The Kremlin is continuing to suffer significant manpower losses to make tactical advances in western Donetsk Oblast at the expense of Russia's ongoing war effort and the medium-term viability of the Russian economy. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD), citing data from the Ukrainian General Staff, reported on December 5 that the average daily Russian personnel casualties reached a new all-time high of 1,523 casualties per day in November 2024. The UK MoD noted that Russian forces suffered just over 2,000 casualties in a single day for the first time on November 28, 2024. Russian forces suffered an estimated 45,690 total casualties throughout November 2024, and the UK MoD noted that November 2024 was the fifth consecutive month that Russian casualties increased. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced at a rate of roughly 27.96 square kilometers per day and seized a total of 839 square kilometers in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast in November 2024. ISW previously reported that Russian forces suffered increased casualties in September and October 2024 as well and that Russian casualties totaled an estimated 80,110 troops in exchange for roughly 1,517 square kilometers of gains in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast in those two months. Russian forces have thus suffered an estimated 125,800 casualties during a period of intensified offensive operations in September, October, and November 2024 in exchange for 2,356 square kilometers of gains. (Or approximately 53 Russian casualties per square kilometer of Ukrainian territory seized.)

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is continuing to suffer significant manpower losses to make tactical advances in western Donetsk Oblast at the expense of Russia's ongoing war effort and the medium-term viability of the Russian economy.

• Russia's constrained labor pool is likely unable to sustain this increased casualty rate in the medium-term, and continued Western military support for Ukraine remains vital to Ukraine's ability to inflict losses at this rate.

• Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov undermined the Kremlin's information operation to portray Russia's November 21 Oreshnik ballistic missile strike against Ukraine as a defensive response to the US permitting Ukraine to conduct strikes in Russia with US-provided ATACMS missiles.

• Russian-North Korean military cooperation will likely continue to intensify in the coming months following the formal commencement of their comprehensive strategic partnership agreement on December 4.

• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues to publicly position himself as a defender of migrants and Russian ethnic minorities in opposition to other senior Russian security officials, suggesting that senior Russian officials may be increasingly divided over Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to promote an inclusive Russian civic nationalism that ensures interethnic and interreligious harmony in Russia.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk and northern Kharkiv oblasts, and Russian forces advanced in the Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions.

• Russian forces are reportedly increasingly recruiting women for combat and logistics functions.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces have not yet evacuated the Russian naval base in Tartus, Syria as of December 6, but it remains unclear whether Russia will keep its vessels at the port as Syrian rebels continue to advance swiftly across regime-held territory. Former Norwegian Navy officer and independent OSINT analyst Thord Are Iversen assessed that the Russian Novorossiysk Kilo-class submarine, a Gorshkov-class frigate, the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate, and possibly the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler have returned to the port in Tartus based on satellite imagery collected on December 6. Satellite imagery collected on December 3 showed that Russia had removed all of its ships stationed at Tartus - the Admiral Grigorovich frigate, the Novorossisysk submarine, the Admiral Gorshkov and Admiral Golovko Gorskhov-class frigates, and likely the Vyazma oiler and the Yelnya Altay-class oiler - from the port sometime between December 1 and 3. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on December 3 that ten Russian naval vessels, including the Admiral Gorshkov and Admiral Golovko frigates and Novorossiysk submarine, participated in hypersonic and cruise missile launch exercises in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, and Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov reportedly informed the US about Russian exercises in the Mediterranean during a call on November 27. It is unclear if Russia removed the Admiral Grigorovich and the two oilers from Tartus as part of the exercise as well. Some of the vessels that Russian forces removed from Tartus between December 1 and 3 have not returned to port as of December 6.

Bloomberg reported on December 6 that a person close to the Kremlin stated that Russia does not have a plan to save Syrian President Bashar al Assad and that Russia is unlikely to create such a plan as long as pro-regime forces continue to abandon their positions. The Russian Embassy in Syria notably announced on December 6 that Russian citizens living in Syria should leave the country on commercial flights due to the "difficult military and political situation" in Syria. It remains unclear whether Russia plans to continue to maintain all of these vessels at Tartus or is planning to evacuate all or some of them elsewhere.

Russia appears to be redeploying at least some of its air defense assets that were defending Russia's Khmeimim Air Base in Syria, but the reason for this redeployment remains unclear at this time. Geolocated footage published on December 6 shows Russian forces transporting S-300 or S-400 and Tor-M1 air defense systems near Baniyas along the M1 Lakatia-Tartus highway. A Russian milblogger posted the same footage on December 6 and claimed that it showed Russian forces moving an S-400 system and a Tor-M2 system that Russian forces had deployed near Masyaf (about 50 kilometers southeast of Khmeimin Air Base) in 2017 to protect Khmeimin Air Base. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are either redeploying the air defense systems to Khmeimim Air Base or Tartus due to Syrian rebel groups' recent seizure of Hama City (roughly 35 kilometers east of Masyaf). It is unclear if Russian forces are redeploying the air defense systems to new positions within western Syria in order to improve their survivability or if Russian forces are moving the air defense systems for evacuation from Syria through Tartus.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces have not yet evacuated the Russian naval base in Tartus, Syria as of December 6, but it remains unclear whether Russia will keep its vessels at the port as Syrian rebels continue to advance swiftly across regime-held territory.

• Russia appears to be redeploying at least some of its air defense assets that were defending Russia's Khmeimim Air Base in Syria, but the reason for this redeployment remains unclear at this time.

• The Kremlin continues to advance its strategic effort to de facto annex Belarus and further expand the Russian military’s presence in Belarus through the Union State framework.

• Lukashenko is likely trying to preserve Belarusian sovereignty against Moscow by advocating that Belarus control Russian weapons deployed in Belarus - an endeavor Lukashenko has historically failed at.

• The deployment of the Oreshnik missiles to Belarus does not significantly increase the immediate risks of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strikes against Ukraine or NATO states despite the Kremlin’s intensified nuclear saber-rattling.

• The Kremlin is scapegoating former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov for Russia's failure to adequately respond to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used his interview with an American media personality to reiterate Kremlin talking points that are intended to shape American foreign policy and achieve a US-Russia reset detrimental to US interests and on the Kremlin's terms.

• Western sanctions are reportedly degrading the overall quality of Russian drones, indicating that targeted sanctions are having some negative effects on the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).

• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.

• The Russian military continues to lose parts of its officer corps, a resource that is difficult to replenish, as part of Russia's ever-increasing casualties.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces have resumed their offensive operations directly aimed at seizing Pokrovsk through a turning maneuver from the south after successfully widening their salient south and southeast of the town. Russian forces, including elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army , Central Military District ), began advancing further west and northwest of Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk) along the Petrivka-Pustynka-Zhovte line south of Pokrovsk in late November 2024 after mainly focusing their offensive efforts on widening the salient south of Selydove and eliminating the Ukrainian pockets north and south of Kurakhove. Russian forces recently seized Novopustynka (southwest of Pokrovsk and west of Zhovte) and advanced near the southern outskirts of Shevchenko (north of Zhovte), and geolocated footage published on December 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Novotroitske (just west of Novopustynka) and along the T-05-15 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynopil highway towards Shevchenko. Russian milbloggers claimed on December 6 and 7 that fighting is ongoing towards Shevchenko and within the center of the settlement and that Russian forces have either advanced into northern Novotroitske or seized the entire settlement. ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces have resumed attacks east of Myrnohrad (just east of Pokrovsk) near Hrodivka and Mykolaivka, are advancing southeast of Pokrovsk near Dachenske (east of Shevchenko), and are attacking with armored vehicle support near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka (both northeast of Dachenske). Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in late November 2024 that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) — a formation that the Russian military command often redeploys to priority sectors and uses to exploit tactical gains — are attacking along the Novotroitske-Ukrainka line. Russian forces' turn north towards Shevchenko marks a notable inflection in the orientation of the Russian attacks in this area, as Russian forces mainly focused on advancing further west of Selydove in November 2024. The redeployment of elements of the 90th Tank Division and intensified Russian assaults near Dachenske and east of Myrnohrad further indicate a reprioritization of this sector of the frontline.

The Russian military command likely assesses that they have allocated sufficient manpower and materiel to the efforts to seize Kurakhove and seize or bypass Velyka Novosilka and level the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast in the coming weeks. Mashovets stated on December 6 that Russian forces likely seized Stari Terny (northwest of Kurakhove and on the northern shore of the Kurakhivske Reservoir), suggesting that Russian forces have likely almost completely eliminated the Ukrainian pocket north of the reservoir. Russian forces have continued to use frontal mechanized and dismounted infantry assaults to advance slowly but gradually into eastern and central Kurakhove and south of Kurakhove into Dalne, which supports larger Russian efforts to eliminate the remaining Ukrainian pocket between Dalne and Kurakhove. The Russian command may be satisfied with recent Russian advances northwest of Vuhledar into Kostyantynopolske and Uspenivka and up to Sukhi Yaly (all along the C-051104 highway) such that the Russian military command assesses that Russian forces will be able to close the Ukrainian pocket extending from Kostyantynopolske to Dalne and level the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast along the Dachne-Sukhi Yaly line in the coming weeks. Russian forces have also advanced north, east, and south of Velyka Novosilka in recent weeks as part of their ongoing efforts to envelop the settlement. The Russian military command likely assesses that Russian forces can now relaunch offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk due to Russian tactical gains in collapsing the Ukrainian pockets north and south of Kurakhove and north of Vuhledar.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces have resumed their offensive operations directly aimed at seizing Pokrovsk through a turning maneuver from the south after successfully widening their salient south and southeast of the town.

• The Russian military command likely assesses that they have allocated sufficient manpower and materiel to the efforts to seize Kurakhove and seize or bypass Velyka Novosilka and level the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast in the coming weeks.

• Russian forces are likely attempting to flank Pokrovsk from the west and force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in order to minimize Russia's need to conduct frontal assaults on the towns’ eastern and southern approaches.

• The Russian military command will likely continue to trade Russian materiel and manpower for tactical territorial gains at an unsustainable rate during their offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk into 2025.

• Ukrainian forces continue to use drone strikes to contest Russia's presence in the northwestern Black Sea, including near gas extraction platforms.

• Ukrainian forces will reportedly receive increased access to Starshield, a more secure satellite network for Starlink terminals, which may give Ukrainian forces an advantage in the technological innovation arms race in which Ukrainian and Russian forces are currently engaged.

• Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor appears to be testing the Russian sovereign internet in Russian regions populated by ethnic minorities.

• Roskomnadzor indicated that it may intend to force Russians to migrate their websites from Western hosting providers to Russian hosting providers likely to better enforce Russian censorship laws.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and reportedly advanced near Velyka Novosilka while Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

• Russian authorities continue efforts to forcibly impress migrants into signing military service contracts with the Ministry of Defense (MoD) as part of ongoing cryptomobilization efforts.

Institute for the Study of War

The rapid collapse of the Assad regime in Syria – a regime that the Kremlin helped prop up since 2015 – is a strategic political defeat for Moscow and has thrown the Kremlin into a crisis as it seeks to retain its strategic military basing in Syria. Russia intervened on behalf of former Syrian President Bashar al Assad in 2015 in order to secure Assad's regime after mass protests began in 2011 as part of the larger Arab Spring movement, which triggered the Syrian Civil War and threatened to oust Assad. Russian President Vladimir Putin has long viewed the "color revolutions" that ushered in new democratic governments in former Soviet states as a threat to his own regime's stability and security. Putin has also more widely opposed democratic movements to oust Kremlin-allied authoritarian rulers worldwide as he views these movements as hindering his efforts to create his envisioned multipolar world where Russia and Russia's key authoritarian allies and partners play a major role. Russia's inability or decision to not reinforce Assad's regime as the Syrian opposition offensive made rapid gains throughout the country will also hurt Russia's credibility as a reliable and effective security partner throughout the world, which will in turn negatively affect Putin's ability to garner support throughout the world for his desired multipolar world.

Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 8 that a Kremlin source stated that Assad and his family fled to Moscow and that Russian authorities granted them asylum. Putin has been able to ensure the survivability of Assad himself, but Putin intervened in the Syrian Civil War with the primary objective of bolstering Assad's regime and preventing his loss of power – an objective that the Kremlin has failed to achieve. Putin also intervened on behalf of Assad in 2015 to secure Russian military bases in Syria, support Russia's wider efforts to project power in the Mediterranean and Red Seas, increase its global footprint in the Middle East and Africa, and threaten NATO's southern flank. Russia is attempting to secure its bases in Syria as opposition forces come to power, but Russia's continued military presence in the country is not guaranteed, especially as Russia's actions in support of Assad over the past nine years have likely undermined Moscow's ability to form a lasting, positive relationship with ruling Syrian opposition groups.

Key Takeaways:

• The rapid collapse of the Assad regime in Syria – a regime that the Kremlin helped prop up since 2015 – is a strategic political defeat for Moscow and has thrown the Kremlin into a crisis as it seeks to retain its strategic military basing in Syria.

• The Kremlin reportedly secured an agreement on December 8 with unspecified Syrian opposition leaders to ensure the security of Russian military bases in Syria, but the contours of this arrangement and its longevity remain unclear given a volatile and rapidly evolving political situation on the ground in Syria.

• ISW has collected strong indicators that Russia has been setting conditions to evacuate its military assets from Syria and that Russian military basing is not secure.

• The loss of Russian bases in Syria will have major implications for Russia’s global military footprint and ability to operate in Africa.

• Russian ultranationalist milbloggers – many of whom fought in or covered the Syrian war – are upset about the fall of the Assad regime, criticizing it as yet another failure of Russian foreign policy to exert and maintain influence in areas of strategic importance.

• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on December 7 an additional military aid package for Ukraine worth $988 million.

• Russian authorities detained alleged terrorists in the Republic of Dagestan on December 7 amid growing Russian milblogger claims that the fall of former Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime in Syria will foster terrorism in Russia.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and the Pokrovsk and Vuhledar directions.

• One of Russia's largest microchip manufacturers has reportedly begun bankruptcy proceedings.

Institute for the Study of War

>• The loss of Russian bases in Syria will have major
>implications for Russia’s global military footprint and
>ability to operate in Africa.

Eine Wohltat für alle von den Wagner Söldner und ihren korrupten Geschäften gebeutelten Staaten.

Wieder mal hat sich gezeigt, dass die militärische Potenz der Russen überschätzt wurde (und weiterhin wird).

Dass sie der pro russ. georgischen Regierung nicht schon längst zur Hilfe kommen, zeigt, dass da nicht mehr viel übrig ist.

The Kremlin continues to cautiously signal that it can ensure the security of Russian military bases in Syria in the short-term but notably has expressed uncertainty about the long-term future of the military bases against the backdrop of the volatile and rapidly evolving political situation in Syria. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on December 9 that the Russian military is taking all necessary precautions to ensure the security of Russian military bases in Syria and that Russia is "doing everything possible" to establish contact with those who can ensure the safety of Russian military personnel in Syria. Peskov noted that the Kremlin will host "serious discussions" with the future Syrian authorities about Russia's military bases in Khmeimim and Tartus at an unspecified future date but noted that it is currently too early to discuss maintaining these bases since such a discussion involves "those who will lead Syria." Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 9, citing an unspecified source in Latakia Governorate, that Syrian opposition forces have full control over Latakia Governorate and Tartus City, but that Syrian opposition forces have not and do not intend to "invade" the Russian Khmeimim Air Base near Latakia City and the naval base at the Port of Tartus. The source added that both Russian bases are functioning normally. Russian state outlet RBK reported on December 9 that the Syrian National Coordination Committee's Foreign Relations Head Ahmed al Asrawi stated during a discussion about Russia's military bases in Syria that Syria would continue to uphold agreements that are in Syria's interest and would "never" take a hostile position toward Russia or any other friendly country. Russian milbloggers continued to debate the future of the Russian bases in Syria on December 8 and 9, expressing uncertainty about whether Russian forces will be able to maintain their presence in the country or will have to conduct a full evacuation. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) continues to assess that the potential loss of Russian bases in Syria will have major implications for Russia’s ability to project power in the Mediterranean Sea, threaten NATO's southern flank, and operate in Africa.

Russia has removed some vessels from the Port of Tartus to a nearby area offshore. Satellite imagery taken on December 9 shows that all Russian ships and submarines have left the Port of Tartus. OSINT analyst MT Anderson reported that satellite imagery taken on December 9 also shows that Russian vessels — likely the Admiral Gorshkov Gorskhov-class frigate, Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate, Novorossiysk Kilo-class submarine, and Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler – are in a holding pattern in the roadstead about eight kilometers west of the port. The location of the other ships that were reportedly previously docked in the Port of Tartus, including the Admiral Golovko Gorskhov-class frigates and the Yelnya Altay-class oiler, is unclear. Syrian opposition leaders reportedly guaranteed on December 8 the security of Russian military institutions in Syria, and Syrian Prime Minister Mohammad Ghazi al Jalali stated on December 8 that the new Syrian authorities would make the decisions about the future of Russia's military bases in Syria. The current and future security of the Russian military bases in Syria remains unclear as Moscow continues to hold talks with the new Syrian authorities, and it is also unclear at this time if Russia is removing the vessels from the Port of Tartus as part of a wider evacuation or to better protect these military assets.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues to cautiously signal that it can ensure the security of Russian military bases in Syria in the short-term but notably has expressed uncertainty about the long-term future of the military bases against the backdrop of the volatile and rapidly evolving political situation in Syria.

• Russia has removed some vessels from the Port of Tartus to a nearby area offshore.

• The Syrian Embassy in Moscow confirmed to Kremlin newswire TASS on December 9 that former Syrian President Bashar al Assad is in Moscow.

• Russia continues to face staggering costs required to maintain its war effort against Ukraine, with mounting economic strain, labor shortages, and systemic corruption threatening the sustainability of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).

• Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov and Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov amid ongoing Kremlin efforts to shift blame for Russia's inadequate response to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast onto local government officials and away from the military.

• The Russian government claimed to have returned the bodies of deceased Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) who were allegedly killed in the January 24 Russian Il-76 military transport aircraft crash in Belgorod Oblast.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velyka Novosilka.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to highlight Russian officials who sponsor Russian volunteer units in Ukraine and the "Time of Heroes program," which places veterans of the war in Ukraine in leadership positions within the Russian federal and regional governments.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia's force posture around Syria continues to reflect the Kremlin's current cautious and indecisive response to the fall of Bashar al Assad's regime. Sentinel-2 satellite imagery from December 10 shows that Russian ships have still not returned to Syria's Port of Tartus and that the Russian Mediterranean Sea Flotilla is still in a holding pattern about eight to 15km away from Tartus. Open-source analyst MT Anderson identified four Russian ships within this radius as of December 10—the Admiral Golovko Gorshkov-class frigate, the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate, the Novorossiysk Improved Kilo-class submarine, and the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler. Satellite imagery from December 9 indicated that the Admiral Grigorovich, Novorossiysk, and Vyazma were in the same holding pattern as they are as of December 10. Other open-source analysts noted that the Baltic Fleet's Alexander Shabalin Project 775 large landing ship exited the Baltic Sea maritime zone on December 10, potentially to facilitate the removal of some Russian military assets from Tartus to the Mediterranean (potentially Tobruk, Libya). A Russian milblogger claimed that as of the end of the day on December 9 "the status of Hmeimim (Air Base) and Tartus is up in the air," and Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov emphasized that it is "difficult to predict" what will happen in Syria but that Russia will continue a dialogue with all countries that share interests with Russia. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 10 that Russian forces are still disassembling equipment and weapons and removing troops from Hmeimim in An-124 and Il-76 military transport aircraft and are "dismantling" equipment at Tartus under the supervision of recently-deployed Russian Spetsnaz. Maxar satellite imagery from December 10 shows that Russian aircraft, helicopters, and associated military equipment remain in place at the Hmeimim Air Base (see embedded imagery below). The continued lack of a coherent Russian response, both in terms of military posture and rhetorical overtures, suggests that the Kremlin is still waiting to formulate a path forward in Syria as it observes the situation on the ground. The Kremlin is very likely hesitant to completely evacuate all military assets from Syria in the event that it can establish a relationship with Syrian opposition forces and the transitional government and continue to ensure the security of its basing and personnel in Syria.

Russia intends to supply North Korea with fighter jets amid growing military partnership between the two countries. US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) commander Admiral Samuel Paparo revealed on December 10 that Russia and North Korea struck a deal in which Russia agreed to send MiG-29 and Su-27 fighter aircraft to Pyongyang in exchange for North Korea deploying troops to Russia to support Russia's war in Ukraine. Paparo highlighted that North Korea's receipt of these aircraft will enhance its military capabilities and that Pyongyang likely expects additional military equipment and technologies from Russia, including ballistic missile reentry vehicles, submarine technologies, and air defense systems, as part of the agreement. Paparo noted that North Korean soldiers remain in combat zones, likely in reference to Kursk Oblast, but are not yet actively fighting. South Korean network TV Chosun published an exclusive report on October 21 stating that North Korea dispatched an unspecified number of fighter pilots to Vladivostok before the deployment of ground troops to Russia in early October likely in an effort to train its pilots to fly Russian fighter jets. North Korean pilots are trained on Russian Su-25 attack aircraft (which are already part of the Korean People's Army Air Force fleet) further indicating that a Russian delivery of fighter jets will benefit and expand North Korea's military capabilities, especially in the air domain. ISW continues to assess that military cooperation between Russia and North Korea has particularly intensified since the two countries signed their Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in June 2024, and especially since it entered into force on December 4.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia's force posture around Syria continues to reflect the Kremlin's current cautious and indecisive response to the fall of Bashar al Assad's regime.

• Russia intends to supply North Korea with fighter jets amid a growing military partnership between the two countries.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh in Moscow on December 10 as India continues efforts to balance military technical cooperation with Russia and maintain good relations with key Western allies.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Vuhledar direction, and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Kharkiv oblasts and in the Svatove, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and Velyka Novosilka directions.

• The Russian government continues efforts to formalize irregular Russian military units and veterans from the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics army corps (DNR and LNR ACs) and formally integrate them under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

• Russia continues to utilize Western-produced high-tech components in Russian weapons systems despite Western sanctions against Russia and cobelligerent states.

• A Russian insider source who has previously correctly predicted command changes within the Russian MoD claimed on December 9 that Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted the Russian Deputy Defense Minister, Pavel Fradkov, to the rank of Major General.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces continue to make tactical gains south of Pokrovsk as they attack into Ukrainian weak points and attempt to conduct a turning maneuver to directly assault Pokrovsk from the south. Geolocated footage published on December 10 indicates that Russian forces have advanced in western Novyi Trud and along the E50 highway south of Dachenske, narrowing the small pocket west of the E50 highway and south of the Novyi Trud-Dachenske line. This advance places Russian forces about six kilometers south of Pokrovsk. Russian forces will likely continue efforts to close the pocket between Novyi Trud and Dachenske in the coming days, as doing so will provide them a stronger position from which to assault Shevchenko (just northwest of Novyi Trud and southwest of Pokrovsk). Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Nazar Voloshyn noted on December 11 that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian fortifications west of Novyi Trud, south of Novotroitske (southwest of Shevchenko), and on the southwestern outskirts of Shevchenko itself. Voloshyn reported that Ukrainian forces lost two positions during these attacks and are working to restore them. A Ukrainian battalion commander operating near Pokrovsk characterized the situation in this direction as "critical," largely because each Russian battalion-sized formation receives about 200 fresh personnel per month. The Ukrainian commander also emphasized that Russian forces are attacking Ukrainian positions up to 30 times per day and have an advantage in artillery fires—suggesting that Russian forces are currently relying on a superior number of personnel and artillery ammunition to secure tactical gains in the Pokrovsk direction. ISW recently assessed that the Russian command has resumed offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk via a turning maneuver from the south, but that this maneuver is coming at a massive cost to Russian manpower and equipment. Another Ukrainian brigade officer reported that Russian forces lost nearly 3,000 personnel in the Pokrovsk direction in two weeks. Continued Russian losses at this scale will impose a mounting cost on Russia's already-strained force generation apparatus. Russian forces may well continue making gains towards Pokrovsk, but the losses they are taking to do so will temper their ability to translate these gains into more far-reaching offensive operations.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continue to make tactical gains south of Pokrovsk as they attack into Ukrainian weak points and attempt to conduct a turning maneuver to directly assault Pokrovsk from the south.

• US intelligence had warned that Russia may fire a second "Oreshnik" ballistic missile at Ukraine in the near future, likely in a continued effort to dissuade the West from providing further military assistance to Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in Bryansk Oblast and an aircraft repair plant in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast on the night of December 10 to 11.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and in the Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions.

• The Kremlin continues to leverage its "Time of Heroes" program to integrate Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine into leadership positions within Russian regional administrations.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia has reportedly reached an agreement with select elements of the Syrian opposition about control over Russian military bases in Syria, but it remains unclear if the alleged agreement ensures the security of Russia's bases in Syria in the long-term. Bloomberg reported on December 12 that unspecified sources with knowledge of the matter stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) thinks it has an "informal understanding" with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) that would allow Russian forces to stay at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus but noted that the situation could change due to instability in Syria. Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated on December 12 that Russia has established contacts with HTS in Damascus and that Russian bases "continue to be located on Syrian territory." Bogdanov expressed hesitancy in response to a question about whether Russia expects its bases to remain in Syria, stating that the bases will "probably" remain but that there are no other decisions yet on the matter. Bogdanov implied that Russia's continued presence in Syria is important for the ongoing fight against terrorism in the country, likely as part of efforts to convince Syrian authorities to allow Russia to continue to operate its bases in the long-term. Russia has been using the cover of "fighting terrorism" as an excuse for military activities primarily aimed at supporting the Bashar al-Assad regime since it entered the Syrian Civil War in 2015. A Russian milblogger claimed on December 11 that Syrian "militants" have surrounded Hmeimim Air Base and are periodically attempting to conduct provocations and shell the facility. The milblogger claimed that Russia reached a "preliminary" agreement about the continued presence of Russian forces in Syria but that the agreement only lasts for 75 days, after which Russia will withdraw from Syria. It is unclear if the reported Russian agreement with Syrian authorities is permanent or temporary. The Syrian opposition encompasses several factions with varying ideologies and political objectives, and it is unclear if Russia is in contact with all the Syrian opposition factions necessary to guarantee the safety of Russian military bases in Syria.

Russia is reportedly moving four ships from Russian ports to Syria, possibly to facilitate evacuations —further demonstrating the Kremlin's current cautious response to the developing situation in Syria. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 12 that Russian forces from throughout Syria are withdrawing to Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus and that Russian forces are flying four to five miliary transport sorties daily between Hmeimim and unspecified airfields in Russia. The GUR stated that Russia is moving its Ivan Gren Ivan Gren-class large landing ship and the Aleksandr Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship to Tartus to evacuate weapons and equipment. The GUR stated that the two ships are currently in the Norwegian Sea and are scheduled to pass the English Channel in "a few days." The GUR stated that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships also left Baltiysk, Kaliningrad Oblast and St. Petersburg, respectively, and are heading to Tartus. It will likely be weeks until these ships reach the Mediterranean Sea and arrive at the Port of Tartus, and Russia may be moving these ships as a precaution should Moscow decide to conduct wider evacuations of the Port of Tartus and Hmeimim Air Base in the coming weeks. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is very likely hesitant to completely evacuate all military assets from Syria in the event that it can establish a relationship with Syrian opposition forces and the transitional government and continue to ensure the security of its basing and personnel in Syria.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia has reportedly reached an agreement with select elements of the Syrian opposition about control over Russian military bases in Syria, but it remains unclear if the alleged agreement ensures the security of Russia's bases in Syria in the long-term.

• Russia is reportedly moving four ships from Russian ports to Syria, possibly to facilitate evacuations — further demonstrating the Kremlin's current cautious response to the developing situation in Syria.

• Ukrainian officials denied Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's claim that Ukraine rejected his offer to mediate a Christmas ceasefire and a large-scale prisoner of war (POW) exchange with Russia.

• People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping continues to provide Kremlin officials with a platform from which to articulate their uncompromising demands on Ukrainian sovereignty.

• India continues to preserve and enhance its economic relations with Russia despite recent efforts to reduce its reliance on Russia as a security partner.
• Russian authorities are set to equate the violation of Russian censorship laws with extremism and terrorism, furthering the Kremlin's effort to establish a pseudo-state ideology.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded the Russian “Golden Star” Medal to a military correspondent for the first time since World War II as the Kremlin continues to use state awards to co-opt milbloggers and gain control over the Russian information space.

• Actors affiliated with Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) likely assassinated the Deputy General Designer and Functional Software Department Head of the Russian Rosatom-owned “Mars” design bureau Mikhail Shatsky in Russia on December 12.

• Russian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and in the Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Svatove.

• The Russian military command's efforts to ensure operational security amongst Russian forces continue to draw ire from select milbloggers, who derided these efforts as disruptive overreach.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted their largest series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine since the start of the war overnight on December 12 to 13, largely targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 94 missiles and 193 Shahed and other drones at Ukraine, including four Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal" aeroballistic missiles; two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, one KN-23 ballistic missile, 55 Kh-101 and Kh-55SM cruise missiles, 24 Kalibr cruise missiles, seven Iskander-K cruise missiles, and one Kh-59/69 cruise missile. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that Ukrainian forces downed 80 Kh-101, Kh-55SM, Kalibr, and Iskander-K cruise missiles; one Iskander-M; and 80 drones and that 105 other drones became "lost" due to Ukrainian countermeasures and six drones flew into Russian and Belarusian airspace as of 1130 local time.

Ukrainian energy operator DTEK reported that the strike caused severe damage to DTEK's thermal power plants (TPPs), and Ukrainian authorities reported that the Russian strikes targeted energy and critical infrastructure in Kyiv, Odesa, Chernihiv, Vinnytsia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Ternopil oblasts. Ukrainian authorities reported rolling blackouts throughout much of the country following the strike. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that five of the nine nuclear reactors in Ukrainian-controlled territory reduced their output due to the Russian strikes, of which two nuclear reactors were already producing power at a reduced output due to the residual effects of Russian strikes in late November 2024 and the remaining three returned to full capacity on December 13.

Russia's strike series targeting Ukrainian energy facilities is part of a broader campaign aimed at freezing out Ukraine in Winter 2024-2025 and compelling Ukraine and the West to self-deter into making policy decisions that benefit Russia. Russia has repeatedly targeted Ukrainian infrastructure during the fall and winter since launching the full-scale invasion in 2022 and conducted large-scale strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure on November 16 to 17 and 25 to 26. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces conducted the December 12 to 13 strike in retribution for a Ukrainian strike against Taganrog, Rostov Oblast on December 11 using Western-provided ATACMS, although Russian forces were likely planned to conduct such a strike regardless and are conveniently using the December 11 strike to justify ongoing Russian strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. This Russian messaging is likely aimed at assuaging the Russian ultranationalist community's calls for retribution for Ukrainian strikes into Russia and intended to support the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign aimed at compelling Western countries to make decisions about Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons and future peace negotiations that benefit Russia.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted their largest series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine since the start of the war overnight on December 12 to 13, largely targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

• Russia's strike series targeting Ukrainian energy facilities is part of a broader campaign aimed at freezing out Ukraine in Winter 2024-2025 and compelling Ukraine and the West to self-deter into making policy decisions that benefit Russia.

• Ukrainian strikes against military airfields in Russia and Russian air defense systems in near rear areas may be prompting a decrease in Russian air operations and glide bomb strikes against Ukraine.

• Russia is evacuating elements of its force grouping in Syria while continuing negotiations with select Syrian groups about Russia's longer-term military presence in the country.

• The status of Russia's helicopter base at Qamishli in northeastern Syria remains unclear, however.

• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on December 12 a new military aid package for Ukraine valued at $500 million.

• A Russian insider source who has previously correctly predicted command changes within the Russian military responded to recent claims that the Russian military command removed 3rd Combined Arms Army (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps) commander Major General Dmitry Ovcharov.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Vuhledar.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov with the Hero of Russia award.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 14 that the Russian military had deployed North Korean soldiers in infantry assaults in Kursk Oblast. Zelensky stated that the Russian military is incorporating "a significant number" of North Korean soldiers into Russian units operating in Kursk Oblast and that North Korean soldiers have already sustained "noticeable" losses. Zelensky noted that Russian forces have only deployed North Korean soldiers to offensive operations in Kursk Oblast but may use them in other unspecified areas of the frontline in the future. This is the first time a Ukrainian official has reported that North Korean forces are conducting assault operations since Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced in an interview with South Korean national broadcaster KBS on November 5 that Ukrainian forces engaged in "small-scale" clashes with North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers recently acknowledged that North Korean forces are involved in assaults in Kursk Oblast and claimed on December 12 and 13 that North Korean soldiers participated in the seizure of Plekhovo (south of Sudzha) on December 6. Several Russian milbloggers claimed that North Korean special forces seized Plekhovo with no assistance from Russian forces, but one milblogger characterized the assault as a joint Russian-North Korean operation. Geolocated footage published on December 14 shows roughly 40 infantry personnel conducting an assault east of Kremyanoye (east of Korenevo), and some sources claimed that the footage shows North Korean troops, although ISW cannot independently verify if the footage shows North Korth or Russian personnel. A Russian milblogger claimed on December 14 that elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (a mobilized element of the Russian Territorial Troops) advanced near Russkoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha) with support from North Korean personnel. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps , Leningrad Military District ), 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet , Southern Military District ), and "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion (Donetsk People's Republic "Pyatnashka" International Volunteer Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army ) trained North Korean personnel operating in Kursk Oblast for "many weeks." Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi amplified several Ukrainian sources on December 14 claiming that North Korean soldiers conducted infantry assaults across open terrain in groups of 20 to 30 personnel in unspecified areas in Kursk Oblast. ISW cannot independently verify any of these claims, however. ISW previously noted that North Korea's ability to learn and integrate lessons from fighting alongside Russia is likely to be significantly degraded if the Russian military command uses North Korean troops in the same highly attritional infantry-led assaults that it uses most Russian personnel.

The prospects for Russia's continued military presence in Syria remain unclear as reports that Russia is evacuating its military assets from Syria continue. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 14 that "hundreds" of Russian soldiers cannot reach Hmeimim Air Base from Homs Governorate out of fear that Russian forces will come under fire from unspecified actors. The GUR stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Africa Corps arrived in Syria to protect Russian forces moving towards Russia's bases on the western coast and that Russian Colonel Dmitry Motrenko is negotiating with military contingents in Syria from other unspecified states in order to secure guarantees of "immunity" for Russian soldiers waiting at the Tiyas Air Base west of Palmyra. The GUR also stated that roughly 1,000 Russian personnel left Damascus on December 13 in a column heading towards the Port of Tartus and Hmeimim Air Base, and ISW observed footage on December 13 of Russian military convoys moving from Damascus and other areas in southern Syria, likely towards the two main Russian bases. Reuters reported on December 14 that a "Syrian security official" stationed near Hmeimim Air Base stated that at least one cargo plane flew out of the base on December 14 bound for Libya. Syrian military and security sources reportedly stated that Russia is withdrawing some heavy equipment and senior officers from the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) to Moscow but is currently not planning to permanently pull out of the Port of Tartus or Hmeimim Air Base. A Russian milblogger posted photos and footage on December 14 purportedly showing Russian military assets still operating at the Russian helicopter base at Qamishli in northeastern Syria, and a Russian source claimed on December 14 that Russian forces have withdrawn from their base in Kobani in northern Syria.

The complex nature of the interim Syrian government is likely resulting in conflicting reports about whether Russia is engaged in talks with Syrian opposition groups. Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) controls the Syrian interim government, but HTS and the interim government do not yet have complete control over the disparate groups that helped overthrow the Assad regime. Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated on December 12 that Russia has established contacts with HTS. Reuters reported on December 14 that a Russian source stated that discussions between Russia and the interim Syrian government are ongoing. A "senior rebel official close to the new interim administration" told Reuters, however, that the issue of Russia's military presence in Syria and Russia's previous agreements with the Assad regime are "not under discussion" and that talks at an unspecified time in the future will address this matter. The official reportedly stated that the "Syrian people will have the final say." Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 13 that Mohammed Sabra, a Syrian politician who represented the Syrian opposition's High Negotiations Committee at the 2016 Geneva peace talks on the Syrian Civil War, similarly stated that there should be a referendum in the future to allow the Syrian people to approve any foreign military presence in Syria. It is unclear if Reuter's "senior rebel official close to the new interim administration" who denied talks between Russia and the interim government is a member of HTS or another Syrian opposition group. It remains unclear if Russia is in contact with all the Syrian opposition groups necessary to guarantee the short- and long-term safety of its military bases and select opposition groups may be unaware that Russia is in discussion with other groups. Russian state media has notably not differentiated between different opposition groups when reporting on the situation in Syria, possibly as part of efforts to present the interim government as more united so as to increase the legitimacy of any agreements Russia reaches with one or some of the groups.

Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 14 that the Russian military has deployed North Korean soldiers in infantry assaults in Kursk Oblast.

• The prospects for Russia's continued military presence in Syria remain unclear as reports that Russia is evacuating its military assets from Syria continue.

• The complex nature of the interim Syrian government is likely to result in conflicting reports about whether Russia is engaged in talks with Syrian opposition groups.

• Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in Oryol Oblast on the night of December 13 to 14.

• The new Georgian Dream-dominated parliament and other government bodies elected Georgian Dream's candidate, Mikheil Kavelashvili, as Georgian President on December 14.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Torestk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Robotyne.

• Ukrainian forces regained lost positions near Vovchansk within the past several weeks.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to exalt the "Time of Heroes" veteran program and use it to militarize the Russian government and society.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted a roughly battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Siversk direction following a recent reported command change of the Russian forces operating near Siversk. Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov reported on December 15 that Russian forces conducted a three-pronged mechanized assault with over 400 personnel, up to 30 armored vehicles, 13 buggies, and 60 motorcycles north, east, and south of Siversk on December 14. Geolocated footage published on December 15 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced during a roughly company-sized mechanized assault north of Vesele (south of Siversk) — likely a component of the larger attack. Butusov reported that Russian forces managed to wedge into four Ukrainian defensive positions and drop infantry but that Ukrainian drone and artillery fire as well as close combat ultimately repelled the assault. Butusov stated that Russian forces aimed to wedge two to three kilometers into Ukrainian defenses, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced two kilometers in depth from the direction of Zolotarvika (east of Siversk). ISW is currently unable to confirm the extent of Russian advances in this assault, and additional footage of the Russian assault will likely emerge in the coming days. Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Anastasiya Bobovnikova stated on December 14 that Russian forces fielded more than 100 pieces of equipment in a recent assault in the Siversk direction and noted that there were 55 combat engagements in this direction on December 13 — a significant increase in tempo in this area of the frontline.

The recent Siversk assault indicates that Russian forces appear to be learning to conduct more effective assaults but remain far from restoring maneuver to the battlefield. This Russian assault was much larger and more coherent than most Russian assaults in the Siversk direction, and Butusov assessed that Russian forces carefully prepared this assault. Butusov noted that Russian forces specifically coordinated interactions between assault units and communications, electronic warfare (EW), and drone operations – all elements of command and control (C2) with which the Russian military command has historically struggled to conduct effectively. A more prepared Russian assault may be the result of the recent reported command changes in the area. Russian forces near Siversk have especially struggled to conduct effective assaults, as a failed Russian mechanized assault northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka in early November 2024 and exaggerated claims of success in the area contributed to the Russian military command's reported removal and arrest of several brigade commanders within the 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps ). A Russian insider source who has previously correctly predicted Russian command changes claimed on December 13 that the Russian military command recently removed 3rd CAA Commander Major General Dmitry Ovcharov.<9> A Russian milblogger rejected this claim on December 15, instead claiming that Major General Alexei Kolesnikov was the most recent commander of the 3rd CAA and that Kolesnikov recently took up a new, unspecified position.

More Key Takeaways:

• North Korean forces are reportedly facing expected struggles with high casualties and poor communication with Russian forces in Kursk Oblast, likely disrupting coordination between North Korean and Russian personnel and undermining Russian military operations.

• Russia's immediate plans for its military assets in Syria remain unclear as reports continue that Russia has secured agreements to keep its main military bases in western Syria while also withdrawing from its other bases in the country.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.

• Russian sources continue to complain about the Russian military's insufficient training system and inept military instructors.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin's continued fixation on the Russian "Oreshnik" ballistic missile and Russia's non-nuclear deterrents suggests that the Kremlin may be searching for off-ramps from its continued nuclear saber-rattling narrative. Putin addressed the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) board on December 16 and discussed Russian military developments in 2024 and Russia's military goals for 2025. Putin stated that Russia is developing military capabilities and technologies alongside its nuclear triad and emphasized that the Oreshnik ballistic missile is Russia's "latest powerful weapon," of which Russia will soon serialize production. Putin also notably claimed that if Russia were to use the Oreshnik in a "complex manner" in tandem with other non-nuclear munitions, the resulting strike would be "comparable in power to the use of nuclear weapons." Putin noted that the Oreshnik does not have a nuclear payload and therefore does not create nuclear contamination, emphasizing that the Oreshnik's non-nuclear nature "is a very important element when deciding what means of armed struggle" Russia will employ. Putin has previously lauded the technical specifications of the Oreshnik ballistic missile, including by comparing it to a nuclear weapon or a meteorite in terms of the damage it can cause.

Putin's recent emphasis on the purported power of Oreshnik is notable and suggests that the Kremlin may seek an off-ramp from the intense nuclear saber-rattling it has employed thus far in the war. Putin's December 16 MoD address, his statements at the Collective Security Treaty Organization's (CSTO) Security Council in Astana, Kazakhstan, on November 28, and his speech to the MoD on November 22 all appear to be trying to establish the Oreshnik as the bastion of Russia's non-nuclear deterrent. Russia has repeatedly invoked the threat of nuclear retaliation in order to force Ukraine and the West into self-deterrence, but Ukrainian and Western actions have challenged Kremlin's nuclear narrative every time the Kremlin has employed it, constantly undermining Russia's self-defined thresholds for nuclear use. ISW has previously assessed that there is nothing particularly new about the Oreshnik's capabilities, so Putin is likely extolling its technical specifications in order to create fear and uncertainty about the damage the Oreshnik can inflict and to pressure Ukraine's partners to push Ukraine to limit its strikes against Russia out of fear that he will actually conduct retaliation. Putin likely introduced the Oreshnik as a new element in the Kremlin's wider reflexive-control toolkit as the Kremlin increasingly comes to terms with the fact that Putin's unwillingness to follow through on hints of nuclear threats is devaluing them such that he must find a rhetorical off-ramp in order to maintain its credibility in the international information space.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin's continued fixation on the Russian "Oreshnik" ballistic missile and Russia's non-nuclear deterrents suggests that the Kremlin may be searching for off-ramps from its continued nuclear saber-rattling narrative.

• Putin once again reiterated the false Russian narrative that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is illegitimate—firmly establishing that the deposition of Ukraine's legitimate, democratic government is one of the Kremlin's prerequisites for a negotiated settlement to the war.

• Russian Defense Minister Belousov also used the December 16 Russian MoD board meeting to reiterate Putin's previously stated territorial objectives in Ukraine as another Kremlin prerequisite to a negotiated settlement to the war.

• Belousov also used his December 16 address to posture as an effective and innovative manager—sharply contrasting his leadership of the MoD with that of former Defense Minister and current Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu.

• Putin ordered the MoD to establish the Unmanned Systems Forces as part of continued efforts to centralize control over Russian irregular drone units.

• Belousov's statements confirm that the Russian military is recruiting just enough military personnel to replace its recent casualty rates, but intensified offensive operations have and will likely continue to strain the efficacy of Russia's cryptomobilization efforts.

• Russia continues to negotiate with the interim Syrian government to maintain its military presence at the Hmeimim Air Base and Port of Tartus in Syria, but Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's recent appeals to Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) suggest that talks may have hit a snag.

• Russia continues to withdraw elements of its force grouping in Syria to the western coast amid limited reports that Moscow plans to fully withdraw within one month.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka and in Kursk Oblast.

• The Russian government appointed Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov as the Chairperson of the Supervisory Board of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Military Construction Company, likely as part of ongoing anti-corruption efforts within the Russian MoD.

Institute for the Study of War

Syrskyj: Große russische Gegenoffensive in Kursk


Russland hat nach Angaben des ukrainischen Generalstabs eine umfangreiche Gegenoffensive in der russischen Region Kursk begonnen.


AP/Russisches Verteidigungsministerium
Moskaus Truppen hätten ihre Angriffe auf das von der Ukraine gehaltene Gebiete in den vergangenen drei Tagen intensiviert, sagte Armeechef Olexandr Syrskyj heute. Dabei setze Russland auch nordkoreanische Einheiten ein, unter denen es hohe Verluste gebe, so Syrskyj.

https://orf.at/stories/3379240/

The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) killed Russian Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Forces (NBC) Head Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his assistant, Major Ilya Polikarpov, in Moscow on December 17. SBU sources confirmed to various Ukrainian and Western outlets that the SBU carried out a "special operation" to kill Kirillov, whom the SBU sources described as a "legitimate target" for his war crimes and use of banned chemical weapons against the Ukrainian military. Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Representative Svetlana Petrenko announced that Sledkom's Main Investigative Department for Moscow launched an investigation into Kirillov's and Polikarpov's deaths after an improvised explosive device (IED) planted in a scooter remotely detonated near a residential building on Ryazansky Prospect. Russian sources released later geolocated footage of the IED attack and its aftermath, showing a badly damaged entrance to the building and blown out windows. The SBU notably charged Kirillov in absentia on December 16 for being responsible for the mass use of banned chemical weapons in Ukraine and reported that Russian forces carried out over 4,800 attacks with chemical weapons in Ukraine under Kirillov's command.

The Kremlin and Russian propagandists overwhelmingly attempted to frame Kirillov's assassination as an unprovoked terrorist act, rather than a consequence of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Kirillov's responsibility for Russian chemical weapons attacks and information operations against Ukraine. Petrenko announced that Sledkom designated Kirillov's and Polokarpov's deaths as a terrorist act, and Russian officials such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova emphasized Kirillov's prominent role in spreading numerous (false) narratives about Ukraine's and NATO's alleged use of chemical and biological weapons. Kirillov spread several false narratives over the years, such as nonsensically claiming that the United States established "biolabs" in Ukraine and other countries around Russia and that the Pentagon deliberately destroyed the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) to spread contagious diseases via insects. The Kremlin notably used the false claims of Ukrainian use of biolabs as a pretext for Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Federation Council Committee of Defense and Security Member Vladimir Chizhov among other Russian officials and propagandists claimed that Western and Ukrainian security officials hated Kirillov for "exposing" Western provocations in Russia.

Key Takeaways:

• The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) killed Russian Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Forces (NBC) Head Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his assistant, Major Ilya Polikarpov, in Moscow on December 17.

• The Kremlin and Russian propagandists overwhelmingly attempted to frame Kirillov's assassination as an unprovoked terrorist act, rather than a consequence of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Kirillov's responsibility for Russian chemical weapons attacks and information operations against Ukraine.

• The Russian ultranationalist information space overwhelmingly called on the Kremlin to retaliate against Ukraine by targeting its military-political leadership and indirectly criticized the Kremlin's decision to not recognize the war in Ukraine as a full-scale war that also impacts the Russian rear.

• US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby confirmed on December 16 that North Korean forces are engaged in combat operations and suffering losses in Kursk Oblast as Russian official sources continue to avoid reporting on or confirming the deployment of North Korean forces to combat in Russia.

• Neither the Kremlin nor the interim Syrian government appear sure of the future of Russian bases in Syria, likely accounting for Russia's continued visible preparations at Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus to withdraw forces despite claims and reports that the interim Syrian government might extend Russian basing rights.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Vuhledar, Velyka Novosilka, and in Kursk Oblast.

• The Kremlin is scaling up the intended effects of its "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to install Kremlin-selected veterans into government officials, by tasking Russian regional governments to create more localized analogues.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a chemical plant in Rostov Oblast on December 18. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that unspecified actors struck the Kamensky Chemical Plant and that the plant produces rocket fuel, explosives, and ammunition components and disposes of spent rocket systems. Acting Rostov Oblast Governor Yury Slyusar claimed that Russian forces downed 10 missiles over Rostov Oblast, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces used Storm Shadow or ATACMS missiles in the strike. Russian sources amplified footage purportedly showing Russian air defenses downing the missiles, and a Russian insider source claimed that Ukrainian forces also targeted the Taganrog Metallurgical Plant.

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) announced on December 18 that Russian authorities detained the suspect who planted the improvised explosive device (IED) that killed Russian Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Forces (NBC) Head Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his aide, Major Ilya Polikarpov, in Moscow on December 17. The FSB claimed that the alleged perpetrator is a 29-year-old citizen of Uzbekistan who claimed that Ukrainian special services recruited him to place an IED planted in an electric scooter near Kirillov's residence in exchange for money and permission to live in the European Union. The Uzbek Embassy in Moscow stated on December 18 that it is in contact with Russian law enforcement to clarify information about the alleged suspect. ISW cannot independently confirm if the suspect was involved in Kirillov's and his assistant's death. Russian milbloggers seized on the suspect's Central Asian origins to call for harsher migration laws and restrictions against migrants. Russian milbloggers' hyperfocus on the alleged perpetrator's ethnic origins highlights the polarizing debate over the role and treatment of migrants and ethnic minorities in Russian society, suggesting that the Kremlin is increasingly struggling to foster civic Russian nationalism and portray Russia as an inclusive and harmonious multicultural country.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's European allies continue to provide monetary and defense industrial support to sustain Ukraine's war effort.

• Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov heavily inflated alleged statistics about Russian territorial gains in 2024.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Kreminna, and Pokrovsk.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is increasingly tricking conscripts into signing military service contracts to fight in Ukraine likely in an effort to generate more assault forces and maintain the tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin said that he should have violated the ceasefire he had imposed on Ukraine in 2014 by launching a full-scale invasion even earlier when asked to reflect on his 2022 decision to attack. Putin responded to a media question during his annual Direct Line televised press conference on December 19 on whether he would change his decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine if he had it to do over again, stating that he should have made this decision earlier. Putin added that Russia should have systematically prepared ahead of the full-scale invasion and falsely claimed that Russia "spontaneously" invaded Ukraine in 2022 after Ukraine "directly" announced that it would not abide by the Minsk II Accords.

The Minsk II Accords were extremely favorable to Russia, imposing a set of commitments on Ukraine that surrendered core elements of Ukrainian sovereignty and allowing Russian proxies supported by Russian military forces to continue to occupy the areas they had seized during their initial invasions in 2014. The accords imposed no obligations on Russia — which was party to the negotiations as an alleged neutral mediator. They established a "ceasefire" that Russian proxies continually violated with Russian support. The Minsk II Accords also accepted the false Russian narrative that Russian proxies in Ukraine were independent of Moscow, and Putin insisted that Ukraine uphold its commitments even as the proxies, operating directly on orders from Moscow, violated their own obligations. The Minsk II Accords did not require Russia to withdraw its armed forces from occupied areas of Ukraine, and Russia used positions in the occupied areas as staging areas for the 2022 full-scale invasion.

Putin insisted that negotiations with Ukraine must be based on the same demands he made before the invasion and at the moment of Russia's greatest territorial gains, despite the fact that Ukraine has secured Kyiv and liberated much of the territory his forces held at that time. Putin said during Direct Line that he is ready to hold talks with Ukraine without preconditions, that any talks must be based on what Russia and Ukraine had agreed upon during negotiations in Istanbul in March 2022, when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv and throughout eastern and southern Ukraine, and on "the realities that are developing on the ground today." Putin reiterated that the demands he made at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in June 2024 — that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before Russia can agree to a ceasefire or peace negotiations — still stand. The draft treaty that resulted from the Ukraine-Russia negotiations in Istanbul in March 2022 stated that Ukraine would be a permanently neutral state that could not join NATO, and imposed limitations on the Ukrainian military similar to those imposed by the Treaty of Versailles on Germany after World War I, restricting Ukraine's armed forces to 85,000 soldiers. Russia's demands at Istanbul were mainly more detailed versions of the demands that Putin made in the months before he launched the full-scale invasion in February 2022, including Ukraine's "demilitarization" and neutrality.

Putin's reference to conditions he attempted to impose on Ukraine when he believed his invasion could succeed in a few days and then, later, as his forces were still driving on Kyiv, reflects his projected confidence that he can completely defeat Ukraine militarily despite the tremendous setbacks Ukraine has inflicted on Russian forces since then. Russian forces were driving on Kyiv and advancing in southern, eastern, and northern Ukraine while the Istanbul negotiations were ongoing in March 2022. Ukrainian forces have since pushed Russian forces away from Kyiv and secured the city and its environs from ground attack while conducting counteroffensives that pushed Russian forces away from Kharkiv City and liberated Kherson as well as much other territory. Kremlin officials have repeatedly invoked the concept of the "realities on the ground" in reference to Russian gains on the battleground, but realities on the ground reflect Ukraine's demonstrated ability to stop Russian advances and reverse them.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin said that he should have violated the ceasefire he had imposed on Ukraine in 2014 by launching a full-scale invasion even earlier when asked to reflect on his 2022 decision to attack.

• Putin insisted that negotiations with Ukraine must be based on the same demands he made before the invasion and at the moment of Russia's greatest territorial gains, despite the fact that Ukraine has secured Kyiv and liberated much of the territory his forces held at that time.

• Putin's insistence on Ukraine's complete surrender reflects his belief that Russia is winning and will outlast Ukrainian and Western resolve. Putin will not likely accept a lesser settlement unless Ukrainian forces inflict other significant battlefield setbacks on Russia and demonstrate to him that he cannot win militarily.

• Putin reiterated the false narrative that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's presidency is illegitimate, in part, to blame Ukraine for delaying negotiations and garner support for full Ukrainian capitulation among a Russian population that increasingly wants the war to end.

• Putin continues to justify his decision to prioritize Russian offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast over expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.

• Putin is apparently embarrassed to admit his need for North Korean forces to push Ukrainian forces out of Russian territory, despite his openness about the Russia-North Korea relationship.

• Putin continues to fixate on the Russian "Oreshnik" ballistic missile as part of his non-nuclear deterrent aimed at simultaneously forcing the West to make decisions favorable to Russia and providing Putin with an off-ramp from his failed nuclear saber-rattling narrative.

• Putin's boasting about Russia's military capabilities ignores the reality of the serious and unsustainable losses that Russia has suffered to advance relatively more rapidly in Donetsk Oblast in recent months.

• Putin continues to falsely posture the Russian economy as strong and stable while deflecting blame for economic issues onto the Russian Central Bank.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, Vuhledar, Velyka Novosilka, and Robotyne.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continued efforts to evade blame for ongoing systemic payment issues impacting Russian servicemembers fighting in Kursk Oblast caused by his decision to downplay Ukraine's incursion into the region as a "counterterrorism operation" by scapegoating the Russian Ministry of Defense.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin called on Mariupol occupation officials to redistribute illegally confiscated Ukrainian apartments during his annual Direct Line televised press conference on December 19, signaling Russia's continued efforts to forcibly repopulate occupied areas of Ukraine with Russians to fundamentally alter Ukraine's demographics.

Institute for the Study of War

Krieg der Roboter:

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted their first attack solely using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and first-person view (FPV) drones


Russian ballistic missile strikes damaged several embassies in central Kyiv on the morning of December 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched five Iskander-M/North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles at Kyiv City on the morning of December 20 and that Ukrainian forces downed all five, but that missile debris damaged infrastructure in Kyiv City and caused civilian casualties. Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhiy Tykhyi stated that the Russian missile strike damaged multiple embassies in a single building, including the embassies of Albania, Argentina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Palestine, and Portugal. Kyiv City officials reported that debris from Russian missiles damaged warehouses and infrastructure in Kyiv City. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile, a Kh-59/69 cruise missile, and 65 Shahed and other drones at Ukraine overnight on December 19 to 20, of which Ukrainian air defenses downed 40 drones and electronic warfare (EW) interference caused 20 drones to become lost. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the overnight drone and missile strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Sumy oblasts.

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted their first attack solely using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and first-person view (FPV) drones, highlighting Ukraine's ongoing efforts to leverage technological innovation into ground operations. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on December 20 that Ukrainian forces conducted their first ground attack exclusively using robotic systems instead of infantry on an unspecified date near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) and successfully destroyed unspecified Russian positions during the attack. The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces conducted the attack with dozens of UGVs equipped with machine guns and also used the UGVs to lay and clear mines in unspecified positions in the area. Ukrainian officials have repeatedly highlighted Ukraine's efforts to utilize technological innovations and asymmetric strike capabilities to offset Ukraine's manpower limitations in contrast with Russia's willingness to accept unsustainable casualty rates for marginal territorial gains.

Ukraine also continues to innovate aerial drone production. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian officials completed tests of a drone attached to fiber optic cables that will be more resistant to electronic warfare (EW) interference. Russian forces have recently fielded such drones in Kursk Oblast and Ukraine. A Ukrainian drone company reported that it recently assembled a prototype of the first FPV drone made exclusively from components manufactured in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian ballistic missile strikes damaged several embassies in central Kyiv on the morning of December 20.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted their first attack solely using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and first-person view (FPV) drones, highlighting Ukraine's ongoing efforts to leverage technological innovation into ground operations.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his intention to orient Russia's political and ideological priorities for 2025 around Russian veterans.

• The Kremlin continues to scapegoat Kursk Oblast civil servants for its failure in responding to Ukraine's Kursk Oblast incursion.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, near Kupyansk, within Toretsk, and in the Vuhledar direction.

• Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported on December 20 that it has confirmed that at least 20,364 Russian soldiers have been killed in action (KIA) in Ukraine since January 1, 2024.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin repeated his latest assertion that he should have violated the ceasefire he had imposed on Ukraine in 2014 and 2015 by launching a full-scale invasion even earlier than February 2022. Putin reiterated during an interview with Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on December 22 that Russia should have started its full-scale invasion of Ukraine earlier than February 2022 but added that it is impossible to say exactly when that should have been. Putin blamed Ukraine and the West for "misleading" Russia and not implementing the Minsk II Accords, which Putin claimed gave the West time to prepare Ukraine for future "military actions" against Russia. Putin claimed that Russia should have "prepared for this" and "chosen the right moment" to begin its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and not "waited for the moment when it was no longer possible to do nothing." Putin failed to mention that Ukraine worked to strengthen its military as a defensive response to Russia's 2014 annexation of Ukrainian territory and the launch of a war in the country's east. Putin made similar remarks during his December 19 Direct Line televised press conference wherein he claimed that he would have made the decision to launch his full-scale invasion earlier if he could do it over again. Putin also claimed on December 19 that Ukraine did not abide by the Minsk II Accords and that Russia "spontaneously" invaded Ukraine in 2022. The Minsk II Accords were notably extremely favorable to Russia, placing no obligations on Moscow – which was party to the negotiations as an alleged neutral mediator. The Accords established a "ceasefire" that Russian proxies continually violated with Russian support.

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an oil depot in Oryol Oblast with drones on the night of December 21 to 22. Oryol Oblast Governor Andrei Klychkov claimed on December 22 that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare (EW) downed 20 Ukrainian drones over Oryol Oblast and that drone strikes caused a fire at a fuel facility. Footage published on December 22 purportedly shows a drone strike at the Stalnoy Kon (Steel Horse) oil depot on the northeastern outskirts of Oryol City. Ukrainian forces previously struck the Stalnoy Kon oil depot on the night of December 13 to 14. Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported on December 22 that international sanctions preventing Russia from accessing Western equipment and components, Ukrainian drone strikes, reduced Russian oil exports, and high Russian loan rates have caused Russian oil refineries to increase their downtime in 2024. The SZRU reported that Russian oil refineries experienced a total downtime that prevented the facilities from refining 41.1 million tons of oil in 2024 after having only experienced a total downtime worth 35.9 million tons of oil in 2023. Ukrainian drone strikes have also targeted Russian air bases and the Russian military appears to be building shelters for aircraft at several Russian air bases. Satellite imagery collected throughout October 2024 indicates that the Russian military has been constructing shelters for aircraft at several air bases, including in Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Kursk City; and occupied Belbek, Crimea.

Russian forces recently executed more Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on the battlefield. Geolocated footage published on December 22 shows Russian forces executing five Ukrainian POWs in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area in Blahodatne (south of Velyka Novosilka). ISW has routinely assessed that Russian commanders are either complacent or enabling their subordinates to engage in POW executions in clear violation of international law.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin repeated his latest assertion that he should have violated the ceasefire he had imposed on Ukraine in 2014 and 2015 by launching a full-scale invasion even earlier than February 2022.

• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an oil depot in Oryol Oblast with drones on the night of December 21 to 22.

• Russian forces recently executed more Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on the battlefield.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk and in Kursk Oblast.

• North Korea may have transferred at least four additional ballistic missiles to Russia.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly rejected a suggestion reportedly considered by US President-elect Donald Trump's team in early November 2024 that would delay Ukraine's membership in NATO for at least a decade as a condition for ending the war in Ukraine. Putin responded on December 26 to a journalist's request to comment on the Trump team’s reported early November suggestion to delay Ukraine's membership in NATO for 10 to 20 years. Putin stated that it does not matter if Ukraine joins NATO "today, tomorrow, or in 10 years." Putin's December 26 statement is part of a series of comments he has made recently reiterating his refusal to consider compromises on his late 2021 and early 2022 demands. These demands include forcing Ukraine to become a permanently neutral state that will never join NATO, imposing severe limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military, and removing the Ukrainian government.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Putin's false claims that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and cannot be a legitimate negotiating partner for Russia. Lavrov claimed on December 26 during an interview with Russian and foreign media that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is not legitimate according to Ukraine's constitution and that Ukraine needs to hold presidential elections. Kremlin officials have been deliberately misinterpreting the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian law to delegitimatize Ukraine's government and sovereignty in recent months. The Kremlin's allegations that Zelensky and the Ukrainian government are not legitimate demonstrate that the Kremlin is unwilling in engage in negotiations with Ukraine or are effectively demanding regime change in Kyiv as a precondition for negotiations. Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly reiterated this false narrative about Zelensky's alleged illegitimacy in order to blame Ukraine — and not Russia — for delaying negotiations. This false narrative also promotes Putin's demand for the removal of the legitimate, democratically elected Ukrainian government – one of the Kremlin's ongoing maximalist demands in the war.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly rejected a suggestion reportedly considered by US President-elect Donald Trump's team in early November 2024 that would delay Ukraine's membership in NATO for at least a decade as a condition for ending the war in Ukraine.

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Putin's false claims that the current Ukrainian government is illegitimate and cannot be a legitimate negotiating partner for Russia.

• Russian forces have likely seized Kurakhove following two months of intensified offensive operations aimed at seizing the settlement and eliminating the Ukrainian salient north and south of the settlement.

• Russian forces may struggle to advance rapidly further west of Kurakhove along the H-15 Kurakhove-Pokrovske highway should Ukrainian forces choose to defend in the Kurakhivska TPP and Russian forces fail to outflank Ukrainian positions in the TPP near Dachne or Ulakly.

• Elements of the 51st CAA have been the main forces participating in the seizure of Kurakhove amid ongoing efforts to centralize and formalize elements of the 51st CAA within the Russian military.

• Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of December 24 to 25, seriously damaging thermal power plants (TPPs).

• Ukrainian forces conducted a successful strike on December 25 against the command post of a Russian unit operating in Kursk Oblast.

• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot in Rostov Oblast and Russian defense industrial base (DIB) facilities in Rostov and Tambov oblasts on December 25 and 26.

• A Russian air defense system reportedly shot an Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190 passenger aircraft over the Republic of Chechnya on December 25, after which the plane crashed in Aktau, Kazakhstan.

• A Russian insider source, who is reportedly affiliated with Russian law enforcement, claimed that an air defense missile likely struck the plane at an altitude of 2,400 meters approximately 18 kilometers northwest of the Grozny airport over Naursky Raion.

• Japan will provide Ukraine with $3 billion in non-lethal assistance generated solely from the proceeds of frozen Russian assets.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

• Russian milbloggers acknowledged that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is attempting to monopolize crowdfunding efforts for the Russian military amid ongoing fallout from the deaths of two Russian drone operators in September 2024.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia has continued to expand its domestic production capabilities of Iranian-designed Shahed drones ahead of its Winter 2024-2025 strike campaign against Ukraine. CNN, citing Ukrainian defense intelligence sources, estimated on December 27 that Russia's Shahed drone production facility in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan produced 5,760 drones between January and September 2024 — more than twice the number of drones that the facility produced in 2023. CNN reported that satellite imagery shows that Russian authorities have constructed two new buildings and appear to have installed anti-drone mesh cages over several buildings at the facility in the Alabuga SEZ. CNN, citing leaked documents from the facility, reported that the Alabuga facility is Russia's main Shahed production facility and has already fulfilled an agreement to produce 6,000 drones for the Russian military by September 2025. Sources in Ukraine's defense intelligence told CNN that the Alabuga facility began producing low-tech "decoy" drones that resemble Shahed drones and that Russian forces use these decoys to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems in Summer 2024. The sources told CNN that Russia intends to produce 10,000 decoy drones by the end of 2024 — almost double the number of Shahed strike drones that Russia produced in the first nine months of 2024 — since decoy drones are 10 times cheaper to produce than armed Shahed strike drones. CNN noted that Russia has also constructed a train station near the Alabuga SEZ with a direct rail connection between Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC), which a Ukrainian intelligence officer stated could be used to transfer components required for drone production between the PRC and the Alabuga SEZ.

Russia has yet to address limitations in its ability to produce and field Shahed drones, however, and will likely continue to struggle with these limitations in 2025. ISW has previously observed indications that Western sanctions are complicating Russia's ability to source quality components for Shahed drones and that Russia is increasingly relying on low quality motors from the PRC to power Shahed drones. Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) innovations also appear to be enabling Ukrainian forces to disrupt Shahed-heavy strikes more effectively. Russian forces will likely continue to adjust their strike packages during Winter 2024-2025 and beyond in order to inflict significant damage on Ukraine's energy grid and critical infrastructure, and Russia likely intends to further increase its production and use of Shahed drones following the anticipated signing of the Russian-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement in January 2025.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia has continued to expand its domestic production capabilities of Iranian-designed Shahed drones ahead of its Winter 2024–2025 strike campaign against Ukraine.

• Russia has yet to address limitations in its ability to produce and field Shahed drones, however, and will likely continue to struggle with these limitations in 2025.

• North Korean forces are continuing to experience high casualty rates amid recent confirmation of the first captured North Korean soldier in Kursk Oblast.

• Ukrainian forces recently conducted a HIMARS strike against a Russian staff meeting in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, reportedly killing three Russian officers, following Ukrainian warnings about the possibility of renewed Russian offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

• Russian Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsiya) attempted to blame weather conditions and the pilot’s response to the Russian emergency airspace closure over the Republic of Chechnya for the Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190 passenger aircraft crash in Aktau, Kazakhstan on December 25.

• A Russian insider source — who is reportedly affiliated with Russian law enforcement and released an alleged transcript of the communications between the crew and a Russian air traffic control in Grozny — accused Rosaviatsiya of attempting to conceal the misuse of Russian air defense systems.

• Finnish authorities seized the Russian-owned Eagle S crude oil tanker on suspicion that the vessel was recently involved in damaging undersea electricity and telecommunication cables in the Baltic Sea but noted that it is too soon to conclude that Russia is behind the cable disruptions.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu to head the newly established Scientific Expert Council of the Russian Security Council.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained positions near Siversk and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Velyka Novosilka, and in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions.

• Russian federal subjects (regions) are continuing to increase the value of enlistment bonuses to incentivize military recruitment.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be trying to smooth over possible tensions in the Russian-Azerbaijani and Russian-Kazakh relationships after Russian air defense likely shot an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane on December 25, causing it to crash in Kazakhstan. Putin called Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev about the December 25 crash on December 28. The Kremlin readout of the conversation stated that Putin and Aliyev discussed "in detail" the December 25 plane crash in Aktau, Kazakhstan, and that Putin apologized that the "tragic incident" occurred in Russian airspace. The Kremlin readout noted that the plane repeatedly tried to land at the Grozny airport in the Republic of Chechnya as Russian air defense systems were repelling Ukrainian drone strikes against Grozny as well as Mozkok and Vladikavkaz in the North Ossetia-Alania Republic. The Kremlin readout stated that the Russian Investigative Committee has opened a criminal case for violating traffic safety rules, but notably did not specify that the "tragic incident" that occurred over Russian airspace was Russian air defense shooting the passenger plane. The readout from Aliyev's press service, however, stated that Putin apologized for the fact that the plane "was subjected to physical and technical impact from outside in Russian airspace, which resulted in the tragic incident." Azerbaijan's readout stated that Aliyev noted that there were holes in the plane's fuselage and that survivors' testimonies talked about how "foreign particles" pierced the cabin while the plane was flying. Azerbaijan's readout, although more explicit than the Russian one, also does not specify that Russian air defense struck the plane. The differences between the Russian and Azerbaijani readouts suggest that Azerbaijan is unhappy with the extent to which the Kremlin is refusing to directly acknowledge the role Russian air defense systems played in bringing down the plane.

Putin also called Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on December 28, likely to discuss how the official investigation of the crash site in Kazakhstan will present Russia's role in the crash. The Russian and Kazakh readouts of the call both stated that Putin and Tokayev exchanged condolences over the deaths of Russian and Kazakh citizens in the crash. Putin and Tokayev discussed the Kazakh government commission investigating the crash, which includes specialists from Russia, Azerbaijan, and Brazil. The Russian readout stated that the specialists will decode the flight recorders from the plane. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also spoke by phone with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov on December 28 and discussed the need to establish "all causes" of the plane crash and to take "urgent measures" to prevent a similar situation in the future. Russian authorities reportedly did not allow the plane to land at Russian airports, even though an alleged transcript of communications between the plane's crew and a dispatcher in Grozny claimed that the pilot requested emergency landing locations in Russia.

MSNBC and NBC News reported on December 27 that two US military officials, citing US intelligence, indicated that Russian forces targeted the plane with air defense systems after they likely misidentified the Azerbaijani airliner as a Ukrainian drone, in part due to the plane's irregular flight pattern. A Russian insider source, who reportedly has ties to Russian law enforcement and published an alleged transcript of communications between the plane's crew and a dispatcher in Grozny, claimed on December 28 that Russia transported air defense systems, including S-300 air defense systems, from Syria to Chechnya after the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime and recently installed these air defense systems around Grozny. ISW and the Critical Threats Project's (CTP) Africa File recently observed Russian flights from Syria to Makhachkala Airport (about 180 kilometers southeast of Grozny) but cannot confirm what cargo the plane was carrying.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be trying to smooth over possible tensions in the Russian-Azerbaijani and Russian-Kazakh relationships after Russian air defense likely shot an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane on December 25, causing it to crash in Kazakhstan.

• Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian Shahed drone storage, maintenance, and repair facility in Oryol City, Oryol Oblast.

• Russian authorities continue to establish a legal basis to remove the Taliban and Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) from the Russian government’s official list of banned terrorist organizations.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Siversk, Toretsk, and Kurakhove.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on December 28 that the Russian military completed its Fall 2024 conscription cycle.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explicitly rejected two suggestions reportedly considered by US President-elect Donald Trump's team in early November 2024 as conditions for ending the war in Ukraine – the delay of Ukraine's membership in NATO for 20 years and the deployment of European peacekeepers in Ukraine. Lavrov stated in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on December 29 that Russia is "not satisfied" with the Trump team's reported early November 2024 proposals to delay Ukraine's membership in NATO for 20 years and to station a European peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine. Lavrov is amplifying Russian President Vladimir Putin's December 26 explicit rejection of the Trump team’s reported suggestion to delay Ukraine's membership in NATO for 20 years. Lavrov stated that any agreements to end the war in Ukraine "must eliminate the root causes" of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and "must establish a mechanism to make it impossible to violate them." Lavrov claimed in an interview on December 26 that the two main "root causes" of the war are NATO's alleged violation of obligations to not advance eastward and "aggressive absorption" of areas near Russia's borders and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine. Lavrov's statements are part of ongoing senior Russian officials' statements that the Kremlin refuses to consider any compromises on Putin's late 2021 and early 2022 demands. These demands include forcing Ukraine to become a permanently neutral state that will never join NATO, imposing severe limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military, and removing the Ukrainian government.

Russian President Vladimir Putin enshrined his alleged policy of Ukrainian "denazification" in a new state strategy document about countering extremism, demonstrating how Putin continues to make the same demands for the removal of the Ukrainian government that he made in 2022 when launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin signed on December 28 a new Strategy for Countering Extremism in Russia. Putin signed Russia's last iteration of such strategy in 2020. The 2024 strategy includes mentions of "Russophobia" for the first time, which the document defines as the "unfriendly, biased, and hostile" attitudes and "discriminatory actions" towards Russian citizens, language, and culture by states that are unfriendly to Russia. The 2024 document, unlike the 2020 version, also lists Ukraine as a main source of extremism and accuses Ukraine of disseminating neo-Nazi ideas. The documents states that Russia needs to "eliminate" the source of extremist threats that come from Ukraine. Putin claimed in February 2022 when he launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine that Russia was pursuing the "denazification" of Ukraine – an attempt to justify the removal of the legitimate, democratically elected government of Ukraine. Putin has made similar statements recently reiterating his refusal to consider compromises on his late 2021 and early 2022 demands. The document's mentions of "Russophobia" and "discrimination" against Russian citizens, language, and culture also align with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's recent talking point that such alleged discrimination by the current Ukrainian authorities is a "root cause" of Russia's war against Ukraine that any future negotiations must address. The Kremlin will likely exploit this new strategy document to justify its calls for the removal of the Ukrainian government as "anti-extremist" measures.


Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explicitly rejected two suggestions reportedly considered by US President-elect Donald Trump's team in early November 2024 as conditions for ending the war in Ukraine – the delay of Ukraine's membership in NATO for 20 years and the deployment of European peacekeepers in Ukraine.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin enshrined his alleged policy of Ukrainian "denazification" in a new state strategy document about countering extremism, demonstrating how Putin continues to make the same demands for the removal of the Ukrainian government that he made in 2022 when launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

• Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev accused Russia of shooting the Azerbaijan Airlines Embraer 190 passenger flight over the Republic of Chechnya on December 25 and of attempting to cover up Russia's responsibility for the plane's crash in Kazakhstan — effectively rejecting Russian President Vladimir Putin's lackluster apology.

• Ukrainian forces are successfully innovating to combat Russian guided glide bomb strikes against Kharkiv Oblast.

• The US delivered its first liquified natural gas (LNG) shipment to Ukraine on December 27.

• Salome Zurabishvili announced her departure from the Georgian presidential palace on December 29 but stated that she considers herself to be Georgia's "legitimate" president.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Vuhledar and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

• Russia reportedly continues to face labor shortages that Russian military recruitment and persistent demographic problems are likely exacerbating.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Russia's demand that Ukraine renounce its right to sovereignty and territorial integrity as a precondition to start peace talks, indicating that Russia is not interested in good faith negotiations. Lavrov stated in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on December 30 that Russia will not participate in any negotiations to end its war in Ukraine unless Ukraine renounces its right and objective of liberating its territory up to its internationally recognized 1991 borders. Lavrov added that Russia considers Ukraine's objective of liberating its territory to its internationally recognized 1991 borders an "ultimatum." The Kremlin is likely attempting to impose unrealistic demands on Ukraine that violate international law to stymie legitimate good faith negotiations. Russia is also likely attempting to force the West into coercing Ukraine into acknowledging and accepting territorial concessions that will benefit Russia in the long term. Lavrov and other Russian officials have previously dismissed Ukraine's right to sovereignty and territorial integrity as a legitimate negotiating position. ISW continues to assess that Russia is not interested in good faith negotiations with Ukraine and will continue to pursue Ukraine's total capitulation.

US President Joe Biden announced an additional military aid package for Ukraine worth $2.5 billion on December 30. The package is funded by a combined $1.25 billion from the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) and $1.22 billion from the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) and will include thousands of artillery rounds, thousands of rockets, and hundreds of armored vehicles. The US Department of Defense (DoD) reported that the package also includes: munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS); HAWK air defense munitions; Stinger missiles; counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) munitions; ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS); High-speed Anti-radiation missiles (HARMs); Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; Tube-launched, Optically-guided, Wire-tracked (TOW) missiles; and other materiel.

Russia and Ukraine conducted one of the largest prisoners of war (POW) exchanges in 2024 on December 30, resulting in the return of 189 Ukrainian POWs — some of whom spent over two years in Russian captivity since early 2022. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on December 30 that Ukraine returned 189 Ukrainians, some of whom defended Ukrainian positions at the Azovstal Steel Plant, Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), and Snake Island in early 2022. Zelensky added that Ukraine also returned two civilians whom Russian forces captured during the siege of Mariupol. Ukraine's Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reported that this POW exchange was one of the largest POWs exchanges since the January 3, 2024, and that Ukraine returned 173 privates and sergeants and 14 officers: 87 servicemen of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, 43 of Ukraine's National Guard, 33 of Ukraine's Border Guards Service, and 24 of the Ukrainian Navy. The Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs added that some of the servicemen also participated in combat operations in Kursk, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. The Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs noted that in total 3,956 Ukrainian POWs returned to Ukraine, of which 1,358 returned in 2024. The Russian MoD announced on December 30 that Russia exchanged 150 Ukrainian POWs for 150 Russian POWs.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Russia's demand that Ukraine renounce its right to sovereignty and territorial integrity as a precondition to start peace talks, indicating that Russia is not interested in good faith negotiations.

• The Kremlin appears to be prioritizing Russia's force generation requirements and domestic political stability over efforts to mitigate economic pressure and labor shortages going into 2025.

• US President Joe Biden announced an additional military aid package for Ukraine worth $2.5 billion on December 30.

• Russia and Ukraine conducted one of the largest prisoners of war (POW) exchanges in 2024 on December 30, resulting in the return of 189 Ukrainian POWs - some of whom spent over two years in Russian captivity since early 2022.

• Russia and Ukraine conducted one of the largest prisoners of war (POW) exchanges in 2024 on December 30, resulting in the return of 189 Ukrainian POWs - some of whom spent over two years in Russian captivity since early 2022.

• Russian border guards withdrew from the Agarak border checkpoint on the Armenia-Iran border on December 30 after controlling the checkpoint for over 30 years.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and Velyka Novosilka.

• A Russian milblogger who focuses on Russian veteran issues claimed that Russian forces have significantly strengthened the Russian international border with Ukraine since 2022 and no longer overwhelmingly rely on conscripts and alleged deserters as border security.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces gained 4,168 square kilometers, largely comprised of fields and small settlements in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, at a reported cost of over 420,000 casualties in 2024. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on December 30 that Russian forces suffered 427,000 casualties in 2024. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced 4,168 square kilometers in 2024, indicating that Russian forces have suffered approximately 102 casualties per square kilometer of Ukrainian territory seized. ISW previously observed that Russian forces gained 2,356 square kilometers in exchange for an estimated 125,800 casualties during a period of intensified Russian offensive operations in September, October, and November 2024. Russian forces made 56.5 percent of their 2024 territorial gains during the September through November 2024 period. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on December 24 that 440,000 recruits signed military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in 2024, suggesting that Russia is likely recruiting just enough military personnel to replace its recently high casualty rates one for one.

Russian advances have slowed in December 2024, however. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces gained 593 square kilometers or 18.1 square kilometers per day in December 2024, while the number of daily Russian casualties in December 2024 remained similar to the estimated daily casualty rate in November 2024. The Ukrainian General Staff reported a daily Russian personnel casualty average of 1,585 in December 2024, marking a fourth all-time high of Russia's daily casualty rate following reports that Russia's average daily Russian personnel casualty reached a new all-time high of 1,523 casualties per day in November 2024. Russian forces were advancing at the notably higher rate of 27.96 square kilometers per day in November 2024. Syrskyi stated on December 30 that Russian forces have suffered 1,700 casualties per day over the past week (since December 23), indicating the Russian forces may have suffered an even higher casualty rate in the last few weeks of 2024 even as Russian advances slowed. The Russian military command likely tolerated record levels of personnel casualties from September through November 2024 to facilitate larger territorial gains, but it remains unclear if the Russian military command will be willing to sustain such casualties if Russian forces' rate of advance continues to decline as Russian forces continue to advance on more heavily defended settlements such as Pokrovsk.

Ukrainian forces have yet to stop Russian forces from advancing in their priority sectors, however, and Western aid remains critical to Ukraine's ability to stabilize the frontline in 2025. Ukrainian defenders have largely stalled Russian advances near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, but Russian forces continue to make gradual, grinding advances in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions. Ongoing Ukrainian manpower constraints and morale issues are also creating vulnerabilities in Ukraine's defensive lines, and Ukrainian officials must address these issues and steel defenders against Russian infantry assaults in eastern and southern Ukraine. Russian forces, and Russian President Vladimir Putin, are currently operating under a theory of victory that assumes that Russian forces can indefinitely advance in Ukraine but fails to account for the possibility that Ukrainian forces could inflict losses sufficient to stall or stop future Russian offensive operations. Ukrainian forces, with support from Ukraine's Western allies, must therefore work to integrate Ukrainian drone operations, sufficiently resourced artillery and long-range strike capabilities, and committed Ukrainian infantry units to defend against Russian advances and undermine Putin's theory of victory in 2025.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces gained 4,168 square kilometers, largely comprised of fields and small settlements in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast, at a reported cost of over 420,000 casualties in 2024.

• The Russian military command largely prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast in 2024 but failed to accomplish these goals.

• Russian forces have seized four mid-sized settlements - Avdiivka, Selydove, Vuhledar, and Kurakhove - in all of 2024, the largest of which had a pre-war population of just over 31,000 people.

• Russian forces would require just over two years to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast at their 2024 rates of advance, assuming that all their advances were confined to Donetsk, that they can seize large urban areas as easily as small villages and fields, and that the Ukrainians do not conduct any significant counterattacks in Donetsk.

• Ukrainian forces have yet to stop Russian forces from advancing in their priority sectors, however, and Western aid remains critical to Ukraine's ability to stabilize the frontline in 2025.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin officially declared 2025 the "Year of the Defender of the Fatherland" during his New Year's address on December 31 - signaling the Kremlin's continued efforts to militarize Russian society and maintain regime stability by appeasing the growing Russian veteran community.

• Ukrainian naval drones reportedly downed a Russian Mi-8 helicopter near occupied Cape Tarkhankut, Crimea, reportedly marking the first time that a naval drone has shot down an air target.

• Ukrainian forces struck the Yarsevskaya oil depot in Smolensk Oblast and a building used by the Russian military in Lgov, Kursk Oblast on December 30 and 31.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kreminna and in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

• The Russian government will deprive prisoners who volunteer to fight in Ukraine of the one-time enlistment bonus starting January 1, 2025, marking another instance of Russia trying to cut the mounting short- and long-term costs of war.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukraine's decision to not renew its contract to transport Russian gas through Ukrainian territory will likely significantly impact Russian gas revenues despite Kremlin posturing to the contrary. Russian and Ukrainian authorities confirmed that Russian gas ceased flowing through Ukrainian territory as of the morning of January 1, and Russian officials and media largely projected confidence that the cessation of gas supplies through Ukraine will harm Europe but not Russia. The loss of gas revenue will likely negatively affect Russian state energy operator Gazprom, which has been struggling with decreasing gas revenue from Europe since 2022. Bloomberg estimated on January 2 that Gazprom will likely lose $6 billion in gas revenues per year due to the cessation of gas transports through Ukraine. The BBC Russian Service noted on January 1 that Gazprom's main source of income in 2021 came from Russia's 45 percent share of the European gas market at the time but that Russia now has only one remaining route to export gas to Europe — the TurkStream pipeline bypassing Ukraine through the Black Sea to Turkey — and that Russian gas currently only accounts for five percent of the European market. The BBC noted that Slovakia and Austria — the final destinations of the blocked Russian gas through Ukraine — have both fully met their energy needs through alternative sources. The Kremlin's efforts to project confidence about the cessation of gas transit through Ukraine mirrors its efforts to coerce Europe into authorizing Russian gas transit to Europe through the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in Winter 2021–2022, and the Kremlin's renewed posturing in Winter 2024–2025 likely aim to extract economic or diplomatic concessions from Europe, undermine unity within the European Union (EU), and drive a wedge between the US and EU.

Gazprom is likely attempting to exploit the cessation of gas transits through Ukraine to create an artificial energy crisis to destabilize Moldova. Gazprom shut off gas supplies to Transnistria via Ukraine on January 1, claiming that Moldova failed to pay a debt worth $709 million. An audit by British and Norwegian audit firms, however, found in 2022 that Moldova owed Gazprom only $8.6 million. Moldova recently held talks with Gazprom about transporting gas to Transnistria via the TurkStream pipeline that runs from Russia to Turkey, but Gazprom refused and did not make the arrangements to do so by the deadline on December 16. Free Gazprom gas has long powered Transnistria's Cuciurgan power station, which exported a significant amount of electricity to Moldova and used the profits from these sales to support Transnistria's budget. The Cuciurgan power station switched to coal reserves on January 1, which reportedly can last about 50 days. Transnistrian gas company Tiraspoltransgaz stopped gas supplies to most consumers in Transnistria and shut off most of the hot water and heat on January 1. Moldova increased its electricity imports from Romania to make up for lost supplies from Transnistria. Moldovan gas company Moldovagaz and Moldovan state electricity company Energocom offered on January 1 to provide Tiraspoltransgaz technical and commercial assistance to obtain gas from European markets after successful tests on December 31, 2024 to supply Moldova with gas through Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's decision to not renew its contract to transport Russian gas through Ukrainian territory will likely significantly impact Russian gas revenues despite Kremlin posturing to the contrary.

• Gazprom is likely attempting to exploit the cessation of gas transits through Ukraine to create an artificial energy crisis to destabilize Moldova.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signaled that Ukraine will increase drone and missile strikes against Russia in 2025 as part of efforts to bring Russia to accept Ukraine's demands for a "just peace" in future negotiations.

• Russia intends to issue Russian licenses for the operation of all six of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant's (ZNPP) reactors by 2028 as part of Moscow's long-term efforts to legitimize its illegal occupation of the plant and exploit Ukraine's energy supplies.

• Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike in Kursk Oblast, reportedly against a Russian military command post.

• Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) specified new details about the December 31 Ukrainian naval drone strike against Russian Mi-8 helicopters in the Black Sea as Ukrainian strikes continue to degrade Russian operations in occupied Crimea.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to inadequately supply Russian military personnel with basic equipment and ammunition, forcing soldiers to provide their own materiel.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky outlined the conditions that must be met to push Russia to agree to a "just peace." Zelensky stated on January 2 that achieving a "just peace" in future negotiations – a concept Zelensky highlighted in his December 31 New Year’s address – requires a strong Ukrainian military, security guarantees from Western allies, and Ukraine's future membership in NATO and the European Union (EU) in order to deter Russia from renewed aggression against Ukraine. Zelensky stated that Ukraine cannot achieve a just peace with a small military, such as "40,000 or 50,000 soldiers" – a reference to Russian President Vladimir Putin's initial demand during the Istanbul peace talks between Russia and Ukraine in Spring 2022 that Ukraine demilitarize and only maintain a force of roughly 50,000 personnel. Putin and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly demanded conditions for ending the war that amount to Ukraine's complete capitulation, including the removal of the legitimate Ukrainian government and Ukraine's demilitarization. These demands have not changed since 2021.

Ukrainian officials continue to signal that Ukraine is working to further increase its drone and missile capabilities in support of this goal. Zelensky stated on December 31 that Ukrainian missiles and drones are Ukraine's "arguments for a just peace." Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on January 3 that Ukraine plans to produce about 3,000 cruise missiles and "drone-missiles" and at least 30,000 long-range drones in 2025. Shmyhal stated that Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) will also increase production capacity to about $30 billion worth of goods and attract $1 billion in foreign investment in 2025. The Telegraph reported on January 2 that Ukraine is working to mass produce the "Trembita" cruise missile, which has a 90-mile range, a 40-pound payload, and costs $10,000 per missile to produce.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky outlined the conditions that must be met to push Russia to agree to a "just peace."

• Ukrainian officials continue to signal that Ukraine is working to further increase its drone and missile capabilities in support of this goal.

• Zelensky reiterated on January 2 that the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian law prohibit Ukraine from holding presidential and parliamentary elections during periods of martial law.

• Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that several Russian ships will soon arrive at the Port of Tartus in Syria to evacuate Russian military assets to Libya.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to support its official “Glaz/Groza” reconnaissance and strike unit coordination software package despite Russian soldiers’ continued reliance on other ad hoc communications systems.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue vehicle losses that are likely unsustainable in the medium-term. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Ukrainian forces destroyed or damaged 3,689 tanks, 8,956 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 13,050 artillery systems, and 407 air defense systems between January 1, 2024 and January 1, 2025. Russian forces reportedly lost at least 197 tanks, 661 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 65 artillery systems larger than 100mm throughout the frontline during a period of intensified offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast in September and October 2024 and likely sustained a higher rate of tank and armored vehicle losses in June and July 2024 when Russian forces were conducting mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast several times a week that often resulted in armored vehicle losses.

Russia's current armored vehicle and tank production rates indicate that such losses will likely be prohibitive over the longer term, particularly as Russia continues to dip into its Soviet-era stocks. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in February 2024 that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce 250-300 "new and thoroughly modernized" tanks per year and can repair roughly 250-300 additional damaged tanks per year, far below Ukraine's estimate of 3,600 Russian tanks lost in 2024. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank also reported in February 2024 that Russia is likely able to sustain its rate of vehicle losses at that time (over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles annually as of 2023 and nearly 8,800 between February 2022 and February 2024) for at least two to three years (until about February 2026 or 2027) by mainly refurbishing vehicles from Soviet-era storage facilities. A social media source tracking Russian military depots via satellite imagery shared an updated assessment of Russian tank and armored vehicle storage facilities on December 22 and assessed that Russian forces have 47 percent of their pre-war tank reserves, 52 percent of pre-war infantry fighting vehicle reserves, and 45 percent of pre-war armored personnel carrier reserves remaining in storage as of a recent unspecified date. The social media source noted that Russian forces have used most of their newer T-90 and T-80 tanks but still have a majority of their older tanks in storage, although some of these tanks have likely been heavily degraded by weather and time. It appears increasingly unlikely that the Russian military can sustain its current annual rate of almost 9,000 armored vehicle losses through 2025. This loss rate is nearly three times the annual loss rate of the first two years of the war according to IISS, suggesting that the February 2024 IISS estimate that Russia can sustain its vehicle losses through 2025 and possibly 2026 is no longer valid.

Russian forces have reportedly been using fewer armored vehicles in assaults in the most active areas of the frontline in recent weeks, possibly in order to conserve these vehicles as Soviet stocks dwindle. Ukrainian military sources have recently noted that Russian forces have been using fewer armored vehicles and conducting fewer mechanized assaults in the Kurakhove direction after suffering significant vehicle losses in October and November 2024. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated on January 3 that Russian forces have switched to mainly using infantry to conduct assaults in the area over the past few weeks and are only using armored vehicles as fire support for infantry assaults. The New York Times reported on December 31 that a Ukrainian lieutenant colonel stated that Russian forces are increasingly using electric scooters, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) during assaults in eastern Ukraine, possibly as part of ongoing Russian efforts to offset armored vehicle losses. Russian attacks near more mid-sized, urban settlements such as Kurakhove and Pokrovsk may also be less conducive to mechanized assaults than the small settlements and open fields where Russian forces advanced in most of 2024. Russian forces may be using fewer armored vehicles in the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk directions if the Russian military is struggling to reequip frontline Russian units and formations and if Russian military command does not want to withdraw Russian units for rest and reconstitution and risk further slowing Russian advances in high-priority frontline sectors.

Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue vehicle losses that are likely unsustainable in the medium-term.

• Russian forces have reportedly been using fewer armored vehicles in assaults in the most active areas of the frontline in recent weeks, possibly in order to conserve these vehicles as Soviet stocks dwindle.

• Ukrainian forces struck a gas terminal at the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast on the night of January 3 to 4.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kreminna and likely maintain positions near Kurakhove.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

• The Russian government continues to increase financial incentives in order to boost the recruitment of military personnel.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces resumed offensive operations in at least three areas within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and made tactical advances on January 5. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted multiple roughly company-sized mechanized assaults in the Berdin-Novosotnitsky direction (northeast of Sudzha) in three waves of attack using roughly a battalion's worth of armored vehicles. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also intensified offensive operations in the direction of Leonidovo (southeast of Korenevo) and conducted a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Pushkarnoye (east of Sudzha). Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in fields southwest and south of Berdin and entered the southern part of the settlement. Russian milbloggers published updated maps of the Kursk area of operations that indicate that Ukrainian forces also occupy Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, Martynovka, and Mikhaylovka (all northeast of Sudzha and southwest of Berdin) as of January 5 and reported that Ukrainian forces recently entered Novosotnitsky (just east of Berdin); and advanced in fields west of Yamskaya Step (immediately northwest of Berdin) and west of Novaya Sorochina (north of Sudzha and northwest of Berdin). Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces also conducted offensive operations near Nikolskiy and Alexandriya (east and southeast of Leonidovo, respectively) and north of Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha) towards Pushkarnoye in small infantry groups but did not provide details about the extent of any possible Ukrainian advances in these areas. Russian milbloggers largely expressed concern that the renewed Ukrainian effort in Kursk Oblast may be a diversionary effort and claimed that it is too early to determine whether these operations in Kursk could be part of a future main effort.

Russian forces also advanced southeast of Sudzha and counterattacked against intensified Ukrainian attacks southeast of Korenevo and north of Sudzha on January 5. Geolocated footage published on January 5 shows that Russian forces advanced in western and southern Makhnovka (just southeast of Sudzha). Russian milbloggers claimed that unspecified Russian airborne (VDV) elements pushed Ukrainian forces from Makhnovka and Dmitryukov (immediately northeast of Makhnovka). A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces may have advanced into Makhnovka "some time ago, however. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 4 that Russian and North Korean forces lost up to a battalion of infantry near Makhnovka on January 3 and 4. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced southeast of Makhnovka and along a road into southeastern Kurilovka (immediately southwest of Makhnovka). ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced during counterattacks against Ukrainian assaults east of Leonidovo towards Nikolskiy and in the direction of Malaya Loknya (northeast of Sudzha) on January 5. Another Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian mechanized column unsuccessfully attempted to advance towards Malaya Loknya, however. The milblogger complained that Ukrainian forces destroy most Russian mechanized columns in Kursk Oblast. Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District ), Chechen Akhmat "Aida" Spetsnaz group, former Wagner Group personnel, and unspecified BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) units reportedly defended against the Ukrainian effort in Kursk Oblast.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces resumed offensive operations in at least three areas within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and made tactical advances on January 5.

Russian forces also advanced southeast of Sudzha and counterattacked against intensified Ukrainian attacks southeast of Korenevo and north of Sudzha on January 5.

Russian sources expressed concern about the Russian military's ability to react to Ukraine's ongoing combined arms efforts to integrate electronic warfare (EW) and long-range strike capabilities with ground operations.

Russian forces recently advanced east of Pokrovsk amid renewed offensive operations in the area likely aimed at supporting the envelopment of Pokrovsk from the northeast.

The recent intensification in the Russian 41st CAA's area of responsibility east of Pokrovsk indicates that the Russian military command is still considering the envelopment of Pokrovsk as one of their key operational objectives in this area.

Russian forces may also be exploiting comparatively weaker Ukrainian defensive positions further east and south of Pokrovsk as part of an ongoing effort to seize any territory, regardless of such territory’s relative tactical insignificance.

Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps) are reportedly split between the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions — Russia's two most prioritized sectors of the frontline.

Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kursk salient and regained lost positions near Chasiv Yar.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces recently made tactical advances amid continued intensified offensive operations in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 6. Geolocated footage published on January 5 and 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Berdin, central Russkoye Porechnoye, and central Novosotnitsky (all northeast of Sudzha). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed on January 6 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian roughly reduced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Berdin and that Russian forces, including elements of Rosgvardia's "Talib" Group, repelled Ukrainian attacks near Novosotnitsky. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps , Leningrad Military District ), 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate ), 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, and Akhmat Spetsnaz units cleared areas near Berdin and Novosotnitsky. One Russian milblogger characterized recent Ukrainian attacks in Kursk Oblast as enhanced reconnaissance in force operations that could be a diversionary effort for unspecified future operations. Increased Ukrainian offensive operations in Kursk Oblast may be the beginning stages of a concerted Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast or elsewhere in the theater, though ISW is unprepared to offer any specific forecast.

Russian forces attempted to leverage Ukrainian attacks northeast of Sudzha to attack elsewhere in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 6. Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Malaya Loknya (northwest of Sudzha). Russian milbloggers claimed on January 6 that Russian forces, including elements of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), seized Leonidovo (northwest of Sudzha) and that Russian forces advanced in northeastern Russkoye Porechnoye (northeast of Sudzha). Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced near Makhnovka and Dmitryukov (both southeast of Sudzha). ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District ), attacked toward Malaya Loknya and near Novoivanovka, Viktorovka, and Nikolskiy (all northwest of Sudzha). The Russian MoD claimed that "Caspian naval infantry" drone units, likely referring to drone units of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), are operating in Kursk Oblast, indicating that the Russian military command likely redeployed elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment from western Zaporizhia Oblast to Kursk Oblast.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces recently made tactical advances amid continued intensified offensive operations in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 6.

• Russian forces attempted to leverage Ukrainian attacks northeast of Sudzha to attack elsewhere in the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on January 6.

• Ukrainian forces may be continuing to conduct long-range strikes against Russian rear areas in Kursk Oblast as part of efforts to use integrated strike capabilities to support ground operations.

• Russian forces reportedly executed more Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on January 3.

• Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets announced that Ukraine and Russia have reached a preliminary agreement to conduct regular POW exchanges in 2025.

• The leaders of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz forces and the far-right paramilitary unit "Rusich" Russian Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group met on January 6 and promoted a message about Russia's ethnic diversity and harmony.

• Russian forces advanced in the Lyman, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk directions, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Kurakhove.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview published on January 5 that 3,800 North Korean personnel have been killed and wounded in Kursk Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk following several weeks of higher tempo Russian offensive operations and gains in the area. Geolocated footage published on January 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Kvitkova Street and reached the northwestern administrative boundary of Toretsk. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along Pyrohova Street in northern Toretsk, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy roughly 90 percent of Toretsk, but ISW has only observed geolocated footage to assess that Russian forces occupy approximately 71 percent of the settlement as of January 7. Russian forces intensified offensive operations in the Toretsk direction in June 2024, likely to reduce the Ukrainian salient in the area and deny Ukrainian forces the ability to shell rear Russian areas in the Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk directions, both of which were Russian main efforts at the time. Russian forces originally committed limited combat power, including elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps ), Territorial Troops, and some elements of the Central Military District , to intensified operations near Toretsk in June 2024. Russian forces have made creeping and grinding gains within Toretsk and the nearby settlements since June 2024 but have intensified offensive operations in recent weeks and made tactical gains within northern and northwestern Toretsk.

Russian forces appear to be shifting assault tactics in Toretsk in order to overwhelm Ukrainian forces and facilitate tactical gains within the settlement. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported on January 5 that Russian forces are now attacking in platoons of up to 20 soldiers after previously attacking in fireteams of roughly five personnel. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 7 that Russian forces had made recent gains in Toretsk by attacking in multiple areas at once instead of focusing attacks in one location. Russian forces are likely leveraging their superior manpower quantities to intensify offensive operations and advance within Toretsk.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk following several weeks of higher tempo Russian offensive operations and gains in the area.

• Russian forces likely intend to exploit their advances in northwestern Toretsk to push further west of Toretsk and Shcherbynivka and along the T-05-16 Toretsk-Kostyantnivka highway towards the southernmost point of Ukraine's fortress belt in Kostyantynivka.

• Russian forces may attempt to leverage tactical gains within and near Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk.

• Russian forces are likely attempting to break out of Toretsk's urban environment and advance into more open and rural areas that are similar to the areas where Russian forces have made significant gains in other sectors of the front in recent months.

• Russian forces are unlikely to pose a significant threat to Kostyantynivka unless the Russian military command reinforced the existing force grouping in the area with troops from other frontline areas.

• The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet , Southern Military District ) in Belaya, Kursk Oblast on January 7.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk and in Kursk Oblast.

• The Kremlin continues to promote the "Time of Heroes" program, which aims to place veterans of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in positions in local, regional, and federal governments.


Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces struck Russia's state-owned Kombinat Kristal oil storage facility near Engels, Saratov Oblast on the night of January 7 to 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and the Unmanned Systems Forces struck the oil storage facility and caused a large fire. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the facility provides fuel for the Russian military's Engels-2 Air Base and noted that strike will create logistical issues for Russia's strategic aircraft based at the airfield. Geolocated footage published on January 8 shows a large fire at the storage facility, and Russian sources noted that the fire continued to burn into the morning of January 8. Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed that debris from a falling drone struck an unspecified industrial facility near Engels but later acknowledged that the strike caused a fire in the area.

Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District ) on January 8 in occupied Khartsyzk, Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the 8th CAA used this command post to coordinate operations in Kurakhove. Russian sources amplified reports on January 8 that a Ukrainian purported Storm Shadow strike against Lgov, Kursk Oblast on December 30 killed at least one serviceman in the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) and three servicemen in the 76th VDV Division.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck Russia's state-owned Kombinat Kristal oil storage facility near Engels, Saratov Oblast on the night of January 7 to 8.

• Ukrainian forces struck a command post of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District ) on January 8 in occupied Khartsyzk, Donetsk Oblast.

• Russian forces advanced in Kursk Oblast, in Toretsk, and near Kurakhove.

• Russian forces are increasingly using drones attached to fiber optic cables in Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukraine's Western partners reiterated their support for Ukraine and their commitment to the development of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany on January 9. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called for all participants of the group to sign bilateral security agreements with Ukraine in order to strengthen Ukrainian forces and protect Ukraine's energy sector. Zelensky emphasized the importance of providing Ukraine with more air defense systems and stated that Ukraine wants to supply Ukrainian forces with a record number of domestically produced and internationally procured drones in 2025. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced that the Ukraine Defense Contact Group approved eight roadmap documents that outline the Ukrainian forces' objectives through 2027 in key areas for international cooperation, including air defense, artillery, armored vehicles, drones, air force, and maritime security. Umerov stated that the roadmaps aim to ensure that the Ukrainian military is compatible with NATO and serve as the basis for medium- and long-term support for Ukraine. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin told Bloomberg ahead of the January 8 Ramstein meeting that Russia has some advantages in the war but is also facing challenges, as evidenced by Russia's turn to North Korea and Iran for assistance in its war against Ukraine.

Ukraine's Western partners announced additional military aid packages at Ramstein Air Base on January 9. Austin announced a new US military aid package for Ukraine under the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) valued at approximately $500 million. The package includes AIM-7, RIM-7, and AIM-9M air defense missiles; air-to-ground munitions; F-16 support equipment; and small-arms ammunition. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced that Germany will provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of IRIS-T air defense missiles. Polish Deputy Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz announced that Poland is also preparing a new aid package for Ukraine. UK Defense Secretary John Healey and Latvian Defense Minister Andris Spruds jointly announced that the drone coalition, including the UK, Latvia, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, will provide Ukraine with 30,000 drones at an unspecified future time after the coalition signed contracts worth 45 million pounds ($55.4 million).

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's Western partners reiterated their support for Ukraine and their commitment to the development of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany on January 9.

• Ukraine's Western partners announced additional military aid packages at Ramstein Air Base on January 9.

• Russian elites and high-ranking security officials are reportedly frustrated with Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to wage a full-scale war in Ukraine with half measures and are increasingly concerned with Putin's timeline to end the war.

• High-ranking Russian security officials appear to be assessing that Russia needs to intensify its war in Ukraine rather than seek an exit via negotiations.

• Russian elites' reported diagnosis of the main problem with Russia's conduct of the war is inaccurate, as Russia's failure to restore maneuver to the battlefield — not a shortage of manpower — is the main factor causing Russia's relatively slow rate of advance.

• Meduza's report indicates that Russia's security elite — like Putin himself — is uninterested in a negotiated and peaceful resolution to the war in the near future.

• A Russian opposition investigative outlet reported that Russian authorities have turned a pretrial detention center (SIZO) in Taganrog, Voronezh Oblast into a torture center for Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and imprisoned Ukrainian civilians.

• The UN condemned the recent surge in Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs.

• The Armenian government approved a draft law on January 9, beginning Armenia's accession process into the EU.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Pokrovsk and in Kursk Oblast.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Sudzha.

• Russian officials continue to indicate that the Kremlin intends to further militarize the Russian government and Russian society in the long term.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition and drone storage warehouse in Rostov Oblast on the night of January 9 to 10. Sources within Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian outlets Suspline and ArmyTV that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian military warehouse near Chaltyr, Rostov Oblast with drones and Neptune anti-ship cruise missiles. The sources stated that Ukrainian forces used the drones to overwhelm and exhaust Russian air defenses in the area before launching Neptune missiles at the warehouse. The sources stated that Russian forces use reconnaissance drones from this warehouse to correct Russian strikes on Ukrainian cities and frontline positions. Rostov Oblast Governor Yury Slyusar stated that Russian forces downed 16 Ukrainian drones over the oblast and that the strike caused a fire at an industrial enterprise just north of Chaltyr. Russian opposition outlet Astra assessed that the fire occurred at a plastic coating production plant in the area.

The Kremlin reiterated that it is ready to hold talks with US President-elect Donald Trump without any "preconditions" but noted that its negotiating position remains unchanged. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on January 10 to a Trump statement about arranging a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and stated that Putin is open to contact with international leaders and that "no conditions are required for this ." Peskov reiterated, however, that the Kremlin maintains its "repeatedly voiced" position on Ukraine that Putin explicitly defined in June 2024 and repeated in his December 19 Direct Line presentation. Putin demanded in June 2024 that Ukraine replace Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and his government under the guise of "denazification," demilitarize, and cede significant swaths of territory in eastern and southern Ukraine to Russia, including areas of Ukraine that Russia does not currently occupy – all effectively amounting to Ukraine's full capitulation. No negotiations will result in a meaningful or sustainable peace as long as Putin remains committed to these demands – regardless of the Kremlin's "willingness" to hold talks with Western leaders.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition and drone storage warehouse in Rostov Oblast on the night of January 9 to 10.

• The Kremlin reiterated that it is ready to hold talks with US President-elect Donald Trump without any "preconditions" but noted that its negotiating position remains unchanged.

• The United States, United Kingdom, and Japan announced new sanctions against Russia on January 10.

• The EU recently transferred three billion euros (about $3.07 billion) to Ukraine, the first tranche of EU funding from the profits of frozen Russian assets.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

• The BBC Russian Service reported on January 10 that a joint investigation conducted with Russian opposition outlet Medizona using open-source data has confirmed that at least 88,055 Russian soldiers have been killed in Ukraine since February 2022.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces reportedly captured the first North Korean prisoners of war (POWs) in Kursk Oblast. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) stated on January 11 that elements of the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) captured a North Korean soldier in Kursk Oblast on January 9 and that Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces recently captured a second North Korean solider in the area on an unspecified date. The SBU stated that Ukrainian authorities are working with South Korean intelligence to communicate with the POWs as they do not speak English, Russian, or Ukrainian. One of the POWs was carrying a Russian military registration card from the Tuva Republic that Russian authorities reportedly issued him in Fall 2024. The POW told Ukrainian authorities that he had undergone coordination training with Russian forces for only one week before deploying to combat and that he thought he was going to a training exercise in Russia, not to the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that usually Russian or North Korean forces kill wounded North Korean personnel in order to conceal their participation in the war.

North Korean forces are reportedly deploying large assault groups to combat operations despite frequent Ukrainian drone strikes, which is likely contributing to North Korea's high casualty rates and will likely affect the lessons that the North Korean military command will learn from fighting in the war. The Washington Post reported on January 11 that North Koreans fighting in Kursk Oblast are attacking in large groups with support from Russian artillery and drones, unlike Russian forces who usually move in smaller groups. North Korean soldiers are also reportedly ignoring Ukrainian drones and continuing to move forward despite drone strikes on personnel. The Washington Post reported that Russian forces are following behind North Korean advances in order to "stabilize the gains," but a Ukrainian solider operating in Kursk Oblast reported that communications issues between Russian and North Korean forces may be slowing Russian efforts to consolidate new positions. The Ukrainian soldier stated that North Korean forces launched an assault consisting of 400 to 500 personnel in December 2024, during which North Korean forces outnumbered Ukrainian forces six-to-one. Ammunition shortages reportedly forced the Ukrainian forces to withdraw after eight hours of fighting — suggesting that North Korean forces are heavily relying on a superior number of personnel to advance despite poor tactics. The solider stated that Ukrainian forces had inflicted significant losses on Russia's 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet , Southern Military District ), possibly pushing the Russian military command to deploy North Korean forces to Kursk Oblast sooner than planned. Western officials have recently noted that North Korean forces are suffering high casualties, including at least one instance of roughly 1,000 casualties in Kursk Oblast in only one week in late December 2024. Zelensky reported on January 5 that 3,800 North Korean personnel have been killed or wounded in Kursk Oblast — roughly a third of the reported 12,000 total North Korean personnel in Kursk Oblast — and stated that North Korean forces lost up to a battalion of infantry near Makhnovka, Kursk Oblast on January 3 and 4 alone. ISW continues to assess that North Korea's ability to learn and integrate lessons from fighting alongside Russian forces will likely be significantly degraded if the Russian military command uses North Korean troops in highly attritional infantry-led assaults in similar or greater sizes than it conducts with most Russian personnel. North Korean forces' inability or refusal to learn to effectively counter drones will also affect the lessons they can learn from the war.

Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces reportedly captured the first North Korean prisoners of war (POWs) in Kursk Oblast.

• North Korean forces are reportedly deploying large assault groups to combat operations despite frequent Ukrainian drone strikes, which is likely contributing to North Korea's high casualty rates and will likely affect the lessons that the North Korean military command will learn from fighting in the war.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin maintains his maximalist pre-war demands to isolate Ukraine and weaken NATO and reportedly aims to enforce these demands in any possible talks with Western leaders about ending the war in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces may have conducted a drone strike against an oil refinery in the Republic of Tatarstan on January 11, but details of the possible strike remain unclear at this time.

• Ukrainian forces may have conducted a drone strike against an oil refinery in the Republic of Tatarstan on January 11, but details of the possible strike remain unclear at this time.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

The Ukrainian General staff reported on January 12 that Ukrainian forces conducted a high-precision airstrike on the command post of Russia's 2nd Combined Arms Army (Central Military District) in Novohrodivka, Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the operation is part of a broader series of Ukrainian strikes targeting command posts of Russian forces operating in the Donetsk direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 8 and 10 that Ukrainian forces struck the command posts of the Russian 8th CAA (Southern Military District) in occupied Khartsyzk, Donetsk Oblast, and the 3rd Army Corps (Central Military District) in occupied Svitlodarsk, Donetsk Oblast, respectively. Ukrainian strikes on tactical command posts and positions located near the frontline, such as the strike against Novohrodivka, are likely intended to disrupt Russian tactical activity and directly complicate Russian command and control (C2) on the battlefield. Ukrainian strikes against main command posts further in the Russian rear, such as the January 8 strike on the Russian 8th CAA post, are likely aimed at degrading broader Russian logistics and operational planning efforts, which could have impacts on Russia's ability to conduct its military operations in western Donetsk Oblast. ISW has observed that the 2nd CAA is currently leading Russian operations south of Pokrovsk, that the 3rd AC is operating near Chasiv Yar, and that the 8th CAA is leading Russian efforts near Kurakhove.

South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed that Ukrainian forces captured two North Korean soldiers during combat operations in Kursk Oblast on January 9. The NIS told Agence-France-Presse (AFP) on January 12 that one of the captured North Korean soldiers initially believed that North Korean authorities had sent him to Russia for training but that he realized upon arrival that he would be engaged in combat - in line with recent statements from Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. One of the captured North Korean soldiers also stated that they suffered food and water shortages for several days before their capture and that North Korean forces have suffered significant losses.

Key Takeaways:

• The Ukrainian General staff reported on January 12 that Ukrainian forces conducted a high-precision airstrike on the command post of Russia's 2nd Combined Arms Army (Central Military District) in Novohrodivka, Donetsk Oblast.

• South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed that Ukrainian forces captured two North Korean soldiers during combat operations in Kursk Oblast on January 9.

• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces recently cut the T-0405 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway east of Pokrovsk and the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezhova highway southwest of Pokrovsk as part of their efforts to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Geolocated footage published on January 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Myrne (east of Pokrovsk) and seized positions along the T-0504 highway. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 13 that elements of the Russian 55th and 74th motorized rifle brigades (41st Combined Arms Army , Central Military District ) recently advanced to and cut the T-0406 highway between Kotlyne and Udachne (both southwest of Pokrovsk), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized a section of both highways. ISW assesses that Russian forces likely seized the remainder of Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk) as part of this advance. Mashovets stated that Russian forces are deploying the 55th and 74th motorized rifle brigades in a two-echelon formation and that elements of the 74th Brigade conduct the initial attacks and elements of the 55th Brigade follow behind to consolidate positions. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 239th Tank Regiment, 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and 67th Rifle Regiment (all 90th Tank Division, CMD) are operating in the Novovasylivka-Uspenivka-Novooleksandriivka area (southwest of Pokrovsk). Mashovets acknowledged that the Russian military command recently redeployed elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps ) from the Kurakhove direction to offensive operations near Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk), further substantiating previous milblogger claims that the 5th Brigade was redeployed to the Vozdvyzhenka area Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade may have participated in the interdiction of the T-0405 highway near Myrne, and the Russian military command's decision to redeploy the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade suggests that it is prioritizing efforts to advance in this area and envelop Pokrovsk from the east over further advances west of Kurakhove. ISW previously noted that Russian forces could also leverage advances east of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka and Myrne to eliminate the Ukrainian salient southwest of Toretsk along the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway.

Russian forces also advanced in other areas southwest of Pokrovsk amid ongoing efforts to envelop the town on January 12. Geolocated footage published on January 13 indicates that Russian forces seized Pishchane (southwest of Pokrovsk), and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the 55th, 35th, and 74th motorized rifle brigades (all 41st CAA, CMD) with the seizure of the settlement. Russian forces continued attacking near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Baranivka, Zelene Pole, Nova Poltavka, and Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske, Novooleksandrivka, Myrolyubivka, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novyi Trud, Zelene, and Shevchenko; southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Uspenivka, Novovasylivka, Novoandriivka, Sribne, and Yasenove; and west of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne on January 12 and 13.

Russian forces likely intend to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in order to force Ukrainian units to withdraw from the towns in future months. The T-0405 and T-0406 highways are two of the three main east-west GLOCs supporting the Ukrainian force grouping in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area. Russian advances east and west of Pokrovsk may complicate Ukrainian logistics and Ukraine's ability to resupply and redeploy troops to defend Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. The Russian military command may intend to make further advances north of the T-0405 and T-0406 highways in an effort to force Ukrainian forces to eventually withdraw to the north (rather than to the east or west) to support Russia's envelopment of both settlements and further advances west towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border. The Russian military command likely also hopes to avoid conducting infantry-heavy frontal assaults through the urban areas of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad and likely assesses that interdicting these GLOCs increases the likelihood that Ukrainian forces will withdraw from these towns and that Russian forces will be able to avoid conducting costly urban combat operations to take the towns.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently cut the T-0405 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway east of Pokrovsk and the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezhova highway southwest of Pokrovsk as part of their efforts to envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.

• Russian forces likely intend to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in order to force Ukrainian units to withdraw from the towns in future months.

• Russian state-owned energy corporation Gazprom acknowledged that it is considering reducing the size of its central office staff by 40 percent, indicating that Gazprom may be concerned about the long-term effects that the war in Ukraine and the reduction in Russian gas exports to Europe will have on the Russian gas industry.

• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kharkiv, Borova, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions.

• South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) reportedly announced that North Korean casualties in Kursk Oblast total roughly 3,000 killed and wounded.

Institute for the Study of War

The Kremlin remains committed to achieving the original goals of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in any future peace negotiations — namely the destruction of the Ukrainian state, dissolution of the current Ukrainian government, demilitarization of Ukraine, and a permanent ban on Ukraine's future membership in NATO. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev rejected the suggestion that Russia could be willing to cede any occupied territory to Ukraine in future negotiations during an interview with Russian outlet Komsomolskaya Pravda published on January 14 and stated that this idea is "not even up for discussion." Patrushev falsely claimed that sham referendums in occupied Ukraine in September 2022 legitimized Russia's claim to occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and insinuated that international recognition of Russia's illegal occupation and annexation of the four oblasts and occupied Crimea is a non-negotiable condition for a future peace agreement.

Patrushev stated that Russia's goals in Ukraine remain unchanged and that Russia remains committed to achieving all of the goals that Russian President Vladimir Putin used to justify the full-scale invasion. Putin identified the "demilitarization" and "denazification" of Ukraine as the key goals of the full-scale invasion during a speech on February 23, 2022 — and these goals amount to the destruction of Ukraine's ability to defend itself and replacement of the legitimate Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government. Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin stated during an interview with Russian outlet Gazeta.Ru on January 14 that the Russian government continues to pursue "denazification" in Ukraine, which Rogozin defined as the "liquidation of those who instill a misanthropic Russophobic spirit" in people. Putin has consistently demanded that the Ukrainian people concede their right to determine their own government, the right to defend themselves against ongoing and future aggression, and the right to choose their own security alliances before and throughout the full-scale invasion. ISW continues to assess that Putin's goals in Ukraine are to break up NATO and seize full control over Ukraine and that Putin remains committed to these goals, and ISW has not observed any indication that Putin is willing to concede on such goals in future negotiations.

Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against military and defense industrial targets in Russia on the night of January 13 to 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces targeted Russian military facilities between 200 and 1,110 kilometers deep in the Russian rear in Bryansk, Saratov, and Tula oblasts and the Republic of Tatarstan. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) struck the Russian state-owned Kombinat Kristal oil storage facility near Engels, Saratov Oblast, which provides fuel for the strategic bombers at Russia's Engels-2 Air Base, and that the GUR and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) also struck the Saratov Oil Refinery. The Ukrainian Unmanned System Forces' 14th Drone Regiment reported that Ukrainian drones struck tanks with aviation fuel for Tu-160 bomber aircraft at the Kristal oil facility at the Engels-2 Air Base. Sources within the SBU told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that Ukrainian forces struck glide bomb and cruise missile warehouses at the Engels-2 Air Base. Geolocated footage published on January 14 shows a fire at the Saratov Oil Refinery. Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged unspecified industrial enterprises in Engels and Saratov City. Ukrainian forces notably struck the Kristal oil facility on the night of January 7 to 8, causing a fire that Russian authorities did not put out until January 13 — likely several hours before Ukrainian forces struck the facility again.

The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reported that Ukrainian forces, including elements of the Unmanned Systems Force, Special Operations Forces (SSO), SBU, missile troops, and GUR, struck the Bryansk Chemical Plant in Seltso, Bryansk Oblast, which produces components for Kh-59 cruise missiles and ammunition for tube artillery, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), and TOS thermobaric artillery systems and repairs Russian MLRS systems. The Unmanned Systems Forces reported that Ukrainian forces used drones to overwhelm Russian air defense systems, allowing missiles to strike their targets and that Ukrainian drones hit substations and other infrastructure after the missile strike. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that there were secondary explosions at the plant and that Ukrainian forces also destroyed a Tor and a Buk air defense system during the strike. Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Andriy Kovalenko noted that the Bryansk Chemical Plant is important for Russian artillery ammunition and missile production and specializes in the production of gunpowder, solid propellant components for rocket fuel, and explosives. Kovalenko also stated that Ukrainian forces struck the "Kremniy El" microelectronics plant in Bryansk City, which Ukrainian forces previously struck in October 2024 and that produces microelectronics for missile systems, Pantsir air defense systems, and Iskander missiles; radars, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and drones. Geolocated footage shows drone strikes and explosions in Seltso. Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed on January 13 that Ukrainian forces conducted a large combined missile strike against Bryansk Oblast and that Russian air defense systems destroyed all targets. Bogomaz later claimed on January 14 that a falling missile fragment damaged civilian property in Bryansk Oblast, including in Seltso. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted Bryansk Oblast with six ATACMS missiles, six Storm Shadow missiles, and 31 drones.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin remains committed to achieving the original goals of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in any future peace negotiations — namely the destruction of the Ukrainian state, dissolution of the current Ukrainian government, demilitarization of Ukraine, and a permanent ban on Ukraine's future membership in NATO.

• Patrushev stated that Russia's goals in Ukraine remain unchanged and that Russia remains committed to achieving all of the goals that Russian President Vladimir Putin used to justify the full-scale invasion.

• Russian officials continue to deny the existence of a Ukrainian identity and state that is independent of Russia as part of ongoing Russian efforts to justify the destruction of the Ukrainian state.

• Patrushev stated that he believes that only Russia and the United States should engage in negotiations to end Russia's war in Ukraine, and senior Kremlin officials are also questioning the role that European countries could play in such negotiations.

• The Kremlin will likely attempt to seize on potential future Russian advances into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast for informational purposes, but these advances, if they occur, are unlikely to have significant operational impact.

• Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against military and defense industrial targets in Russia on the night of January 13 to 14.

• Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities continue efforts to find a solution to the gas crisis in Moldova as the pro-Russian breakaway republic Transnistria continues to refuse help from Ukraine or Moldova.

• Kremlin officials are attempting to exploit the energy crisis in Moldova to set conditions to justify future Russian aggression against Moldova.

• Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor reportedly caused a brief but widespread internet outage in Russia while operating restriction systems of its Sovereign Internet on January 14.

• Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk and Pokrovsk directions.

• Russia continues efforts to bolster military recruitment efforts by offering financial incentives to those who sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of January 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 74 Shahed and other strike drones and 43 missiles at Ukraine, including one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Belgorod Oblast, seven Kh-22/32 cruise missiles from airspace over Tula Oblast, four Kalibr cruise missiles from ships in the Black Sea, 27 Kh-101/55SM cruise missiles from airspace over Volgograd Oblast, and four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from airspace over Belgorod Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 23 Kh-101/55SM missiles, three Kalibr missiles, four Kh-59/69 missiles, and 47 drones, and that 27 drones became "lost" and did not hit their targets. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the Russian strikes targeted Ukrainian gas facilities and other energy infrastructure. Ukrainian officials reported damage to energy and critical infrastructure facilities in Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, and Lviv oblasts and residential areas in Kirovohrad Oblast. Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko and Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported temporary emergency shutdowns in Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kirovohrad oblasts on the morning of January 15 due to the strikes. Ukrenergo has since lifted the emergency shutdowns but noted that Ukrainians still need to limit their energy consumption following the strikes. Russia has regularly targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure in large strike series since the Winter of 2022–2023 likely in an attempt to collapse Ukraine's energy grid, limit its defense industrial capacity, and degrade Ukrainians' will to fight.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a large series of missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of January 14 to 15.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on January 15, their first POW exchange in 2025.

• A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian drone and artillery capabilities are providing Ukrainian tanks with tactical advantages over Russian tanks in unspecified, select areas of the frontline.

• Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky announced on January 15 that Russia will soon provide Transnistria with gas as "humanitarian aid" but did not specify the delivery date or method.

• Armenia continues to enhance its relations with Western partners amid waning relations with Russia.

• Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk directions.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 15 that about 600,000 Russian soldiers are currently operating in Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the night of January 15 to 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 16 that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) and other Ukrainian forces struck the Lisinskaya Oil Refinery in Voronezh Oblast with at least three drones, causing a fire. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the oil refinery stored fuel for Russian military uses. Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on January 16 that Ukrainian forces launched over 10 drones against three raions in Voronezh Oblast and that most of the drones hit the oil depot in Liski Raion. Geolocated footage and footage posted by Russian milbloggers show a fire at the Lisinskaya Oil Refinery. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on January 16 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Tambov Gunpowder Plant in Kuzmino-Gat, Tambov Oblast, noting that the plant produces gunpowder for various arms, artillery, and rocket systems; nitrocellulose used to produce explosives; and other specialized products. Russian news aggregator SHOT reported on January 15 that locals reported sounds of drones over Kotovsk (directly north of Kuzmino-Gat) and that Russian forces downed three drones near Kotovsk and Kuzmino-Gat.

The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate in the future. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in early January 2025 that 3,800 North Korean personnel had been killed or wounded in Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on November 5, 2024 that North Korean forces were engaged in "small-scale" clashes in Kursk Oblast, but Russian milbloggers began claiming on December 6 that North Korean forces were participating in more significant combat operations. North Korean have therefore likely suffered roughly 92 casualties per day since starting to participate in significant fighting in early December 2024. North Korea reportedly transferred roughly 12,000 North Korean personnel to Kursk Oblast, and the entirety of this North Korean contingent in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in roughly 12 weeks (about mid-April 2025) should North Korean forces continue to suffer similarly high casualty rates in the future. South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) stated on January 13 that so far 300 North Koreans have been killed in action and 2,700 have been wounded in action in Kursk Oblast. North Korean forces will likely continue to suffer a larger ratio of wounded to killed in action - as is typical for armed conflict - and it is unclear if or when injured North Korean soldiers return to combat.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Voronezh Oblast and a gunpowder plant in Tambov Oblast on the night of January 15 to 16.

• The entire North Korean contingent of roughly 12,000 personnel currently in Kursk Oblast may be killed or wounded in action by mid-April 2025 should North Korean forces continue to suffer from their current high loss rate in the future.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer signed a landmark "Centennial Partnership Agreement" on January 16 outlining Ukrainian-British cooperation for the next 100 years and continued UK support to Ukraine.

• Russian and Transnistrian authorities are reportedly discussing Russian purchases of European gas for Transnistria through an intermediary, likely to avoid having to gain various states' permission to use the TurkStream and Trans-Balkan pipelines to supply Russian gas to the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement on January 17. The agreement addresses issues spanning enhanced defense cooperation, intelligence sharing, nuclear energy use and cooperation, transportation support and development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and a clause stipulating that neither party shall allow third parties to use their territory to threaten the security of the other among other economic and social areas of partnership. The agreement notably includes the unspecified development of "military-technical cooperation" between the two countries, which could allude to Iran's extensive export of domestically-produced Shahed drones and other military equipment for Russia's use in Ukraine, Iran's assistance in Russia's domestic production of Shahed drones, and possible efforts to expand Russia's use and production of Shaheds.

The bilateral agreement could also lay the groundwork for Russia to establish aircraft refueling hubs and a naval presence in Iran, particularly as the fall of Russian ally Bashar al-Assad's regime and overall waning of Russian influence in the Middle East threatens the presence of key Russian bases and assets in Syria. Russia could use Iranian territory to support some of its operations in North Africa and the Middle East despite Iran's suboptimal geographic location when compared to Syria's proximity to Russia's basing in Libya and the Mediterranean Sea. Russia may also use the agreement to establish a more permanent military presence in Iran in the long term. However, Iran may be reluctant to such efforts due to the possibility of further Western sanctions and retaliation.

Russia may leverage enhanced economic and transportation ties with Iran to further Western sanctions evasion efforts and mitigate economic challenges brought about by sanctions - a broader strategy Russia has established with multiple international partners to circumvent restrictions and alleviate domestic economic pressures.

The Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement lacks a mutual defense clause, however, indicating that Russia likely lacks the bandwidth to support significant operations outside of Ukraine and is prioritizing its manpower needs through its mutual defense treaty with North Korea. Russia likely does not have the military and defense industrial capacity to support any significant military operations apart from its war in Ukraine, especially as Russia continues to suffer high personnel losses and is reportedly struggling to produce and refurbish enough armored vehicles to replace destroyed vehicles. Putin is likely wary of intensified Russian engagements in the Middle East after Russia's strategic political defeat in Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime and is likely to focus on negotiations with the interim Syrian government to maintain the Russian military presence at the Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus.

Russia appears to be valuing its ability to mitigate its manpower constraints by leveraging the mutual defense clause within its Strategic Partnership agreement with North Korea to deploy North Korean forces to Kursk Oblast over further military-technical cooperation with Iran. ISW previously assessed that Russia is deploying North Korean forces to operations in Kursk Oblast in order to free up Russian military personnel for operations in Ukraine. Russia is likely to prioritize addressing its manpower issues through defense agreements with North Korea, as Iran is unlikely to provide military personnel to support Russia's war in Ukraine, and Russia has been leveraging its military-technical ties with Iran since 2022 without a strategic partnership agreement.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement on January 17.

• The Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement lacks a mutual defense clause, however, indicating that Russia likely lacks the bandwidth to support significant operations outside of Ukraine and is prioritizing its manpower needs through its mutual defense treaty with North Korea.

• Russian forces seized Vremivka on January 17 as part of their efforts to envelop Velyka Novosilka and force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the settlement.

• Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin had a phone call on January 17 indicating the Kremlin's growing concerns over Armenia's deepening ties with the West.

• Recently declassified US documents highlight the integral role of US monetary and technical assistance in expanding Ukraine's domestic drone production capabilities and how US national security is directly benefiting by integrating lessons learned from Ukraine in America’s defense industry.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and the Kharkiv, Kupyansk, Borova, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on January 17 authorizing calling up Russian reservists (“personnel mobilization resource” or zapas) for training in 2025.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces struck two Russian oil depots in Kaluga and Tula oblasts on the night of January 17 to 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) units and other Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot of the Kaluganeftprodukt joint-stock company (JSC) near Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast, causing a fire at the facility on the night of January 17 to 18. Kaluga Oblast Governor Vladislav Shapsha claimed on January 17 and 18 that a drone strike caused a fire at an unspecified industrial enterprise in Lyudinovo, Kaluga Oblast, and later added that Russian forces downed seven drones over the region. Russian sources posted footage purportedly showing the fire at the oil depot. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on January 18 that units of Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and other Ukrainian forces struck the state-owned "March 8" oil depot in Tula Oblast and noted that there were reports of a fire at the facility. Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed on January 18 that drone debris struck an unspecified enterprise in Tula Oblast, causing a fuel tank to catch on fire. Geolocated footage and other footage published by Russian milbloggers showed a fire at an oil depot near Didilovo, Tula Oblast.

The Russian Central Grouping of Forces appears to have assembled a strike group comprised of units of the 2nd and 41st combined arms armies (CAAs) south of Pokrovsk, likely as part of ongoing Russian efforts to intensify offensive operations south and southwest of the town. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 18 that the Russian military command has consolidated elements of four brigades - the 2nd CAA's 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 41st CAA's 35th, 55th, and 74th motorized rifle brigades — and three regiments — the 243rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly subordinated to 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA) and the 239th Tank Regiment and the 87th Rifle Regiment (both of the 90th Tank Division, 41st CAA) — south and southwest of Pokrovsk between Dachenske and Novotroitske. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade recently interdicted the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Mezheva Highway and are attacking between Udachne and Kotlyne (both southwest of Pokrovsk). Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade maintain positions on the outskirts of Zvirove (east of Kotlyne) and attacking in the area while elements of the Russian 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment with support from the 239th Tank Regiment and 87th Rifle Regiment are attacking along the banks of the Solone River toward Solone-Novoserhiivka and Novovasylivka-Uspenivka (south to southwest of Kotlyne). Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade are attacking towards Dachenske-Chyushchyne and Zelene-Chyushchyne (all south of Pokrovsk) and are making marginal advances. ISW has observed reports that all the brigades and regiments referenced by Mashovets are operating south and southwest of Pokrovsk except for elements of the 243rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, which ISW has not previously observed involved in combat operations in Ukraine.

The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on January 17 that the Russian military command is accumulating forces to advance west of Pokrovsk as part of ongoing Russian efforts to envelop the town but noted that Russian forces are not advancing immediately south of the town. The Ukrainian commander noted that Russian forces are currently focused on interdicting the railway line between Kotlyne and Udachne. Russian milbloggers similarly claimed on January 17 and 18 that Russian forces are advancing southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, Novooleksandrivka, Novoserhiivka, and Sribne and attempting to interdict the E-50 Pavlohrad-Pokrovsk highway west of the town. ISW previously observed indications that the Russian military command defined the 2nd CAA's area of responsibility (AoR) as south and southwest of Pokrovsk and the 41st CAA's AoR as east of Pokrovsk. The Russian military command's decision to establish a strike group comprised of units of both the 2nd and 41st CAAs south of Pokrovsk indicates that Russian forces may be reprioritizing tactical objectives in the Pokrovsk direction to set conditions to exploit more opportunistic avenues of advance closer to Pokrovsk’s immediate flanks. Mashovets noted that elements of the 15th and 30th motorized rifle brigades (2nd CAA) and the 348th Motorized Rifle Regiment (41st CAA) are currently resting and reconstituting in rear areas of the Pokrovsk direction and that it is unclear which sector of this direction the Russian military command will choose to redeploy these forces. The Russian military command may redeploy these units to areas south of Pokrovsk if the Russian command continues to prioritize tactical advances in the direction of Pokrovsk’s southern flanks in the coming weeks and months.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck two Russian oil depots in Kaluga and Tula oblasts on the night of January 17 to 18.

• Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian air defense system and radars in occupied Ukraine on the night of January 17 to 18.

• The Russian Central Grouping of Forces appears to have assembled a strike group comprised of units of the 2nd and 41st combined arms armies (CAAs) south of Pokrovsk, likely as part of ongoing Russian efforts to intensify offensive operations south and southwest of the town.

• The Russian military command also reportedly redeployed elements of a second unit of the 51st CAA from the Kurakhove direction to offensive operations east of Pokrovsk amid ongoing efforts to intensify activity in this area.

• NATO officials are reportedly preparing for a joint NATO-Georgia exercise scheduled for March 2025.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and in the Chasiv Yar and Velyka Novosilka directions.

• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions in the Kharkiv direction.


Institute for the Study of War

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Russian forces used ammunition equipped with chemical agents banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 434 times in Ukraine in December 2024, contributing to a total of 5,389 documented cases since February 2023. Ukraine's radiation, chemical, and biological intelligence units are monitoring Russia's use of banned chemical agents, which include using regulated K-51 and RG-VO grenade launchers to launch munitions containing chemical agents and ammunition containing unspecified hazardous chemicals that are banned in warfare under the 1925 Geneva Protocol and CWC. Ukrainian officials have previously reported on increasingly common instances of Russian forces using chemical substances in combat that are banned by the CWC, to which Russia is a signatory, and the Ukrainian General Staff noted that such violations have been systematic in the Russian military since February 2023.

Both Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive operations in the area on January 19. Geolocated footage published on January 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar. Geolocated footage published on January 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Tolstoho Street in western Chasiv Yar. Russian milbloggers claimed on January 19 that Russian forces captured the Novopivnichnyi and Desyata microraions in Chasiv Yar, advanced in the workshop area of the Refractory Plant, and in northern Chasiv Yar. ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued ground attacks within Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne, Stupochky, and Bila Hora on January 18 and 19. Ukraine's Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on January 18 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian small and medium-sized assaults on the grounds of the Refractory Plant in central Chasiv Yar. Elements of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th VDV Division), drone operators of the Russian "Terek" Cossack Reconnaissance Brigade (reportedly of the volunteer Cossack Assault Corps), and drone operators of the Russian "Sever-V" Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are all reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction; additional elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division and elements of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps , Leningrad Military District ) are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar itself.

Key Takeaways:

• The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 18 that Russian forces used ammunition equipped with chemical agents banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 434 times in Ukraine in December 2024, contributing to a total of 5,389 documented cases since February 2023.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Lyman, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.

• Russian volunteer military detachments continue efforts to boost manpower by recruiting women into the Russian Armed Forces.

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Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were personnel killed in action. Syrskyi stated on December 30, 2024, that Russian forces suffered 427,000 casualties in 2024, and Syrskyi's January 20 number likely reflects additional losses that Russian forces incurred in the final days of 2024. ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command was likely willing to accept record levels of casualties in Fall–Winter 2024, especially from September to November 2024, in order to achieve relatively larger territorial gains from continued infantry-led, attritional assaults.

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated on January 20 that the Kremlin is willing to negotiate with the United States about the war in Ukraine but indicated that he maintains his demands for Ukraine's full capitulation. Putin convened a meeting of the Russian Security Council on January 20, at which he and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Russia's willingness to engage in peace negotiations with the new US presidential administration under President Donald Trump. Putin caveated that any peace settlement should "eliminate the root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Lavrov defined these root causes on December 26 as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture within Ukraine. Senior Kremlin officials, including Putin and Lavrov, have been reiterating in recent weeks that the Kremlin refuses to consider any compromises to Putin's late 2021 and early 2022 demands, which include demands that Ukraine remain permanently "neutral" and not join NATO, impose severe limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military, and remove the current Ukrainian government. Putin himself stated on December 26 that then US President Joe Biden suggested to him in 2021 that Ukraine's NATO membership be postponed by 10 to 15 years — further demonstrating that alleged threats from NATO expansion did not actually drive Putin to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces suffered more than 434,000 casualties in 2024 — 150,000 of which were personnel killed in action.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated on January 20 that the Kremlin is willing to negotiate with the US about the war in Ukraine but indicated that he maintains his demands for Ukraine's full capitulation.

• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an aircraft production plant in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on January 20 as a part of an ongoing series of strikes aimed at degrading Russian military capacity.

• Ukrainian strikes against Russian defense industrial base (DIB) targets are reportedly affecting Russian forces' combat capabilities.

• Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities continue efforts to supply Transnistria with European gas.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

• A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor repeated on January 20 complaints that Russian milbloggers first issued in May 2024 about insufficient quality controls on Russian artillery shells.

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Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries in Russia on the night of January 20 to 21 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading Russian military capacity. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) elements and other Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against Rosneft's Lisinskaya Oil Refinery in Voronezh Oblast for the second time this week following successful strikes on the night of January 15 to 16. The January 20 to 21 strike caused a fire at fuel and lubricant tanks, and the Ukrainian General Staff noted that the oil refinery supplies the Russian military. Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on January 20 that Russian forces destroyed several drones in Voronezh Oblast but that a drone fell on an oil depot in Liskinsky Raion, starting a fire. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted that the oil depot was still burning from the January 15-16 strike and the second strike started another fire at the facility. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and SSO struck the Smolensk Aviation Plant in Smolensk Oblast. Geolocated footage shows fires at the production building of the Smolensk Aviation Plant. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that the plant produces and modernizes Su-25 attack aircraft and maintains aviation equipment. Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily Anokhin claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike against Smolensk Oblast but that falling drone debris caused fires. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces struck Lukoil's Saratovorgsintez Chemical Plant in Saratov City overnight that produces acrylonitrile, acetonitrile, and sodium cyanide. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed 10 drones over Smolensk Oblast, six over Voronezh Oblast, and four over Saratov Oblast on the night of January 20 to 21.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also continue to conduct strikes against Russian command posts in the Russian rear. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the command post of the Russian 29th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Eastern Military District ) in occupied Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast on the night of January 20 to 21. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that there are reports of explosions and smoke after the strike and that Ukrainian authorities are clarifying the results of the strike. ISW has not observed footage or other reporting of this command post strike. ISW has observed reports that elements of the 29th CAA are currently operating along the Yantarne-Zelenivka line southwest of Kurakhove. The Ukrainian General Staff reported in early and mid-January 2025 that Ukrainian forces struck the command posts of the Russian 2nd CAA (Central Military District ), 8th CAA (Southern Military District), and 3rd Army Corps (AC) (CMD) in occupied Donetsk Oblast. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian strikes against main command posts further in the Russian rear are likely aimed at degrading broader Russian logistics and operational planning efforts, which could impact Russia's ability to conduct its military operations in western Donetsk Oblast.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping held a phone call on January 21 and emphasized deepening cooperation. Putin and Xi reiterated boilerplate narratives emphasizing increasing Russian-PRC foreign policy, energy, and economic cooperation. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov claimed that Putin and Xi discussed Russia's war in Ukraine and Russia's and the PRC's relations with the United States, although the official Kremlin readout of the call did not mention these topics. Ushakov also claimed that Xi gave Putin an overview of Xi's recent call with US President Donald Trump.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries in Russia on the night of January 20 to 21 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading Russian military capacity.

• The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also continue to conduct strikes against Russian command posts in the Russian rear.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping held a phone call on January 21 and emphasized deepening cooperation.

• Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein's recent appointment has thus far failed to solve or distract from Russia's failure to adequately respond to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove. Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Pokrovsk.

• Russian ultranationalist milbloggers renewed complaints against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for failing to hold the Russian military command accountable for military failures.

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The Kremlin has launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russian economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during a meeting on economic issues on January 22 that 2024 was a "strong year" for the Russian economy. Putin claimed that Russia has a manageable budget deficit of 1.7 percent and achieved a 26 percent increase in non-oil-and-gas revenue to 25.6 trillion rubles (approximately $257.9 billion) in 2024 and announced a retroactive 9.5 percent increase in insurance and military pensions to address rising Russian inflation. Bloomberg reported on January 21 that the Russian Finance Ministry released a report projecting economic strength and suggesting that Russian budget revenue in December 2024 reached a record high of over 4 trillion rubles (about $40 billion) — a 28 percent increase compared to December 2023 and the highest level recorded since 2011. The data fails to account for Russia's unsustainable levels of defense spending, rampant inflation, a growing deficit and the erosion of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, however. ISW continues to observe macroeconomic data that directly contradict the Kremlin's claims that the Russian economy is performing well. The Kremlin has recently adopted policies aimed at increasing defense spending all while Russian society faces labor shortages, broader demographic issues, declining savings, and increasing reliance on bailouts as the Russian economy faces rising interest rates, inflated salaries, and deteriorating production capacity. These economic realities suggest that the Kremlin's efforts to posture economic strength are largely an information operation aimed at reassuring domestic audiences and posturing Russian strength abroad while masking the true challenges Russia's economy is facing, particularly heightened due to its war against Ukraine.

North Korea will reportedly deploy new military personnel to Russia by mid-March 2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of attritional, infantry-led assaults in Kursk Oblast. The New York Times (NYT) reported on January 22 that a US senior defense official stated that additional North Korean forces will arrive in Russia "within the next two months," (roughly mid-March 2025). The NYT did not specify the number of troops or whether North Korea is rotating forces or increasing the size of its total force grouping in Russia, however. The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff reported on December 23 that North Korea may be preparing to deploy an unspecified number of additional forces to Ukraine and military equipment to Russia, either as a rotation or additional deployment of forces. Western officials told the BBC on January 22 that North Korean forces have suffered roughly 1,000 killed in action and 3,000 missing or wounded in action as of mid-January 2025, roughly 33 to 40 percent of the 11,000 to 12,000 total North Korean personnel already in Russia] ISW recently assessed that the entirety of the North Korean contingent in Russia may be killed or wounded in action by about mid-April 2025 at their current casualty rate, and a new North Korean deployment — whether intended to increase the current grouping or rotate out existing forces — is likely intended to sustain Russia’s tempo of operations despite heavy losses of about 30,000 - 45,000 causalities (combined killed and wounded) per month. North Korean forces reportedly spent at least a month training in eastern Russia before deploying to Kursk Oblast for further training in near rear areas in November 2024 and joining combat operations at least as of early December 2024. This timeline roughly coheres with the possibility that a fresh contingent of North Korean forces could undergo training and replace the shrinking North Korean group in Kursk Oblast by mid-April 2025, assuming the reported next batch of North Korean troops will train for the same duration as their predecessors, and deploy to Russia imminently in late January or early February 2025.

These fresh North Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve Russian operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and complications operating with Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent, provided the Russian command continues to use North Korean forces the same way as it has thus far. US officials and Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT that North Korean and Russian forces continue to struggle with communications and cohesion and that Russian and North Korean forces have "clashed" at least twice due to troop identification errors. A Ukrainian commander told the NYT that North Korean assault groups now include a translator who speaks Russian but that these groups are still not very effective. Ukrainian soldiers reported that North Korean forces continue conducting mass infantry assaults and that North Korean soldiers do not retreat even if injured. Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) published footage on January 22 of North Korean forces massing for an infantry assault and reported that Ukrainian forces killed 21 and wounded 40 North Korean soldiers during the eight-hour long combat engagement. Ukrainian soldiers told the NYT that Russian forces are still attempting to conceal the presence of North Koreans on the battlefield by conducting drone strikes against wounded North Korean troops as Ukrainian forces attempt to take them prisoner. ISW continues to assess that North Korea's high casualty rate and interoperability difficulties with Russian forces will affect the lessons that the North Korean military command will learn from fighting in Russia's war.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin has launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russian economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.

• Russia continues long-term efforts to build out its manpower reserve with All-Russian Cossack Society organizations and create a willing and well-trained prioritized pool designed to buffer the Kremlin from potential blowback in the event of a possible future partial call up of Russian reservists.

• North Korea will reportedly deploy new military personnel to Russia by mid-March 2025, likely to maintain the current pace and intensity of attritional, infantry-led assaults in Kursk Oblast.

• These fresh North Korean forces are unlikely to decisively improve Russian operations and will likely face the same high casualty rates and complications operating with Russian forces as the current North Korean contingent, provided the Russian command continues to use North Korean forces the same way as it has thus far.

• Russian milbloggers complained and expressed concern over recent claims that the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government in Syria suspended Russian investment and financial involvement in the port of Tartus as Russia's long-term military presence in Syria remains unclear.

• A Russian state media outlet reported that Russia may resume direct gas deliveries to Transnistria despite recent discussions about sourcing non-Russian gas to the region.

• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

• Russia and Uzbekistan are deepening military cooperation.

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Russia is reportedly planning to deploy additional North Korean forces, missiles, artillery systems, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Kursk Oblast to support Russian long-range fire operations. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told The War Zone in an article published on January 22 that North Korea will deploy an unspecified number of additional missile and artillery troops to Kursk Oblast at an unspecified future time. Budanov reported that North Korea is unlikely to deploy a large number of additional ground combat troops, however. Budanov stated that North Korea has provided Russia with roughly 120 M-1989 Koksan 170mm self-propelled artillery systems and 120 M-1991 240mm MLRS since November 2024 and will likely send at least 120 more of each system in the future. The GUR previously reported in November 2024 that North Korea had provided Russia with roughly 100 of each of these systems as of October 2024. Budanov stated that North Korea plans to provide Russia with 150 additional KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles in 2025 and sent Russia 148 KN-23 missiles in 2024. Budanov noted that North Korean troops typically operate North Korean-provided weapons in Kursk Oblast and are also training Russian forces on these systems. A US senior defense official recently told the New York Times (NYT) that additional North Korean forces will arrive in Russian "within the next two months (roughly mid-March 2025)."

The Kremlin appears to be growing increasingly concerned about perceptions of Russia's economic instability. Reuters, citing five sources with knowledge of the situation, reported on January 23 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is growing increasingly concerned about "distortions" in the Russian economy due to the war in Ukraine. Two sources familiar with "thinking in the Kremlin" told Reuters that there is a camp within the Russian elite that views a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine as desirable and key to addressing Russia's economic issues. One source claimed that Putin recognizes the strain that the war is placing on the Russian economy and assesses that he has achieved his "key war goals" in Ukraine, including seizing land in southern Ukraine to connect Russia within occupied Crimea and weakening the Ukrainian military. The source did not speculate on Putin's willingness to end the war, however. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on January 9 — citing sources in the Russian presidential administration, State Duma, and wider Russian federal government and regional governments — that Russian elites are growing increasingly dissatisfied with the impact of the war on the Russian economy. ISW noted on January 22 that the Kremlin recently launched an information operation that seeks to create the false impression that the Russia economy is performing well despite numerous continued indicators of macroeconomic distress.

Russian forces recently executed at least six unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian sources circulated footage on January 23 of Russian soldiers shooting unarmed Ukrainian POWs in an unspecified area of Ukraine. Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets and the Ukrainian Attorney General's Office reported on January 23 that Ukrainian officials are investigating social media footage of Russian forces executing six captured and unarmed Ukrainian servicemembers in an unspecified area of Donetsk Oblast. Lyubinets noted that the footage shows a seventh Ukrainian POW in this group but that it is unclear what happened to the seventh POW based on the footage. ISW has frequently reported that Russian forces are conducting frontline executions of Ukrainian POWs and continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to conduct these executions.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is reportedly planning to deploy additional North Korean forces, missiles, artillery systems, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) to Kursk Oblast to support Russian long-range fire operations.

• The Kremlin appears to be growing increasingly concerned about perceptions of Russia's economic instability.

• Russian forces recently executed at least six unarmed Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

• The Kremlin is reportedly taking measures to protect industrial facilities in Russian border regions from Ukrainian strikes.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin is once again attempting to obfuscate his unwillingness to participate in good-faith negotiations to end the war by blaming Ukraine for defending itself against Russia's invasion and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. Putin claimed during a televised interview with Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on January 24 that he is willing to negotiate "on the Ukraine issue," but that a 2022 Ukrainian presidential decree declaring the "impossibility of negotiating" with Putin is a significant impediment to peace negotiations. Putin falsely claimed that Ukraine and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky are not interested in peace negotiations and that it is impossible for Russia and Ukraine to discuss "anything serious" with the decree in place. Putin claimed that any peace agreements that result from negotiations between Russia and Ukraine before Ukraine repeals the 2022 decree will be "illegitimate" and claimed that the West must force Zelensky to repeal the 2022 decree. Putin also once again questioned Zelensky's legitimacy as the current president of Ukraine and insinuated that US President Donald Trump should negotiate exclusively with Putin about Ukraine's fate, as the two leaders can "calmly" discuss their interests. Putin has previously called for Ukraine to repeal the 2022 decree, but Putin's intense focus on the decree during his January 24 interview marks yet another attempt to distract from his unwillingness to engage in peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.

Zelensky signed the September 2022 decree banning negotiations with Putin in direct response to Putin's illegal annexation of four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine and after months of negotiations in which Russia continued to demand Ukraine's full capitulation. The Ukrainian presidential decree explicitly prohibits Ukraine from conducting negotiations with Putin. The context within which the decree was signed is important, however. Zelensky signed the decree on the day that Putin illegally annexed four Ukrainian oblasts (Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts), including areas that Russian forces did not then and still do not occupy. The decree states that the ban on negotiations with Putin is a response to Russia's illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory and part of Ukraine's efforts to "guarantee the security of the Euro-Atlantic space, Ukraine, and territorial integrity." Zelensky signed the September 2022 decree after months of Russian-Ukrainian peace talks in Istanbul in Spring 2022, during which Russia demanded that Ukraine be a permanently neutral state that could not join NATO and that Ukraine submit to limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military similar to those imposed by the Treaty of Versailles on Germany after World War I. These terms would have restricted Ukraine's Armed Forces to 85,000 soldiers who would be unable to defend Ukraine against a third Russian invasion.

However, Zelensky has consistently signaled his willingness to negotiate with Russia and make certain compromises in pursuit of peace following the 2022 decree banning formal negotiations with Putin. Zelensky has outlined clear conditions for potential talks with Russia and emphasized the importance of preserving Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, developing Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB), and securing security guarantees from Ukraine's Western allies. Zelensky has repeatedly advocated for a diplomatic solution to the war, proposing that Ukraine should enter any peace negotiations from a "position of strength" – a strategy aimed at compelling Russia to engage in good-faith negotiations and consider just compromises in such negotiations. Zelensky has also invited Russian representatives to attend Ukraine's second Global Peace Summit in the future.

Kremlin officials have consistently dismissed these overtures, labeling Ukraine's proposed peace formula and platforms "unviable," and Putin even reportedly asked People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping to "snub" the first Global Peace Conference in June 2024. Zelensky has continued to express openness to direct negotiations and has acknowledged the possibility of a diplomatic compromise as part of a broader solution to the war despite Russia's repeated rejections.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is once again attempting to obfuscate his unwillingness to participate in good-faith negotiations to end the war by blaming Ukraine for defending itself against Russia's invasion and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory.

• Zelensky signed the decree in September 2022 banning negotiations with Putin in direct response to Putin's illegal annexation of four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine and after months of negotiations in which Russia continued to demand Ukraine's full capitulation.

• However, Zelensky has consistently signaled his willingness to negotiate with Russia and make certain compromises in pursuit of peace following the 2022 decree banning formal negotiations with Putin.

• Putin meanwhile continues to signal to both his domestic and global audiences that he is not interested in peace short of his full demands and remains committed to Ukraine's complete capitulation.

• Putin is attempting to leverage the 2022 decree as a strawman to hide the reality of his disinterest in negotiations and to sow discord between Ukraine and its Western allies.

• Putin also attempted to position himself as Trump’s equal during his interview, reinforcing his long-held belief that Russia is the great-power heir to the Soviet Union.

• Putin demonstrated that he is worried about the effect that lower oil prices would have on his domestic stability and ability to wage his war in Ukraine.

• The Kremlin is attempting to revive its information operation aimed at deterring the US and other Western states from providing further military assistance to Ukraine.

• The Kremlin is framing the new 2025 Union State Security Concept as completely superseding the original 1999 Security Concept, indicating that this new agreement may be more expansive than the original and will further forward the Kremlin's effort to annex Belarus.

• Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial enterprises and oil refineries on the night of January 23 to 24 as part of an ongoing strike series aimed at degrading Russian military capacity.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured lost positions near Toretsk.

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Ukraine and Moldova continue to offer solutions to Transnistria's energy crisis as Moldovan President Maia Sandu met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on January 25. Zelensky stated at a press conference with Sandu that Ukraine can supply Transnistria with coal at low prices or even free of charge if Transnistria would supply Ukraine with electricity in return. Zelensky also stated that Ukraine is ready to send a team of specialists to help increase the Transnistrian power plant's electricity output such that it would far exceed Transnistria's domestic needs, allowing Transnistria to provide electricity to all of Moldova and Ukraine. Zelensky noted that Transnistria's cooperation with Moldova and Ukraine would help reduce electricity prices throughout all of Moldova by 30 percent. Transnistrian authorities have previously refused Moldovan and Ukrainian offers of help, instead turning to schemes that involve Moscow directly or indirectly providing enough gas to the breakaway republic to cover only its domestic electricity needs. Ukrainian and Moldovan officials have noted that Russia is trying to leverage its manufactured gas crisis to affect Moldovan public opinion before the Summer 2025 Moldovan parliamentary elections.<3> Transnistria's possible acceptance of Ukrainian and Moldovan offers of aid and Transnistria's subsequent supply of cheaper electricity to the rest of Moldova would disrupt Russian efforts to use the energy crisis to strengthen Transnistria's economic dependence on Moscow, to posture Russia as the breakaway republic's savior and benefactor, and to leverage Chisinau's turn to higher priced European electricity as part of Moscow's anti-EU narratives.

The Kremlin is continuing to leverage the prominent Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel to cultivate increased Russian influence in Iraq. The Rybar channel claimed on January 25 that members of the Rybar team – including its founder Mikhail Zvinchuk – visited Iraq over the last week and met with Iraqi officials, including Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia Al Sudani. The channel claimed that Iraqi officials noted their openness to increasing trade and foreign investments with Russian partners and their interest in further developing Russian–Iraqi relations. The channel welcomed Russian businesses, media companies, bloggers, and investors to begin exploring opportunities in Iraq. Member of the Rybar team visited Iraq in August 2024, and ISW noted at the time that this was the first observed report of a Russian milblogger meeting with a senior foreign official. ISW-CTP previously assessed that Russia may be setting conditions to supplant the US as a security partner in Iraq in anticipation of the US possibly reducing its military presence there. The recent fall of the Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria may be prompting the Kremlin to reconsider the contours of its relations with Iraq.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine and Moldova continue to offer solutions to Transnistria's energy crisis as Moldovan President Maia Sandu met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv on January 25.

• The Kremlin is continuing to leverage the prominent Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel to cultivate increased Russian influence in Iraq.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 25 that the Russian government will allow veterans of volunteer formations (dobrovolcheskie formirovaniya) to receive "combat veteran status" without submitting a formal application.

Institute for the Study of War