Russian forces recently cut the T-0405 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway east of Pokrovsk and the T-0406
Pokrovsk-Mezhova highway southwest of Pokrovsk as part of their efforts to envelop Pokrovsk and
Myrnohrad. Geolocated footage published on January 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced
east of Myrne (east of Pokrovsk) and seized positions along the T-0504 highway. Ukrainian military
observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 13 that elements of the Russian 55th and 74th motorized
rifle brigades (41st Combined Arms Army , Central Military District ) recently advanced to and
cut the T-0406 highway between Kotlyne and Udachne (both southwest of Pokrovsk), and Russian milbloggers
claimed that Russian forces seized a section of both highways. ISW assesses that Russian forces likely
seized the remainder of Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk) as part of this advance. Mashovets stated that
Russian forces are deploying the 55th and 74th motorized rifle brigades in a two-echelon formation and
that elements of the 74th Brigade conduct the initial attacks and elements of the 55th Brigade follow
behind to consolidate positions. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 239th Tank Regiment, 228th
Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 67th Rifle Regiment (all 90th Tank Division, CMD) are operating in the
Novovasylivka-Uspenivka-Novooleksandriivka area (southwest of Pokrovsk). Mashovets acknowledged that the
Russian military command recently redeployed elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st
CAA, formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps ) from the Kurakhove direction to
offensive operations near Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk), further substantiating previous milblogger
claims that the 5th Brigade was redeployed to the Vozdvyzhenka area Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle
Brigade may have participated in the interdiction of the T-0405 highway near Myrne, and the Russian
military command's decision to redeploy the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade suggests that it is prioritizing
efforts to advance in this area and envelop Pokrovsk from the east over further advances west of
Kurakhove. ISW previously noted that Russian forces could also leverage advances east of Pokrovsk near
Vozdvyzhenka and Myrne to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk along the H-20 Donetsk
City-Kostyantynivka highway.
Russian forces also advanced in other areas southwest of Pokrovsk
amid ongoing efforts to envelop the town on January 12. Geolocated footage published on January 13
indicates that Russian forces seized Pishchane (southwest of Pokrovsk), and the Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) credited elements of the 55th, 35th, and 74th motorized rifle brigades (all 41st CAA, CMD)
with the seizure of the settlement. Russian forces continued attacking near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of
Pokrovsk near Baranivka, Zelene Pole, Nova Poltavka, and Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske,
Novooleksandrivka, Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near
Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novyi Trud, Zelene, and Shevchenko; southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne,
Uspenivka, Novovasylivka, Novoandriivka, Sribne, and Yasenove; and west of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne on
January 12 and 13.
Russian forces likely intend to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of
communications (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in order to force Ukrainian units to withdraw from the
towns in future months. The T-0405 and T-0406 highways are two of the three main east-west GLOCs
supporting the Ukrainian force grouping in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area. Russian advances east and west of
Pokrovsk may complicate Ukrainian logistics and Ukraine's ability to resupply and redeploy troops to
defend Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. The Russian military command may intend to make further advances north of
the T-0405 and T-0406 highways in an effort to force Ukrainian forces to eventually withdraw to the north
(rather than to the east or west) to support Russia's envelopment of both settlements and further
advances west towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border. The Russian military
command likely also hopes to avoid conducting infantry-heavy frontal assaults through the urban areas of
Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad and likely assesses that interdicting these GLOCs increases the likelihood that
Ukrainian forces will withdraw from these towns and that Russian forces will be able to avoid conducting
costly urban combat operations to take the towns.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces
recently cut the T-0405 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway east of Pokrovsk and the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezhova
highway southwest of Pokrovsk as part of their efforts to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.
• Russian forces likely intend to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) into
Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in order to force Ukrainian units to withdraw from the towns in future months.
• Russian state-owned energy corporation Gazprom acknowledged that it is considering reducing the
size of its central office staff by 40 percent, indicating that Gazprom may be concerned about the
long-term effects that the war in Ukraine and the reduction in Russian gas exports to Europe will have on
the Russian gas industry.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kharkiv, Borova, Pokrovsk,
Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions.
• South Korea's National Intelligence Service
(NIS) reportedly announced that North Korean casualties in Kursk Oblast total roughly 3,000 killed and
wounded.
The Kremlin remains committed to achieving the original goals of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in
any future peace negotiations — namely the destruction of the Ukrainian state, dissolution of the current
Ukrainian government, demilitarization of Ukraine, and a permanent ban on Ukraine's future membership in
NATO. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev rejected the
suggestion that Russia could be willing to cede any occupied territory to Ukraine in future negotiations
during an interview with Russian outlet Komsomolskaya Pravda published on January 14 and stated that this
idea is "not even up for discussion." Patrushev falsely claimed that sham referendums in occupied Ukraine
in September 2022 legitimized Russia's claim to occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson
oblasts and insinuated that international recognition of Russia's illegal occupation and annexation of
the four oblasts and occupied Crimea is a non-negotiable condition for a future peace agreement.
Patrushev stated that Russia's goals in Ukraine remain unchanged and that Russia remains committed to
achieving all of the goals that Russian President Vladimir Putin used to justify the full-scale invasion.
Putin identified the "demilitarization" and "denazification" of Ukraine as the key goals of the
full-scale invasion during a speech on February 23, 2022 — and these goals amount to the destruction of
Ukraine's ability to defend itself and replacement of the legitimate Ukrainian government with a
pro-Russian puppet government. Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and Zaporizhia Oblast
occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin stated during an interview with Russian outlet Gazeta.Ru on January 14
that the Russian government continues to pursue "denazification" in Ukraine, which Rogozin defined as the
"liquidation of those who instill a misanthropic Russophobic spirit" in people. Putin has consistently
demanded that the Ukrainian people concede their right to determine their own government, the right to
defend themselves against ongoing and future aggression, and the right to choose their own security
alliances before and throughout the full-scale invasion. ISW continues to assess that Putin's goals in
Ukraine are to break up NATO and seize full control over Ukraine and that Putin remains committed to
these goals, and ISW has not observed any indication that Putin is willing to concede on such goals in
future negotiations.
Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile
strikes against military and defense industrial targets in Russia on the night of January 13 to 14. The
Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces targeted Russian military facilities between 200
and 1,110 kilometers deep in the Russian rear in Bryansk, Saratov, and Tula oblasts and the Republic of
Tatarstan. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and Ukraine's Main
Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) struck the Russian state-owned Kombinat Kristal oil storage
facility near Engels, Saratov Oblast, which provides fuel for the strategic bombers at Russia's Engels-2
Air Base, and that the GUR and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) also struck the Saratov Oil Refinery. The
Ukrainian Unmanned System Forces' 14th Drone Regiment reported that Ukrainian drones struck tanks with
aviation fuel for Tu-160 bomber aircraft at the Kristal oil facility at the Engels-2 Air Base. Sources
within the SBU told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that Ukrainian forces struck glide bomb and cruise missile
warehouses at the Engels-2 Air Base. Geolocated footage published on January 14 shows a fire at the
Saratov Oil Refinery. Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike
damaged unspecified industrial enterprises in Engels and Saratov City. Ukrainian forces notably struck
the Kristal oil facility on the night of January 7 to 8, causing a fire that Russian authorities did not
put out until January 13 — likely several hours before Ukrainian forces struck the facility again.
The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reported that Ukrainian forces,
including elements of the Unmanned Systems Force, Special Operations Forces (SSO), SBU, missile troops,
and GUR, struck the Bryansk Chemical Plant in Seltso, Bryansk Oblast, which produces components for Kh-59
cruise missiles and ammunition for tube artillery, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), and TOS
thermobaric artillery systems and repairs Russian MLRS systems. The Unmanned Systems Forces reported that
Ukrainian forces used drones to overwhelm Russian air defense systems, allowing missiles to strike their
targets and that Ukrainian drones hit substations and other infrastructure after the missile strike. The
Ukrainian General Staff reported that there were secondary explosions at the plant and that Ukrainian
forces also destroyed a Tor and a Buk air defense system during the strike. Ukrainian Center for
Combatting Disinformation Head Andriy Kovalenko noted that the Bryansk Chemical Plant is important for
Russian artillery ammunition and missile production and specializes in the production of gunpowder, solid
propellant components for rocket fuel, and explosives. Kovalenko also stated that Ukrainian forces struck
the "Kremniy El" microelectronics plant in Bryansk City, which Ukrainian forces previously struck in
October 2024 and that produces microelectronics for missile systems, Pantsir air defense systems, and
Iskander missiles; radars, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and drones. Geolocated footage shows drone
strikes and explosions in Seltso. Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed on January 13 that
Ukrainian forces conducted a large combined missile strike against Bryansk Oblast and that Russian air
defense systems destroyed all targets. Bogomaz later claimed on January 14 that a falling missile
fragment damaged civilian property in Bryansk Oblast, including in Seltso. The Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted Bryansk Oblast with six ATACMS missiles, six Storm
Shadow missiles, and 31 drones.
Key Takeaways:
• The Kremlin remains committed to
achieving the original goals of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in any future peace negotiations —
namely the destruction of the Ukrainian state, dissolution of the current Ukrainian government,
demilitarization of Ukraine, and a permanent ban on Ukraine's future membership in NATO.
• Patrushev stated that Russia's goals in Ukraine remain unchanged and that Russia remains committed to
achieving all of the goals that Russian President Vladimir Putin used to justify the full-scale
invasion.
• Russian officials continue to deny the existence of a Ukrainian identity and state
that is independent of Russia as part of ongoing Russian efforts to justify the destruction of the
Ukrainian state.
• Patrushev stated that he believes that only Russia and the United States
should engage in negotiations to end Russia's war in Ukraine, and senior Kremlin officials are also
questioning the role that European countries could play in such negotiations.
• The Kremlin
will likely attempt to seize on potential future Russian advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast for
informational purposes, but these advances, if they occur, are unlikely to have significant operational
impact.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against
military and defense industrial targets in Russia on the night of January 13 to 14.
• Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities continue efforts to find a solution to the gas crisis in Moldova
as the pro-Russian breakaway republic Transnistria continues to refuse help from Ukraine or Moldova.
• Kremlin officials are attempting to exploit the energy crisis in Moldova to set conditions to
justify future Russian aggression against Moldova.
• Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor
reportedly caused a brief but widespread internet outage in Russia while operating restriction systems of
its Sovereign Internet on January 14.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk and
Pokrovsk directions.
• Russia continues efforts to bolster military recruitment efforts by
offering financial incentives to those who sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD).
Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian energy
infrastructure on the night of January 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces
launched 74 Shahed and other strike drones and 43 missiles at Ukraine, including one Iskander-M ballistic
missile from Belgorod Oblast, seven Kh-22/32 cruise missiles from airspace over Tula Oblast, four Kalibr
cruise missiles from ships in the Black Sea, 27 Kh-101/55SM cruise missiles from airspace over Volgograd
Oblast, and four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from airspace over Belgorod Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force
reported that Ukrainian forces downed 23 Kh-101/55SM missiles, three Kalibr missiles, four Kh-59/69
missiles, and 47 drones, and that 27 drones became "lost" and did not hit their targets. Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the Russian strikes targeted Ukrainian gas facilities and
other energy infrastructure. Ukrainian officials reported damage to energy and critical infrastructure
facilities in Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, and Lviv oblasts and residential areas in Kirovohrad Oblast.
Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko and Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator
Ukrenergo reported temporary emergency shutdowns in Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava, Donetsk, Zaporizhia,
Dnipropetrovsk, and Kirovohrad oblasts on the morning of January 15 due to the strikes. Ukrenergo has
since lifted the emergency shutdowns but noted that Ukrainians still need to limit their energy
consumption following the strikes. Russia has regularly targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure in large
strike series since the Winter of 2022–2023 likely in an attempt to collapse Ukraine's energy grid, limit
its defense industrial capacity, and degrade Ukrainians' will to fight.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian energy
infrastructure on the night of January 14 to 15.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one
prisoner of war (POW) exchange on January 15, their first POW exchange in 2025.
• A Russian
source claimed that Ukrainian drone and artillery capabilities are providing Ukrainian tanks with
tactical advantages over Russian tanks in unspecified, select areas of the frontline.
• Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky announced on January 15 that Russia will soon provide
Transnistria with gas as "humanitarian aid" but did not specify the delivery date or method.
• Armenia continues to enhance its relations with Western partners amid waning relations with
Russia.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk
directions.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 15 that about 600,000
Russian soldiers are currently operating in Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the
night of January 15 to 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 16 that Ukrainian Special
Operation Forces (SSO) and other Ukrainian forces struck the Lisinskaya Oil Refinery in Voronezh Oblast
with at least three drones, causing a fire. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the oil refinery
stored fuel for Russian military uses. Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on January 16
that Ukrainian forces launched over 10 drones against three raions in Voronezh Oblast and that most of
the drones hit the oil depot in Liski Raion. Geolocated footage and footage posted by Russian milbloggers
show a fire at the Lisinskaya Oil Refinery. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head
Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on January 16 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Tambov Gunpowder
Plant in Kuzmino-Gat, Tambov Oblast, noting that the plant produces gunpowder for various arms,
artillery, and rocket systems; nitrocellulose used to produce explosives; and other specialized products.
Russian news aggregator SHOT reported on January 15 that locals reported sounds of drones over Kotovsk
(directly north of Kuzmino-Gat) and that Russian forces downed three drones near Kotovsk and
Kuzmino-Gat.
The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk
Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer
from their current high loss rate in the future. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in early
January 2025 that 3,800 North Korean personnel had been killed or wounded in Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian
Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on November 5, 2024 that North Korean forces were engaged in
"small-scale" clashes in Kursk Oblast, but Russian milbloggers began claiming on December 6 that North
Korean forces were participating in more significant combat operations. North Korean have therefore
likely suffered roughly 92 casualties per day since starting to participate in significant fighting in
early December 2024. North Korea reportedly transferred roughly 12,000 North Korean personnel to Kursk
Oblast, and the entirety of this North Korean contingent in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in
roughly 12 weeks (about mid-April 2025) should North Korean forces continue to suffer similarly high
casualty rates in the future. South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) stated on January 13 that
so far 300 North Koreans have been killed in action and 2,700 have been wounded in action in Kursk
Oblast. North Korean forces will likely continue to suffer a larger ratio of wounded to killed in action
- as is typical for armed conflict - and it is unclear if or when injured North Korean soldiers return to
combat.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast
and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the night of January 15 to 16.
• The entire North
Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in
action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate
in the future.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer
signed a landmark "Centennial Partnership Agreement" on January 16 outlining Ukrainian-British
cooperation for the next 100 years and continued UK support to Ukraine.
• Russian and
Transnistrian authorities are reportedly discussing Russian purchases of European gas for Transnistria
through an intermediary, likely to avoid having to gain various states' permission to use the TurkStream
and Trans-Balkan pipelines to supply Russian gas to the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced
near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the Russia-Iran
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement on January 17. The agreement addresses issues spanning
enhanced defense cooperation, intelligence sharing, nuclear energy use and cooperation, transportation
support and development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and a clause
stipulating that neither party shall allow third parties to use their territory to threaten the security
of the other among other economic and social areas of partnership. The agreement notably includes the
unspecified development of "military-technical cooperation" between the two countries, which could allude
to Iran's extensive export of domestically-produced Shahed drones and other military equipment for
Russia's use in Ukraine, Iran's assistance in Russia's domestic production of Shahed drones, and possible
efforts to expand Russia's use and production of Shaheds.
The bilateral agreement could also
lay the groundwork for Russia to establish aircraft refueling hubs and a naval presence in Iran,
particularly as the fall of Russian ally Bashar al-Assad's regime and overall waning of Russian influence
in the Middle East threatens the presence of key Russian bases and assets in Syria. Russia could use
Iranian territory to support some of its operations in North Africa and the Middle East despite Iran's
suboptimal geographic location when compared to Syria's proximity to Russia's basing in Libya and the
Mediterranean Sea. Russia may also use the agreement to establish a more permanent military presence in
Iran in the long term. However, Iran may be reluctant to such efforts due to the possibility of further
Western sanctions and retaliation.
Russia may leverage enhanced economic and transportation
ties with Iran to further Western sanctions evasion efforts and mitigate economic challenges brought
about by sanctions - a broader strategy Russia has established with multiple international partners to
circumvent restrictions and alleviate domestic economic pressures.
The Russia-Iran
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement lacks a mutual defense clause, however, indicating that
Russia likely lacks the bandwidth to support significant operations outside of Ukraine and is
prioritizing its manpower needs through its mutual defense treaty with North Korea. Russia likely does
not have the military and defense industrial capacity to support any significant military operations
apart from its war in Ukraine, especially as Russia continues to suffer high personnel losses and is
reportedly struggling to produce and refurbish enough armored vehicles to replace destroyed vehicles.
Putin is likely wary of intensified Russian engagements in the Middle East after Russia's strategic
political defeat in Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime and is likely to focus on
negotiations with the interim Syrian government to maintain the Russian military presence at the Hmeimim
Air Base and the Port of Tartus.
Russia appears to be valuing its ability to mitigate its
manpower constraints by leveraging the mutual defense clause within its Strategic Partnership agreement
with North Korea to deploy North Korean forces to Kursk Oblast over further military-technical
cooperation with Iran. ISW previously assessed that Russia is deploying North Korean forces to operations
in Kursk Oblast in order to free up Russian military personnel for operations in Ukraine. Russia is
likely to prioritize addressing its manpower issues through defense agreements with North Korea, as Iran
is unlikely to provide military personnel to support Russia's war in Ukraine, and Russia has been
leveraging its military-technical ties with Iran since 2022 without a strategic partnership agreement.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud
Pezeshkian signed the Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement on January 17.
• The Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement lacks a mutual defense clause, however,
indicating that Russia likely lacks the bandwidth to support significant operations outside of Ukraine
and is prioritizing its manpower needs through its mutual defense treaty with North Korea.
• Russian forces seized Vremivka on January 17 as part of their efforts to envelop Velyka Novosilka and
force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the settlement.
• Armenian Prime Minister Nikol
Pashinyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin had a phone call on January 17 indicating the Kremlin's
growing concerns over Armenia's deepening ties with the West.
• Recently declassified US
documents highlight the integral role of US monetary and technical assistance in expanding Ukraine's
domestic drone production capabilities and how US national security is directly benefiting by integrating
lessons learned from Ukraine in America’s defense industry.
• Russian forces recently advanced
in Kursk Oblast and the Kharkiv, Kupyansk, Borova, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on January 17 authorizing calling up Russian
reservists (“personnel mobilization resource” or zapas) for training in 2025.
Ukrainian forces struck two Russian oil depots in Kaluga and Tula oblasts on the night of January 17 to
18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO)
units and other Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot of the Kaluganeftprodukt joint-stock company (JSC)
near Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast, causing a fire at the facility on the night of January 17 to 18. Kaluga
Oblast Governor Vladislav Shapsha claimed on January 17 and 18 that a drone strike caused a fire at an
unspecified industrial enterprise in Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast, and later added that Russian forces downed
seven drones over the region. Russian sources posted footage purportedly showing the fire at the oil
depot. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on January 18 that units of Ukraine's Main Military
Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and other Ukrainian forces struck the state-owned "March 8" oil depot in
Tula Oblast and noted that there were reports of a fire at the facility. Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry
Milyaev claimed on January 18 that drone debris struck an unspecified enterprise in Tula Oblast, causing
a fuel tank to catch on fire. Geolocated footage and other footage published by Russian milbloggers
showed a fire at an oil depot near Didilovo, Tula Oblast.
The Russian Central Grouping of
Forces appears to have assembled a strike group comprised of units of the 2nd and 41st combined arms
armies (CAAs) south of Pokrovsk, likely as part of ongoing Russian efforts to intensify offensive
operations south and southwest of the town. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on
January 18 that the Russian military command has consolidated elements of four brigades - the 2nd CAA's
30th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 41st CAA's 35th, 55th, and 74th motorized rifle brigades — and three
regiments — the 243rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly subordinated to 27th Motorized Rifle Division,
2nd CAA) and the 239th Tank Regiment and the 87th Rifle Regiment (both of the 90th Tank Division, 41st
CAA) — south and southwest of Pokrovsk between Dachenske and Novotroitske. Mashovets stated that elements
of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade recently interdicted the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezheva Highway and
are attacking between Udachne and Kotlyne (both southwest of Pokrovsk). Mashovets stated that elements of
the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade maintain positions on the outskirts of Zvirove (east of Kotlyne)
and attacking in the area while elements of the Russian 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment with support from
the 239th Tank Regiment and 87th Rifle Regiment are attacking along the banks of the Solone River toward
Solone-Novoserhiivka and Novovasylivka-Uspenivka (south to southwest of Kotlyne). Mashovets stated that
elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade are attacking towards Dachenske-Chyushchyne and
Zelene-Chyushchyne (all south of Pokrovsk) and are making marginal advances. ISW has observed reports
that all the brigades and regiments referenced by Mashovets are operating south and southwest of Pokrovsk
except for elements of the 243rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, which ISW has not previously observed involved
in combat operations in Ukraine.
The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the
Pokrovsk direction stated on January 17 that the Russian military command is accumulating forces to
advance west of Pokrovsk as part of ongoing Russian efforts to envelop the town but noted that Russian
forces are not advancing immediately south of the town. The Ukrainian commander noted that Russian forces
are currently focused on interdicting the railway line between Kotlyne and Udachne. Russian milbloggers
similarly claimed on January 17 and 18 that Russian forces are advancing southwest of Pokrovsk near
Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, Novooleksandrivka, Novoserhiivka, and Sribne and attempting to interdict the
E-50 Pavlohrad-Pokrovsk highway west of the town. ISW previously observed indications that the Russian
military command defined the 2nd CAA's area of responsibility (AoR) as south and southwest of Pokrovsk
and the 41st CAA's AoR as east of Pokrovsk. The Russian military command's decision to establish a strike
group comprised of units of both the 2nd and 41st CAAs south of Pokrovsk indicates that Russian forces
may be reprioritizing tactical objectives in the Pokrovsk direction to set conditions to exploit more
opportunistic avenues of advance closer to Pokrovsk’s immediate flanks. Mashovets noted that elements of
the 15th and 30th motorized rifle brigades (2nd CAA) and the 348th Motorized Rifle Regiment (41st CAA)
are currently resting and reconstituting in rear areas of the Pokrovsk direction and that it is unclear
which sector of this direction the Russian military command will choose to redeploy these forces. The
Russian military command may redeploy these units to areas south of Pokrovsk if the Russian command
continues to prioritize tactical advances in the direction of Pokrovsk’s southern flanks in the coming
weeks and months.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces struck two Russian oil depots
in Kaluga and Tula oblasts on the night of January 17 to 18.
• Ukrainian forces also struck a
Russian air defense system and radars in occupied Ukraine on the night of January 17 to 18.
• The Russian Central Grouping of Forces appears to have assembled a strike group comprised of units of
the 2nd and 41st combined arms armies (CAAs) south of Pokrovsk, likely as part of ongoing Russian efforts
to intensify offensive operations south and southwest of the town.
• The Russian military
command also reportedly redeployed elements of a second unit of the 51st CAA from the Kurakhove direction
to offensive operations east of Pokrovsk amid ongoing efforts to intensify activity in this area.
• NATO officials are reportedly preparing for a joint NATO-Georgia exercise scheduled for March
2025.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and in the Chasiv Yar and Velyka
Novosilka directions.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions in the Kharkiv
direction.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Russian forces used ammunition equipped with
chemical agents banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 434 times in Ukraine in December 2024,
contributing to a total of 5,389 documented cases since February 2023. Ukraine's radiation, chemical, and
biological intelligence units are monitoring Russia's use of banned chemical agents, which include using
regulated K-51 and RG-VO grenade launchers to launch munitions containing chemical agents and ammunition
containing unspecified hazardous chemicals that are banned in warfare under the 1925 Geneva Protocol and
CWC. Ukrainian officials have previously reported on increasingly common instances of Russian forces
using chemical substances in combat that are banned by the CWC, to which Russia is a signatory, and the
Ukrainian General Staff noted that such violations have been systematic in the Russian military since
February 2023.
Both Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Chasiv Yar amid
continued offensive operations in the area on January 19. Geolocated footage published on January 18
indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in the Refractory Plant in central
Chasiv Yar. Geolocated footage published on January 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced
along Tolstoho Street in western Chasiv Yar. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 19 that Russian
forces captured the Novopivnichnyi and Desyata microraions in Chasiv Yar, advanced in the workshop area
of the Refractory Plant, and in northern Chasiv Yar. ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims,
however. Russian forces continued ground attacks within Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near
Predtechyne, Stupochky, and Bila Hora on January 18 and 19. Ukraine's Luhansk Group of Forces
Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on January 18 that Ukrainian forces repelled
Russian small and medium-sized assaults on the grounds of the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar.
Elements of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th VDV Division), drone operators of the
Russian "Terek" Cossack Reconnaissance Brigade (reportedly of the volunteer Cossack Assault Corps), and
drone operators of the Russian "Sever-V" Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are all reportedly operating
in the Chasiv Yar direction; additional elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division and elements of the
200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps , Leningrad Military District ) are reportedly
operating in Chasiv Yar itself.
Key Takeaways:
• The Ukrainian General Staff
reported on January 18 that Russian forces used ammunition equipped with chemical agents banned by the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 434 times in Ukraine in December 2024, contributing to a total of 5,389
documented cases since February 2023.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and
near Kupyansk, Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Ukrainian forces
recently recaptured lost positions near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.
• Russian volunteer military
detachments continue efforts to boost manpower by recruiting women into the Russian Armed Forces.
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces
suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were personnel killed in action. Syrskyi
stated on December 30, 2024, that Russian forces suffered 427,000 casualties in 2024, and Syrskyi's
January 20 number likely reflects additional losses that Russian forces incurred in the final days of
2024. ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command was likely willing to accept record
levels of casualties in Fall–Winter 2024, especially from September to November 2024, in order to achieve
relatively larger territorial gains from continued infantry-led, attritional assaults.
Russian
President Vladimir Putin reiterated on January 20 that the Kremlin is willing to negotiate with the
United States about the war in Ukraine but indicated that he maintains his demands for Ukraine's full
capitulation. Putin convened a meeting of the Russian Security Council on January 20, at which he and
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Russia's willingness to engage in peace negotiations
with the new US presidential administration under President Donald Trump. Putin caveated that any peace
settlement should "eliminate the root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Lavrov defined these root causes on
December 26 as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian
government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture
within Ukraine. Senior Kremlin officials, including Putin and Lavrov, have been reiterating in recent
weeks that the Kremlin refuses to consider any compromises to Putin's late 2021 and early 2022 demands,
which include demands that Ukraine remain permanently "neutral" and not join NATO, impose severe
limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military, and remove the current Ukrainian government. Putin
himself stated on December 26 that then US President Joe Biden suggested to him in 2021 that Ukraine's
NATO membership be postponed by 10 to 15 years — further demonstrating that alleged threats from NATO
expansion did not actually drive Putin to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January
20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were personnel
killed in action.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated on January 20 that the Kremlin
is willing to negotiate with the US about the war in Ukraine but indicated that he maintains his demands
for Ukraine's full capitulation.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an aircraft production
plant in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on January 20 as a part of an ongoing series of strikes aimed at
degrading Russian military capacity.
• Ukrainian strikes against Russian defense industrial
base (DIB) targets are reportedly affecting Russian forces' combat capabilities.
• Moldovan
and Transnistrian authorities continue efforts to supply Transnistria with European gas.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• A Russian
milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor repeated on January 20 complaints that Russian milbloggers first
issued in May 2024 about insufficient quality controls on Russian artillery shells.
Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and
oil refineries in Russia on the night of January 20 to 21 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at
degrading Russian military capacity. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Special
Operation Forces (SSO) elements and other Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against Rosneft's
Lisinskaya Oil Refinery in Voronezh Oblast for the second time this week following successful strikes on
the night of January 15 to 16. The January 20 to 21 strike caused a fire at fuel and lubricant tanks, and
the Ukrainian General Staff noted that the oil refinery supplies the Russian military. Voronezh Oblast
Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on January 20 that Russian forces destroyed several drones in Voronezh
Oblast but that a drone fell on an oil depot in Liskinsky Raion, starting a fire. A Kremlin-affiliated
Russian milblogger noted that the oil depot was still burning from the January 15-16 strike and the
second strike started another fire at the facility. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that
Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and SSO struck the Smolensk Aviation Plant in Smolensk Oblast.
Geolocated footage shows fires at the production building of the Smolensk Aviation Plant. Ukrainian
Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that the plant produces and
modernizes Su-25 attack aircraft and maintains aviation equipment. Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily
Anokhin claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike against Smolensk Oblast but that
falling drone debris caused fires. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces struck
Lukoil's Saratovorgsintez Chemical Plant in Saratov City overnight that produces acrylonitrile,
acetonitrile, and sodium cyanide. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces
destroyed 10 drones over Smolensk Oblast, six over Voronezh Oblast, and four over Saratov Oblast on the
night of January 20 to 21.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also
continue to conduct strikes against Russian command posts in the Russian rear. The Ukrainian General
Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the command post of the Russian 29th Combined Arms Army (CAA)
(Eastern Military District ) in occupied Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast on the night of January 20 to
21. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that there are reports of explosions and smoke after the strike
and that Ukrainian authorities are clarifying the results of the strike. ISW has not observed footage or
other reporting of this command post strike. ISW has observed reports that elements of the 29th CAA are
currently operating along the Yantarne-Zelenivka line southwest of Kurakhove. The Ukrainian General Staff
reported in early and mid-January 2025 that Ukrainian forces struck the command posts of the Russian 2nd
CAA (Central Military District ), 8th CAA (Southern Military District), and 3rd Army Corps (AC)
(CMD) in occupied Donetsk Oblast. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian strikes against main command
posts further in the Russian rear are likely aimed at degrading broader Russian logistics and operational
planning efforts, which could impact Russia's ability to conduct its military operations in western
Donetsk Oblast.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC)
President Xi Jinping held a phone call on January 21 and emphasized deepening cooperation. Putin and Xi
reiterated boilerplate narratives emphasizing increasing Russian-PRC foreign policy, energy, and economic
cooperation. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov claimed that Putin and Xi discussed Russia's war in
Ukraine and Russia's and the PRC's relations with the United States, although the official Kremlin
readout of the call did not mention these topics. Ushakov also claimed that Xi gave Putin an overview of
Xi's recent call with US President Donald Trump.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces
conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries in
Russia on the night of January 20 to 21 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading Russian
military capacity.
• The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also continue
to conduct strikes against Russian command posts in the Russian rear.
• Russian President
Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping held a phone call on January 21
and emphasized deepening cooperation.
• Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein's
recent appointment has thus far failed to solve or distract from Russia's failure to adequately respond
to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast
and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove. Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near
Pokrovsk.
• Russian ultranationalist milbloggers renewed complaints against the Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) for failing to hold the Russian military command accountable for military
failures.
The Kremlin has launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the
Russian economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.
Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during a meeting on economic issues on January 22 that 2024 was
a "strong year" for the Russian economy. Putin claimed that Russia has a manageable budget deficit of 1.7
percent and achieved a 26 percent increase in non-oil-and-gas revenue to 25.6 trillion rubles
(approximately $257.9 billion) in 2024 and announced a retroactive 9.5 percent increase in insurance and
military pensions to address rising Russian inflation. Bloomberg reported on January 21 that the Russian
Finance Ministry released a report projecting economic strength and suggesting that Russian budget
revenue in December 2024 reached a record high of over 4 trillion rubles (about $40 billion) — a 28
percent increase compared to December 2023 and the highest level recorded since 2011. The data fails to
account for Russia's unsustainable levels of defense spending, rampant inflation, a growing deficit and
the erosion of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, however. ISW continues to observe macroeconomic data that
directly contradict the Kremlin's claims that the Russian economy is performing well. The Kremlin has
recently adopted policies aimed at increasing defense spending all while Russian society faces labor
shortages, broader demographic issues, declining savings, and increasing reliance on bailouts as the
Russian economy faces rising interest rates, inflated salaries, and deteriorating production capacity.
These economic realities suggest that the Kremlin's efforts to posture economic strength are largely an
information operation aimed at reassuring domestic audiences and posturing Russian strength abroad while
masking the true challenges Russia's economy is facing, particularly heightened due to its war against
Ukraine.
North Korea will reportedly deploy new military personnel to Russia by mid-March
2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of attritional, infantry-led assaults in Kursk
Oblast. The New York Times (NYT) reported on January 22 that a US senior defense official stated that
additional North Korean forces will arrive in Russia "within the next two months," (roughly mid-March
2025). The NYT did not specify the number of troops or whether North Korea is rotating forces or
increasing the size of its total force grouping in Russia, however. The South Korean Joint Chiefs of
Staff reported on December 23 that North Korea may be preparing to deploy an unspecified number of
additional forces to Ukraine and military equipment to Russia, either as a rotation or additional
deployment of forces. Western officials told the BBC on January 22 that North Korean forces have suffered
roughly 1,000 killed in action and 3,000 missing or wounded in action as of mid-January 2025, roughly 33
to 40 percent of the 11,000 to 12,000 total North Korean personnel already in Russia] ISW recently
assessed that the entirety of the North Korean contingent in Russia may be killed or wounded in action by
about mid-April 2025 at their current casualty rate, and a new North Korean deployment — whether intended
to increase the current grouping or rotate out existing forces — is likely intended to sustain Russia’s
tempo of operations despite heavy losses of about 30,000 - 45,000 causalities (combined killed and
wounded) per month. North Korean forces reportedly spent at least a month training in eastern Russia
before deploying to Kursk Oblast for further training in near rear areas in November 2024 and joining
combat operations at least as of early December 2024. This timeline roughly coheres with the possibility
that a fresh contingent of North Korean forces could undergo training and replace the shrinking North
Korean group in Kursk Oblast by mid-April 2025, assuming the reported next batch of North Korean troops
will train for the same duration as their predecessors, and deploy to Russia imminently in late January
or early February 2025.
These fresh North Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve
Russian operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and complications operating with
Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent, provided the Russian command continues to use
North Korean forces the same way as it has thus far. US officials and Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT
that North Korean and Russian forces continue to struggle with communications and cohesion and that
Russian and North Korean forces have "clashed" at least twice due to troop identification errors. A
Ukrainian commander told the NYT that North Korean assault groups now include a translator who speaks
Russian but that these groups are still not very effective. Ukrainian soldiers reported that North Korean
forces continue conducting mass infantry assaults and that North Korean soldiers do not retreat even if
injured. Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) published footage on January 22 of North Korean forces
massing for an infantry assault and reported that Ukrainian forces killed 21 and wounded 40 North Korean
soldiers during the eight-hour long combat engagement. Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT that Russian
forces are still attempting to conceal the presence of North Koreans on the battlefield by conducting
drone strikes against wounded North Korean troops as Ukrainian forces attempt to take them prisoner. ISW
continues to assess that North Korea's high casualty rate and interoperability difficulties with Russian
forces will affect the lessons that the North Korean military command will learn from fighting in
Russia's war.
Key Takeaways:
• The Kremlin has launched an information operation
that seeks to create the false impression that the Russian economy is performing well despite numerous
continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.
• Russia continues long-term efforts to build
out its manpower reserve with All-Russian Cossack Society organizations and create a willing and
well-trained prioritized pool designed to buffer the Kremlin from potential blowback in the event of a
possible future partial call up of Russian reservists.
• North Korea will reportedly deploy
new military personnel to Russia by mid-March 2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of
attritional, infantry-led assaults in Kursk Oblast.
• These fresh North Korean forces are
unlikely to decisively improve Russian operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and
complications operating with Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent, provided the Russian
command continues to use North Korean forces the same way as it has thus far.
• Russian
milbloggers complained and expressed concern over recent claims that the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led
interim government in Syria suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus
as Russia's long-term military presence in Syria remains unclear.
• A Russian state media
outlet reported that Russia may resume direct gas deliveries to Transnistria despite recent discussions
about sourcing non-Russian gas to the region.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost
positions near Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk,
Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia and Uzbekistan are deepening military cooperation.
Russia is reportedly planning to deploy additional North Korean forces, missiles, artillery systems, and
multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Kursk Oblast to support Russian long-range fire operations.
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told The
War Zone in an article published on January 22 that North Korea will deploy an unspecified number of
additional missile and artillery troops to Kursk Oblast at an unspecified future time. Budanov reported
that North Korea is unlikely to deploy a large number of additional ground combat troops, however.
Budanov stated that North Korea has provided Russia with roughly 120 M-1989 Koksan 170mm self-propelled
artillery systems and 120 M-1991 240mm MLRS since November 2024 and will likely send at least 120 more of
each system in the future. The GUR previously reported in November 2024 that North Korea had provided
Russia with roughly 100 of each of these systems as of October 2024. Budanov stated that North Korea
plans to provide Russia with 150 additional KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles in 2025 and sent Russia
148 KN-23 missiles in 2024. Budanov noted that North Korean troops typically operate North
Korean-provided weapons in Kursk Oblast and are also training Russian forces on these systems. A US
senior defense official recently told the New York Times (NYT) that additional North Korean forces will
arrive in Russian "within the next two months (roughly mid-March 2025)."
The Kremlin appears
to be growing increasingly concerned about perceptions of Russia's economic instability. Reuters, citing
five sources with knowledge of the situation, reported on January 23 that Russian President Vladimir
Putin is growing increasingly concerned about "distortions" in the Russian economy due to the war in
Ukraine. Two sources familiar with "thinking in the Kremlin" told Reuters that there is a camp within the
Russian elite that views a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine as desirable and key to addressing
Russia's economic issues. One source claimed that Putin recognizes the strain that the war is placing on
the Russian economy and assesses that he has achieved his "key war goals" in Ukraine, including seizing
land in southern Ukraine to connect Russia within occupied Crimea and weakening the Ukrainian military.
The source did not speculate on Putin's willingness to end the war, however. Russian opposition outlet
Meduza reported on January 9 — citing sources in the Russian presidential administration, State Duma, and
wider Russian federal government and regional governments — that Russian elites are growing increasingly
dissatisfied with the impact of the war on the Russian economy. ISW noted on January 22 that the Kremlin
recently launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russia
economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.
Russian forces recently executed at least six unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk
Oblast. Ukrainian sources circulated footage on January 23 of Russian soldiers shooting unarmed Ukrainian
POWs in an unspecified area of Ukraine. Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets and the
Ukrainian Attorney General's Office reported on January 23 that Ukrainian officials are investigating
social media footage of Russian forces executing six captured and unarmed Ukrainian servicemembers in an
unspecified area of Donetsk Oblast. Lyubinets noted that the footage shows a seventh Ukrainian POW in
this group but that it is unclear what happened to the seventh POW based on the footage. ISW has
frequently reported that Russian forces are conducting frontline executions of Ukrainian POWs and
continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or enabling their
subordinates to conduct these executions.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia is reportedly
planning to deploy additional North Korean forces, missiles, artillery systems, and multiple launch
rocket systems (MLRS) to Kursk Oblast to support Russian long-range fire operations.
• The
Kremlin appears to be growing increasingly concerned about perceptions of Russia's economic
instability.
• Russian forces recently executed at least six unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of
war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near
Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
• The Kremlin is reportedly taking measures to protect industrial
facilities in Russian border regions from Ukrainian strikes.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is once again attempting to obfuscate his unwillingness to participate
in good-faith negotiations to end the war by blaming Ukraine for defending itself against Russia's
invasion and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. Putin claimed during a televised interview with
Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on January 24 that he is willing to negotiate "on the Ukraine issue,"
but that a 2022 Ukrainian presidential decree declaring the "impossibility of negotiating" with Putin is
a significant impediment to peace negotiations. Putin falsely claimed that Ukraine and Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky are not interested in peace negotiations and that it is impossible for
Russia and Ukraine to discuss "anything serious" with the decree in place. Putin claimed that any peace
agreements that result from negotiations between Russia and Ukraine before Ukraine repeals the 2022
decree will be "illegitimate" and claimed that the West must force Zelensky to repeal the 2022 decree.
Putin also once again questioned Zelensky's legitimacy as the current president of Ukraine and insinuated
that US President Donald Trump should negotiate exclusively with Putin about Ukraine's fate, as the two
leaders can "calmly" discuss their interests. Putin has previously called for Ukraine to repeal the 2022
decree, but Putin's intense focus on the decree during his January 24 interview marks yet another attempt
to distract from his unwillingness to engage in peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
Zelensky signed the September 2022 decree banning negotiations with Putin in direct response to Putin's
illegal annexation of four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine and after months of negotiations in
which Russia continued to demand Ukraine's full capitulation. The Ukrainian presidential decree
explicitly prohibits Ukraine from conducting negotiations with Putin. The context within which the decree
was signed is important, however. Zelensky signed the decree on the day that Putin illegally annexed four
Ukrainian oblasts (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts), including areas that Russian
forces did not then and still do not occupy. The decree states that the ban on negotiations with Putin is
a response to Russia's illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory and part of Ukraine's efforts to
"guarantee the security of the Euro-Atlantic space, Ukraine, and
territorial integrity." Zelensky signed the September 2022 decree after months of Russian-Ukrainian peace
talks in Istanbul in Spring 2022, during which Russia demanded that Ukraine be a permanently neutral
state that could not join NATO and that Ukraine submit to limitations on the size of the Ukrainian
military similar to those imposed by the Treaty of Versailles on Germany after World War I. These terms
would have restricted Ukraine's Armed Forces to 85,000 soldiers who would be unable to defend Ukraine
against a third Russian invasion.
However, Zelensky has consistently signaled his willingness
to negotiate with Russia and make certain compromises in pursuit of peace following the 2022 decree
banning formal negotiations with Putin. Zelensky has outlined clear conditions for potential talks with
Russia and emphasized the importance of preserving Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity,
developing Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB), and securing security guarantees from Ukraine's
Western allies. Zelensky has repeatedly advocated for a diplomatic solution to the war, proposing that
Ukraine should enter any peace negotiations from a "position of strength" – a strategy aimed at
compelling Russia to engage in good-faith negotiations and consider just compromises in such
negotiations. Zelensky has also invited Russian representatives to attend Ukraine's second Global Peace
Summit in the future.
Kremlin officials have consistently dismissed these overtures, labeling
Ukraine's proposed peace formula and platforms "unviable," and Putin even reportedly asked People's
Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping to "snub" the first Global Peace Conference in June 2024.
Zelensky has continued to express openness to direct negotiations and has acknowledged the possibility of
a diplomatic compromise as part of a broader solution to the war despite Russia's repeated rejections.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is once again attempting to
obfuscate his unwillingness to participate in good-faith negotiations to end the war by blaming Ukraine
for defending itself against Russia's invasion and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory.
• Zelensky signed the decree in September 2022 banning negotiations with Putin in direct response to
Putin's illegal annexation of four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine and after months of
negotiations in which Russia continued to demand Ukraine's full capitulation.
• However,
Zelensky has consistently signaled his willingness to negotiate with Russia and make certain compromises
in pursuit of peace following the 2022 decree banning formal negotiations with Putin.
• Putin
meanwhile continues to signal to both his domestic and global audiences that he is not interested in
peace short of his full demands and remains committed to Ukraine's complete capitulation.
• Putin is attempting to leverage the 2022 decree as a strawman to hide the reality of his disinterest
in negotiations and to sow discord between Ukraine and its Western allies.
• Putin also
attempted to position himself as Trump’s equal during his interview, reinforcing his long-held belief
that Russia is the great-power heir to the Soviet Union.
• Putin demonstrated that he is
worried about the effect that lower oil prices would have on his domestic stability and ability to wage
his war in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is attempting to revive its information operation aimed at
deterring the US and other Western states from providing further military assistance to Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is framing the new 2025 Union State Security Concept as completely superseding the
original 1999 Security Concept, indicating that this new agreement may be more expansive than the
original and will further forward the Kremlin's effort to annex Belarus.
• Ukrainian forces
conducted a large series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil
refineries on the night of January 23 to 24 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading
Russian military capacity.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv
Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Ukrainian forces recently
recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.
Ukraine and Moldova continue to offer solutions to Transnistria's energy crisis as Moldovan President
Maia Sandu met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on January 25. Zelensky stated at a
press conference with Sandu that Ukraine can supply Transnistria with coal at low prices or even free of
charge if Transnistria would supply Ukraine with electricity in return. Zelensky also stated that Ukraine
is ready to send a team of specialists to help increase the Transnistrian power plant's electricity
output such that it would far exceed Transnistria's domestic needs, allowing Transnistria to provide
electricity to all of Moldova and Ukraine. Zelensky noted that Transnistria's cooperation with Moldova
and Ukraine would help reduce electricity prices throughout all of Moldova by 30 percent. Transnistrian
authorities have previously refused Moldovan and Ukrainian offers of help, instead turning to schemes
that involve Moscow directly or indirectly providing enough gas to the breakaway republic to cover only
its domestic electricity needs. Ukrainian and Moldovan officials have noted that Russia is trying to
leverage its manufactured gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion before the Summer 2025 Moldovan
parliamentary elections.<3> Transnistria's possible acceptance of Ukrainian and Moldovan offers of aid
and Transnistria's subsequent supply of cheaper electricity to the rest of Moldova would disrupt Russian
efforts to use the energy crisis to strengthen Transnistria's economic dependence on Moscow, to posture
Russia as the breakaway republic's savior and benefactor, and to leverage Chisinau's turn to higher
priced European electricity as part of Moscow's anti-EU narratives.
The Kremlin is continuing
to leverage the prominent Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel to cultivate increased Russian influence
in Iraq. The Rybar channel claimed on January 25 that members of the Rybar team – including its founder
Mikhail Zvinchuk – visited Iraq over the last week and met with Iraqi officials, including Iraqi Prime
Minister Mohammad Shia Al Sudani. The channel claimed that Iraqi officials noted their openness to
increasing trade and foreign investments with Russian partners and their interest in further developing
Russian–Iraqi relations. The channel welcomed Russian businesses, media companies, bloggers, and
investors to begin exploring opportunities in Iraq. Member of the Rybar team visited Iraq in August 2024,
and ISW noted at the time that this was the first observed report of a Russian milblogger meeting with a
senior foreign official. ISW-CTP previously assessed that Russia may be setting conditions to supplant
the US as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the US possibly reducing its military presence
there. The recent fall of the Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria may be prompting the Kremlin to reconsider
the contours of its relations with Iraq.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukraine and Moldova
continue to offer solutions to Transnistria's energy crisis as Moldovan President Maia Sandu met with
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on January 25.
• The Kremlin is continuing to
leverage the prominent Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel to cultivate increased Russian influence in
Iraq.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka
Novosilka.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 25 that the Russian
government will allow veterans of volunteer formations (dobrovolcheskie formirovaniya) to receive "combat
veteran status" without submitting a formal application.
Russian forces recently made further advances within Velyka Novosilka amid official Russian claims that
Russian forces seized the entire settlement on January 26. Geolocated footage published on January 26
indicates that Russian forces advanced northward along Tsentralana Street in northern Velyka Novosilka.
Some Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on January 26 that Russian
forces completely seized Velyka Novosilka, whereas other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces had
seized most of the settlement. Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are still clearing
Ukrainian forces from the settlement, including the northern part, and that Ukrainian forces are still
counterattacking in the area. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces occupy
89 percent of the settlement, however. Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov
stated on January 26 that Russian forces have not occupied all of Velyka Novosilka and that Ukrainian
forces maintain positions in the settlement. A Ukrainian brigade operating within Velyka Novosilka stated
on January 26 that fighting continues within the settlement and that Russian forces do not pose a threat
of encircling the brigade's elements. ISW has not observed independent evidence of Russian forces
encircling Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka. The Ukrainian brigade also reported that neither Russian
nor Ukrainian forces can use heavy equipment due to parity of strikes near the contact line and that
Ukrainian and Russian forces have "approximate parity" in terms of artillery and first-person view (FPV)
drones but that Russian forces have a "huge" manpower advantage in the area. The brigade stated that
Ukrainian forces are conducting artillery and drone strikes against Russian forces within Velyka
Novosilka and that the Mokri Yaly River that flows through western Velyka Novosilka is an obstacle to
Russian advances. Russian forces continued offensive operations within and near Velyka Novosilka itself,
northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne, and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on January 25
and 26.
The Russian MoD notably is paying an abnormally high amount of fanfare to the claimed
Russian seizure of Velyka Novosilka, very likely as part of informational efforts to shape Western
perceptions of the battlefield situation in Ukraine and degrade international support for Ukraine. The
Russian MoD posted footage during the day of January 26 purportedly showing Russian forces conducting
thermobaric artillery strikes against Ukrainian forces in Velyka Novosilka and claimed that Russian
assault groups were clearing Ukrainian positions. The Russian MoD later claimed that elements of the
Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army , Eastern Military District ) and the 40th
Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) seized all of Velyka Novosilka, and Russian Defense Minister
Andrei Belousov congratulated the command and personnel of the two brigades for the seizure. The Russian
MoD subsequently posted footage purportedly showing Russian flags in multiple areas of the settlement.
Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA) also
participated in the claimed seizure of Velyka Novosilka, and it is unclear why the Russian MoD did not
credit the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade in their announcements. The Russian MoD has not recently been
announcing the claimed seizures of settlements with so much fanfare and as quickly as they did on January
26. Russia is likely trying to leverage the claimed seizure of Velyka Novosilka in order to influence
Western perceptions of the situation on the battlefield in Donetsk Oblast, to advance narratives that
Russian battlefield gains are inevitable and that Ukrainian positions are rapidly deteriorating. Russian
gains in western Donetsk Oblast continue to be gradual and far below the pace that is normal for modern
mechanized warfare. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether Russian forces will be able to rapidly
advance beyond Velyka Novosilka, as it is unclear how much combat power elements of the EMD still retain
after several months of continuous offensive operations. Velyka Novosilka is located next to several
rivers which will likely complicate and hamper further Russian tactical advances in the area. Russian
forces have historically struggled with river crossings and tactical terrain features, such as rivers,
will likely complicate Russian forces' ability to leverage the seizure of Velyka Novosilka to make
operationally significant advances in western Donetsk Oblast.
The seizure and clearing of
Velyka Novosilka will likely present opportunities and a decision point to the Russian military command
on whether to redeploy elements of the Russian Eastern Military District from the Velyka Novosilka
area to other priority operational areas. Any redeployment of EMD elements from the Velyka Novosilka area
over the coming weeks will indicate the Russian military command’s priority operational areas for
offensive operations in Spring and Summer 2025. Elements of the Russian EMD have been the primary
fighting force in the Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka directions since at least early 2023, defended
against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Summer 2023, and later intensified offensive operations in the
area in Fall 2024. Elements of the EMD participated in the seizure of Vuhledar in September and October
2024 and successfully exploited the seizure of the settlement to advance north towards Kurakhove and west
towards and into Velyka Novosilka over the following three months. The seizure of Velyka Novosilka will
present the Russian military command with a decision point during which the Russian military command can
pursue several courses of action (COAs). Velyka Novosilka is protected from Ukrainian counterattack due
to the settlement’s disposition near the Mokri Yaly River. The Russian military command may opt to retain
elements of the EMD in the western Donetsk Oblast area and continue advancing towards the
Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary, which runs north and west of Velyka Novosilka.
This decision would indicate that the Russian military is prioritizing advances to the administrative
boundary as quickly as possible over other axes of advance in Donetsk Oblast or other frontline areas. It
remains unclear how much combat power the EMD elements still retain after having engaged in intense
operations for over six months, however. The Russian military command could also retain some EMD elements
in the Velyka Novosilka area to continue limited attacks and pin Ukrainian forces in the area but
redeploy the bulk of the EMD to another frontline area. Russian forces are currently intensifying
offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Borova, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk directions and are still
working to eliminate the remainder of the Ukrainian salients in the Kurakhove direction and Kursk Oblast.
Ukrainian officials have also recently warned that Russian forces may also renew offensive operations in
Zaporizhia Oblast in 2025. The Russian military command could redeploy EMD elements to any of these
directions, and the redeployment of elements of the EMD will be an indicator of the Russian military
command's priority areas for Spring and Summer 2025.
Russian forces are poised to seize
Toretsk in the coming days and a redeployment of elements of the EMD to reinforce the Russian force
grouping in the Toretsk direction would indicate a new Russian priority effort to resume attacks in the
direction of Kostyantynivka. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely intend to exploit the
seizure of Toretsk to push further west and along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway towards the
southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka. Russian advances in the Toretsk
direction have historically been slow as Russian forces fought through built up urban areas, but Russian
forces may begin to advance relatively more quickly once they break out of Toretsk into the more open
fields west of the settlement. Russian forces may also attempt to leverage tactical gains within and near
Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk and select Russian
milbloggers have recently speculated that Russian forces may be intensifying offensive operations
southwest of Toretsk for this purpose. Russian forces may want to eliminate the Ukrainian salient
southwest of Toretsk in order to firm up their southern flank ahead of a push on Kostyantynivka. The
Russian military command may redeploy elements of the EMD to reinforce offensive operations in the
Toretsk direction if it intends to prioritize pressuring the Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast in
the Spring and Summer 2025. Seizing Pokrovsk has been the Russian military command’s main operational
objective in Donetsk Oblast since February 2024. A Russian redeployment of EMD elements to the Toretsk or
Chasiv Yar directions - as opposed to retaining the EMD elements in western Donetsk Oblast, redeploying
them to the Zaporizhia direction, or redeploying them to the Pokrovsk direction - would therefore
indicate an inflection in Russian operational priorities.
Ukrainian forces conducted a second
strike on the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26. The Ukrainian
General Staff reported on January 26 that elements of Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate
(GUR) and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan City. Geolocated footage shows
a fire at a tank at the refinery. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 26 that
Russian forces downed eight drones over Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26. Ryazan Oblast
Governor Pavel Malkov claimed that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) systems destroyed
Ukrainian drones over Ryazan Oblast and that authorities were assessing material damage. Ukrainian
official sources noted that the Ryazan Oil Refinery is one of the four largest refineries in Russia and
produces fuel for military equipment; jet fuel; diesel fuel; and other petroleum products for tanks,
aircraft, and ships. Ukrainian forces last struck the Ryazan Oil Refinery on the night of January 23 to
24.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces recently made further advances within Velyka
Novosilka amid official Russian claims that Russian forces seized the entire settlement on January 26.
• The Russian MoD notably is paying an abnormally high amount of fanfare to the claimed Russian
seizure of Velyka Novosilka, very likely as part of informational efforts to shape Western perceptions of
the battlefield situation in Ukraine and degrade international support for Ukraine.
• The
seizure and clearing of Velyka Novosilka will likely present opportunities and a decision point to the
Russian military command on whether to redeploy elements of the Russian Eastern Military District
from the Velyka Novosilka area to other priority operational areas. Any redeployment of EMD elements from
the Velyka Novosilka area over the coming weeks will indicate the Russian military command’s priority
operational areas for offensive operations in Spring and Summer 2025.
• Russian forces are
poised to seize Toretsk in the coming days and a redeployment of elements of the EMD to reinforce the
Russian force grouping in the Toretsk direction would indicate a new Russian priority effort to resume
attacks in the direction of Kostyantynivka.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a second strike on
the Ryazan Oil Refinery in Ryazan Oblast on the night of January 25 to 26.
• Ukrainian forces
advanced in Kursk Oblast and regained positions in Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced
near Borova, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian government
on January 25 for not prioritizing the recruitment and training of Russia's next generation of military
officers.
Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone storage facilities in Oryol Oblast again on January 26.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 26 that the Ukrainian forces struck drone and thermobaric
warhead storage warehouses, causing secondary detonations. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the
strike destroyed over 200 Shahed drones. Oryol Oblast Governor Andrei Klychkov claimed on January 26 that
Ukrainian forces repeatedly attempted to strike Oryol Oblast and that Russian electronic warfare (EW)
interference downed a Ukrainian drone in Oryol Oblast. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation
Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian forces struck the same drone storage facility at
the end of December 2024.
The European Union (EU) proposed an aid package on January 27 to
Moldova and Transnistria to help the ongoing gas crisis in the pro-Russian breakaway republic as part of
efforts to reduce Russia's ability to exploit Transnistria in its energy blackmail schemes targeting
Chisinau. The package includes an immediate loan of three million cubic meters of gas to Transnistria and
offers a grant of 30 million euros (about $31.4 million) for Moldova to purchase gas – presumably from
the European market – from February 1 to 10 to support Transnistria's electricity production for domestic
consumption and export to the rest of Moldova. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean noted that the EU
will continue to support Chisinau after February 10 in order to ensure that Transnistria can continue to
produce electricity for Transnistria and Moldova. The EU aid package offers to invest in Transnistrian
electricity production and distribution over the next two years. The EU stated that it is also
considering supporting coal deliveries from Ukraine to Transnistria and that it has supported the
allocation of transmission capacity along the gas delivery route from Bulgaria and Romania to Moldova.
The Transnistrian Energy Operational Headquarters stated on January 27 that Transnistrian gas reserves
are running out and will last only until early February 2025 "at most." Russian business outlet
Kommersant reported on January 27 that its sources stated that Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz is in
discussions with Hungarian oil and gas company MOL and Hungarian electricity company MVM about buying gas
for Transnistria, the delivery of which would begin in early February 2025 and continue until late March
or early April 2025. Recean confirmed on January 27 that MOL presented Moldovagaz with a draft contract
on the supply of gas for Transnistria but that Moldovan authorities must verify the legality and
compliance of the contract with national and international law. Transnistrian authorities have previously
rejected Moldovan and Ukrainian offers of aid. ISW continues to assess that Transnistria's possible
acceptance of aid from Moldova, Ukraine, or the EU and Transnistria's subsequent supply of cheaper
electricity to the rest of Moldova would disrupt Russian efforts to use the energy crisis to strengthen
Transnistria's economic dependence on Moscow, to posture Russia as the breakaway republic's savior and
benefactor, and to leverage Chisinau's turn to higher priced European electricity as part of Moscow's
anti-EU narratives.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Khortytsia Group of Forces
Commander Brigadier General Andrii Hnatov with Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi on
January 26. Zelensky stated that Drapatyi will also remain Ground Forces Commander and that Hnatov will
become Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff. Zelensky noted that Drapatyi's dual position will
help combine the Ukrainian military's combat operations with the proper training of brigades and that
Hnatov will work to improve coordination between headquarters and the front.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone storage facilities in Oryol Oblast again on
January 26.
• The European Union (EU) proposed an aid package on January 27 to Moldova and
Transnistria to help the ongoing gas crisis in the pro-Russian breakaway republic as part of efforts to
reduce Russia's ability to exploit Transnistria in its energy blackmail schemes targeting Chisinau.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Khortytsia Group of Forces Commander Brigadier
General Andrii Hnatov with Ground Forces Commander Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi on January 26.
• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.
• Russian forces
recently advanced near Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, and Kurakhove.
• The Russian government continues
to expand the federal "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into
government positions, by creating similar programs for Russian veterans across government, including at
the regional level.
The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on January 28
to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria. The Russian delegation includes Deputy
Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Presidential Special Representative to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev.
Reuters reported that two Syrian sources stated that the delegation will meet with the new Syrian
government sometime this week. Bogdanov told Russian state media outlet RT that the visit aims to
strengthen Russian-Syrian historical relations based on common interests. Bloomberg reported that a
Russian source familiar with the matter stated that Russia is struggling to retain access to the Hmeimim
Air Base and Port of Tartus because negotiations with the new Syrian government are "stuck." Russian
milbloggers responded to the Russian delegation's arrival, claiming that Syria is "far from" Russia's
first or even second priority and cautioning against believing Russian or Syrian officials' "standard
phrases" about cooperation. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that there is no hope that
Russian-Syrian relations can return to their previous strength and that Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) holds
the upper hand in negotiations and can extract greater concessions from Russia.
The Russian
military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian
negotiations. Commercially available satellite imagery collected by Planet Labs PBC from January 18 and
27 shows that the Russian military loaded equipment onto the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships at
Tartus and that the Sparta II ship left the port while the Sparta remained. OSINT analyst MT Anderson
posted satellite imagery from January 23 showing the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler alongside the
port and possibly suggesting that the Russian military was loading vehicles onto the Sparta.<8> Bloomberg
reported on January 28 that a Russian source stated that two Russian transport ships — likely the Sparta
and Sparta II — had been waiting for weeks off Tartus before Syrian authorities allowed them to dock.
A senior NATO official acknowledged that Russia is escalating a sabotage and destabilization
campaign against European NATO member states to deter further military assistance to Ukraine. NATO Deputy
Assistant Secretary General James Appathurai stated at the European Parliament on January 28 that NATO
states have faced acts of sabotage in recent years, including train derailments, arson, attacks against
politicians' property, and assassination plots against defense industry figures, including a Kremlin plot
to assassinate Rheinmetall Head Armin Papperger. Appathurai emphasized that the Kremlin aims to "create
disquiet to undermine support for Ukraine" and called for NATO states to more assertively deter Russian
sabotage acts. The Kremlin has consistently attempted to use information operations to deter Western
states from providing additional military assistance to Ukraine. The Kremlin's sabotage and
destabilization campaign directly targeting NATO states supports ISW's assessment that Russian President
Vladimir Putin sees Russia as waging a hybrid war directly against NATO.
Key Takeaways:
• The first official Russian delegation arrived in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on
January 28 to discuss Russia's continued use of its military bases in Syria.
• The Russian
military continues to evacuate military assets from the Port of Tartus amid the ongoing Russian-Syrian
negotiations.
• The Russian military likely formed a separate unmanned systems regiment at the
military district level in order to augment Russia's unmanned systems capabilities. The creation of this
regiment supports the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) recent coordinated effort to establish the
Unmanned Systems Forces within the Russian military and centralize control over informal drone
detachments.
• A senior NATO official acknowledged that Russia is escalating a sabotage and
destabilization campaign against European NATO member states in Europe to deter further military
assistance to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk and near Pokrovsk, and
Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and in western
Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian government continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to
appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine to federal government positions as part of wider Kremlin efforts
to militarize Russian society.
Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Western military assistance remains vital to Ukraine's
ability to maintain its defense against Russian aggression. Putin gave an interview to Kremlin journalist
Pavel Zarubin published on January 28 in which he claimed that the war in Ukraine could be over within
two months if the West stops providing Ukraine with military assistance and that Ukraine's dependence on
Western military aid indicates that Ukraine has "no sovereignty." Putin's claims about how quickly the
war will end without further Western military assistance and his explicit rejection of Ukrainian
sovereignty are a part of long-term Kremlin information operations aimed at undermining Western support
for Ukraine and deterring additional Western military assistance. Putin is correct, however, that
additional Western military assistance — particularly US military assistance — remains critical to
maintaining and further developing Ukraine's warfighting capabilities. Ukrainian forces have consistently
proven throughout the war that they can achieve operationally- and strategically significant battlefield
victories when armed with sufficient quantities of US and other Western-provided military assistance.
Ukrainian forces have also maintained stubborn defenses even when poorly provisioned and notably forced
Russian forces to withdraw from Kyiv Oblast in April 2022 before significant deliveries of Western aid
even arrived at the frontline and significantly slowed the pace of Russian offensive operations in
Ukraine in Summer 2022. Putin and other Kremlin officials aim to portray Ukraine as weak and incapable of
adequately leveraging Western-provided weapons at this critical moment in Western policy discussions
about Ukraine — even though Ukraine has proven that it is anything but weak after fending off Russia for
the almost three years of war.
Putin's longstanding theory of victory relies on the assumption
that the West will abandon Ukraine, and only unwavering Western support and consistent deliveries of
Western military assistance to Kyiv can force Putin to abandon his theory and accept the need to offer
the concessions necessary for any resolution to the conflict acceptable to the United States, Europe, and
Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that only the United States can provide Ukraine with some critical
weapons and military equipment at the scale, speed, and regularity necessary for Ukraine's defense
against Russia, and Western officials have recently proposed that European states increasingly assist in
funding US military assistance to Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike at the
Russian oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, and reportedly hit a Russian arsenal in Tver
Oblast on the night of January 28 to 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 29 that elements
of Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the
Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez oil refinery in Kstovo and caused a fire. Ukrainian Center for Countering
Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko posted footage of the oil refinery fire in Kstovo and
reported that the refinery produces gasoline, diesel, aviation kerosene, and bitumen; processes 15 to 17
million tons of oil per year; and supports the Russian military. Geolocated footage posted on January 28
and 29 shows a fire at the Nizhny Novgorod Oil Refinery. Russian petrochemicals company Sibur-Ksotvo
Enterprise reported on January 29 that Ukrainian drone debris struck the enterprise on the night of
January 28 to 29, and Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin acknowledged that drone debris started
a fire in an industrial area. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on January 29 that Ukrainian
drones also struck the Russian Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD)'s 23rd Arsenal near Oktyabrsky, Tver Oblast, reportedly damaging an empty weapons storage building
and three other buildings. Ukrainian forces previously struck the Russian 23rd Arsenal in September
2024.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Western
military assistance remains vital to Ukraine's ability to maintain its defense against Russian
aggression.
• Putin's longstanding theory of victory relies on the assumption that the West
will abandon Ukraine, and only unwavering Western support and consistent deliveries of Western military
assistance to Kyiv can force Putin to abandon his theory and accept the need to offer the concessions
necessary for any resolution to the conflict acceptable to the US, Europe, and Ukraine.
• Putin indicated that he will not view any peace agreement with Ukraine as binding by claiming that
the Ukrainian government is either unwilling or unable to rescind the 2022 Ukrainian presidential decree
banning negotiations with Putin.
• Putin's statements rejecting the legitimacy of the
Ukrainian government and of a possible future peace agreement set conditions for Russia to justify
violating any future agreements with Ukraine.
• Putin continues efforts to coerce US President
Donald Trump into bilateral negotiations that exclude Ukraine, impose his desired negotiations framework
on Trump, and compel Trump to inadvertently endorse ongoing Russian information operations about the
illegitimacy of the current Ukrainian government.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike
at the Russian oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast and reportedly hit a Russian arsenal in
Tver Oblast on the night of January 28 to 29.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)
confirmed in a post on January 29 that Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik is the commander of the
Russian Southern Grouping of Forces.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and
near Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove,
Velyka Novosilka, Robotnye, and in the Dnipro direction.
• Volunteer recruitment rates in in
Moscow have dropped sharply, as Russian citizens grow increasingly unwilling to serve in Ukraine.
Kremlin newswire TASS published an interview with Valdai Discussion Club Research Director Fyodor
Lukyanov on January 30 entitled "Don't count on big agreements," highlighting the Kremlin's ongoing
efforts to shape domestic and global expectations about future negotiations between Russian President
Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump. The Valdai Discussion Club is an international forum where
Kremlin officials, Russian scholars, and foreign officials and scholars meet to discuss international
issues and has proven to be a useful tool in the Kremlin's decades-long efforts to influence Western
policy in Russia's favor. Lukyanov is a senior member and scholar at the Valdai Club, has repeatedly
moderated Putin's annual speech at Valdai, and is considered a well-connected and authoritative voice on
the Kremlin's foreign policy goals and objectives -- though he holds no formal position in the Russian
government. ISW is not prepared to assess or argue that Lukyanov has intimate and personal knowledge
about Putin's state of mind or intentions in future peace negotiations, but Lukyanov's statements in this
interview are generally consistent with Putin's and other Kremlin officials' statements about Russia's
future negotiating positions. TASS’ decision to leverage Lukyanov's interview to dampen domestic
speculation about the possibility of a peace agreement in the near future also highlights the relevance
of this interview and Lukyanov's statements when considering Russia's possible negotiating positions
vis-a-vis Ukraine and the United States.
Lukyanov stated during the interview that the "main
thing" for future peace negotiations regarding Ukraine is "not the territories" but addressing the "root
causes" of the war, which Lukyanov defined as NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early
2000s. Lukyanov stated with respect to Ukrainian lands Russian forces now hold that "with the
territories, everything is clear: how much you take is yours," further indicating that the Kremlin has no
intention of compromising on its territorial gains in Ukraine in future peace negotiations. This position
suggests that the Kremlin likely means for any future peace negotiations with Trump to start with the
United States recognizing Russia's territorial claims over Ukraine, likely including areas that Russia
does not currently occupy, before actual negotiations can begin that should focus on these so-called
"root causes." Lukyanov stated that Russia's chief demand for future peace negotiations with Trump is "a
change in the security landscape in Eastern Europe" and the "abandoning a number of provisions on
which NATO's existence and functioning are based." Lukyanov stated that Russia may also want to discuss
the possibility of "reducing the level of military presence," presumably along Russia's borders,
but noted that this is unlikely to happen.
Kremlin officials have repeatedly alluded to the
need for future peace negotiations to address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov defined in December 2024 as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to
advance eastward and "aggressive absorption" of areas near Russia's borders. Putin issued a series of
demands to the United States in December 2021 ahead of his full-scale invasion of Ukraine that included
that: NATO commit to not accepting Ukraine or any other countries as new members; the United States
commit to upholding the alleged ban on NATO enlargement; NATO not deploy any military forces to states
that became NATO members after May 1997; and NATO ban any military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe,
the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, among other things. The Financial Times (FT) reported on January
10, citing a former senior Kremlin official and another source who discussed the topic with Putin, that
Putin will maintain his pre-war demands of preventing Ukraine from joining NATO and forcing NATO to
withdraw deployments in Eastern Europe in any future negotiations. Lukyanov's statements are yet another
indication that the Kremlin remains committed to imposing its will and security interests on the United
States and Europe and is not interested in compromising on this goal.
Lukyanov's statements
assume that Trump and his administration are weak and more susceptible to being intimidated by the
Kremlin's shows of force than the former Biden Administration. Lukyanov claimed that Trump wants to "dump
all further problems" concerning Ukraine on Europe and "does not respect" European states or NATO more
broadly. Lukyanov claimed that Trump may be willing to compromise NATO's foundational principles to
appease Putin's demand for a NATO withdrawal from Eastern Europe and suggested more broadly that Trump
will abandon Ukraine and NATO. Lukyanov claimed that "Trump only respects those who show steadfastness"
and called on the Kremlin to "never give in" and "to be prepared for a fairly tough conversation, even
including elements of bluff" -- calling on the Putin to strongarm Trump and demonstrate his resolve in
future negotiations with Trump. Lukyanov's interview supports the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to force
Trump into acquiescing to Putin's demands that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation and the weakening of
NATO and Putin's personal efforts to position himself as Trump's equal on the international stage.
Key Takeaways:
• Kremlin newswire TASS published an interview with Valdai Discussion
Club Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov on January 30 entitled "Don't count on big agreements,"
highlighting the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to shape domestic and global expectations about future
negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump.
• Lukyanov stated during the interview that the "main thing" for future peace negotiations regarding
Ukraine is "not the territories" but addressing the "root causes" of the war, which Lukyanov defined as
NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe in the 1990s and early 2000s.
• Lukyanov's statements
assume that Trump and his administration are weak and more susceptible to being intimidated by the
Kremlin's shows of force than the former Biden Administration.
• People's Republic of China
(PRC)-based companies continue to supply Russia with critical materials needed to sustain Russia's war
efforts in Ukraine.
• The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a
resolution on January 28 defining its position on peace in Ukraine, closely echoing the principle of
"peace through strength" that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky previously outlined.
• The US military reportedly recently transferred Patriot missiles from Israel to Poland and is
expected to deliver these missiles to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost
positions near Kharkiv and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and
Kurakhove and in the Dnipro direction.
The United Kingdom (UK), Finland, and Czechia announced several immediate and longer-term military
assistance packages for Ukraine on January 31. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on January
31 that the UK will provide Ukraine with a military assistance package valued at two billion GBP (about
$2.5 billion), primarily for the purchase of air defense systems and funding for the localization of
defense production in Ukraine. Finnish Defense Minister Antti Hakkanen announced on January 31 that
Finland will provide Ukraine with a new tranche of military assistance valued at almost 200 million euros
(about $207 million). Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky stated on January 31 that the Czech government
is considering creating a new initiative to purchase artillery ammunition for Ukraine.
Russian
forces are expanding their salient north of Kupyansk as part of long-term operational efforts to push
Ukrainian forces from the east (left) bank of the Oskil River. Russian offensive operations along the
Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna (Kupyansk-Borova-Lyman) line gradually intensified in September 2024 after a
relatively low tempo period in early and mid-2024 during which Russian forces primarily conducted
infantry assaults and occasional platoon-sized mechanized assaults in the area. Ukrainian forces repelled
a reinforced battalion-sized Russian mechanized assault near Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk) in late
September 2024 – the first large Russian mechanized assault in this direction since Winter 2023-2024.
Russian forces have recently intensified offensive operations north of Kupyansk, particularly near
Dvorichna, as part of this broader intensification in the Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions.
Geolocated footage published on January 30 and 31 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally
advanced north of Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk and on the west bank of the Oskil River), advanced
in the southern outskirts of Zapadne (southwest of Dvorichna), and advanced northward along the west bank
of the Oskil River northwest of Novomlynsk (northeast of Dvorichna). The Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD) claimed on January 28 and 31 that Russian forces recently seized Dvorichna, and a Russian
milblogger claimed on January 31 that Russian forces seized Novomlynsk. ISW has not observed confirmation
of these claims, however.
Russian forces are also leveraging mechanized assaults to expand
their salient north of Kupyansk. Russian forces have conducted five company-sized mechanized assaults and
at least one reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction since late October
2024. The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on January
28 that Ukrainian forces have repelled four mechanized assaults of unspecified echelon since January 22
alone. The Russian military command has historically allocated armored vehicles to priority frontline
areas and intensified mechanized activity could indicate that the Kupyansk direction is becoming a
priority sector for Russian forces.
Key Takeaways:
• The United Kingdom (UK),
Finland, and Czechia announced several immediate and longer-term military assistance packages for Ukraine
on January 31.
• Russian forces are expanding their salient north of Kupyansk as part of
long-term operational efforts to push Ukrainian forces from the east (left) bank of the Oskil River.
• Elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Leningrad Military District ) are reportedly
leading the Russian effort to expand the salient north of Kupyansk.
• Elements of the Russian
1st Guards Tank Army (GTA) (Moscow Military District ) are also participating in the envelopment of
Kupyansk and are attempting to advance east of Kupyansk and to expand the Russian salient south of
Kupyansk near Kruhlyakivka likely in order to prepare for advances south of Kupyansk, cross the Oskil
River, and pressure Borova.
• Russian forces appear to be developing and disseminating a
doctrinal method for advances throughout the theater that aims to conduct slow envelopments of frontline
towns and settlements at a scale that is reasonable for Russian forces to conclude before culminating.
• The Russian military command has shown that it is willing to commit to operations that could
take six to nine months to conclude. Russian commanders are likely operating under the assumption or
direct knowledge that Russian President Vladimir Putin does not intend to end the war in Ukraine in the
near future.
• This Russian offensive method is bringing about slow operational maneuver on
the battlefield, but these envelopments require significant planning, foresight, manpower, and equipment
and do not restore rapid, mechanized maneuver to the battlefield.
• Russian forces are also
intensifying their efforts to close the remaining Ukrainian pocket west of Kurakhove.
• Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities agreed to accept a European Union (EU) package that includes
funding for gas purchases for Transnistria, further limiting Russia’s economic influence over the
pro-Russian breakaway republic.
• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil refinery in Volgograd
Oblast amid continued strikes against Russian energy and defense industrial infrastructure.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Western and Ukrainian officials continue to report that North Korean forces have withdrawn from
frontline positions in Kursk Oblast.
Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night
of January 31 to February 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven
Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast and occupied Crimea; seven Iskander-K cruise
missiles from occupied Crimea and Donetsk Oblast; eight Kh-22 cruise missiles from Tu-22M3 aircraft;
eight Kh-101/55 cruise missiles from Tu-95MS strategic bombers; 10 Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from tactical
aircraft over Voronezh Oblast; two Kh-31P anti-radiation missiles from the Black Sea; and 123 Shahed and
decoy drones from Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk,
Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces
shot down 56 Shahed and decoy drones; that 61 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic
warfare (EW) interference; and that Ukrainian countermeasures prevented an unspecified but significant
number of Russian missiles from reaching their targets. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian
ballistic missiles had a higher success rate, and ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are likely
leveraging ballistic missiles in strike packages since Ukraine only has a few air defense systems
suitable for intercepting such missiles. Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky, reported that a Russian Kh-22 missile struck a residential building in Poltava City; that
Russian ballistic missiles struck the historical center of Odesa City, and damaged a United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) protected building; and that drones damaged
residential areas, warehouses, and private property in Kharkiv and Kyiv oblasts. The Norwegian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs confirmed that Russian forces struck an area near where Norwegian diplomats were
staying in Odesa City. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russia's overnight strikes
targeted Ukrainian gas and energy facilities that support the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).
A recent Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian naval drone suggests that Russian forces have
developed a new method to offset Ukrainian capabilities in the Black Sea. The Russian MoD reported on
February 1 that Russia's Black Sea Fleet (BSF) used a drone to destroy a Ukrainian naval drone in the
Black Sea. Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian BSF launched a Kronshtadt Orion missile-capable
drone from an unspecified naval asset and that this strike may be the first documented case of Russian
forces leveraging a naval asset to deploy drones capable of destroying Ukrainian naval drones. Another
Russian milblogger called on Russian authorities to increase the production of weapons similar to the
drone-launched X-UAV missiles (TKB-1030) to effectively combat Ukrainian forces' naval drone capabilities
as it is now too risky for Russia to operate helicopters near the Black Sea. Ukrainian forces have
demonstrated their ability to down Russian Mi-8 helicopters operating over the Black Sea using missiles
launched from Magura V5 naval strike drones, and the February 1 BSF strike suggests that Russian forces
have developed a new method to try to offset this Ukrainian naval drone adaptation.
Key
Takeaways:
• Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes
against Ukraine on the night of January 31 to February 1.
• A recent Russian drone strike on a
Ukrainian naval drone suggests that Russian forces have developed a new method to offset Ukrainian
capabilities in the Black Sea.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian
forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
Russian forces reportedly struck a dormitory holding Russian civilians in
Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 1 as Russian authorities widely attempted to deny Russian responsibility
for the strike and blame Ukraine.
Russia continues efforts to illegally deport Ukrainian
children to occupied Crimea and Russia under the guise of evacuation and rehabilitation programs.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman,
Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
Russian forces continue to forcibly
mobilize civilians in occupied Ukraine into the Russian military in violation of the Geneva
Convention.
Russian forces continued to suffer high losses in January 2025 despite a slower rate of advance as
compared with previous months in late 2024. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on February
3 that Russian forces suffered 48,240 casualties – over three Russian motorized rifle divisions worth of
personnel – in January 2025, making January the second highest month of losses since Russia's full-scale
invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.<1> ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian
forces gained roughly 498 square kilometers in January in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, or roughly 16.1
square kilometers per day. The available figures suggest Russian forces suffered roughly 96 casualties
per square kilometer of territory seized. The Ukrainian MoD reported that Russian forces suffered 48,670
casualties in December 2024 – their highest monthly casualty rate since the start of Russia's full-scale
invasion – and ISW assessed that Russian forces gained a total of 593 square kilometers in December 2024.
The roughly 100-square-kilometer decrease in seized territory between December 2024 and January 2025,
coupled with a similar monthly casualty rate, indicates that Russian forces are taking the same high
level of losses despite achieving fewer territorial advances in the near term. ISW previously observed
that Russian advances slowed from November 2024 to December 2024. ISW previously assessed that the
Russian military command likely tolerated record levels of personnel casualties from September 2024
through November 2024 to facilitate larger territorial gains, but it remains unclear whether the Russian
military command will be willing to sustain such casualties if Russian forces' rate of advance continues
to decline as Russian forces are advancing on more heavily defended settlements such as Pokrovsk.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces continued to suffer high losses in January 2025
despite a slower rate of advance as compared with previous months in late 2024.
• Ukrainian
forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure in Volgograd and
Astrakhan oblasts on the night of February 2 to 3.
• Ukrainian forces continue to innovate
with drone operations to maintain their technological advantage over Russia and bring about battlefield
effects.
• The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU)
expressed concern about the "sharp rise" in reports of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of
war (POWs).
• Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on February 3 that
Ukraine has started implementing organizational reforms to transition the Ukrainian Armed Forces into a
"corps structure."
• Unspecified actors assassinated Armen Sargsyan, the founder of the
"Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion, who has been involved in Russia's hybrid activities and invasions of
Ukraine since 2014.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, and Russian forces
recently advanced near Kupyansk, Borova, Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and in the
Dnipro direction.
• The Russian government is expanding the federal "Time of Heroes" program,
which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into government positions, to occupied Ukraine as part of
long-term efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska
Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess damage to the substation as Russian
long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue to threaten Ukraine's nuclear power plants
(NPPs) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities. Grossi did not specify when Russian forces damaged
the Kyviska Electrical Substation but emphasized that a direct strike on the substation or a power supply
disruption could cause a nuclear accident. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne noted that the Kyivska Electrical
Substation is connected to the Rivne NPP and supplies Kyiv City and central and northern Ukraine with
power. Russian forces launched a large series of missile and drone strikes targeting Ukrainian energy
infrastructure connected to Ukrainian NPPs on the night of November 16 to 17, 2024. Grossi reported that
the November 2024 Russian strikes damaged several unspecified electrical substations that are connected
to the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs but that the strikes did not damage the NPPs
themselves. Russian strikes against Ukrainian electrical substations — not just NPPs — continue to
threaten Ukraine's energy generation abilities and can cause long-term damage. Artur Lorkowski, the
director of the Energy Community (an international organization that manages Ukraine’s energy
procurement), told Politico in November 2024 that repairing damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure may
require a significant amount of time because it can take up to one year for Ukraine to find and reinstall
specialized equipment, including auto transformers. Another Ukrainian energy expert told Politico that
Ukraine needs an expedited supply of spare parts for energy infrastructure.
Russian officials
continue to justify the Kremlin's decision to not conduct an involuntary reserve call up at this time
despite indications that the Russian military is struggling to recruit enough new personnel to replace
its high casualties. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed on
February 4 that Russia does not need to conduct another partial involuntary reserve call up because
Russia currently has the battlefield "advantage." Duma Defense Committee member Viktor Sobolev added that
740,000 people have signed Russian military service contracts — presumably since the start of Russia's
full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 — and claimed that mobilization would "only make things worse"
because it would send people without any previous military experience or specialized skills to the
frontline. Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Andrei Krasov also claimed that mobilization
is unnecessary because Russian military registration and enlistment officers are successfully recruiting
new personnel. These Russian Duma deputies are likely claiming that Russian recruitment rates are
sufficient in order to assuage fears among the Russian public of a widely unpopular potential new partial
involuntary reserve call up.
A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port
of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's
continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on
February 3 that Russian and Syrian authorities will continue contacts on "all issues," including about
Russia's continued access to the Port of Tartus. Data from MarineTraffic.com showed that the Russian
Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships were off the coast of Tunisia on February 4. OSINT analyst MT Anderson
posted satellite imagery from the morning of February 4 showing thе Sparta and Sparta II, as well
as potentially the Alexander Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship, the Admiral Golovko Admiral
Gorshkov-class frigate, and the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate off the coast of Tunisia.
Satellite imagery and reports from Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) indicated that
all these vessels had been at the Port of Tartus in December 2024 and January 2025. The departure of a
significant number of vessels from the Port of Tartus suggests that the Kremlin is not optimistic about
the results of ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. The location of the vessels off the coast of Tunisia
also suggests that these ships are not bound for Libya despite the fact that Russia sent some assets from
Syria to Libya by air in December 2024 and January 2025 - as the Critical Threats Project's (CTP) Africa
File previously reported. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's Resistance Center reported on February 4
that Russian ships began evacuating weapons from the Port of Tartus on January 27, and satellite imagery
collected on January 18 and 27 showed that the Russian military had loaded equipment onto the Sparta and
Sparta II at Tartus. The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that the Sparta II turned off its automatic
identification system (AIS) after leaving Syria - a common practice among ships in Russia's "shadow
fleet."
Key Takeaways:
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General
Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess
damage to the substation as Russian long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue threaten
Ukraine's nuclear power plants (NPPS) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities.
• Russian
officials continue to justify the Kremlin's decision to not conduct an involuntary reserve call up at
this time despite indications that the Russian military is struggling to recruit enough new personnel to
replace its high casualties.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to discuss Russia's
possible illegal annexation of Kharkiv Oblast but claimed that Ukraine's September 2022 counteroffensive
in Kharkiv Oblast spoiled Russia's plans to hold a "referendum" in the region at that time.
• A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have
left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in
Syria reportedly continue.
• Ukrainian naval drone strikes have likely forced Russia to
dramatically alter Russian ships' routes between Russia and Syria.
• Russia has also
reportedly used vessels belong to the MoD's Oboronlogistika company to monitor NATO vessels in the Baltic
Sea.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk.
• A Kremlin-affiliated
Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the Siversk direction continue to struggle with
systemic issues with field commanders filing false progress reports despite recent command changes.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his willingness to negotiate with Russia
from a principled position that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the long
run. Zelensky reiterated during an interview published on February 4 that Ukraine cannot and will not
compromise its sovereignty in future peace negotiations, but that Ukraine's partners are not currently
providing Ukraine with sufficient military assistance for Ukrainian forces to push Russian forces from
all occupied Ukrainian territory. Zelensky stated that he is willing to negotiate directly with Russian
President Vladimir Putin but warned that any peace agreement that significantly weakens Ukraine's ability
to defend itself in the future risks another Russian invasion of Ukraine. Zelensky stated that Ukraine
will never recognize Russia's illegal occupation of Ukrainian territory and emphasized that there can be
no compromise on Ukraine's sovereignty. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine will eventually retake all its
territory militarily and diplomatically but noted that the liberation of all Ukrainian territory from
Russian occupation will take time. Zelensky called on Ukraine's allies to pressure Putin and demand that
Russian forces withdraw from all Ukrainian territory. Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine wants peace and
that the United States, Europe, Ukraine, and Russia must all be represented in future peace negotiations.
Zelensky's statements highlight that Putin's unwillingness to participate in good-faith negotiations is
the true impediment to the end of the war, despite Putin's recent efforts to falsely blame Zelensky and
Ukraine for the lack of progress towards peace in Ukraine.
Zelensky reiterated that the
Ukrainian Constitution bans Ukraine from holding elections during wartime, but that Ukraine remains
committed to holding elections in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution and laws after the war ends.
Zelensky stated that Ukraine would have to change its constitution to hold an election outside of peace
time and asked how Ukrainian servicemembers, citizens living in Russian-occupied Ukraine, and Ukrainian
refugees and expatriates living abroad would be able to vote in the election before the Ukrainian
government lifts martial law. Zelensky stated that Ukraine will "definitely" hold elections after the war
ends but that Ukraine currently must focus on defending itself from Russian aggression. Putin and other
Kremlin officials have repeatedly used deliberately false readings of Ukraine's law and constitution to
claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate president after Ukraine, adhering to the law and constitution, did
not hold elections under martial law in 2024. The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government from holding
elections or amending the Ukrainian constitution in times of martial law, and the Ukrainian government
legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.
Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Russian forces have suffered roughly 300,000 to
350,000 killed in action (KIA) and roughly 600,000 to 700,000 wounded in action (WIA) since the February
2022 start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Zelensky added that Russian military personnel
suffer a 2:1 wounded to killed ratio because Russian field medicine is poor, and Russian forces struggle
to evacuate wounded personnel from the battlefield. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr
Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 —
150,000 of which were KIA. Zelensky's and Syrskyi's figures indicate that the Russian military suffered
roughly 41 to 48 percent of its total casualties in Ukraine since 2022 in 2024 alone. The highest range
of Zelensky's estimates are notably larger than recent Russian casualty figures from the Ukrainian
General Staff and former US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. Zelensky also stated that roughly 50,000 to
70,000 Russian soldiers have been classified as missing in action (MIA) since February 2022.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to demonstrate his
willingness to negotiate with Russia from a principled position that preserves Ukraine's sovereignty and
territorial integrity in the long run.
• Zelensky reiterated that the Ukrainian Constitution
bans Ukraine from holding elections during wartime, but that Ukraine remains committed to holding
elections in accordance with Ukraine’s constitution and laws after the war ends.
• Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 4 that Russian forces have suffered roughly 300,000 to
350,000 killed in action (KIA) and roughly 600,000 to 700,000 wounded in action (WIA) since the February
2022 start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a strike
against an oil depot in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 4 to 5 as a part of an ongoing strike
campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.
• The Russian
military continues efforts to restructure Russia's peacetime military administrative control over
military services (вид; vid) and is apparently disaggregating administrative control
for Russia’s Air Force and Navy from Russia’s military districts.
• The Kremlin continues to
prioritize domestic political stability over efforts to mitigate economic pressure and labor
shortages.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange on
February 5.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and
Kurakhove.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.
Executive Summary: A small group of Ukrainian
troops in Kursk Oblast have complicated the Russian military's efforts to advance in Ukraine over the
last six months. Roughly a division's worth of Ukrainian troops have undermined the Russian military's
ability to launch or renew offensive operations in lower-priority areas of the frontline and to reinforce
priority efforts with elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units. The Ukrainian incursion in Kursk
Oblast is a partial proof of concept of how limited Ukrainian battlefield activity that leverages
vulnerabilities in Russia's warfighting capabilities and that integrates technological adaptations with
mechanized maneuver can have theater-wide impacts on operations. It showed that surprise is still
possible even on a partially transparent battlefield and that rapid maneuver is possible under the right
conditions. The war in Ukraine, in other words, is not permanently stalemated. Either side can
potentially restore maneuver and begin to gain or regain significant territory. Russia will be able to do
so if the West reduces or cuts off aid. Ukraine may be able to do so if Western support continues to
empower Ukrainian innovation.
The Russian military command has gathered around 78,000 troops,
including 11,000 North Koreans, in an attempt to expel Ukrainian forces from positions in Kursk Oblast
over the last six months. An estimated 11,000 Ukrainian forces advanced into Kursk Oblast in early August
2024, seizing the tactical initiative and complicating the Russian military's Fall 2024 offensive effort.
Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly delayed his deadlines for Russian forces to push Ukrainian
troops from Kursk Oblast first by mid-October 2024 then by January 2025 and repeatedly prioritized
Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast over regaining control of the Kursk salient, which Russian forces
still had not done at the end of January 2025. Putin has not been able fully to insulate Russian forces
in Donetsk Oblast from the theater-wide impacts of the incursion, however, and the Russian military has
simultaneously been pulling troops, armored vehicles, and artillery and air defense systems away from
other sectors in Ukraine to reinforce the Russian force grouping fighting in Kursk Oblast. Recent
Ukrainian estimates indicate that Putin has accumulated roughly 67,000 Russian troops and 11,000 North
Korean troops in Kursk Oblast expel a reinforced Ukrainian grouping in Kursk Oblast that now constitutes
at most 30,000 troops by the most generous Western estimations.
Ukraine conducted the
incursion at a critical moment to gain leverage in the battlespace and successfully inflicted asymmetric,
theater-wide impacts on the Russian military with this limited ground operation. The first seven months
of 2024 were characterized by the Russian seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024, continued Russian
offensive operations west of Avdiivka in Spring and Summer 2024, the Russian offensive operations in
northern Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024, and intensified Russian offensive operations in the Toretsk and
Kurakhove directions in June and July 2024. Critical delays in Western aid over the winter of 2023-2024
created shortages in Ukraine's air defense interceptors and Ukrainian artillery units and wider
vulnerabilities in Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian attacks. Western leaders and intelligence
agencies spent most of early 2024 advocating for Ukraine to maintain an "active defense" and focus on
repelling and slowing Russian advances before attempting another counteroffensive operation possibly in
2025. The Ukrainian incursion refocused the conversation and allowed Ukraine to seize the narrative and
tactical initiative. The Ukrainian incursion reportedly stymied a planned Russian offensive into Sumy
Oblast, prevented the Russian military from substantially reinforcing its offensive in northern Kharkiv
Oblast, and complicated but failed to stop Russian advances in priority sectors of Donetsk Oblast.
Ukrainian officials have never suggested that they intended to hold positions in Kursk Oblast in
perpetuity. Ukrainian officials have instead repeatedly characterized the incursion as an effort to
distract and pin Russian forces away from Russia's main operational objectives in Ukraine. ISW assesses
as of February 5 that Russian forces had retaken at least 57 percent (roughly 655 square kilometers) of
the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. The Russian military certainly can expel Ukrainian forces from
Russia whenever it chooses to allocate the necessary resources but has yet to prioritize this effort over
making further advances in eastern Ukraine. Russian authorities may prioritize pushing Ukrainian forces
from Russian territory in the coming months, however, particularly if Russian officials begin to
seriously consider peace negotiations and intend to enter such negotiations from the strongest possible
position. It is too early to determine the long-term impacts of the incursion on the resolution of the
war in Ukraine, and these impacts will almost certainly be affected by Ukraine's ability to capitalize on
the military and political pressures that the incursion has created for Russia. Ukraine may be able to
replicate and exploit the pressure that Kursk has inflicted on the Russian military if the West continues
to support Ukraine and if Ukraine can address its own manpower, morale, and materiel issues and identify
a key location and moment to conduct a similar such operation in the future.
Ukrainian forces launched a new series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in Kursk Oblast and
advanced up to five kilometers behind Russian lines southeast of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 6.
Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of
Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha) and north and east of Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha) along
the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway and seized Kolmakov (north of Cherkasskaya Konopelka) and Fanaseyevka
(just southeast of Cherkasskaya Konopelka). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian
forces attacked in several waves in the direction of Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Ulanok (southeast of
Cherkasskaya Konopelka along the 38K-028 highway) with up to two mechanized battalions' worth of armored
vehicles and that Russian forces repelled the attack. Russian milbloggers estimated that Ukrainian forces
attacked with 30 to 50 armored vehicles and claimed that one group of Ukrainian forces successfully
attacked from Makhnovka towards Cherkasskaya Konopelka, Fanaseyevka, and Ulanok and that Russian forces
repelled another Ukrainian group that attacked from Dmitriukov (just east of Makhnovka) towards Russkaya
Konopelka (east of Sudzha). A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized
Cherkasskaya Konopelka, but two other milbloggers denied this claim. Some Russian sources claimed that
Ukrainian forces broke through to or even seized Ulanok, but other sources also denied these claims. ISW
has not yet observed geolocated evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces are operating in Ulanok. The
Ukrainian General Staff published a map on February 6 indicating that Russian forces recently marginally
advanced in a forested area southwest of Kurilovka.
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger
claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that Ukrainian forces also attacked near Kruglenkoye
(northwest of Sudzha), but ISW did not observe additional claims of Ukrainian activity in this area or
north of Sudzha near Berdin where Ukrainian forces attacked in early January 2025.<7> Russian milbloggers
claimed that Ukrainian forces launched the attacks southeast of Sudzha during poor weather conditions
that complicated Russian drone operations in the area. Some Russian milbloggers expressed concern that
further Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast could threaten rear areas of the Russian force grouping
attacking Guyevo (south of Sudzha) and complicate Russia's ability to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of
communication (GLOCs) within the Ukrainian salient. Russian sources acknowledged that elements of the
Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 30th Motorized Rifle
Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps , Leningrad Military District ), and
177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and Chechen Akhmat drone operators are the main forces
defending against the Ukrainian attacks southeast of Sudzha.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces launched a new series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in Kursk Oblast and
advanced up to five kilometers behind Russian lines southeast of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast on February 6.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin praised elite Russian VDV and naval infantry formations
defending Kursk Oblast on February 5, highlighting the fact that the Ukrainian incursion has pinned about
a combined arms army’s worth of Russian troops in Kursk Oblast since August 6, 2024.
• Ukrainian officials provided additional details about Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast in honor of
the six-month anniversary of the incursion.
• A Russian state-run poll suggests that the
Russian public maintains a high level of support for the war in Ukraine despite mounting challenges.
• North Korea appears to be using its alliance with Russia to leverage the war in Ukraine as a
testing ground to refine its missile technology and broader military capabilities.
• Ukrainian
forces conducted a strike against an air base in Krasnodar Krai on the night of February 5 to 6 as a part
of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries.
• Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military assistance to Ukraine.
• Russian
President Vladimir Putin appointed Deputy Minister of Transport Dmitry Bakanov to replace Yuri Borisov as
head of the state-owned Russian space agency Roscosmos on February 6.
• Ukrainian forces
recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and recaptured lost positions near Kurakhove.
• Russian
forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, and Kurakhove.
• Russian authorities
continue efforts to increase social benefits for Russian military personnel likely to support ongoing
recruitment efforts.
Ukrainian forces marginally advanced during mechanized assaults in their salient in Kursk Oblast on
February 6, but Russian sources claimed on February 6 and 7 that Russian forces have at least temporarily
stalled Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha. Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that
Ukrainian forces marginally advanced along the 38K-028 Sudzha-Oboyan highway and in the fields east of
Fanaseyevka (southeast of Sudzha) during the February 6 attacks. Russian sources widely claimed that
Russian forces repelled all Ukrainian attacks on February 6 and on the night of February 6 to 7 but
acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain some positions near Cherkasskaya Konopelka (north of
Fanaseyevka), Fanaseyevka, and Ulanok (east of Fanaseyevka). A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger
claimed that fighting is ongoing on the outskirts of Makhnovka (just southeast of Sudzha) but that
Ukrainian forces did not launch new attacks near Cherkasskaya Konopelka during the day on February 7.
Russian milbloggers continued to issue conflicting claims about the situation in Cherkasskaya Konopelka.
Some milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have seized the settlement, while others claimed that
Ukrainian forces bypassed the settlement or that Russian forces have retaken the settlement. ISW cannot
independently verify Russian claims about the situation in Cherkasskaya Konopelka. A Russian milblogger
claimed that Russian forces are effectively using fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones to counter
Ukrainian forces attacking in the area.
Russian sources provided additional information about
the Russian force grouping defending southeast of Sudzha. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported
that elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet),
40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), "Veterany"
Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps), "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army
, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps , SMD), and drone operators of the
Russian Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are defending in the area. Russian milbloggers
widely credited drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz forces with defending against the
Ukrainian attacks on February 6 and 7 and complained that the Russian MoD did not acknowledge the Chechen
drone operators. Russian milbloggers also claimed that the Russian military command reportedly removed
the 11th VDV Brigade's commander and that the MoD is blaming the commander for failing to sufficiently
man and defend Russian positions near Cherkasskaya Konopelka.
The Kremlin continues to conduct
an information campaign likely directed toward both domestic and international audiences that aims to
conceal the extent to which Russia's protracted war against Ukraine has negatively affected Russia's
economy. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin met on February 7 with Russian President Vladimir Putin
to discuss the state of the Russian economy. Mishustin claimed that Russia's gross domestic product (GDP)
rose in 2024 by 4.1 percent largely due to "intensive" growth in Russia's manufacturing industry – likely
referring to Russia's boost of its defense industrial base (DIB) since the start of its full-scale
invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Mishustin claimed that the main contributors to the growth in
Russia's manufacturing sector were the machine-building, transport engineering, automotive, and computer
and electronic equipment sectors.
Mishustin claimed that inflation in Russia reached 9.52
percent in 2024, and Putin claimed that inflation was already 9.9 percent as of February 3, 2025.
Russia's true inflation is quite higher than the official statistics the Kremlin is willing to publicize,
however. (Several studies indicate that Russia’s inflation rate is closer to 20 percent.) Mishustin
highlighted Russia's low 2024 unemployment rate of 2.5 percent but only briefly acknowledged Russia's
significant labor shortages, which are the reason for Russia's low unemployment.
Mishustin
noted that Russian economic growth might be less significant in 2025 as it is very important to stop
inflation and ensure long-term economic growth – likely a signal to prepare the Russian population to
expect economic hardships in 2025. Mishustin and Putin also attempted to posture Russia's economy as
stable in the face of international economic pressure. Mishustin claimed that Russia's fuel and energy
complex is adapting and finding new markets.
Mishustin claimed that Russia's economy has
"successfully managed" with "unprecedented sanctions pressure" in recent years and that anti-Russian
sanctions are hurting the states that imposed the sanctions more than the sanctions are hurting Russia.
Putin similarly attempted to posture Russia's economy as stronger and growing more rapidly than economies
in the West. Mishustin and Putin notably did not mention how the Russian Central Bank raised the interest
rate to 21 percent in October 2024 or how Russia has been drawing from its National Welfare Fund to
finance its war effort over the last three years. The liquidity portion of Russia’s National Welfare fund
may run out by Fall 2025.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces marginally advanced
during mechanized assaults in their salient in Kursk Oblast on February 6, but Russian sources claimed on
February 6 and 7 that Russian forces have at least temporarily stalled Ukrainian advances southeast of
Sudzha.
• The Kremlin continues to conduct an information campaign likely directed toward
both domestic and international audiences that aims to conceal the extent to which Russia's protracted
war against Ukraine has negatively affected Russia's economy.
• Ukrainian military officials
continue to highlight the country’s growing drone production capacity and its effectiveness on the
battlefield but acknowledged that Ukraine must address its force generation issues to fully stop Russian
advances in eastern Ukraine.
• Interim Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra stated in an
interview with the Washington Post that Syria is open to Russia retaining its air and naval bases in
Syria if there are “benefits” for Syria.
• Azerbaijan-Russia relations continue to sour
following Russia’s refusal to take full responsibility for the December 25, 2024 downing of an
Azerbaijani Airlines (AZAL) passenger plane, likely shot mid-air by Russian air defense before crashing
in Aktau, Kazakhstan
• Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers appointed Lieutenant General Yevhen
Moysiuk and Captain Valeriy Churkin as Deputy Defense Ministers on February 7.
• Russian
forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk.
• The Russian government continues to use
its "Time of Heroes" program to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine to regional government
positions.
Russia may be providing drone and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops
fighting in Kursk Oblast. Japanese outlet NHK, citing multiple sources familiar with Russia–North Korea
relations, reported on February 8 that Russia has agreed to assist North Korea in developing and
mass-producing various types of drones in exchange for North Korean forces supporting Russia’s war effort
against Ukraine. NHK noted that Russia remains reluctant to help North Korea develop nuclear weapons,
fearing that North Korean nuclear tests could further strain relations with the United States and
complicate relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), however. Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky noted on February 8 that Russia is specifically spreading modern technology to North Korea,
including drone technology, and told Reuters on February 7 that thousands of North Korean troops have
returned to active combat in Kursk Oblast after a brief pause. A Ukrainian brigade operating in Kursk
Oblast published a video on February 8 reportedly showing North Korean forces conducting assaults
alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast. South Korean sources recently reported that Russia withdrew
North Korean troops from the battlefield in Kursk Oblast in mid-January 2025, possibly for rest and
reconstitution or to rethink how Russia is using these troops. ISW assesses that North Korea is using the
war in Ukraine as a testing ground for its own military capabilities. Reuters reported on February 6 that
North Korean ballistic missiles fired by Russian forces since December 2024 have demonstrated
significantly improved accuracy, likely an example of North Korean capability enhancement gained through
the North Korea-Russia alliance.
Russia continues to expand its military capabilities,
indicating that the Kremlin has no immediate interest in negotiations or a lasting peace with Ukraine.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, citing Ukrainian intelligence, reported on February 8 that
Russian forces are forming new military divisions, building additional defense-industrial base (DIB)
facilities, planning to increase military personnel by over 100,000 soldiers, and deepening military
cooperations with North Korea. Then–Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in January 2023 that
Russia would create 14 new military divisions, but ISW is unable to assess whether Zelensky is referring
to these previously announced plans or the creation of additional new divisions. ISW also cannot verify
the status of the formation of the 14 divisions Shoigu previously announced. Zelensky highlighted that
Russia's force-generation, restructuring, and defense-production efforts make it clear that Putin is not
interested in negotiations with Ukraine and seeks to continue Russia’s war. Such Russian plans suggest
that Russia, not Ukraine, is the party refusing good-faith negotiations and actively pushing for
protracted war rather than peace, while also setting conditions to prepare for a potential broader
conflict with NATO. Russian officials and information space have frequently framed the war in Ukraine as
a part of a larger confrontation with the West.
The Russian command may be redeploying forces
from the Kurakhove direction towards Toretsk in order to facilitate Russian offensive operations against
Kostyantynivka in Spring or Summer 2025. A Russian source claimed that the Russian military command is
redeploying elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments, 163rd Tank Regiment, and 381st
Artillery Regiment (all of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division) and elements of the 96th regiment
(possibly also part of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, although ISW has not previously observed
reports of this unit operating in Ukraine) from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk direction. ISW has
not observed confirmation or other reporting on this alleged redeployment. Another Russian source claimed
that elements of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments are operating near Dachne as of February
8, however. A redeployment of elements of the 8th CAA to the Toretsk direction- in conjunction with
intensified Russian efforts in the Chasiv Yar direction in recent weeks- would indicate that the Russian
command may intend to prioritize advances towards Kostyantynivka and pressuring Ukraine's fortress belt
in 2025, as ISW previously assessed.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia may be providing drone
and missile technology to North Korea in exchange for North Korean troops fighting in Kursk Oblast.
• Russia continues to expand its military capabilities, indicating that the Kremlin has no
immediate interest in negotiations or a lasting peace with Ukraine.
• The Russian command may
be redeploying forces from the Kurakhove direction towards Toretsk in order to facilitate Russian
offensive operations against Kostyantynivka in Spring or Summer 2025.
• The Baltic States cut
ties with the Soviet-era power grid that connected them to Belarus and Russia on February 8 as part of
efforts to achieve full energy independence from Russia and further integrate their energy infrastructure
with the European Union (EU).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, and
Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Toretsk.
• The Kremlin continues
efforts to incentivize Russian citizens to serve in the military.
Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to offset the
resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency
reported on February 9, citing South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), that thousands of North
Korean workers arrived in Russia in 2024 to take construction jobs. Russian official data shows that
13,221 North Koreans entered Russia in 2024 — up to 12 times the number that entered Russia in 2023. Many
of the North Korean workers are reportedly entering Russia on student visas, with 7,887 North Koreans
having entered Russia in 2024 for alleged education purposes. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii
reported on February 4 that the number of North Koreans who came to Russia to study in 2024 was the
highest number since 2019. Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported in November 2024 that data from
the Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service showed that a record number of North Koreans entered
Russia for education between July and September 2024 — notably in the lead up to the reported start of
North Korea's deployment of troops to Russia in early October 2024.
Russia has been suffering
from significant labor shortages in both its civilian and defense industrial sectors since the start of
its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The arrival of several thousands of North Koreans to work in civilian
sectors is marginal and will not significantly alleviate Russia's labor shortages. Russia reportedly has
an estimated labor shortage of 1.5 million workers as of December 2024, for example. North Korea's
provisions of materiel and troops to Russia have significantly increased over the course of 2024,
however, and the several thousands of North Korean workers that arrived in Russia recently may be the
beginning of larger influxes in the future that could more significantly help Russia's labor shortage
issues. (Russian forces‘ initial use of small numbers of North Korean artillery and mortar shells grew
rapidly, with 60 percent of Russian forces‘ artillery ammunition fired now being sourced from North Korea
as of December 2024.) Russian enterprises are also likely not paying North Korean workers the same
salaries as Russian citizens, so a significant influx of North Korean workers into the Russian work force
in the future could also financially benefit Russian enterprises that are having to offer high salaries
to Russian citizens in order to compete against Russian military and defense industrial enterprises for
employees. Significant increases in the number of North Koreans working in Russia's civilian sectors in
the future could also free up Russian civilian sector employees to work in the Russian defense industrial
base (DIB) or fight in Ukraine.
The arrival of North Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how
Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution
2397. Russia voted for Resolution 2397 in 2017 in response to North Korea's intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) tests. The resolution explicitly prohibits North Korea from sending its citizens abroad
for work and mandated that all UN member states expel all North Koreans "earning income" abroad by
December 2019. Russia is likely using the guise of student visas to hide Russia's violation of the
resolution.
North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un continues to reiterate his support for Russia
and its war effort in Ukraine. Kim gave a speech at the North Korean Ministry of National Defense on
February 9 that heavily focused on the threats the US and the West allegedly pose to North Korean
security. Kim criticized the US for protracting the war in Ukraine and claimed that he is "seriously
concerned" about the West's alleged desire to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia. Kim notably claimed
that the North Korean military and people will "invariably support and encourage" Russia's "just cause"
to defend its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity "in the spirit of" the June 2024
Russian-North Korean comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with US adversaries, including North Korea, to
offset the resource shortages constraining Russia's economy and war effort.
• The arrival of
North Korean workers to Russia demonstrates how Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC), is violating UNSC Resolution 2397.
• North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un
continues to reiterate his support for Russia and its war effort in Ukraine.
• German
authorities reportedly failed to down suspected Russian reconnaissance drones flying near a German
military facility in January 2025 where Ukrainian forces have undergone training.
• Russia
appears to be leveraging the technological innovations it is developing in its war in Ukraine directly
against NATO states.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near
Vovchansk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia continues efforts to recruit Russians and citizens of other Commonwealth of Independent
State (CIS) countries to sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced the Ukrainian "Drone Line" project on February 10 as
part of ongoing Ukrainian efforts to integrate drone and ground operations. Umerov stated that the
Ukrainian military will "scale up" five existing drone regiments and brigades in the Ukrainian military
and border guard service and will integrate infantry and drones into a single strike system, which will
enable Ukrainian forces to create kill zones 10 to 15 kilometers deep, will provide constant aerial
support and infantry cover, and will detect and destroy Russian forces before they can approach Ukrainian
positions. Ukraine's Ground Forces reported that the expansion of five such existing drone units is only
the first stage of the Drone Line project. This project likely formalizes and provides additional support
to ongoing Ukrainian efforts to expand drone units and increase their coordination with regiments and
brigades, while keeping regular units and drone units separate in order to support drone units' more
rapid combat and technological adaptations and innovations.
Ukraine's efforts to integrate
drone operations with ground operations significantly differ from Russian efforts to centralize drone
units. Russian efforts to centralize drone units have attempted to augment Russian drone capabilities by
expanding state control over drone operators and developers and increasing their incorporation into the
Russian military bureaucracy. The Russian military began efforts to centralize drone operators and
developers in Fall 2024, disbanding informal Russian drone detachments and removing drone specialists
from regular military units, then selectively reorganizing them to form new Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD)-controlled drone units and centralizing their assets. The Russian MoD also reportedly established
its first separate unmanned systems regiment at the military district level in January 2024, further
highlighting ongoing efforts to centralize and bureaucratize control over drone operations. ISW continues
to assess that the Russian MoD's efforts to centralize and reorganize drone units and monopolize drone
production and procurement processes may complicate Russian forces' ability to rapidly innovate and adapt
new technologies and combat techniques in the short- to medium-term.
Ukrainian forces continue
to target oil refineries in Russia as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense
industrial enterprises and oil refineries. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation
Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko implied on February 10 that Ukrainian drones struck Krasnodar City and the
Afipsky Oil Refinery in Neftekachka, Krasnodar Krai just south of Krasnodar City. Kovalenko noted that
the Afipsky refinery has a production capacity of 6.25 million tons of oil per year and plays a vital
role in providing fuel to the Russian military, particularly in southern Ukraine. Kovalenko highlighted
that the refinery's location in Krasnodar Krai makes it a significant logistical hub supplying diesel
fuel and jet fuel to Russian forces. The Afipsky Oil Refinery notably borders the base of the Russian
90th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army , Southern Military District ),
which has previously been armed with Buk-M2 and Buk-M3 air defense systems, although the base's current
air defense capabilities are unknown. Geolocated footage published on February 9 shows an explosion near
Krasnodar City. Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev claimed on February 10 that Russian forces
downed a Ukrainian drone over Krasnodar City, damaging a residential building. Kondratyev claimed that
Russian forces also downed a drone over Afipsky and that debris damaged a private residence. Krasnodar
City Mayor Evgeny Naumov claimed on February 10 that drone debris fell near a market.
Key
Takeaways:
• Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced the Ukrainian "Drone Line"
project on February 10 as part of ongoing Ukrainian efforts to integrate drone and ground operations.
• Ukraine's efforts to integrate drone operations with ground operations significantly differ
from Russian efforts to centralize drone units.
• Ukrainian forces continue to target oil
refineries in Russia as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises
and oil refineries.
• Russian authorities reportedly authorized the systematic torture of
Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) held in Russian prisons as early as March 2022.
• The
Kremlin may be setting informational conditions to justify an influx of North Korean citizens arriving in
Russia to join either the Russian workforce or the Russian military.
• A Russian official
claimed that Russia is sending experienced Russian military personnel to North Korea for medical
treatment.
• The pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway republic of Transnistria refused aid from the
EU to resolve its gas crisis, demonstrating Russia's continued economic influence over Transnistria and
the Kremlin's prioritization of the region.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near
Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar and
Pokrovsk.
• Russian milbloggers continue to complain about the systemic issue of Russian
forces submitting false reports to Russian military authorities and of high-level Russian officers
micromanaging tactical-level units on the battlefield.
Russian officials are reportedly attempting to constrain Russian milblogger reporting about the current
frontline in Kursk Oblast, likely in response to concerns that the West will pressure Russia into trading
Russian territory for occupied Ukrainian territory. Several Russian milbloggers who regularly criticize
the Russian military's conduct of the war in Ukraine claimed on February 10 and 11 that unspecified
actors are calling for Russian authorities to charge the milbloggers with discrediting the Russian
military after the milbloggers reported about recent Ukrainian advances southeast of Sudzha. The
milbloggers claimed that the Russian military command is targeting them for publishing information about
successful Ukrainian attacks near Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseyevka, and one milblogger claimed that
the recent Ukrainian attacks forced the Russian military command to delay plans for a future offensive
operation in the area. The latter claim indicates that the Russian military command may have been
planning to conduct an offensive operation to seize Sudzha, a prominent gas transit hub and the main town
that Ukrainian forces control in Kursk Oblast.
The Russian military appears increasingly
anxious to consolidate control over reporting about the situation in Kursk Oblast as Zelensky continues
to express his intent to leverage Russian territory in future peace negotiations. Zelensky stated during
his interview with The Guardian that he intends to use Ukrainian-held territory in Kursk Oblast to secure
the return of Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory or "something else" during future peace negotiations
with Russia. Zelensky noted that it is important to retake all of occupied Ukraine and did not speculate
on which area of occupied Ukraine he would consider trading Russian territory for. Russian President
Vladimir Putin likely intends to expel Ukraine from Kursk Oblast, or at least from Sudzha, before
beginning peace negotiations in order to avoid having to trade occupied Ukrainian territory for Russian
territory.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated
Ukraine's commitment to good faith peace negotiations with Russia and the particular importance of US
military assistance to Ukraine's security.
• Russian officials are reportedly attempting to
constrain Russian milblogger reporting about the current frontline in Kursk Oblast, likely in response to
concerns that the West will pressure Russia into trading Russian territory for occupied Ukrainian
territory.
• Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery and reportedly struck Engels Air Base in
Saratov Oblast on the night of February 10 to 11.
• The Russian State Duma voted to remove
Russian State Duma deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) retired
Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev from the Duma Defense Committee on February 11.
• The
Kremlin may be setting informational conditions for possible false flag attacks in the Baltic Sea and
against Russian opposition politicians living abroad in order to discredit Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near
Borova, Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka, and Hulyaipole.
• Russian
regional authorities are reportedly reducing payments due to regional budget deficits for Russian
soldiers who received minor injuries.
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