Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to laud the technical specifications of the recently launched Oreshnik ballistic missile and threaten additional Oreshnik strikes against Ukraine as part of an intensified Russian reflexive control campaign aimed at forcing the West and Ukraine into self-deterrence. Putin addressed members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization's (CSTO) Security Council in Astana, Kazakhstan, on November 28 and reiterated several claims about the Oreshnik ballistic missile, with which Russian forces struck Dnipro City on November 21. Putin's November 28 statements closely resembled the speeches he gave on November 21 and 22 immediately following the Oreshnik strike, again presenting the Oreshnik strike as the commensurate Russian response to recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory using Western-provided long-range missile systems such as ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALPs. Putin detailed the purported technical specifications of the Oreshnik during his CSTO speech and subsequent press conference with journalists on November 28, highlighting the size and maximum internal temperature of its warhead, its launch speed, and its blast radius, and compared the Oreshnik to both a "nuclear weapon" and a "meteorite" in terms of the damage it can cause. Putin threateningly claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian General Staff are "selecting targets for destruction" in Ukraine, including "decision-making centers in Kyiv," and later responded to a question about whether these are military or political targets by stating that "everything is possible."

Russian forces conducted a large series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine’s energy grid and major defense industrial facilities on the nights of November 27 to 28 and 28 to 29. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 188 drones and missiles against Ukraine on the night of November 27 to 28, including: three S-300 air defense missiles from Belgorod Oblast targeting Kharkiv Oblast; 57 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Volgograd Oblast; 28 Kalibr cruise missiles from vessels in the Black Sea; three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from airspace over the Black Sea; and 97 Shahed drones and unknown other strike drones (likely referring to decoy drones) from Kursk, Oryol, and Rostov oblasts and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai as of 1030 local time on November 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 76 Kh-101 missiles, three Kh-59/69 missiles, and 35 drones, and 62 Russian drones became “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that Ukrainian forces also downed 90 percent of the Russian Kalibr missiles and that at least 12 Russian drones and missiles successfully struck Ukrainian fuel and energy objects.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 132 Shahed drones and unknown other strike drones (likely referring to decoy drones) from Oryol, Rostov, and Kursk oblasts and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of November 28 to 29 and that Ukrainian forces downed 88 drones over Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkassy, Sumy, Kharkiv, Poltava, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Odesa oblasts at of 900 local time on November 29. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 41 Russian drones became ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian EW interference, and that one Russian drone returned to Russian air space. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones and missiles damaged residential buildings and critical infrastructure in Chernihiv, Chernivitsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kyiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Volyn oblasts on November 28 and 29. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that Russian forces have used large numbers of missiles and drones during recent strikes to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and that Russian forces are launching thermal and radar interference devices and placing EW systems directly on missiles to defend against Ukrainian countermeasures. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces have also recently seized on poor weather conditions to conduct strikes under dense fog and cloud cover.

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against four Russian air defense systems and radars in occupied Ukraine and two oil depots in Russia on November 28 and 29. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 29 that Ukrainian drone units recently destroyed a Russian Zoopark radar system in an unspecified area of Russia or occupied Ukraine, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Buk-M3 air defense system in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The GUR reported on November 28 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a ”Podlyot” mobile radar system — which identifies targets for S-300/400 air defense systems — near occupied Kotovske, Crimea (north of Yevpatoria on Crimea‘s northwestern coast). Geolocated footage published on November 29 purportedly shows Ukrainian forces also striking an S-400 air defense system near occupied Simferopol, Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 29 that Ukrainian drones struck the Atlas Oil Depot in Rostov Oblast and caused a fire at the oil depot. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Atlas Oil Depot supplies petrol products to the Russian military. Russian sources posted imagery claiming to show a fire near the Atlas Oil Depot and claimed that Ukrainian forces also conducted a drone strike likely against an oil depot near Slavyansk-on-Kuban, Krasnodar Krai on November 28. Ukrainian forces previously conducted a drone strike against the Atlas Oil Depot in August 2024.

Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to laud the technical specifications of the recently launched Oreshnik ballistic missile and threaten additional Oreshnik strikes against Ukraine as part of an intensified Russian reflexive control campaign aimed at forcing the West and Ukraine into self-deterrence.

• There is nothing particularly novel about the capabilities of the Oreshnik missile, and US and Ukrainian officials indicated that the Oreshnik missile does not portend a Russian escalation in the war. Putin's constant flaunting of the Oreshnik and Russian missile capabilities therefore remains part of the Kremlin's reflexive control information operation and is unlikely to presage the development of particularly novel Russian deep strike capabilities.

• The Russian military is considering establishing a separate service branch for unmanned systems, likely as part of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) in a belated effort to catch up to the establishment of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) in February 2024.

• Russian forces conducted a large series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine’s energy grid and major defense industrial facilities on the nights of November 27 to 28 and 28 to 29.

• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against four Russian air defense systems and radars in occupied Ukraine and two oil depots in Russia on November 28 and 29.

• Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov made an unannounced visit to Pyongyang, North Korea on November 29 amid intensifying Russian-North Korean cooperation.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly appointed Colonel General Rustam Muradov as First Deputy Commander of the Russian Ground Forces.

• The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office opened additional investigations on November 28 into the apparent Russian execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky the appointment of Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi as Ukraine's new Ground Forces Commander on November 29, replacing Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk.

• Georgians protested in Tbilisi, Georgia in response to an initiative by the ruling pro-Kremlin Georgian Dream party to delay European Union (EU) accession negotiations, prompting the Russian information space to resurrect information operations falsely framing the protests and Georgian opposition parties as potential threats to Georgian sovereignty.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Vuhledar.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, in Toretsk, near Pokrovsk, and near Velyka Novosilka.

• Russian opposition outlets Mediazona and BBC Russian Service reported that they have confirmed that at least 80,937 Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022.

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Kremlin officials responded to Syrian opposition forces' offensive into Syrian regime-held territory on November 29 and 30 and expressed interest in using the Astana Process to respond to the situation. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on November 29 that the Syrian opposition forces' offensive is an "encroachment on Syria's sovereignty" and that Russia advocates for Syrian authorities to restore "constitutional order." Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke on the phone with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on November 30 to discuss the situation in Syria. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that both parties expressed serious concerns about the "dangerous developments" in Aleppo and Idlib provinces. Lavrov and Fidan reportedly discussed the need to coordinate joint Russian-Turkish actions to stabilize the situation, primarily through the Astana Process that Russia, Turkey, and Iran launched in December 2016. (The Astana Process is a rival political process to the United Nations -led Geneva Process under UN Security Council Resolution 2254.) Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi also reportedly initiated a telephone conversation with Lavrov on November 30, during which Lavrov and Araghchi expressed "extreme concern" about the "dangerous escalation" in Syria. Lavrov reportedly reaffirmed Russia's strong support for Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and both agreed to intensify joint efforts to stabilize and review the situation through the Astana Process. It remains unclear whether the Kremlin will be able to deploy additional assets to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime given the high tempo and operational requirements for Russia to continue conducting operations in Ukraine – the Kremlin’s priority theater. Russia withdrew S-300 systems from Syria back to Russia in 2022, likely to support Russian operations in Ukraine. ISW collected unconfirmed reports in March 2022 that Russia withdrew Russian soldiers and Wagner militants from Syria, likely to support Russian operations in Ukraine.

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un during his unannounced trip to Pyongyang on November 30. Belousov and Kim discussed the Russia-North Korea strategic partnership and relations between the Russian and North Korean militaries. Kim reiterated support for Russia's war in Ukraine and boilerplate rhetoric that the Kremlin uses to forward its reflexive control campaign aimed at forcing the West into self-deterrence.

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials responded to Syrian opposition forces' offensive into Syrian regime-held territory on November 29 and 30 and expressed interest in using the Astana Process to respond to the situation.

• Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un during his unannounced trip to Pyongyang on November 30.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions north of Kharkiv City, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.

• Russian milbloggers continued to criticize poor Russian military command decisions and poor training and discipline among Russian personnel.

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The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly replaced Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel with Colonel General Alexander Chaiko who will reprise his previous assignment as commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria, though it remains unclear how Russian operations in Syria may change. Russian ultranationalist milbloggers, including the Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel, claimed on November 30 and December 1 that the MoD removed Kisel as Commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria and replaced him with Chaiko. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 1 that Chaiko replaced Kisel and that Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Alexander Moiseyev arrived in Tartus, Syria. Chaiko served as chief of staff of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria from 2015 to 2017 and served as overall commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria in September 2019 to November 2020, February to June 2021, and September to December 2022. It is unclear what Chaiko’s assignment was between December 2022 until present. Kisel has reportedly commanded the Russian Force Grouping in Syria since at least May 2024. Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Kisel's removal will not significantly change the situation or Russian operations in Syria because the Russian military command has routinely rotated commanders to positions in Syria after battlefield failures in Ukraine. ISW is unable to independently confirm this reported command change at this time.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree approving the 2025 federal budget and the 2026–2027 draft federal budget on December 1. The 2025 budget allocates about 41 percent of Russia's annual expenditures to national security and defense. ISW continues to assess that the increased Russian defense spending, while dangerous, does not necessarily equate to a one-to-one increase in Russian military capabilities, especially given that significant funding is going towards paying benefits to Russian soldiers, veterans, and their families. Russia's continued focus on defense spending is likely also affecting the effectiveness and sustainability of Russian social programs, which may affect the Kremlin's ability to sustain its war in Ukraine, given mounting pressures on the Russian economy and Putin’s observed tendency to avoid risking his regime's stability.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly replaced Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel with Colonel General Alexander Chaiko who will reprise his previous assignment as commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria, though it remains unclear how Russian operations in Syria may change.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree approving the 2025 federal budget and the 2026–2027 draft federal budget on December 1.

• Russian state media reported that the Russian military command appointed Colonel General Rustam Muradov as the First Deputy Commander of the Russian Ground Forces.

• The Georgian opposition continues to contest the legitimacy of Georgia's ruling Georgian Dream party's electoral victory following Georgian Dream's suspension of Georgia's European Union (EU) membership accession talks.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole.

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Prominent voices within the Russian information space continue to emphasize that Russian President Vladimir Putin is uninterested in a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine that results in anything less than total Ukrainian capitulation. Kremlin-affiliated Russian oligarch and Orthodox nationalist and founder of the ultranationalist Tsargrad outlet Konstantin Malofeev told the Financial Times (FT) in an interview published on December 2 that Putin will likely reject any plan for peace negotiations that US President-elect Donald Trump puts forth unless the plan accounts for Russia's "security concerns." Malofeev claimed that the Kremlin will only consider peace negotiations with the Trump administration if Trump reverses the US policy allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided long-range weapons to strike into Russia; "removes" Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from office; and agrees to meet with Putin to discuss the situation in Ukraine, the future European security, the conflict in the Middle East, and Russia's growing alliance with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Putin may intend to use such a meeting to extract future US policy concessions on these issues from Trump. Malofeev also claimed that the war in Ukraine has helped strengthen Russia's relationships with the PRC, Iran, and North Korea and has revitalized Russia’s economy and defense industry. However, ISW continues to observe macroeconomic indications that Russia's economy is struggling to bear the weight of inflation, ongoing international sanctions, and labor shortages and will face significant challenges in 2025 assuming Russia’s war in Ukraine continues at the current tempo.

Putin and other senior Russian officials have recently issued similar statements. Malofeev's interview further indicates that the Kremlin is not interested in good faith negotiations, no matter who mediates such talks. Malofeev does not currently hold an official position within the Russian government, but his rhetoric is important given his relationships with high-level Kremlin officials and the influence of Tsargrad among Russian ultranationalists. Malofeev has previously used Tsargrad to promote Kremlin narratives justifying Russia's invasion and occupation of Ukraine and continues to be an outspoken supporter of Putin. Zelensky recently acknowledged that Ukraine must find diplomatic solutions to end the war and secure the return of some parts of occupied Ukraine (including Crimea) in the future, but Malofeev's comments indicate that Putin remains averse to good faith negotiations and is committed to destroying the Ukrainian state through military means.

Key Takeaways:

• Prominent voices within the Russian information space continue to emphasize that Russian President Vladimir Putin is uninterested in a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine that results in anything less than total Ukrainian capitulation.

• Russia's increased domestic production of Shahed-type drones has allowed Russia to increase the number of drones it is using in strike packages launched at Ukraine, but Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) innovations are enabling Ukrainian forces to more effectively respond to Russian strike packages.

• The Kremlin continues efforts to minimize the war’s social impacts on the Russian populace while tacitly resetting the goalposts for what the Kremlin initially defined as victory in Ukraine.

• Pro-Kremlin Russian Telegram channel operators continue to resist Russian government efforts to deanonymize Russian social media accounts.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

• The Russian military command is focusing on training additional Russian forces and improving Russian forces' tactical assault operations.

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Russia is evacuating naval assets from its base in Tartus, Syria, which may suggest that Russia does not intend to send significant reinforcements to support Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime in the near term. OSINT analyst MT Anderson reported on December 2 that satellite imagery from November 30 and December 1 showed that the Russian Admiral Gorshkov and Admiral Golovko Gorskhov-class frigates, the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate, the Novorossiysk Kilo-class submarine, the Yelnya Altay-class oiler, and the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler were at the Russian base in Tartus. Anderson then reported that satellite imagery from December 3 showed that Russia removed the three frigates, the submarine, and two unnamed auxiliary vessels (likely the Yelnya and Vyazma) from the base — amounting to all of the vessels that Russia had stationed at Tartus. Russia cannot redeploy these vessels to its Black Sea ports because Turkey is enforcing the Montreux Convention, which prevents Russian warships from passing through the Turkish Straits. Russia will likely therefore redeploy the vessels to its bases in northwestern Russia and Kaliningrad Oblast. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 3 that the Russian military command has likely deployed a force grouping of an unspecified size from its Africa Corps — the organization that the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) created to supplant the Wagner Group's operations in Africa following Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin's death in August 2023 — to Syria. ISW cannot independently confirm reports of Africa Corps elements deploying to Syria, but these reports, if true, would indicate that the Russian military command is avoiding redeploying regular Russian military forces from its priority theater in Ukraine to Syria. The Russian evacuation of Tartus and the reported deployment of Africa Corps forces to Syria suggest that Russia is worried that Syrian opposition forces may advance southward to Hama (roughly 80 kilometers northeast of Tartus) and threaten the Tartus base but that the Russian military command will not deploy significant reinforcements to Syria in the near term to prevent such advances. The Critical Threats Project's (CTP) Africa File will cover Syria's impact on Russian activity in Africa and the Mediterranean in its upcoming update.

The United States announced additional military assistance worth $725 million for Ukraine on December 2. The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced its 71st tranche of military assistance under the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), including Stinger man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS) missiles; HIMARS ammunition; 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition; munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS); Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles; Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) equipment and munitions; and AT-4 and Javelin anti-armor systems. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated on December 2 that US President Joe Biden has asked the DoD to deliver the aid rapidly and that the United States "will deliver hundreds of thousands of additional artillery rounds, thousands of additional rockets, and other critical capabilities" to Ukraine between early December 2024 and mid-January 2025.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is evacuating naval assets from its base in Tartus, Syria, which may suggest that Russia does not intend to send significant reinforcements to support Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime in the near term.

• The US announced additional military assistance worth $725 million for Ukraine on December 2.

• Russian officials continue to perpetuate information operations about prisoner-of-war (POW) exchanges in order to portray Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate and to undermine Ukrainians' trust in their government.

• India is reportedly attempting to decouple its defense industry from Russia as it increases cooperation with Western defense companies and builds up its own defense industrial base (DIB).

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and regained lost positions near Kupyansk. Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

• Russian forces reportedly continued to suffer significant personnel and armored vehicle losses throughout November 2024 as they attempted to maintain intensified offensive operations in eastern Ukraine.

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Mounting evidence continues to personally implicate Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Kremlin officials in the forced deportation and "re-education" of Ukrainian children in Russia. The US Department of State and Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab published a report on December 3 detailing the role of Putin, Kremlin Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, members of Russia's ruling United Russia party, Russia's Ministry of Education, and occupation officials in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in at least 314 confirmed cases of child deportation from occupied Ukraine. The report states that Putin maintains primary control over and is the main decision-maker for Russia's deportation program and that Lvova-Belova acts as Putin's executive officer who oversees the implementation of the program. The report notes that Russian authorities have used military transport aircraft and aircraft under Putin's personal control to deport children from occupied Ukraine to intermediary holding facilities in Russia. The report states that Russian and occupation authorities have primarily deported to Russia children whom Russian authorities claim to be orphans or children without parental care and that Russian authorities have placed most of the children in Russian foster or adoptive families. The report assesses that it is highly likely that most, if not all, deported Ukrainian children have been naturalized as Russian citizens and that Russian authorities force the children to participate in a patriotic re-education program intended to Russify, militarize, and indoctrinate them into Russian cultural and historical narratives and forcibly separate them from their Ukrainian heritage. The report notes that the true number of Ukrainian children that Russia has forcibly deported to Russia remains unclear and that the number is significantly higher than the 314 children identified in the report. ISW has reported extensively on Russia's crimes in occupied Ukraine, including the forced deportation of Ukrainian youth to Russia. The Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines "forcibly transferring children of a group to another group" as an act constituting genocide.

Key Takeaways:

• Mounting evidence continues to personally implicate Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Kremlin officials in the forced deportation and "re-education" of Ukrainian children in Russia.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to posture Russian economic stability and growth while high interest rates and efforts to combat inflation suggest that the Kremlin is worried about economic stability in the long-term.

• Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced on December 4 that Armenia has effectively reached "the point of no return" in its ties with the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in Toretsk and near Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces recently advanced in Chasiv Yar, near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Vuhledar, Velyka Novosilka, and in Kursk Oblast.

• The Kremlin continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program to place veterans of the war in Ukraine in leadership positions within the Russian government and major state companies.

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The Kremlin is continuing to suffer significant manpower losses to make tactical advances in western Donetsk Oblast at the expense of Russia's ongoing war effort and the medium-term viability of the Russian economy. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD), citing data from the Ukrainian General Staff, reported on December 5 that the average daily Russian personnel casualties reached a new all-time high of 1,523 casualties per day in November 2024. The UK MoD noted that Russian forces suffered just over 2,000 casualties in a single day for the first time on November 28, 2024. Russian forces suffered an estimated 45,690 total casualties throughout November 2024, and the UK MoD noted that November 2024 was the fifth consecutive month that Russian casualties increased. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced at a rate of roughly 27.96 square kilometers per day and seized a total of 839 square kilometers in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast in November 2024. ISW previously reported that Russian forces suffered increased casualties in September and October 2024 as well and that Russian casualties totaled an estimated 80,110 troops in exchange for roughly 1,517 square kilometers of gains in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast in those two months. Russian forces have thus suffered an estimated 125,800 casualties during a period of intensified offensive operations in September, October, and November 2024 in exchange for 2,356 square kilometers of gains. (Or approximately 53 Russian casualties per square kilometer of Ukrainian territory seized.)

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is continuing to suffer significant manpower losses to make tactical advances in western Donetsk Oblast at the expense of Russia's ongoing war effort and the medium-term viability of the Russian economy.

• Russia's constrained labor pool is likely unable to sustain this increased casualty rate in the medium-term, and continued Western military support for Ukraine remains vital to Ukraine's ability to inflict losses at this rate.

• Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov undermined the Kremlin's information operation to portray Russia's November 21 Oreshnik ballistic missile strike against Ukraine as a defensive response to the US permitting Ukraine to conduct strikes in Russia with US-provided ATACMS missiles.

• Russian-North Korean military cooperation will likely continue to intensify in the coming months following the formal commencement of their comprehensive strategic partnership agreement on December 4.

• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues to publicly position himself as a defender of migrants and Russian ethnic minorities in opposition to other senior Russian security officials, suggesting that senior Russian officials may be increasingly divided over Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to promote an inclusive Russian civic nationalism that ensures interethnic and interreligious harmony in Russia.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk and northern Kharkiv oblasts, and Russian forces advanced in the Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions.

• Russian forces are reportedly increasingly recruiting women for combat and logistics functions.

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