Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition and drone storage warehouse in Rostov Oblast on the night of January 9 to 10. Sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian outlets Suspline and ArmyTV that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian military warehouse near Chaltyr, Rostov Oblast with drones and Neptune anti-ship cruise missiles. The sources stated that Ukrainian forces used the drones to overwhelm and exhaust Russian air defenses in the area before launching Neptune missiles at the warehouse. The sources stated that Russian forces use reconnaissance drones from this warehouse to correct Russian strikes on Ukrainian cities and frontline positions. Rostov Oblast Governor Yury Slyusar stated that Russian forces downed 16 Ukrainian drones over the oblast and that the strike caused a fire at an industrial enterprise just north of Chaltyr. Russian opposition outlet Astra assessed that the fire occurred at a plastic coating production plant in the area.

The Kremlin reiterated that it is ready to hold talks with US President-elect Donald Trump without any "preconditions" but noted that its negotiating position remains unchanged. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on January 10 to a Trump statement about arranging a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and stated that Putin is open to contact with international leaders and that "no conditions are required for this ." Peskov reiterated, however, that the Kremlin maintains its "repeatedly voiced" position on Ukraine that Putin explicitly defined in June 2024 and repeated in his December 19 Direct Line presentation. Putin demanded in June 2024 that Ukraine replace Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his government under the guise of "denazification," demilitarize, and cede significant swaths of territory in eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia, including areas of Ukraine that Russia does not currently occupy – all effectively amounting to Ukraine's full capitulation. No negotiations will result in a meaningful or sustainable peace as long as Putin remains committed to these demands – regardless of the Kremlin's "willingness" to hold talks with Western leaders.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition and drone storage warehouse in Rostov Oblast on the night of January 9 to 10.

• The Kremlin reiterated that it is ready to hold talks with US President-elect Donald Trump without any "preconditions" but noted that its negotiating position remains unchanged.

• The United States, United Kingdom, and Japan announced new sanctions against Russia on January 10.

• The EU recently transferred three billion euros (about $3.07 billion) to Ukraine, the first tranche of EU funding from the profits of frozen Russian assets.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

• The BBC Russian Service reported on January 10 that a joint investigation conducted with Russian opposition outlet Medizona using open-source data has confirmed that at least 88,055 Russian soldiers have been killed in Ukraine since February 2022.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces reportedly captured the first North Korean prisoners of war (POWs) in Kursk Oblast. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) stated on January 11 that elements of the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) captured a North Korean soldier in Kursk Oblast on January 9 and that Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces recently captured a second North Korean solider in the area on an unspecified date. The SBU stated that Ukrainian authorities are working with South Korean intelligence to communicate with the POWs as they do not speak English, Russian, or Ukrainian. One of the POWs was carrying a Russian military registration card from the Tuva Republic that Russian authorities reportedly issued him in Fall 2024. The POW told Ukrainian authorities that he had undergone coordination training with Russian forces for only one week before deploying to combat and that he thought he was going to a training exercise in Russia, not to the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that usually Russian or North Korean forces kill wounded North Korean personnel in order to conceal their participation in the war.

North Korean forces are reportedly deploying large assault groups to combat operations despite frequent Ukrainian drone strikes, which is likely contributing to North Korea's high casualty rates and will likely affect the lessons that the North Korean military command will learn from fighting in the war. The Washington Post reported on January 11 that North Koreans fighting in Kursk Oblast are attacking in large groups with support from Russian artillery and drones, unlike Russian forces who usually move in smaller groups. North Korean soldiers are also reportedly ignoring Ukrainian drones and continuing to move forward despite drone strikes on personnel. The Washington Post reported that Russian forces are following behind North Korean advances in order to "stabilize the gains," but a Ukrainian solider operating in Kursk Oblast reported that communications issues between Russian and North Korean forces may be slowing Russian efforts to consolidate new positions. The Ukrainian soldier stated that North Korean forces launched an assault consisting of 400 to 500 personnel in December 2024, during which North Korean forces outnumbered Ukrainian forces six-to-one. Ammunition shortages reportedly forced the Ukrainian forces to withdraw after eight hours of fighting — suggesting that North Korean forces are heavily relying on a superior number of personnel to advance despite poor tactics. The solider stated that Ukrainian forces had inflicted significant losses on Russia's 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet , Southern Military District ), possibly pushing the Russian military command to deploy North Korean forces to Kursk Oblast sooner than planned. Western officials have recently noted that North Korean forces are suffering high casualties, including at least one instance of roughly 1,000 casualties in Kursk Oblast in only one week in late December 2024. Zelensky reported on January 5 that 3,800 North Korean personnel have been killed or wounded in Kursk Oblast — roughly a third of the reported 12,000 total North Korean personnel in Kursk Oblast — and stated that North Korean forces lost up to a battalion of infantry near Makhnovka, Kursk Oblast on January 3 and 4 alone. ISW continues to assess that North Korea's ability to learn and integrate lessons from fighting alongside Russian forces will likely be significantly degraded if the Russian military command uses North Korean troops in highly attritional infantry-led assaults in similar or greater sizes than it conducts with most Russian personnel. North Korean forces' inability or refusal to learn to effectively counter drones will also affect the lessons they can learn from the war.

Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces reportedly captured the first North Korean prisoners of war (POWs) in Kursk Oblast.

• North Korean forces are reportedly deploying large assault groups to combat operations despite frequent Ukrainian drone strikes, which is likely contributing to North Korea's high casualty rates and will likely affect the lessons that the North Korean military command will learn from fighting in the war.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin maintains his maximalist pre-war demands to isolate Ukraine and weaken NATO and reportedly aims to enforce these demands in any possible talks with Western leaders about ending the war in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces may have conducted a drone strike against an oil refinery in the Republic of Tatarstan on January 11, but details of the possible strike remain unclear at this time.

• Ukrainian forces may have conducted a drone strike against an oil refinery in the Republic of Tatarstan on January 11, but details of the possible strike remain unclear at this time.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

The Ukrainian General staff reported on January 12 that Ukrainian forces conducted a high-precision airstrike on the command post of Russia's 2nd Combined Arms Army (Central Military District) in Novohrodivka, Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the operation is part of a broader series of Ukrainian strikes targeting command posts of Russian forces operating in the Donetsk direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 8 and 10 that Ukrainian forces struck the command posts of the Russian 8th CAA (Southern Military District) in occupied Khartsyzk, Donetsk Oblast, and the 3rd Army Corps (Central Military District) in occupied Svitlodarsk, Donetsk Oblast, respectively. Ukrainian strikes on tactical command posts and positions located near the frontline, such as the strike against Novohrodivka, are likely intended to disrupt Russian tactical activity and directly complicate Russian command and control (C2) on the battlefield. Ukrainian strikes against main command posts further in the Russian rear, such as the January 8 strike on the Russian 8th CAA post, are likely aimed at degrading broader Russian logistics and operational planning efforts, which could have impacts on Russia's ability to conduct its military operations in western Donetsk Oblast. ISW has observed that the 2nd CAA is currently leading Russian operations south of Pokrovsk, that the 3rd AC is operating near Chasiv Yar, and that the 8th CAA is leading Russian efforts near Kurakhove.

South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed that Ukrainian forces captured two North Korean soldiers during combat operations in Kursk Oblast on January 9. The NIS told Agence-France-Presse (AFP) on January 12 that one of the captured North Korean soldiers initially believed that North Korean authorities had sent him to Russia for training but that he realized upon arrival that he would be engaged in combat - in line with recent statements from Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. One of the captured North Korean soldiers also stated that they suffered food and water shortages for several days before their capture and that North Korean forces have suffered significant losses.

Key Takeaways:

• The Ukrainian General staff reported on January 12 that Ukrainian forces conducted a high-precision airstrike on the command post of Russia's 2nd Combined Arms Army (Central Military District) in Novohrodivka, Donetsk Oblast.

• South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed that Ukrainian forces captured two North Korean soldiers during combat operations in Kursk Oblast on January 9.

• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces recently cut the T-0405 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway east of Pokrovsk and the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezhova highway southwest of Pokrovsk as part of their efforts to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Geolocated footage published on January 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Myrne (east of Pokrovsk) and seized positions along the T-0504 highway. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 13 that elements of the Russian 55th and 74th motorized rifle brigades (41st Combined Arms Army , Central Military District ) recently advanced to and cut the T-0406 highway between Kotlyne and Udachne (both southwest of Pokrovsk), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized a section of both highways. ISW assesses that Russian forces likely seized the remainder of Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk) as part of this advance. Mashovets stated that Russian forces are deploying the 55th and 74th motorized rifle brigades in a two-echelon formation and that elements of the 74th Brigade conduct the initial attacks and elements of the 55th Brigade follow behind to consolidate positions. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 239th Tank Regiment, 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 67th Rifle Regiment (all 90th Tank Division, CMD) are operating in the Novovasylivka-Uspenivka-Novooleksandriivka area (southwest of Pokrovsk). Mashovets acknowledged that the Russian military command recently redeployed elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps ) from the Kurakhove direction to offensive operations near Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk), further substantiating previous milblogger claims that the 5th Brigade was redeployed to the Vozdvyzhenka area Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade may have participated in the interdiction of the T-0405 highway near Myrne, and the Russian military command's decision to redeploy the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade suggests that it is prioritizing efforts to advance in this area and envelop Pokrovsk from the east over further advances west of Kurakhove. ISW previously noted that Russian forces could also leverage advances east of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka and Myrne to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk along the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway.

Russian forces also advanced in other areas southwest of Pokrovsk amid ongoing efforts to envelop the town on January 12. Geolocated footage published on January 13 indicates that Russian forces seized Pishchane (southwest of Pokrovsk), and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the 55th, 35th, and 74th motorized rifle brigades (all 41st CAA, CMD) with the seizure of the settlement. Russian forces continued attacking near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Baranivka, Zelene Pole, Nova Poltavka, and Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske, Novooleksandrivka, Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novyi Trud, Zelene, and Shevchenko; southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Uspenivka, Novovasylivka, Novoandriivka, Sribne, and Yasenove; and west of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne on January 12 and 13.

Russian forces likely intend to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in order to force Ukrainian units to withdraw from the towns in future months. The T-0405 and T-0406 highways are two of the three main east-west GLOCs supporting the Ukrainian force grouping in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area. Russian advances east and west of Pokrovsk may complicate Ukrainian logistics and Ukraine's ability to resupply and redeploy troops to defend Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. The Russian military command may intend to make further advances north of the T-0405 and T-0406 highways in an effort to force Ukrainian forces to eventually withdraw to the north (rather than to the east or west) to support Russia's envelopment of both settlements and further advances west towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border. The Russian military command likely also hopes to avoid conducting infantry-heavy frontal assaults through the urban areas of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad and likely assesses that interdicting these GLOCs increases the likelihood that Ukrainian forces will withdraw from these towns and that Russian forces will be able to avoid conducting costly urban combat operations to take the towns.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently cut the T-0405 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway east of Pokrovsk and the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezhova highway southwest of Pokrovsk as part of their efforts to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.

• Russian forces likely intend to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in order to force Ukrainian units to withdraw from the towns in future months.

• Russian state-owned energy corporation Gazprom acknowledged that it is considering reducing the size of its central office staff by 40 percent, indicating that Gazprom may be concerned about the long-term effects that the war in Ukraine and the reduction in Russian gas exports to Europe will have on the Russian gas industry.

• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kharkiv, Borova, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions.

• South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) reportedly announced that North Korean casualties in Kursk Oblast total roughly 3,000 killed and wounded.

Institute for the Study of War

The Kremlin remains committed to achieving the original goals of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in any future peace negotiations — namely the destruction of the Ukrainian state, dissolution of the current Ukrainian government, demilitarization of Ukraine, and a permanent ban on Ukraine's future membership in NATO. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev rejected the suggestion that Russia could be willing to cede any occupied territory to Ukraine in future negotiations during an interview with Russian outlet Komsomolskaya Pravda published on January 14 and stated that this idea is "not even up for discussion." Patrushev falsely claimed that sham referendums in occupied Ukraine in September 2022 legitimized Russia's claim to occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and insinuated that international recognition of Russia's illegal occupation and annexation of the four oblasts and occupied Crimea is a non-negotiable condition for a future peace agreement.

Patrushev stated that Russia's goals in Ukraine remain unchanged and that Russia remains committed to achieving all of the goals that Russian President Vladimir Putin used to justify the full-scale invasion. Putin identified the "demilitarization" and "denazification" of Ukraine as the key goals of the full-scale invasion during a speech on February 23, 2022 — and these goals amount to the destruction of Ukraine's ability to defend itself and replacement of the legitimate Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government. Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin stated during an interview with Russian outlet Gazeta.Ru on January 14 that the Russian government continues to pursue "denazification" in Ukraine, which Rogozin defined as the "liquidation of those who instill a misanthropic Russophobic spirit" in people. Putin has consistently demanded that the Ukrainian people concede their right to determine their own government, the right to defend themselves against ongoing and future aggression, and the right to choose their own security alliances before and throughout the full-scale invasion. ISW continues to assess that Putin's goals in Ukraine are to break up NATO and seize full control over Ukraine and that Putin remains committed to these goals, and ISW has not observed any indication that Putin is willing to concede on such goals in future negotiations.

Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against military and defense industrial targets in Russia on the night of January 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces targeted Russian military facilities between 200 and 1,110 kilometers deep in the Russian rear in Bryansk, Saratov, and Tula oblasts and the Republic of Tatarstan. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) struck the Russian state-owned Kombinat Kristal oil storage facility near Engels, Saratov Oblast, which provides fuel for the strategic bombers at Russia's Engels-2 Air Base, and that the GUR and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) also struck the Saratov Oil Refinery. The Ukrainian Unmanned System Forces' 14th Drone Regiment reported that Ukrainian drones struck tanks with aviation fuel for Tu-160 bomber aircraft at the Kristal oil facility at the Engels-2 Air Base. Sources within the SBU told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that Ukrainian forces struck glide bomb and cruise missile warehouses at the Engels-2 Air Base. Geolocated footage published on January 14 shows a fire at the Saratov Oil Refinery. Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged unspecified industrial enterprises in Engels and Saratov City. Ukrainian forces notably struck the Kristal oil facility on the night of January 7 to 8, causing a fire that Russian authorities did not put out until January 13 — likely several hours before Ukrainian forces struck the facility again.

The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reported that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Force, Special Operations Forces (SSO), SBU, missile troops, and GUR, struck the Bryansk Chemical Plant in Seltso, Bryansk Oblast, which produces components for Kh-59 cruise missiles and ammunition for tube artillery, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), and TOS thermobaric artillery systems and repairs Russian MLRS systems. The Unmanned Systems Forces reported that Ukrainian forces used drones to overwhelm Russian air defense systems, allowing missiles to strike their targets and that Ukrainian drones hit substations and other infrastructure after the missile strike. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that there were secondary explosions at the plant and that Ukrainian forces also destroyed a Tor and a Buk air defense system during the strike. Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Andriy Kovalenko noted that the Bryansk Chemical Plant is important for Russian artillery ammunition and missile production and specializes in the production of gunpowder, solid propellant components for rocket fuel, and explosives. Kovalenko also stated that Ukrainian forces struck the "Kremniy El" microelectronics plant in Bryansk City, which Ukrainian forces previously struck in October 2024 and that produces microelectronics for missile systems, Pantsir air defense systems, and Iskander missiles; radars, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and drones. Geolocated footage shows drone strikes and explosions in Seltso. Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed on January 13 that Ukrainian forces conducted a large combined missile strike against Bryansk Oblast and that Russian air defense systems destroyed all targets. Bogomaz later claimed on January 14 that a falling missile fragment damaged civilian property in Bryansk Oblast, including in Seltso. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted Bryansk Oblast with six ATACMS missiles, six Storm Shadow missiles, and 31 drones.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin remains committed to achieving the original goals of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in any future peace negotiations — namely the destruction of the Ukrainian state, dissolution of the current Ukrainian government, demilitarization of Ukraine, and a permanent ban on Ukraine's future membership in NATO.

• Patrushev stated that Russia's goals in Ukraine remain unchanged and that Russia remains committed to achieving all of the goals that Russian President Vladimir Putin used to justify the full-scale invasion.

• Russian officials continue to deny the existence of a Ukrainian identity and state that is independent of Russia as part of ongoing Russian efforts to justify the destruction of the Ukrainian state.

• Patrushev stated that he believes that only Russia and the United States should engage in negotiations to end Russia's war in Ukraine, and senior Kremlin officials are also questioning the role that European countries could play in such negotiations.

• The Kremlin will likely attempt to seize on potential future Russian advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast for informational purposes, but these advances, if they occur, are unlikely to have significant operational impact.

• Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against military and defense industrial targets in Russia on the night of January 13 to 14.

• Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities continue efforts to find a solution to the gas crisis in Moldova as the pro-Russian breakaway republic Transnistria continues to refuse help from Ukraine or Moldova.

• Kremlin officials are attempting to exploit the energy crisis in Moldova to set conditions to justify future Russian aggression against Moldova.

• Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor reportedly caused a brief but widespread internet outage in Russia while operating restriction systems of its Sovereign Internet on January 14.

• Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk and Pokrovsk directions.

• Russia continues efforts to bolster military recruitment efforts by offering financial incentives to those who sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of January 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 74 Shahed and other strike drones and 43 missiles at Ukraine, including one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Belgorod Oblast, seven Kh-22/32 cruise missiles from airspace over Tula Oblast, four Kalibr cruise missiles from ships in the Black Sea, 27 Kh-101/55SM cruise missiles from airspace over Volgograd Oblast, and four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from airspace over Belgorod Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 23 Kh-101/55SM missiles, three Kalibr missiles, four Kh-59/69 missiles, and 47 drones, and that 27 drones became "lost" and did not hit their targets. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the Russian strikes targeted Ukrainian gas facilities and other energy infrastructure. Ukrainian officials reported damage to energy and critical infrastructure facilities in Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, and Lviv oblasts and residential areas in Kirovohrad Oblast. Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko and Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported temporary emergency shutdowns in Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kirovohrad oblasts on the morning of January 15 due to the strikes. Ukrenergo has since lifted the emergency shutdowns but noted that Ukrainians still need to limit their energy consumption following the strikes. Russia has regularly targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure in large strike series since the Winter of 2022–2023 likely in an attempt to collapse Ukraine's energy grid, limit its defense industrial capacity, and degrade Ukrainians' will to fight.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of January 14 to 15.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on January 15, their first POW exchange in 2025.

• A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian drone and artillery capabilities are providing Ukrainian tanks with tactical advantages over Russian tanks in unspecified, select areas of the frontline.

• Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky announced on January 15 that Russia will soon provide Transnistria with gas as "humanitarian aid" but did not specify the delivery date or method.

• Armenia continues to enhance its relations with Western partners amid waning relations with Russia.

• Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk directions.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 15 that about 600,000 Russian soldiers are currently operating in Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the night of January 15 to 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 16 that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) and other Ukrainian forces struck the Lisinskaya Oil Refinery in Voronezh Oblast with at least three drones, causing a fire. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the oil refinery stored fuel for Russian military uses. Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on January 16 that Ukrainian forces launched over 10 drones against three raions in Voronezh Oblast and that most of the drones hit the oil depot in Liski Raion. Geolocated footage and footage posted by Russian milbloggers show a fire at the Lisinskaya Oil Refinery. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on January 16 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Tambov Gunpowder Plant in Kuzmino-Gat, Tambov Oblast, noting that the plant produces gunpowder for various arms, artillery, and rocket systems; nitrocellulose used to produce explosives; and other specialized products. Russian news aggregator SHOT reported on January 15 that locals reported sounds of drones over Kotovsk (directly north of Kuzmino-Gat) and that Russian forces downed three drones near Kotovsk and Kuzmino-Gat.

The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate in the future. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in early January 2025 that 3,800 North Korean personnel had been killed or wounded in Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on November 5, 2024 that North Korean forces were engaged in "small-scale" clashes in Kursk Oblast, but Russian milbloggers began claiming on December 6 that North Korean forces were participating in more significant combat operations. North Korean have therefore likely suffered roughly 92 casualties per day since starting to participate in significant fighting in early December 2024. North Korea reportedly transferred roughly 12,000 North Korean personnel to Kursk Oblast, and the entirety of this North Korean contingent in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in roughly 12 weeks (about mid-April 2025) should North Korean forces continue to suffer similarly high casualty rates in the future. South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) stated on January 13 that so far 300 North Koreans have been killed in action and 2,700 have been wounded in action in Kursk Oblast. North Korean forces will likely continue to suffer a larger ratio of wounded to killed in action - as is typical for armed conflict - and it is unclear if or when injured North Korean soldiers return to combat.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the night of January 15 to 16.

• The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate in the future.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer signed a landmark "Centennial Partnership Agreement" on January 16 outlining Ukrainian-British cooperation for the next 100 years and continued UK support to Ukraine.

• Russian and Transnistrian authorities are reportedly discussing Russian purchases of European gas for Transnistria through an intermediary, likely to avoid having to gain various states' permission to use the TurkStream and Trans-Balkan pipelines to supply Russian gas to the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement on January 17. The agreement addresses issues spanning enhanced defense cooperation, intelligence sharing, nuclear energy use and cooperation, transportation support and development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and a clause stipulating that neither party shall allow third parties to use their territory to threaten the security of the other among other economic and social areas of partnership. The agreement notably includes the unspecified development of "military-technical cooperation" between the two countries, which could allude to Iran's extensive export of domestically-produced Shahed drones and other military equipment for Russia's use in Ukraine, Iran's assistance in Russia's domestic production of Shahed drones, and possible efforts to expand Russia's use and production of Shaheds.

The bilateral agreement could also lay the groundwork for Russia to establish aircraft refueling hubs and a naval presence in Iran, particularly as the fall of Russian ally Bashar al-Assad's regime and overall waning of Russian influence in the Middle East threatens the presence of key Russian bases and assets in Syria. Russia could use Iranian territory to support some of its operations in North Africa and the Middle East despite Iran's suboptimal geographic location when compared to Syria's proximity to Russia's basing in Libya and the Mediterranean Sea. Russia may also use the agreement to establish a more permanent military presence in Iran in the long term. However, Iran may be reluctant to such efforts due to the possibility of further Western sanctions and retaliation.

Russia may leverage enhanced economic and transportation ties with Iran to further Western sanctions evasion efforts and mitigate economic challenges brought about by sanctions - a broader strategy Russia has established with multiple international partners to circumvent restrictions and alleviate domestic economic pressures.

The Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement lacks a mutual defense clause, however, indicating that Russia likely lacks the bandwidth to support significant operations outside of Ukraine and is prioritizing its manpower needs through its mutual defense treaty with North Korea. Russia likely does not have the military and defense industrial capacity to support any significant military operations apart from its war in Ukraine, especially as Russia continues to suffer high personnel losses and is reportedly struggling to produce and refurbish enough armored vehicles to replace destroyed vehicles. Putin is likely wary of intensified Russian engagements in the Middle East after Russia's strategic political defeat in Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime and is likely to focus on negotiations with the interim Syrian government to maintain the Russian military presence at the Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus.

Russia appears to be valuing its ability to mitigate its manpower constraints by leveraging the mutual defense clause within its Strategic Partnership agreement with North Korea to deploy North Korean forces to Kursk Oblast over further military-technical cooperation with Iran. ISW previously assessed that Russia is deploying North Korean forces to operations in Kursk Oblast in order to free up Russian military personnel for operations in Ukraine. Russia is likely to prioritize addressing its manpower issues through defense agreements with North Korea, as Iran is unlikely to provide military personnel to support Russia's war in Ukraine, and Russia has been leveraging its military-technical ties with Iran since 2022 without a strategic partnership agreement.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement on January 17.

• The Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement lacks a mutual defense clause, however, indicating that Russia likely lacks the bandwidth to support significant operations outside of Ukraine and is prioritizing its manpower needs through its mutual defense treaty with North Korea.

• Russian forces seized Vremivka on January 17 as part of their efforts to envelop Velyka Novosilka and force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the settlement.

• Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin had a phone call on January 17 indicating the Kremlin's growing concerns over Armenia's deepening ties with the West.

• Recently declassified US documents highlight the integral role of US monetary and technical assistance in expanding Ukraine's domestic drone production capabilities and how US national security is directly benefiting by integrating lessons learned from Ukraine in America’s defense industry.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and the Kharkiv, Kupyansk, Borova, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on January 17 authorizing calling up Russian reservists (“personnel mobilization resource” or zapas) for training in 2025.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces struck two Russian oil depots in Kaluga and Tula oblasts on the night of January 17 to 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) units and other Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot of the Kaluganeftprodukt joint-stock company (JSC) near Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast, causing a fire at the facility on the night of January 17 to 18. Kaluga Oblast Governor Vladislav Shapsha claimed on January 17 and 18 that a drone strike caused a fire at an unspecified industrial enterprise in Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast, and later added that Russian forces downed seven drones over the region. Russian sources posted footage purportedly showing the fire at the oil depot. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on January 18 that units of Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and other Ukrainian forces struck the state-owned "March 8" oil depot in Tula Oblast and noted that there were reports of a fire at the facility. Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed on January 18 that drone debris struck an unspecified enterprise in Tula Oblast, causing a fuel tank to catch on fire. Geolocated footage and other footage published by Russian milbloggers showed a fire at an oil depot near Didilovo, Tula Oblast.

The Russian Central Grouping of Forces appears to have assembled a strike group comprised of units of the 2nd and 41st combined arms armies (CAAs) south of Pokrovsk, likely as part of ongoing Russian efforts to intensify offensive operations south and southwest of the town. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 18 that the Russian military command has consolidated elements of four brigades - the 2nd CAA's 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 41st CAA's 35th, 55th, and 74th motorized rifle brigades — and three regiments — the 243rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly subordinated to 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA) and the 239th Tank Regiment and the 87th Rifle Regiment (both of the 90th Tank Division, 41st CAA) — south and southwest of Pokrovsk between Dachenske and Novotroitske. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade recently interdicted the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezheva Highway and are attacking between Udachne and Kotlyne (both southwest of Pokrovsk). Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade maintain positions on the outskirts of Zvirove (east of Kotlyne) and attacking in the area while elements of the Russian 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment with support from the 239th Tank Regiment and 87th Rifle Regiment are attacking along the banks of the Solone River toward Solone-Novoserhiivka and Novovasylivka-Uspenivka (south to southwest of Kotlyne). Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade are attacking towards Dachenske-Chyushchyne and Zelene-Chyushchyne (all south of Pokrovsk) and are making marginal advances. ISW has observed reports that all the brigades and regiments referenced by Mashovets are operating south and southwest of Pokrovsk except for elements of the 243rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, which ISW has not previously observed involved in combat operations in Ukraine.

The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on January 17 that the Russian military command is accumulating forces to advance west of Pokrovsk as part of ongoing Russian efforts to envelop the town but noted that Russian forces are not advancing immediately south of the town. The Ukrainian commander noted that Russian forces are currently focused on interdicting the railway line between Kotlyne and Udachne. Russian milbloggers similarly claimed on January 17 and 18 that Russian forces are advancing southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, Novooleksandrivka, Novoserhiivka, and Sribne and attempting to interdict the E-50 Pavlohrad-Pokrovsk highway west of the town. ISW previously observed indications that the Russian military command defined the 2nd CAA's area of responsibility (AoR) as south and southwest of Pokrovsk and the 41st CAA's AoR as east of Pokrovsk. The Russian military command's decision to establish a strike group comprised of units of both the 2nd and 41st CAAs south of Pokrovsk indicates that Russian forces may be reprioritizing tactical objectives in the Pokrovsk direction to set conditions to exploit more opportunistic avenues of advance closer to Pokrovsk’s immediate flanks. Mashovets noted that elements of the 15th and 30th motorized rifle brigades (2nd CAA) and the 348th Motorized Rifle Regiment (41st CAA) are currently resting and reconstituting in rear areas of the Pokrovsk direction and that it is unclear which sector of this direction the Russian military command will choose to redeploy these forces. The Russian military command may redeploy these units to areas south of Pokrovsk if the Russian command continues to prioritize tactical advances in the direction of Pokrovsk’s southern flanks in the coming weeks and months.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck two Russian oil depots in Kaluga and Tula oblasts on the night of January 17 to 18.

• Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian air defense system and radars in occupied Ukraine on the night of January 17 to 18.

• The Russian Central Grouping of Forces appears to have assembled a strike group comprised of units of the 2nd and 41st combined arms armies (CAAs) south of Pokrovsk, likely as part of ongoing Russian efforts to intensify offensive operations south and southwest of the town.

• The Russian military command also reportedly redeployed elements of a second unit of the 51st CAA from the Kurakhove direction to offensive operations east of Pokrovsk amid ongoing efforts to intensify activity in this area.

• NATO officials are reportedly preparing for a joint NATO-Georgia exercise scheduled for March 2025.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and in the Chasiv Yar and Velyka Novosilka directions.

• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions in the Kharkiv direction.


Institute for the Study of War

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Russian forces used ammunition equipped with chemical agents banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 434 times in Ukraine in December 2024, contributing to a total of 5,389 documented cases since February 2023. Ukraine's radiation, chemical, and biological intelligence units are monitoring Russia's use of banned chemical agents, which include using regulated K-51 and RG-VO grenade launchers to launch munitions containing chemical agents and ammunition containing unspecified hazardous chemicals that are banned in warfare under the 1925 Geneva Protocol and CWC. Ukrainian officials have previously reported on increasingly common instances of Russian forces using chemical substances in combat that are banned by the CWC, to which Russia is a signatory, and the Ukrainian General Staff noted that such violations have been systematic in the Russian military since February 2023.

Both Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 19. Geolocated footage published on January 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar. Geolocated footage published on January 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Tolstoho Street in western Chasiv Yar. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 19 that Russian forces captured the Novopivnichnyi and Desyata microraions in Chasiv Yar, advanced in the workshop area of the Refractory Plant, and in northern Chasiv Yar. ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued ground attacks within Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne, Stupochky, and Bila Hora on January 18 and 19. Ukraine's Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on January 18 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian small and medium-sized assaults on the grounds of the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar. Elements of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th VDV Division), drone operators of the Russian "Terek" Cossack Reconnaissance Brigade (reportedly of the volunteer Cossack Assault Corps), and drone operators of the Russian "Sever-V" Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are all reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction; additional elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division and elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps , Leningrad Military District ) are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar itself.

Key Takeaways:

• The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Russian forces used ammunition equipped with chemical agents banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 434 times in Ukraine in December 2024, contributing to a total of 5,389 documented cases since February 2023.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.

• Russian volunteer military detachments continue efforts to boost manpower by recruiting women into the Russian Armed Forces.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were personnel killed in action. Syrskyi stated on December 30, 2024, that Russian forces suffered 427,000 casualties in 2024, and Syrskyi's January 20 number likely reflects additional losses that Russian forces incurred in the final days of 2024. ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command was likely willing to accept record levels of casualties in Fall–Winter 2024, especially from September to November 2024, in order to achieve relatively larger territorial gains from continued infantry-led, attritional assaults.

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated on January 20 that the Kremlin is willing to negotiate with the United States about the war in Ukraine but indicated that he maintains his demands for Ukraine's full capitulation. Putin convened a meeting of the Russian Security Council on January 20, at which he and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Russia's willingness to engage in peace negotiations with the new US presidential administration under President Donald Trump. Putin caveated that any peace settlement should "eliminate the root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Lavrov defined these root causes on December 26 as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture within Ukraine. Senior Kremlin officials, including Putin and Lavrov, have been reiterating in recent weeks that the Kremlin refuses to consider any compromises to Putin's late 2021 and early 2022 demands, which include demands that Ukraine remain permanently "neutral" and not join NATO, impose severe limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military, and remove the current Ukrainian government. Putin himself stated on December 26 that then US President Joe Biden suggested to him in 2021 that Ukraine's NATO membership be postponed by 10 to 15 years — further demonstrating that alleged threats from NATO expansion did not actually drive Putin to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were personnel killed in action.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated on January 20 that the Kremlin is willing to negotiate with the US about the war in Ukraine but indicated that he maintains his demands for Ukraine's full capitulation.

• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an aircraft production plant in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on January 20 as a part of an ongoing series of strikes aimed at degrading Russian military capacity.

• Ukrainian strikes against Russian defense industrial base (DIB) targets are reportedly affecting Russian forces' combat capabilities.

• Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities continue efforts to supply Transnistria with European gas.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

• A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor repeated on January 20 complaints that Russian milbloggers first issued in May 2024 about insufficient quality controls on Russian artillery shells.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries in Russia on the night of January 20 to 21 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading Russian military capacity. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) elements and other Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against Rosneft's Lisinskaya Oil Refinery in Voronezh Oblast for the second time this week following successful strikes on the night of January 15 to 16. The January 20 to 21 strike caused a fire at fuel and lubricant tanks, and the Ukrainian General Staff noted that the oil refinery supplies the Russian military. Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on January 20 that Russian forces destroyed several drones in Voronezh Oblast but that a drone fell on an oil depot in Liskinsky Raion, starting a fire. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted that the oil depot was still burning from the January 15-16 strike and the second strike started another fire at the facility. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and SSO struck the Smolensk Aviation Plant in Smolensk Oblast. Geolocated footage shows fires at the production building of the Smolensk Aviation Plant. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that the plant produces and modernizes Su-25 attack aircraft and maintains aviation equipment. Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily Anokhin claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike against Smolensk Oblast but that falling drone debris caused fires. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces struck Lukoil's Saratovorgsintez Chemical Plant in Saratov City overnight that produces acrylonitrile, acetonitrile, and sodium cyanide. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed 10 drones over Smolensk Oblast, six over Voronezh Oblast, and four over Saratov Oblast on the night of January 20 to 21.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also continue to conduct strikes against Russian command posts in the Russian rear. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the command post of the Russian 29th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Eastern Military District ) in occupied Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast on the night of January 20 to 21. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that there are reports of explosions and smoke after the strike and that Ukrainian authorities are clarifying the results of the strike. ISW has not observed footage or other reporting of this command post strike. ISW has observed reports that elements of the 29th CAA are currently operating along the Yantarne-Zelenivka line southwest of Kurakhove. The Ukrainian General Staff reported in early and mid-January 2025 that Ukrainian forces struck the command posts of the Russian 2nd CAA (Central Military District ), 8th CAA (Southern Military District), and 3rd Army Corps (AC) (CMD) in occupied Donetsk Oblast. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian strikes against main command posts further in the Russian rear are likely aimed at degrading broader Russian logistics and operational planning efforts, which could impact Russia's ability to conduct its military operations in western Donetsk Oblast.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping held a phone call on January 21 and emphasized deepening cooperation. Putin and Xi reiterated boilerplate narratives emphasizing increasing Russian-PRC foreign policy, energy, and economic cooperation. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov claimed that Putin and Xi discussed Russia's war in Ukraine and Russia's and the PRC's relations with the United States, although the official Kremlin readout of the call did not mention these topics. Ushakov also claimed that Xi gave Putin an overview of Xi's recent call with US President Donald Trump.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries in Russia on the night of January 20 to 21 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading Russian military capacity.

• The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also continue to conduct strikes against Russian command posts in the Russian rear.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping held a phone call on January 21 and emphasized deepening cooperation.

• Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein's recent appointment has thus far failed to solve or distract from Russia's failure to adequately respond to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove. Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Pokrovsk.

• Russian ultranationalist milbloggers renewed complaints against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for failing to hold the Russian military command accountable for military failures.

Institute for the Study of War

The Kremlin has launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russian economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during a meeting on economic issues on January 22 that 2024 was a "strong year" for the Russian economy. Putin claimed that Russia has a manageable budget deficit of 1.7 percent and achieved a 26 percent increase in non-oil-and-gas revenue to 25.6 trillion rubles (approximately $257.9 billion) in 2024 and announced a retroactive 9.5 percent increase in insurance and military pensions to address rising Russian inflation. Bloomberg reported on January 21 that the Russian Finance Ministry released a report projecting economic strength and suggesting that Russian budget revenue in December 2024 reached a record high of over 4 trillion rubles (about $40 billion) — a 28 percent increase compared to December 2023 and the highest level recorded since 2011. The data fails to account for Russia's unsustainable levels of defense spending, rampant inflation, a growing deficit and the erosion of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, however. ISW continues to observe macroeconomic data that directly contradict the Kremlin's claims that the Russian economy is performing well. The Kremlin has recently adopted policies aimed at increasing defense spending all while Russian society faces labor shortages, broader demographic issues, declining savings, and increasing reliance on bailouts as the Russian economy faces rising interest rates, inflated salaries, and deteriorating production capacity. These economic realities suggest that the Kremlin's efforts to posture economic strength are largely an information operation aimed at reassuring domestic audiences and posturing Russian strength abroad while masking the true challenges Russia's economy is facing, particularly heightened due to its war against Ukraine.

North Korea will reportedly deploy new military personnel to Russia by mid-March 2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of attritional, infantry-led assaults in Kursk Oblast. The New York Times (NYT) reported on January 22 that a US senior defense official stated that additional North Korean forces will arrive in Russia "within the next two months," (roughly mid-March 2025). The NYT did not specify the number of troops or whether North Korea is rotating forces or increasing the size of its total force grouping in Russia, however. The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff reported on December 23 that North Korea may be preparing to deploy an unspecified number of additional forces to Ukraine and military equipment to Russia, either as a rotation or additional deployment of forces. Western officials told the BBC on January 22 that North Korean forces have suffered roughly 1,000 killed in action and 3,000 missing or wounded in action as of mid-January 2025, roughly 33 to 40 percent of the 11,000 to 12,000 total North Korean personnel already in Russia] ISW recently assessed that the entirety of the North Korean contingent in Russia may be killed or wounded in action by about mid-April 2025 at their current casualty rate, and a new North Korean deployment — whether intended to increase the current grouping or rotate out existing forces — is likely intended to sustain Russia’s tempo of operations despite heavy losses of about 30,000 - 45,000 causalities (combined killed and wounded) per month. North Korean forces reportedly spent at least a month training in eastern Russia before deploying to Kursk Oblast for further training in near rear areas in November 2024 and joining combat operations at least as of early December 2024. This timeline roughly coheres with the possibility that a fresh contingent of North Korean forces could undergo training and replace the shrinking North Korean group in Kursk Oblast by mid-April 2025, assuming the reported next batch of North Korean troops will train for the same duration as their predecessors, and deploy to Russia imminently in late January or early February 2025.

These fresh North Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve Russian operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and complications operating with Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent, provided the Russian command continues to use North Korean forces the same way as it has thus far. US officials and Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT that North Korean and Russian forces continue to struggle with communications and cohesion and that Russian and North Korean forces have "clashed" at least twice due to troop identification errors. A Ukrainian commander told the NYT that North Korean assault groups now include a translator who speaks Russian but that these groups are still not very effective. Ukrainian soldiers reported that North Korean forces continue conducting mass infantry assaults and that North Korean soldiers do not retreat even if injured. Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) published footage on January 22 of North Korean forces massing for an infantry assault and reported that Ukrainian forces killed 21 and wounded 40 North Korean soldiers during the eight-hour long combat engagement. Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT that Russian forces are still attempting to conceal the presence of North Koreans on the battlefield by conducting drone strikes against wounded North Korean troops as Ukrainian forces attempt to take them prisoner. ISW continues to assess that North Korea's high casualty rate and interoperability difficulties with Russian forces will affect the lessons that the North Korean military command will learn from fighting in Russia's war.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin has launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russian economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.

• Russia continues long-term efforts to build out its manpower reserve with All-Russian Cossack Society organizations and create a willing and well-trained prioritized pool designed to buffer the Kremlin from potential blowback in the event of a possible future partial call up of Russian reservists.

• North Korea will reportedly deploy new military personnel to Russia by mid-March 2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of attritional, infantry-led assaults in Kursk Oblast.

• These fresh North Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve Russian operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and complications operating with Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent, provided the Russian command continues to use North Korean forces the same way as it has thus far.

• Russian milbloggers complained and expressed concern over recent claims that the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government in Syria suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus as Russia's long-term military presence in Syria remains unclear.

• A Russian state media outlet reported that Russia may resume direct gas deliveries to Transnistria despite recent discussions about sourcing non-Russian gas to the region.

• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

• Russia and Uzbekistan are deepening military cooperation.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia is reportedly planning to deploy additional North Korean forces, missiles, artillery systems, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Kursk Oblast to support Russian long-range fire operations. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told The War Zone in an article published on January 22 that North Korea will deploy an unspecified number of additional missile and artillery troops to Kursk Oblast at an unspecified future time. Budanov reported that North Korea is unlikely to deploy a large number of additional ground combat troops, however. Budanov stated that North Korea has provided Russia with roughly 120 M-1989 Koksan 170mm self-propelled artillery systems and 120 M-1991 240mm MLRS since November 2024 and will likely send at least 120 more of each system in the future. The GUR previously reported in November 2024 that North Korea had provided Russia with roughly 100 of each of these systems as of October 2024. Budanov stated that North Korea plans to provide Russia with 150 additional KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles in 2025 and sent Russia 148 KN-23 missiles in 2024. Budanov noted that North Korean troops typically operate North Korean-provided weapons in Kursk Oblast and are also training Russian forces on these systems. A US senior defense official recently told the New York Times (NYT) that additional North Korean forces will arrive in Russian "within the next two months (roughly mid-March 2025)."

The Kremlin appears to be growing increasingly concerned about perceptions of Russia's economic instability. Reuters, citing five sources with knowledge of the situation, reported on January 23 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is growing increasingly concerned about "distortions" in the Russian economy due to the war in Ukraine. Two sources familiar with "thinking in the Kremlin" told Reuters that there is a camp within the Russian elite that views a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine as desirable and key to addressing Russia's economic issues. One source claimed that Putin recognizes the strain that the war is placing on the Russian economy and assesses that he has achieved his "key war goals" in Ukraine, including seizing land in southern Ukraine to connect Russia within occupied Crimea and weakening the Ukrainian military. The source did not speculate on Putin's willingness to end the war, however. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on January 9 — citing sources in the Russian presidential administration, State Duma, and wider Russian federal government and regional governments — that Russian elites are growing increasingly dissatisfied with the impact of the war on the Russian economy. ISW noted on January 22 that the Kremlin recently launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russia economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.

Russian forces recently executed at least six unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian sources circulated footage on January 23 of Russian soldiers shooting unarmed Ukrainian POWs in an unspecified area of Ukraine. Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets and the Ukrainian Attorney General's Office reported on January 23 that Ukrainian officials are investigating social media footage of Russian forces executing six captured and unarmed Ukrainian servicemembers in an unspecified area of Donetsk Oblast. Lyubinets noted that the footage shows a seventh Ukrainian POW in this group but that it is unclear what happened to the seventh POW based on the footage. ISW has frequently reported that Russian forces are conducting frontline executions of Ukrainian POWs and continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to conduct these executions.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is reportedly planning to deploy additional North Korean forces, missiles, artillery systems, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Kursk Oblast to support Russian long-range fire operations.

• The Kremlin appears to be growing increasingly concerned about perceptions of Russia's economic instability.

• Russian forces recently executed at least six unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

• The Kremlin is reportedly taking measures to protect industrial facilities in Russian border regions from Ukrainian strikes.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin is once again attempting to obfuscate his unwillingness to participate in good-faith negotiations to end the war by blaming Ukraine for defending itself against Russia's invasion and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. Putin claimed during a televised interview with Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on January 24 that he is willing to negotiate "on the Ukraine issue," but that a 2022 Ukrainian presidential decree declaring the "impossibility of negotiating" with Putin is a significant impediment to peace negotiations. Putin falsely claimed that Ukraine and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky are not interested in peace negotiations and that it is impossible for Russia and Ukraine to discuss "anything serious" with the decree in place. Putin claimed that any peace agreements that result from negotiations between Russia and Ukraine before Ukraine repeals the 2022 decree will be "illegitimate" and claimed that the West must force Zelensky to repeal the 2022 decree. Putin also once again questioned Zelensky's legitimacy as the current president of Ukraine and insinuated that US President Donald Trump should negotiate exclusively with Putin about Ukraine's fate, as the two leaders can "calmly" discuss their interests. Putin has previously called for Ukraine to repeal the 2022 decree, but Putin's intense focus on the decree during his January 24 interview marks yet another attempt to distract from his unwillingness to engage in peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.

Zelensky signed the September 2022 decree banning negotiations with Putin in direct response to Putin's illegal annexation of four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine and after months of negotiations in which Russia continued to demand Ukraine's full capitulation. The Ukrainian presidential decree explicitly prohibits Ukraine from conducting negotiations with Putin. The context within which the decree was signed is important, however. Zelensky signed the decree on the day that Putin illegally annexed four Ukrainian oblasts (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts), including areas that Russian forces did not then and still do not occupy. The decree states that the ban on negotiations with Putin is a response to Russia's illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory and part of Ukraine's efforts to "guarantee the security of the Euro-Atlantic space, Ukraine, and territorial integrity." Zelensky signed the September 2022 decree after months of Russian-Ukrainian peace talks in Istanbul in Spring 2022, during which Russia demanded that Ukraine be a permanently neutral state that could not join NATO and that Ukraine submit to limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military similar to those imposed by the Treaty of Versailles on Germany after World War I. These terms would have restricted Ukraine's Armed Forces to 85,000 soldiers who would be unable to defend Ukraine against a third Russian invasion.

However, Zelensky has consistently signaled his willingness to negotiate with Russia and make certain compromises in pursuit of peace following the 2022 decree banning formal negotiations with Putin. Zelensky has outlined clear conditions for potential talks with Russia and emphasized the importance of preserving Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, developing Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB), and securing security guarantees from Ukraine's Western allies. Zelensky has repeatedly advocated for a diplomatic solution to the war, proposing that Ukraine should enter any peace negotiations from a "position of strength" – a strategy aimed at compelling Russia to engage in good-faith negotiations and consider just compromises in such negotiations. Zelensky has also invited Russian representatives to attend Ukraine's second Global Peace Summit in the future.

Kremlin officials have consistently dismissed these overtures, labeling Ukraine's proposed peace formula and platforms "unviable," and Putin even reportedly asked People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping to "snub" the first Global Peace Conference in June 2024. Zelensky has continued to express openness to direct negotiations and has acknowledged the possibility of a diplomatic compromise as part of a broader solution to the war despite Russia's repeated rejections.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is once again attempting to obfuscate his unwillingness to participate in good-faith negotiations to end the war by blaming Ukraine for defending itself against Russia's invasion and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory.

• Zelensky signed the decree in September 2022 banning negotiations with Putin in direct response to Putin's illegal annexation of four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine and after months of negotiations in which Russia continued to demand Ukraine's full capitulation.

• However, Zelensky has consistently signaled his willingness to negotiate with Russia and make certain compromises in pursuit of peace following the 2022 decree banning formal negotiations with Putin.

• Putin meanwhile continues to signal to both his domestic and global audiences that he is not interested in peace short of his full demands and remains committed to Ukraine's complete capitulation.

• Putin is attempting to leverage the 2022 decree as a strawman to hide the reality of his disinterest in negotiations and to sow discord between Ukraine and its Western allies.

• Putin also attempted to position himself as Trump’s equal during his interview, reinforcing his long-held belief that Russia is the great-power heir to the Soviet Union.

• Putin demonstrated that he is worried about the effect that lower oil prices would have on his domestic stability and ability to wage his war in Ukraine.

• The Kremlin is attempting to revive its information operation aimed at deterring the US and other Western states from providing further military assistance to Ukraine.

• The Kremlin is framing the new 2025 Union State Security Concept as completely superseding the original 1999 Security Concept, indicating that this new agreement may be more expansive than the original and will further forward the Kremlin's effort to annex Belarus.

• Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries on the night of January 23 to 24 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading Russian military capacity.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War