposition politicians living abroad in order to discredit Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near
Borova, Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and Hulyaipole.
• Russian
regional authorities are reportedly reducing payments due to regional budget deficits for Russian
soldiers who received minor injuries.
US President Donald Trump held bilateral phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 12. Trump stated on February 12 that he discussed the war in
Ukraine with Putin and that he and Putin agreed that their administrations will "immediately" begin
negotiations. Trump added that he planned to "inform of the conversation" after his call with
Putin. The official Kremlin readout of the call claimed that Putin emphasized the need to "eliminate the
root causes" of the war and that Putin "agreed with" Trump that "a long-term settlement could be achieved
through peaceful negotiations." Russian officials have explicitly defined the "root causes" of the war as
NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to advance eastward in areas near Russia's border, which
indicates that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United
States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this demand. Trump confirmed his phone call
with Zelensky and stated that they discussed the war and the upcoming February 14 meeting between
Zelensky and US Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the Munich Security
Conference. Zelensky stated that he and Trump discussed opportunities to achieve peace, readiness to work
together, and Ukraine's technological capabilities — including drones. Zelensky stated that Trump shared
the details of his conversation with Putin and that he and Trump agreed to plan future bilateral
meetings.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson
Dmitry Medvedev explicitly rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's proposal to trade occupied
Ukrainian territory for territory held by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast during future peace
negotiations. Medvedev stated that it would be "nonsense" to swap Russian and Ukrainian territory, and
Peskov stated that Russia will "never discuss" exchanging its territory. Medvedev's and Peskov's
statements further support ISW's assessment that Russian President Vladimir Putin is uninterested in
making any compromises during future peace negotiations and will only comply with a peace agreement that
fulfills all of Putin's maximalist demands in Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
• US
President Donald Trump held bilateral phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky on February 12.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian
Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev explicitly rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky's proposal to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for territory held by Ukrainian forces in Kursk
Oblast during future peace negotiations.
• Denmark's Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS)
assessed that Russia may have the capabilities to launch a full-scale war against NATO in the next five
years, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts to restructure and prepare its
military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term.
• The
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently launched the "Contract 18-24" voluntary recruitment program
aimed a recruiting 18 to 24-year-old Ukrainians into the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
• Russian
President Vladimir Putin held his first official call with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara on
February 12 since the fall of Russian-backed former Syrian President Bashar al Assad.
• The
Armenian National Assembly approved a draft law in the first reading on February 12 to commence the
process of joining the European Union (EU).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk
Oblast and near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova, Siversk,
Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Russia's Shahed drone production rate may be
declining.
Ukraine's European partners announced new military assistance to Ukraine amid the February 12 Ukraine
Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting. The United Kingdom (UK) pledged 150 million pounds
(about $188 million) in military support, including drones, "dozens" of battle tanks and armored
vehicles, and air defense systems, and confirmed plans to provide Ukraine with an additional 4.5 billion
pounds (about $5.6 billion) worth of military assistance in 2025. The UK stated that it will provide
Ukraine will over 50 armored and protective vehicles, including modernized T-72 tanks, by the end of
Spring 2025. Germany committed to supplying 100 IRIS-T air defense system missiles to Ukraine in the near
future, and German defense company Helsing announced the delivery of 6,000 AI-equipped drones to Ukraine.
Norway joined the Ukrainian Drone Coalition and revealed plans to establish and equip Ukraine's "Northern
Brigade" as part of a broader Nordic initiative in which the Nordic countries will equip and train one
Ukrainian battalion each. The Netherlands announced the delivery of 25 YPR armored infantry vehicles,
Latvia announced the donation of 42 armored personnel carriers, and Estonia also pledged to allocate 0.25
percent of its GDP for military assistance to Ukraine in 2025.
Russia reportedly lost just
over 5,000 tanks and armored vehicles during 2024 compared with 3,000 in 2023. The British International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated on February 10 that Russia lost 1,400 main battle tanks
(roughly four tank divisions' worth) and over 3,700 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored
personnel carriers (APCs) — totaling 5,100 lost tanks and armored vehicles in 2024. Data from the
Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Ukrainian forces damaged or destroyed over 3,000 Russian tanks and
almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024, and IISS' estimates likely only account for destroyed tanks and
armored vehicles. IISS assessed in February 2024 that Russia would be able to sustain its then-rate of
vehicle losses (over 3,000 tanks, APCs, and IFVs annually as of 2023) until February 2026 or 2027 by
refurbishing vehicles from Soviet-era storage facilities. It remains unclear if the Russian military
command will remain willing or able to sustain this increased rate of armored vehicle losses in 2025, as
Russian forces appear to be adapting their tactics to limit such losses.
Ukrainian forces
continue to target Russian energy and military infrastructure as part of an ongoing strike campaign
against Russian defense industrial enterprises. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR)
announced on February 13 that Ukrainian drones destroyed two Valdai radar complexes in Dolgoprudny,
Moscow Oblast and noted that Russian forces used the radar complexes to detect and down drones over the
airspace near Moscow City. Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed on February 13 that Ukrainian
drones targeted the Lipetsk water aeration station in Lipetsk City, and a Russian source claimed that
Ukrainian drones targeted the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant, which is located near the station and
produces about 20 percent of Russia's steel output. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne, citing sources in
Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), reported on February 13 that the SBU struck the Andreapol oil pumping
station in Tver Oblast, causing a fire at the boiler equipment warehouse and a closed switchgear.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukraine's European partners announced new military assistance to
Ukraine amid the February 12 Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting.
• Russia reportedly lost just over 5,000 tanks and armored vehicles during 2024 compared with 3,000 in
2023.
• IISS noted that Russia has adapted some of its tactics to address ongoing equipment
shortages and is increasingly relying on infantry-led assaults to advance along the frontline.
• It remains unclear if Russia can repair and newly-produce a sufficient number of tanks and armored
vehicles to replace losses in Ukraine and equip new Russian units.
• Estonia's Foreign
Intelligence Service (EFIS) assessed that Russia is attempting to build its capabilities not only to
support Russia's war effort in Ukraine but also to prepare for a potential future war with NATO, which is
consistent with ISW's assessments about ongoing Russian efforts to prepare its military and society for a
future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term.
• Ukrainian forces continue to target
Russian energy and military infrastructure as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense
industrial enterprises.
• The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on February
13 the termination of the Moldovan-Russian Intergovernmental Agreement on the establishment and
functioning of Russian cultural centers in Moldova in response to ongoing reports of Russian drones
violating Moldovan airspace.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Siversk.
• Russian officials continue efforts to increase recruitment for the "BARS-Bryansk" volunteer
territorial defense detachment.
Lessons of the Minsk Deal: Breaking the Cycle of Russia's War in Ukraine
Some peace deals lead
to peace, others to more war. The Minsk II deal aimed to end Russia’s limited invasion of Ukraine in 2015
but instead laid the groundwork for the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022. The United States must learn
from the Minsk deal or risk a direct Russia-NATO conflict that puts American lives at risk.
Minsk II was a weak deal. It demanded nothing of the invader— Russia. It strengthened the Kremlin’s
aggressive worldview that had driven the conflict to begin with. It masked Russian military weakness. It
gave the Kremlin time and space to prepare for a larger invasion. The West could have helped Ukraine
reach a stronger deal in 2015.
Minsk II gave Russian President Vladimir Putin hope that he
could win in Ukraine without war. Russia sought and failed to control Ukraine in 2014 by military means.
Minsk II gave Putin a way to demand that Ukraine — an independent state —give Russia control over its
internal policies. Putin failed at that too and turned to the full-scale invasion in 2022.
Minsk II helped Putin mask his demands for Ukraine’s surrender behind false calls for peace. The West
has repeatedly failed to call out and counter the real Russian demands since 2014. Minsk II reinforced
Western delusions that Putin might simply settle if he received some land or if the West metered support
to Ukraine or tried harder to negotiate with Putin. The deal also gave an excuse to those who understood
the Kremlin’s goals but sought to restore ties with Russia anyway.
Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s
close adviser in 2014, said in 2024 that Minsk II “legitimized the first partition of Ukraine.” Surkov’s
words confirm Russia’s goal to destroy Ukraine as a state and to use the Minsk deal to do so. He added
that “peace is nothing more than the continuation of war by other means.”
Another weak deal
today would validate Putin’s 2022 full-scale invasion and give Putin hope to gain more over time. Hope
for Putin means more war. More war means a larger war: An absolved Russia that bears little or no cost
for its invasion will want more and will rebuild its capability to do more. A larger war would mean a
higher cost for the United States, risk to American lives, and risk of a catastrophic escalation.
The Trump Administration has a historic opportunity to break Russia’s cycle of overt war and war
through “peace” in Ukraine. To do so, the United States must learn the lessons from the Minsk deal:
• Russia will seek to transfer the responsibility and cost for its war onto someone else’s
balance sheet.
• Putin’s demands are stand-ins for his goals – controlling Ukraine and making
the United States bend to Putin’s demands to create a world order that favors Russia.
• Putin
will fight as long as he believes he can outlast the West and Ukraine. Ending the war requires stripping
Putin of hope that he can destroy Ukraine as a state in his lifetime — militarily or through a “peace
deal.”
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US Vice President JD Vance met on the sidelines of the Munich
Security Conference on February 14. Vance stated during a press conference following the meeting that the
United States remains committed to ending the war and achieving a "durable, lasting peace" in Ukraine and
not the "kind of peace that's going to have Eastern Europe in conflict just a couple years down the
road." Vance noted the importance of dialogue between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, and
declined to speculate on possible conditions of a future peace agreement in order to "preserve the
optionality" for the delegations. Vance and Zelensky both noted that the conversation was productive and
Zelensky thanked the United States for continued military support. Zelensky stated that the United States
and Ukraine are preparing a plan to stop Russian President Vladimir Putin's aggression and finish the war
in a just and lasting peace that provides tangible security guarantees for Ukraine. US President Donald
Trump told reporters on February 14 that Ukraine would have a seat at the table during future peace
negotiations with Russia to end the war.
Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak met
with US Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg in Munich and discussed ongoing efforts
to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine. Zelensky also met with a bipartisan delegation of US senators to
discuss ongoing US military support for Ukraine, economic cooperation, and the future joint development
of critical minerals and rare earth materials in Ukraine. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius,
British Deputy Defense Minister Luke Polland, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, and other European
officials reiterated Europe's support for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity amid ongoing
discussions about future peace negotiations with Russia.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky and US Vice President JD Vance met on the sidelines of the Munich Security
Conference on February 14.
• The Kremlin reportedly ordered Russian government-linked media to
reduce reporting about US President Donald Trump and portray Russian President Vladimir Putin as a strong
and decisive leader after the February 12 Trump-Putin phone call.
• Russian officials and
information space actors have notably not amplified the Russian information operation aimed at portraying
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the illegitimate leader of Ukraine since the February 12
Trump-Putin call.
• A Russian Shahed drone struck the protective structure of the Chornobyl
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) on February 14.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that
Russia may be preparing to launch intensified offensive operations into northern Ukraine or attack NATO's
eastern flank in 2026.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near
Kurakhove, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Vovchansk, Lyman, Kurakhove, and
Pokrovsk.
• Russia is reportedly intensifying efforts to coerce Russian mobilized and
conscripted personnel into signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to
create conditions to frame Putin as the victor over US President Donald Trump in negotiations. Zelensky
stated during his address at the Munich Security Conference on February 15 that Putin intends to cut
Ukraine out of negotiations about the resolution of the war in Ukraine and conduct direct bilateral
negotiations with the United States. ISW has previously noted that Putin has recently attempted to
present himself as equal to Trump and to present Russia as a global power comparable to the United States
and as an heir to the Soviet Union's "superpower" status. Zelensky stated that Putin wants to embarrass
Trump and have Trump attend the Russian Victory Day Parade — which highlights Russia's role in defeating
Nazi Germany during the Second World War — on May 9 as a "prop." Zelensky's warning aligns with a report
from Russian opposition news outlet Meduza that the Kremlin instructed Russian state media to reduce
reporting about Trump and instead portray Putin as a strong and decisive leader, as well as to frame the
February 12 Putin-Trump phone call as a victory for Putin. Zelensky also stated that Trump has not
discussed the prospect of having other European states participate in negotiations and that Ukraine and
the rest of Europe need to present a united front to Putin and Europe needs to participate in decisions
about its own future. The Kremlin has routinely attempted to portray the US as the only other relevant
actor in Ukraine besides Russia to deny Ukraine's agency in future negotiations and set conditions to
convince the US to ignore Ukraine's interests, all likely to demand significant concessions in Russia's
favor. Zelensky also reiterated his warning that Russia will field 15 new divisions and use military
exercises in Belarus to threaten NATO.
Ukrainian and US officials continue to provide details
on upcoming peace negotiations to end the war. Zelensky told Newsmax on February 15 that Russian forces
at "minimum" need to withdraw to the pre-full scale invasion frontline and reiterated his commitment to
ending the war in 2025. US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated that the US
aims to engage "all parties in a peace process" within 180 days (by roughly August 2025) and noted that
other European states would not "be at the table" in peace negotiations but that the US will consider
their points of view.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky
warned that Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to create conditions to frame Putin as the
victor over US President Donald Trump in negotiations.
• Ukraine's US and European partners
continue to work to jointly develop Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).
• Kremlin-controlled state media used an interview with Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna
Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk to reiterate the Kremlin's false narrative about Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky's illegitimacy and Russia's longstanding goal of destroying the Ukrainian state.
• Russian advances south and southwest of Pokrovsk have slowed over the last two weeks amid
indications that the Russian military command may prioritize offensive operations against Kostyantynivka
— the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast — in Spring and Summer 2025.
• Russian advances may be slowing south of Pokrovsk due to degradation among frontline Russian
units and intensified Ukrainian drone operations in the area.
• The Russian military command
may also intend to prioritize assaults on Kostyantynivka in 2025 and are thus reportedly not reinforcing
the Russian force grouping south of Pokrovsk.
• Russian cargo vessels have continued to
evacuate military assets from the port of Tartus as Russia negotiates its presence in Syria with the
interim government.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces
recently advanced near Toretsk and Velyka Novosilka and in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian occupation
authorities continue to create regional analogues to the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to
place veterans of the war in Ukraine in government positions as part of Kremlin efforts to integrate
occupied Ukraine into Russia and militarize society and government.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov held a telephone call on
February 16 to "open a channel of communication" for future talks about the war in Ukraine. US State
Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated that Rubio spoke with Lavrov as a follow up to US President
Donald Trump's recent call with Russian President Vladimir Putin and that Rubio reaffirmed Trump's
commitment to ending the war in Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that Rubio
and Lavrov agreed to maintain a channel of communication to resolve issues in the US-Russian
relationship; to remove barriers to trade, economic, and investment cooperation; to work together on
ending the war in Ukraine and solving issues in the Middle East; and to organize future meetings to
improve the work of foreign missions in the United States and Russia. The Russian MFA claimed that Rubio
and Lavrov agreed to work to restore "mutually respectful" interstate dialogue and to hold regular
contacts, including a Russian-American summit in the future. Rubio stated on CBS on February 16 that his
phone call with Lavrov was meant to establish communications for future efforts aimed at reaching a peace
agreement in Ukraine. Rubio noted that he discussed issues surrounding the operation of American and
Russian embassies because it will be difficult to communicate with Russia if the embassies are not
functioning.
US, Russian, and Ukrainian delegations are reportedly gathering in Saudi Arabia
ahead of bilateral US-Russia and US-Ukraine negotiations in the coming weeks. US Special Presidential
Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff stated on February 16 that he, National Security Advisor Mike
Waltz, and other unnamed US officials will travel to Saudi Arabia for bilateral negotiations with Russia.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told CBS that he will also travel to Saudi Arabia this week and will
take advantage of "any opportunity" to further US President Donald Trump's goal of ending the war in
Ukraine. It remains unclear who will represent Russia during the meeting, although a Russian insider
source claimed on February 16 that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will arrive in Saudi Arabia in
February 18. Ukrainian Economic Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated that a Ukrainian delegation has also
arrived in Saudi Arabia on a working visit. It is unclear if US and Ukrainian officials will meet in
Saudi Arabia, as US Special Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg will arrive in
Ukraine in the coming days to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
US officials
continue to outline their expectations for the peace negotiations. Witkoff noted that his initial meeting
with Russian officials is about "trust building" and expressed hope that he will make progress during
these initial meetings. Kellogg stated during the Munich Security Conference on February 15 that Russia
must make territorial concessions during the negotiations and that Russia could also promise to not use
force against Ukraine in the future or commit to "downsizing" the Russian military. Rubio stated during
his interview with CBS that European officials must be involved in the peace negotiations in some
capacity, but did not provide additional details. The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Brazil also
released a statement on February 16 calling for major world powers to work together to promote peace in
Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov held a telephone call on February 16 to "open a channel of communication" for
future talks about the war in Ukraine.
• US, Russian, and Ukrainian delegations are reportedly
gathering in Saudi Arabia ahead of bilateral US-Russia and US-Ukraine negotiations in the coming
weeks.
• Ukraine's European partners reiterated their support for Ukraine's war effort and
domestic defense industry at the Munich Security Conference.
• The Kremlin officially
reiterated its claim that Ukraine has no sovereignty, setting conditions for Moscow to claim that Ukraine
has no standing to negotiate with Russia or that any agreements reached with Ukraine in the future are
invalid.
• Medvedchuk's interview and Peskov's February 16 statements continue to cast doubt
on Moscow's willingness to negotiate in good faith about a settlement of the war and set informational
conditions for Russia to violate any agreement reached on the grounds that the Ukrainian government had
no legal right to conclude it.
• The Kremlin extended an open invitation to US President
Donald Trump to attend the May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow as part of efforts to posture Russia's
strength and global power status.
• Western reporting suggests that the United States intends
to ease sanctions on Belarus. Russia uses Belarus as a staging ground for its military against Ukraine
and NATO and as a critical tool in its sanctions evasion schemes.
• The Russian military
command reportedly redeployed additional elements of the Southern Military District's (SMD) 8th Combined
Arms Army (CAA) to the Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk directions, further indicating that the Russian
military command intends to prioritize putting pressure on Kostyantynivka – the southernmost point of
Ukraine's "fortress belt" – in 2025.
• The Russian military appears to be committing to a
multi-year-long effort to seize Ukraine's "fortress belt" in Donetsk Oblast, further underscoring
Russia's Putin's apparent disinterest in a lasting and enduring peace in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian
forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near
Kupyansk, Siversk, and Kurakhove.
The Kremlin reiterated its demands that Ukraine cede additional territory in eastern and southern Ukraine
to Russia and disband the Ukrainian military in the future while continuing to message that the Kremlin
is unwilling to make territorial concessions itself in any future peace negotiations. Russian Permanent
Representative to the United Nations (UN) Vasily Nebenzya stated during a UN Security Council meeting on
February 17 that Ukraine has "irrevocably lost" Crimea, the "Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics"
(referring to occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts), and Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Nebenzya
insinuated that peace negotiations should "correct" the situation in these oblasts and that Ukraine
should cede the remaining parts of the four oblasts that Ukraine currently controls. Nebenzya is calling
for Ukraine to cede the roughly 30 percent of the total area in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts
that Russia does not currently occupy. (Russian forces currently occupy roughly 99 percent of Luhansk
Oblast.) Nebenzya also demanded that Ukraine become a "demilitarized" neutral state in the future and
that Ukraine not join any alliances or security blocs. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dismissed
on February 17 the possibility of Russia making territorial concessions during future negotiations.
Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in June 2024 that Ukraine should withdraw its forces from and
cede any unoccupied territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts to Russia, and
Nebenzya appears to be resurrecting this demand ahead of bilateral US-Russia negotiations. US Special
Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated during the Munich Security Conference on
February 15 that Russia must make territorial concessions during negotiations, and US Secretary of State
Marco Rubio noted on February 16 that US President Donald Trump wants to see the war end in a way that
"protects Ukraine's sovereignty."
Lavrov and Nebenzya also categorically rejected European
involvement in future peace negotiations and accused European countries of being aggressive toward
Russia. Nebenzya claimed that European Union (EU) countries and the United Kingdom (UK) are "incapable"
of reaching any agreement with Russia and cannot be party to any future agreements about the war in
Ukraine. Nebenzya accused European countries of being "blinded" by Russophobia and unrealistic about
peace negotiations. Lavrov questioned why European countries should participate in negotiations and
insinuated that European leaders only want to prolong the war in Ukraine in order to defeat Russia and
prepare for a future war between Russia and Europe. Russian authorities have previously focused their
information operations against NATO, accusing the alliance of conspiring and preparing for a future war
with Russia. Russian accusations that European countries and the EU more broadly (implicitly as distinct
from the US) are acting aggressively towards Russia is a notable informational inflection and likely
indicates a new Kremlin effort to drive a wedge between the US and Europe taking advantage of tensions
evident at the recent Munich Security Conference.
The Kremlin also appears to be resurrecting
Putin's previous demands and information operations aimed at delegitimizing Ukraine and its government in
the eyes of the West — notably ahead of the February 18 Russia-US bilateral meeting in Saudi Arabia.
Nebenzya reiterated Putin's demand that Ukraine must conduct elections before the implementation of any
peace agreements, continuing the Kremlin's efforts to falsely portray the current Ukrainian government as
illegitimate. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada
Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk have also recently repeated the Kremlin's false claims that Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky is "illegitimate" and implicitly that Russia thus is not obligated to honor agreements
concluded with the current Ukrainian government. The Kremlin's apparent unwillingness to make territorial
concessions, commit to honoring any future peace agreement with Ukraine, or involve any European leaders
in these negotiations calls into question Putin's supposed willingness to engage in good faith
negotiations that could bring about long-term peace in Ukraine and Europe more broadly.
Key
Takeaways:
• The Kremlin reiterated its demands that Ukraine cede additional territory in
eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia and disband the Ukrainian military in the future while continuing
to message that the Kremlin is unwilling to make territorial concessions itself in any future peace
negotiations.
• Lavrov and Nebenzya also categorically rejected European involvement in future
peace negotiations and accused European countries of being aggressive toward Russia.
• The
Kremlin also appears to be resurrecting Putin's previous demands and information operations aimed at
delegitimizing Ukraine and its government in the eyes of the West – notably ahead of the February 18
Russia-US bilateral meeting in Saudi Arabia.
• The Russian delegation participating in
Russian-American talks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on February 18 does not include one of the members of
Russian President Vladimir Putin's innermost circle who had been reported as a likely negotiator.
• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes against Russian energy facilities supplying
the Russian military.
• Russian commanders continue to give orders for Russian forces to
execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on the frontline.
• Unspecified sources told
Bloomberg that Russia appears to be nearing a deal with the Syrian interim government to maintain a
“reduced” military presence in Syria.
• Russian forces advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk,
Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to violate the
Geneva Convention by conscripting civilians in occupied Ukraine to serve in the Russian military.
> >• The Kremlin reiterated its demands that Ukraine cede >additional territory
in eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia >and disband the Ukrainian military in the future
while >continuing to message that the Kremlin is unwilling to make >territorial
concessions itself in any future peace >negotiations. > >• Lavrov and Nebenzya
also categorically rejected European >involvement in future peace negotiations and accused
European >countries of being aggressive toward Russia. > >• The Kremlin also
appears to be resurrecting Putin's previous >demands and information operations aimed at
delegitimizing >Ukraine and its government in the eyes of the West – notably >ahead of
the February 18 Russia-US bilateral meeting in Saudi >Arabia. >
Kleiner Teaser
für alle die glauben, dass die Nummer eh gleich durch ist.
Russian and American officials met in Saudi Arabia for bilateral talks about the war in Ukraine on
February 18, but Russia continues to display no indications that it is prepared to make any meaningful
concessions on Ukraine as assessed by Western intelligence and US officials in line with ISW's
longstanding assessment. NBC reported on February 18 that four Western intelligence officials and two US
congressional officials stated that intelligence from the United States and unspecified close American
allies shows that Russian President Vladimir Putin still wants to control all of Ukraine and that his
goals "remain maximalist." One congressional official stated that there is "zero" intelligence showing
that Putin is interested in a "real peace deal right now." Intelligence officials stated that Putin has
no plans to withdraw troops from Ukraine or to pull any personnel or equipment from western Russia. The
six officials stated that Putin may agree to a ceasefire and peace deal in order to give the Russian
military time to rest and reconstitute, and there is an idea among Western officials that Putin may "go
through the motions" of negotiations in order to see what concessions he can get and to reintegrate
Russia back into the global community. The two congressional officials and a former senior US
administration official noted that Putin's "broad ambitions" have remained unchanged from the end of the
Biden administration into the new Trump administration.
Western intelligence assessments
suggest that Putin has not changed his theory of victory in Ukraine and still believes that Russia's
military superiority is such that Russia can outlast the West and Ukraine on the battlefield. The six
official sources told NBC that Putin still thinks that he can "wait out" Ukraine and Europe to eventually
control all of Ukraine. A Western intelligence official noted that Putin "thinks he is winning" and does
not feel pressure to stop hostilities due to Russian battlefield losses. Putin claimed in June 2024 that
Russian forces aim to "squeeze" Ukrainian forces out "of those territories that should be under Russian
control" and that Russia did not need to conduct another partial involuntary reserve call up similar to
that in September 2022 because Russia is not trying to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine
rapidly. Putin's theory of victory assumes that the Russian military can sustain slow, creeping advances
on the battlefield longer than Ukrainian forces can defend and longer than the West is willing to support
Ukraine.
Many recent Russian statements show that Putin remains uninterested in engaging in
good faith negotiations and retains his objective of destroying the Ukrainian state while the Kremlin has
offered no public indication that it would materially compromise. Kremlin officials have repeatedly
denied Ukraine's sovereignty over its internationally recognized 1991 borders and the legitimacy of the
Ukrainian government. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov most recently claimed on February 16. Kremlin
officials, including Putin, have promoted false narratives that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is
"illegitimate" as part of efforts to claim that Zelensky does not have the authority to negotiate with
Russia or that Russia does not have to honor any agreements that Zelensky may sign in the future. Putin
and other Russian officials have also demanded that Ukraine cede additional territory in eastern and
southern Ukraine to Russia, while denying that Russia will make any territorial concessions of its
own.
Russia attempted to posture itself as on equal terms with the United States during the
February 18 Russian-American talks in Saudi Arabia, focusing its official public rhetoric about the
meeting on US-Russian relations and not the war in Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
published a boilerplate readout of the meeting, during which Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and
Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, National Security Adviser
Michael Waltz, and Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff. Russian officials, including Peskov,
Lavrov, and Ushakov, broadly stated that the talks went well, claiming that the discussions were the
start of a long process and that Russia and the United States will continue dialogue on these issues.
Lavrov claimed that the meeting was "useful" and that Russia and the United States began to "hear each
other" and share a "determination to move forward." The Russian MFA's readout emphasized the
Russian-American bilateral aspects of the talks, including normalizing bilateral relations, establishing
a dialogue for future economic and energy cooperation, and resuming communications on international
issues. The Russian MFA's readout also emphasized that Russia and the United States have a "special
responsibility" as nuclear powers and members of the UN Security Council to resume communicating on
international issues. ISW continues to note that Putin is trying to present himself as equal to US
President Donald Trump and to present Russia as a global power comparable to the United States and as the
heir to the Soviet Union's "superpower" status. The Russian MFA readout only briefly mentioned Ukraine,
claiming that the delegations "exchanged views" on the situation "around Ukraine" and mutually committed
to resolving the war.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian and American officials met in Saudi
Arabia for bilateral talks about the war in Ukraine on February 18, but Russia continues to display no
indications that it is prepared to make any meaningful concessions on Ukraine as assessed by Western
intelligence and US officials in line with ISW's longstanding assessment.
• Many recent
Russian statements show that the Kremlin remains uninterested in engaging in good faith negotiations and
retains his objective of destroying the Ukrainian state while the Kremlin has offered no public
indication that it would materially compromise.
• Russia attempted to posture itself as on
equal terms with the United States during the February 18 Russian-American talks in Saudi Arabia,
focusing its official public rhetoric about the meeting on US-Russian relations and not the war in
Ukraine.
• Russian officials at the bilateral meeting continued to signal the Kremlin's
unwillingness to negotiate on the war in Ukraine and determination to achieve its maximalist objectives
in Ukraine.
• Zelensky, in contrast to Kremlin officials, continues to demonstrate Ukraine's
willingness to compromise to bring about an enduring end to the war.
• Russian officials in
Saudi Arabia began what will likely be an ongoing effort to push the United States into accepting Russian
offers of economic and investment measures in lieu of any actual Russian concessions on Ukraine.
• Dmitriev attempted to frame Russian-offered economic incentives as more beneficial for the US than
for Russia, but in reality Russia needs economic relief as soon as possible to stave off looming crises
in 2025 and 2026.
• US officials continue to meet with European leaders about support for
Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor continued to complain that the Russian
military command's lack of response to systemic issues is limiting Russian advances near Pokrovsk.
• Russian opposition outlet SOTA reported on February 18 that Republic of Mordovia Head Artyom
Zdunov announced that regional authorities are raising one-time payments for recruits who sign a contract
with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) from 400,000 rubles ($4,369) to 1.1 million rubles
($12,015).
• Russian forces continue to deploy wounded and medically unfit soldiers to the
frontline in an effort to address personnel shortages.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly trying to optimize the Russian negotiations delegation to
be most effective with the specific individuals whom the United States chooses for its negotiation
delegation, likely in an effort to extract maximum concessions from the United States. Kremlin
Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 19 that Putin will appoint a negotiator for talks with the
United States after the United States appoints its own negotiator. Russian opposition outlet Meduza
reported on February 19, citing a source close to the Kremlin, that the United States was the first to
select its delegation for the February 18 bilateral talks in Saudi Arabia, after which Russia attempted
to "select relevant" counterparts for each of the selected US officials. The source claimed that Russian
Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev's appointment to the delegation appeared largely as a
response to US demands that Russia appoint someone that would "understand" the United States. Another
source close to the Kremlin told Meduza that Putin may appoint his aide Vladimir Medinsky to the Russian
negotiations delegation if Ukrainian representatives join future negotiations because Medinsky took part
in the Spring 2022 Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul. The source claimed that the Kremlin does
not need to include Medinsky in the Russian delegation so long as negotiations remain bilateral between
the United States and Russia. The Moscow Times reported on February 19, citing a diplomatic source
familiar with the February 18 US-Russia meeting, that the Kremlin seeks to restore access to roughly $6
billion worth of frozen Russian Central Bank reserves in the US. The source claimed that the Russian
negotiations delegation in Saudi Arabia pushed for the United States to agree that both countries fully
resume the operations of their diplomatic missions in the other country and to return Russian diplomatic
property in the United States, which US authorities had previously seized on charges of being used for
intelligence purposes. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 18 that the United States and
Russia had agreed to restore "the functionality of respective missions in Washington and Moscow."
The Kremlin appears to be attempting to push the United States to accept economic and diplomatic terms
that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine, possibly in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions that
are related to the war. US acceptance of these economic and diplomatic terms — without demanding any
Russian concessions on Ukraine in return — would give away leverage that the United States will need to
achieve US President Donald Trump's stated objective of achieving a lasting and enduring peace that
benefits the United States and Ukraine.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National
Security Adviser Michael Waltz reiterated on February 18 that US President Donald Trump's position that
the war in Ukraine must end in a way that is "fair, enduring, sustainable, and acceptable to all parties
involved" remains unchanged. Rubio, Waltz, and Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff gave an
interview to CNN and the Associated Press (AP) on February 18 following bilateral talks with Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov in Saudi Arabia. Waltz stated that any
future end to the war needs to be "permanent," not "temporary as we have seen in the past." Waltz stated
that there is going to have to be "some discussion of territory...and security guarantees" and that
future talks will discuss Russia's ability to retain any Ukrainian territory that Russia has illegally
annexed since February 2022. Rubio answered a question about possible concessions from Russia, stating
that these "kinds of things" will happen through "difficult diplomacy in closed rooms." Rubio later noted
that there will have to be concessions "made by all sides" in order to bring about an end to the war.
Rubio emphasized that a war can only end when "everyone involved" in the war — which Rubio explicitly
defined as including Ukraine, Russia, and US partners in Europe — is "okay with" and accepts the end
agreement. Rubio answered a question about his assessment of Russia's desire to achieve peace following
the talks in Saudi Arabia, stating that Russia appears willing to "begin to engage in a serious process
to determine" the mechanism to end the war, but that an outcome will ultimately depend on the willingness
of every side in the war to "agree to certain things."
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky
reiterated on February 19 that Ukraine needs either NATO membership or a strong military and security
guarantees for a sustainable peace. Zelensky emphasized that security guarantees do not necessarily mean
deploying peacekeeping forces to Ukraine. Zelensky stated that it would be sufficient if the United
States provided Ukraine with 20 Patriot air defense systems and the license to domestically produce
Patriot missiles. Zelensky has repeatedly emphasized Ukraine's need for additional Patriot systems and
missiles to defend against Russian missile strikes, particularly those with ballistic missiles targeting
Ukrainian energy infrastructure, and his February 19 statements are consistent with previous statements
that Ukraine needs a strong military of its own to deter and defend against future Russian aggression.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly trying to
optimize the Russian negotiations delegation to be most effective with the specific individuals whom the
United States chooses for its negotiation delegation, likely in an effort to extract maximum concessions
from the United States.
• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser
Michael Waltz reiterated on February 18 that US President Donald Trump's position that the war in Ukraine
must end in a way that is "fair, enduring, sustainable, and acceptable to all parties involved" remains
unchanged.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on February 19 that Ukraine
needs either NATO membership or a strong military and security guarantees for a sustainable peace.
• US Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg arrived in Kyiv on February 19
for his first official visit to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces continue to conduct drone strikes
against Russian energy facilities supplying the Russian military.
• Ukrainian forces recently
advanced near Vovchansk and Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Siversk, Pokrovsk,
Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian federal subjects are reportedly halting their
recruitment of foreigners who do not speak Russian for service in the Russian military.
The Financial Times (FT) published an investigation on February 20 supporting ISW's long-held assessment
that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute
Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law. The FT investigation provided
additional details and analysis following a significant increase in the number of credible reports of
Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs in 2024 compared to the first two years of the war. FT and
experts from the Center for Information Resilience analyzed footage of the executions and used the
soldiers' uniforms to confirm that Russian forces were conducting the executions. FT conducted an
investigation into footage of a Russian soldier shooting six unarmed Ukrainian POWs and identified the
possible perpetrator as a soldier in a "Storm" penal detachment of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd
Combined Arms Army , Central Military District ), but noted that the situation warrants further
investigation to confirm this soldier's involvement. FT reported that the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade
has been fighting near Pokrovsk since Fall 2024, which is consistent with ISW's observations. FT noted
that Ukrainian frontline units are often the primary source of execution reports and drone footage of
executions. FT noted, however, that tracking these executions is challenging because the Ukrainian units
do not always relay reports of Ukrainian POW executions to their commanders. FT noted that Ukrainian
prosecutors sometimes find out about the executions based on footage published online. FT interviewed the
cofounders of a project reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence who stated that many
Ukrainian units do not publish information about executions "because it has become routine" and that
there are likely hundreds of instances of POW executions beyond the "dozens" recorded so far.
FT's investigation suggests that more senior Russian commanders may also be complicit in issuing orders
to execute Ukrainian POWs. Ukrainian officials opened investigations into 43 executions with 109 victims
in 2024, and FT analyzed footage of 30 of these instances with 133 victims. The FT investigation found
that Russian forces across the frontline — particularly in eastern Ukraine and Zaporizhia Oblast - are
executing Ukrainian POWs, not just a few isolated "rogue units." Global Rights Compliance
President Wayne Jordash, who is assisting Ukrainian investigations into POW executions, told the FT that
Russia is pursuing a "strategy of criminality" in Ukraine, including by torturing, sexually assaulting,
and otherwise abusing residents in occupied Ukraine, and that the POW executions are also part of this
criminality campaign. Jordash stated that Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs function to degrade
Ukraine's military and security apparatus, leaving Ukraine more vulnerable to aggression.
Jordash noted that international law states that individuals who fail to prevent war crimes are also
culpable for said war crimes and that government officials calling for POW executions are violating
international law. Jordash mentioned specific instances of senior Russian leaders, including Security
Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev and Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, explicitly calling
for Russian forces to execute Ukrainian POWs. Jordash highlighted that Russian President Vladimir Putin
praised the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) for its actions in combat, which is
notable because the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade is has been linked to the beheading of Ukrainian POWs
and execution of Ukrainian drone operators in October 2024. Forbes attributed beheadings of Ukrainian
POWs in August 2024 and summary executions in October 2024 in Kursk Oblast to the 155th Naval Infantry
Brigade. Putin awarded the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade the "Guards" honorific title in July 2024. FT
reported that Putin held highly publicized meetings with two unspecified participants of the Kremlin's
"Time of Heroes" veterans program who reportedly executed POWs near Robotyne, Zaporizhia Oblast in May
2024. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) recently reported that there is a culture of torture and abuse of
Ukrainian POWs detained in Russian penal colonies, and taken together these reports suggest that Russian
decisionmakers in higher echelons of the chain of command may be implicitly encouraging, explicitly
ordering, or failing to stop Russian executions and other abuses of Ukrainian POWs in a system that seems
to incentivize such abuses.
Key Takeaways:
• The Financial Times (FT)
published an investigation on February 20 supporting ISW's long-held assessment that Russian military
commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of
war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.
• FT's investigation suggests that more
senior Russian commanders may also be complicit in issuing orders to execute Ukrainian POWs.
• Senior Ukrainian intelligence officials reported that North Korean forces are conducting joint
operations with Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and are gaining new combat capabilities.
• US
Special Representative for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky in Kyiv on February 20.
• The Kremlin is likely attempting to portray the People's
Republic of China (PRC) as more aligned with its stance on the war in Ukraine than the PRC is willing to
publicly message.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces
recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia is reportedly increasing its
production of glide bombs and modernizing its cruise missiles.
Russian state media and Kremlin officials appear to be leveraging select statements from US officials
alongside long-standing Russian narratives to create tension between the United States and Ukraine and
undermine faith in America's commitment to Ukraine. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate
(GUR) reported on February 21 that the Kremlin has ordered Russian state media personalities and other
prominent voices in the Russian information space to intensify narratives aimed at creating discord in
Ukrainian society and discrediting Ukraine among Western allies. The GUR stated that Russian actors
intend to amplify narratives falsely alleging that the West has "betrayed" Ukraine, the United States is
not concerned about Europe's and Ukraine's opinions, the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, the
Ukrainian military is losing on the frontline, and "corrupt people" are stealing billions of dollars of
US aid from Ukraine. The GUR reported that the Kremlin is also preparing to declare "victory" over
Ukraine and possibly over NATO on the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion – February 24,
2025.
ISW has recently observed Kremlin officials and prominent voices in the Russian
information space amplifying these narratives and other select statements from US officials aimed at
sowing discord between Ukraine and its allies. ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir
Putin's theory of victory is built on the assumption that Russia can outlast Western support for Ukraine
and that Putin is thus attempting to bring about the cessation of Western and particularly US support for
Ukraine. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported that Russian actors also intend to incite protests in
Ukraine via social media posts on February 24, 2025, and will offer to pay protestors if they attend
rallies in Ukraine. The SBU asked Ukrainian citizens to be cautious of Russian efforts to manipulate
Ukraine's information space ahead of the third anniversary of the war.
US officials continue
to reiterate their support for Ukraine and a lasting and just resolution of the war. US Secretary of
State Marco Rubio stated on February 20 that the United States used the recent bilateral meeting with
Russian officials in Saudi Arabia to gauge Russia's interest in good faith peace negotiations and to open
a communication channel between the two countries. Rubio emphasized on February 18 that a war can only
end when "everyone involved" in the war — which Rubio explicitly defined as including Ukraine, Russia,
and US partners in Europe — is "okay with" and accepts the end agreement. Rubio reiterated on February 16
that Trump wants to see the war end in a way that "protects Ukraine's sovereignty," and US Special
Presidential Envoy for Russia and Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated on February 15 that Russia must make
territorial concessions during negotiations.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian state media
and Kremlin officials appear to be leveraging select statements from US officials alongside long-standing
Russian narratives to create tension between the United States and Ukraine and undermine faith in
America's commitment to Ukraine.
• US officials continue to reiterate their support for
Ukraine and a lasting and just resolution of the war.
• Russian forces recently eliminated the
Ukrainian pocket west of Kurakhove amid continued reports that the Russian military is redeploying
elements of the Russian Southern Military District's (SMD) 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) from the
Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction.
• Russian forces are attempting to leverage the
seizure of Velyka Novosilka to advance further north of the settlement toward the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk
Oblast administrative border.
• Ukrainian officials continue to highlight the growth of
Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) through significant expansion in the domestic production of key
military equipment.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF)
Commander Sergei Pinchuk to the rank of Admiral and Eastern Group of Forces Commander Andrei Ivanayev to
the rank of Colonel General on February 21.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove
and Velyka Novosilka and in Kursk Oblast.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is
reportedly falsely designating former penal recruits as having abandoned their units without
authorization (SOCH) to avoid paying them amid continued indicators that Russian authorities are
concerned about the war's strain on the Russian economy.
• Zelensky does not imminently risk losing all of
Ukraine. • Most Ukrainian cities have not been destroyed. • Ukrainian law prohibits holding
elections in wartime (unlike the US Constitution, which requires it). • Ukraine has not
suffered millions of losses. • Europe provides about as much direct aid to Ukraine as the United
States. • European loans to Ukraine are backed by income from frozen Russian assets, not
Ukraine. • Ukraine did not misuse or lose half of the aid the United States has provided. •
Ukraine repeatedly invited Putin to negotiate in early 2022.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on February 22 that US and Russian officials are
planning to meet within the next two weeks in an unspecified third country about bilateral relations.
Ryabkov claimed that the United States and Russia are undertaking two "parallel" but "politically
interconnected" negotiation tracks that will discuss the war in Ukraine and US-Russian bilateral
relations. Ryabkov added that Russia is prioritizing its demand for the United States to return six
Russian diplomatic properties, likely referring to properties US authorities previously seized on charges
of being used for intelligence purposes. Ryabkov also stated that the United States and Russian
delegations may discuss other international topics such as arms control and the situation in the Middle
East. US and Russian officials met in Saudi Arabia for bilateral talks about the war in Ukraine on
February 18.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov
claimed on February 22 that US and Russian officials are planning to meet within the next two weeks in an
unspecified third country about bilateral relations.
• Russian forces recently advanced in
Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Russian forces continue
to deploy wounded and medically unfit soldiers to the frontline in an effort to address personnel
shortages.
US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff referred to the early 2022 Istanbul protocols as
offering "guideposts" for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on February 23. An agreement based on
those protocols would be a capitulation document. Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior
Russian officials have repeatedly identified the 2022 peace negotiations in Istanbul as their ideal
framework for future peace negotiations to end Putin's war in Ukraine, as such a framework would force
the West to concede to all of Russia's long-standing demands. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New
York Times (NYT) reported in March and June 2024 that both publications obtained several versions of the
draft treaties from the March and April 2022 Ukrainian-Russian peace negotiations in Istanbul that
indicate that both sides initially agreed that Ukraine would forgo its NATO membership aspirations and be
a "permanently neutral state that doesn't participate in military blocs." The draft treaties also
reportedly banned Ukraine from receiving any foreign weapons or hosting any foreign military personnel.
The WSJ and NYT reported that Russia pushed for the Ukrainian military to be limited to 85,000 soldiers,
342 tanks, and 519 artillery systems. Russia also reportedly demanded that Ukrainian missiles be limited
to a range of 40 kilometers (25 miles), a range that would allow Russian forces to deploy critical
systems and materiel close to Ukraine without fear of strikes. The draft treaties reportedly listed the
United States, United Kingdom (UK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), France, and Russia as
guarantors of the treaty, and Russia reportedly wanted to include Belarus as a guarantor. The guarantor
states were supposed to “terminate international treaties and agreements incompatible with the permanent
neutrality ," including military aid agreements. The draft treaties did not specify if other
non-guarantor states would have to terminate their agreements with Ukraine as well, although this is
likely considering that the treaty would ban Ukraine from having any foreign-supplied weapons. Russia
insisted on these terms in the first and second months of the war when Russian troops were advancing on
Kyiv City and throughout northeastern, eastern, and southern Ukraine and before Ukrainian forces
conducted successful counteroffensives that liberated significant swaths of territory in Kharkiv and
Kherson oblasts.
Ukraine is unlikely to accept any peace agreement based on the Istanbul
negotiations as such terms are effectively a full Ukrainian surrender to Russia's long-term war goals.
The Istanbul negotiations effectively conceded to Russia's long-standing demands to "denazify" —
overthrow and replace the democratically elected Ukrainian government and install a pro-Russian puppet
state — and "demilitarize" — constrain and shrink the Ukrainian military beyond the point of being able
to defend itself against future Russian aggression — Ukraine. The Istanbul negotiations also conceded to
Russia's demands that Ukraine abandon its aspirations to join NATO or any other security blocs in the
future. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky walked away from the Istanbul negotiations with the
backing of Europe and the United States in 2022 and will almost certainly reject such terms in 2025.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his commitment to preserving
Ukraine's democracy and a just resolution to the war. Zelensky responded to a hypothetical question
during the "Ukraine. Year 2025" Forum on February 23 about stepping down as president and stated that he
is ready to step down in the event of or to facilitate peace or immediate NATO membership for Ukraine.
Zelensky noted that he remains committed to holding elections after the war ends and has no interest in
being in power "for a decade" and reiterated that Ukraine cannot hold elections until after Russia stops
attacking Ukraine and after Ukraine lifts martial law. The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government
from holding elections or amending the Ukrainian constitution in times of martial law, and the Ukrainian
government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine. Zelensky has
repeatedly noted Ukraine's commitment to holding fair and democratic elections in the future.
Key Takeaways:
• US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff referred to the early
2022 Istanbul protocols as offering "guideposts" for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on February
23. An agreement based on those protocols would be a capitulation document.
• Ukraine is
unlikely to accept any peace agreement based on the Istanbul negotiations as such terms are effectively a
full Ukrainian surrender to Russia's long-term war goals.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky continues to demonstrate his commitment to preserving Ukraine's democracy and a just resolution
to the war.
• Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Ukraine's domestic defense industry
and domestically produced strike capabilities.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed
Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev as Special Presidential Representative for
Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries on February 23.
• Russian forces
launched a record number of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 22 to 23, ahead of the
third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24.
• Russia appears
to be relying more on Iran and North Korea to support its war in Ukraine.
• Russian forces
continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in clear violation of international law.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk,
Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• The Russian government continues efforts to increase its
defense industrial output.
Russia dedicated staggering
amounts of manpower and equipment to several major offensive efforts in Ukraine in 2024, intending to
degrade Ukrainian defenses and seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. These Russian efforts
included major operations in the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast area, Avdiivka, Chasiv Yar, northern Kharkiv
Oblast, Toretsk, Marinka-Kurakhove, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar-Velyka Novosilka. Russia has achieved
relatively faster gains in 2024 than throughout most of the war after the initial invasion and developed
a blueprint for conducting slow, tactical envelopments to achieve these advances, but Russian forces have
failed to restore the operational maneuver necessary to achieve operationally significant gains rapidly.
Russia has thus paid an exorbitant price in manpower and equipment losses that Russia cannot sustain in
the medium term for very limited gains.
Russian losses in massive efforts that have failed to
break Ukrainian lines or even drive them back very far are exacerbating challenges that Russia will face
in sustaining the war effort through 2025 and 2026, as ISW's Christina Harward has recently reported.
Russia likely cannot sustain continued efforts along these lines indefinitely without a major
mobilization effort that Russian President Vladimir Putin has so far refused to order. Ukraine, on the
other hand, has shown its ability to fight off massive and determined Russian offensive efforts even
during periods of restricted Western aid. The effective failure of these major and costly Russian
offensive operations highlights the opportunities Ukraine has to inflict more serious battlefield defeats
on Russia that could compel Putin to rethink his approach to the war and to negotiations if the United
States and the West continue to provide essential support.
>Russian losses in massive efforts that
have failed to break >Ukrainian lines or even drive them back very far are >exacerbating
challenges that Russia will face in sustaining >the war effort through 2025 and 2026, as ISW's
Christina >Harward has recently reported. Russia likely cannot sustain >continued efforts
along these lines indefinitely without a >major mobilization effort that Russian President
Vladimir >Putin has so far refused to order. Ukraine, on the other hand, >has shown its
ability to fight off massive and determined >Russian offensive efforts even during periods of
restricted >Western aid. The effective failure of these major and costly >Russian
offensive operations highlights the opportunities >Ukraine has to inflict more serious
battlefield defeats on >Russia that could compel Putin to rethink his approach to the >war and to negotiations if the United States and the West >continue to provide essential
support. > >Institute for the Study of War > >https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine
Denke ein Punkt der zu selten erwähnt wird (auch bei Reisner kaum). Wenn man sich die
Gebietsgewinne ansieht und dazu in Relation ihre Verluste ist das eine ganz miese Performance der
Russen. In manchen Bereichen (bspw. Panzermodelle) haben sie 80% ihres Equipments versenkt. Somit
sehr beachtlich die Perf. der Ukraine
Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago on
February 24, 2022. Ukraine has not been defeated or destroyed but remains resilient and innovative in the
face of this unjustified Russian aggression. Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in a
failed attempt to seize Kyiv City, overthrow Ukraine's democratically elected government, and forcibly
install a pro-Russian proxy government in three days. Ukrainian forces, supported by a coalition of
allies including the United States and European partners, have since successfully pushed Russian forces
out of northern Ukraine and liberated significant territory in southern and northeastern Ukraine.
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksander Syrskyi reported on February 24 that Ukrainian forces
have regained more than 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces have occupied since February 24,
2022. ISW has observed confirmation that Ukrainian forces have regained 50.03 percent of the territory
that Russian forces had seized since February 24, 2022. Russian forces have spent the last year making
slow and incremental but steady advances in eastern Ukraine as a result of significant Russian manpower
and materiel advantages and Russia's ability to leverage delays in Western aid to Ukraine. Ukrainian
forces are using their technological advantages and integrating technological innovations with ground
operations in order to slow Russian gains. Ukraine continues to improve and innovate its warfighting
capabilities and is working to become self-sufficient in the long-term, but Western and international
military support for Ukraine in the short- and medium-term remains crucial for Ukraine's ability to
defend against Russian aggression. The defense of Ukraine and the preservation of Ukraine as an
independent, sovereign, and democratic country capable of defending itself against Russia is a critical
part of deterring broader Russian aggression against the West. The United States, Europe, and other
Western allies must demonstrate commitment to Ukraine through timely and reliable military assistance,
continue to enable Ukrainian forces to impose significant pressure on Russia, and force Putin to abandon
his conquest of Ukraine and his wider ambitions in Europe in order to bring about sustainable peace.
Russia has accumulated unsustainable personnel and vehicle losses in the last three years since
Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksander
Syrskyi reported on February 24 that Russian forces have lost over 10,100 tanks, 21,100 armored combat
vehicles, and 23,300 artillery systems presumably destroyed and damaged in the three years of Russia's
full-scale invasion. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) recently estimated
that Russia had lost about 14,000 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers since
February 2022. (IISS's numbers likely differ from those from Syrskyi as IISS data likely only accounts
for destroyed vehicles.) Syrskyi stated on February 24 that Russian forces have lost almost 870,000
personnel, including about 250,000 dead. Russian opposition outlets Meduza and Mediazona published a
joint report on February 24 wherein they used the Russian Register of Inheritance Cases (RND) to estimate
that at least 160,000 to 165,000 Russian servicemembers have died in the past three years of the war.
Syrskyi previously reported that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 alone, and
Meduza and Mediazone estimated in February 2024 that Russia had lost at least 66,000 to 88,000 personnel
during the first two years of the war — suggesting that Russian loses significantly increased in 2024.
ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have suffered vehicle and artillery system losses on the
battlefield that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term given the limitations of Russia's defense
industrial capacity and Soviet-era weapons and equipment stocks, and that Russia's force generation
apparatus is struggling to recruit enough soldiers to sustain Russia's current rate of offensive
operations and loss rates.
The United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a Ukrainian- and
European-backed resolution on February 24 commemorating the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale
invasion of Ukraine that recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war, called for a just peace in
Ukraine, and supported Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The United States, Russia,
Belarus, North Korea, and 14 other countries voted against the Ukrainian- and European-backed resolution,
while 93 countries supported it. The People’s Republic of China and Iran abstained. The United States
also abstained from a second resolution about the third anniversary of the war that it had proposed after
European countries amended the resolution to add language supporting Ukraine's "sovereignty,
independence, unity, and territorial integrity." The US-backed draft resolution — prior to the European
amendments — reportedly did not acknowledge Russia's role as the aggressor and referred to Russia's war
against Ukraine as the "Russian Federation-Ukraine conflict."
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years
ago on February 24, 2022. Ukraine has not been defeated or destroyed but remains resilient and innovative
in the face of this unjustified Russian aggression.
• Russia has accumulated unsustainable
personnel and vehicles losses in the last three years since Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24,
2022.
• The United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed a Ukrainian- and European-backed
resolution on February 24 commemorating the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine
that recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war, called for a just peace in Ukraine, and supported
Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
• Recent polling indicates that Russians are
increasingly supportive of Russia continuing the war in Ukraine until it achieves complete Ukrainian
capitulation but are simultaneously starting to feel the economic toll of the three years of Russia's war
– casting doubt on Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to continue to balance "butter and guns" at
home in the medium- to long-term.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin currently remains
committed to continuing his war in Ukraine despite rising domestic political and economic pressure and
has shown no indication that he is rethinking his determination to compel Ukraine to surrender.
• Kremlin officials formally rejected the possibility of a ceasefire on any terms other than the
complete capitulation of Ukraine and the West on February 24, further underscoring Russia's unwillingness
to make compromises during future peace negotiations.
• European leaders announced a series of
new aid packages during their visit to Kyiv on February 24 for the third anniversary of the full-scale
invasion on February 24.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv
Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• The Kremlin continues to use Muslim religious and
cultural structures in Russia for military recruitment.
Russian President Vladimir Putin implicitly acknowledged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the
legitimate president of Ukraine and Russia's future negotiating partner while promoting a new information
operation that aims to destabilize Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian military from within. Putin gave
an interview with Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on February 24 in which Putin stated that "elections
in Ukraine are not held under the pretext of martial law" — Putin's first acknowledgment that Ukrainian
law prohibits elections during martial law. Putin claimed that Zelensky is "toxic" for Ukrainian society
and the Ukrainian military and that Zelensky would lose any future presidential election to other
Ukrainian political and military leaders. Putin's statements are likely aimed at Ukrainian and Russian
audiences. Putin's claims that Zelensky is unpopular and harmful to Ukraine are attempts to drive a wedge
between the legitimate government of Ukraine and the Ukrainian military and population. Putin has
repeatedly claimed that Zelensky is not the legitimate leader of Ukraine after Ukraine did not hold
elections in 2024 — in accordance with Ukrainian law — as part of Russian efforts to claim that Russia
cannot negotiate with Zelensky. US President Donald Trump has stated that Putin and Zelensky must engage
in negotiations, and Putin is likely shifting his rhetoric in order to explain to Russian domestic
audiences his decision to engage in any future negotiations with Zelensky. Putin and other Kremlin
officials will likely attempt to exploit any Ukrainian military setbacks or differing opinions among
Ukrainian officials to intensify this information operation and sow discord in Ukraine.
Putin
attempted to use new language to repackage the calls for regime change in Ukraine that he has demanded
since 2021. Putin stated during the interview with Zarubin that Russia "has nothing against" the
preservation of Ukrainian statehood but wants Ukraine to "turn into a friendly neighboring state" and for
Ukrainian territory to "not be used as a springboard for an attack against Russia" in the future. Putin's
calls for Ukraine to "turn" into a "friendly" state demonstrate that Putin is still calling for the
removal of the democratically elected government in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Kremlin
government. The Kremlin has previously used thinly veiled calls for "denazification" to demand regime
change in Ukraine, and Putin appears to be using new language to make these same demands. Putin has
demanded Ukrainian regime change since Summer 2021.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian
President Vladimir Putin implicitly acknowledged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate
president of Ukraine and Russia's future negotiating partner while promoting a new information operation
that aims to destabilize Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian military from within.
• Putin
attempted to use new language to repackage the calls for regime change in Ukraine that he has demanded
since 2021.
• Putin offered to make a deal with the United States on Russian rare earth
minerals as part of efforts to outbid Ukraine on this matter and to push the United States to accept
Russian offers of economic measures in lieu of any actual Russian concessions on Ukraine.
• Putin attempted to claim that he supports Europe's participation in negotiations on Ukraine while
continuing to show his unwillingness to make concessions and seemingly proposing Russian allies as
possible future negotiating parties.
• Kremlin officials continue to exploit diplomatic
engagements with Russia's allies to reinforce Moscow's narrative that Russia invaded Ukraine to protect
Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.
• A delegation from North Korea's Workers' Party of
Korea (WPK) arrived in Moscow on February 25 at the invitation of Russia's ruling party, United Russia,
amid reports that North Korea may be shipping more material to Russia.
• Western officials
continue to highlight the scale of European military aid to Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently
advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Velyka Novosilka, and Ukrainian forces recently
advanced near Kupyansk.
• Samara Oblast authorities reduced one-time payments to soldiers who
sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) after temporarily increasing
these payments in January 2025.
• The BBC Russian Service reported on February 25 that over
100 Russian government, military, and security officials accused and convicted of various corruption
charges are fighting in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to use its "Time of Heroes"
program, which places veterans of the war in Ukraine in government positions, to form a new Russian elite
composed of loyal and ultranationalist veterans that will continue to militarize Russian society over the
long term.
• Russia may be reopening a Soviet-era submarine base in occupied Crimea.
US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky are planning to meet at the White
House on February 28, likely to sign a US-Ukraine mineral deal. A draft agreement of the deal published
ahead of the meeting does not provide US security assistance or security guarantees to Ukraine, however.
The Financial Times (FT) published a draft bilateral US-Ukrainian deal on February 26 that states that
the United States wants to "invest alongside Ukraine in a free, sovereign and secure Ukraine" and
supports "Ukraine’s efforts to obtain security guarantees needed to establish lasting peace" but does not
include any concrete US provisions of security assistance or guarantees to Ukraine. Continued US security
assistance to Ukraine is essential to help Ukraine set conditions for a lasting and just resolution of
the war that is in the interests of Ukraine, the United States, and Europe.
Russian officials
directly involved in negotiations with the United States continue to insist that any peace agreement to
resolve the war in Ukraine must be based on Russia’s 2021 demands. They also insist on the surrender to
Russia of territory that Ukrainian forces currently hold that is home to major cities and well over a
million people. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who recently led the Russian delegation at the
February 18 US-Russian negotiations in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, claimed on February 26 that negotiations
that result in freezing the current frontlines in Ukraine are impossible because the Russian Constitution
stipulates that Russia’s borders include all of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia
oblasts. Russia currently does not occupy large parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts and a
small part of western Luhansk Oblast. Lavrov also stated that Russia will reject any peace deal that
involves continued Western arms provisions to Ukraine. Lavrov is repackaging the maximalist demands
Russia has long made of Ukraine using a pseudo-legal facade, despite the illegitimacy of Russian
annexations of Ukrainian territory under international law. Lavrov likely attempted to justify Russia's
long-standing demands by framing the Russian Constitution as a legal and hence “necessary” element in
future negotiations with the United States. Russian officials have previously invoked “denazification,”
the alleged Ukrainian violations of Russian-speaking minorities’ rights, and the false historical
narrative that Ukraine is inherently part of Russia to justify their territorial claims against Ukraine
and to call for full Ukrainian capitulation.
Russia is demanding that Ukraine surrender
several large cities that Russian forces do not currently occupy and have no prospect of seizing, handing
over one million Ukrainians over to Russia. Russia’s occupation of the remainder of the four Ukrainian
oblasts would include large cities such as Kherson City (pre-war population of about 275,000), Kramatorsk
(147,00 people), and Zaporizhzhia City (706,000 people) — all of which remain under Ukrainian control.
The Russian occupation of such large population centers would significantly escalate the humanitarian
catastrophe in Ukraine. Russian authorities would likely employ the same tactics of oppression,
displacement, and forcible assimilation to Ukrainian civilians living in these areas as they have
employed against the millions of Ukrainians who have been living under Russian occupation for over three
years. Russian advances have recently stalled along the frontline, and Russian forces increasingly face
unsustainable vehicle and personnel losses, indicating that Russian forces will likely be unable to
occupy the full extent of these oblasts through military means in any short period of time if at all.
Lavrov’s rhetoric is likely an attempt to achieve through negotiations what the Russian military cannot
achieve by force. The Kremlin’s stated intent of seizing more of Ukraine's land and people directly
contradicts US and European efforts to achieve a sustainable and lasting peace in Ukraine and reinforces
Russia’s continued efforts to illegally occupy Ukrainian territory rather than to negotiate in good faith
or offer concessions.
Key Takeaways:
• US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky are planning to meet at the White House on February 28, likely to sign a
US-Ukraine mineral deal. A draft agreement of the deal published ahead of the meeting does not provide US
security assistance or security guarantees to Ukraine, however.
• Russian officials directly
involved in negotiations with the United States continue to insist that any peace agreement to resolve
the war in Ukraine must be based on Russia’s 2021 demands. They also insist on the surrender to Russia of
territory that Ukrainian forces currently hold that is home to major cities and well over a million
people.
• Russia is demanding that Ukraine surrender several large cities that Russian forces
do not currently occupy and have no prospect of seizing, handing over one million Ukrainians over to
Russia.
• Lavrov's and other Kremlin officials' continued rejections of a ceasefire and other
terms that US President Donald Trump and European leaders have identified as necessary to achieve a
lasting peace in Ukraine demonstrate that Russian President Vladimir Putin remains uninterested in
meaningful negotiations and assesses that he can achieve his war objectives militarily in the medium- to
long-term.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces
recently advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and Robotyne.
• Russian officials proposed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) assume control over all
Russian pretrial detention facilities amid reports that the FSB is in charge of a pretrial detention
facility linked to the abuse of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).
Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian officials continue to reject US negotiating terms and
demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not occupy. Putin stated in his February 27
address to the Federal Security Service (FSB) board that Russia will continue to strengthen FSB
operations in Donbas and "Novorossiya." Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov similarly claimed on February
27 that Donbas and "Novorossiya" are an "integral" part of Russia. Putin and other Russian officials have
previously defined "Novorossiya" as all of eastern and southern Ukraine (including Kharkiv,
Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts), although its precise borders are disputed among Russian
ultranationalists. Putin has previously demanded that Ukraine surrender all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson,
and Zaporizhia oblasts even though Russian forces do not occupy large parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and
Zaporizhia oblasts. Putin and other Russian officials have routinely indicated that they aim for
territorial conquest beyond the administrative boundaries of these four illegally annexed oblasts.
Renewed official Russian statements that the invented region of "Novorossiya" is part of Russia indicate
that Putin maintains his maximalist territorial ambitions and is unwilling to offer territorial
concessions. Russian forces currently occupy a small portion of Kharkiv Oblast and the Kinburn Spit in
Mykolaiv Oblast and are attempting to advance to the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border, and the Kremlin may
use the Russian occupation of limited territory in these oblasts as a false premise to demand that
Ukraine surrender even more territory. ISW continues to assess that Putin remains uninterested in
good-faith negotiations that require compromises and thinks that he can achieve his war objectives
militarily in the medium- to long-term. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on February 26 that if
Russia is "making maximalist demands that knowscan’t be met," then the United States will know
that Putin is not "serious" about engaging in negotiations. US President Donald Trump reiterated on
February 26 that Russia will have to make concessions in peace negotiations and reiterated on February 27
that the United States will "certainly try to get as much as can back ."
Kremlin guidelines to Russian state media about coverage of recent US–Russian meetings indicate
Russian President Vladimir Putin's determination to manipulate US President Donald Trump and divide the
West. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on February 27 that sources in Russian state media who
are close to the Russian presidential administration stated that the Kremlin has not given "strict"
instructions to media about how to cover recent US–Russian contacts. A source who regularly participates
in Kremlin meetings with major media editors reportedly stated that the Kremlin told media outlets to
emphasize "in every way" that Russia is in contact "not with some abstract Americans, but with Trump's
team" and to demonstrate that Trump is "a man who was oppressed in every way both at home and in Europe."
Multiple sources reportedly told Verstka that they had received instructions to create an image of Trump
as a man who "had the wisdom" to respond to the Kremlin's "outstretched" hand. Putin praised the Trump
administration on February 27, claiming that Russia's first contacts with the administration "inspire
certain hopes" and that the Trump team is displaying a "reciprocal determination" to restore US–Russian
relations. Putin claimed that "ideological cliches" have started to "destroy the Western community ...
from within," as evidenced by alleged problems in Western states' economies and domestic politics. Putin
claimed that "some Western elites" are trying to "maintain instability" in the world and will try to
"disrupt or compromise" the US–Russian dialogue that has begun. Putin's claim that "some Western elites"
— but not the Trump administration — are against US–Russian talks is likely an attempt to drive wedges
between Trump and other US actors and European leaders. The Kremlin has similarly recently framed
European leaders as interested in prolonging the war in Ukraine as part of efforts to falsely portray the
US and European positions on negotiations as significantly different and to discredit any possible
European role in negotiations.
US and Russian delegations met in Istanbul, Turkey on February
27 to continue to discuss US–Russian bilateral diplomatic relations. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov
claimed on February 27 that the Russian delegation in Istanbul is working to develop the agreements
reached during the February 18 US–Russian talks in Saudi Arabia. Kremlin newswire TASS reported that the
bilateral meeting would include discussions on the resumption of the work of the US and Russian embassies
in each state. Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) correspondent Denis
Davydov claimed that Director of the North American Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) Alexander Darchiev headed the Russian delegation in Istanbul. Darchiev served as the Russian
Ambassador to Canada from 2014 to 2021. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported in November 2024 that
three informed sources stated that Darchiev is the most likely candidate to become the new Russian
Ambassador to the United States. Peskov stated in November 2024 that the Kremlin had chosen a candidate
and would announce the appointment "in the foreseeable future." The Russian State Duma reportedly held
closed consultations in November 2024 with Darchiev about the appointments of Russian diplomats abroad.
Reuters reported on February 27 that a US official stated that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Eurasian Affairs Sonata Coulter led the US delegation in Istanbul.
The Kremlin is
reportedly continuing to push the United States to accept economic benefits that are unrelated to the war
in Ukraine in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions that are related to the war. Bloomberg, citing
a source familiar with the topic, reported on February 27 that CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund
(RDIF) and newly appointed Special Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation
with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev — who was part of the Russian delegation during the February 18
US–Russian talks in Saudi Arabia — convinced Putin to seek negotiations with the United States through
business opportunities. The Kremlin reportedly viewed US President Donald Trump's interest in a mineral
deal with Ukraine as a chance to initiate economic cooperation discussions between the United States and
Russia, giving Dmitriev an opportunity to take the lead on such initiatives.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian officials continue to reject US negotiating
terms and demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not occupy.
• Kremlin
guidelines to Russian state media about coverage of recent US–Russian meetings indicate Russian President
Vladimir Putin's determination to manipulate US President Donald Trump and divide the West.
• US and Russian delegations met in Istanbul, Turkey on February 27 to continue to discuss US–Russian
bilateral diplomatic relations.
• The Kremlin is reportedly continuing to push the United
States to accept economic benefits that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine in return for Ukrainian and
Western concessions that are related to the war.
• North Korea reportedly recently deployed
additional troops to Kursk Oblast as North Korea continues to expand its military capabilities through
cooperation with Russia.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and
Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump held a contentious meeting at the
White House on February 28. Zelensky observed that Russia has repeatedly violated previous ceasefire
agreements, as ISW has reported. Zelensky said that Ukraine will not accept a ceasefire agreement with
Russia without sufficient external security guarantees, as such an agreement will fail to preserve
Ukraine's sovereignty and prevent war in Europe in the long-term. Zelensky stated that Russian strikes
have not "completely destroyed" Ukraine and that Ukraine is "alive" and continuing to defend itself
against Russian aggression. Zelensky reiterated that no country wants to end the war more than Ukraine
and that any negotiations to end the war will be between Ukraine and Russia with US and European
mediation efforts. Trump declined to comment on the possibility of future US security guarantees for
Ukraine and US troop deployments to Ukraine. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reportedly told Zelensky to
leave the White House following the meeting, and the White House cancelled the afternoon press conference
and the signing of the US-Ukraine mineral deal. ISW continues to assess that supporting Ukraine is a
vital American national security interest, as is a strong bilateral relationship between the United
States and Ukraine.
Russia continues to showcase its deepening relations with American
adversaries despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's effort to posture Russia's receptiveness to
negotiations with the United States. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu met separately with
People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping and PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on
February 28 to discuss bilateral security issues and international and regional matters. Shoigu and Xi
also underlined the need to continue coordinating efforts at key international platforms including BRICS
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and diplomatic efforts about "solving the Ukrainian
crisis." Shoigu claimed that the Russia-PRC relationship has reached "unprecedented" heights, and Russian
state media highlighted statements from Xi and PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Lin
Jian's praise of close bilateral relations.
Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson and
Chairperson of the ruling United Russia party Dmitry Medvedev met with North Korea's Workers' Party (WPK)
Central Committee member Ri Hi-yong on February 26 in Moscow to express United Russia's desire "for
closer cooperation with the WPK and for expanding contracts and exchanges in all areas." Russian
President Vladimir Putin met with Ri on February 27, but the Kremlin's readout did not provide further
details about the meeting. Representatives of the Kursk Oblast Chamber of Commerce signed a cooperation
agreement with the Pyongyang Chamber of Commerce on February 27 to develop bilateral economic ties and
expand municipal production opportunities between Kursk Oblast and North Korean enterprises. The
agreement also includes trade and economic ties; cooperation in industry, agriculture, and processing;
and joint logistical projects. Russia continues to range itself with adversaries of the United States,
underscoring the importance of strengthening and supporting US allies and partners, including Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump
held a contentious meeting at the White House on February 28.
• Russia continues to showcase
its deepening relations with American adversaries despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's effort to
posture Russia's receptiveness to negotiations with the United States.
• Russia continues to
range itself with adversaries of the United States, underscoring the importance of strengthening and
supporting US allies and partners, including Ukraine.
• Ukrainian officials are increasing
cooperation with South Korea amid deepening Russia-North Korea ties and recent reports of a new wave of
North Korean troop deployments to Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against
near-rear Russian military assets in occupied Ukraine.
• The Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) announced on February 28 that the United States approved current MFA North American
Department Director Alexander Darchiev's appointment as Russia's Ambassador to the United States.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka and in western
Zaporizhia.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin tasked Crimea occupation head Sergey Aksyonov
with establishing a "Kadry" ("Human Resources") national project to integrate Russian veterans into the
Russian economy, likely in support of the Kremlin's efforts to prevent the emergence of subversive
veteran civil societies.
Senior US officials are suggesting that the United States may cut all aid to Ukraine, although US
President Donald Trump has not indicated any such intention. Cutting the current flow of aid to Ukraine
would directly undermine President Trump’s stated goal of achieving a sustainable peace in Ukraine. The
New York Times and Washington Post, citing unnamed senior Trump Administration officials, reported on
February 28 that the Trump Administration is considering canceling all US military assistance to Ukraine,
including any final aid shipments that former US President Joe Biden approved.
Ukrainian
forces, enabled by essential US assistance, are inflicting unsustainable losses on Russian forces while
holding them to marginal gains. This situation, combined with the severe challenges Russia will face in
2025, offers the United States great leverage in peace negotiations. A suspension of ongoing US military
assistance to Ukraine would encourage Russian President Vladimir Putin to continue to increase his
demands and fuel his conviction that he can achieve total victory through war. ISW has repeatedly
highlighted the importance of continued and timely Western military assistance to Ukraine and observed a
correlation between the magnitude of the Russian gains in Ukraine and delays or halts in Western military
support. Ukrainian forces have leveraged US-supplied military systems, including Patriot air defense
systems and HIMARS and ATACMS long-range strike systems, to defend against nightly Russian drone and
missile strikes, enhance Ukraine's strike capabilities, complicate Russian logistics and command and
control (C2), and disrupt Russia's defense industrial base (DIB). Ukrainian efforts, aided by the steady
flow of Western aid, have significantly slowed Russian advances along the front, inflicted significant
Russian personnel and equipment losses, and undermined Russia's efforts to project economic and domestic
stability amid rising pressures from the war. Russia's economic, force generation, and defense industrial
constraints provide key opportunities that Ukraine, the United States, and its Western allies could
leverage to extract concessions from Putin in peace negotiations.
The cessation of US military
assistance and monetary assistance aimed at strengthening Ukraine's defense industry could help tip the
balance of the war and give Russia greater advantages on the battlefield in Ukraine, increasing the
likelihood of a Russian victory in Ukraine. Russia would leverage the cessation of US aid to Ukraine to
seize more territory in Ukraine and attempt to exhaust European support – the approach Putin has outlined
in his theory of victory. Ending US aid to Ukraine and enabling further Russian gains would also embolden
Putin and strengthen his belief that Russia can seize and control Ukraine and other former Soviet
countries, including current NATO member states. The Kremlin will likely intensify its military campaign
in Ukraine and attempt to exploit any delay or cessation of US military assistance to Ukraine - as the
Kremlin did in Spring 2024.
Curtailing aid to Ukraine would risk diminishing US influence in
the world and emboldening US adversaries. Russia, Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China
(PRC) have formed a bloc aimed at defeating the United States and its allies around the world and are
currently testing the limits of US commitment to its allies in Europe, the Middle East, and the
Asia-Pacific region. PRC President Xi Jinping stated during a phone call with Russian President Vladimir
Putin in late February 2025 that the PRC and Russia are "true friends" who "cannot be moved away" from
each other and will not be influenced by "any third party." Russia established bilateral comprehensive
strategic partnership agreements since the start of the war with the PRC in May 2023, North Korea in
October 2024, and Iran in January 2025. Putin continues to rely on Iranian drones and North Korean
ballistic missiles and troops in his war against Ukraine. US aid to Ukraine is a demonstration of the
United States' commitment to defending democracies against ongoing and future aggression around the
world, including but not limited to Ukraine, Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan. The Russia-led bloc will
likely see the United States abandoning Ukraine as an indicator that the United States will abandon its
other allies and will seek to test the limits of US commitment around the world. The Russia-led bloc is
searching for easily exploitable divisions between the United States and its allies to isolate and weaken
the United States on the global stage, allowing adversaries to rise up and dictate where and how the
United States can engage the world. Cutting US aid to Ukraine plays directly into these adversaries'
goals and is a step toward curtailing US influence in the world.
Putin, not Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky, remains the main obstacle to a lasting peace agreement on Ukraine. Zelensky
has continuously reiterated his commitment to obtaining a just and lasting peace in Ukraine through
negotiations. Zelensky has indicated several times — including in his February 28 Fox News interview —
that he is willing to make concessions on territory, Ukraine's NATO membership, and even his own tenure
in office to secure a just and sustainable peace. These concessions align with US Secretary of State
Marco Rubio's February 26 statement that "what Ukraine really needs is deterrence...to make it costly for
anyone to come after them again in the future" and that both the United States and Europe "can be
involved" in such deterrence efforts.
Putin and other senior Kremlin officials have by
contrast continuously reiterated their commitment to Putin's initial war aims in Ukraine, which amount to
Ukraine's full capitulation, replacing the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet
government, and Ukrainian commitments to neutrality and demilitarization — all of which would leave
Ukraine nearly helpless against future Russian aggression and destabilization efforts. Putin and other
Kremlin officials are repackaging these demands in efforts to appear willing to negotiate in good faith
with the United States, likely to extract concessions from the United States regarding Ukraine. Achieving
a meaningful peace in Ukraine will require the United States and its allies to help Ukraine continue to
inflict significant losses on Russia and to undertake a diplomatic and economic pressure campaign aimed
at forcing Putin to abandon his insistence on full Ukrainian surrender and efforts to weaken Europe and
the United States.
Key Takeaways:
• Senior US officials are suggesting that the
United States may cut all aid to Ukraine, although US President Donald Trump has not indicated any such
intention. Cutting the current flow of aid to Ukraine would directly undermine President Trump’s stated
goal of achieving a sustainable peace in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces enabled by essential US
assistance are inflicting unsustainable losses on Russian forces while holding them to marginal gains.
This situation, combined with the severe challenges Russia will face in 2025, offers the US great
leverage in peace negotiations. A suspension of ongoing US military assistance to Ukraine would encourage
Russian President Vladimir Putin to continue to increase his demands and fuel his conviction that he can
achieve total victory through war.
• Curtailing aid to Ukraine would risk diminishing US
influence in the world and emboldening US adversaries.
• Putin, not Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky, remains the main obstacle to a lasting peace agreement on Ukraine.
• The
Kremlin launched another informational effort intended to discourage additional US and European military
assistance to Ukraine by claiming that Russia has won the war in Ukraine.
• European countries
remain committed to supporting the Ukrainian military and defense industry, however, amid preparations
for a European defense summit about Ukraine on March 2.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced
near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka.
• The Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to recruit medically unfit soldiers in an effort to address personnel
shortages.
Recent Russian official statements in response to the proposed US-Ukraine mineral deal indicate that the
Kremlin is trying to sabotage the deal through narratives targeting Ukrainian and American audiences. The
Kremlin is claiming that this mineral deal does not benefit Ukraine while also claiming that Russia can
make a better offer to the United States, indicating that Moscow sees the deal as harmful to its
objectives. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on February 23 to a question about the
US-Ukraine mineral deal and whether US pressure would push Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to
"finally sell out all of Ukraine," including Russia's illegally annexed territories in Ukraine.<1> Peskov
claimed that the people in occupied Ukraine decided "long ago" that they wanted to join Russia so "no one
will ever sell off these territories" — implying that Zelensky may "sell out" other areas of Ukraine.
Russian state television evening news program Vesti claimed on February 24 that the United States is
"blackmailing" Ukraine with the mineral deal.<2> A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on
February 22 that "there is nothing good for Kyiv" in a new version of the US-Ukraine mineral deal.<3> The
milblogger claimed that the mineral deal is "humiliating" for Ukraine and that Zelensky would be "selling
the benefits of his country for nothing" should he sign the deal.
Kremlin officials are also
trying to prevent the United States and Ukraine from concluding a mineral deal by making competing
offers. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed to Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on February 24 that
Russia has an "order of magnitude" more rare earth materials than Ukraine and stated that Russia can
cooperate with both the US government and US companies in capital investment projects for rare earth
materials.<4> Putin referred to mineral reserves both within Russia and within occupied Ukraine in his
attempts to appeal to the United States to invest in "Russian" rare earth minerals (claiming minerals in
occupied Ukraine as Russia's own). Putin also offered to conclude deals with the United States on the
supply of Russian aluminum. CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and newly appointed Special
Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill
Dmitriev told CNN on February 24 that Russia is open to economic cooperation with the United States, that
the first stage of cooperation would be in the energy sphere, and that such cooperation is key for a
"more resilient global economy."<5>
Russian state media is delaying coverage of select Kremlin
statements in order to exploit changing dynamics in the US-Ukrainian relationship and drive wedges
between Ukraine and the United States. Zarubin and Russian state media outlets TASS and RIA Novosti
amplified on March 2 a previous statement from Peskov about the US decision on February 24 to vote
alongside Russia against a Ukrainian- and European-backed UN resolution that recognized Russia as the
aggressor in the war.<6> Peskov claimed on February 26 that the Trump administration is "rapidly
changing" all of its foreign policies in ways that "largely coincide with vision," but TASS,
RIA Novosti, and Zarubin only reported Peskov's statements on March 2.<7> Russian state media headlines
on March 2 deliberately misrepresented Peskov's statements such that they appeared to be in response to
the February 28 meeting between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky.<8>
The Kremlin has a vested interest in preventing the United States and Ukraine
from signing a mineral deal, as the deal will commit the United States to a long-term investment in
Ukraine and Ukraine's sovereignty. The Kremlin is investing significant time and effort into undermining
and misrepresenting the US-Ukrainian mineral deal, indicating that the Kremlin views the deal as an
impediment to accomplishing Russian President Vladimir Putin's objectives in Ukraine.<9> The mineral
deal, even one that does not include text about an American security guarantees for Ukraine, will
represent a long-term US economic investment in Ukraine and could be a building block towards additional
US assistance or military sales to Ukraine in the future, as US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent
observed in an interview to CBS on March 2.<10> Any agreement that ties the United States to an
independent and sovereign Ukraine is contrary to Russia's long-term goals of isolating and conquering
Ukraine. Putin likely assesses that preventing the US-Ukrainian mineral deal is a necessary step towards
pushing the United States into stopping military assistance to Ukraine and abandoning Ukraine altogether.
Putin's articulated theory of victory in Ukraine — which assumes that Russia can continue slow, gradual
advances in exchange for significant personnel and materiel losses — rests on the assumption that Russia
can outlast and overcome US and European security assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainian efforts to mobilize
its economy and population to support its defense.<11> Putin is likely attempting to undermine the
US-Ukrainian mineral deal in order to prevent deepening US-Ukraine ties in the hope that Russia will be
able to destroy or extract significant territorial concessions from Ukraine during future negotiations
before Russia's own wartime economic and force generation issues begin to significantly impede Russia
ability to advance on the battlefield in 2025 and beyond.<12>
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov is attempting to exploit discussions between the United States and the EU about the possible
deployment of European peacekeeping forces to Ukraine as part of a future peace settlement in order to
reinvigorate the Kremlin's demands for regime change in Ukraine. Lavrov claimed on March 2 that plans to
introduce European peacekeeping forces in Ukraine in the future are a continuation of European leaders'
supposed efforts to "incite" Ukraine to "war against ."<13> Lavrov claimed that the West brought
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to power using "bayonets" and will use future peacekeeping forces
as "bayonets" to "prop up" Zelensky. Lavrov claimed that Europe wants to continue the war in Ukraine
through these peacekeeping forces whereas the United States is openly stating its desire to end the
war.<14> Lavrov claimed that the introduction of peacekeepers to Ukraine would not eliminate the "root
causes" of the war.<15> Lavrov has previously defined the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged
violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination
against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.<16> The Kremlin has recently
attempted to use this phrase to justify its calls for regime change in Ukraine. Lavrov is exploiting the
ongoing discussions in the West about the deployment of peacekeepers to Ukraine in the future to make yet
another argument for Russia's longstanding demand for regime change. Lavrov and other Kremlin officials
have recently engaged in rhetoric similarly attempting to exacerbate US-European divisions and falsely
portraying European countries as wanting to continue the war in Ukraine.<17> The Kremlin is likely
attempting to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe to extract concessions in Russia's favor
in future peace negotiations and other talks.<18>
European leaders demonstrated their
commitment to supporting Ukraine at a defense summit in London on March 2. The United Kingdom (UK) hosted
leaders of Ukraine, France, Germany, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Canada,
Finland, Sweden, Czechia, and Romania as well as the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Hakan Fidan, NATO
General Secretary Mark Rutte, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and President of
the European Council Antonio Costa.<19> UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced at the summit that the
UK and France, along with other unspecified countries, have expressed their commitment to develop a
"coalition of the willing" that will deploy peacekeepers to defend a peace agreement in Ukraine.<20>
Starmer revealed at the summit a plan aimed at assisting Ukraine: keeping military aid flowing while the
war continues and increasing economic pressure on Russia; ensuring that any peace deal upholds Ukraine's
sovereignty and security and that Ukraine is at the negotiating table; and committing European leaders to
aim to deter any future invasion of Ukraine.<21> Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the
defense summit was dedicated to Ukraine and a common European future and noted that "European unity is at
an extremely high level."<22> Zelensky stated that Ukraine is continuing discussions about security
guarantees and conditions for a just peace with partner states and is working with Europe to create a
"reliable basis of cooperation" with the United States about Ukrainian peace and guaranteed security.
Zelensky met with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni on the sidelines of the summit to discuss the
development of a joint action plan to end the war in Ukraine.<23> Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem
Umerov also met with UK Defense Secretary John Healey on the sidelines to discuss the UK's readiness to
increase military assistance to Ukraine, the prospect of purchasing weapons with profits from frozen
Russian assets, and the UK's role in the Ramstein format.<24>
European countries announced
additional military assistance packages for Ukraine before and during the summit. The UK announced on
March 1 a loan worth 2.6 billion pounds (roughly $3.2 billion) to bolster Ukraine's defense backed by
profits from frozen Russian assets.<25> The UK stated that the first tranche of the loan will arrive
later next week. Zelensky stated that the UK loan will fund Ukrainian weapons production.<26> Starmer
announced on March 2 an additional 1.6 billion pound (roughly $2 billion) deal that will allow Ukraine to
purchase 5,000 lightweight-multirole missiles from the UK.<27> The Lithuanian Ministry of Defense (MoD)
announced on March 1 that it will allocate 20 million euros (roughly $20.7 million) to purchasing
Ukrainian-produced weapons for Ukraine and to develop a joint weapons production facility in
Lithuania.<28>
Key Takeaways:
Recent Russian official statements in response to the
proposed US-Ukraine mineral deal indicate that the Kremlin is trying to sabotage the deal through
narratives targeting Ukrainian and American audiences. The Kremlin is claiming that this mineral deal
does not benefit Ukraine while also claiming that Russia can make a better offer to the United States,
indicating that Moscow sees the deal as harmful to its objectives. The Kremlin has a vested interest
in preventing the United States and Ukraine from signing a mineral deal, as the deal will commit the
United States to a long-term investment in Ukraine and Ukraine's sovereignty. Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov is attempting to exploit discussions between the United States and the EU about
the possible deployment of European peacekeeping forces to Ukraine as part of a future peace settlement
in order to reinvigorate the Kremlin's demands for regime change in Ukraine. European leaders
demonstrated their commitment to supporting Ukraine at a defense summit in London on March 2. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka
Novosilka.
Ich fühle mich überhaupt zurückerinnert an meinen Geschichtsunterricht in der Schule, als über die
Kolonialisierungszeit vor dem 1. Weltkrieg gesprochen wurde. Ich hab das Gefühl, dass sich diese
Geschichte in abgeänderter Form (anderer Technologiestandard, anderer Fokus bei Landeinnahme) wiederholt.
Ukraine, Grönland, Panama, Gaza, vielleicht dann in weiterer Folge Moldawien, Georgien. China
kolonialisiert Afrika und Teile Asiens mit wirtschaftlicher Totalabhängigkeit. Irgendwie gruselig.
>Es wird ungemütlich in Europa. Trump würde den Russen damit >Europa als leicht verdaulichen
Leckerbissen servieren und >bekommt dafür freie Hand in Kanada und Grönland?
Ich
dachte, er möchte, dass die Europäer (mehr) Waren aus den USA kaufen. Mit Europa unter Russland wird das
nicht gelingen.
Ukrainian military intelligence indicated that about 620,000 Russian soldiers are operating in Ukraine
and Kursk Oblast, an increase of about 40,000 personnel compared to late 2024. Ukrainian Main Military
Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in an interview with
RBK-Ukraine published on March 3 that there are 620,000 Russian soldiers in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast,
about 200,000 of whom are actively fighting on the frontline. Skibitskyi stated that there are roughly
35,000 additional Rosgvardia troops protecting rear areas and that these personnel can become a second
line of defense if necessary. Skibitskyi stated in November 2024 there were about 580,000 Russian
soldiers operating against Ukraine (presumably both within Ukraine and in Kursk Oblast), and Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in January 2025 that the total Russian force grouping in Ukraine was
about 600,000 troops.
Russian authorities reportedly exceeded their recruitment quotas in 2024
and January 2025, likely in part due to increased financial incentives for recruits and prison
recruitment efforts that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term. Skibitskyi reported on March 3
that Russian authorities recruited 440,000 military personnel in 2024 — 10,000 more than their quota for
the year — and fulfilled their January 2025 recruitment quota by 107 percent. Russian Security Council
Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev also claimed in late December 2024 that 440,000 recruits signed
military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in 2024. Russian President Vladimir
Putin signed a decree in July 2024 awarding 400,000 rubles (roughly $4,400) to anyone who signed a
contract with the Russian MoD between August 1, 2024 and December 31, 2024 - more than double the
previous federal award of 195,000 rubles (roughly $2,100). This increased federal reward likely
contributed to Russia's successful recruitment drive in 2024. Russian federal subjects offered additional
high regional bonuses to those who signed military service contracts in late 2024 and early 2025, but
select federal subjects have started to reduce these regional payments following the expiration of these
limited time offers, indicating that such measures are not sustainable indefinitely. Skibitskyi stated
that 15 percent of Russian recruits in 2024 were people under criminal investigation, in prison, or
serving suspended sentences and that this figure will increase to roughly 30 percent in 2025. Russian
officials reported in 2024 that Russia was shutting down some prisons after Russia's prison population
significantly dropped due to the Russian prison recruitment drives. Russia has recently been increasingly
recruiting defendants in pretrial detention centers, likely as the pool of prison recruits has dwindled.
ISW continues to assess that increased military spending, including large payments and benefits to
Russian servicemembers, is hurting the Russian economy at the macro level and that the Kremlin is
reducing this spending on military personnel as part of efforts to mitigate the impacts of such
initiatives. Russian authorities are unlikely to sustain such high financial incentives as part of their
recruitment drives in the medium- and long-term as the Russian economy continues to decline.
Skibitskyi noted that Russian authorities have previously adjusted their annual quotas throughout the
year, having originally called for Russian authorities to recruit 375,000 to 380,000 personnel in 2024
before increasing this number to 430,000. Adjustments to the 2024 recruitment quotas were likely meant to
account for Russia's increased tempo of offensive operations in the last few months of 2024 that resulted
in the highest casualty rates Russia experienced since early 2022. Skibitskyi concluded that Russia's
recruitment plans for 2025 will "mostly" allow the Russian military command to replace its battlefield
losses should the current tempo of offensive operations and losses continue. Russian authorities will
likely have to adjust their 2025 quotas as they did in 2024 should they want the current tempo of
offensive operations to continue and should Russian forces continue to suffer high losses while advancing
at a slower rate. Russian authorities are unlikely to generate enough forces to significantly increase
the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine in the near future. Continued Western military aid
would help Ukrainian forces inflict additional losses on the Russian military that would likely intensify
Russia's economic and military issues and force Putin into making concessions during meaningful
negotiations in 2025.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian military intelligence indicated
that about 620,000 Russian soldiers are operating in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, an increase of about
40,000 personnel compared to late 2024.
• Russian authorities reportedly exceeded their
recruitment quotas in 2024 and January 2025, likely in part due to increased financial incentives for
recruits and prison recruitment efforts that are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term.
• Russian forces continue to innovate their strike packages and leverage larger numbers of Shahed and
decoy drones in an attempt to penetrate Ukraine's air defense umbrella.
• Russian missile
production has reportedly not significantly increased, but Russian forces appear to be prioritizing
production of missile and drone variants that are more effective against Ukrainian air defenses.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka
Novosilka and in Kursk Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues to promote its "Time of Heroes"
veterans' program as part of efforts to militarize the Russian government and society.
US President Donald Trump ordered a pause on US military aid to Ukraine on March 3, suspending the
delivery of critical warfighting materiel. An anonymous White House official told the Wall Street Journal
on March 3 that the United States is "pausing and reviewing" military aid to Ukraine until Trump
"determines that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is making a good-faith effort towards peace
negotiations with Russia." The White House official did not provide clarification about what conditions
the White House is expecting Zelensky to meet in order to resume aid.
The United States had
been providing Ukraine with artillery ammunition, armored vehicles, towed howitzers, Patriot air defense
batteries, and long-range rocket and missile systems such as HIMARS and ATACMS — many of which are
sophisticated systems that only the United States can supply Pauses in this aid will harm Ukraine's
warfighting capabilities, although it will likely take from weeks to months for the suspension of US aid
to affect the frontline. Western officials estimated in late February 2025 that Ukraine will be able to
sustain its current pace of operations until about mid-2025 (roughly June 2025) as long as the United
States continues to provide the aid contracted under the Biden administration on the previously
anticipated timelines. A Ukrainian official told CNN on March 4 following the suspension that Ukraine may
run out of US-provided artillery shells by May or June 2025 but warned that Patriot air defense missiles
could run out "in a matter of weeks." Ukraine relies heavily on US Patriot systems for its air defense
umbrella to protect against Russian missile strikes against Ukraine's rear areas. The shortage and
eventual lack of Patriot missiles is likely to have severe impacts on the safety of Ukraine's critical,
industrial, and civilian infrastructure, as Ukraine's other supporters lack an analogous system that can
protect against Russian missile strikes, particularly those including ballistic missiles. As Ukraine runs
short on Patriot missiles, Kyiv will have to make difficult decisions about which population centers to
prioritize in terms of air defense protection. If it runs out of Patriots entirely then Ukrainian cities
will lie open to Russian ballistic missiles.
Key Takeaways:
• US President Donald
Trump ordered a pause on US military aid to Ukraine on March 3, suspending the delivery of critical
warfighting materiel.
• The United States had been providing Ukraine with artillery
ammunition, armored vehicles, towed howitzers, Patriot air defense batteries, and long-range rocket and
missile systems such as HIMARS and ATACMS — many of which are sophisticated systems that only the United
States can supply.
• The frontline in Ukraine does not risk imminent collapse, but the
effects of the US aid pause will become more acute over time.
• The European Commission
proposed a plan on March 4 that would enable EU member states to increase defense spending to support
Ukraine and strengthen European security. European rearmament is vital for Europe's short- and long-term
security, and Europe should pursue these efforts regardless of the status of US aid to Ukraine.
• Ukraine has significantly expanded its defense industrial production capabilities throughout the war
in an effort to eventually meet its military needs independently, but Ukraine's ability to become
self-sufficient in the long-term is contingent on continued support from partner states in the short- and
medium-term.
• The Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky reiterated on March 4 Ukraine's commitment to work with the Trump Administration to achieve a
sustainable and lasting peace in Ukraine.
• The high casualties in Russia's war in Ukraine
are the direct result of Putin's determination to conquer all of Ukraine using horrific and costly
tactics, and Putin can dramatically reduce this killing any time he chooses
• The Kremlin
continues to express cautious optimism about the pausing of US military aid to Ukraine and advanced
several narratives as part of efforts to impose additional demands on the United States.Russian forces
recently advanced near Lyman, and Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces
recently advanced near Pokrovsk.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly
developing a plan to partially demobilize a limited number of mobilized personnel no earlier than July
2025, likely to address growing societal backlash over the lack of rotations and demobilization of
Russian mobilized troops for over two years.
>The shortage and eventual lack of Patriot missiles is likely to have >severe impacts on the
safety of Ukraine's critical, industrial, and >civilian infrastructure, as Ukraine's other
supporters lack an >analogous system that can protect against Russian missile strikes
Patriots hat aber so ziemlich jeder NATO-Staat. Kurzfristig könnten die aus ihren Beständen liefern und
beim Hersteller nachbestellen, solange die USA das nicht untersagen.
>>The shortage and eventual lack of Patriot missiles is >likely to have >>severe impacts on the safety of Ukraine's critical, >industrial, and >>civilian infrastructure, as Ukraine's other supporters >lack an >>analogous
system that can protect against Russian missile >strikes > >Patriots hat aber so
ziemlich jeder NATO-Staat. Kurzfristig >könnten die aus ihren Beständen liefern und beim
Hersteller >nachbestellen, solange die USA das nicht untersagen.
Aber die Frage
ist halt Lieferzeit? Ganz auf Null Bestand werden die alle nicht gehen wollen.
>>Patriots hat aber so ziemlich jeder NATO-Staat. >Kurzfristig >>könnten
die aus ihren Beständen liefern und beim >Hersteller >>nachbestellen, solange die USA
das nicht untersagen. > > >Aber die Frage ist halt Lieferzeit? Ganz auf Null
Bestand >werden die alle nicht gehen wollen.
Ich denke, dass man jetzt sowieso wieder
mehr auf den Verhandlungstisch zurück muss und anstatt sich auf weitere Waffenlieferungen(ohne USA!) zu
konzentrieren.
>Patriots hat aber so ziemlich jeder NATO-Staat. Kurzfristig >könnten die aus ihren Beständen
liefern und beim Hersteller >nachbestellen, solange die USA das nicht untersagen.
Aber
gibt ja keiner her, wie man sieht. In Zeiten wie diesen will keiner die eigene Verteidigung
vernachlässigen.
Ok, Israel gibt einige her, die haben mittlerweile ihr eigenes, besseres
System. Aber lange genug waren die Patriots unverzichtbar.
The Trump administration suspended intelligence sharing with Ukraine, one of many demands the Kremlin has
made of the US, Ukraine, and Ukraine's other supporters. Details about the US suspension of intelligence
sharing with Ukraine vary in different reports, but the Trump administration has suspended some level of
intelligence sharing with Ukraine with some reporting indicating that the suspension affected all
intelligence sharing. Western media reported that the Trump administration specifically suspended the
sharing of intelligence that Ukraine uses for early warning systems to protect against Russian long-range
missile and drone strikes, for target designation for HIMARS Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems
(GMLRS) strikes, and for target designation for long-range strikes within Russia. British outlet Daily
Mail reported that the United States also prohibited the United Kingdom from sharing US intelligence with
Ukraine. The Kremlin has repeatedly insisted on an end to the provision of all foreign assistance to
Ukraine as part of any peace agreement, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov March 4 specifically
stated on March 4 that the United States provides Ukraine with intelligence data such as satellite
reconnaissance data.
The suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine will damage
Ukraine's ability to defend itself against ongoing Russian attacks against military and civilian targets.
Ukrainian forces have leveraged their ability to strike within Russia and destroy significant amounts of
materiel in order to increase pressure on Russia. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian missile and
ammunition storage facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast on the night of September 17 to 18, 2024,
destroying two to three months of Russia’s ammunition supply. The Toropets facility also stored Iskander
missiles, Tochka-U ballistic missiles, glide bombs, and artillery ammunition. Ukrainian forces struck the
Tikhoretsk Arsenal just north of Kamenny, Krasnodar Krai on the night of September 20 to 21, 2024, which
at the time contained at least 2,000 tons of munitions, including munitions from North Korea. Russian
forces previously leveraged their quantitative artillery ammunition advantage and glide bomb strikes to
facilitate battlefield gains by destroying settlements before deploying infantry to attack the area —
most notably near Avdiivka in February 2024 during delays in US military aid to Ukraine. Ukrainian
strikes on Russian missile and ammunition storage facilities have previously relieved pressure on
Ukrainian forces across the frontline by preventing Russian forces from leveraging their artillery
advantage to secure gains. Ukrainian strikes against military targets in Russia also pushed Russian
aviation operations further from Ukraine into Russia's rear areas, hindering Russia's ability to conduct
glide bomb and missile strikes against Ukrainian frontline positions from Russian airspace. Ukraine's
inability to conduct ATACMS and HIMARS strikes against Russian air defense systems within Russia and
occupied Ukraine will likely impact how close to the frontline Russian pilots are willing to operate and
expand Russia's ability to effectively use glide bombs against both frontline areas and near rear
Ukrainian cities.
The suspension of all US intelligence sharing with Ukraine would also allow
Russian forces to intensify their drone and missile strikes against the Ukrainian rear, affecting
millions of Ukrainian civilians and the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB). US
intelligence has contributed to Ukraine's early warning system against Russian strikes against Ukrainian
cities, allowing Ukrainian authorities and civilians to prepare once Russian forces launch missiles and
drones. The suspension of US intelligence on Russian strikes against the Ukrainian rear, coupled with the
US suspension of supplies of Patriot air defense missiles that Ukraine relies upon to defend against
Russian ballistic missiles, would have severe impacts on the safety of Ukrainian rear areas.
Russian drone and missile strikes have heavily targeted Ukraine's energy infrastructure and DIB. The
likely intensification of these strikes following the US suspension of military aid and intelligence
sharing to Ukraine will hinder Ukraine's ongoing progress towards expanding its DIB to be able to supply
the Ukrainian military with all of its materiel needs. A self-sufficient Ukrainian DIB would allow
Ukraine to defend itself over the long-term with dramatically reduced foreign military assistance, and it
is in America's core national security interests that Ukraine be able to continue its efforts towards
self-sufficiency.
The Trump administration has been applying considerable pressure on Ukraine,
whose leaders continue to offer concessions and publicly declare their interest in achieving a lasting
end to the war. These Trump administration policies are undermining the leverage that the United States
needs to get Russian President Vladimir Putin to accept any peace agreement that is in the interests of
the United States, Ukraine, and Europe. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 4 that
"Ukraine is ready to come to the negotiating table as soon as possible to bring lasting peace closer."
Zelensky also offered to exchange Ukrainian and Russian prisoners of war (POWs), to ban missile and
long-range drone strikes against energy and civilian infrastructure, and to reach an immediate truce in
the Black Sea. Zelensky has indicated several times — including in his February 28 Fox News interview —
that he is willing to make concessions on territory, Ukraine's NATO membership, and his own tenure in
office in order to secure a just and sustainable peace. Russian President Vladimir Putin and numerous
Kremlin officials have, in contrast, offered no meaningful concessions. They continuously repeat demands
that amount to complete Ukrainian capitulation as well as the rolling back of NATO from Eastern
Europe.
Russia's war effort in Ukraine has brought about a series of materiel, manpower, and
economic challenges for Moscow that will worsen in the coming months if Ukraine is able to sustain its
defensive military operations. The United States should leverage these Russian challenges in order to
secure concessions necessary to achieve a just and sustainable peace. US policies suspending military aid
and intelligence sharing to Ukraine reduce the leverage US President Donald Trump's needs to achieve his
stated policy objective of bringing about an end to the war in Ukraine on acceptable terms, a task that
requires increasing pressure on Russia, not Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
• The Trump
administration suspended intelligence sharing with Ukraine, one of many demands the Kremlin has made of
the US, Ukraine, and Ukraine's other supporters.
• The suspension of US intelligence sharing
with Ukraine will damage Ukraine's ability to defend itself against ongoing Russian attacks against
military and civilian targets.
• The suspension of all US intelligence sharing with Ukraine
would also allow Russian forces to intensify their drone and missile strikes against the Ukrainian rear,
affecting millions of Ukrainian civilians and the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).
• The Trump administration has been applying considerable pressure on Ukraine, whose leaders
continue to offer concessions and publicly declare their interest in achieving a lasting end to the war.
These Trump administration policies are undermining the leverage that the United States needs to get
Russian President Vladimir Putin to accept any peace agreement that is in the interests of the United
States, Ukraine, and Europe.
• Kremlin officials announced their intention of taking advantage
of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing to make additional battlefield gains.
• Russian officials continue inaccurately to place the blame on Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky — and not Russian President Vladimir Putin — for the lack of meaningful peace negotiations.
• Kremlin officials continue to use business incentives to make further demands of the United
States and to push the United States to de facto recognize Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territory.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
• Over 50,000 Russian
servicemembers are reportedly listed as having abandoned their units and are absent without leave (AWOL)
between February 2022 and mid-December 2024.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials explicitly rejected making any concessions
in future peace negotiations or accepting any US, European, or Ukrainian peace proposals and the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) rejected the possibility of a negotiated ceasefire on March 6. Putin
stated during a visit to the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation's Moscow branch on March 6 that
Russia does not intend to "give in to anyone" or make any compromises in future peace negotiations. Putin
stated that Russia must choose a peace option that best suits Russia and will ensure peace in the
long-term. Putin noted that Russian societal unity is critical for Russian victory in Ukraine. Putin
alluded to the Russian Revolution, noted that Russian society collapsed during the First World War, and
urged Russians to maintain support and unity as the war continues. Putin stated that Russia "will not
give up" its "own" territory in future peace negotiations — likely referring to illegally annexed
territory in occupied Ukraine. The Kremlin launched the Defenders of the Fatherland State Fund in April
2023 to oversee social support for veterans, elevate veterans within Russian society, and monopolize
control over veterans activities in Russia. Putin has also declared 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the
Fatherland" — underlining Putin's efforts to prioritize militarizing Russian society and rallying support
behind Russia's war effort in Ukraine in 2025.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed
during a press conference on March 6 that Russia will reject any proposals to station European
peacekeeping forces in Ukraine to enforce a future ceasefire agreement. Lavrov stated that Russia sees
"no room for compromise" on this issue and will consider the presence of a European peacekeeping force in
Ukraine as akin to a NATO deployment in Ukraine. Lavrov stated that Russia will consider the deployment
of any European peacekeepers to Ukraine as the "direct, official, undisguised involvement of NATO
countries" in the war and that Russia will reject such a deployment. Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria
Zakharova rejected the possibility of a negotiated ceasefire and the deployment of European troops to
Ukraine on March 6 and claimed that Russia considers any proposal that gives Ukraine a "respite" along
the frontline as unacceptable. Lavrov and Zakharova are explicitly rejecting US Defense Secretary Pete
Hegseth's February 12 suggestion that European and non-European countries should station troops in
Ukraine to enforce any future peace agreement.
Lavrov said that any peace agreement must
account for the alleged "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, including guarantees that NATO will stop
expanding, trying to "swallow" Ukraine, and developing threats against Russia. Lavrov claimed that US
President Donald Trump "understands" the need to eliminate these "root causes" while European countries
are attempting to ignore the "root causes." Lavrov previously identified the "root causes" of the war as
NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged
discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine. Russian
officials often invoke the concept of "root causes" to allude to their demands for NATO to abandon its
open-door policy and to blame the West and Ukraine for Putin's decision to invade Ukraine.
Key
Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Kremlin officials explicitly rejected
making any concessions in future peace negotiations or accepting any US, European, or Ukrainian peace
proposals and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) rejected the possibility of a negotiated
ceasefire on March 6.
• Russian officials will likely take advantage of the suspension of US
military aid to and intelligence sharing with Ukraine to spread a longstanding Russian information
operation meant to falsely portray Russian victory as inevitable.
• The Kremlin welcomed a
Trump administration official's recent comments mischaracterizing Russia's illegal and unprovoked
invasion of Ukraine as a "proxy war," and Russian media portrayed the statement as an admission that the
United States is a participant in the war.
• US and Ukrainian delegations will conduct
bilateral meetings in Saudi Arabia next week.
• Ukrainian opposition politicians rejected the
possibility of holding elections in Ukraine before the end of the war.
• European countries
continue to announce new military assistance packages and other measures to support the Ukrainian
military.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction and Russian forces
recently advanced in the Kupyansk, Borova, Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to assuage Russian fears about conscripts going to war
amid continued reports that Russian military units are forcing conscripts to sign contracts with the
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
Russian forces conducted one of the largest ever missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night
of March 6 to 7 as Russian forces continue to adapt strike packages to overwhelm Ukraine's air defense
umbrella by increasing the total number of Shahed and decoy drones in each strike. Russian forces
launched the largest combined strike package against Ukraine since November 2024 on the night of March 6
to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 67 missiles including 35 Kh-101/Kh-55
cruise missiles, eight Kalibr cruise missiles, three Iskander-M/Kn-23 ballistic missiles, four S-300 air
defense missiles, eight Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 194 Shahed and decoy drones. The Ukrainian Air
Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 25 Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles, all eight Kalibr cruise
missiles, one Kh-59/69 cruise missile, and 100 Shahed and decoy drones and that 86 decoy drones and up to
10 missiles did not reach their targets, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference.
The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed Russian targets using F-16 and
Mirage-2000 aircraft and that this was the first instance of Ukrainian forces using Mirage-2000s, which
arrived one month ago, to defend against Russian strikes. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian
forces targeted Ukrainian gas production facilities during the strike. Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky and other official Ukrainian sources stated that Russian strikes damaged energy facilities in
Odesa, Poltava, Chernihiv, and Ternopil oblasts. Ternopil Oblast Military Administration reported that
two Russian missiles struck a critical infrastructure facility, causing a fire. Ukraine's largest private
energy company DTEK stated that the strikes damaged an energy facility in Odesa Oblast.
Russian forces began increasing the number of Shahed and decoy drones in strike packages in Fall 2024,
likely to adapt to successful Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) innovations. ISW observed reports that
Russian forces began launching between 80 and 100 (or more) Shahed and decoy drones as part of their
larger strike packages in October and November 2024, and reports indicate that Russia has increased the
production of Shahed drone airframes while continuing to rely on Iranian or Chinese imports for other
drone components in December 2024. Russia has likely leveraged the increased production of Shahed drones
to increase the total number of drones launched in each strike package. Russian forces launched an
average 83.4 drones per strike package in January 2025, an average of 139.3 drones per strike package in
February 2024, and an average of 128.8 drones per strike package from March 1 through 7. Russian forces
have only sporadically included missiles in the January, February, and March 2025 strike packages, and
the 67 missiles launched in the March 6 to 7 strike series is a larger amount than in previous missile
strikes this year. Russian forces likely increased the combined number of Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic
missiles and Kh-101/Kh-55 cruise missiles in the March 6 to 7 strike packages to inflict maximum damage
on select targets in Ukraine while using the large number of Shahed drones, decoy drones, and Kalibr
cruise missiles to detect and overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and mobile fire groups.
Russia
will likely take advantage of the suspension of US military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine to
intensify its long-range strike campaign and deplete Ukrainian air defense missiles. US intelligence has
contributed to Ukraine's early warning system against Russian strikes and its suspension will likely
impact Ukraine's ability to rapidly respond to adapting Russian strike packages. Ukraine's Main Military
Intelligence Directorate (GUR) recently reported that Russia is modernizing and increasing its production
of Shahed-136 drones and producing a new Geran-3 drone variant. Russan forces will likely attempt to
overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems by increasing the number of Shahed and decoy drones per strike
package in addition to increasing the number of missiles in select strike packages to destroy Ukrainian
energy and defense industrial base (DIB) infrastructure. Russia also likely intends to force Ukraine into
quickly depleting its supply of Patriot air defense interceptors - which Ukraine relies on to defend
against Russian ballistic missiles - during the pause in US military aid and intelligence sharing to
maximize the damage of subsequent strikes. Ukrainian forces will likely have to be more selective in
intercepting strikes as their stock of interceptors decreases with no resupply on the horizon, and
successful Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities will likely have lasting effects on
Ukraine's ability to generate power for DIB and civilian use.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces conducted one of the largest ever missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the
night of March 6 to 7 as Russian forces continue to adapt strike packages to overwhelm Ukraine's air
defense umbrella by increasing the total number of Shahed and decoy drones in each strike.
• Russian forces began increasing the number of Shahed and decoy drones in strike packages in Fall
2024, likely to adapt to successful Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) innovations.
• Russia
will likely take advantage of the suspension of US military aid to and intelligence sharing with Ukraine
to intensify its long-range strike campaign and deplete Ukrainian air defense missiles.
• Russian forces are further intensifying offensive operations in select frontline areas likely in
order to capitalize on any immediate and longer-term battlefield impacts of the cessation of US aid to
Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced into northern Sumy Oblast for the first time
since 2022 – when Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces from significant swathes of Ukrainian territory
following the initial months of Russian advances. Russian forces likely intend to leverage limited
advances into Sumy Oblast to completely expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast among other
objectives.
• Russian forces also recently intensified offensive operations aimed at seizing
Chasiv Yar and attacking Kostyantynivka – the southernmost settlement of Ukraine's fortress belt in
Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian officials continue to explicitly reject making any concessions in
future peace negotiations or accepting any US, European, or Ukrainian peace proposals.
• Lithuania's intelligence services assessed that Russia may have the capabilities to conduct a limited
campaign against one or several NATO countries within three to five years, an assessment that is
consistent with ISW's assessments about Russian efforts to restructure and prepare its military and
society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term.
• The United Kingdom (UK)
issued Ukraine's first tranche of revenue generated from frozen Russian assets. Russian forces recently
advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Borova, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
• The Kremlin
continues to leverage its "Time of Heroes" program to fill government positions with veterans of its war
in Ukraine as part of a long-term effort to militarize Russian society and form a new cadre of loyal
Russian officials.
The extent of the US suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine remains unclear. The Washington Post
reported on March 7 that a statement by the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) noted that
the NGA "temporarily suspended access" to the system that provides Ukraine with commercial
satellite imagery that the United States has purchased. Ukraine can reportedly still access imagery that
it has purchased with its own accounts. A Ukrainian servicemember told the Washington Post that satellite
service near Pokrovsk "simply disappeared" but that Ukrainian forces will "use own plans." CNN
reported on March 7 that two US defense officials stated that the United States is still sharing
intelligence with Ukraine that can help Ukrainian forces "defend" themselves but has "scaled back" the
sharing of intelligence that Ukrainian forces could use for offensive targeting of Russian forces.
Politico reported on March 8 that a European official familiar with the intelligence capabilities of
allies was "still puzzling" over the extent of the US intelligence sharing suspension and stated that
European states may not be able to "bridge the gap." A source familiar with talks among the NATO allies
about how to handle the US suspension reportedly stated that NATO members are not prohibited from sharing
some US intelligence with Ukraine but that such sharing could be very limited as the NATO allies are
trying to avoid "jeopardizing" their relationships with the United States or with each other. Politico
reported that one NATO official stated that there is no pressure from the Trump administration to reduce
or curtail allies' intelligence sharing or weapons deliveries to Ukraine.
Western and
Ukrainian officials indicated that the US suspension of intelligence sharing is generating battlefield
effects. Time reported on March 8 that five senior Western and Ukrainian officials and military officers
stated that the suspension of US intelligence to Ukraine has helped Russian forces advance on the
battlefield. An unspecified officer told Time that the suspension has left Ukrainian forces unable to use
"some of their best weapons systems." A source in the Ukrainian government stated that the suspension has
impacted Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast the most and that Ukrainian forces have lost the ability to
detect Russian aircraft approaching Ukraine — compromising Ukrainian authorities' ability to warn
civilians and military personnel about incoming Russian strikes. CNN reported on March 8 that a Ukrainian
official stated that Ukrainian forces may run out of artillery shells by May or June 2025 — likely
referring only to stockpiles of US-supplied ammunition. A Ukrainian official also told CNN that Ukraine
may exhaust its stockpile of Patriot air defense missiles, upon which Ukraine relies to shoot down
Russian ballistic missiles, "in a matter of weeks." ISW cannot independently verify statements about the
effects on the ground of the US intelligence sharing suspension. ISW continues to assess, however, that
the complete suspension of US intelligence sharing would damage Ukraine's ability to use long-range
strikes to generate battlefield effects and defend against Russian offensive operations and would allow
Russian forces to intensify their drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian rear areas, affecting
millions of Ukrainian civilians and the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).
European states continue efforts to supplement intelligence sharing with Ukraine following the US
suspension. French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Christophe Lemonde stated on March 8
that European states discussed how to try to compensate for the intelligence that the United States "may
stop providing" during that March 6 EU summit. French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu stated on March
6 that France would continue to provide intelligence to Ukraine. French outlet Intelligence Online
reported on March 7 that Safran.AI, a subsidiary of French defense corporation Safran, will provide
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) with a data fusion platform to analyze French
satellite imagery and that Safran.AI and the GUR signed the agreement at the end of February 2025 —
before the US suspension of intelligence sharing with Ukraine. Two Ukrainian officers told Time that some
European intelligence agencies are trying to fill the gap following the US suspension of intelligence
sharing to Ukraine but that it will take time for European authorities to deploy these capabilities and
that Europe is unlikely to entirely make up for the US intelligence capability "any time soon."
Russian forces intensified their multi-directional campaign to eliminate the remaining Ukrainian
salient in Kursk Oblast on March 7 and 8. Geolocated footage published on March 8 indicates that Russian
forces recently seized Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha). Russian milbloggers claimed that
elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps ,
Leningrad Military District ) and 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial
reserve call up) are advancing near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that
Russian airborne (VDV) units seized Lebedevka (west of Sudzha), and another Russian milblogger claimed
that Russian forces seized Kubatkin (north of Sudzha) and advanced up to eight kilometers into the
Ukrainian salient. A Russian source claimed that fighting is ongoing along the
Lebedevka-Kubatkin-Bondarevka line (northwest and east of Sudzha), but that the situation in this area is
unclear.
Key Takeaways:
• The extent of the US suspension of intelligence sharing
with Ukraine remains unclear.
• Western and Ukrainian officials indicated that the US
suspension of intelligence sharing is generating battlefield effects.
• European states
continue efforts to supplement intelligence sharing with Ukraine following the US suspension.
• Russian forces intensified their multi-directional campaign to eliminate the remaining Ukrainian
salient in Kursk Oblast on March 7 and 8.
• Russian forces appear to be destroying bridges in
Kursk Oblast and along the international border, likely as part of efforts to prevent Ukrainian forces
from withdrawing from Kursk Oblast into Ukraine.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD)
Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Major General Apti
Alaudinov, announced the intensified Russian effort in Kursk Oblast on March 8.
• Russian
forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian rear and near rear areas on the
night of March 7 and 8 and during the day on March 8, and Ukrainian forces notably did not shoot down any
Russian ballistic missiles.
• The Kremlin continues to promote the false narrative that
European Union (EU) member states and Ukraine seek to protract and escalate the war in Ukraine in order
to distract from Russia's own long-term preparations for a war with the West.
• Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 8 that Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff
Andriy Yermak, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, and
Deputy Head of the Ukrainian President's Office Colonel Pavlo Palisa will participate in the US-Ukrainian
talks on March 11 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk
and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
Russian forces are collapsing the northern part of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast following
several days of intensified Russian activity in the area. Geolocated footage published on March 8
indicates that Russian forces seized Novaya Sorochina (northwest of Sudzha), Malaya Loknya (just south of
Novaya Sorochina), and Lebedevka (south of Malaya Loknya), and the fields between the settlements.
Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms
Army , Southern Military District ) seized Malaya Loknya and that elements of the Russian 51st
Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) seized Lebedevka. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces seized Pravda and Ivashkovshyi (both north of Sudzha) and positions along an unspecified area of
the railway line between Malaya Loknya and Sudzha.<3> Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the
Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps
, Leningrad Military District ) participated in the seizure of Kubatkin (north of Sudzha) and
Pravda and that additional elements of the Russian 106th VDV Division are advancing into Kazachya Loknya
(north of Sudzha) from Lebedevka. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops hold limited
positions in Malaya Loknya, Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha), and Martynovka (northeast of
Sudzha) but that most Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from positions in the northern part of the salient
towards Kazachya Loknya and Sudzha. Russian milbloggers claimed that preparatory Russian efforts to
destroy the bridges north and south of Sudzha have significantly complicated Ukraine's ability to
withdraw back to Sudzha. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully
counterattacked near Malaya Loknya.
The temporal correlation between the suspension of US
intelligence sharing with Ukraine and the start of Russia's collapse of the Ukrainian Kursk salient is
noteworthy. Russia has been attempting to push Ukrainian forces from the salient in Kursk Oblast through
slow, grinding advances since the incursion began in August 2024. Russia later deployed roughly 12,000
North Korean military personnel in October 2024 to assist in repelling the incursion, but Russian forces
continued to make only gradual gains. The Trump administration suspended US intelligence sharing with
Ukraine on March 5, although there continue to be conflicting reports about the details about the US
suspension. Russian forces intensified offensive operations to expel Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast
on March 6 and 7. A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence started reporting
more rapid Russian advances in Kursk Oblast on March 5. A source in the Ukrainian government stated in a
March 8 Time article that the US intelligence sharing suspension has impacted Ukrainian operations in
Kursk Oblast the most. The Russian military has not previously prioritized the effort to push Ukrainian
forces out of Kursk Oblast over making further advances in eastern Ukraine despite concentrating a
sufficient force grouping to do so in late 2024. A direct link between the suspension of US intelligence
sharing and the start of the collapse of Ukraine's salient in Kursk Oblast is unclear, although Kremlin
officials have recently announced their intention to take advantage of the suspension of US military aid
and intelligence sharing to "inflict maximum damage" to Ukrainian forces "on the ground" during the
limited time frame before the possible future resumption of US intelligence sharing and military aid to
Ukraine.
Reports about the extent of the suspension of US military aid to Ukraine continue to
indicate that the suspension will likely affect Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russia. Forbes
stated on March 7 that the Trump administration has halted US support for Ukraine's F-16 fighter jet
radar jammers. The Wall Street Journal reported on March 8 that a source familiar with the matter stated
that Ukraine is currently able to fire one artillery shell for every three that Russian forces fire –
even with Ukraine's current supplies of US shells. The suspension of US support to Ukrainian F-16 radar
jammers will likely hamper Ukraine's ability to continue to use the aircraft to defend against Russian
strikes into Ukraine's rear. Ukrainian officials indicated in December 2024 that Ukrainian forces had
been able to gain an artillery advantage of 1.5 to one or three-to-one in some areas of the front, and
Russia's current artillery advantage over Ukraine will likely continue to grow as Ukraine's stockpiles of
US ammunition decrease further following the US suspension of military aid.
Key Takeaways
• Russian forces are collapsing the northern part of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast
following several days of intensified Russian activity in the area.
• The temporal correlation
between the suspension of US intelligence sharing with Ukraine and the start of Russia's collapse of the
Ukrainian Kursk salient is noteworthy.
• Reports about the extent of the suspension of US
military aid to Ukraine continue to indicate that the suspension will likely affect Ukraine's ability to
defend itself against Russia.
• Ukraine's European allies continue to provide material and
financial aid to Ukraine.
• Russia continues to showcase its deepening relations with American
adversaries despite ongoing bilateral talks between the United States and Russia.
• Ukrainian
forces advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Kursk oblasts
and near Siversk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Robotyne.
Russia continues to publicly claim that it wants peace while offering no concessions of its own in sharp
contrast with the concessions Ukraine has already offered. Reuters reported on March 9 that two US
officials stated that the US is planning to use the March 11 US-Ukrainian talks in Saudi Arabia "in part
to determine whether Ukraine is willing to make material concessions to Russia to end the war." One US
official stated that Ukraine cannot say both "I want peace" and "I refuse to compromise on anything" at
the upcoming talks. The other US official stated that the US wants "to see if the Ukrainians are
interested not just in peace, but in a realistic peace." The Financial Times reported on
March 9 that unspecified officials briefed on the upcoming US-Ukrainian negotiations stated that Ukraine
will propose a partial ceasefire with Russia for long-range drone and missile strikes and combat
operations in the Black Sea. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on March 10 that a source familiar with
the Ukrainian delegation's position stated that Ukraine will also propose a prisoner of war (POW)
exchange. The Ukrainian source noted that these proposals are "realistic to implement quickly" and to
"control." Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky first suggested a ceasefire in the air and sea on March
5, and Ukraine is offering the kind of ceasefires that are more straightforward and do not require
extended negotiations or a complex monitoring process. A ceasefire along the thousand kilometers of
complex front line characterized by multiple “gray zones” where the lines of opposing forces are blurred
would be extremely difficult to negotiate and monitor. Zelensky has also indicated several times —
including in his February 28 Fox News interview — that he is willing to make concessions on territory,
Ukraine's NATO membership, and his own tenure in office in order to secure a just and sustainable
peace.
Russian officials, in contrast, continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir
Putin's 2021 and 2022 demands. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed in an interview to "New
Regions of Russia" magazine published on March 10 that any future peace settlement must "eradicate" the
"root causes" of the war. Lavrov defined the "root causes" of the war as the alleged "threats to Russia's
security from the Ukrainian and Western directions in general" that are due to NATO's eastward expansion
and the Ukrainian government's alleged "extermination" of everything that is "connected with Russia and
the Russian World ," including Russian language, culture, Orthodoxy, and media. Lavrov
similarly defined the alleged "root causes" of the war in late December 2024, and the Kremlin's rhetoric
on this topic has not changed in the over two months, even after the start of US-Russian bilateral talks
in February 2024. Russia's repeated rhetoric about the "root causes" of the war and constant reiteration
of its specific unchanged demands contrast sharply with the flexibility Ukraine has shown.
Russian officials continue to capitalize on the Trump administration's statements and actions in an
attempt to divide the United States and Europe. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed in an
interview to the "New Regions of Russia" magazine published on March 10 that US and Russian diplomats
voted the same way for the first time in three years against the Ukrainian- and European-backed United
Nations (UN) resolution on February 24. This resolution commemorated the third anniversary of Russia's
full-scale invasion of Ukraine, recognized Russia as the aggressor in the war, called for a just peace in
Ukraine, and supported Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Lavrov claimed that the
"ultraliberal ruling elites of the West," support Ukraine and that European Union (EU) countries and the
United Kingdom (UK) maintain "predatory, colonial habits." Lavrov notably did not mention the United
States, likely in an attempt to drive a perceived ideological wedge between the United States and Europe.
Lavrov's use of the "ruling elites" narrative echoes Russian President Vladimir Putin's February 27 claim
that "some Western elites" are trying to "maintain instability" in the world and will try to "disrupt or
compromise" the US–Russian dialogue that has begun. Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed
on March 10 that the UK government is prioritizing "undermining Trump's peace efforts" and has tasked
non-governmental organizations with "demonizing" Trump. The SVR notably made such claims ahead of the
UK’s hosting of a virtual meeting on March 15 with mainly European and British commonwealth countries to
support a ceasefire agreement. Russian officials are likely attempting to leverage Trump administration
statements and actions to divide the United States and Europe and will likely continue such efforts to
secure maximum concessions on Ukraine from the US, Europe, and Ukraine as well as to fracture the
US-Europe relationship to Russia’s benefit.
Key Takeaways
• Russia continues
to publicly claim that it wants peace while offering no concessions of its own in sharp contrast with the
concessions Ukraine has already offered.
• Russian officials continue to capitalize on the
Trump administration's statements and actions in an attempt to divide the United States and Europe.
• Russian forces are consolidating their gains in Kursk Oblast and likely preparing to attack
Sudzha in the coming days.
• Ukraine continues to expand its domestic production of drones and
air defense systems to support its war effort.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near
Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a list on March 10 of instructions for the
Russian government and the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation aimed at increasing social benefits to
Russian veterans, which will likely put further strain on the Russian budget and economy.
The United States and Ukraine agreed on March 11 to an immediate 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine contingent
on Russia's agreement, and the United States reportedly restarted intelligence sharing and military aid.
US and Ukrainian representatives met in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on March 11 for bilateral talks and agreed
to the ceasefire proposal, which the United States will soon propose to Russia. The US-Ukrainian joint
statement emphasized that Russia's reciprocity to this ceasefire proposal is the key to achieving peace
and noted that the ceasefire can be extended if all parties agree. The joint statement noted that the
United States will immediately lift its suspension on intelligence sharing and military assistance to
Ukraine. The United States and Ukraine also agreed to finalize a deal on minerals as soon as possible.
Ukraine reiterated in the joint statement that European partners will be involved in the peace process.
The United States and Ukraine also discussed humanitarian relief to Ukraine, especially during the
ceasefire, including the return of prisoners of war (POWs), detained civilians, and forcibly deported
Ukrainian children to Ukraine. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa confirmed on March
11 that the United States has already resumed the flow of military assistance to Ukraine. A source close
to the Ukrainian government told CNN that the United States also fully restored intelligence sharing to
Ukraine on March 11.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the ceasefire would
encompass a cease in combat operations along the entire frontline, a moratorium on long-range missile and
drone strikes, and the cessation of operations in the Black Sea and would begin as soon as Russia agrees
to the US proposal. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio responded during a press conference on March 11 to
a question about a deadline for Russia to respond, stating that the deadline is "as quickly as possible,"
that the United States will inform Russia about the ceasefire proposal through multiple diplomatic
channels, and that the "ball is now in court." US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz stated
that he will speak with his Russian counterpart in the coming days and clarified that the resumed US
military assistance to Ukraine includes the provision of material authorized under the Presidential
Drawdown Authority (PDA). European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, UK Prime Minister Keir
Starmer, and French President Emmanuel Macron expressed support for the 30-day ceasefire proposal and
emphasized that the onus to respond is now on Russia.
Russian ultranationalist voices,
including a Russian State Duma deputy, largely rejected the ceasefire proposal on March 11. Russian
milbloggers, including Kremlin-coopted milbloggers, rejected the ceasefire proposal because the United
States and Ukraine will allegedly "abandon" peace "at the first opportunity" and the war in Ukraine is
existential for Russia. One milblogger claimed that accepting the ceasefire would be "pure betrayal and
sabotage," and another milblogger questioned the purpose of accepting this ceasefire proposal without
achieving Russia's war aims. Russian State Duma Deputy and former 58th Combined Arms Army Commander
Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev stated after the publication of the joint statement that Russia should
not agree to the "unacceptable" 30-day ceasefire proposal because it would allow Ukraine to rearm and
regroup.
The Kremlin has not officially responded to the ceasefire proposal as of this
publication, and Russian state media is attempting to frame earlier official Russian statements about
bilateral US-Russian negotiations as responses to the ceasefire proposal. Following the publication of
the ceasefire proposal, Russian state media largely amplified a statement from Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova from earlier in the day on March 11 saying that Russia "does
not rule out" contacts with the United States in the next few days. Russian State Duma Security Committee
member Mikhail Sheremet stated before the joint statement was released that Russia is interested in a
settlement in Ukraine but will not allow itself to be deceived, and Russian state media only amplified
Sheremet's statement after the ceasefire proposal. Russian state media is likely attempting to portray
the immediate Russian reaction as moderate for domestic audiences until Kremlin officials make public
statements and provide a framing for broader Russian media coverage of the proposal.
Ukraine's
allies and partners from Europe, Asia, and Oceania continue efforts to strengthen the Ukrainian military
and back Ukraine with security guarantees — the most effective deterrent against future Russian
aggression against Ukraine following a potential future peace agreement. French Defense Minister
Sebastien Lecornu stated on March 11 that France "will refuse any form of demilitarization of Ukraine"
and that the "first guarantee of security remains the Ukrainian army." Reuters reported that 34 military
officials from European NATO states, EU states, Asia, and Oceania, met on March 11 in Paris to assess
their militaries' capabilities to maintain Ukraine's long-term military strength and to guarantee
Ukrainian security in the event of a permanent ceasefire in the war. French President Emmanuel Macron
stated after the meeting that Ukraine's partners must "define credible security guarantees" for Ukraine.
A French military official told the Associated Press on March 10 that the meeting would discuss a French
and British plan for the creation of a multinational force that would aim to reassure Ukraine and deter
another large-scale Russian offensive. The official stated that the envisaged force could include heavy
weaponry and weapons stockpiles that participating militaries could deploy to help Ukraine defend itself
in "hours or days" in the event of a renewed Russian attack. A strong Ukrainian military backed by
Western security guarantees continues to be the strongest deterrent against another Russian invasion in
the future, and Russia has been repeatedly insisting on Ukraine's "demilitarization" and disarmament in
order to deny Ukraine this deterrent and allow Russia to renew attacks against Ukraine at a time of
Moscow's choosing in the future.
Bloomberg reported on March 11 that Western security
officials stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin has "no intention" of making compromises on
territory, peacekeepers, or Ukrainian neutrality and that Putin is prepared to continue fighting if he
doesn't achieve his objectives in his war in Ukraine. The officials stated that Putin has deliberately
made "maximalist" demands, knowing that Ukraine and Europe would likely find these demands unacceptable.
Western security officials' reports of the Kremlin's intention to achieve its "maximalist" goals in
Ukraine are consistent with Putin's and other Russian officials' public statements, even as the Kremlin
has attempted to posture itself as open to negotiations and ending the war.
Key Takeaways
• The United States and Ukraine agreed on March 11 to an immediate 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine
contingent on Russia's agreement, and the US reportedly restarted intelligence sharing and military
aid.
• Ukraine's allies and partners from Europe, Asia, and Oceania continue efforts to
strengthen the Ukrainian military and back Ukraine with security guarantees – the most effective
deterrent against future Russian aggression against Ukraine following a potential future peace
agreement.
• Russian forces continue to make confirmed advances in Kursk Oblast and have
likely begun attacking Sudzha.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone
strikes against Russia on the night of March 10 to 11, largely targeting Moscow Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced
near Siversk and Robotyne and in Kursk Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues to expand social
benefits for Russian soldiers who fought in Ukraine, including soldiers who have fought for the militias
of the Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics (DNR and LNR) since 2014.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov offered a vague response on March 12 to the US-Ukrainian 30-day
ceasefire proposal. Peskov responded to a question about Russia's response to the joint temporary
ceasefire proposal, stating that "we don't want to get ahead of ourselves." Peskov stated that Russia
expects US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz to inform the
Kremlin about the details of the US-Ukrainian negotiations. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on
March 12 that its sources in the Russian government stated that the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire
proposal surprised the Kremlin, and a source close to the Russian presidential administration stated that
the Kremlin expected the United States to discuss such a proposal with Russia in private before publicly
announcing it, thereby providing the Kremlin time to formulate a prepared response.
Russian
President Vladimir Putin may hold hostage the ceasefire proposal to which Ukraine has agreed in order to
extract preemptive concessions before formal negotiations to end the war have started. Reuters reported
on March 12 that senior Russian sources stated that a deal on the temporary ceasefire would have to "take
into account" Russia's advances on the battlefield and "address concerns." Bloomberg reported
on March 12 that sources familiar with the Kremlin's thinking and the situation stated that Putin will
"stretch the timeline" for agreeing to the temporary ceasefire in order to ensure that his stipulations
"are taken into account." A source close to the Kremlin stated that Russia may demand a halt to weapons
supplies to Ukraine as a condition of agreeing to the temporary ceasefire, but did not specify whether
such a halt would include all international weapons provisions to Ukraine or only those from select
countries. Suspending US or other military assistance to Ukraine during a ceasefire would be extremely
advantageous to Russia, which continues to receive critical supplies and assistance from Iran, North
Korea, and the People's Republic of China. Such an enormous concession would also destroy US leverage in
future negotiations, in addition to violating the conditions under which Ukraine agreed to the ceasefire
in the first place.
Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on March 12 that a source close
to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the Kremlin would "formally" give a "positive
response" to the temporary ceasefire proposal but would also demand "impossible conditions" to which
Ukraine cannot agree. The source stated that Putin wants to remove Ukraine from talks so that Russia can
engage in negotiations with the United States alone while also "correcting the situation on the front" to
strengthen Russia's negotiating position. The source added that the conditions of the temporary ceasefire
"must suit Russia" and that Russia's agreement to a temporary ceasefire during which Ukraine continues to
receive weapons and financing from its partners and allies is "stupid." These leaks may be intentional
and part of a Russian negotiating strategy that aims to push the United States to renegotiate its deal
with Ukraine on the temporary ceasefire.
Key Takeaways
• Kremlin Spokesperson
Dmitry Peskov offered a vague response on March 12 to the US-Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposal.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin may hold hostage the ceasefire proposal to which Ukraine has
agreed in order to extract preemptive concessions before formal negotiations to end the war have
started.
• Senior US and Ukrainian officials have said that the purpose of the temporary
ceasefire is for Russia and Ukraine to demonstrate their willingness for peace and that the temporary
ceasefire and negotiations to end the war are separate matters, whereas the Kremlin may intend to conjoin
them.
• Russian insider reports about the demands that the Kremlin may make before agreeing to
the temporary ceasefire are in line with Russian officials' public statements in the past months.
• US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director John Ratcliffe and Russian Foreign Intelligence
Service (SVR) Head Sergey Naryshkin had a phone call on March 11 amid talks about the war in Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently seized Sudzha amid continued Russian assaults in Kursk Oblast on March
12.
• Russan President Vladimir Putin visited a Russian military command post in Kursk Oblast
for the first time since Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 — demonstrating Putin's
desire to use Russia's seizure of Sudzha to project military success and strength against the backdrop of
the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near
Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova, Toretsk, and
Velyka Novosilka.
Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the ceasefire proposal that the United States and Ukraine
recently agreed upon in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and offered an alternative proposal that undermines US
President Donald Trump's stated goal of securing a lasting peace in Ukraine. Putin claimed on March 13
that he "agrees" with the temporary ceasefire proposal and that the "idea itself is correct" but that the
cessation of hostilities "should be such that it would lead to long-term peace and eliminate the initial
causes" of the war. Putin thus rejected one of the main principles of the US-Ukrainian proposal — that
the temporary ceasefire precede formal negotiations to end the war. Putin also claimed that there are
questions that "require painstaking research from both sides." Putin questioned several aspects of the
US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal. Putin asked what would happen to the remaining Ukrainian
salient in Kursk Oblast and whether Ukraine would be allowed to continue to mobilize forces, train newly
mobilized soldiers, and receive military aid from its partners and allies. Putin questioned the control
and verification measures of a temporary ceasefire and who would give the orders to stop fighting. Putin
suggested that he may call President Trump to discuss the "issues" involved in the ceasefire proposal.
Putin postured military strength during his rejection of the ceasefire proposal, highlighting recent
Russian successes in pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast and claiming that Russian forces are
advancing in "almost all areas of combat."
Putin is offering an alternative ceasefire
agreement that is contrary to the intentions and goals of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal. The
US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal calls for a renewable 30-day cessation of combat operations along the
entire frontline, a moratorium on long-range missile and drone strikes, and a cessation of operations in
the Black Sea. The proposal allows for Russia and Ukraine to extend the ceasefire and assumes the
continuation of US intelligence sharing and US and other military assistance to Ukraine. The US-Ukrainian
ceasefire proposal was explicitly aimed at allowing Russia and Ukraine to demonstrate their willingness
to make peace and separates the temporary ceasefire from future negotiations to end the war.
Putin is holding the ceasefire proposal hostage and is attempting to extract preemptive concessions
ahead of formal negotiations to end the war. Putin refused to accept the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal
on its own terms and is instead demanding additional conditions that would contribute directly to the
Kremlin's war aims. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on March 11 that the US will "know what the
impediment is to peace" in Ukraine if Putin rejected the ceasefire proposal. ISW continues to assess that
Putin is disinterested in good faith peace negotiations to end the war. Putin remains committed to
accomplishing his long-term goals of installing a pro-Russian puppet regime in Ukraine, undermining
Ukraine's ability to defend itself against future Russian aggression and preventing Ukraine's accession
to NATO. Putin's rejection of the ceasefire proposal underscores Putin's commitment to securing his
objectives in Ukraine, particularly Ukraine's demilitarization, and disinterest in any pause in fighting
that does not result in Ukrainian capitulation or at least set conditions for a successful renewal of
Russian offensive operations in the future.
Key Takeaways
• Russian President
Vladimir Putin rejected the ceasefire proposal that the United States and Ukraine recently agreed upon in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and offered an alternative proposal that undermines US President Donald Trump's
stated goal of securing a lasting peace in Ukraine.
• Putin is offering an alternative
ceasefire agreement that is contrary to the intentions and goals of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire
proposal.
• Putin's envisioned ceasefire agreement would grant Russia greatly disproportionate
advantages and set conditions for the Kremlin to renew hostilities on terms extremely favorable to
Russia.
• Putin is holding the ceasefire proposal hostage and is attempting to extract
preemptive concessions ahead of formal negotiations to end the war.
• Russian forces continue
to clear Ukrainian forces from Sudzha and its environs as Russian troops advance closer to the border in
Kursk Oblast slowed on March 13 compared to recent days.
• Russian milbloggers theorized on
March 13 that Russian forces may launch an organized offensive operation into northern Sumy Oblast in the
coming weeks and months and may also attack into Chernihiv Oblast — in line with Russian President
Vladimir Putin's March 12 statements.
• Kremlin officials continue to use narratives similar
to those that the Kremlin has used to justify its invasions of Ukraine to set informational conditions to
justify future aggression against NATO member states.
• Russian forces continue to execute
Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) in violation of international law.
• Russia will likely
expand its permanent military basing in Belarus to enhance Russia’s force posture against NATO’s eastern
flank.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently
advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Siversk, and Toretsk.
• Russia continues its
crypto-mobilization efforts against the backdrop of US efforts to start the negotiation process to end
the war.
>• Putin is holding the ceasefire proposal hostage and is >attempting to extract
preemptive concessions ahead of formal >negotiations to end the war. > >
Die Amis werden (leider) bzgl. Putin Paktfähigkeit auch noch die Lernkurve machen...
ISW has observed no geolocated evidence to indicate that Russian forces have encircled a significant
number of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast or elsewhere along the frontline in Ukraine. Russian President
Vladimir Putin claimed during a press conference on March 13 that Russian forces have "isolated"
Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and that it is "impossible" for small groups of Ukrainian forces to
withdraw from positions in Kursk Oblast. Putin claimed that Ukrainian forces will not be able to leave
Kursk at all "if" Russian forces can conduct a "physical blockade" in the coming days. Putin stated
during a Russian Security Council meeting on March 14 that Russian forces have "blocked" unspecified
Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 14 that Russian
authorities are fabricating claims about the alleged "encirclement" of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast
in order to influence the political and informational scene. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that
Ukrainian forces have regrouped and withdrawn to more advantageous defensive positions in Kursk Oblast
and that Ukrainian forces are not under threat of encirclement.
Russian milbloggers have also
not coalesced around claims that Russian forces have encircled or "blocked" a significant number of
Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast in recent days, but milbloggers may alter their reporting to mirror
Putin's claims in the coming days. Some Russian milbloggers claimed on March 12 and 13 that Russian
forces encircled an unspecified number of Ukrainian forces in an unspecified area of Kursk Oblast, but
many Russian milbloggers published maps on March 13 and 14 acknowledging that Ukrainian forces have
viable egress routes into Sumy Oblast from their remaining positions in Kursk Oblast. At least one
Russian milblogger explicitly questioned claims that Russian forces encircled Ukrainian forces in Kursk
Oblast on March 12, and another complained on March 12 that Russian forces are unable to encircle
Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast because Russian forces cannot conduct rapid, mechanized breakthroughs
into rear Ukrainian areas.
Putin claimed in October 2024 that Russian forces "encircled" 2,000
Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast, but ISW never observed any Russian milblogger claims or geolocated
footage to substantiate Putin's October 2024 claim. Putin has repeatedly failed to acknowledge that the
Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast extends from the Ukrainian-Russian international border and that
Ukrainian forces can transit the sections of the border under Ukrainian control.
Putin seized
on a statement by US President Donald Trump about the supposed encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Kursk
Oblast to distract from his recent rejection of the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal. President Trump
stated in a post on Truth Social on March 14 that Russian forces have "completely surrounded" "thousands"
of Ukrainian forces, presumably in Kursk Oblast, and called on Putin to "spare" their lives. Putin
responded directly to Trump's request during the March 14 security council meeting and claimed that
Russian forces will guarantee the "life and decent treatment" of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast if
Ukrainian forces surrender. Putin reiterated unsubstantiated claims that Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast
have committed crimes against Russian civilians in the area and said that Russia considers the Ukrainian
incursion an act of "terrorism." Putin claimed that Ukrainian authorities must order Ukrainian forces to
surrender in order for Russia to implement Trump's request. Putin is attempting to present himself as a
reasonable and merciful leader whom President Trump can engage with and to generate a new narrative to
distract from Putin's decision to reject the US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal on March 13.
Key
Takeaways
• ISW has observed no geolocated evidence to indicate that Russian forces have
encircled a significant number of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast or elsewhere along the frontline in
Ukraine.
• Putin seized on a statement by US President Donald Trump about the supposed
encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast to distract from his recent rejection of the
US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal.
• Kremlin statements following Putin's meeting with US
Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff on March 13 underscore Putin's rejection of the
US-Ukrainian ceasefire proposal and continued unwillingness to engage in good faith negotiations to end
the war in Ukraine.
• Russian forces marginally advanced towards the international border in
Kursk Oblast on March 14, but Ukrainian forces still maintain limited positions in Kursk Oblast.
• Consistent Ukrainian strikes against Russian air defense assets are reportedly allowing Ukrainian
long-range drones to increasingly penetrate the Russian air defense umbrella in deep rear areas,
including in Moscow Oblast.
• The Ukrainian military reorganized the Ukrainian 3rd Separate
Assault Brigade into the 3rd Army Corps, further showcasing Ukraine's force efforts to transition to a
corps structure.
• Ukraine's European allies continue to provide military assistance and
technical support and demonstrate interest in strengthening bilateral cooperation.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Toretsk and
near Siversk and Pokrovsk.
Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian officials continue to deny Russian President Vladimir Putin's
unsubstantiated claim that Russian forces have encircled a significant number of Ukrainian troops in
Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers published maps on March 14 and 15 showing Russian and Ukrainian
positions in Kursk Oblast that do not indicate Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces, and two
Russian milbloggers explicitly denied Putin's claim that Russian forces encircled a significant number of
Ukrainian forces in the area on March 13 and 14. One milblogger characterized Putin's claims as a
narrative intended to influence US President Donald Trump ahead of peace negotiations. Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky noted that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attempting to encircle
Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast, that no encirclement currently exists, and stated that Putin is
attempting to delay discussion of the US-Ukrainian 30-day ceasefire proposal by spreading these
claims.Independent Ukrainian sources also denied Putin's claims about Russian encirclements of Ukrainian
forces and noted that Ukrainian forces maintain the ability to maneuver from their remaining positions in
Kursk Oblast despite a difficult tactical situation. ISW has still not observed any Russian milblogger
claims or geolocated footage suggesting that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian troops in Kursk
Oblast. Ukrainian forces appear to maintain egress routes across the international border from their
positions in Kursk Oblast as of this publication.
Russian forces continued offensive
operations in Kursk Oblast but have not completely pushed Ukrainian forces out of the area as of this
publication. Geolocated footage published on March 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in
western Basivka (northeast of Sumy City in Sumy Oblast). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other
Russian sources claimed on March 15 that Russian forces seized Zaoleshenka (immediately west of Sudzha)
and Rubanshchina (west of Sudzha), but ISW has not observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have
seized the entirety of these settlements. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized
Gogolevka (west of Sudzha) and are clearing Guyevo (south of Sudzha). Russian milbloggers claimed that
Ukrainian forces maintain positions near Oleshnya and Gornal (both southwest of Sudzha). Russian forces
continued attacking near Rubanshchina, Gogolevka, and Guyevo. Elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV)
Brigade are reportedly operating near Gogolevka, and elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black
Sea Fleet) and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Guyevo.
Key Takeaways
• Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian officials continue to deny Russian
President Vladimir Putin's unsubstantiated claim that Russian forces have encircled a significant number
of Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk
Oblast but have not completely pushed Ukrainian forces out of the area as of this publication.
• Ukrainian officials expressed concern about Russian ground operations in northern Sumy Oblast but
doubt Russia's ability to conduct an effective concerted offensive operation against Sumy City.
• The Kremlin is likely preparing to intensify a narrative that accuses Ukrainian forces of war crimes
in Kursk Oblast in an attempt to discredit the Ukrainian military, erode Western support for Ukraine, and
spoil or delay straightforward discussions about the 30-day ceasefire that US President Donald Trump
proposed to Putin.
• Russian forces conducted drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the
night of March 14 to 15, including conducting their third double-tap strike against Ukraine in the past
week.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed the official Ukrainian delegation to
"engage with Ukraine's international partners" in the negotiation process to end the war on March 15.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy
Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk.
Mit Blick auf die von ihm geforderte „Kriegswirtschaft“ sagte Weber, das
bedeute zum Beispiel beschleunigte Genehmigungsverfahren bei Rüstungsgütern und mehr Zusammenarbeit
zwischen den europäischen Rüstungsherstellern. Aber auch, dass Unternehmen von der Produktion ziviler auf
militärische Produkte umgestellt werden.
„Klare Ansagen bei Beschaffung“ Zudem brauche
Europa ein gemeinsames europäisches Führungskommando, sagte Weber. Ein europäischer Generalstabschef
solle dann „die aufgerüsteten nationalen Armeen befehligen und klare Ansagen bei der Beschaffung machen
können“, verlangte der EVP-Fraktionschef.
>Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian officials continue to deny >Russian President Vladimir
Putin's unsubstantiated claim that >Russian forces have encircled a significant number of >Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast.
Eine Seite sagt so, die andere so, wenn man
nicht direkt selbst vor Ort ist bleibt eine Einschätzung schwierig.
US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz stated on March 16 that Ukraine will receive unspecified security
guarantees in exchange for unspecified territorial concessions. Waltz also stated that the United States
is considering "the reality of the situation on the ground" in diplomatic talks when discussing an end to
the war in Ukraine. It is not clear exactly what Waltz meant by "the reality of the situation on the
ground." Russian officials have frequently used the narrative that any negotiations must consider the
"realities on the ground" to refer to the current frontline in Ukraine and their claims of the
inevitability of further Russian battlefield gains. Waltz's acknowledgement that Ukraine will receive
unspecified security guarantees is a key aspect of achieving US President Donald Trump's stated goal of
securing a lasting peace in Ukraine, but stopping hostilities on indefensible lines would limit the
effectiveness of security guarantees.
The current frontlines do not provide the strategic
depth that Ukraine will need to reliably defend against renewed Russian aggression. Russian forces are
just across the Dnipro River from Kherson City, roughly 25 kilometers from Zaporizhzhia City, and 30
kilometers from Kharkiv City. Russian troops on the Dnipro River could use a ceasefire to prepare for the
extremely difficult task of conducting an opposed river crossing undisturbed, significantly increasing
the likelihood of success in such an endeavor. Stopping a well-prepared, major mechanized offensive cold
is extremely rare in war, which means that a renewed Russian assault would likely threaten both Kharkiv
and Zaporizhzhia cities, as well as key cities in the Donetsk "fortress belt," almost immediately. Russia
is constructing a large highway and railway aimed at connecting major cities in occupied Ukraine and
Russia, which will reinforce Russia's hold on occupied Ukraine and Russia's ability to transport and
supply Russian forces operating in Ukraine in the event of a future Russian offensive in southern
Ukraine.
The US and Europe would likely need to provide military aid to Ukraine more rapidly,
in much larger volumes, and at higher cost the closer the ultimate ceasefire lines are to the current
frontline. Ukraine would likely need an even larger military with greater capabilities to play its
critical role in deterring and, if necessary, defeating future aggression along current frontline (both
within Ukraine and along Ukraine’s international border with Russia) that is over 2,100 kilometers long.
Enforcing a ceasefire along the current frontline would also require the commitment of large numbers of
Western forces. Helping Ukraine regain strategically critical territory, as Trump has suggested he
intends to do, could significantly reduce the cost and difficulty of securing a future peace. A ceasefire
along more defensible positions would also place Russian forces in a more disadvantaged position for
renewed offensive operations, making future Russian aggression less likely.
Russian officials
maintain their maximalist territorial claims over all occupied Ukraine and significant parts of
unoccupied Ukraine, however. Senior Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have
consistently demanded that Ukraine surrender the entirety of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson
oblasts, including areas that Russian forces do not already occupy, and have reiterated these claims in
recent weeks. Russian state media has also recently amplified similar sentiments from Kremlin-affiliated
mouthpieces. Putin recently claimed that "Novorossiya" is an integral part of Russia, and Kremlin
Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov defined "Novorossiya" as all of eastern and southern Ukraine including
Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Mykolaiv oblasts. Russia currently occupies a small portion of
Kharkiv Oblast and the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast, and Russian forces are advancing towards the
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border. Continued Kremlin statements demanding that Ukraine cede
unoccupied Ukrainian territory indicate that the Kremlin and Putin remain committed to these territorial
goals despite ongoing negotiations.
Russian officials have given no public indications that
they are willing to make concessions on their territorial or security demands of Ukraine. Accepting
Western-backed security guarantees for Ukraine would be a significant concession for Putin. Putin has
repeatedly called for Ukraine to permanently abandon its goals of joining NATO or any security bloc and
to reject future offers of foreign military assistance, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
recently claimed that Russia will reject the future deployment of any European peacekeepers to Ukraine
and consider any such deployment as the "direct, official, undisguised involvement of NATO countries" in
the war. Russian officials also appear to be generating increased support for their demands in Russian
society despite the costs of Russia's protracted war effort, and Putin likely remains committed to
securing a return for Russia's investment in the war he regards as sufficient. Putin and Kremlin
officials have been regularly broadcasting their demands for Ukrainian territorial and security
concessions beyond the current frontlines to the Russian people, underscoring how unlikely Putin is to
abandon his ambitions in Ukraine even after a ceasefire.
Key Takeaways
• US
National Security Advisor Mike Waltz stated on March 16 that Ukraine will receive unspecified security
guarantees in exchange for unspecified territorial concessions.
• The current frontlines do
not provide the strategic depth that Ukraine will need to reliably defend against renewed Russian
aggression.
• Russian officials maintain their maximalist territorial claims over all
occupied Ukraine and significant parts of unoccupied Ukraine, however.
• Russian officials
have given no public indications that they are willing to make concessions on their territorial or
security demands of Ukraine.
• Russia continues to seize on diplomatic engagements with the
United States to normalize its war demands.
• The United Kingdom (UK) convened a virtual
Coalition of the Willing summit on March 15 to reiterate support for Ukraine and discuss plans for
peace.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Russian forces advanced in Sumy
Oblast and near Velyka Novosilka.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues efforts
to posture as solving issues with the Russian military.
Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have been partially successful in holding the ceasefire
proposal hostage as part of his efforts to extract preemptive concessions from US President Donald Trump
in negotiations to end the war. Trump stated on March 17 that he plans to speak with Putin on March 18
and "wants] to see if he and Putin can bring the war to an end." Trump added that he and Putin will "be
talking about land," "power plants," and "dividing up certain assets." The United States and Ukraine
agreed on March 11 to a 30-day ceasefire proposal that is contingent on Russia's "acceptance and
concurrent implementation." The proposal stated that Ukraine and the United States intend to name their
negotiating teams and immediately begin negotiations toward an enduring peace — noting the distinction
between the temporary ceasefire and future negotiations on a peace settlement. Putin rejected the
temporary ceasefire proposal on March 13 and claimed that the cessation of hostilities "should be such
that it would lead to long-term peace and eliminate the initial causes" of the war. Putin thus rejected
one of the main principles of the US-Ukrainian proposal — that the temporary ceasefire precedes formal
negotiations to end the war. The US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal noted that the United States
and Ukraine discussed the return of prisoners of war (POWs), detained civilians, and forcibly deported
Ukrainian children — all of which will require future talks with Russia. The US-Ukrainian temporary
ceasefire proposal did not mention talks with Russia about Ukrainian territory, energy infrastructure, or
assets. Putin also suggested on March 13 that he may call Trump to discuss "issues" involved in the
ceasefire proposal, such as Ukraine's continued ability to mobilize forces and receive military aid from
partners and allies — issues notably not included in the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire proposal. Putin
is attempting to change the sequence of talks in order to push Trump into making preemptive concessions
on issues that are not part of the US-Ukrainian temporary ceasefire but are part of Russia's war aims.
The acceptance of these Russian demands in the context of negotiations for an immediate ceasefire would
cede valuable US and Ukrainian leverage during future negotiations to secure a lasting peace in Ukraine.
Russian officials continue to demonstrate that Russia's aim of destroying Ukrainian
sovereignty remains unchanged since before Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022. Russian
Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko claimed in an interview with Kremlin-affiliated outlet
Izvestiya on March 17 that Russia continues to demand that Ukraine be a neutral state and that NATO
states refuse to accept Ukraine as a member. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha stated to RBK
Ukraine on March 17 that no country should have a "veto" over Ukraine's choice to participate in
alliances, including the EU or NATO. Syhiba noted that Ukraine's NATO aspirations are enshrined in the
Ukrainian Constitution and reflect a "strategic choice of the Ukrainian people." A Russian "veto" of
Ukraine's choices about these matters would amount to a denial of Ukraine's ability to make choices about
its alliances and security arrangements as a sovereign and independent state. Grushko acknowledged during
his interview that Russia's demands for Ukrainian neutrality and NATO's refusal to allow Ukraine into the
alliance are the same demands that Russia made in 2021 before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine —
demonstrating how Russia's demands to destroy Ukraine as an independent, sovereign state have remained
unchanged.
The Kremlin continues to reject the prospect of European peacekeepers in Ukraine,
in opposition to US and Ukrainian positions on the matter and impeding the establishment of a stable,
lasting peace to end the war. Grushko stated on March 17 that Russia will not accept peacekeepers from
the EU, NATO, or individual Western states in post-war Ukraine as Russia considers all of these possible
peacekeeping contingents to be "NATO contingents." Grushko claimed that any talks about future
international peacekeeping missions in Ukraine should only occur after the conclusion of the final peace
agreement to end the war and only if parties to the peace agreement agree that the peace agreement
requires international support. The Kremlin appears to be trying to dictate the timing and sequence of
talks, demanding that final peace talks precede any discussions about peacekeeping missions in post-war
Ukraine. Russia continues to make clear its rejection of any European involvement in post-war Ukraine —
in contradiction to US and Ukrainian positions on the matter. Trump stated on February 26 that Europe
should be responsible for security guarantees for Ukraine, and the joint US-Ukrainian March 11 statement
outlining the temporary ceasefire proposal stated that Ukraine reiterated its positions that European
partners should be involved in the peace process. Sybiha stressed the importance of European support to
assist in monitoring and enforcing the terms of a permanent ceasefire in Ukraine and noted that Ukraine
is already discussing specific details with those European countries willing to deploy peacekeeping
forces to Ukraine. Significant European involvement in post-war Ukraine is critical for any peace
settlement that aims to establish an enduring peace in Ukraine.
A strong Ukrainian military
backed by security guarantees remains the most important component of a sustainable peace in Ukraine and
deterrence of future Russian aggression. Sybiha emphasized that there can be no restriction on Ukraine's
defensive capabilities or military strength in any future peace agreement and that Ukraine must keep
working towards a self-sufficient defense industrial sector to deter further Russian aggression. Sybiha,
responding to a question about Ukraine's fundamental stipulations in "any" future negotiations, stated
that Ukraine will not compromise its territorial integrity and sovereignty and "will never recognize
occupied territories." Discussions on the permanent status of occupied Ukrainian territory should
properly only be a part of negotiations on a permanent settlement of the war.
Key Takeaways
• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have been partially successful in holding the
ceasefire proposal hostage as part of his efforts to extract preemptive concessions from US President
Donald Trump in negotiations to end the war.
• Russian officials continue to demonstrate that
Russia's aim of destroying Ukrainian sovereignty remains unchanged since before Russia launched its
full-scale invasion in 2022.
• The Kremlin continues to reject the prospect of European
peacekeepers in Ukraine, in opposition to US and Ukrainian positions on the matter and impeding the
establishment of a stable, lasting peace to end the war.
• A strong Ukrainian military backed
by security guarantees remains the most important component of a sustainable peace in Ukraine and
deterrence of future Russian aggression.
• The United States announced its withdrawal from war
crimes monitoring agencies related to the war in Ukraine – essentially a unilateral concession to Russia
with no Russian concessions in return.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Chief
of General Staff Lieutenant General Anatoliy Barhylevych with Major General Andriy Hnatov on March 16.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near
Toretsk and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian occupation officials
continue to develop analogues to the federal "Time of Heroes" programming in occupied Ukraine as part of
long-term efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia and militarize society in occupied
Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin did not accept the US-Ukrainian proposal for a temporary ceasefire along
the frontline and reiterated his demands for a resolution to the war that amount to Ukrainian
capitulation. Putin and US President Donald Trump held a phone call on March 18. The Kremlin's official
readout of the call stated that Putin emphasized the need to address the "root causes" of the war.
Russian officials have repeatedly defined these root causes as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's
alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine. Russian officials’ calls for
the elimination of these "root causes" amount to Russian demands for Ukraine's permanent neutrality and
the installation of a pro-Russian government in Kyiv.
Putin demanded on March 18 that Ukraine
stop mobilizing (i.e. recruiting and training) forces during a potential temporary ceasefire. Putin also
called for a halt to all foreign military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine but did not discuss
Russia's military support from North Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Iran. Putin claimed
that Russia and the United States should continue their efforts toward a peace settlement in "bilateral
mode," excluding Ukraine or Europe from future negotiations about the war in Ukraine. Putin's demands on
the March 18 call parallel the demands he made on March 13.
ISW continues to assess that Putin
is attempting to hold the temporary ceasefire proposal hostage in order to extract preemptive concessions
ahead of formal negotiations to end the war. ISW also continues to assess that Putin's demands for the
removal of the legitimate government of Ukraine, the weakening of the Ukrainian military such that it
cannot defend against future Russian aggression, and the denial of Ukraine's sovereignty and independence
remain unchanged. The persistence of Putin's demands for Ukraine's capitulation demonstrates that Putin
is not interested in good-faith negotiations to pursue Trump's stated goal of achieving a lasting peace
in Ukraine.
Trump and Putin agreed on a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against
energy infrastructure, but the exact contours of the moratorium remain unclear at this time. The Kremlin
stated that Putin accepted Trump's proposal for a 30-day moratorium on strikes against "energy
infrastructure" and that Putin "immediately gave the Russian military the corresponding order," whereas
the White House stated that Putin and Trump agreed to "an energy and infrastructure ceasefire." It is
unclear which targets are explicitly prohibited under the 30-day moratorium given the difference in
language between the two readouts of the call.
The Kremlin also stated that Putin "informed"
Trump that Russia and Ukraine will each exchange 175 prisoners of war (POWs) on March 19 and that Russia
will also transfer 23 seriously wounded Ukrainian soldiers, whom Putin claimed are currently undergoing
medical treatment in Russian hospitals, as a "gesture of goodwill." The March 11 US-Ukrainian temporary
ceasefire proposal stated that Ukrainian and American delegations discussed POW exchanges as part of the
peace process, particularly during a potential temporary ceasefire on the frontline. The White House
stated on March 18 that Russia and the United States will "immediately" begin negotiations in an
unspecified country in the Middle East about a temporary maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea, a "full
ceasefire," and a permanent peace settlement. The Kremlin stated that the United States and Russia are
creating "expert groups" to continue efforts to achieve a peace settlement "in bilateral mode."
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky endorsed the Trump-Putin energy strikes moratorium agreement on
March 18 and said that Ukraine expects to receive additional information from Trump about the proposal.
Zelensky stated that Ukraine would not accept a situation in which Russia strikes Ukrainian energy
infrastructure and Ukraine is unable to respond.
Key Takeaways
• Russian President
Vladimir Putin did not accept the US-Ukrainian proposal for a temporary ceasefire along the frontline and
reiterated his demands for a resolution to the war that amount to Ukrainian capitulation.
• Trump and Putin agreed on a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure,
but the exact contours of the moratorium remain unclear at this time.
• Putin continues to
hold the temporary ceasefire hostage, likely to extract further concessions from US President Donald
Trump and delay or spoil negotiations for an enduring peace in Ukraine.
• Russian forces
recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid intensified Russian offensive operations in the area,
likely as part of efforts to leverage Russia's deliberate stalling of the temporary ceasefire proposal to
make battlefield gains.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kurakhove, and Russian
forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Borova.
• The Russian military is reportedly
increasing the number of its information and psychological operations units.
Russia and Ukraine have not formally announced the implementation of the temporary long-range strikes
ceasefire. Ceasefires take time to negotiate, execute, and monitor and require both sides to agree to
cease attacks on specified targets at a specific time and date. Ceasefires also require both sides to
agree to mechanisms to monitor the ceasefire and to address allegations of violations. Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 19 that if Russia and Ukraine come to a temporary strikes
ceasefire agreement, then Ukraine will prepare a list of "civilian objects, energy objects,
infrastructure objects" to give to Ukraine's partners — indicating that Russia and Ukraine have not
finalized the details of which targets would be off limits or agreed on an implementation date.
Official American, Ukrainian, and Russian statements indicate that the parties to the ceasefire have
not yet finalized the details of the agreement. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on March 19
that the temporary ceasefire only applies to "energy infrastructure facilities," and Kremlin newswire
TASS reported that Peskov declined to comment on the White House statement — likely referring to the
March 18 White House statement following the call between US President Donald Trump and Russian President
Vladimir Putin — that the ceasefire applied to "energy and infrastructure." Trump told the Washington
Examiner on March 18 after his call with Putin that Russia agreed to "an immediate ceasefire on energy
and infrastructure." US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff similarly stated on March 18 after
the call that the temporary ceasefire covers "energy and infrastructure in general." The Trump
administration's statement following Trump's March 19 call with Zelensky stated that Trump and Zelensky
"agreed on a partial ceasefire against energy." Zelensky stated on March 19 that Ukraine is "ready to
implement" a ceasefire on strikes against "energy and civilian infrastructure."
Russian
President Vladimir Putin is adding confusion about the timing and details of the ceasefire in an attempt
to falsely blame Ukraine for violating the ceasefire before both countries have officially implemented
the agreement. The Kremlin is attempting to posture Russia as already adhering to the temporary ceasefire
while claiming that Ukraine is violating the ceasefire — even though both parties have not agreed on the
details of the agreement or officially implemented the ceasefire. The Kremlin readout of the March 18
phone call between Putin and Trump stated that Putin "immediately gave the Russian military" an order
that "corresponded" with his "positive response" to Trump's temporary ceasefire proposal. The Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that seven Russian drones were en route to striking Ukrainian energy
facilities connected to defense industrial enterprises in Mykolaiv Oblast when Putin issued the order to
the Russian military. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces received orders to "neutralize" the
drones and that Russian forces used Pantsir air defense systems to down six drones and that a Russian
Aerospace Forces (VKS) fighter jet destroyed the other. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces
launched a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 18 to 19, and
Zelensky noted on March 19 that Russian drones had struck a hospital in Sumy Oblast and unspecified areas
in Donetsk Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian drones struck an oil transshipment facility in
Krasnodar Krai following the Trump-Putin call and attempted to frame the Ukrainian strike as a violation
of the ceasefire agreement. Russian claims that Russia adhered to the ceasefire by abstaining from
conducting strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and that Ukraine violated the ceasefire are
inaccurate as Russia and Ukraine have not yet officially implemented the agreement. Such Russian claims
are attempts to take advantage of the lack of clarity about the details of the ceasefire that the Kremlin
is injecting. Putin's attempt to confuse and manipulate the temporary strikes ceasefire and blame Ukraine
for violations even before the agreement has come into effect is an indicator of how Putin will likely
exploit any future agreements.
Key Takeaways
• Russia and Ukraine have not formally
announced the implementation of the temporary long-range strikes ceasefire.
• Official
American, Ukrainian, and Russian statements indicate that the parties to the ceasefire have not yet
finalized the details of the agreement.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is adding confusion
about the timing and details of the ceasefire in an attempt to falsely blame Ukraine for violating the
ceasefire before both countries have officially implemented the agreement.
• The Kremlin
continues to contradict Trump's report of his call with Putin on March 18.
• The Kremlin
continues to demand that Ukraine cede Ukrainian territory that Russia does not currently occupy and to
set conditions to make further territorial demands.
• The United States, Ukraine, and Europe
continue to agree that Ukraine and Europe must be involved in peace negotiations to end the war, despite
Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to exclude Ukraine and Europe from such negotiations.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on March 19.
• The Russian
Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz
Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, described recent Russian deception tactics that may amount to
acts of perfidy — a war crime under the Geneva Convention.
• Ukrainian forces recently
advanced in Belgorod Oblast and near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar,
Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian milbloggers argued that the Russian
government should give military awards and social benefits to military instructors and Russian defense
industrial base (DIB) employees.
>• The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main >Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head
and Akhmat Spetsnaz >Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, described recent >Russian
deception tactics that may amount to acts of perfidy — >a war crime under the Geneva
Convention.
Acts of perfidy?
Man lernt. In Praxis wohl das Tragen
ukrainischer Uniformen.
Article 37 - Prohibition of perfidy
(d) the feigning
of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral or other
States not Parties to the conflict. 2. Ruses of war are not prohibited.
Die Aussagen von John Bolten würde ich nicht allzu ernst nehmen. Der ist noch immer sauer, weil ihn
Trump, während der 1. Amtszeit, als Berater rausgeschmissen hat. Bolton, einer der für mehr Krieg, als
weniger Krieg eintritt..
"The U.S. leader called Bolton “a disgruntled boring fool who only
wanted to go to war. Never had a clue, was ostracized & happily dumped. What a dope!”
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Warren Buffett(3434)
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