US President Joe Biden stated on September 10 that the presidential administration is working on lifting
restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use US-provided weapons to strike military objects within Russia.
Biden stated that his administration is "working that out now," in response to a question about whether
the United States would lift restrictions prohibiting Ukraine from using US-provided long-range weapons
to strike within Russia. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated earlier on September 10 during a
press conference with UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy that Biden and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer will
likely discuss lifting these restrictions during a meeting on September 13. House Foreign Affairs
Committee Chair Michael McCaul stated on September 10 that he believes that Blinken will use the visit to
Kyiv to inform Ukrainian officials that the United States will allow Ukrainian forces to use US-provided
ATACMS missiles to strike within Russia.
Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC)
continue to pursue various avenues of military-technical cooperation. US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt
Campbell told POLITICO on September 10 that the PRC is giving Russia's defense industry "very
substantial" support in exchange for secretive Russian military technologies. Campbell emphasized that
the PRC is not just supplying dual-use products to Russia but is instead engaged in a "substantial
effort....to help sustain, build, and diversify elements of the Russian war machine." Campbell warned
that Russia is sending the PRC safeguarded submarine, aeronautical design, and missile technologies in
return, which Russia has previously been reluctant to share with Beijing. PRC officials continue to deny
their support for the Russian war effort and claim that the PRC remains "impartial" when it comes to
Russia's war in Ukraine, despite frequent Western reporting of the PRC's material support for Russian
defense industrial output and geospatial intelligence capabilities. Reports of more direct PRC support to
Russia come against the backdrop of the Russia-led "Okean-2024" international naval exercises, which are
currently taking place in the Pacific and Arctic oceans and Mediterranean, Caspian, and Baltic seas with
the involvement of three ships, one vessel, and 15 aircraft of the PRC's People's Liberation Army (PLA).
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the start of Okean-2024 on September 10 and accused the US of
placing pressure on Russia and the PRC, necessitating the conduct of joint naval exercises. PLA and
Russian forces are also currently conducting the "Northern/Interaction-2024" joint "strategic
collaboration" exercise, comprised of air force and naval drills in the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk,
and a joint maritime patrol in the Pacific.
Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of drone
strikes in Russia on the night of September 9 to 10. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that
Russian forces intercepted 144 Ukrainian drones in total, including 72 drones over Bryansk Oblast, 20
drones over Moscow Oblast, 14 drones over Kursk Oblast, 13 drones over Tula Oblast, eight drones over
Belgorod Oblast, seven drones over Kaluga Oblast, five drones over Voronezh Oblast, four drones over
Lipetsk Oblast, and one drone over Oryol Oblast. Footage published on September 10 reportedly shows the
aftermath of a drone strike in Ramenskoye, Moscow Oblast, and Ramenskoye Urban Raion Acting Head Eduard
Malyshev claimed that Ukrainian drones damaged two buildings in the raion. Moscow Oblast Governor Andrei
Vorobyov claimed that Russian forces shot down 14 drones near Podolsk, Ramenskoye, Lyubertsy, Domodedovo,
and Kolomna. Domodedovo Urban Raion Head Yevgenia Krustaleva claimed that falling drone debris blocked a
section of the Kashirskoye Highway from Domodedovo to Moscow City. Russian Federal Aviation Agency
Rosaviatsiya stated that it introduced temporary restrictions at the Vnukovo, Domodedovo, and Zhukovsky
airports near Moscow City and limited airport operations in Kazan, Tatarstan Republic in response to the
drone strikes. Tula Oblast authorities stated that drone debris fell on an unspecified fuel and energy
facility in an unspecified location in Tula Oblast but did not damage the facility. Russian milbloggers
criticized Russian regional authorities for claiming that falling "debris" caused damage to
infrastructure during the strikes and reiterated calls for Russian authorities to allow the Russian
military, Rosgvardia, border guards, and private security companies to create mobile fire groups to repel
drone strikes.
Key Takeaways: • US Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed on
September 10 that Iran has sent short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to Russia amid growing
international condemnation of Tehran's support for Russia's war in Ukraine. • Russia and the
People's Republic of China (PRC) continue to pursue various avenues of military-technical cooperation.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes in Russia on the night of September 9
to 10. • US President Joe Biden stated on September 10 that the presidential administration is
working on lifting restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use US-provided weapons to strike military
objects within Russia. • The Kremlin is reportedly allocating roughly 59 billion rubles (about $648
million) to strengthen its technical ability to restrict internet traffic on its sovereign internet. • Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in
the area on September 10. • Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Siversk, Toretsk,
Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City. • The German-based Kiel Institute for the World Economy published a
report on September 9 warning that Russia has significantly increased its defense industrial base (DIB)
capabilities since 2022 and that depleting weapons and equipment stockpiles may not significantly impact
future Russian DIB production.
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Russian forces began counterattacks along the western edge of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and
reportedly seized several settlements northeast and south of Korenevo on September 10 and 11. The size,
scale, and potential prospects of the September 11 Russian counterattacks in Kursk Oblast are unclear and
the situation remains fluid as of this report. It is premature to draw conclusions about Russia’s new
counterattacks and ISW will continue following the situation. Geolocated footage published on September
11 indicates that Russian forces retook positions east of Zhuravli (northeast of Korenevo). Additional
geolocated footage published on September 10 indicates that elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV)
Regiment (106th VDV Division) advanced north and northeast of Snagost (south of Korenevo) during a
company-sized mechanized assault. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces launched the mechanized
counterattack from the north near Korenevo and that Russian forces quickly advanced into Snagost. Several
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces fully seized Snagost, but ISW has not observed visual
confirmation of these claims. Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 51st VDV Regiment and
155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District ) advanced northwest of
Snagost and seized Krasnooktyabrskoye; advanced west of Snagost and seized Komarovka and Vishnevka;
advanced southwest of Snagost and seized Apanasovka and 10-y Oktyabr; advanced southeast of Snagost and
seized Obukhovka; and advanced south of Snagost and seized Byakhovo, Vnezapnoye, and Gordeevka. A Russian
milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps ,
Leningrad Military District ) seized Olgovka (just east of Korenevo).
Ukrainian forces
reportedly began new attacks against the Russian counterattack west of Snagost and throughout the
Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. A Ukrainian brigade reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast reported on
September 11 that Ukrainian forces began attacking Russian forces' flank west of Snagost after the
initial Russian counterattack into Snagost. An open-source X (formerly Twitter) user claimed that
Ukrainian forces are operating near Kulbaki (southwest of Snagost and roughly five kilometers from the
international border), suggesting that Ukrainian forces recently advanced near the settlement, reportedly
after crossing the international border. Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces are
conducting small mechanized cross-border assaults into Glushkovo Raion near Medvezhye (southwest of
Snagost and along the international border) and in another unspecified area along the international
border. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces
repelled Ukrainian attacks south of Snagost near Apanasovka; east of Korenevo near Kremyanoye; and
southeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskaya Konopelka, Fanaseyevka, and Borki. It remains unclear how much
force Ukraine has committed to the reported Ukrainian counterattack.
Available visual evidence
suggests that Russian forces counterattacking in Kursk Oblast are operating in company-sized units and
may be using elements of more combat-experienced units to conduct counterattacks. Geolocated footage
published on September 10 shows elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division)
conducting a company-seized mechanized assault north of Snagost. A Russian milblogger claimed that
Russian naval infantry and airborne "battalion tactical groups" (BTGs) are conducting offensive
operations in Kursk Oblast, although ISW has only observed geolocated footage of a company-sized
mechanized assault. The milblogger could be referring to a BTG-sized force (roughly a unit with the
strength of a reinforced battalion but not necessarily operating in the structure of a traditional BTG),
and Russian forces could theoretically deploy a detached company from a BTG. Russian forces notably have
not utilized BTGs at scale on the battlefield since mid-2022, following the widespread failure of BTGs to
accomplish Russian offensive objectives in the early stages of the war, as well as damage accrued to BTGs
during costly Russian offensive operations on Kyiv, Severodonetsk, Mariupol, and Lysychansk. The Russian
military has transitioned away from using BTGs in the past two years as a task-organized unit and their
re-emergence in Kursk Oblast, if confirmed, would be a noteworthy inflection. ISW has not observed any
confirmation that Russian forces in Kursk Oblast are operating BTG as of this publication. Russian
milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) and 155th Naval
Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District ) are operating in Kursk Oblast and
involved in the counterattacks. The Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade most notably participated in the
failed Russian push for Vuhledar in late 2022 to early 2023, then fought southwest of Donetsk City near
Marinka, and deployed to participate in the Russian offensive north of Kharkiv City in May 2024 — largely
without significant rest, and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade has been degraded to the point of being
reconstituted several times. Elements of the 56th VDV Regiment participated in repelling Ukrainian
counteroffensive operations near Verbove in Summer 2023 and were reportedly still operating in the area
as of July 2024. The Russian military may be relying on relatively combat-experienced units to conduct
assault operations in Kursk Oblast, although it is unclear how effective these operations will be since
these units, especially units which have been heavily degraded and reconstituted many times, like the
155th Naval Infantry Brigade. It is also unclear if Russian forces have enough forces necessary to fully
repel Ukrainian forces — or defend against reported Ukrainian counterattacks — from Kursk Oblast since
the Russian military command likely deployed elements of these units, instead of the entire formations,
to Kursk Oblast, making it premature to assess the longer-term strategic-level effects of the Ukrainian
incursion.
Key Takeaways: • Russian forces began counterattacks along the western edge of
the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and reportedly seized several settlements northeast and south of
Korenevo on September 10 and 11. • Available visual evidence suggests that Russian forces
counterattacking in Kursk Oblast are operating in company-sized units and may be using elements of more
combat-experienced units to conduct counterattacks. • Russian forces may intend to temporarily
bisect the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast before beginning a more organized and well-equipped effort
to push Ukrainian forces out of Russian territory. • US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and UK
Foreign Secretary Davit Lammy arrived in Kyiv on September 11 and reiterated support for Ukraine but did
not clarify current Western policy on Ukraine’s ability to strike military objects in Russia with
Western-provided weapons. • The People's Republic of China (PRC) continues to promote its
alternative peace plan for the war in Ukraine. • Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated
his support for Ukraine on September 11. • Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk,
near Toretsk, and near Pokrovsk. • Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly
Sarantsev reported on September 11 that Russian forces are replenishing their tactical, operational, and
strategic reserves. • Russian occupation authorities illegally held regional elections in occupied
Crimea on September 6 to 8 and likely fabricated increased voter turnout numbers to claim that residents
broadly support Russia's illegal occupation of Crimea.
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Russian forces continued counterattacking throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on September
12 but made only marginal gains, likely due to continued Ukrainian offensive operations and defensive
counterattacks in the area. Geolocated footage published on September 12 indicates that Russian forces
made marginal advances west of Vishnevka (southwest of Korenevo) and in northern Krasnooktyabrskoye
(southwest of Korenevo). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces have
recaptured 10 settlements south and southwest of Korenevo since starting counterattacks on the night of
September 10 to 11, including Apanasovka, Byakhovo, Vishnevka, Viktorovka, Vnezapnoye, Gordeevka,
Krasnooktyabrskoye, Obukhovka, Snagost, and 10-y Oktyabr. All of these settlements are within the
existing claimed limit of Russian advances, and ISW has yet to observe visual confirmation that Russian
forces have recaptured any of these settlements except parts of Snagost and Krasnooktyabrskoye. Russian
milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued advancing southeast of Korenevo and northeast of
Snagost (southwest of Korenevo), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.
Ukrainian forces continued counterattacking in areas where Russian forces have launched counterattacks
and launched additional attacks outside of the salient, making gains in Glushkovsky Raion (west of
Korenevsky Raion). Geolocated footage published September 12 indicates that Ukrainian infantry have
advanced across the border and into southwestern Tetkino (about 40km southwest of the current Ukrainian
salient in Kursk Oblast). Additional geolocated footage published on September 12 shows Ukrainian armored
vehicles and infantry bypassing Russian dragon's teeth anti-tank obstacles on the Russian-Ukrainian
border southwest of Novy Put (southwest of Glushkovo) unopposed, indicating that Ukrainian forces have
advanced in the area and that Russian forces were not prepared to leverage the obstacles to repel
cross-border Ukrainian assaults. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults near
Novy Put, Medvezhye (southeast of Glushkovo), Snagost, Olgovka (east of Korenevo), and Fanaseyevka
(southeast of Sudzha).
Russian forces have so far advanced in areas of Kursk Oblast that
Ukrainian forces were not yet fully controlling nor attempting to control, and Russian forces will likely
face more difficulty when counterattacking further into areas of the salient where Ukrainian forces do
have control. ISW uses the doctrinal definition of "control" when referring to control of terrain in
which "control is a tactical mission task that requires a commander to maintain physical influence over a
specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly
operations." Russian forces have advanced roughly 58 square kilometers in areas where ISW has observed
either maximalist claims or visual evidence of Ukrainian forces operating since starting counterattacks
on the night of September 10 to 11. ISW previously was not mapping control of terrain within the
Ukrainian salient in Russia, and Russian forces have not advanced in recent days through areas which ISW
formally assessed were under Ukrainian control. ISW has been mapping the maximalist extent of claims and
unverified reports about Ukrainian advances, however, and ISW's mapping never excluded the possibility
that Russian forces were operating in areas within the maximalist extent of claimed Ukrainian advances.
Ukrainian forces have not attempted to consolidate positions everywhere in their salient in Kursk Oblast,
and it is likely that Ukrainian forces had fewer consolidated positions in forward areas at the edges of
the salient where Russian forces have recently advanced. Ukrainian forces most certainly control
territory within some areas of the salient in Kursk Oblast, although ISW will continue to refrain from
mapping Ukrainian control of terrain in Russia. Russian counterattacks against better prepared and
consolidated positions in territory where Ukrainian forces exert control will likely be far less
successful than the counterattacks Russian forces launched on September 10 to 11.
Key
Takeaways: • Russian forces continued counterattacking throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk
Oblast on September 12 but made only marginal gains, likely due to continued Ukrainian offensive
operations and defensive counterattacks in the area. • Russian forces have so far advanced in areas
of Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces were not yet fully controlling nor attempting to control, and
Russian forces will likely face more difficulty when counterattacking further into areas of the salient
where Ukrainian forces do have control. • A Ukrainian HIMARS strike reportedly damaged a temporary
pontoon bridge across the Seym River and wounded a group of nearby Russian troops on September 12. • Russian authorities have reportedly deployed additional elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV)
Division to Kursk Oblast and may begin redeploying more combat experienced forces to support ongoing
Russian counterattacks and future counteroffensive operations against Ukrainian forces in Russia. • The United Kingdom (UK) will reportedly allow Ukraine to use UK-provided long-range Storm Shadow
missiles to strike military objects in Russia in the coming days. • Russian President Vladimir
Putin continues rhetorical efforts aimed at influencing the ongoing Western policy debate about granting
Ukraine permission to use Western-provided weapons against military objects in Russia, although Russia
has not previously escalated militarily against perceived Western violations of Russia's "red lines." • Russian forces struck a civilian cargo ship transiting through the Ukrainian grain corridor in the
western Black Sea on September 11, likely as part of a renewed Russian effort to undermine international
confidence in the safety of the corridor. • Russia continued its efforts to enhance relations with
non-Western countries at the meeting of BRICS high-ranking security officials and advisors in St.
Petersburg. • Iran and Russia are downplaying their disagreement over the Zangezur Corridor project
in the Caucasus. • Russia is continuing to balance its relationships with Iran and the Gulf states.
• Russian investigative outlet Dossier Center published an investigation on September 12 into the
Kremlin's efforts to consolidate its influence over the Russian information space via Telegram ahead of
the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. • Russian forces recently north of Chasiv Yar, southeast of
Pokrovsk, and west of Donetsk City. • Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and Zaporizhia
Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin claimed on September 12 that the first group of the newly-formed
"BARS-Sarmat" volunteer detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) signed military service contracts with
the Russian MoD and are training for deployment to the frontline in Ukraine.
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The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has reportedly spoiled planned Russian offensive operations
along the international border area that likely aimed to expand the area of active combat operations
across a broader front in northeastern Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on
September 13 that the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast stopped Russian plans to create several buffer
zones along the Ukrainian border "from the east to the north," including in Sumy Oblast. Zelensky stated
that Russian forces wanted to launch major offensives to seize regional centers, likely referring to the
regional capitals of Sumy and Kharkiv cities. Sumy and Kharkiv cities are roughly 25 and 30 kilometers
from the international border, respectively – significantly further than the approximately six to 10
kilometers that Russian forces currently occupy near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) and Vovchansk
(northeast of Kharkiv City).
Zelensky's statement suggests that Russian forces planned to
start new offensive operations aimed at penetrating at least 25 kilometers deep into Sumy and Kharkiv
oblasts and activating along a much wider front between at least Sumy and Kharkiv cities. Ukrainian
Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi similarly stated on September 5 that the Ukrainian incursion
spoiled a planned Russian attack into Sumy Oblast and "reduced the threat" of Russian incursions into
northern Ukraine. ISW previously assessed that the Russian offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast
aimed to fix Ukrainian manpower and materiel along the northern border, granting Russian forces
opportunities to re-intensify offensive operations in other higher-priority areas of the theater.
Ukrainian forces have largely stabilized the frontline in the Kharkiv direction since Summer 2024 and
continue to contest the tactical initiative through counterattacks that have regained limited positions
in northern Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian military command may have intended for additional offensive
operations along a wider and more continuous front in northeastern Ukraine to significantly stretch
Ukrainian forces along the international border following the Ukrainian stabilization of the frontline
north and northeast of Kharkiv City.
Zelensky noted that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk
Oblast has also impacted Russian offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast. Zelensky stated that the
Ukrainian incursion "slowed" Russian advances throughout Donetsk Oblast and reduced the advantage in
artillery ammunition that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction had over Ukrainian forces from 12-to-1
to 2.5-to-1. ISW is unable to verify Zelensky’s statement, though the rate of Russian advance in the
Pokrovsk area has notably slowed since the start of September 2024. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence
Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated during an interview published on
September 7 that Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast complicated Russia's plans for offensive
operations, including in Russia's "main direction" (likely referring to the Pokrovsk direction), in
August 2024 and later this fall. ISW has recently observed indications that Russian authorities have
transferred limited elements of likely Russian reserve units from Donetsk Oblast, including from the
Pokrovsk direction, to Kursk Oblast to counter the Ukrainian incursion. Such limited redeployments are
unlikely to have an immediate impact on the tempo of Russian offensive operations, although Russian
forces may struggle to maintain their current offensive tempo into the future if Russian authorities
conduct additional redeployments from reserve forces in Donetsk Oblast.
Russian forces
continue to counterattack throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, but the Russian military will
likely have to redeploy additional elements from elsewhere in the theater to Kursk Oblast to establish a
force grouping capable of pursuing a sustained counteroffensive operation. Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky reiterated on September 13 that Russian forces have begun counteroffensive operations in Kursk
Oblast, and Pentagon Spokesperson Major General Patrick Ryder stated on September 12 that the US has
observed Russian units beginning to try to conduct "some type of counteroffensive" operation that Ryder
described as "marginal." ISW continues to track observable Russian counterattacks in Kursk Oblast but has
not yet observed large-scale combat operations indicating that Russian forces have started a large-scale
concerted counteroffensive operation aimed at completely expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.
Zelensky stated that Russian forces have concentrated 40,000 personnel in Kursk Oblast but did
not specify the composition of the Russian grouping, and it remains unclear whether Zelensky’s count is
representative exclusively of combat-effective Russian soldiers or a joint force that includes contract
soldiers, plus less effective conscripts, irregular forces, border guards, Rosgvardia elements, and
Russian Interior Ministry forces. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on September 13
that there are roughly 33,000 to 35,000 Russian personnel in Kursk Oblast. Zelensky stated that the
Russian military command intends to concentrate 60,000 to 70,000 personnel in Kursk Oblast, a number
notably higher than the 50,000 personnel that US officials reportedly assessed that Russia would need to
push Ukrainians out of Kursk Oblast. Russian authorities have largely relied on poorly-trained and
equipped conscripts and small elements of Russian regular and irregular forces to address the Ukrainian
incursion into Kursk Oblast thus far, and it is unlikely that most of the current Russian force grouping
in Kursk Oblast is comprised of combat experienced units.
A Russian counteroffensive operation
to retake territory seized by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast will very likely require even more
manpower and materiel than Russia has already concentrated in the area — especially if most of the
already committed units lack combat experience. Russian Airborne (VDV) forces that recently redeployed to
Kursk Oblast from the frontline in Ukraine currently appear to be heavily responsible for counterattacks
in Kursk Oblast, suggesting that the Russian military command may intend to field units perceived to be
more "elite" or combat effective to regain territory. The Russian military will most certainly have to
redeploy units already committed to ongoing offensive operations or operational reserves from Ukraine to
Kursk Oblast in order to field the combat-effective units needed for a large counteroffensive operation
and then subsequently guard the international border against future Ukrainian incursion.
Key
Takeaways:
The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has reportedly spoiled planned Russian
offensive operations along the international border area that likely aimed to expand the area of active
combat operations across a broader front in northeastern Ukraine.
Russian forces continue to
counterattack throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, but the Russian military will likely have
to redeploy additional elements from elsewhere in the theater to Kursk Oblast to establish a force
grouping capable of pursuing a sustained counteroffensive operation.
Russian forces appear to
be testing more effective mechanized assault tactics west of Donetsk City, although Russian armored
vehicles remain vulnerable to Ukrainian strike and drone capabilities.
Ukraine and Russia
conducted their second prisoner of war (POW) exchange since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on
September 13.
Russia continues efforts to strengthen strategic military ties with the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran to support its war effort in Ukraine.
Russian
and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued Russian and Ukrainian assaults in
the area on September 13.
Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv
Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
Russian authorities continue attempts to coerce minorities and
Ukrainian youth living in occupied Ukraine to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to avoid
conducting a wider mobilization.
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Ukrainian officials and sources indicated that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has prompted the
Russian authorities to increase the size of the Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast by upwards of a
factor of three. Ukrainian Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated on
September 14 that Russian forces had 11,000 personnel deployed in Kursk Oblast at the start of Ukraine's
incursion in early August 2024. Mysnyk stated that there are various estimates that place the current
size of the Russian grouping in Kursk Oblast between 30,000 and 45,000 personnel. Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 13 that Russian forces have concentrated 40,000 personnel in Kursk
Oblast and aim to concentrate a total of 60,000 to 70,000 personnel in the area. The individual number
breakdown for each of the Russian services (Rosgvardia, border guards, regular units, irregular units,
and conscript forces) contributing to these figures remains unclear. Ukrainian military observer
Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on September 14 that there are roughly 61 various Russian units of various
sizes comprised of roughly 35,500 Russian personnel within the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces' Kursk
Group (which has responsibility for Glushkovsky, Korenevsky, Sudzhansky, Rylsky, Lgovsky, Kurchatovsky,
and Kursky raions). The reported growth in the size of the Russian grouping in Kursk Oblast is reflective
of how operational pressures caused by the incursion have forced the Russian military command to redeploy
elements from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast and commit newly generated forces from within Russia to the area
instead of the frontline in Ukraine. A Russian counteroffensive operation to retake territory seized by
Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast will very likely require even more manpower and materiel than Russia has
already concentrated in the area and therefore additional Russian redeployments from Ukraine.
Ukraine and Russia conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on September 14 — the third POW exchange
since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, which appears to have generated the short-term effect of
increasing incentives for Russia to engage in POW exchanges. Ukrainian officials reported that Russia
returned 103 prisoners to Ukraine including Ukrainian servicemembers who defended the Azovstal Steel
Plant in Mariupol in early 2022, servicemembers of the Ukrainian National Police and State Border
Service, servicemembers of the Ukrainian State Transport Special Service, and other Ukrainian military
personnel. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 14 that Ukraine returned 103
individuals to Russia whom Ukrainian forces captured in Kursk Oblast. Russian sources suggested that the
returned Russian prisoners were conscripts. The POW swap directly follows a similar exchange that Russia
and Ukraine conducted on September 13, during which they returned 49 prisoners each. Ukrainian officials
have repeatedly emphasized that the Kursk incursion has enhanced Ukraine’s negotiating power in POW
exchanges with Russia, following the Kremlin's consistent rejection of Ukraine's attempt to negotiate
exchanges. The frequency of POW exchanges between Ukraine and Russia has significantly increased since
the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on August 6, with both sides exchanging a total of 267 POWs
each in three separate exchanges. Russia and Ukraine only conducted three other POW exchanges,
encompassing roughly 405 Ukrainian POWs and 423 Russian POWs, between January 1 and August 6, 2024.
Key Takeaways:
Ukrainian officials and sources indicated that Ukraine's incursion into
Kursk Oblast has prompted the Russian authorities to increase the size of the Russian force grouping in
Kursk Oblast by upwards of a factor of three.
Ukraine and Russia conducted a prisoner of war
(POW) exchange on September 14 — the third POW exchange since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast,
which appears to have generated the short-term effect of increasing incentives for Russia to engage in
POW exchanges.
Some Russian field commanders continue to make decisions that degrade the
overall quality of their subordinate forces—prioritizing infantry-led frontal assault tactics over
cultivating technical specialists who would allow the Russian military to better field technologies and
innovations in combat operations.
The Kremlin continues efforts to leverage global
informational instruments of influence to develop new capabilities to conduct election interference,
destabilization measures, and sanctions evasion schemes.
Officials of Georgia’s ruling Georgia
Dream party continue to elevate narratives echoing Kremlin information operations justifying Russia’s
occupation of internationally recognized Georgian territories.
Russian forces recently
advanced near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.
Russian forces are reportedly repairing
captured Soviet-era Ukrainian equipment to replenish Russian vehicle stocks.
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Russia reportedly aims to achieve a decisive victory in Ukraine by 2026 before likely medium- to
long-term economic and force generation constraints begin to significantly degrade Russia's ability to
sustain its war effort in Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant
General Kyrylo Budanov announced on September 15 at the 20th Yalta European Strategy meeting in Kyiv that
the Kremlin considers 2025 to be a pivotal year because failure to secure a victory in Ukraine by early
2026 will undermine Russia’s aspirations of remaining a global superpower for the next 30 years. Budanov
noted that Russia anticipates a worsening economic and socio-political situation by mid-2025, alongside
increasing difficulties with military recruitment. Budanov stated that the Russian military is
experiencing personnel shortages and a decrease in the number of new volunteers signing contracts. Recent
significant rises in one-time payments to contract military personnel (kontraktniki), with at least 36
Russian federal subjects (regions) reportedly having increased their one-time payments to kontraktniki in
2024 and at least 11 federal subjects paying Russian kontraktniki one million rubles ($11,000) or more,
are likely evidence of mounting costs and difficulties with the Russian military's ability to continue
recruiting personnel. Budanov also stated that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, coupled with
constant Ukrainian strikes into Russian territories, has demoralized Russian citizens and eroded the
Russian public’s perception of Russian invincibility. Budanov assessed that mounting issues will force
Russian President Vladimir Putin to make a critical decision: either launch another risky and
controversial mobilization or reduce the intensity of combat operations in Ukraine. Budanov’s assessment
implicitly assumes that Western states will maintain support for Ukraine at current levels over the next
one to two years. It remains unclear what Putin may do between now and 2026 or how effective Putin’s
efforts to offset the impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine, including via foreign partners like Iran, North
Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC), will be. ISW continues to assess that Putin remains
averse to announcing another partial mobilization out of fear of domestic discontent and will likely
continue to instruct the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to pursue ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts until
such efforts begin to fall far short of operational requirements in Ukraine. Putin maintains the option
to call another round of mobilization - as he did in Fall 2022 - despite his desire to avoid having to do
so. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is also unwilling to accept reducing the intensity of
Russian forces’ combat operations because the Kremlin sees maintaining the theater-wide initiative as a
strategic imperative. It remains unclear whether Putin will respond with another round of mobilization if
faced with another crisis similar to or worse than the crisis the Kremlin faced in Fall 2022, as Russia’s
investments to grow Russia’s force generation system, war economy, and international defense
relationships have matured over the past two years, and likely will continue to do so through 2026.
Key Takeaways:
- Russia reportedly aims to achieve a decisive victory in Ukraine by
2026 before likely medium- to long-term economic and force generation constraints begin to significantly
degrade Russia's ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine.
-Russia will likely face
growing challenges in the production and procurement of the materiel that Russian operations in Ukraine
require, and the Kremlin will likely become increasingly reliant on foreign partners to meet its materiel
needs.
-Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksandr Kamyshin stated on September 15 that Ukraine
has started domestic serial production of 155mm artillery shells.
-The Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) promptly responded to ultranationalists' outcry surrounding the controversial deaths of two
drone operators in Ukraine, highlighting how Russian authorities continue to be highly attentive to
backlash from the ultranationalist community.
-Russian ultranationalist milbloggers praised
the Russian MoD's response to the drone operators' deaths but expressed concern about the MoD's ability
to solve the systemic issues that led to the deaths.
-Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty
Alaudinov aggravated Kremlin efforts to conduct prisoner of war (POW) exchanges for soldiers who defended
against the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast while balancing his attempts to appeal to both the
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and hardline facets of Chechen society.
-Ukrainian forces
reportedly advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces reportedly recently recaptured
territory in the area as of September 15. Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations throughout
their salient in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced in the salient.
-Russian
forces recently advanced near Svatove, Siversk, and Donetsk City.
-Russian authorities
continue to strengthen coercive mechanisms to support ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts in order to
avoid conducting a wider mobilization.
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Ukraine has taken steps to address its manpower shortages, but delays and insufficiencies in Western
military aid to Ukraine continue to limit its ability to generate effective combat units that can defend
critical areas and contest the theater-wide initiative. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in
an interview with CNN on September 13 that Ukraine "needs 14 brigades to be ready" for an unspecified
requirement and that Ukraine has not been able to equip "even four" of these brigades with slowly
arriving Western aid. Zelensky noted that Ukraine has been increasing its domestic production of drones
and transferring equipment from warehouses or reserve brigades to attempt to offset insufficient Western
military assistance to Ukraine. Zelensky stated that these insufficient provisions, particularly of
armored vehicles and artillery ammunition, have led to Ukrainian personnel losses. Ukrainian Verkhovna
Rada Defense Committee Chairperson Oleksandr Zavitnevych told the Financial Times on September 16 that
Ukrainian mobilization is "on track" and that newly trained forces could "impact" the battlefield likely
in three months. Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated in May
2024 that Ukraine was working to stand up 10 new Ukrainian brigades but that equipment, not manpower, was
the main bottleneck in Ukraine's defensive operations. ISW has long assessed that Ukraine's ability to
defend against Russian offensive operations and challenge the theater-wide initiative heavily depends on
both the Western provision of miliary aid and Ukraine's efforts to reconstitute existing units and create
new ones — the latter of which Ukraine has taken significant steps to resolve. Ukrainian forces have
partially mitigated the artillery ammunition shortages that resulted from delays in Western aid
provisions by using first-person view (FPV) drones to blunt Russian infantry and armored vehicle
assaults, but current FPV drones are unable to offset the tactical requirements of traditional field
artillery. Ukraine has taken steps to boost its domestic production of 155mm artillery ammunition, but
Ukraine has had to build these industries largely from scratch during wartime. Ukraine has also been
working to increase its production of armored vehicles, including armored personnel carriers (APCs),
since 2022, but Ukraine cannot manufacture complete tanks. The US and other foreign allies likely can
greatly increase the effectiveness of Ukrainian force-generation and force-reconstitution efforts by
providing Ukrainian forces with more mechanized equipment, such as M113 armored personnel carriers,
Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and main battle tanks. Ukraine’s 155th Infantry Brigade was recently
upgraded to a mechanized infantry brigade after the brigade was equipped with Leopard tanks, for example.
The generation of more Ukrainian infantry without a commensurate increase in mechanized equipment will
not substantially increase Ukraine’s combat power or increase Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities.
Key Takeaways: • Ukraine has taken steps to address its manpower shortages, but delays and
insufficiencies in Western military aid to Ukraine continue to limit its ability to generate effective
combat units that can defend critical areas and contest the theater-wide initiative. • Zelensky
reiterated that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has forced Russia to redirect some resources from
Ukraine to defend in Russia but that Ukraine still needs sufficient resources and Western permission to
strike military targets in Russia to mitigate the theater-wide strain on Ukrainian forces. • Russia
continues to build out its long-term military capacity by gradually increasing the size of its armed
forces. • Iran is simultaneously setting conditions to build a nuclear weapon while continuing to
signal its willingness to resume nuclear negotiations with the West. • Select Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) officials continue to face corruption charges as the Russian military leadership is
undertaking a wider effort to root out corruption in the MoD. • Ukrainian forces advanced in
Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recaptured territory in the area as of September 16.
Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kursk salient. • Ukrainian forces regained
territory near Kharkiv City and Pokrovsk. • Russian forces advanced near Kreminna, Chasiv Yar,
Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar. • Russia reportedly continues to coerce migrants to fight in the Russian
military.
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Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu arrived in Iran for an unannounced visit on September 17
following recent visits to Syria and North Korea amid ongoing Russian efforts to secure military
cooperation and support from non-Western allies. Shoigu met with Iranian Supreme National Security
Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian during a previously
unannounced visit to Tehran on September 17 and conveyed an unspecified message from Russian President
Vladimir Putin. The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) reported that Shoigu and Ahmadian
discussed upcoming bilateral agreements and emphasized that Iran continues to support Iran's official
policy regarding corridors and communication routes with Azerbaijan. Pezeshkian told Shoigu that the
Iranian government will work to increase cooperation and deepen bilateral relations between the two
countries to reduce the impact of Western sanctions. Shoigu also met with Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad in Damascus, Syria on September 16 and discussed strengthening bilateral relations and regional
and international security issues. Shoigu previously recently visited Pyongyang, North Korea on September
13 and met with North Korean President Kim Jong Un for unspecified bilateral discussions. Shoigu's
international visits are coming against the backdrop of Iran's recent delivery of over 200 Fateh-360
short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to Russia, ongoing North Korean military support for the Russian
war in Ukraine, and Ukrainian reports that Russia is hiring Syrian mercenaries to fight in Ukraine.
Russia’s deepening engagement with the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran is part of
a wider Kremlin effort to establish a coalition of friendly states which can bolster Russia's defense
industrial base (DIB) and secure strategic economic cooperation to support its war in Ukraine.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui in Moscow on
September 17. Lavrov and Choe discussed further developing Russian-North Korean bilateral relations in
unspecified manners, and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) noted that Choe will attend the
BRICS Women's Forum on the sidelines of the Eurasian Women's Forum in St. Petersburg on September 18-20.
Lavrov has recently fostered increased dialogue and cooperation with Russia's non-Western partners
through various meetings on the ministerial level, including with Saudi Minister of Hajj and Umrah Tawfiq
bin Fawzan Al-Rabieh on September 11, a BRICS foreign ministers meeting on September 12, and a meeting
with Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty on September 16.
Key Takeaways:
-The
Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office opened an investigation into another case of apparent Russian abuse
and execution of a Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW).
-Leaked documents outlining large-scale
Kremlin information operation campaigns targeting Ukraine and the West continue to demonstrate the
Kremlin's commitment to leveraging its global information instruments to advance Moscow’s interests using
social media.
-Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu arrived in Iran for an
unannounced visit following recent visits to Syria and North Korea amid ongoing Russian efforts to secure
military cooperation and support from non-Western allies.
-Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov met with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui in Moscow.
-Russian forces recently
advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk and southwest of Donetsk City.
-Ukraine's Main Military
Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 17 that Russia continues to recruit citizens from
Syria to fight in Ukraine.
Originalbeitrag RE: ISW: Ukraine has taken steps to
address its manpower shortages Ukraine has taken steps to address its manpower shortages, but delays
and insufficiencies in Western military aid to Ukraine continue to limit its ability to generate
effective combat units that can defend critical areas and contest the theater-wide initiative. Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with CNN on September 13 that Ukraine "needs 14
brigades to be ready" for an unspecified requirement and that Ukraine has not been able to equip "even
four" of these brigades with slowly arriving Western aid. Zelensky noted that Ukraine has been increasing
its domestic production of drones and transferring equipment from warehouses or reserve brigades to
attempt to offset insufficient Western military assistance to Ukraine. Zelensky stated that these
insufficient provisions, particularly of armored vehicles and artillery ammunition, have led to Ukrainian
personnel losses. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Defense Committee Chairperson Oleksandr Zavitnevych told the
Financial Times on September 16 that Ukrainian mobilization is "on track" and that newly trained forces
could "impact" the battlefield likely in three months. Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant
General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated in May 2024 that Ukraine was working to stand up 10 new Ukrainian
brigades but that equipment, not manpower, was the main bottleneck in Ukraine's defensive operations. ISW
has long assessed that Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian offensive operations and challenge the
theater-wide initiative heavily depends on both the Western provision of miliary aid and Ukraine's
efforts to reconstitute existing units and create new ones — the latter of which Ukraine has taken
significant steps to resolve. Ukrainian forces have partially mitigated the artillery ammunition
shortages that resulted from delays in Western aid provisions by using first-person view (FPV) drones to
blunt Russian infantry and armored vehicle assaults, but current FPV drones are unable to offset the
tactical requirements of traditional field artillery. Ukraine has taken steps to boost its domestic
production of 155mm artillery ammunition, but Ukraine has had to build these industries largely from
scratch during wartime. Ukraine has also been working to increase its production of armored vehicles,
including armored personnel carriers (APCs), since 2022, but Ukraine cannot manufacture complete tanks.
The US and other foreign allies likely can greatly increase the effectiveness of Ukrainian
force-generation and force-reconstitution efforts by providing Ukrainian forces with more mechanized
equipment, such as M113 armored personnel carriers, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and main battle
tanks. Ukraine’s 155th Infantry Brigade was recently upgraded to a mechanized infantry brigade after the
brigade was equipped with Leopard tanks, for example. The generation of more Ukrainian infantry without a
commensurate increase in mechanized equipment will not substantially increase Ukraine’s combat power or
increase Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities.
Key Takeaways: • Ukraine has taken steps to
address its manpower shortages, but delays and insufficiencies in Western military aid to Ukraine
continue to limit its ability to generate effective combat units that can defend critical areas and
contest the theater-wide initiative. • Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk
Oblast has forced Russia to redirect some resources from Ukraine to defend in Russia but that Ukraine
still needs sufficient resources and Western permission to strike military targets in Russia to mitigate
the theater-wide strain on Ukrainian forces. • Russia continues to build out its long-term military
capacity by gradually increasing the size of its armed forces. • Iran is simultaneously setting
conditions to build a nuclear weapon while continuing to signal its willingness to resume nuclear
negotiations with the West. • Select Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials continue to face
corruption charges as the Russian military leadership is undertaking a wider effort to root out
corruption in the MoD. • Ukrainian forces advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast, and Russian
forces recaptured territory in the area as of September 16. Ukrainian and Russian forces recently
advanced in the Kursk salient. • Ukrainian forces regained territory near Kharkiv City and
Pokrovsk. • Russian forces advanced near Kreminna, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar. • Russia
reportedly continues to coerce migrants to fight in the Russian military.
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Ukrainian forces conducted a successful drone strike against a Russian missile and ammunition storage
facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast on September 18. A source within Ukrainian special services told
Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on September 18 that drone operators from Ukraine's Security Service (SBU),
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO)
struck a facility at the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Main Missile and Artillery Directorate's 107th
Arsenal in Toropets, Tver Oblast. Suspilne's sources stated the facility stores Iskander missiles,
Tochka-U ballistic missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, and artillery ammunition and that there were
significant secondary detonations following the initial Ukrainian drone strike. Head of Ukraine's Center
for Combatting Disinformation, Andriy Kovalenko, stated that Russian forces may have also stored
ammunition for Grad multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), S-300 and S-400 air defense missiles, and
North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles at the facility. Footage published on September 16 shows large
secondary detonations, presumably of missile stockpiles and artillery ammunition, following the initial
drone strike. Geolocated footage published on September 18 shows several large smoke plumes over the
facility and satellite imagery shows significant damage to the building in the southern part of the
facility, although most of the facility is obscured by smoke. Russian authorities claimed that wreckage
from a downed Ukrainian drone struck the facility and prompted the secondary detonations, and Russian
authorities temporarily evacuated the area near the facility. Russian milbloggers largely criticized
Russian authorities for poorly constructing the facility and accused Russian forces of possibly
mishandling missiles and artillery ammunition stockpiles at the facility. Milbloggers accused the
detained former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Dmitri Bulgakov of engaging in corrupt
practices leading to poor construction quality at the facility.
Continued Ukrainian strikes
against rear Russian logistics facilities within Russia will generate wider operational pressures on the
Russian military beyond the individual destruction of ammunition stockpiles and logistics facilities.
Suspilne's sources noted that Ukrainian strikes are undermining Russia's ability to conduct long-range
missile strikes against Ukraine. Ukrainian forces conducted a series of HIMARS strikes against Russian
ammunition depots throughout occupied Ukraine in Summer 2022, prompting Russian forces to disperse
ammunition storage facilities and degrading the efficiency of Russian logistics at the time. Repeated
strikes against ammunition depots within Russia that cause similar levels of damage to the strike in
Toropets may force a similar decision point on the Russian military command to reorganize and disperse
support and logistics systems within Russia to mitigate the impact of such strikes. Russian forces may
not have addressed vulnerabilities at many logistics facilities within Russia due to the sanctuary space
that restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons have generated, although the Toropets
facility is not within range of Western systems fired from Ukraine. The lifting of restrictions on the
use of Western systems and the continued development of Ukraine's own long-range strike capabilities may
allow Ukrainian forces to more effectively exploit such Russian vulnerabilities. Ukrainian forces struck
another Russian ammunition depot near Sergeevka, Voronezh Oblast in July 2024 and continued Ukrainian
strikes against Russian ammunition and missile storage facilities could also destroy an important portion
of Russia's materiel reserves. Ukrainian strikes against facilities within Russia could impact offensive
operations throughout the theater in Ukraine if Ukrainian forces have the materiel, capabilities, and
permission to conduct such a strike campaign against logistics and supports facilities within Russia at
scale.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces conducted a successful drone strike
against a Russian missile and ammunition storage facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast on September 18. • Continued Ukrainian strikes against rear Russian logistics facilities within Russia will generate
wider operational pressures on the Russian military beyond the individual destruction of ammunition
stockpiles and logistics facilities. • Russian authorities arrested the head of the Central
Military District (CMD)'s armor service on September 18 on suspicion of receiving a large bribe, marking
yet another corruption case against a high-ranking Russian military official since the April 2024
appointment of Andrei Belousov as Russian Defense Minister. • An unsuccessful armed assault against
several offices of Russia's largest online retailer Wildberries in Moscow City highlights the fragility
of Russia's domestic stability. • Armenian officials continue to criticize the Russian-led
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) amid worsening Armenia-Russia bilateral relations. • Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova condemned Israel for simultaneously detonating
thousands of pagers belonging to Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) members across Lebanon and Syria on September
17, signaling Russia's continued rhetorical alignment with Iran's Axis of Resistance against Israel. • Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kursk Oblast salient. • Russian forces regained
positions within Kursk Oblast salient. • Russian forces recently advanced along the
Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, within Toretsk, east and southeast of Pokrovsk, southwest of Donetsk
City, and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast. • The Russian State Duma announced on September 18 that it
approved a bill in its first reading that proposes releasing Russian servicemembers serving in Ukraine
from criminal punishment associated with cases actively being tried in Russia courts.
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Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly declined a request from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)
to offset Russian losses by declaring another mobilization wave in spring 2024 likely to avoid political
costs associated with involuntary reserve call-ups. Putin has since remained committed to his crypto
mobilization campaign, constraining Russia's mobilization potential. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ),
citing a source “briefed” on an exchange between Putin and Russian MoD officials several months prior to
the presidential inauguration in May 2024, reported that Putin dismissed the Russian MoD’s calls for
another mobilization wave. The source claimed that Putin instead stated his intent to only recruit people
who were voluntarily signing military service contracts but that more Russian officials are convinced
that mobilization is inevitable. The source added that the Russian military's current manpower is
insufficient to achieve Russia's long-term goal of occupying all of Ukraine, degrading overall Ukrainian
combat capability, and protecting the Russian state border. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reiterated
that Russia continues to rapidly recruit contract servicemen (kontraktniki) and volunteers and that these
forces are sufficient for Russia's aggression against Ukraine in response to a request from WSJ. Putin
has avoided declaring another partial mobilization call-up of reservists since his decision to mobilize
300,000 troops in late September 2022 in response to successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations,
and Russia appears to lack the necessary manpower resources to simultaneously sustain the scale and tempo
of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine and defensive efforts in Russian border regions. A mobilized
Russian servicemember and milblogger claimed in late August 2024 that the Russian government continues to
rely on the remnants of regular military forces, mobilized personnel, and deceived short-term volunteers
to continue Russian offensive operations in Ukraine, even though these elements are ill-prepared and have
been suffering significant losses since October 2023.
Mobilization in Russia remains unlikely
in the near to medium term due to Putin’s personal fear that mobilization is a direct threat to his
regime’s stability. ISW observed reports speculating about the possibility of Russia declaring another
mobilization wave prior to Putin’s inauguration and following the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast
in August 2024, but Putin has not yet authorized such mobilization. Russian opposition outlet Meduza
reported that sources close to the Russian government claimed that the Kremlin entertained the idea of
mobilization immediately after Ukraine's incursion, but that the Russian Cabinet of Ministers and
Kremlin-affiliated businessmen opposed these considerations. Putin has also been consistently signaling
throughout the incursion his commitment to recruiting volunteers by boasting about the number of
volunteers interested in fighting in Ukraine and meeting with Russian volunteers in response to the
incursion. Putin notably did not seize on the incursion as an opportunity to condition Russian society
for mobilization in the immediate to medium term, instead choosing to form new irregular formations and
expand Russian volunteer recruitment efforts. The Kremlin and the Russian MoD notably shocked Russian
society with the declaration of partial mobilization in late September 2022, and Putin likely seeks to
avoid societal backlash in response to a new mobilization wave at this time.
Key Takeaways:
Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly declined a request from the Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) to offset Russian losses by declaring another mobilization wave in spring 2024 likely to
avoid political costs associated with involuntary reserve call-ups. Putin has since remained committed to
his crypto mobilization campaign, constraining Russia's mobilization potential.
Mobilization
in Russia remains unlikely in the near to medium term due to Putin’s personal fear that mobilization is a
direct threat to his regime’s stability.
Russian authorities have reportedly tasked Russian
forces with pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast by mid-October 2024 and establishing a "buffer
zone" into Ukrainian border areas along the international border with Russia in northeastern Ukraine by
the end of October — significant undertakings that the Russian military is very unlikely to achieve in
such a short period of time.
The Kremlin continues to signal its commitment to improving
Russian drone operations in Ukraine and drone production capabilities amid efforts to offset the social
and economic impacts of a protracted Russian war effort.
Putin claimed that Russia must ensure
that there are "no barriers" to the movement of Russian citizens between mainland Russia and Kaliningrad
Oblast.
The reported transfer of Indian artillery shells through European intermediaries to
Ukraine is reportedly generating tensions within the Russian-Indian relationship.
The European
Parliament called on member states to lift restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided
long-range systems to strike military objects in Russia.
Ukrainian forces recently marginally
advanced in Kursk Oblast.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces
recently advanced near Kharkiv City, Svatove, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.
Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated during a meeting on the development of the Russian Armed
Forces on September 18 that the Kremlin aims to improve Russia's federal level training system.
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European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced two new loan mechanisms worth up to 45
billion euros (roughly $50 billion) and 35 billion euros (roughly $39 billion) respectively during a
visit to Kyiv on September 20. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with von der Leyen in Kyiv and
stated afterward that Ukraine will use part of the 35 billion euro European loan to purchase domestically
produced long-range missiles and drones, address Ukraine's energy needs, and construct bomb shelters to
defend Ukrainian schools against Russian strikes. The European Commission will distribute the 35 billion
euro loan to Ukraine in one installment before December 31, 2024, and Ukraine can further disburse the
money in one or more tranches before December 31, 2025. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated
on September 14 that Ukraine will be able to domestically produce $20 billion worth of defense equipment
in 2025 if Ukraine receives additional funding from its partners. Umerov noted that Ukraine's defense
industrial production capabilities significantly exceed the amount of investment that Ukraine can provide
alone.
Russian authorities were reportedly aware of the threat of a future Ukrainian incursion
into Kursk Oblast in the months leading up to August 2024 but failed to take adequate steps to address
such a threat. The Guardian, citing Russian government and military documents that Ukrainian forces
seized in Kursk Oblast, reported on September 20 that Russian forces stationed in Kursk Oblast repeatedly
warned the Russian military command about the possibility of a Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast
beginning in late 2023. The documents, which The Guardian reviewed but could not independently verify,
show that local military commanders repeatedly ordered additional training exercises for Russian military
personnel serving in Kursk Oblast, the construction of additional fortifications, and the preparation of
decoy trenches and military equipment in preparation for a future Ukrainian incursion. One of the
documents noted that Russian military units stationed along the international border were only staffed at
between 60 and 70 percent of their intended end strength on average and were primarily staffed by poorly
trained reservists as of June 2024. Russian authorities do not appear to have made any substantive
efforts to improve the preparedness of the Russian military units serving in border areas of Kursk Oblast
or construct additional fortifications along the international border prior to the incursion, and Russian
authorities may have decided to ignore these requests due to a miscalculation of Ukraine's ability to
advance deep into Kursk Oblast.
These documents support ISW's recent assessment that Ukrainian
forces achieved operational surprise during the incursion into Kursk Oblast despite Russian authorities'
reported awareness of the possibility of an incursion. The American doctrinal definition of surprise is
to "attack the enemy in a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared." Although Russian
forces were likely aware of various points along the international border at which Ukraine could conduct
an incursion, Ukrainian forces were able to leverage ambiguity around their operational intent and
capabilities to maintain operational surprise. Ukrainian forces also reportedly experimented with
innovative techniques integrating ground activity and unmanned systems that ISW will not cover in-depth
to maintain Ukrainian operational security. ISW has previously noted that both Russian and Ukrainian
forces have struggled to achieve operational surprise over the past year and a half due to the partially
transparent battlefield in Ukraine. Ukraine's campaign in Kursk Oblast demonstrates that surprise is
still possible even on a partially transparent battlefield where an adversary can observe force
concentrations but not reliably discern an enemy's operational intent and capabilities.
Key
Takeaways:
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced two new loan
mechanisms worth up to 45 billion euros (roughly $50 billion) and 35 billion euros (roughly $39 billion)
respectively during a visit to Kyiv on September 20.
Russian authorities were reportedly aware
of the threat of a future Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in the months leading up to August 2024
but failed to take adequate steps to address such a threat.
These documents support ISW's
recent assessment that Ukrainian forces achieved operational surprise during the incursion into Kursk
Oblast despite Russian authorities' reported awareness of the possibility of an incursion.
Russian officials attempted to use a meeting with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
to legitimize Russia's occupation of Ukraine and promote false narratives about alleged Ukrainian human
rights abuses.
Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Kreminna, Toretsk, and
Pokrovsk, and Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in Vovchansk and Siversk.
Russian state media is increasingly emphasizing the participation of foreign nationals in the Russian
war effort in Ukraine, likely to reassure domestic audiences that Russia continues to recruit sufficient
manpower and will not need to declare another mobilization wave.
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Ukrainian forces conducted another successful drone strike against Russian missile and ammunition storage
facilities as well as a mobile radar system in Russia overnight on September 20 to 21. The Ukrainian
General Staff reported on September 21 that drone operators of the Ukrainian military, Ukrainian Security
Service (SBU), Special Operations Forces (SSO), and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Tikhoretsk Arsenal
just north of Kamenny, Krasnodar Krai and the Russian Main Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of
Defense's (MoD) 23rd Arsenal near Oktyabrsky, Tver Oblast (14km south of Toropets). Footage published on
September 20 and 21 shows explosions and secondary detonations at both arsenals, and fires continued at
both locations during the day on September 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Tikhoretsk
Arsenal contained at least 2,000 tons of munitions, including munitions from North Korea, at the time of
the strike. An SBU source told Ukrainian outlet Hromadske that the Russian 23rd Arsenal contained
Iskander and Tochka-U ballistic missiles and that Ukrainian forces also struck the Shaykovka Airfield in
Kaluga Oblast, and Hromadske included footage of an explosion though it is unclear whether the footage
shows the Shaykovka Airfield. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces intercepted 101 Ukrainian
drones overnight, including 18 drones over Krasnodar Krai and three drones over Tver Oblast. Krasnodar
Krai regional authorities blamed the Tikhoretsk Arsenal explosion on falling Ukrainian drone debris,
declared a local state of emergency, altered railway schedules and routes, and evacuated about 1,200
civilians from the area. The United Kingdom (UK) MoD reported that the Russian Main Artillery
Directorate's 103rd Arsenal near Toropets, which Ukrainian forces struck on September 17 to 18, had
recently undergone modernization because Russian forces had been improperly storing munitions at their
arsenals, causing explosions at several depots.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that
Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian Podlet K1 mobile long-range radar system that was protecting the
Tikhoretsk Arsenal, and this system is at least the fifth Podlet K1 system that Ukrainian forces have
reportedly damaged or destroyed since February 2022. The Podlet K1 system can detect up to 200 aerial
targets simultaneously at a range of up to 300 kilometers and the Russian military introduced the system
into service in 2015. Russian forces use the Podlet K1 system to detect air targets at low and very low
altitudes for Russian air defenses, including S-300 and S-400 systems. Ukrainian forces have reportedly
damaged or destroyed at least four other Russian Podlet K1 systems since the onset of the full-scale
invasion, including in Lazurne, Kherson Oblast as of July 20, 2022; near Zelenotropynske, Kherson Oblast
as of July 24, 2022; in Belgorod Oblast as of November 1, 2023; and in an unspecified location as of
April 27, 2024. Ukrainian forces also found a destroyed Russian Podlet K1 system in Chornobaivka, Kherson
Oblast on November 14, 2022, following Ukraine's liberation of west (right) bank Kherson Oblast as of
November 11, 2022, though the cause of this Podlet K1's destruction was unclear.
Key
Takeaways:
Ukrainian forces conducted another successful drone strike against Russian missile
and ammunition storage facilities as well as a mobile radar system in Russia overnight on September 20 to
21.
The Kremlin appears to be reorganizing Russia's decentralized, regional volunteer
recruitment campaigns into a federal effort, indicating that Russia is struggling to meet the manpower
demands of its war in Ukraine despite previous claims that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast
caused a spike in Russia's volunteer recruitment.
The Russian military leadership and
government are continuing to reduce the class of semi-independent Russian military innovators,
specialists, and irregular commanders to advance force centralization objectives, maintain the offensive
tempo in Donetsk Oblast, and compensate for personnel shortages.
Iran reportedly did not send
mobile launchers for the Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles it recently supplied to Russia, likely
due a decision to prioritize sending additional missiles over bulky and easily replaceable launchers.
Russian officials have designated 47 countries as having opposing and dangerous moral attitudes
to Russia, highlighting that the Kremlin is reviving a Soviet era tactic and mindset that defines a clear
ideological division in the world.
Russian milblogger analyses of Russia’s war in Ukraine
continue to suggest that the Kremlin perceives Western commitment to Ukraine as feeble.
Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.
Russian forces advanced north of Kharkiv
City and near Kupyansk, Kreminna, Tortesk, and southwest of Donetsk City.
The Kremlin has not
fully suppressed localized protests organized by wives of Russian mobilized servicemen since declaring
partial mobilization on September 21, 2022.
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Ukraine's September 18 strike against a Russian missile and ammunition storage facility near Toropets,
Tver Oblast reportedly destroyed enough Russian munitions to affect Russian operations in the coming
months. Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center Head Colonel Ants Kiviselg stated on September 20
that the strike caused 30,000 tons of munitions to explode, noting that the size of the explosion equates
to 750,000 artillery shells and that Russian forces on average fire 10,000 shells per week. His
calculations suggest the Ukrainian strike destroyed two to three months of Russia’s ammunition supply.
Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on September 18 that a source within Ukrainian special services stated
that the Toropets facility stored Iskander missiles, Tochka-U ballistic missiles, glide bombs, and
artillery ammunition. It is unclear if Kiviselg's statement about 30,000 tons of explosives includes both
missiles and artillery ammunition, but the strike destroyed significant Russian materiel stockpiles in
any case. ISW continues to assess that continued Ukrainian strikes against rear Russian logistics
facilities within Russia will generate wider operational pressures on the Russian military, including
forcing the Russian military command to reorganize and disperse support and logistics systems within
Russia to mitigate the impact of such strikes.
The Kremlin is reportedly reconsidering the
effectiveness of nuclear saber-rattling as part of its efforts to influence the ongoing Western policy
debate about supporting Ukraine and specifically permitting Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons
against military objects in Russia. The Washington Post, citing officials close to senior Russian
diplomats, stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be realizing that Russian nuclear threats are
starting to lose their power over Western officials and that Putin may be developing an unspecified more
nuanced and limited informational response to future Western approval of long-range strikes into Russia.
An unnamed Russian official claimed that Russian officials have realized that nuclear threats "don't
frighten anyone," and a Russian academic with close ties to senior Russian diplomats claimed that
Russia's partners in the "Global South" are dissatisfied with Russia's nuclear threats. ISW cannot
independently verify the veracity of the Washington Post's sources, but these reports are consistent with
ISW's various assessments about how the Kremlin uses nuclear saber-rattling to promote Western
self-deterrence and that such statements are not an indication of Russia's willingness to use nuclear
weapons. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin's thinly veiled threats of nuclear confrontation are
aimed at disrupting and delaying key decision points in Western political discussions about further
military assistance to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear
weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere.
Key Takeaways:
Ukraine's September 18 strike
against a Russian missile and ammunition storage facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast reportedly destroyed
enough Russian munitions to affect Russian operations in the coming months.
The Kremlin is
reportedly reconsidering the effectiveness of nuclear saber-rattling as part of its efforts to influence
the ongoing Western policy debate about supporting Ukraine and specifically permitting Ukraine to use
Western-provided weapons against military objects in Russia.
Satellite imagery of damage at
the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk Oblast captured on September 21 suggests that the Russian military
recently conducted an unsuccessful RS-28 "Sarmat" nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) test.
Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on September 21 that Ukraine will
increase its production of drones by "several times" in 2025 in order to maintain Ukraine's quantitative
superiority over Russian drone production.
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
Spokesperson Maria Zakharova announced on September 22 that Russia will not participate in Ukraine's
second peace summit later in 2024 or in any "such summits."
Russia is reportedly expanding
intelligence operations in Mexico to undermine the United States and support for Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Svatove. Russian forces recently marginally advanced near
Toretsk and Pokrovsk, southwest of Donetsk City, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
A Ukrainian officer in a drone crew stated on September 22 that the Russian military command is
forcing soldiers to dig trenches at Russian positions in unspecified areas of Ukraine without weapons and
sometimes without armor, helmets, or military uniforms.
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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in the United States on September 23 and reiterated
Ukraine's need for timely and uninterrupted US military assistance. Zelensky visited the Scranton Army
Ammunition Plant in Pennsylvania and discussed the need for timely delivery of Western aid to Ukraine,
the importance of starting joint American-Ukrainian weapons production in Ukraine as well as the
possibility of US investments in the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB). The Scranton plant
significantly increased its production of 155mm artillery shells in 2024, and Zelensky noted that the
plant employs 400 people. Ukrainian Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov met
with Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro and signed a cooperation agreement between Zaporizhzhia Oblast
and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that calls for interaction between state bodies, scientific
institutions, civil society organizations, and businesses in the fields of energy, agriculture, digital
technologies, and defense. The agreement also calls for Pennsylvania to support the reconstruction of
Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Ukraine has signed five similar agreements with US states previously: between Kyiv
Oblast and Washington and Utah, between Zhytomyr Oblast and Indiana, and between Chernihiv Oblast and
Minnesota.
The Kremlin continues to publicly signal its disinterest in any peace settlement
short of total capitulation of the Ukrainian government and destruction of the Ukrainian state. Zelensky
stated in an interview with the New Yorker about Ukraine’s “Victory Plan” published on September 22 that
Russia is not interested in ending the war on any reasonable terms and is feigning interest in
negotiations. Zelensky highlighted that Ukraine invited Russia to attend Ukraine's second peace summit
but that the Kremlin had not demonstrated any interest in participating. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry
Peskov notably stated on September 22 that there is "no alternative" to Russian victory in Ukraine,
reiterating Russia's unwillingness to negotiate on terms other than Ukrainian capitulation. Peskov also
identified NATO and the West as a “collective enemy.” Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
Spokesperson Maria Zakharova recently announced that Russia will not participate in the second Ukrainian
peace summit or any "such summits." ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is not interested in good
faith peace negotiations with Ukraine and that the Kremlin will only invoke the concept of “peace plans”
and “negotiations” to prompt the West to pressure Ukraine into preemptive concessions on Ukraine's
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Key Takeaways:
Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky arrived in the United States on September 23 and reiterated Ukraine's need for timely and
uninterrupted US military assistance.
The Kremlin continues to publicly signal its disinterest
in any peace settlement short of total capitulation of the Ukrainian government and destruction of the
Ukrainian state.
Russian forces conducted glide bomb strikes against Zaporizhzhia City for the
first time overnight on September 22 to 23.
A high-ranking Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS)
commander reportedly recently committed suicide due to conflicts within his unit's leadership.
Russian forces recently advanced near Hlyboke, Kupyansk, and Pokrovsk. Ukrainian forces recently
advanced in Kursk Oblast.
The Russian government informally supported a bill on September 23
that would allow Russian authorities to fine individuals who promote “child-free propaganda,” likely as
part of an ongoing Kremlin effort to address Russia’s demographic problem.
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Russian forces have reached the outskirts of Vuhledar amid what appears to be an intensified offensive
push near the settlement, but the capture of Vuhledar is unlikely to afford Russian forces any particular
operational edge for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published
on September 24 shows that Russian forces advanced into eastern Vuhledar up to 12 Desantnykiv Street,
confirming reports from Russian and Ukrainian sources that Russian troops broke into eastern Vuhledar
between September 23 and 24. Russian forces are additionally trying to advance on Vuhledar's northeast
flank via Vodyane and southwestern flank via Prechystivka, likely in an effort to encircle the Ukrainian
grouping in Vuhledar and force it to withdraw. ISW geolocated footage published on September 24 that
additionally indicates that Russian forces, likely assault elements of the 29th Combined Arms Army (CAA)
(Eastern Military District ), seized the Pivdennodonbaska Mine No. 3 in western Vodyane, which
creates a sharper salient about five kilometers north of Vuhledar in the area west of Vodyane. Several
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have fire control (the ability to prosecute close-range
artillery fires on an area to inhibit movement) over the C-051134 Vuhledar-Bohoyavlenka road, which is
reportedly Ukraine's final supply route into Vuhledar. Western media and Ukrainian military experts and
journalists widely warned on September 23 and 24 that constant Russian assaults and advances on the
flanks of Vuhledar are threatening to encircle the Ukrainian garrison within the settlement, which may
force Ukrainian troops to withdraw from the area, which has been an important Ukrainian stronghold for
over two years.
Russian forces may manage to seize all of Vuhledar, but how quickly or easily
they are able to do so will likely be contingent partially on Ukrainian decision-making. If the Ukrainian
command decides that the risk of a Russian encirclement of Vuhledar or the costs of defending the
settlement itself in urban combat are too great, Ukrainian forces may withdraw, allowing Russian forces
to seize Vuhledar relatively rapidly and without engaging in close combat fighting. If Ukrainian forces
decide to defend Vuhledar and can prevent Russian efforts to envelop or encircle it, however. Russian
forces may struggle to fight through a settlement that Ukrainian forces have had over two years to
fortify. If the Russians do not take the settlement relatively rapidly, Russian maneuver along the flanks
of Vuhledar may also be impacted by the onset of autumn rains, which would make it much more difficult
for Russian forces to advance through the mainly rural and agricultural terrain surrounding Vuhledar as
it becomes much muddier. Russian milbloggers have identified Vuhledar's fortifications and the terrain
along its flanks as major obstacles to Russia's ability to advance in the area, both during previous
offensive efforts and during the current set of attacks. Russia attempted at least two major offensive
efforts to seize Vuhledar in late 2022 and early 2023, both of which led to considerable Russian
personnel and equipment losses while affording Ukrainian forces the ability to further commit to
fortifying the settlement and observe how the Russian grouping in this area plans and prosecutes
offensive operations. Elements of the EMD, particularly the Pacific Fleet's 40th Naval Infantry Brigade,
have notably been committed to this area and engaged in offensive efforts on Vuhledar since 2022, and the
Ukrainian brigade and other Ukrainian formations that have been defending Vuhledar during the same time
period have likely learned certain valuable lessons about how these Russian formations fight.
Russia's potential seizure of Vuhledar is unlikely to fundamentally alter the course of offensive
operations in western Donetsk Oblast, however. Vuhledar is not a particularly crucial logistics
node—Russian forces already control most of the main roads running into Vuhledar (the T0509
Vuhledar-Prechystivka road, the C050524 Pavlivka-Vuhledar road, and the T0524 Vuhledar-Marinka road) and
are likely already credibly threatening the C051134 route into Bohoyavlenka with close range artillery
fires, so the capture of the settlement would not immediately offer Russian forces access to a new
roadway, nor cut Ukrainian forces off from a roadway that is crucial to their logistical supply. The
potential seizure of Vuhledar will also not necessarily afford Russian forces a beneficial position from
which to launch subsequent offensive operations elsewhere in western Donetsk Oblast. Vuhledar is 23
kilometers south of the H-15 highway, which runs from Donetsk City to the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast
border area, but the area between Vuhledar and the highway is mainly comprised of open fields that would
require Russian forces to conduct successful mechanized assaults across areas that may soon become too
muddy to make more rapid tactical gains. Vuhledar is also about 30 kilometers south of the areas
southeast of Pokrovsk that Russian forces are currently prioritizing, and Russian forces would have to
maneuver across more than 30 kilometers of open terrain to meaningfully support offensive efforts
southeast of Pokrovsk. ISW previously assessed that Russian offensive efforts near Vuhledar and Pokrovsk
are mutually reinforcing and intended to stretch Ukrainian forces along a wider front in Donetsk Oblast,
but the hypothetical Russian seizure of Vuhledar would not necessarily be operationally significant
enough to stretch Ukrainian forces even further in this area.
Recent Ukrainian strikes against
Russian rear ammunition depots demonstrate the extent to which Russian military logistics still benefit
from Western-provided sanctuary that secures Russia’s rear. Maxar collected satellite imagery
demonstrating dramatic damage to three large Russian ammunition depots in western and southwestern Russia
following Ukrainian strikes in September 2024. The imagery of the damage at the Oktyabrskii and Toropets
depots in Tver Oblast and the Tikhoretsk depot in Krasnodar Krai depicts the destruction of dozens of
ammunition storage buildings, rail cars that Russian forces likely used to transport ammunition to the
depots, and masses of probable rocket canisters and other material that Russian forces had haphazardly
left in the open. Such a crowded disposition of massed materiel underscores the lack of operational
security in Russia’s rear supply depots, demonstrating the extent to which Western restrictions
prohibiting Ukraine from firing Western-provided weapons into Russia has granted the Russian command
flexibility to not properly protect its rear areas. This flexibility has granted Russia the ability to
optimize large rear staging facilities to marshal massed materiel to Ukraine at scale.
Key
Takeaways:
Russian forces have reached the outskirts of Vuhledar amid what appears to be an
intensified offensive push near the settlement, but the capture of Vuhledar is unlikely to afford Russian
forces any particular operational edge for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast.
Recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian rear ammunition depots demonstrate the extent to which
Russian military logistics still benefit from Western-provided sanctuary that secures Russia’s rear.
Russia continues to expand and leverage its bilateral relations with the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) in order to support its war effort in Ukraine.
The Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD) has failed to appease the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community by downplaying the Russian
military command’s responsibility for its insistence on misusing technical specialists in infantry-led
frontal assaults in eastern Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of the Kursk
Oblast salient.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk and in eastern Toretsk.
Russian opposition outlet Meduza, citing its own conversations with various unspecified Russian
officials close to the Russian Presidential Administration, an interlocutor in the federal government,
and regional officials, reported on September 24 that mobilization is a very sensitive topic among
Kremlin officials.
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Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to threaten the possibility of a nuclear confrontation between
Russia and the West in order to exert further control over Western decision-making and discourage the
West from allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike military objects in Russia. Putin
claimed during the first public meeting of the Russian Security Council's standing conference on nuclear
deterrence on September 25 that Russia is adjusting its nuclear doctrine to introduce "clarifications"
regarding necessary preconditions for Russia to use a nuclear weapon. Putin shared two "clarifications"
to the nuclear doctrine: that the Kremlin will consider using nuclear weapons in the case of "aggression
against Russia by a non-nuclear state with support or participation from a nuclear state" or in the case
of "the receipt of reliable information about the massive launch of air and space weapons" against Russia
and these weapons crossing Russia's borders. Putin specified that these "air and space weapons" that
could justify Russian nuclear weapons use include strategic and tactical aviation, cruise missiles,
drones, and/or hypersonic missiles. Putin likely intends for the hyper-specificity of his nuclear threats
to breathe new life into the Kremlin's tired nuclear saber-rattling information operation and generate a
new wave of panic among Western policymakers during a particularly critical moment in Western policy
discussions about Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided weapons. Kremlin officials routinely invoke
thinly veiled threats of nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West during key moments in Western
political debates regarding further military assistance to Ukraine — such as the ongoing debate about
Ukraine's right to use Western-provided systems to conduct long-range strikes against Russian military
objects — to induce fear among decision makers. US Central Intelligence Agency Director (CIA) William
Burns cautioned Western policymakers on September 7 against fearing boilerplate Russian nuclear
saber-rattling, and ISW has long identified Russia's nuclear saber-rattling as part of the Kremlin's
effort to promote Western self-deterrence and not as indicative of Russia's willingness to use nuclear
weapons. ISW continues to assess that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or
elsewhere.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing for
potential strikes against Ukraine’s three remaining operational nuclear power plants ahead of the coming
winter, highlighting the Kremlin's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations and continued
commitment to the destruction of the Ukrainian state and its people. Zelensky gave speeches to the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA) on September 25 stating that Ukrainian
intelligence found that Russia aims to target Ukraine's three operational nuclear power plants in order
to degrade Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and power generation capacity before winter 2024–2025 and
cause “nuclear disaster.” Zelensky recently noted that Russia is using unspecified Chinese satellites to
photograph Ukraine’s nuclear power plants in preparation for strikes and emphasized in his UNGA speech
that Russia's previous winter strike campaigns against Ukrainian energy infrastructure have already
destroyed Ukraine's thermal power generation capacity and severely degraded its hydroelectric power
generation capacity. Russian authorities and sources have repeatedly falsely accused Ukrainian forces of
targeting Russian and Russian-occupied nuclear power plants likely as part of Russia’s overarching
informational effort to falsely paint Ukraine and the Zelensky government as illegitimate actors and war
criminals with whom Russia cannot engage in peace negotiations. Zelensky’s UN speeches also emphasized
the principles of international law and the UN Charter as the main avenue through which Ukraine can
achieve peace and highlighted the illegality of Russia’s war under international law alongside Russia’s
ongoing destabilizing global efforts to enhance its war in Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to threaten the possibility of a nuclear confrontation
between Russia and the West in order to exert further control over Western decision-making and discourage
the West from allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike military objects in Russia.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing for potential strikes
against Ukraine’s three remaining operational nuclear power plants ahead of the coming winter,
highlighting the Kremlin's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations and continued commitment to
the destruction of the Ukrainian state and its people.
A Russian company is reportedly
collaborating with entities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to develop an attack drone for
Russia's war in Ukraine.
Russia continues to deepen its relationship with Iran's Axis of
Resistance, this time reportedly via Iran-brokered talks facilitating Russian missile transfers to
Yemen's Houthi rebels.
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances in Kursk
Oblast.
Ukrainian forces continued to regain positions in Vovchansk.
Russian forces
advanced northwest of Kreminna, in Toretsk, and southeast of Pokrovsk.
Russian forces
reportedly advanced within and around Vuhledar (southwest of Donetsk City) amid continued offensive
efforts to seize the settlement.
Veterans of Russia's war in Ukraine continue to commit crimes
upon returning to Russia.
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Germany, France, and the US announced several immediate and more long-term aid packages for Ukraine on
September 25 and 26. The German Ministry of Development announced on September 25 that it will provide
support to Ukraine this winter for heat and energy in a package totaling around 70 million euros ($78.2
million). Germany will provide Ukrainian cities and municipalities with combined heat and power plants,
boiler systems, generators, and solar-power systems to support communities that have been most affected
by heat and electricity shortages resulting from heavy Russian strikes. The German Bundestag also
announced on September 25 a 400 million euro ($447 million) increase in military funding for Ukraine to
enable the purchase of additional air defense systems, tanks, drones, ammunition, and spare parts. French
President Emmanuel Macron said during a meeting with Zelensky on September 25 that France will train and
fully equip a Ukrainian brigade in the "near future."
The US Department of Defense (DoD)
announced on September 25 that the Pentagon will send an additional military assistance package to
Ukraine worth roughly $375 million and that the package will include: air-to-ground munitions; HIMARS
ammunition; 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition; Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW)
missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; M1117 armored security vehicles; Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) vehicles; light tactical vehicles; armored bridging systems; small arms, patrol boats;
demolitions equipment and munitions; and other miscellaneous equipment and support materiel. US President
Joe Biden announced on September 26 that he directed the DoD to allocate all of the remaining security
assistance funding to Ukraine (roughly $8 billion) by the end of Biden's presidential term, including
funding from the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, and that he authorized $5.5 billion in
Presidential Drawdown Authority to fund the drawdown of US equipment for Ukraine and replenish US
stockpiles. Biden stated that the DoD will also announce an additional assistance package worth $2.4
billion to provide Ukraine with additional air defense systems, unmanned aerial systems, and
air-to-ground munitions; strengthen Ukraine's defense industry; and support Ukraine's maintenance and
sustainment requirements. Biden also announced that the US will provide Ukraine with Joint Standoff
Weapon (JOW) long-range munitions, a refurbished Patriot air defense battery, and additional Patriot
missiles and will expand F-16 training capabilities to accommodate training 18 additional Ukrainian
pilots in 2025. Biden noted that he will also convene a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in
October 2024 to coordinate further Western support for Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
Germany, France, and the United States announced several immediate and more long-term aid packages for
Ukraine on September 25 and 26.
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is reportedly
struggling to coordinate combat tasks with the Russian military despite having control over the
counterterrorism operation against the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast.
Russian and
Ukrainian forces continued assaults in Kursk Oblast but neither side made further advances in the
area.
Russian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City and Chasiv Yar and east and
southeast of Pokrovsk.
Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian military command for holding
joint military exercises with Laos, arguing that such exercises demonstrate that Russia is not learning
from its battlefield experience in Ukraine.
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Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced battalion-size Russian mechanized assault in the Kupyansk
direction on September 26 — the first large Russian mechanized assault along the
Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line since Winter 2024. A Ukrainian battalion operating near Pishchane
(northwest of Svatove and southeast of Kupyansk) posted geolocated footage on September 26 showing
Ukrainian forces repelling the reinforced battalion-size Russian mechanized assault in fields around
Pishchane and reported that Russian forces attacked in the direction of Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka
(west of Pishchane and directly on the Oskil River). The Ukrainian battalion reported that Russian forces
used 50 armored vehicles in the assault, and the Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces Command reported that
Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions in two columns, one with 37 armored vehicles and the other
with 13. The Ukrainian battalion reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed three tanks and 11 armored
vehicles and damaged 10 tanks and 16 armored vehicles. The Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces Command
posted footage showing damaged and destroyed Russian armored vehicles crowded close to one another,
suggesting that Russian armored vehicles attacked in tight columns and became jammed once Ukrainian fire
elements started to strike the column— a common occurrence in failed Russian mechanized assaults.
Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian forces back to their starting
positions near Pishchane, and none of the geolocated footage that ISW has observed of the assault
indicates that Russian forces advanced during the assault.
The Russian Western Grouping of
Forces conducted several large mechanized assaults between January and February 2024 at the start of the
Russian offensive operation along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, with the last observed
battalion-size Russian mechanized assault occurring west of Kreminna in late January. Russian forces have
since conducted infantry assaults and occasional roughly platoon-size mechanized assaults along the
Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and the tempo of the Russian offensive operation along this sector of the
front has generally been much lower than Russian offensive operations elsewhere in Ukraine.
Russian forces may be intensifying their efforts to reach the Oskil River, although Russian advances on
the east (left) bank of the Oskil River will likely continue to be relatively gradual. Russian forces
have created a small tactical salient around Pishchane in recent weeks and have focused on advancing
toward Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka. Russian forces advanced along a ravine running east of Pishchane
and in fields south and north of the settlement but have struggled to advance in the fields immediately
east of Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka. The command of the Western Grouping of Forces may have intended
for the large mechanized assault to allow Russian forces to advance rapidly through these fields and
consolidate positions within Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka and enable Russian infantry to establish a
more enduring foothold within the two settlements on the Oskil River.
Russian forces are
likely focusing on establishing a foothold directly on the Oskil River because it would allow Russian
forces to envelop Ukrainian positions on the east bank of the river both to the north and south -
creating a narrower Ukrainian salient between Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and Hlushkivka and a wider Ukrainian
salient south of Kruhlyakivka since the Oskil River acts as a barrier. The Western Grouping of Forces has
conducted the offensive operation along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in four mutually supporting
axes of advance (northeast of Kupyansk, northwest of Svatove, southwest of Svatove, and west of Kreminna)
specifically so that Russian territorial gains on any route of advance would generate opportunities to
create Ukrainian salients on the east bank of the Oskil River and envelop Ukrainian positions both to the
north and south of any advance. The desired Russian seizure of Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka does not
ensure that Russian forces would be able to more quickly reduce the potential Ukrainian salient between
Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and Hlushkivka nor increase the pace of advance south of Kruhlyakivka, however. Russian
forces have not demonstrated the ability to quicken the pace of their advance along the
Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in recent months, and Russian forces have also failed to make even
marginal gains on other axes of advance, notably spending weeks to enter small settlements like Nevske
and Makiivka (both northwest of Kreminna). Russian sources claimed as of September 27 that Ukrainian
forces are actively counterattacking near Nevske, and Ukrainian forces have previously conducted
tactically successful counterattacks in the Kreminna area — suggesting that Ukrainian forces have more
flexibility to contest the tactical initiative in the area than elsewhere in eastern Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced battalion-size Russian mechanized
assault in the Kupyansk direction on September 26 — the first large Russian mechanized assault along the
Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line since Winter 2024.
Russian forces may be intensifying their
efforts to reach the Oskil River, although Russian advances on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River
will likely continue to be relatively gradual.
The Russian military command has demonstrated
that it will likely accept continued gradual gains along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, however.
The Western Grouping of Forces likely has limited capacity to maintain an intensified offensive
effort along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line or conduct effective combat operations that result in
more rapid gains.
Russian authorities appear to be expending a significant amount of effort to
influence the Western debate about allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to conduct long-range
strikes against military objects in Russia. This Russian effort suggests a deep concern with the
operational pressures that such strikes into Russia would generate on Russian offensive operations in
Ukraine, although US officials remain hesitant to permit Ukraine to conduct such strikes.
The
benefits of allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided long-range strike systems against Russia may
outweigh the risk of Russian retaliation more than Western policymakers are currently considering.
Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers on September 27,
likely as part of the ongoing Kremlin effort to coopt Russian milbloggers and downplay recent backlash in
the ultranationalist information space over the death of two prominent drone operators.
The
People's Republic of China (PRC) announced a new initiative to draw international support for its
alternative peace plan for Ukraine amid increasing cooperation with Russia.
Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky continued to meet with US officials about the war in Ukraine during his
visit to the US on September 26 and 27.
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued assaults in
Kursk Oblast, but neither side made further advances.
Russian forces recently advanced within
and around Toretsk and southeast of Pokrovsk.
Russian authorities continue to threaten Russian
frontline soldiers' ad-hoc communications networks.
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Western officials continue to highlight efforts by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to support the
Russian war effort in Ukraine. The Times reported on September 27 that Western officials revealed that an
unspecified PRC company is sending a range of military drones to Russia for testing and eventual use by
Russian forces in Ukraine. A Western official reportedly stated that the PRC company signed the agreement
with Russia in 2023 and that there is "clear evidence that PRC companies are supplying Russia with deadly
weapons for use in Ukraine." The Times reported that the Western official confirmed a September 25 report
from Reuters about Russia's secret weapons program in the PRC to develop long-range attack drones for use
in Ukraine. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated on September 27 that roughly 70 percent of
Russian imports of machine tools and 90 percent of microelectronic imports come from the PRC and Hong
Kong and that Russia is using these imports to produce missiles, rockets, armored vehicles, and
munitions. Blinken stated that the PRC's actions do not "add up" since the PRC speaks about wanting peace
in Ukraine but is allowing PRC companies to take actions that are helping the Russian war effort. The PRC
has repeatedly attempted to depict itself as a neutral mediator in the war in Ukraine, and continued
reports of PRC aid to Russia's war effort undermine this claim.
The Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) strongly condemned on September 28 Israel’s “political assassination” of Hezbollah
Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. The Russian MFA responded to the Israeli airstrike on Beirut,
Lebanon that killed Nasrallah and advocated for an immediate cessation to hostilities, stating that
Israel will bear full responsibility for any subsequent escalation in the Middle East. Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov also issued a joint condemnation of Israel’s airstrikes in Syria on September 28
during a meeting with the Turkish and Iranian foreign ministers.
Key Takeaways:
Western officials continue to highlight efforts by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to support the
Russian war effort in Ukraine.
Ukrainian media reported on September 28 that unspecified
Russian resistance movements, in coordination with the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate
(GUR), killed the Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) 924th State Center for Unmanned
Aviation Colonel Aleksei Kolomeystev in Koloma, Moscow Oblast.
The Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) strongly condemned on September 28 Israel’s “political assassination” of Hezbollah
Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.
Russian forces recently marginally advanced in
Kursk Oblast.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Selydove, and Vuhledar.
Russia is reportedly implementing legislation that allows Russian authorities to release those accused
of crimes from criminal liabilities if the accused signs a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD).
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Western countries continue to invest in the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB). The Danish
Ministry of Defense (MoD), in collaboration with the Danish DIB, announced on September 29 the
establishment of a defense industrial hub at the Danish embassy in Kyiv with the aim of enhancing
Danish-Ukrainian defense industrial cooperation. The Danish initiative aims to support Danish defense and
dual-use companies that want to establish production or partnerships with Ukraine. Ukrainian Defense
Minister Rustem Umerov and Danish Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Troels Lund Poulsen also
signed a Letter of Intent on September 29 that pledges Danish financial support for defense production in
Ukraine. Denmark will allocate a total of 575 million euros ($641 million) for investment in the
Ukrainian DIB, with 175 million euros ($195 million) coming directly from the Danish budget and an
additional 400 million euros ($446 million) from profits from frozen Russian assets. Ukrainian Defense
Minister Rustem Umerov stated on September 14 that Ukraine will be able to domestically produce $20
billion worth of defense equipment in 2025 if Ukraine receives additional funding from its partners. ISW
has assessed the importance of sustained and timely Western military support for Ukraine, particularly
Western assistance to develop Ukraine’s DIB, so that Ukraine can become more self-sufficient and reduce
its reliance on Western military aid in the long-term.
Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a
Russian ammunition depot and missile storage facility near Kotluban, Volgograd Oblast on September 29.
The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian media reported on September 29 that drone operators of the
Unmanned Systems Forces, Special Operations Forces (SSO), Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence
Directorate (GUR), and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) struck the facility and suggested that a shipment
of an unspecified number of Iranian missiles recently arrived at the facility. The Ukrainian General
Staff noted that the strike caused a fire and secondary ammunition denotations at the facility. Satellite
imagery captured on September 29 shows that the strikes likely caused a fire just northwest of the
facility, and data available from NASA FIRMS shows heat anomalies in this area. Kotluban Head Igor
Davydenko stated that Ukrainian drones attempted to strike the area but did not cause any damage to the
facility, although a local Volgograd Oblast outlet reported that firefighters extinguished a fire caused
by falling drone debris near an unspecified military facility. Russian opposition outlet Astra noted that
internet sources are falsely attributing footage from a 2021 explosion in Dubai, United Arab Emirates to
the Kutluban strike. Astra also reported that its sources in Rostov Oblast's emergency services stated
that Russian forces shot down over 20 Ukrainian drones targeting the Millerovo Air Base on the night of
September 28 to 29 and noted that data available from NASA FIRMS shows heat anomalies near the air base.
Footage published on September 29 purportedly shows a fire near the Millerovo Air Base. A Russian insider
source published footage purportedly showing a fire near the Yeysk Air Base in Krasnodar Krai, but ISW
cannot confirm the authenticity of this footage. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that
Russian forces shot down 125 Ukrainian drones on the night of September 28 to 29, including 67 drones
over Volgograd Oblast, 17 drones over Voronezh Oblast, and 18 drones over Rostov Oblast.
Key
Takeaways:
Western countries continue to invest in the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial
base (DIB).
Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian ammunition depot and missile storage
facility near Kotluban, Volgograd Oblast on September 29.
The Russian government is reportedly
planning to further increase defense spending in 2025, although Kremlin officials appear to be
highlighting planned social spending while avoiding discussions of increased defense spending.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, west of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk
Oblast.
Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk and Pokrovsk directions.
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The Russian government plans to spend 17 trillion rubles ($183 billion) on national security and defense
in 2025 — about 41 percent of its annual expenditures. The Russian government submitted a bill on the
federal budget for 2025 to 2027 to the State Duma on September 30. The bill projects federal revenues to
be 40.3 trillion rubles ($433 billion) in 2025 and federal expenditures to amount to 41.5 trillion rubles
($446 billion). The budget calls for 13.5 trillion rubles ($145 billion) to go towards "National Defense"
expenditures in 2025 and projects that defense spending will decrease to 12.8 trillion rubles ($137
billion) in 2026 but increase to 13 trillion rubles ($139 billion) in 2027. The 2025 budget also calls
for 3.5 trillion rubles ($37 billion) towards "National Security" — meaning that Russia plans to commit
about 41 percent of its expenditures in 2025 to combined "defense" and "security" expenses. The budget
notably allocates 14.03 billion rubles ($151 million) annually from 2025 to 2027 to the creation of a
mobilization reserve in the Russian Armed Forces. The bill calls for about 40 billion rubles ($430
million) in 2025 to fund the "Defenders of the Fatherland Fund," which supports Russian veterans and
their families. The Russian government is also earmarking significant funding towards developing new
technologies. The 2025–2027 budget allocates 6.1 trillion rubles ($65 billion) for measures to "achieve
technological leadership," 234.4 billion rubles ($2.5 billion) for machine-tool production, 112.1 billion
rubles ($1.2 billion) for the "Unmanned Aircraft Systems" production project, 46.9 billion rubles ($504
million) for the development of new nuclear and energy technologies, and 175.3 billion rubles ($1.8
billion) for the development of radio and microelectronics. Increases in defense spending do not
necessarily equate to increased military capabilities, however, especially when significant funding is
going towards paying benefits to Russian soldiers, veterans, and their families.
The Russian
budget will continue to support various social programs, including the Kremlin's pro-natalist programs,
but a continued focus on defense spending is likely affecting the effectiveness and sustainability of
these programs. The "Social Policy" section of the 2025 budget accounts for 6.4 trillion rubles ($69
billion). The bill allocates about 4 trillion rubles ($43 billion) between 2025 and 2027 for payments to
people with children and about 1.7 trillion rubles ($18 billion) for Russia's maternity capital program
through 2030. The budget accounts for 1.57 trillion rubles ($16 billion) for education in 2025, and
healthcare spending accounts for 1.86 trillion rubles ($20 billion) in 2025 and 2026. The Russian
government has allocated 824 billion rubles ($8.8 million) for the payment of state pensions in 2025 and
1.36 trillion rubles ($14 billion) for recently announced pension increases. Russian opposition outlet
Meduza noted that the Russian government press release highlighted funding for pregnant women, families
with children, national projects, and regional support but did not mention defense spending. Kremlin
officials similarly highlighted social spending while avoiding discussions of increased defense spending
on September 29 when the Cabinet of Ministers initially approved the draft federal budget, likely due to
the Kremlin's wariness about war fatigue among the Russian population. Sustained high levels of defense
spending in the coming years during a protracted war in Ukraine and continued military preparations for a
possible conflict with NATO will make it more difficult for the Kremlin to sustain funding for the social
programs that the Russian population cares about, such as pension increases and healthcare. Increased
defense spending will also affect the long-term effectiveness of the Kremlin's efforts to use financial
incentives to increase Russia's birth rate and reverse Russia's demographic crisis. Popular demands for
increased social and decreased defense funding in the future may also hamper the Kremlin's ability to
sustain its war in Ukraine as Russian President Vladimir Putin must take his regime's stability and
domestic support into account.
Key Takeaways:
The Russian government plans to spend
17 trillion rubles ($183 billion) on national security and defense in 2025 — about 41 percent of its
annual expenditures. The Russian budget will continue to support various social programs, including the
Kremlin's pronatalist programs, but a continued focus on defense spending is likely affecting the
effectiveness and sustainability of these programs.
Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted
Presidential Aide and close personal ally Alexei Dyumin to the Russian Security Council alongside three
other officials.
The Kremlin continues to use state and regional awards to coopt previously
critical milbloggers as part of wider efforts to gain control over the information space. Russian
Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin arrived in Tehran on September 30 to meet with various Iranian officials
and highlight Russo-Iranian economic cooperation.
Russian forces recently advanced in
Glushkvosky Raion, Kursk Oblast, and Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced within the Ukrainian
salient in Kursk Oblast.
Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk,
Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed on September 30 the decree
on Russia’s usual semi-annual fall conscription for 133,000 draftees.
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Russian forces likely seized Vuhledar as of October 1 following a reported Ukrainian withdrawal from the
settlement, though it is unclear if Russian forces will make rapid gains beyond Vuhledar in the immediate
future. Geolocated footage published on September 30 and October 1 shows Russian forces planting Russian
flags and freely operating in various parts of Vuhledar, and Russian milbloggers claimed on October 1
that Russian forces seized the settlement. A Ukrainian servicemember reported on October 1 that a part of
the Ukrainian force grouping conducted a planned withdrawal from Vuhledar to avoid encirclement, and
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces began to withdraw from Vuhledar as of the end of
September 30. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces did not completely interdict Ukrainian
egress routes before Ukrainian forces withdrew but that Russian artillery and drones inflicted
unspecified losses on withdrawing Ukrainian personnel. The scale of Ukrainian casualties is unknown at
this time, however, but the widespread reports of Ukrainian withdrawal suggest that the larger Ukrainian
contingent likely avoided a Russian encirclement that would have generated greater casualties. Russian
sources credited elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military
District ), 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army , EMD), 5th Tank Brigade and
37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both part of 36th CAA, EMD), 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a
mobilized unit of the 29th CAA), and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Special Forces of the Main Directorate of the
General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces ) for directly seizing or assisting in the seizure of
Vuhledar. Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces continued to advance west of Vodyane
(northeast of Vuhledar).
The Russian seizure of Vuhledar follows a series of costly, failed
Russian assaults near the settlement over the past two and a half years. A prominent Russian milblogger
celebrated reports of Vuhledar’s seizure by recalling an alleged conversation he had with a Russian
high-ranking officer, who told him that the Russian decision to attack in the Vuhledar direction in March
2022 was ill-advised because Russian forces would get “stuck” on the settlement. The milblogger implied
that the officer was wrong given that Russian forces eventually seized Vuhledar, although the milblogger
failed to acknowledge that Russian forces struggled to advance in the Vuhledar area for over two years.
Russia attempted at least two major offensive efforts to seize Vuhledar in October-November 2022 and
January-February 2023, both of which resulted in heavy personnel and military equipment losses. Russia's
previous defeats around Vuhledar notably resulted in the attrition of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade
(Pacific Fleet, EMD).
Key Takeaways:
Russian forces likely seized Vuhledar as of
October 1 following a reported Ukrainian withdrawal from the settlement, though it is unclear if Russian
forces will make rapid gains beyond Vuhledar in the immediate future.
Some Russian sources
expressed doubts that Russian forces would be able to rapidly advance and achieve
operationally-significant breakthroughs immediately after seizing Vuhledar.
Ukrainian
officials continue to highlight how Ukraine is reducing Russia's battlefield artillery ammunition
advantage, likely in part due to recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian ammunition depots.
The
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) issued its June-August 2024
report detailing Ukrainian civilian casualties, systemic Russian mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of
war (POWs), and limited Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs. The UN OHCHR report highlighted the
difference between official Russian and Ukrainian reactions to the mistreatment of POWs, and Russian
state media largely misrepresented the report by ignoring assessments about Russia's systemic
mistreatment of Ukrainian POWs.
The Russian federal budget for 2025-2027 has carved out
funding to support online platforms belonging to a prominent Kremlin propagandist and a former opposition
outlet, further highlighting the Kremlin's efforts to adapt its propaganda machine to Russians’ growing
reliance on social media for information.
Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk,
Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.
Russian authorities are reportedly planning to
increase recruitment within Russian pre-trial detention centers.
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Ukraine continues efforts to expand domestic production of significant military equipment and maintain
its drone advantage over Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 1 that
Ukrainian companies can currently produce four million drones annually and that Ukraine has already
contracted the domestic production of 1.5 million drones (presumably in 2024). Russian President Vladimir
Putin recently claimed that Russia plans to increase drone production by tenfold to 1.4 million drones in
2024, which will be lower than the two million drones that Ukraine aims to produce in 2024. Zelensky also
stated that Ukraine can produce 15 "Bohdan" self-propelled artillery systems every month and recently
conducted a successful flight test for an unspecified domestically produced ballistic missile. Ukrainian
Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on October 2 that Ukraine will continue prioritizing domestic
production of drones and long-range missiles, including ballistic missiles. Ukrainian Prime Minister
Denys Shmyhal stated on October 2 that Ukraine has allocated $7 billion for the purchase of weapons and
military equipment in the Ukrainian draft 2025 state budget — a 65 percent increase from the 2024 state
budget. Shmyhal stated that Ukraine increased domestic weapons production by a factor of three in 2023
and by factor of two in the first eight months of 2024. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian efforts to
expand domestic military production will allow Ukraine to reduce its dependence on Western military
assistance in the long-term, but that Ukraine still requires considerable Western assistance for the next
several years in order to defend against Russian aggression and liberate strategically vital areas that
Russian forces currently occupy.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov condemned
the Israel Defense Force's (IDF) ground operation in southern Lebanon during a meeting with the Lebanese
ambassador to Russia on October 1. Bogdanov met with Lebanese Ambassador Shawki Bou Nassar and discussed
the military-political situation in the Middle East. Bogdanov expressed "strong condemnation of Israel's
ground invasion of Lebanon and emphasized Russia's opposition to alleged Israeli political
assassinations. Bogdanov highlighted the importance of providing humanitarian assistance to Lebanon and
safely evacuating Russian citizens from Lebanon. Russian Ambassador to Israel Anatoly Viktorov called for
an immediate end to the conflict in the Middle East, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with
ambassadors of unspecified Arab states and called for the immediate end of military operations in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict area. The Kremlin likely seeks to take advantage of the conflict in the
Middle East to promote Russian-dominated international structures, including some connected to the
Kremlin's effort to establish an alternative "Eurasian security architecture." Russian Deputy Foreign
Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on October 2 that Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas has
accepted Russia's invitation to attend the BRICS summit in Kazan on October 22–24 and that participants
will discuss the situation in the Middle East. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) recently
condemned Israel’s “political assassination” of Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah,
Israel's decision to simultaneously detonate thousands of pagers belonging to Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)
members across Lebanon and Syria, and previous Israeli strikes against Iran.
Key
Takeaways:
Ukraine continues efforts to expand domestic production of significant military
equipment and maintain its drone advantage over Russia.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
Mikhail Bogdanov condemned the Israel Defense Force's (IDF) ground operation in southern Lebanon during a
meeting with the Lebanese ambassador to Russia on October 1.
Latvian forces enhanced air
defense near the Russian border following a recent Russian drone crash in the country.
Russian
and Ukrainian forces continued assaults in Kursk Oblast.
Russian forces recently marginally
advanced near Svatove, Siversk, and Vuhledar and east and southeast of Pokrovsk
Russian
defense enterprises are recruiting tens of thousands of new workers due to acute personnel shortages amid
increased production of weapons due to the war in Ukraine.
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The Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine that began in fall 2023 continues to produce gradual
Russian tactical gains in specific sectors of the front, but operationally significant gains will likely
continue to elude Russian forces. Ukrainian forces are conducting an effective defense in depth along the
frontline, inflicting significant losses upon Russian forces while slowly giving ground but preventing
the Russian military from making more rapid gains on the battlefield. Ukrainian forces do face serious
operational challenges and constraints, which are providing Russian forces with opportunities to pursue
tactically significant gains. Russian forces do not have the available manpower and materiel to continue
intensified offensive efforts indefinitely, however, and current Russian offensive operations in eastern
Ukraine will likely culminate in the coming months, if not weeks, as Ukrainian officials and ISW have
previously assessed.
Russian forces have recently made notable tactical gains but have not
demonstrated a capacity to seize operationally significant objectives. ISW distinguishes between tactical
gains, which are relevant at the tactical level of war in the near vicinity of the fighting, and
operational gains, which are significant at the operational level of war and affect large sectors of the
entire frontline. Russian forces seized Vuhledar in western Donetsk Oblast as of October 1, and the
settlement will likely afford Russian forces an improved tactical position for pursuing their operational
effort to advance towards the H-15 (Donetsk City–Zaporizhzhia City) highway and eliminate the wide
Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast. The Russian seizure of Vuhledar will not on its own
radically change the operational situation in western Donetsk Oblast, however, and Russian forces will
likely struggle to achieve their operational objectives in the area during the ongoing offensive
operation in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian offensive operations that are pursuing operationally
significant objectives, like the Russian effort to seize Chasiv Yar or to push Ukrainian forces off the
left (east) bank of the Oskil River, have either stalled or are resulting in particularly gradual gains
over long stretches of time, respectively. Russian forces continue to prioritize their offensive push
towards Pokrovsk, and the operational significance of seizing the city will likely in part depend on the
Russian military's ability to leverage the city in wider operational maneuver in Donetsk Oblast.Russian
forces have tried and failed to conduct wide operational maneuver across several axes throughout Donetsk
Oblast on several occasions during the full-scale invasion and are currently conducting intensified
offensive operations in pursuit of more limited objectives on only two mutually supporting sectors of the
frontline in Donetsk Oblast (western Donetsk Oblast and the Pokrovsk direction).
Key
Takeaways:
The Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine that began in fall 2023 continues
to produce gradual Russian tactical gains in specific sectors of the front, but operationally significant
gains will likely continue to elude Russian forces.
Ukrainian forces are conducting an
effective defense in depth along the frontline, inflicting significant losses upon Russian forces while
slowly giving ground but preventing the Russian military from making more rapid gains on the
battlefield.
Ukrainian forces do face serious operational challenges and constraints, which
are providing Russian forces with opportunities to pursue tactically significant gains.
Russian forces do not have the available manpower and materiel to continue intensified offensive
efforts indefinitely, however, and current Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine will likely
culminate in the coming months, if not weeks, as Ukrainian officials and ISW have previously assessed.
Russian forces have recently made notable tactical gains but have not demonstrated a capacity to
seize operationally significant objectives.
The Russian military command prepared the ongoing
Russian summer 2024 offensive operation for months in advance and accumulated operational reserves and
resources for the operation that the recent months of attritional fighting have likely heavily
degraded.
Russian forces have reportedly committed a significant portion of their intended
operational reserves to offensive operations in Donetsk and northern Kharkiv oblasts, indicating that the
Russian military command may have prioritized forming operational reserves to support offensive
operations in priority sectors of the frontline over developing theater-wide strategic reserves for the
entire offensive campaign in Ukraine.
The Russian military command is continuing to prioritize
offensive operations in priority sectors of the frontline over long-term planning for Russia's
theater-wide campaign in Ukraine, but the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast appears to have
significantly complicated the development of Russia's operational reserves.
Russian President
Vladimir Putin appears to be using the "Time of Heroes" veteran support program to militarize regional
and local government administrations and further solidify a pro-war ideology into the Russian state and
society.
Russian authorities continue to arrest Russian officials on charges related to
mismanagement and corruption within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
Strikes reportedly
targeted an ammunition depot near Russia's Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia Province, Syria overnight on
October 2 to 3.
Russian forces recently advanced south of Siversk and east and southeast of
Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast.
Russian authorities continue to nationalize Russian enterprises
for the benefit of the federal government.
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Ukrainian forces struck a fuel storage facility in Anna, Voronezh Oblast on the night of October 3 to 4.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and Ukrainian military
struck at least one vertical fuel reservoir at the Annaneftprodukt fuel and oil storage facility and that
Ukrainian military officials are still clarifying the damage at the facility. Voronezh Oblast Governor
Alexander Gusev claimed that Russian electronic warfare (EW) interference caused a Ukrainian drone to
fall onto the fuel storage facility and start a fire at an empty fuel reservoir. Footage published on
October 4 shows a fire at a purported fuel storage facility near Anna.
Key Takeaways:
Ukrainian forces struck a fuel storage facility in Anna, Voronezh Oblast on the night of October 3 to
4.
Russian forces recently advanced in Vovchansk, near Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and
Donetsk City.
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The Russian Government plans to allocate 90 billion rubles ($948 million) to one-time payments for
concluding a military contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) between 2025 and 2027,
indicating that the Kremlin plans to continue relying on ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts to meet the
manpower requirements of its war in Ukraine for as long as the crypto-mobilization system works. The
Russian federal government currently offers 400,000 rubles ($4,200) one-time payments for signing a
military contract (in addition to one-time payments offered by regional governments, some of which
recently exceed one million rubles), suggesting that the Kremlin intends to recruit 225,000 new personnel
through contract service between 2025 and 2027, assuming current rates hold, which is unlikely given
these rates have steadily increased since 2022. Russian authorities have significantly increased
financial incentives, particularly one-time payments, in recent months for signing military contracts,
and the Kremlin may have allocated 90 billion rubles to one-time payments with the intent of further
raising federal payments between 2025 and 2027. Russian authorities have reportedly expressed concerns
that ongoing recruitment efforts are producing diminishing results, however, and the significant increase
in financial incentives in recent months suggests that existing recruitment efforts were insufficient for
maintaining the consistent generation of new forces that the Russian military relies on for sustaining
its offensive tempo in Ukraine. ISW assesses that there are medium- to long-term constraints on how many
recruits the ongoing Russian crypto-mobilization campaign can generate, and increased financial
incentives are unlikely to significantly address these constraints. Russian President Vladimir Putin
remains committed to the ongoing crypto-mobilization campaign in order to avoid declaring another widely
unpopular partial mobilization call-up of reservists, although he maintains the option to call another
round of partial mobilization — as he did in Fall 2022. Putin and the Russian military command appear
unwilling to accept reducing the intensity of Russian combat operations in Ukraine since they view
maintaining the theater-wide initiative as a strategic imperative, and it remains unclear whether Putin
will respond with another round of mobilization if faced with another crisis similar to or worse than the
crisis the Kremlin faced in Fall 2022.
A recent Ukrainian missile strike near occupied Donetsk
City reportedly killed several North Korean military officials. Unspecified sources in Ukraine's
intelligence community told the Kyiv Post that an October 3 Ukrainian missile strike near occupied
Donetsk City killed 20 Russian soldiers, including six unidentified North Korean officers "who came to
confer with their Russian counterparts," and injured three other North Korean soldiers. The Kyiv Post,
citing Russian social media posts, reported that Russian forces were demonstrating infantry assault and
defense training to the North Korean military personnel. ISW cannot independently confirm the presence of
North Korean military officials in occupied Donetsk City. ISW has previously observed unconfirmed reports
in June 2024 that North Korea planned to dispatch a large-scale engineering force to occupied Donetsk
Oblast as early as July 2024. ISW also observed reports in July 2024 that a delegation from North Korea's
Kim Il Sung Military University visited Russia, which against the backdrop of deepening bilateral
relations, suggests that the North Korean military likely intends to learn from the Russian military's
experience in the war in Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
The Russian Government plans to
allocate 90 billion rubles ($948 million) to one-time payments for concluding a military contract with
the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) between 2025 and 2027, indicating that the Kremlin plans to
continue relying on ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts to meet the manpower requirements of its war in
Ukraine for as long as the crypto-mobilization system works.
Ukrainian officials continue to
provide statistics regarding Russian war crimes, shedding light on the extent of violations committed by
Russian forces and authorities.
The Russian government appears to have amended its plan to
deanonymize Russian social media accounts following significant backlash within the Russian
ultranationalist information space.
A recent Ukrainian missile strike near occupied Donetsk
City reportedly killed several North Korean military officials.
Russian forces recently
advanced within the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, near Toretsk, near Pokrovsk, and southwest of
Donetsk City.
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Russian forces have reportedly lost at least five divisions’ worth of armored vehicles and tanks in
Pokrovsk Raion since beginning their offensive operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and during
intensified Russian offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast in Summer 2024. An open-source X
(formerly Twitter) user tracking visually confirmed Russian vehicle and equipment losses in Ukraine
stated on October 4 that the user has confirmed that Russian forces have lost 1,830 pieces of heavy
equipment in Pokrovsk Raion since October 9, 2023. The X user stated that Russian forces have lost a
total of 539 tanks (roughly a division and a half's worth of Russian tanks) and 1,020 infantry fighting
vehicles (roughly four to five mechanized infantry divisions’ worth of vehicles) during offensive
operations in Pokrovsk Raion and specified that Ukrainian forces destroyed 381 of the 539 Russian tanks
and 835 of the 1,020 armored vehicles. The X user noted that Russian forces have also lost 26 infantry
mobility vehicles, 22 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), 11 towed artillery systems, and 92 unarmored
trucks. The X user noted that he confirmed that Russian forces lost 25 tanks and 59 armored vehicles
(roughly two battalions' worth of mechanized equipment) in Pokrovsk Raion since September 6, 2024.
Russian forces launched an intensified four-month-long offensive operation to seize Avdiivka in October
2023 and later continued assaults west of Avdiivka and west and southwest of Donetsk City in spring and
summer 2024, and the user's data should reflect Russian vehicle losses accrued during these offensive
efforts. The X user’s assessment based on visually confirmed vehicle losses is likely conservative given
that not all Russian vehicle losses are visually documented. The actual number of Russian vehicle losses
in the Pokrovsk area is likely higher than reported.
The Russian military command may not be
willing or able to accept the current scale and rate of vehicle loss in the coming months and years given
the constraints in Russia's defense industrial production, limits to Russia’s Soviet-era vehicle
stockpiles, and the Russian military's failure to achieve operationally significant territorial advances
through mechanized maneuver. Russian forces expended a significant number of armored vehicles during the
first weeks of their offensive effort to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and later limited their armored
vehicle usage while fighting within Avdiivka's administrative boundaries. Russian forces appear to have
limited their armored vehicle use in the area immediately west of Avdiivka in recent months, although
Russian forces have simultaneously intensified their offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk
city and frequently conduct largely unsuccessful platoon- and company-sized mechanized assaults in the
area. Russian forces have conducted several battalion-sized mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast
since July 2024, the majority of which resulted in significant armored vehicle losses in exchange for
marginal territorial advances. The commander of a Ukrainian bridge operating in the Donetsk direction
recently reported that Russian forces are losing up to 90 percent of the vehicles used in mechanized
assaults in the Donetsk direction. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think
tank previously estimated that Russian forces were losing over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles annually
as of February 2024, although Russia's current rate of armored vehicle losses may be higher given that
the X user's data notably does not account for Russian equipment losses throughout the entire frontline.
Russian forces have only advanced about 40 km in the Avdiivka/Pokrovsk operational direction since
October 2023 and a loss of over five divisions’ worth of equipment for such tactical gains is not
sustainable indefinitely without a fundamental shift in Russia‘s capability to resource its war.
Russian forces have likely accumulated a large amount of equipment for these assaults, although the
medium- to long-term constraints of Russia's armored vehicle stocks and production rates alongside
mounting equipment losses may force the Russian military to rethink the benefit of intensified mechanized
activity in this sector over Russia's longer-term war effort in Ukraine. The Russian military command's
willingness to pursue limited tactical advances in exchange for significant armored vehicle losses will
become increasingly costly as Russian forces burn through finite Soviet-era weapons and equipment stocks
in the coming months and years. Russia will likely struggle to adequately supply its units with materiel
in the long term without transferring the Russian economy to a wartime footing and significantly
increasing Russia's defense industrial production rates — a move that Russian President Vladimir Putin
has sought to avoid thus far.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces have reportedly lost
at least five divisions’ worth of armored vehicles and tanks in Pokrovsk Raion since beginning their
offensive operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and during intensified Russian offensive operations
in western Donetsk Oblast in Summer 2024.
• The Russian military command may not be willing or
able to accept the current scale and rate of vehicle loss in the coming months and years given the
constraints in Russia's defense industrial production, limits to Russia’s Soviet-era vehicle stockpiles,
and the Russian military's failure to achieve operationally significant territorial advances through
mechanized maneuver.
• Ukrainian officials continue to document and prosecute Russian war
crimes committed against Ukrainian forces.
• Russian authorities reportedly arrested the
administrator of the Russian Telegram channel Thirteenth, who has previously criticized the Kremlin and
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), on October 5.
• Russian forces recently advanced southeast
of Pokrovsk.
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Ukrainian forces struck an oil terminal in occupied Feodosia, Crimea on the night of October 6 to 7. The
Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 7 that Ukrainian forces struck an oil terminal in occupied
Feodosia causing a fire near the facility and that Ukrainian authorities are clarifying the damage to the
facility. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Feodosia houses the largest oil terminal in
occupied Crimea and that Russia uses this terminal to transport petroleum products to the Russian
military. Feodosia occupation mayor Igor Tkachenko acknowledged the fire at the oil depot and claimed
that it did not cause an oil spill. A Crimea-focused source claimed that the Russian military had
deployed a Pantsir-S1 air defense system to the area in June 2024 to protect the Feodosia oil terminal.
Footage published on October 7 shows a fire purportedly at the Feodosia oil terminal.
Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets reported on October 7 that
Ukrainian authorities are investigating another case of Russian forces' unjust abuse and execution of
Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). Lyubinets reported that he sent letters to the United Nations (UN) and
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in response to recent aerial footage of Russian
forces torturing and executing three unarmed Ukrainian POWs near Niu York, Donetsk Oblast. Lyubinets
noted that a Ukrainian brigade operating in the area published the footage on October 6 and highlighted
that the highest levels of the Russian military command appear to be tolerating Russian war crimes in
Ukraine. The Geneva Convention on POWs prohibits the "mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture" of POWs,
as well as the execution of POWs or persons who are clearly rendered hors de combat. Head of the
Ukrainian Department for Combating Crimes in Conditions of Armed Conflict Yuri Bilousov stated on October
4 that Ukrainian sources documented evidence indicating that Russian forces have executed 93 Ukrainian
prisoners of war (POW) on the battlefield since the start of the full-scale invasion and that 80 percent
of the recorded cases occurred in 2024. Bilousov noted on October 5 that these war crimes are systemic
and that Russian authorities clearly condone these crimes. ISW has extensively reported on previous
footage and reports of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and observed a
wider trend of Russian abuses against Ukrainian POWs across various sectors of the front that appeared to
be enabled, if not explicitly endorsed, by individual Russian commanders and unpunished by Russian field
commanders.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces struck an oil terminal in occupied
Feodosia, Crimea on the night of October 6 to 7.
• Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights
Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets reported on October 7 that Ukrainian authorities are investigating another
case of Russian forces' unjust abuse and execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).
• Russian authorities announced an "unprecedented" cyberattack against Russian state media
infrastructure on October 7.
• Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast, in
Donetsk Oblast, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
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Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Shahed drone storage facility in Krasnodar Krai and an ammunition
warehouse in the Republic of Adygea on October 9 and 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October
9 that Ukrainian naval forces and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) struck a Russian Shahed drone storage
facility near Oktyabrsky, Krasnodar Krai and that Russian forces stored around 400 Shahed drones at the
facility. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that there were secondary detonations at the facility
immediately following the strike, and footage published on October 10 shows a large fire and secondary
detonations near the facility. Krasnodar Krai officials stated on October 9 that Ukrainian drone strikes
damaged several houses near Oktyabrsky and that unspecified warehouses in the area caught fire but
claimed that the strike did not significantly damage the facilities. The Ukrainian General Staff reported
on October 10 that drone operators from the SBU, Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR),
and Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) struck an ammunition warehouse at the Khanskaya Air Base in
the Republic of Adygea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces base Su-34
fighter-bombers and Su-27 fighter aircraft at the Khanskaya Air Base, and Ukrainian outlet Suspilne
reported that sources within Ukrainian special services stated that there were 57 Russian training and
combat aircraft and helicopters at the airfield at the time of the strike. Suspilne's sources stated that
Russian forces use the Khanskaya Air Base to refuel planes during air strikes against frontline Ukrainian
units and settlements. Ukrainian forces are still determining the extent of the strike's damage to the
airfield, and it is unclear whether Ukrainian forces struck any Russian aircraft at the Khanskaya Air
Base as of the time of this report. Russian sources published footage on October 10 purportedly showing
Ukrainian drones striking the airfield and noted that the Russian 272nd Training Aviation Base of the
Krasnodar Higher Military Aviation School of Pilots is based at the Khanskaya Air Base.
Russian forces have reportedly struck three civilian vessels docked in Ukrainian ports since October 5,
likely as part of intensified Russian military, political, and economic pressure to undermine confidence
in Ukraine's grain corridor, Western support for Ukraine, and push Ukraine into premature negotiations.
Ukrainian Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper stated on October 9 that Russian ballistic
missiles struck port infrastructure in Odesa Raion and that Russian missiles struck a civilian container
ship under the flag of Panama. Kiper noted that this was the third Russian strike on a civilian vessel in
the last four days and stated that these strikes are an attempt to disrupt Ukraine's grain corridor, kill
civilians, and destroy Ukrainian infrastructure. Ukrainian officials reported that a Russian ballistic
missile struck a civilian vessel under the flag of Palau in Odesa's port on October 7 and that Russian
missiles damaged a civilian cargo ship on the night of October 5 to 6 near Odesa City. Russian sources
have attempted to justify the recent Russian strikes against civilian ships by claiming that the ships
were carrying weapons, but ISW has not observed independent confirmation of these claims. Ukrainian
officials reported that Russian forces conducted a cruise missile strike against a civilian cargo ship
under the flag of St. Kitts and Nevis transporting Ukrainian wheat to Egypt as it was leaving Ukrainian
territorial waters in the Black Sea on the night of September 11. Russian forces have previously heavily
targeted Ukrainian ports and grain infrastructure in southern Ukraine and have engaged in threatening
military posturing in the Black Sea in an effort to damage Ukrainian grain exports and undermine
international confidence in Ukraine's grain corridor. Russian strikes against civilian vessels in the
grain corridor are almost certainly intended to undermine confidence in Ukraine's ability to enforce and
defend the corridor, influence ongoing Western discussions about long-term Western support for Ukraine,
and negatively impact Ukraine's efforts to economically recover amid the ongoing war.|
Key
Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Shahed drone storage facility in Krasnodar
Krai and an ammunition warehouse in the Republic of Adygea on October 9 and 10.
• Russian
forces have reportedly struck three civilian vessels docked in Ukrainian ports since October 5, likely as
part of intensified Russian military, political, and economic pressure to undermine confidence in
Ukraine's grain corridor, Western support for Ukraine, and push Ukraine into premature negotiations.
• An unspecified senior US defense official stated on October 9 that Russian forces have suffered
over 600,000 casualties since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 — a stark increase
from a prior US intelligence assessment that Russian forces suffered about 315,000 casualties in Ukraine
as of December 2023.
• An Iranian outlet affiliated with former Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohsen Rezaei claimed on October 8 that Russia provided Iran with an
S-400 air defense system and a squadron of Su-35 fighter jets but provided no evidence for this claim.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk
Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, southeast of Pokrovsk, and southwest of Donetsk City.
• The
Russian military appears to be increasingly recruiting older Russian volunteers in order to sustain
ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.
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Russian forces intensified their ongoing effort to dislodge Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast around the
evening of October 10 and have recently advanced further into the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast
while reportedly eliminating almost the entirety of the smaller Ukrainian salient in Glushkovsky Raion.
Russian forces reportedly simultaneously intensified counterattacks in Glushkovksy Raion, on the left
flank of the main Ukrainian salient in Korenevsky Raion, and on the right flank of the main Ukrainian
salient in Sudzhansky Raion on the evening of October 10. Geolocated footage published on October 10
indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into central Kremyanoye (east of Korenevo) and to the
northern outskirts of Zeleny Shlyakh (southeast of Korenevo) and enveloped Ukrainian positions near
Lyubimovka (southeast of Korenevo). Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating in
Korenevsky Raion seized Olgovka (east of Korenevo) and Nizhny Klin (southeast of Korenevo and
Lyubimovka), advanced up the outskirts of Tolsty Lug and Novoivanovka (both southeast of Korenevo), and
broke through Ukrainian defenses near Lyubimovka during an alleged battalion-sized mechanized assault.
ISW has yet to observe confirmation that Russian forces recently conducted a battalion-sized
mechanized assault in the area or recaptured any settlements. Russian milbloggers widely claimed that
Russian forces enveloped Ukrainian forces in Lyubimovka and Tolsty Lug, although some milbloggers claimed
that Russian forces have encircled up to two Ukrainian battalions in Korenevsky Raion. ISW has not
observed confirmation that Russian forces have encircled any Ukrainian units in Kursk Oblast, however.
Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District ) and
810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Southern Military District ) are reportedly
conducting these intensified counterattacks in Korenevsky Raion.
Russian milbloggers claimed
that Russian forces operating in Sudzhansky Raion broke through Ukrainian defenses near Martynovka and
Mykhailivka (both northeast of Sudzha), advanced two kilometers deep north of Malaya Loknya (north of
Sudzha), and are enveloping Ukrainian positions near Plekhovo (southeast of Sudzha). A Russian milblogger
claimed that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade advanced up to the northwestern outskirts of
Sudzha, although a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger repeatedly denied these reports. ISW has not
observed any visual confirmation of Russian advances in Sudzhansky Raion since the start of intensified
Russian counterattacks in the area on the evening of October 10. Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry
Brigade, 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD), 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 1220th Motorized
Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized unit), and unspecified Chechen Akhmat units are reportedly conducting
the intensified counterattacks in Sudzhansky Raion.
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of most of Glushkovksy Raion on October 10 and 11, although ISW has
yet to observe visual confirmation of these alleged Russian advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that
Russian forces operating south of Glushkovo pushed Ukrainian forces back from Veseloye, advanced near
Medvezhye, and approached the international border with Sumy Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed that
Ukrainian forces only retain limited positions near Krasnooktyabrskoye and on the outskirts of Novy Put
(both south of Glushkovo and immediately on the border with Sumy Oblast) and declared the Ukrainian
offensive effort in Glushkovsky Raion a failure. Ukrainian forces began ground assaults into Glushkovsky
Raion on September 11, 2024, following the start of Russian counterattacks in Kursk Oblast on September
10, 2024, but have not yet established a significant foothold in the area. Elements of the Russian 155th
Naval Infantry Brigade, 1434th Akhmat "Chechnya" Regiment, 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), 83rd VDV
Brigade, and 106th VDV Division are reportedly conducting intensified counterattacks in Glushkovsky
Raion.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces intensified their ongoing effort to dislodge
Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast around the evening of October 10 and have recently advanced further
into the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast while reportedly eliminating almost the entirety of the
smaller Ukrainian salient in Glushkovsky Raion.
• Intensified Russian counterattacks likely
aim to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast before poor weather conditions in Fall 2024 and early
Winter 2024-2025 begin to constrain battlefield maneuver.
• The Russian military command
likely aims to rapidly push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast in order to free up combat power for its
priority offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast and to ease the theater-wide operational pressures that
the Ukrainian incursion has generated.
• South Korean and Ukrainian officials reportedly
continue to identify North Korean military personnel already fighting in Ukraine as well as training in
Russia for possible future deployments alongside the Russian military.
• Western partners
continue to announce and provide new military assistance to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky continues diplomatic efforts to establish and clarify Ukraine’s strategic vision for
peace.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov declared a "blood feud" against Russian
legislators, suggesting that Kadyrov is becoming increasingly emboldened in his personal political
disputes.
• Ukrainian officials confirmed that Ukrainian journalist Viktoriya Roshchyna died
in Russian captivity.
• Ukrainian officials announced new appointments in the Ministry of
Defense (MoD).
• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Kurakhove.
• The Kremlin is deceptively recruiting young African women to assemble Iranian-designed Shahed drones
in the Republic of Tatarstan, likely to address labor shortages in Russia.
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Russian forces are reportedly relying on illicitly obtained Starlink terminals to improve combat
coordination and the effectiveness of their tactical reconnaissance strike complex (TRSC) in Ukraine as
part of an overarching effort to reach technological parity with Ukrainian forces. Ukrainian military
personnel operating in Donetsk Oblast told the Washington Post in an article published on October 12 that
Starlink terminals have increasingly appeared at Russian frontline positions and that the illicitly
obtained technology is helping Russian forces fix persisting issues with combat coordination and
communications while improving the precision of Russian tactical fires. The commander of a Ukrainian
drone platoon operating near Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) told the Washington Post that Ukrainian
reconnaissance drones started widely recording Starlink terminals at Russian positions in the area in
September 2024 and that the arrival of the terminals corresponded with a decrease in intercepted Russian
radio transmissions in which Russian soldiers relayed incomplete or incorrect battlefield information to
their commanders. Another Ukrainian soldier reportedly stated that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk
direction appear to have enough Starlink terminals to give individual tactical groups their own terminal.
Ukrainian soldiers reportedly credited recent Russian battlefield gains, including the Russian seizure of
Vuhledar in late September 2024, partially to the Russian use of Starlink terminals. Russian forces have
mainly relied on radio and other insecure communication technologies for organizing combat coordination
and relaying targeting information to fire and strike elements, and Russian forces have yet to field
modern battlefield management systems at scale to organize their TRSC as many Ukrainian units have.
Ukrainian access to Starlink has afforded Ukrainian forces a technological edge to conduct more effective
combat coordination and field new developments in the TRSC ahead of Russian forces, and Russian forces
are likely trying to degrade these Ukrainian advantages by scaling up their own use of the terminals.
Ukraine is currently pursuing a strategy to offset Russian manpower and materiel advantages through
technological innovation and adaptation, and technological parity between Ukrainian and Russian forces
will undermine this effort.
A Russian milblogger claimed that a Ukrainian F-16 downed a
Russian Su-34 fighter aircraft in an unspecified area of the theater on October 12. ISW cannot verify the
claim that a Ukrainian F-16 was involved in the reported loss of the Russian Su-34. A Russian milblogger
closely affiliated with Russian aviation published a tribute to a lost Su-34 aircraft on October 12 but
did not provide additional details about the incident. A prominent Russian milblogger also confirmed that
the Su-34 crew died but claimed that this loss was not related to Ukrainian activity, and other
milbloggers speculated that the Su-34 could have crashed as a result of technical malfunction or human
error. A Russian Telegram channel, which claims to be managed by Russian airborne (VDV) officers and
staff of the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces, claimed that a Ukrainian F-16 fighter jet presumably
shot down the Russian Su-34 fighter aircraft while the Su-34 was dropping FAB glide bombs with unified
planning and correction modules (UMPC) at a distance of about 50 kilometers from the frontline. The
Telegram channel later responded to the claims that the Su-34 could have crashed due to technical
malfunction or human error, noting that such hypothetical scenarios still highlight a problem with the
wear and tear of Russian aircraft, unprofessionalism among pilots, and pilot exhaustion. The Telegram
channel accused Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers of lying about the Su-34 crash and preventing Russian
forces from developing plans to counter the Ukrainian F-16 threat. The Telegram channel claimed in March
2024 that Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor filed a complaint against the channel for “discrediting” a
Russian military commander. ISW cannot independently confirm the Telegram channel’s claim, but if
confirmed, this incident would mark the first Ukrainian shootdown of a Russian manned aircraft with a
Western-provided F-16 fighter jet.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces are reportedly
relying on illicitly obtained Starlink terminals to improve combat coordination and the effectiveness of
their tactical reconnaissance strike complex (TRSC) in Ukraine as part of an overarching effort to reach
technological parity with Ukrainian forces.
• A Russian milblogger claimed that a Ukrainian
F-16 downed a Russian Su-34 fighter aircraft in an unspecified area of the theater on October 12, but ISW
cannot verify the claim that a Ukrainian F-16 was involved in the reported loss of the Russian Su-34.
• Unknown actors opened fire on personnel of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs' (MVD)
Center for Combating Extremism in Nazran, Republic of Ingushetia on the night of October 11.
• Indian enterprises are reportedly increasing exports of dual-use technologies to Russia, in part
thanks to large Russian reserves of rupees from oil sales to India.
• Russian forces recently
advanced near Kupyansk, Donetsk City, and Robotyne.
• Russian forces are reportedly struggling
to conduct effective counterbattery fires.
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Russian forces have recently resumed tactical offensive attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border
area and have made tactical gains in localized assaults, but this activity so far does not appear to be a
part of a larger operational offensive effort to support the wider Russian offensive operation in western
Donetsk Oblast. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated on October 12 and 13 that elements of the Russian
336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, Leningrad Military District ) and the 394th Motorized
Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army , Eastern Military District
) launched assaults near Levadne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and broke through Ukrainian
defenses. A Ukrainian military observer noted that Russian forces reached the outskirts of Levadne and
advanced in the direction of Novodarivka (southwest of Novodarivka). Russian milbloggers widely claimed
that Russian forces seized Levadne and advanced up to the southern outskirts of Novodarivka, although ISW
has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims.
These tactical gains are not the result
of a sudden or unexpected Russian breakthrough. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces
began conducting renewed ground assaults southwest of Velyka Novosilka beginning around October 11.
Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on October 3 that
Russian forces were preparing assaults groups for offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast in the near
future but that Ukrainian forces had not identified large Russian force concentrations in southern
Ukraine. Voloshyn added that the planned Russian offensive activity aimed to improve Russian tactical
positions and establish tactical footholds for continued offensive actions. Russian forces activated on a
long dormant sector of the front in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Kamyanske (south of Stepnohirsk) in
early October, but this activity has so far been limited and has resulted in only marginal tactical
gains. Russian forces may be reactivating in less active sectors of the front in southern Ukraine to
divert Ukrainian attention away from Russia's priority offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast and to fix
Ukrainian forces along the front in southern Ukraine and prevent Ukraine from redeploying forces to
Donetsk Oblast.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces have recently resumed tactical
offensive attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and have made tactical gains in localized
assaults, but this activity so far does not appear to be a part of a larger operational offensive effort
to support the wider Russian offensive operation in western Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian forces
recently executed nine Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Kursk Oblast amid a theater-wide increase in
Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs.
• Russian milbloggers largely glorified the Russian
execution of the Ukrainian POWs, reinforcing a cultural norm to justify and celebrate war crimes within
the broader Russian ultranationalist community.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost
positions near Selydove, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Donetsk City, and Velyka
Novosilka.
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>• Russian forces recently executed nine Ukrainian prisoners of >war (POWs) in Kursk Oblast
amid a theater-wide increase in >Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs. > >• Russian milbloggers largely glorified the Russian execution >of the Ukrainian POWs,
reinforcing a cultural norm to justify >and celebrate war crimes within the broader Russian >ultranationalist community.
Und nachher wird in Rußland dann keiner etwas davon
gewußt haben.
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Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov arrived in the People's Republic of China (PRC) for an official
visit on October 14, highlighting continued Russia-PRC defense cooperation against the backdrop of
bilateral naval exercises in the Pacific Ocean. Belousov met with PRC Defense Minister Dong Jun in
Beijing on August 14 and discussed the role of bilateral cooperation in enhancing each state's respective
defensive capabilities and maintaining global security and regional stability. Dong emphasized that
Russia and the PRC share a common desire to develop military cooperation and open new avenues for
unspecified joint defense cooperation. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) notably published footage on
October 14 of ongoing joint Russia-PRC People's Liberation Army (PLA) anti-submarine naval exercises in
the northwestern Pacific Ocean and claimed that a detachment of Russian and PLA naval vessels are
conducting a joint patrol of the Asia–Pacific region. Such joint naval exercises are manifestations of
intensified Russia-PRC defense cooperation, as each party can learn valuable lessons from one another
during combined exercises, improving interoperability and potentially shaping military doctrine in the
future. Russian forces have experience repelling Ukrainian autonomous naval drone strikes against Russian
naval and port infrastructure, and the PLA may hope to absorb some of these lessons in planning for the
PRC's potential future actions against Taiwan. Taiwan's MoD warned that the PRC launched "massive
military drills" encircling Taiwan with warships on October 14, which overlapped with Belousov's
visit.
Russian forces struck civilian vessels docked at Ukrainian ports for the fourth time
since October 5, part of an apparent Russian strike campaign targeting port areas to undermine Ukraine's
grain corridor, spoil international support for Ukraine, and push Ukraine into premature negotiations.
Odesa Oblast officials reported that Russian forces struck the port of Odesa with a ballistic missile
during the day on October 14, hitting the civilian vessels NS Moon flying the Belize flag and the Optima
dry cargo vessel flying the Palau flag, as well as port infrastructure and a grain warehouse. The
officials stated that Russian strikes on October 7 already damaged the Optima. Ukrainian sources reported
that Russian forces most recently struck civilian vessels docked at the port of Odesa overnight on
October 5 to 6 and on October 7 and 9. Russian ultranationalist milbloggers responded to the October 9
strike with rhetoric supporting existing Kremlin narratives aimed at undermining confidence in the grain
corridor as well as attempting to justify the strike. Milbloggers explicitly called for further Russian
strikes against Ukrainian grain infrastructure, civilian vessels at Ukrainian ports, and other targets
that would further degrade Ukraine's economic potential. ISW recently assessed that Russian strikes
against civilian vessels and other grain corridor infrastructure are almost certainly intended to
undermine Western confidence in Ukraine's ability to enforce and defend the corridor, influence ongoing
Western discussions about long-term support for Ukraine, and impede Ukraine's ability to survive
economically during the war.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian Defense Minister Andrei
Belousov arrived in the People's Republic of China (PRC) for an official visit on October 14,
highlighting continued Russia-PRC defense cooperation against the backdrop of bilateral naval exercises
in the Pacific Ocean. • Russian forces struck civilian vessels docked at Ukrainian ports for
the fourth time since October 5, part of an apparent Russian strike campaign targeting port areas to
undermine Ukraine's grain corridor, spoil international support for Ukraine, and push Ukraine into
premature negotiations.
• Russian sources claimed that Russian forces recaptured positions in
Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained positions in central Toretsk.
• Russian forces recently conducted a reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Kurakhove
direction and recently made confirmed advances northeast of Vuhledar.
• Russian opposition
outlet Verstka reported on October 11 that sources within the Russian Presidential Administration stated
that the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" program, which places veterans of the war in Ukraine into government
positions after returning to Russia, is meant to increase the popularity of contract military service and
boost recruitment.
• Russian occupation officials continue to pathologize Ukrainian identity
in an effort to indoctrinate children in occupied Ukraine.
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The Kremlin is likely leveraging the recent June 2024 Russia-North Korea comprehensive strategic
partnership agreement in part to offset Russian force generation and border security requirements—further
cementing Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to avoiding mobilization for as long as possible.
Ukrainian outlets Suspilne and Liga reported on October 15, citing anonymous military intelligence
sources, that the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade is forming a 3,000-person “battalion” staffed by
North Korean citizens (the numerical strength is far beyond a battalion’s). Ukrainian intelligence
sources assessed that the “battalion” will likely be involved in ongoing Russian defensive operations in
Kursk Oblast and reported that up to 18 North Korean soldiers have already deserted their positions in
Bryansk and Kursk oblasts before the unit has been committed to combat operations. ISW cannot
independently confirm the veracity of these reports, but Russian officials notably did not deny them on
October 15. Putin submitted the text of the Russia-North Korea comprehensive strategic partnership
agreement, which both countries signed in June 2024, to the Russian State Duma for ratification on
October 14. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov emphasized in a comment to Kremlin newswire TASS that the
Russia-North Korea agreement is "unambiguous" in its provision of "mutual defense and security
cooperation." The Kremlin is likely using the "mutual defense" provision of the agreement to provide the
legal justification for the deployment of North Korean soldiers to the combat zone in Russia in response
to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. ISW has recently observed reports that a small contingent
of North Korean personnel was operating near occupied Donetsk City.
Key Takeaways:
• The Kremlin is likely leveraging the recent June 2024 Russia-North Korea comprehensive strategic
partnership agreement in part to offset Russian force generation and border security requirements—further
cementing Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to avoiding mobilization for as long as
possible.
• The Kremlin has elected to address the recent controversy regarding its reliance
on conscripts to repel Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast by offering financial incentives to any
personnel involved in defending the state border.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a
law allowing Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin to stay in his position despite
reaching retirement age (again) demonstrating Putin's continued preference for keeping curated loyalists
from his inner circle in positions of power.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk
Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
• A former Russian Storm-Z instructor and
milblogger heavily criticized Russian forces' reliance on the partially-encrypted communications platform
Discord following Russia's recent ban of the platform.
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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky presented Ukraine's five-part Victory Plan aimed at winning the
war by the end of 2025 to the Verkhovna Rada on October 16, which includes a promise to contribute
experienced Ukrainian troops to defending NATO's eastern flank following the resolution of the war in
Ukraine. Zelensky stated that Ukraine's Victory Plan is intended to end the war "no later than" 2025 and
is composed of five points, including: an immediate invitation to join NATO; continued Western support
and aid including equipping Ukrainian brigades, supporting Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided
weapons to strike military targets in Russia and increasing intelligence sharing with Ukraine; Western
and Ukrainian non-nuclear strategic deterrence against Russia; Western investment in Ukraine's strategic
economic growth; and a promise that Ukrainian forces will "replace" certain Western military contingents
currently stationed in Europe after the war's conclusion. Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces will use
their experience in the war to strengthen NATO's defense and ensure security in Europe and noted that
Ukrainian units could replace unspecified contingents of US forces in Europe in the future. Zelensky
noted that there are several secret aspects of the plan that he has shared with Ukraine's Western allies.
Zelensky stated that Ukraine's fate is connected to the fate of its neighbors in the Baltics, Balkans,
Caucasus, and Central Asia and warned that Ukraine and the West must support Ukraine's sovereignty and
territorial integrity or risk future Russian aggression. Ukrainian and Western officials expressed
support for Zelensky's plan on October 16, and Zelensky noted that he will present the plan to the
European Council on October 17.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky presented Ukraine's five-part Victory Plan aimed at winning the war by the end of 2025 to the
Verkhovna Rada on October 16, which includes a promise to contribute experienced Ukrainian troops to
defending NATO's eastern flank following the resolution of the war in Ukraine.
• Russian
President Vladimir Putin's current theory of victory in Ukraine seeks to protract the war and posits that
Russian forces can outlast Western support for Ukraine and collapse Ukrainian resistance by winning a war
of attrition. Russia will likely face serious medium- and long-term constraints that will undermine this
strategic effort, however.
• Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor
Girkin notably questioned the Kremlin's articulated theory of victory and assessed that 2025 and possibly
late 2024 will be “a serious test” for Russia because the Kremlin has yet to address medium- to long-term
force-generation and defense-industrial-capacity constraints.
• Girkin also assessed that
Russian Summer–Fall 2024 offensive campaign did not accomplish its goals in the entire theater and is
unlikely to do so ahead of the muddy season, although Russian forces are continuing intense offensive
operations in several operational directions in Ukraine.
• US President Joe Biden announced a
new military assistance package for Ukraine worth $425 million following a phone call with Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky on October 16.
• The South Korean Ministry of Defense (MoD)
stated on October 16 that it is "closely" monitoring indications that North Korean troops are directly
supporting Russia's war effort in Ukraine amid reports that the Russian military is training North Korean
soldiers.
• Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast, near Kreminna, near
Siversk, and near Toretsk.
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Russian sources reported on October 16 that unspecified actors killed the deputy commander of Russia's
Special Operations Forces (SSO) Training Center, Nikita Klenkov, near Moscow City. Klenkov reportedly
fought in the war in Ukraine as part of military unit 43292 and was a high-ranking officer of the Russian
Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GRU). Russian authorities claimed that Klenkov's murder was a
planned contract killing and opened a criminal investigation into the murder but have yet to accuse
Ukraine or other Western actors of being involved in the murder. ISW cannot independently verify these
claims.
The European Union (EU) issued a statement on October 16 condemning Russian executions
of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and noted that at least 177 Ukrainian POWs have died in Russian
captivity since February 2022. The EU called Russia's increasingly frequent executions of Ukrainian POWs
a grave breach of the Geneva Convention, highlighting that the executions demonstrate Russia’s systemic
disregard for international law. The Geneva Convention on POWs prohibits the inhumane treatment and
execution of POWs or persons who are clearly rendered hors de combat. ISW has recently observed an
increase in Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout the theater of war. Head of the Ukrainian
Department for Combating Crimes in Conditions of Armed Conflict Yuri Bilousov stated on October 4 that
Ukrainian sources documented evidence indicating that Russian forces have executed 93 Ukrainian POWs on
the battlefield since the start of the full-scale invasion and that 80 percent of the recorded cases
occurred in 2024.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian sources reported on October 16 that
unspecified actors killed the deputy commander of Russia's Special Operations Forces (SSO) Training
Center, Nikita Klenkov, near Moscow City.
• The European Union (EU) issued a statement on
October 16 condemning Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and noted that at least 177
Ukrainian POWs have died in Russian captivity since February 2022.
• Ukrainian forces recently
advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and
near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
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South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) reported that North Korea transferred roughly 1,500
North Korean special forces to eastern Russia, where they are reportedly training before deploying to
participate in Russia's war against Ukraine. The NIS stated on October 18 that seven Russian Pacific
Fleet ships transported roughly 1,500 North Korean special forces from Chongjin, Hamhung, and Musudan in
North Korea to Vladivostok, Russia between October 8 and 13 and that North Korea will send a second batch
of military personnel to Russia soon. The NIS stated that North Korean servicemembers are currently
stationed in Vladivostok, Ussuriysk, Khabarovsk, and Blagoveshchensk in eastern Russia. The NIS stated
that the Russian military has issued the North Korean personnel Russian uniforms, weapons, and fake
identification cards claiming that the North Koreans are residents of the Sakha and Buryatia republics.
The NIS posted satellite imagery showing a Russian transport ship near North Korea and an estimated 640
North Korean personnel gathered at Russian military facilities in Ussuryisk and Khabarovsk on October 16.
South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on October 18 that the NIS also stated that North Korea
recently decided to send four brigades totaling 12,000 personnel to the war in Ukraine. Ukraine's Main
Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told The War Zone on
October 17 that there are nearly 11,000 North Korean infantry troops training in eastern Russia and that
they will be ready to fight in Ukraine by November 1. Budanov stated that the first cadre of 2,600 North
Korean soldiers will deploy to Kursk Oblast but that it is unclear where the remaining troops will
deploy. ISW cannot independently verify these statements but has no basis to question the veracity of
these intelligence reports, which are consistent with previous reports from South Korean and Ukrainian
officials about North Korean troops training in Russia before deploying to the war in Ukraine, including
to Kursk Oblast. ISW has also observed recent reports that a limited number of North Korean military
personnel, mainly engineering personnel, are likely operating near occupied Donetsk City.
A
number of sources provided footage purporting to substantiate these intelligence reports. The footage
appears consistent with reports of North Korean troop deployments to Russia but does not independently
validate the intelligence reports. A Russian Telegram channel posted footage on October 18 purportedly
showing North Korean soldiers marching at a Russian training ground, and the footage was later geolocated
to Sergeevka, Primorsky Krai. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne, along with Vox Ukraine's fact-checking project
VoxCheck, reported that they could neither confirm nor deny that the soldiers in the footage are North
Korean as the speech in the video is hard to hear and there are no clear external signs to indicate that
the soldiers are North Korean. The Ukrainian Center for Strategic Communications (Stratcom) posted
additional footage on October 18 reportedly showing Russian forces outfitting North Korean troops with
Russian uniforms and equipment at the Sergeevka training ground. ISW cannot independently verify the
presence of North Korean troops in either of the videos and cannot verify the location of the second
video.
Suspilne stated that the footage of North Korean troops marching was filmed at the base
of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) in
Sergeevka. ISW has observed reports that elements of the 127th Division's 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment
were operating in Kursk Oblast as of late August 2024, while other elements of the division, including
its 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment, have been operating in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area
since at least June 2024. Both the 394th and 143rd motorized rifle regiments are based in Sergeevka. ISW
continues to assess that the Kremlin is likely leveraging its June 2024 Russia-North Korea comprehensive
strategic partnership agreement, which Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted for ratification on
October 14, to in part offset Russian force generation and border security requirements – further
cementing Putin's commitment to avoiding mobilization for as long as possible.
Key
Takeaways:
• South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) reported that North Korea
transferred roughly 1,500 North Korean special forces to eastern Russia, where they are reportedly
training before deploying to participate in Russia's war against Ukraine.
• A number of
sources provided footage purporting to substantiate these intelligence reports. The footage appears
consistent with reports of North Korean troop deployments to Russia but does not independently validate
the intelligence reports.
• Russian forces appear to be further intensifying mechanized
activity in western Donetsk Oblast amid initial reports of the start of autumnal muddy ground
conditions.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to signal his disinterest in
meaningful peace negotiations with Ukraine while using the upcoming BRICS summit to legitimize Kremlin
information operations falsely portraying Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate.
• Putin used
ongoing conversations about security guarantees in Ukraine's Victory Plan to further boilerplate nuclear
saber-ratting information operations that aim to discredit Ukraine to its Western partners and prevent
Western aid to Ukraine.
• Western partners continue to announce new military assistance to
Ukraine.
• The US Department of State (DoS) program Rewards for Justice offered a reward of up
to $10 million for information leading to the identification or location of foreigners involved in
interfering in US elections, including members of prominent Kremlin-awarded milblogger channel Rybar.
• Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on October 18 that Ukraine has
recorded more than 100 confirmed cases of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) amid
a recent theater-wide increase in Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs.
• Russian forces
recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Kreminna, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.
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Ukrainian drones reportedly struck the "Kremniy El" microelectronic plant in Bryansk City on the night of
October 18 to 19. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on October 19 that Ukrainian drones struck the
plant and noted that "Kremniy El" is one of Russia's largest microelectronic manufacturers and that the
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is one of the company's main customers. Head of the Ukrainian Center
for Countering Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko acknowledged the report of the strike and
stated that the plant manufactures microelectronics for Russian Pantsir air defense systems, Iskander
missiles, radars, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and drones. Ukrainian outlet RBC Ukraine and Ukrainian
open-source intelligence group CyberBoroshno published photos showing the aftermath of the strike and
damage to a building at the plant. Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed on October 19 that
debris from a downed Ukrainian drone struck and caused a fire at a "non-residential building" in Bryansk
Oblast, possibly referring to the plant.
Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner
of war (POW) exchange on October 18 - the fourth exchange since the start of Ukrainian operations in
Kursk Oblast in August 2024. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on October 19 that Ukraine
returned 95 POWs, including Ukrainian servicemembers who defended the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol in
early 2022, Ukrainian National Guardsmen, servicemembers of the Ukrainian State Border Service, and other
Ukrainian military personnel. The Russian MoD claimed on October 18 that Russian authorities also
returned 95 Russian POWs and that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchange. The Ukrainian
Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs noted that many of the returned Ukrainian POWs had
serious illnesses and severe injuries and experienced weight loss due to torture and malnutrition in
Russian captivity. ISW previously observed that the frequency of POW exchanges between Ukraine and
Russia has significantly increased since the start of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on August
6, with both sides exchanging a total of 267 POWs each in three separate exchanges prior to the most
recent October 18 POW exchange. Russia and Ukraine only conducted three POW exchanges between January 1
and August 6, 2024, in comparison. ISW continues to assess that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast
has likely increasingly incentivized Russia to engage in POW exchanges.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian drones reportedly struck the "Kremniy El" microelectronic plant in Bryansk City on
the night of October 18 to 19.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner of war
(POW) exchange on October 18 - the fourth exchange since the start of Ukrainian operations in Kursk
Oblast in August 2024.
• Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office reported on October 18 that
Ukrainian authorities opened an investigation into the execution of a Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW) in
Bakhmut Raion in September 2024.
• Russian forces recently advanced within the main Ukrainian
salient in Kursk oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
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Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against the Lipetsk-2 Air Base near Lipetsk City and Russian
state-owned defense enterprise Sverdlov in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast on the night of October 19
to 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that forces from Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), Main
Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and Special Operations Forces (SSO) struck the Lipetsk-2 Air
Base and caused a fire and secondary explosions. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces
targeted ammunition depots, fuel storage, and aircraft and noted that the Russian military bases Su-34
fighter-bomber, Su-35 fighter, and MiG-31 interceptor/fighter fixed-wing aircraft at the base. Lipetsk
Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed that Russian forces intercepted drones over Lipetsk City and
Oblast and that a crashed drone caused a fire in an unspecified area. The Ukrainian General Staff
reported that forces from Ukraine's SBU, GUR, and SSO also struck the Sverdlov Plant, causing secondary
explosions. The Sverdlov plant produces chemicals for artillery ammunition and stores and produces glide
bombs, and sources in Ukrainian intelligence told Western and Ukrainian news outlets that the plant is
one of Russia's largest explosives factories. Geolocated footage published on October 20 shows an
explosion near the Sverdlov Plant. The US imposed sanctions on the Sverdlov Plant in July 2023 for its
support of Russia's war effort in Ukraine. Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin claimed that
Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike on the Dzerzhinsk industrial zone and that several plant
employees received minor injuries.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces conducted
drone strikes against the Lipetsk-2 Air Base near Lipetsk City and Russian state-owned defense enterprise
Sverdlov in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast on the night of October 19 to 20.
• Moldovan
authorities have yet to announce the results of the October 20 presidential election and European Union
(EU) referendum, but both the election and referendum have passed the required voter turnout threshold to
be valid.
• Russian sources claimed on October 20 that former Russian Yukos Oil Company Vice
President for Corporate Management Mikhail Rogachev was found dead in a possible suicide after falling
from a window in Moscow.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Sudzha and Russian
forces recently marginally advanced near Toretsk and Selydove.
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Moldova's October 20 European Union (EU) referendum passed by an extremely narrow margin in large part
due to support from the Moldovan diaspora, and current Moldovan President Maia Sandu will face Alexandr
Stoianoglo in a second round of voting on November 3. Several Moldovan and European officials reported
potential Russian interference in the election, and the Kremlin and its affiliates in Moldova will likely
continue their malign influence efforts in the leadup to the November 3 runoff. The Moldovan Central
Election Commission (CEC) completed the vote count on October 21 and reported that 50.46 percent
(751,235) voted in favor of the EU referendum and that 49.54 percent (737,639) voted against — a
difference of only 13,596 votes. The CEC reported that Sandu took first place in the presidential
election with 42.45 percent (656,354) and Stoianoglo took second with 25.98 percent (401,726). Sandu
failed to gain the majority vote required to win in the first round, and she and Stoianoglo will move to
the second round. Moldovan authorities counted votes from polling stations abroad last, during which the
number of votes in favor of the referendum and Sandu greatly increased. Sandu stated early on October 21
while Moldovan authorities were still counting votes that "criminal groups" and "foreign forces" — likely
referring to Russia and Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politician Ilan Shor — used tens of millions
of euros to spread propaganda to destabilize Moldova. Sandu stated that Moldovan authorities have
evidence that the criminal groups wanted to buy 300,000 Moldovan votes and that the scale of fraud was
"unprecedented." The European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations' (ENEMO) International
Election Observation Mission reported on October 21 that it found "massive malign foreign interference
attempts" ahead of the October 20 election despite Moldovan authorities' efforts to counter
misinformation and vote buying schemes. The BBC reported that it witnessed at least one instance of vote
buying at a polling station in the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic of Transnistria after a voter
exited the poll and asked where she would receive her promised payment. Moldovan authorities previously
reported that Shor used a Russian state bank to distribute at least $15 million to Shor-affiliated
regional leaders and voters in Moldova in September 2024 alone.
Kremlin officials and Russian
milbloggers claimed that Moldovan authorities falsified the results of the election and referendum and
continued to promote long-standing Kremlin narratives targeting Moldova's path towards European
integration. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that Moldovan
authorities used "totalitarian" methods during the election campaign and that the number of votes
supporting the referendum "inexplicably" began to increase during the later stages of counting. Zakharova
claimed that the West is trying to turn Moldova into a "Russophobic NATO appendage deprived of
sovereignty." Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused Moldovan authorities of persecuting opposition
forces and claimed that Russian authorities are monitoring the allegedly questionable increase in the
number of votes for Sandu and in support of the referendum. Several Russian milbloggers, including
Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers, claimed that Moldovan authorities falsified the election results and
adjusted the referendum's voter turnout numbers. One milblogger called for Russian authorities to create
a network of "analytical and information centers" that will study how to influence processes in Moldova
and promote Russia's state interests in Russia.
Key Takeaways:
• Moldova's October
20 European Union (EU) referendum passed by an extremely narrow margin in large part due to support from
the Moldovan diaspora, and current Moldovan President Maia Sandu will face Alexandr Stoianoglo in a
second round of voting on November 3. Several Moldovan and European officials reported potential Russian
interference in the election, and the Kremlin and its affiliates in Moldova will likely continue their
malign influence efforts in the leadup to the November 3 runoff.
• Kremlin officials and
Russian milbloggers claimed that Moldovan authorities falsified the results of the election and
referendum and continued to promote long-standing Kremlin narratives targeting Moldova's path towards
European integration.
• US Secretary of Defense Llyod Austin travelled to Kyiv on October 21
and announced a new $400 million military aid package for Ukraine.
• Russia appears to be
scrambling to reduce tensions with South Korea following credible reports of intensified North Korean
cooperation with Russia, including South Korean and Ukrainian intelligence warnings that a contingent of
North Korean troops has deployed for training to Russia.
• Russian forces continue to
systematically perpetrate war crimes, including the continued executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war
(POWs) and use of chemical weapons.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the western part
of the Kursk Oblast salient.
• Russian forces advanced west of Kreminna, southeast of
Pokrovsk, and southeast of Kurakhove.
• Russian forces recently conducted several mechanized
attacks of various echelons in the Kurakhove direction.
• Russian occupation authorities
continue to coerce occupied Ukrainian populations into signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD).
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Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes on the night of October 21 to 22 targeting
distilleries in Russia that reportedly manufacture products for the Russian military. Tula Oblast
Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged distilleries in Yefremov and
Luzhlovsky. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that the Ukrainian drone strike also damaged local
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Federal Security Service (FSB) buildings near the distillery in
Yefremov. Russian opposition and insider sources posted footage showing a fire near the Yefremov
distillery, synthetic rubber plant (just northwest of the distillery), and thermal power plant (just
northeast of the distillery). Tambov Oblast Governor Maksim Egorov claimed that a drone struck the
Biokhim enterprise in Rasskozovo, starting a fire. Biokhim produces ethyl alcohol, and its website claims
that it manufactures products that are of "strategic importance to the state." Voronezh Oblast
Governor Aleksander Gusev claimed that Russian forces "suppressed" a drone that then fell on an
unspecified industrial enterprise in Voronezh Oblast, damaging a workshop. Head of the Ukrainian Center
for Countering Disinformation Andriy Kovalenko stated that Russia uses alcohol factories to manufacture
fuel for military needs and explosives.
South Korea may be considering directly sending
weapons and intelligence personnel to Ukraine in response to the reported deployment of North Korean
troops to Russia to participate in Russia's war in Ukraine. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on
October 22 that a South Korean government source stated that South Korea is considering sending South
Korean military personnel, likely from intelligence units, to Ukraine to monitor North Korean forces'
tactics and combat capabilities and to question captured North Koreans. The source also reportedly stated
that South Korea will prioritize giving Ukraine defensive weapons over lethal aid but, if South Korea
were to provide lethal weapons, Seoul will first try to find a way to provide them indirectly to Ukraine.
South Korean National Security Director Chang Ho-jin stated on June 20 following the initial creation of
the Russian-North Korean strategic partnership agreement on June 19 that the agreement had encouraged
South Korea to change its long-standing policy prohibiting the transfer of arms to Ukraine, and Yonhap
News Agency reported on June 21 that South Korea was considering sending 155mm artillery shells and
unspecified air defense systems to Ukraine. South Korea's continued consideration of sending lethal aid
to Ukraine comes against the backdrop of threats from Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 20, when
Putin stated that Seoul would be making "a very big mistake" if it decided to supply arms to Ukraine.
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov
told The War Zone on October 22 that the first North Korean military personnel are expected to arrive in
Kursk Oblast on October 23 but that it is unclear how large the force grouping will be or how they will
be equipped. Newsweek reported that a South Korean government official stated that North Korea sent
fighter pilots to Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai in September 2024, possibly to train on Russian combat
aircraft that Russia has allegedly supplied to North Korea, or to supplement Russia's pilot shortages.
Thirty-six world leaders, including from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India, South
Africa, and Iran, arrived in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, for the 16th annual BRICS summit held from
October 22 to 24 during which Russia will likely seek to establish mechanisms to enhance its war effort
in Ukraine. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, the Taliban’s Minister of Trade and Industry Nooruddin
Azizi, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and other
world leaders also arrived in Kazan on October 22. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with PRC
President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS summit during which both leaders emphasized the
importance of multifaceted Russia-PRC relations while Xi highlighted BRICS as a format for global
strategic cooperation. Putin also met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and South African
President Cyril Ramaphosa with whom he discussed bilateral ties, the creation of a multipolar world
order, and the use of national currencies in mutual trade settlements. Modi reiterated the need to find
"the earliest possible" peaceful solution to the war in Ukraine and reaffirmed India’s role as a
potential mediator.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone
strikes on the night of October 21 to 22 targeting distilleries in Russia that reportedly manufacture
products for the Russian military.
• South Korea may be considering directly sending weapons
and intelligence personnel to Ukraine in response to the reported deployment of North Korean troops to
Russia to participate in Russia's war in Ukraine.
• Thirty-six world leaders, including from
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India, South Africa, and Iran, arrived in Kazan, Republic of
Tatarstan, for the 16th annual BRICS summit held from October 22 to 24 during which Russia will likely
seek to establish mechanisms to enhance its war effort in Ukraine.
• A recent Russian opinion
poll suggests that Russian President Vladimir Putin enjoys widespread support among Russian citizens even
though many do not agree with some of the Kremlin's policies, including about the war.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kurakhove and Vuhledar.
• Russian forces conducted multilateral military exercises with international partners. Iran hosted
Russian and Omani naval forces as part of the "IMEX 2024" naval drills, which took place between October
19-20 in the Indian Ocean.
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The adoption of the Kazan Declaration on the second day of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of
Tatarstan on October 23 demonstrated that Russia has not yet secured the international support nor
created the alternative security structure that the Kremlin desires. The Kazan Declaration notably only
mentioned Russia's war in Ukraine once. The declaration states that all signatories should act in
accordance with the principles of the UN Charter — including the provision on respect for territorial
integrity — and that BRICS states welcome "relevant" offers of mediation aimed at ensuring a peaceful
settlement of the war through dialogue and diplomacy. Ukraine has emphasized that the "principles of the
UN Charter" is a main avenue through which Ukraine can achieve peace and highlighted the illegality of
Russia's war under international law. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) responded to the
Kazan Declaration, stating that it shows that Russia failed to "export" its views on changing the world
order and global security architecture to BRICS summit participant states. The Ukrainian MFA stated that
the declaration also demonstrates that BRICS states are not unified around Russia's war against Ukraine,
likely since many of these countries support the UN Charter's principles. Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence
Service similarly assessed that the BRICS summit will not result in the international community's
approval of an alternative system of international settlements that Russia wants and stated that India,
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Brazil, and South Africa opposed the transformation of BRICS into an
anti-US coalition.
People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping reiterated the PRC’s
longstanding position calling for de-escalation in Russia’s war in Ukraine and discouraged the
involvement of third parties in the war amid reports of Russia preparing to deploy North Korean troops to
Ukraine. Xi emphasized the need to promote “a rapid de-escalation" of Russia’s war in Ukraine and avoid
“adding fuel to the fire” during the 16th annual BRICS summit in Kazan on October 23. Xi also stated that
BRICS members must prevent the spreading of the war to “third parties” and avoid the escalation of
hostilities. Xi stated that the PRC, Brazil and countries of the Global South created a group of “Friends
of Peace,” which aims to unite voices in support of a peaceful resolution of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Xi
had previously called for de-escalation of the war and attempted to position the PRC as an impartial
third-party mediator for a negotiated peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine. Russia has been
increasingly leveraging partnerships with North Korea and Iran, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky has accused Russia of directly involving North Korea in the war amid reports of North Korean
combat forces training in Russia for possible participation in the war.
Iranian President
Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated Iran’s intentions to increase ties with Russia and the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23. NOTE: This text also appears in
ISW-CTP's October 23 Iran Update. Pezeshkian met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss
Russo-Iranian economic and strategic relations on the sidelines of the summit. Pezeshkian stated that the
two officials will finalize and sign memorandums soon, suggesting that both states will sign the new
comprehensive strategic partnership agreement. Putin authorized the signing of the deal on September 18.
It is in Iran’s interests to have a formalized agreement with Russia. Iran presumably will seek greater
international support as Israel’s ground and air offensives on the Gaza Strip and Lebanon have disrupted
some elements of Iran’s proxy network. This disruption is particularly notable given that Hezbollah’s
capabilities — which now appear degraded by Israeli action at a minimum — have long served as Iran’s
principal deterrence against Israeli attack. Russia has discouraged Israeli attack on nuclear facilities,
demonstrating the advantages of strong Iranian relations with Russia. The Pezeshkian administration’s
policy continues former President Ebrahim Raisi’s "neighborhood policy.” This policy is centered on
building relations with regional and extra-regional states, thus demonstrating the administration’s
efforts to mitigate the impact of international sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy. The Iranian
regime calculates that mitigating the impact of sanctions increases domestic stability and regime
credibility. Russo-Iranian cooperation has accelerated since the start of Russia’s offensive campaign in
Ukraine due to Iran’s military support in the war.
Key Takeaways:
• The adoption
of the Kazan Declaration on the second day of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on October
23 demonstrated that Russia has not yet secured the international support nor created the alternative
security structure that the Kremlin desires.
• People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi
Jinping reiterated the PRC’s longstanding position calling for de-escalation in Russia’s war in Ukraine
and discouraged the involvement of third parties in the war amid reports of Russia preparing to deploy
North Korean troops to Ukraine.
• Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated Iran’s
intentions to increase ties with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the BRICS Summit in
Kazan, Russia, on October 23.
• Russian forces have made significant tactical advances into
and around Selydove in recent days, but the Russian military command's apparent focus on securing
Selydove has come at the expense of Russian forces' ability to sustain a meaningful offensive drive
directly on Pokrovsk — Russia's self-defined operational objective on this sector of the front.
• The Pentagon and White House confirmed the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia.
• Russia and Belarus announced plans to conduct the “Zapad-2025” command staff exercise on an
unspecified date in 2025 against the backdrop of deepening Russian-Belarusian security integration within
the Union State framework.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk
Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.
• The Russian military is reportedly coercing Russian conscripts into contract service in the Russian
military by issuing enlistment bonuses to conscripts who never signed military service contracts with the
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
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Russian President Vladimir Putin failed to deny the presence of North Korean military personnel in Russia
on October 24, amid official Ukrainian reports that the first North Korean military units arrived in
Kursk Oblast on October 23. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on October 24
that the first units of North Korean personnel arrived in Kursk Oblast on October 23. The GUR reported
that the North Korean personnel trained at the Baranovsky military training ground in Ussuriysk,
Primorsky Krai; the Donguz military training ground in Ulan-Ude, Republic of Buryatia; the
Yekaterinoslavsky military training ground in Yekaterinslavka, Amur Oblast; the 248th military training
ground in Knyazye-Volkonskoye, Khabarovsk Krai; and the 249th military training ground in Primorsky Krai.
The GUR reported that the Russian military spent several weeks coordinating with the North Korean
military units. The GUR reported that North Korea has transferred roughly 12,000 North Korean personnel,
including 500 officers and three generals, to Russia and that Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel
General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov is responsible for overseeing the training and adaptation of the North Korean
military personnel. The GUR noted that the Russian military is providing ammunition and other personal
kit to the North Korean personnel. Russian President Vladimir Putin responded to a question at a press
conference after the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, regarding recently released South
Korean intelligence satellite imagery reportedly showing North Korean troops in Russia. Putin wryly
responded that "photos are a serious thing" and "reflect something." Putin reiterated the mutual defense
article in the Russian-North Korean strategic partnership agreement with North Korea, announced in June
2024 and officially ratified by the Russian State Duma on October 24, 2024.
Belarusian
President Alexander Lukashenko strongly hinted that Belarusian forces will not fight in Ukraine and
appeared to question Russian President Vladimir Putin's likely efforts to introduce North Korean forces
into Russia's war against Ukraine in the process. Lukashenko answered a question from the BBC on October
23 about reports of North Korean troops going to fight alongside Russian forces in Ukraine, claiming that
these reports are "rubbish," that Russian President Vladimir Putin would "never try to persuade" another
state to involve its army in Russia's war in Ukraine, and that the deployment of armed forces from any
state – including from Belarus – to the frontline in Ukraine would be a "step towards the escalation" of
the war. Lukashenko claimed that if "we" (Belarussians) got involved in the war, this would be the "path
to escalation" and that NATO would deploy forces to Ukraine in response to another country's involvement.
Lukashenko continued to deny that Belarus was involved in the Russia's launch of its full-scale invasion
of Ukraine in part from Belarussian territory. Lukashenko also gave an interview on October 23 to Russian
state-run TV channel Rossiya 1 in which he claimed that he did not think that the Russian leadership or
military needs North Korean troops as there are enough Russian forces on the front and Russia has
significant mobilization resources. Lukashenko claimed that Moscow understands that the deployment of
North Korean forces to the war would be "undesirable for Russia" and that the West will respond by
sending NATO troops to Ukraine. Kremlin newswire TASS notably did not report on Lukashenko's statements
about how the use of North Korean forces in Russia's war against Ukraine is not in Russia's interests and
only reported on his claims that NATO would deploy troops to Ukraine in response to the participation of
North Korean forces in the war.
The Kremlin is reportedly attempting to portray the BRICS
summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan as evidence of widespread international support for Russia –
especially to domestic audiences in Russia. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on October 24 that
it reviewed the Russian Presidential Administration's manual to Russian state media and propagandists
with guidelines about how to frame the ongoing BRICS summit in Kazan. The manual reportedly highlighted
three themes: Russian President Vladimir Putin is the "informal lead of the world majority," Western
elites are "panicking," and "anxiety" is prevalent in the West generally. The Kremlin reportedly told
media outlets to report that the BRICS summit "has the world's attention" and proves that "attempts to
isolate" Russia after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine have "failed." Meduza reported that media
outlets are supposed to highlight how Putin establishes "strategic ties that are not limited to one
direction" in contrast to the West's alleged "fleeting alliances" (NATO celebrated its 75th anniversary
this year). Russian state media and propagandists recently published articles highlighting many of these
themes, sometimes even word for word as reportedly written in the manual." Russian opposition outlet
Verstka reported on October 24 that pro-Russian bots on Russian social media site VKontakte (VK) have
left over 10,000 comments in two days about the BRICS summit – reportedly one of the largest Kremlin bot
efforts recently. The bots were promoting the idea that Russia is not internationally isolated, that
BRICS' influence is growing, that anti-Russian sanctions are decreasing in importance, and that Russian
forces are achieving successes in Ukraine. A Russian insider source claimed on October 24 that
unspecified Kremlin-linked sources stated that BRICS states largely do not support Russia's position on
its war in Ukraine, forcing the Kremlin to push this topic into the background in order to achieve some
kind of "serious international association." The insider source claimed that multiple meetings during the
summit discussed the People's Republic of China's (PRC) and Brazil's peace proposals – which favor Russia
– but that these discussions "ultimately led to nothing." ISW assessed on October 23 that the adoption of
the Kazan Declaration on the second day of the BRICS summit demonstrated that Russia has not yet secured
the international support nor created the alternative security structure that the Kremlin desires.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin failed to deny the presence of North
Korean military personnel in Russia on October 24, amid official Ukrainian reports that the first North
Korean military units arrived in Kursk Oblast on October 23.
• Belarusian President Alexander
Lukashenko strongly hinted that Belarusian forces will not fight in Ukraine and appeared to question
Russian President Vladimir Putin's likely efforts to introduce North Korean forces into Russia's war
against Ukraine in the process.
• The Kremlin is reportedly attempting to portray the BRICS
summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan as evidence of widespread international support for Russia –
especially to domestic audiences in Russia.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to
project Russian confidence in the Russian military's ability to repel the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk
Oblast at a press conference after the BRICS summit on October 24.
• Ukrainian authorities are
investigating another execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) by Russian forces in the Pokrovsk
direction against the backdrop of Russian forces' increasingly frequent POW executions across the
theater.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and
Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna and Siversk.
• The
Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), Ministry of Defense (MoD), and Rosgvardia reportedly each
have their own Akhmat units that perform different functions in different sectors of the front and
rear.
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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia will imminently deploy North Korean forces to
unspecified combat zones on October 27 and 28, as Russian and North Korean officials continued to issue
vague yet suggestive statements regarding the possible presence of North Korean troops in Russia.
Zelensky stressed that Russia's involvement of North Korean forces in combat is an escalatory step and
urged the international community to apply pressure on Moscow and Pyongyang. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben
Brekelmans confirmed on October 25 that Dutch intelligence assesses that Russia is deploying at least
1,500 North Korean forces likely to Kursk Oblast. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR)
published an intercepted audio recording on October 25 in which elements of the Russian 810th Naval
Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Southern Military District ) operating in Kursk Oblast reportedly
expressed concerns about the ability of North Korean troops to adjust to Russian command culture and
language upon their deployment to the region. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian air assault brigade operating
in the Kursk direction stated that Ukrainian forces have not yet observed North Korean troops in Kursk
Oblast and emphasized that North Korean forces do not have experience fighting in large-scale,
technologically-driven wars. Head of Ukraine’s Center for Military Legal Research Oleksandr Mysyenko
stated on October 25 that Russia’s efforts to directly involve North Korean forces in the war are
ultimately indicative of Russia's inability to recruit sufficient personnel amid systematic yet likely
unsuccessful attempts to recruit volunteers domestically.
North Korean Vice Foreign Minister
Kim Jong Gyu failed to deny reports of North Korean troop deployments to Russia but claimed that such
deployments would be in line with principles of international law. Russian President Vladimir Putin once
again failed to deny the presence of the North Korean troops in Russia during an interview with Russian
state TV channel Rossiya 1 on October 25 following the conclusion of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic
of Tatarstan and stated that it is Russia’s sovereign decision to activate the Treaty on Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership between Russia and North Korea signed on June 18, 2024. Russian Deputy Foreign
Minister Sergei Ryabkov similarly claimed that the provision of military assistance under the treaty is a
signal of deterrence and that military assistance will be activated only in the event of “aggression”
against any of the parties to the treaty. The participation of North Korean troops in combat operations
in Kursk Oblast or frontline areas in Ukraine would make North Korea an active combatant and belligerent
in Russia's war in Ukraine. The Kremlin may be setting information operations to accuse Ukraine of being
the aggressor in Russia's invasion of Ukraine to justify its use of North Korean forces as combatants in
its war.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signaled that Western “Ukraine fatigue” is
encouraging Russia to continue its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and pursue its theory of victory
predicated on Russia outlasting Western support for Ukraine. Putin responded to a question during an
interview with Russian state TV channel Rossiya 1 on October 25 following the conclusion of the BRICS
summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on whether exhausted Ukrainian troops, Western war fatigue, or
Russian military’s power is contributing to the success of Russian theater-wide offensive operations.
Putin responded by stating that Russia should continue to double down on its war effort in Ukraine and
not pay attention to discussions of the enemy's fatigue. Putin added that the West is “beginning to
realistically assess the situation around Ukraine” and “change its rhetoric” about the need for Russia’s
“strategic defeat,” and that Russia can “only praise” the West for this rhetorical shift away from
complete Russian defeat in Ukraine. Putin later stated in the interview that any outcome of Russia’s war
in Ukraine must be in Russia’s favor and be based on the "realities on the battlefield," indicating that
Russia remains committed to its original goal of forcing the Ukrainian government to capitulate and
destroying Ukraine’s statehood and military and that Western hesitance in support for Ukraine only
encourages Russia's commitment to this goal. ISW continues to assess that Putin’s theory of victory rests
on a critical assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine to Russian victory, either of its own accord
or in response to Russian efforts to persuade the West to do so, and that it is far from clear that the
West will do so.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned
that Russia will imminently deploy North Korean forces to unspecified combat zones on October 27 and 28,
as Russian and North Korean officials continued to issue vague yet suggestive statements regarding the
possible presence of North Korean troops in Russia.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin
signaled that Western “Ukraine fatigue” is encouraging Russia to continue its full-scale invasion of
Ukraine and pursue its theory of victory predicated on Russia outlasting Western support for Ukraine.
• Putin also continued to exaggerate Russian progress in Kursk Oblast, likely in an attempt to
reassure domestic audiences of the Russian military's ability to suppress Ukraine's incursion into Kursk
Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR)
“Sparta” Battalion Commander and Plenipotentiary Representative in the Urals Lieutenant Colonel Artyom
Zhoga to the Russian Security Council, likely in an ongoing effort to establish younger, pro-war figures
within the Kremlin.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia does not seek to
“influence” elections of other countries "unlike the West" amid continued evidence to the contrary.
• Russian authorities swiftly responded to xenophobic riots in Korkino, Chelyabinsk Oblast on
October 25, a marked change from Russian authorities' slow and disorganized response to the October 2023
antisemitic riots in the Republic of Dagestan.
• German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall
announced on October 24 that it recently delivered 20 additional Marder infantry fighting vehicles to
Ukraine and noted that Germany financed the delivery of the vehicles.
• Ukrainian forces
advanced near Borki and regained lost territory near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.
• Russian forces
advanced near Siversk, Pokrovsk, and regained territory near Obukhovka.
• The Kremlin is
continuing to forge new state-affiliated veteran societies and organizations likely in an ongoing effort
to replace veteran organizations that have been critical of Russia’s conduct of war in Ukraine.
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Bloomberg reported on October 25, citing South Korean intelligence documents, that a second group of
North Korean soldiers will soon deploy to Russia. Bloomberg reported that it viewed South Korean
intelligence documents from an unspecified date that assessed that the first group of 1,500 North Korean
"elite special forces" had arrived in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai between October 8 and 13 and that this
first group was part of a planned deployment of roughly 10,000 North Korean soldiers in total. Bloomberg
also reported that the documents assessed that North Korea has sent roughly 8 million rounds of 122mm and
152mm shells to Russia since August 2023, roughly 100 KN-23 Hwasong-11 ballistic missiles, and an
unspecified number of Bulsae-4 anti-tank weapons. Bloomberg, citing two people familiar with the matter,
stated that South Korean officials will share South Korea's assessments about North Korean-Russian
cooperation with NATO officials at an October 28 NATO meeting. The New York Times (NYT), citing one
unnamed Ukrainian official and two unnamed US officials, reported on October 25 that "several thousand"
North Korean soldiers arrived at Kursk Oblast to participate in an upcoming Russian counteroffensive
operation to push Ukrainian forces from their salient in Kursk Oblast. The officials stated that North
Korean forces have not engaged in combat operations yet and that the North Korean forces' task in Kursk
oblast is unclear. The officials noted that a significant contingent of North Korean forces would help
the Russian military to avoid pulling additional forces from eastern Ukraine to participate in
counteroffensive operations in Kursk Oblast. A senior Ukrainian official told the NYT that a maximum
number of 5,000 elite North Korean troops had likely arrived in Russia by October 21. The participation
of North Korean troops in combat operations in Kursk Oblast or frontline areas in Ukraine would make
North Korea an active combatant and belligerent in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
German arms
manufacturer Rheinmetall announced preparations to open additional defense industrial plants in Ukraine.
Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger announced on October 26 that Rheinmetall already opened one plant in
Ukraine that serves as a maintenance and production facility for infantry fighting vehicles and main
battle tanks and is on track to build a powder factory and a munitions manufacturing plant in Ukraine.
Papperger added that Rheinmetall expects to begin the production of the Lynx infantry fighting vehicles
at the recently operational plant in Ukraine by the end of 2024. Rheinmetall also reportedly plans to
open a joint production facility for air defense systems in Ukraine. Rheinmetall announced in March 2024
that it plans to open at least four weapons manufacturing plants in Ukraine.
Key Takeaways:
• Bloomberg reported on October 25, citing South Korean intelligence documents, that a second
group of North Korean soldiers will soon deploy to Russia. • German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall
announced preparations to open additional defense industrial plants in Ukraine. • Russian forces
recently advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast and near Pokrovsk and Vuhledar. • Russian
military command is reportedly continuing to commit military specialists to assault operations and
incurring unnecessary losses, likely in an effort to centralize control over Russian forces and maintain
the tempo of Russian offensive operations throughout the theater.
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Was sagt die Wagenknecht…. die Russen kriegen von den Iranern Drohnen, Raketen, usw, die Chinesen
liefern die Elektronik und alles mögliche an Ausrüstung, die Nordkoreaner Soldaten, dies alles ohne
Fragen und sogenannte rote Linien. Und die Ukrainer betteln seit Monaten, dass sie Raketen auf
militärische Ziele in Russland richten dürfen, von denen sie täglich mit Bomben und Drohnen attackiert
werden. Israel? verstehe das muss man differenziert betrachten Die Ukrainer können einem echt
leid tun.
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>die Russen kriegen von den Iranern Drohnen, Raketen, usw, die >Chinesen liefern die
Elektronik und alles mögliche an >Ausrüstung, die Nordkoreaner Soldaten, dies alles ohne
Fragen >und sogenannte rote Linien.
Ja, aber wenn beide Seiten massiv aufrüsten
kommt es auch nicht zum Frieden. Wie ich schon vor einiger Zeit gesagt habe, du kannst gegen solche
Mächte(Russland, China etc.) auf Dauer, ohne wirklicher Ausrüstung und Armee, keinen Krieg führen. Oder
wie US-Senatoren drauf bestehen "bis zum letzten Mann".
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Russia's economy and war effort is coming under increasing strain, which will pose increasingly acute
challenges to Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to sustain the war over the long term. The
Washington Post reported on October 27 that the Russian economy is "in danger of overheating," noting
that Russia's excessively high military spending has fueled economic growth in a way that has forced
Russian companies to artificially raise their salaries in order to fulfill labor demands by remaining
competitive with Russia’s high military salaries. The Washington Post quoted Russian Central Bank Head
Elvira Nabiullina, who warned in July 2024 that Russia's labor force and production capacity are "almost
exhausted." The Washington Post noted that private Russian companies are struggling to keep up with
Russian military salaries and are increasingly having to offer wages several times higher than the
typical industry averages. ISW has recently reported that Russian regional authorities are significantly
increasing the one-time signing bonuses for Russian contract servicemembers in order to sustain Russia’s
rate of force generation (roughly 30,000 troops per month), which underscores the fact that Russia does
not have an indefinite pool of manpower and must financially and socially reckon with the ever-growing
costs of replenishing its frontline losses via various force-generation avenues. The Washington Post also
noted that Russia's stringent migration policies, particularly after the March 2024 Crocus City Hall
attack, have further depleted Russia's labor pool and amplified economic frictions. This has particularly
become the case as migrant workers are increasingly identifying Russia as a hostile and unattractive
place to relocate for work. ISW has reported at length on the balance that Putin is trying to strike
between catering to his pro-war ultranationalist constituency, which espouses extreme anti-migrant
sentiments, and his practical need to leverage migrant labor both economically and militarily.
Putin very likely assesses that calling another partial mobilization wave, or introducing general
mobilization, will be too costly to his regime, and has therefore resorted to crypto-mobilization efforts
that appear to be placing greater and greater strains on the Russian wartime economy. The recent
appearance of North Korean troops in Russia, and their reported deployment to the combat zone in Kursk
Oblast, further suggests that Putin's entire force-generation system is very tenuous. The costs of
fueling the war will increase as Russia continues to burn through manpower and materiel on the frontline.
Russian resources are finite, and Putin cannot reckon with these costs indefinitely. Russia's economy
will reach a burnout point. That burnout point will inflict great costs on Russian society, which may
force Putin to make major decisions about how to resource Russia’s war or change Russia’s mode of
warfighting to preserve his regime’s stability.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia's economy
and war effort is coming under increasing strain, which will pose increasingly acute challenges to
Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to sustain the war over the long term.
• Ukrainian
and Russian forces both advanced within the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian
forces advanced in and near Selydove and northwest of Vuhledar.
• Russian authorities are
using Cossack organizations to militarize Russian children and build out Russia's force generation
reserve in the long term.
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NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced that South Korean intelligence officials shared evidence with
NATO officials on October 28 that North Korean units are operating in Kursk Oblast. Rutte stated that
senior representatives from South Korea's National Intelligence Service and Ministry of National Defense
and other Western allies shared intelligence assessments during a meeting on the morning of October 28
about North Korea's growing involvement in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Rutte stated that the deployment
of North Korean forces represented a significant escalation in North Korea's involvement in Russia's
invasion of Ukraine, a breach of United National Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, and a “dangerous
expansion” of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Rutte, on behalf of NATO, called for Russia and North Korea
to immediately cease these actions and stated that he will meet with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol
and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov later on October 28. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence
Directorate (GUR) reported on October 27 that Russian forces are transferring North Korean military
personnel along the E38 Kursk-Voronezh highway in vehicles with civilian license plates. Ukraine's
Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated on October 28 that Ukrainian
forces have not engaged North Korean forces in combat or taken North Korean forces as prisoners of war
(POWs), although Ukrainian intelligence has information indicating that North Korean forces have been
transferred to Kursk Oblast. ISW previously noted that the involvement of North Korean troops in combat
operations in Kursk Oblast or frontline areas in Ukraine would make North Korea an active combatant and
belligerent in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces conducted another series of
drone strikes against Russian distilleries on the night of October 27 to 28, reportedly to reduce Russian
aviation capabilities. Voronezh Oblast Governor Aleksander Gusev claimed that falling drone debris
damaged two unspecified industrial enterprises in Anninsky and Novokhopersky raions. Geolocated footage
shows a fire in Krasnoye, Novokhopersky Raion. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian
drones struck the Ethanol Spirit distillery in Krasnoye. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation
Head Andriy Kovalenko posted footage of a drone strike against a distillery in Krasnoye and noted that
Russian distilleries produce rocket fuel and fuel for aviation brake systems, technical needs, and
anti-icing agents. Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian strikes against Russian distilleries are meant to
reduce Russian aviation capabilities. Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes on the night
of October 21 to 22 targeting distilleries in Tula Oblast.
Key Takeaways:
• NATO
Secretary General Mark Rutte announced that South Korean intelligence officials shared evidence with NATO
officials on October 28 that North Korean units are operating in Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian
forces conducted another series of drone strikes against Russian distilleries on the night of October 27
to 28, reportedly to reduce Russian aviation capabilities.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin
briefly acknowledged Russia's labor shortages on October 28, but highlighted Russia's low unemployment
rates in an attempt to reframe this challenge in a beneficial light and claim that the Russian economy is
able to sustain a long war in Ukraine.
• The Moldovan Constitutional Court stated it that it
will review the results of the October 20 European Union (EU) referendum on October 31, and the third
runner up in the first round of the presidential election announced that he would not endorse a candidate
in the runoff.
• Georgian civil society, opposition, and international election observers
continue to reject the results of the 2024 Georgian parliament elections amid a large-scale demonstration
in Tbilisi on October 28.
• Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Kupyansk,
southeast of Pokrovsk, and southwest of Donetsk City.
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The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has increased in recent weeks but remains slow and consistent
with positional warfare rather than with rapid mechanized maneuver—emphasizing how generally stagnant
Russian advances have been after over two and half years of war. Recent Western reporting linking the
Russian rate of advance in September 2024 with Russian advances at the start of the war is highly
misleading. ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced at an average rate of 1,265 square kilometers per
day in March 2022—roughly 90 times the roughly 14 square kilometers that ISW calculates that Russian
forces have taken per day in September 2024. Rapid Russian advances deep into Ukrainian territory,
including the temporary seizure of large portions of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts
characterized the first month of the Russian full-scale invasion, whereas more recent Russian advances
have been characterized by small-scale, localized, tactical advances. Russian forces have been making
gains in eastern Ukraine recently, but comparing those gains to the initial deep Russian penetration into
Ukraine at the start of the war misleadingly frames these most recent advances. For example, Russian
forces seized the settlement of Vuhledar as of October 1, 2024, have continued to advance north and
northwest of Vuhledar, and have made significant tactical gains in and near Selydove (southeast of
Pokrovsk) over the course of the past week. These respective advances are tactically significant but do
not represent a general increase in the pace of Russian advances across the frontline, much of which
remains relatively stagnant, nor are they within two orders of magnitude of the rate of Russian advance
in the first stage of the war. The current rate of Russian advances is consistent, rather, with ISW's
recent assessment that the Russian command has likely ordered Russian forces to significantly increase
their tempo of mechanized attacks throughout the theater before the full onset of muddy ground conditions
in the fall months.
Russian officials and milbloggers are conducting information operations
that falsely portray the Georgian opposition's peaceful and legal challenges to the conduct of the
October 26 parliamentary election results as a Western- and Ukrainian-sponsored illegal coup d'état.
Russian state media claimed on October 29 that the West is supporting the transfer of Ukraine-trained
snipers to Georgia in order to organize false flag provocations and trigger a pro-Western coup akin to
the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity that started in 2013, which Russian actors have often labeled a
Western-instigated illegal coup. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev called on
October 28 for the arrest of Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili, falsely claiming that she “called
for a coup.” Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
Spokesperson Maria Zakharova baselessly suggested that the West ordered the opposition protests, which
they claim are trying to destabilize Georgia. Russian milbloggers also widely claimed that the West and
Ukraine are sponsoring a revolution via the Georgian opposition and Zourabicvhili and that Georgian
opposition reports of Russian interference in the Georgian elections are false, Western-backed talking
points.
The Russian information space continues to closely echo the rhetoric of the ruling
Georgian Dream party. Georgian Prime Minister Kobakhidze rejected the claims of election irregularities
on October 28, and Georgian Dream member of parliament and Vice-Speaker of Parliament Nino Tsilosani
claimed on October 29 that the opposition is attempting to organize a coup. ISW previously assessed that
Georgian Dream’s rhetoric has increasingly echoed that of the Kremlin, particularly the Kremlin's
narratives that aim to justify Russia's violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
post-Soviet countries that seek greater Western integration, including Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
Key Takeaways: • The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has increased in recent weeks but
remains slow and consistent with positional warfare rather than with rapid mechanized
maneuver—emphasizing how generally stagnant Russian advances have been after over two and half years of
war. • Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to use an annual Russian nuclear deterrence
exercise to further boilerplate nuclear saber-rattling information operations that aim to influence
Western decision making. • Recent Russian polling suggests that Russian domestic support for local
government entities has somewhat declined over the past year, most likely in response to increased
crypto-mobilization force generation efforts at the regional level. • Russian officials and
milbloggers are conducting information operations that falsely portray the Georgian opposition's peaceful
and legal challenges to the conduct of the October 26 parliamentary election results as a Western- and
Ukrainian-sponsored illegal coup d'état. • The Georgian protests have been peaceful and legal - far
from the Russian claims of an illegal coup. • These concerted Russian efforts to baselessly
discredit the Georgian pro-Western opposition and civil society are part of a common Kremlin tactic aimed
at framing the valid and legal concerns of pro-Western political entities in the post-Soviet space as
illegitimate and violent. • Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk, and Russian forces made
advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and southwest of Donetsk City. • The Russian Ministry
of Defense (MOD) continues to rely on Russia's prison population to replace depleted Russian units on the
frontline.
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Western intelligence officials reportedly stated that North Korean troops are in an unspecified area in
occupied Ukraine. CNN, citing two unspecified Western intelligence officials, reported on October 30 that
a small number of North Korean personnel are in occupied Ukraine but did not specify their location — the
first such confirmation from Western sources. The intelligence officials stated that they expect the
number of North Korean personnel in Ukraine to grow as they complete training in Russia. Ukrainian and
South Korean officials reported in early October 2024 the presence of a limited number of North Korean
personnel in occupied Donetsk City, mainly engineering personnel, who were likely repairing or somehow
improving the quality of a large amount of low-quality ammunition that North Korea provided to the
Russian military. The reports from Western intelligence officials could refer to the same group of North
Korean personnel or similar specialists conducting engineering work in occupied Ukraine. Financial Times
reported on October 30 that senior unspecified Ukrainian intelligence officials have stated that Russian
authorities transferred about 3,000 North Korean personnel to western Kursk Oblast from other areas in
Russia in civilian vehicles and that the group consisted of a few hundred special forces servicemembers
and regular troops. North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui visited Russia on October 29 but did not
specify the purpose of the visit. AP, citing South Korean intelligence, reported on October 29 that Choe
might have visited Russia to discuss the deployment of additional North Korean troops to Russia. Russian
Foreign ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that the arrival of the North Korean foreign
minister was pre-planned, in line with Russia–North Korea cooperation.
Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted enhanced Ukraine–South Korea cooperation amid since-retracted reports that
South Korea would consider providing direct military assistance to Ukraine. Zelensky reported on October
29 that he had discussed enhanced intelligence cooperation with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol in
order to develop an action plan and propose a set of countermeasures in response to Russian and North
Korean escalation of the war. Zelensky announced that the two countries will soon exchange delegations to
coordinate their actions and that they will involve common partners in their proposed intelligence
cooperation. South Korean news outlet The Dong-A Ilbo reported on October 30 that the South Korean
government was considering providing 155mm artillery shells directly to Ukraine, but the South Korean
presidential office denied these reports, stating that Ukrainian officials have not requested such
assistance.
Key Takeaways:
• Western intelligence officials reportedly stated that
North Korean troops are in an unspecified area in occupied Ukraine.
• Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted enhanced Ukraine-South Korea cooperation amid since-retracted reports that
South Korea would consider providing direct military assistance to Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is
reportedly struggling to prepare for the September 2026 Russian State Duma elections campaign due to
uncertainty about the course of the war in the Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin is not confident that
Russia will be able to win the war over the next two years.
• The Kremlin simultaneously
continues to militarize various levels of Russian government, likely in preparation for long-term war
efforts in Ukraine and confrontation against NATO despite the reported lack of preparation for the Duma
elections.
• The US Treasury and State departments sanctioned nearly 400 entities and
individuals from over a dozen countries on October 30 in one of the largest concerted efforts to address
Russian sanctions evasions via third parties to date.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained
positions near Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kreminna,
Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to advertise
Russian military service to civilians in occupied Ukraine.
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North Korea and Russia signed an agreement on October 30 to cooperate in the sphere of digital
communications — the latest development in Russian-North Korean cooperation likely aimed at enhancing the
Kremlin's digital authoritarianism tools to increase domestic repressions. The North Korean Ministry of
Information Technology and the Russian Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media
signed a cooperation agreement on October 30 that includes cooperation in the fields of communications,
information technology, and digital development. Russia and North Korea signed an agreement on joint work
between the Russian and North Korean prosecutor generals' offices in July 2024, after which Russian
Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov stated that Russia wanted to learn about North Korean judicial practice,
particularly in the spheres of communication and information technology. ISW previously assessed that the
North Korean-Russian judicial agreement was likely part of Kremlin efforts to increase Russia's arsenal
of domestic control methods and consolidate control over the Russian information space, including via
messaging platforms and virtual private network (VPN) services. The details of the October 30 digital
communications agreement are unclear, but it is likely similarly aimed at increasing Russia's tools for
domestic information space repression.
The South Korean government reportedly intends to send
an unspecified number of South Korean personnel to Ukraine to monitor North Korean troops. South Korean
newspaper Hankyoreh reported on October 31 that a senior South Korean presidential office official stated
on October 30 that South Korea has a "legitimate need" to analyze North Korean military activities in the
war in Ukraine and "feels the need" to establish a team to monitor North Korean troops and the
battlefield situation. South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun reportedly stated on October 31 that
the South Korean defense minister can make the decision about the monitoring team's deployment without
parliamentary approval. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on October 22 that a South Korean
government source stated that South Korea was considering sending South Korean military personnel, likely
from intelligence units, to Ukraine to monitor North Korean forces' tactics and combat capabilities and
to question captured North Koreans. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 29 that he
discussed enhanced intelligence cooperation with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol.
Key
Takeaways:
• North Korea and Russia signed an agreement on October 30 to cooperate in the
sphere of digital communications — the latest development in Russian-North Korean cooperation likely
aimed at enhancing the Kremlin's digital authoritarianism tools to increase domestic repressions.
• The South Korean government reportedly intends to send an unspecified number of South Korean
personnel to Ukraine to monitor North Korean troops.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin
continues to communicate that he is uninterested in a negotiated ceasefire and is committed to achieving
his goal of destroying Ukrainian statehood.
• Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide
military aid to Ukraine and ensure future aid provisions over the long-term.
• The Russian
military command continues to commit seriously wounded personnel to highly attritional infantry-led
“meat” assaults in the Kurakhove direction as Russian President Vladimir Putin attempts to posture
himself as deeply concerned with the medical treatment of Russian veterans.
• The Moldovan
Constitutional Court confirmed on October 31 the passing of the October 20 European Union (EU) referendum
with a 50.72 percent turnout rate.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Svatove,
Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar, and Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near
Kurakhove.
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North Korea Joins Russia's War Against Ukraine: Operational and Strategic Implications in Ukraine and
Northeast Asia
North Korea has deployed a contingent of troops to Russia in support of
Russia's war in Ukraine —the latest development in intensified cooperation between the two countries
since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The Kremlin is likely to leverage North
Korean manpower to support its ongoing offensive efforts and offset requirements of Russia's domestic
force generation capacity. The impacts of the deployment of North Korean troops into the Ukrainian
theater of operations extend far beyond the battlefield in Ukraine, however. Pyongyang likely hopes that
North Korean military personnel will gain combat experience in the conditions of contemporary war —
experience that it may hope to apply to future conflicts it may fight. The alignment between North Korea
and Russia poses the distinct possibility of threatening the long-term stability of the Korean Peninsula
and the broader Asia-Pacific region.
Key takeaways:
• The implications of a
long-term alignment between Russia and North Korea extend far beyond the battlefield in Ukraine and may
have long-term impacts on the stability of the Korean Peninsula and Asia-Pacific region.
• The
war in Ukraine will change the character of all future wars, and Pyongyang has evidently identified this
fact as a vital learning opportunity for its forces. North Korea's military has not experienced
large-scale conventional combat since 1953 and understands that its doctrine is unprepared to fight in a
modern war, especially against a sophisticated adversary such as South Korea.
• North Korea
likely hopes that its forces will have the opportunity to refine offensive doctrine, test their weapons
systems against a Western-provisioned adversary, gain command and control experience, and learn how to
operate drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems on the modern battlefield. Pyongyang likely hopes that
any skills its troops learn in the Ukraine war will give it an offensive edge in future conflicts,
including on the Korean Peninsula.
• The actual ability of North Korean forces to absorb,
disseminate, and institutionalize lessons learned on the battlefield is entirely contingent on how the
Russian command uses North Korean manpower. If Russia uses North Korean personnel as "cannon fodder," the
casualties that North Korean troops are sure to accrue will undermine whatever battlefield lessons
Pyongyang hopes to learn.
• North Korea may be using its increasing alignment with Russia to
reduce its reliance on the People's Republic of China (PRC), therefore reducing Beijing’s leverage over
the North Korean regime. A reduction of PRC leverage over North Korea will likely reduce the stability of
the Korean Peninsula and endanger the broader Asia-Pacific region, because the PRC uses its leverage to
restrain North Korea’s aggression.
• North Korea’s recent partnership agreement and
strengthening relations with Russia may help it advance the development of its nuclear weapons program,
even if Russian aid does not take the form of direct technical assistance to the program.
• Pyongyang may be trying to secure Russian defense commitments in the case of a conflict on the Korean
Peninsula as part of the larger quid pro quo for committing such a large contingent of North Korean
troops to an entirely foreign conflict. The 2024 Russia-North Korea mutual defense agreement may allow
Russia to avoid committing troops to an inter-Korean war, however.
• North Korea’s defense
agreement with Russia increases the credibility and effectiveness of its threats and coercion toward
South Korea.
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Patriarch Kirill, head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP),
highlighted ongoing social and ideological divides within Russian society while reiterating boilerplate
justifications for the war in Ukraine during a speech on October 31. Kirill offered his assessment of the
main external and internal threats to the Russian state during a meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium
of the World Russian People's Council, which include ethno-religious conflict, migration, and Russia's
ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Kirill noted that while the war in Ukraine is the "most pressing threat" to
the Russian state, some people within Russian society "prefer to ignore" what is happening on the
frontline in Ukraine and the struggles of people who live in Russian border areas closer to the combat
zone. Kirill criticized Russians who are unwilling to "give up their personal comforts" and who are
relying on "frivolous entertainment" to distract them from the reality of the war.
Kirill's
rebuke of Russians who are apathetic and disinterested in the war suggests that the Kremlin may be
increasingly concerned about the sustainability of Russian society's support for the war. Recent Russian
opinion polls have suggested that support for local Russian government entities and some Kremlin
policies, including the invasion of Ukraine, may be wavering, although Russian citizens continue to
widely support Russian President Vladimir Putin. Additional polling has suggested that most Russians,
particularly Russians who have not personally lost family members in Ukraine, are largely apathetic to
the invasion and are able to avoid thinking about the invasion entirely as long as it does not personally
affect them. The Kremlin may be concerned about the growing cleavage between Russian citizens who have
been immediately impacted by the invasion and Russians who have successfully insulated themselves and
their families from the invasion. The Kremlin may also be concerned about apathy towards the invasion in
the context of the possible societal reaction to conducting a second wave of mobilization, to which most
Russians remain averse. Kirill has previously acted as a key figure in injecting Kremlin narratives into
the Russian information space, and the Kremlin may be in the early stages of justifying and preparing
Russian society to support a future wave of mobilization.
Kirill also highlighted the growing
trend of brutality and cruelty in the Russian military and attempted to excuse this trend as the
emergence of a “neo-pagan” cult. Kirill stated on October 31 that neo-pagan preachers are trying to
revive paganism and instill a "cult of brute force and cruelty” in Russia. Kirill added that neo-pagans
are introducing a false belief that Christianity discourages personal heroism and valor and that "holy"
Russian servicemen disprove this belief with their conduct, but he then noted that "neo-paganism" is
present in the Russian army. Kirill concluded the segment by criticizing Halloween celebrations in
Russia, and Kirill likely used the occasion to introduce a discussion about Russian servicemen committing
brutal and cruel acts on the frontlines or upon their return to Russia from the frontlines.
ISW has observed numerous instances of Russian military personnel, especially former Wagner Group
fighters, committing gruesome acts against fellow Russian servicemen on the frontlines, Ukrainian forces
and civilians, and Russian citizens upon their return from the frontlines. Russia is likely to see a
significant rise of brutality and cruelty in its communities upon the arrival of more traumatized Russian
servicemen home as long as it continues to brutalize its soldiers; refuses to provide the necessary
psychological assistance to returning veterans; and militarizes its society, educational institutions,
and government.
Russian authorities also continue to identify conflict between ethnic Russians
and minority groups as a critical issue. Kirill identified "issues with migrants" and ethno-religious
tensions as key internal threats to the Russian state during his October 31 speech, and Russian Security
Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev noted on October 31 that Russia needs to address its migration
issues. Medvedev suggested that Russia should introduce "digital migrant profile," which would reportedly
allow Russian authorities to stop foreigners at any time and identify foreigners via electronic
immigration or travel documents. ISW has reported at length on the balance that Putin is trying to strike
between catering to his pro-war ultranationalist constituency, which espouses extreme anti-migrant
sentiments, and his practical need to leverage migrant labor both economically and militarily.
Key Takeaways:
• Patriarch Kirill, head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church
Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP), highlighted ongoing social and ideological divides within Russian society
while reiterating boilerplate justifications for the war in Ukraine during a speech on October 31.
• Kirill also highlighted the growing trend of brutality and cruelty in the Russian military and
attempted to excuse this trend as the emergence of a “neo-pagan” cult.
• Russian authorities
also continue to identify conflict between ethnic Russians and minority groups as a critical issue.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with his North Korean counterpart Choe Son-hui in
Moscow on November 1, securing strong affirmations of North Korea's support for Russia amid updated
Western reports on the number of North Korean troops deployed to Russia.
• North Korean troops
are unlikely to present Russia with a long-term solution to its manpower concerns, despite Choe's
comments about Pyongyang's indefinite commitment to Russia's war effort.
• The US Department
of Defense (DoD) announced a new tranche of military assistance valued at $425 million to Ukraine on
November 1.
• Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor failed to enforce its plan to deanonymize
Russian social media accounts by its stated November 1 deadline.
• Ukrainian forces recently
advanced north of Sudzha.
• Both Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced within
central Vovchansk. Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kupyansk and northwest of Kreminna.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) introduced a new system on November 1 allowing Russian
veterans and their families to confirm their veteran statuses digitally.
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Ukrainian forces have reportedly struck seven Russian radars and air defense systems since the night of
October 20 to 21. A Russian Telegram user, who claims to be an employee of an unspecified branch of the
Russian special services, claimed on November 2 that Ukrainian forces conducted an ATACMS strike against
a Russian S-300/400 air defense system near occupied Mospyne (just southeast of Donetsk City) and that
their sources are still clarifying the damage to the system. The Telegram user claimed that Ukrainian
forces targeted the air defense systems with six ATACMS missiles and that Russian forces downed three of
the missiles. The Telegram user claimed on October 31 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian "Podlet"
radar station near occupied Cape Tarkhankut, Crimea with a drone on October 23 and that Russian forces
have not evacuated the damaged station for repairs yet. A Ukrainian division posted footage on October 31
purportedly showing a successful Ukrainian strike against a Russian Buk air defense system in an
unspecified frontline area, and the footage showed secondary detonations consistent with a successful
strike against such a system. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 25 that Ukrainian forces
struck a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system and destroyed the radar system of another Buk-M2 air defense
system in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of October 24 to 25. Official Ukrainian sources reported
that Ukrainian forces also struck a Buk-M2 system in southern Ukraine on October 23 and a Buk-M3 air
defense system on the night of October 20 to 21 in an unspecified frontline area. ISW has previously
observed indications that Russia has struggled to source the microelectronic components necessary to
produce complex weapons and air defense systems due to Western sanctions, and Russia may not be able to
produce or repair a sufficient number of air defense systems to maintain the current density of Russia's
air defense coverage over occupied Ukraine if Ukraine destroys a significant number of Russian systems.
Further degradation of Russia's air defense umbrella, particularly over occupied Ukraine, may impact how
close to the frontline Russian pilots are willing to operate and could limit Russia's ability to
effectively use glide bombs against both frontline areas and rear Ukrainian cities.
South
Korea signaled possible readiness to increase support for Ukraine amid continued Ukrainian intelligence
on the deployment of North Korean forces near the Russian border with Ukraine. South Korean Foreign
Minister Cho Tae-yul stated on November 1 that "all possible scenarios are under consideration" in
response to a question about possibly sending weapons to Ukraine following the deployment of North Korean
troops in Russia. Cho emphasized that South Korea will monitor North Korean troop involvement in Russia
and the "benefits" that North Korea receives from Russia to determine a course of action. Ukraine's Main
Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 2 that Russian forces transferred 7,000
additional North Korean personnel to unspecified areas near the border with Ukraine in the last week
(since about October 26). The GUR reported that Russian forces have armed North Korean soldiers with 60mm
mortars, AK-12 assault rifles, RPK/PKM machine guns, SVD/SVCh sniper rifles, Phoenix anti-tank guided
missiles (ATGMs), and RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers and have equipped North Korean forces with some
night vision devices, thermal imagers, and other optical equipment.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces have reportedly struck seven Russian radars and air defense systems since the night
of October 20 to 21.
• South Korea signaled possible readiness to increase support for Ukraine
amid continued Ukrainian intelligence on the deployment of North Korean forces near the Russian border
with Ukraine.
• Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor implemented its plan to deanonymize
Russian social media accounts on November 2.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces marginally
advanced north of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces marginally advanced north of
Kurakhove in Donetsk Oblast.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed to have rescinded
an order for his Akhmat Spetsnaz soldiers to not take Ukrainian servicemembers as prisoners in the war in
Ukraine.
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Incumbent Moldova President Maia Sandu has claimed victory in the Moldovan presidential runoff election
held on November 3, 2024. Preliminary results reported by the Moldovan Central Election Commission (CEC)
show that Maia Sandu has won around 55 percent of the vote, defeating Kremlin-friendly presidential
candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo. The Moldovan CEC reported on November 3 that over 54 percent of the
Moldovan electorate voted in the presidential runoff elections compared to the approximately 51 percent
voter turnout during the first election round held on October 20, 2024. The reported voter turnout for
the runoff election is also over the minimum legal turnout requirement of 20 percent. ISW will cover the
final result of the runoff Moldovan presidential elections on November 4 after the Moldovan CEC finishes
counting all votes, including votes from the Moldovan diaspora voters whose votes take longer to count
due to time zone differences.
Moldovan authorities reported extensive Russian interference and
sabotage efforts during the runoff presidential elections held on November 3, 2024, in a likely effort to
favor pro-Kremlin Stoianoglo. Sandu’s National Security Advisor Stanislav Secrieru warned on November 3
of significant Russian interference in the runoff election, noting the organization of voter transport in
Transnistria (which is illegal under Moldovan law); the organization of buses and charter flights from
Russia to polling stations in Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Belarus; the distribution of vouchers to Moldovan
voters in Moscow; and cyberattacks against the Moldova CEC's voter education site. Moldovan Independent
Press Agency IPN reported on November 2 that Russian authorities preemptively transported 150 Moldovan
citizens from Russia to Moldova via Turkey for free in a concerted effort to maximize the voter base of
Kremlin-friendly Stoianoglo. Moldovan authorities also notified numerous Western countries about Russian
efforts to disrupt Moldovan diaspora voting abroad by creating false bomb threats at polling stations.
The Moldovan diaspora notably largely favored Sandu in the first round of the presidential elections.
Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean stated that Moldovans throughout the country had received anonymous
“death threats” through phone calls, likely as part of a scare tactic to sway election results. ISW
previously reported on large-scale Russian intervention efforts in the first round of the 2024 Moldovan
presidential elections in order to enhance the outcome in favor of Stoianoglo and against Moldova’s
European Union (EU) referendum vote, which ultimately passed by a small margin. Sandu stated on October
21 that "criminal groups" and "foreign forces" — likely referring to Russia and Kremlin-linked Moldovan
opposition politician Ilan Shor — used tens of millions of euros to spread propaganda to destabilize
Moldova. Sandu also stated that Moldovan authorities had evidence that the criminal groups wanted to buy
300,000 Moldovan votes during the first round of presidential elections and that the scale of fraud was
"unprecedented.”
Key Takeaways:
• Incumbent Moldova President Maia Sandu has
claimed victory in the Moldovan presidential runoff election held on November 3, 2024.
• Moldovan authorities reported extensive Russian interference and sabotage efforts during the runoff
presidential elections held on November 3, 2024, in a likely effort to favor pro-Kremlin Stoianoglo.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) efforts to centralize control over informal Russian
drone operation units may degrade the effectiveness of Russian drone capabilities.
• Ukrainian
Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets refuted a Russian information operation about prisoner of war
(POW) exchanges aimed at destabilizing Ukrainian society and undermining Ukrainians' trust in their
government.
• Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets refuted a Russian information
operation about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges aimed at destabilizing Ukrainian society and undermining
Ukrainians' trust in their government.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk,
Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar in Donetsk Oblast.
• A Ukrainian official reported that
Russian naval infantry units cannot be considered “elite” due to a lack of specialized training for new
recruits and because Ukrainian forces have destroyed the main core of the Russian professional army since
the start of the Russian full-scale invasion.
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Russian and pro-Kremlin actors launched an information operation on November 4 to discredit incumbent
Moldovan President Maia Sandu’s victory in the Moldovan presidential elections. The Moldovan Central
Election Commission (CEC) confirmed on November 4 that Sandu won 55.35 percent of the vote, defeating
Kremlin-friendly opponent Alexandr Stoianoglo. Numerous world leaders congratulated Sandu on November 3
and 4, and international election observers largely commended the conduct of the elections in spite of
Russian attempts to sway the outcomes against Sandu. Pro-Russian opposition parties and officials
attempted to discredit Sandu’s victory, with the Moldovan Socialist party calling her “an illegitimate
president”; Kremlin-affiliated Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor telling Russian state TV channel Rossiya-24
that the Moldovan opposition has 'evidence' of mass falsifications in favor of Sandu; and pro-Kremlin
former Moldovan president Igor Dodon telling Kremlin newswire TASS that Sandu only won because of the
Moldovan diaspora vote. The Russian information space, including Russian milbloggers, echoed the words of
the pro-Russian Moldovan opposition claiming that Moldovan elections were controlled by 'European
bureaucrats' and that Moldovans had no agency in determining the outcome of the elections. ISW previously
reported on Russia’s systematic efforts to interfere in the Moldovan election in order to derail the
passage of Moldova’s European Union (EU) referendum and Sandu’s victory.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian and pro-Kremlin actors launched an information operation on November 4 to discredit
incumbent Moldovan President Maia Sandu’s victory in the Moldovan presidential elections.
• Georgian civil society and opposition resumed peaceful demonstrations on November 4 against the
highly contested October 26 Georgian parliamentary elections, calling for continued resistance and
further investigations into large-scale voting irregularities.
• Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty's (RFE/RL) Sistema project released an investigation on November 4 detailing Russia's initial
2022 demands for Ukraine's total capitulation, further supporting ISW's long-standing assessment that
Russia has never been willing to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine on any terms but its
own.
• Russian drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in Summer
2024 reportedly significantly impacted Ukrainian electrical generation capacity compared to March 2024,
though it is unclear whether Russia had been able to inflict significant further damage on the Ukrainian
energy grid since.
• The Kremlin-awarded founder and director of the prominent Rybar Telegram
channel and social media project attempted to falsely portray himself as a non-Kremlin actor in the
Western media and confirmed the Kremlin’s efforts to establish “media schools” abroad.
• Russian authorities arrested Rosgvardia's Deputy Head of Logistics Major General Mirza Mirzaev for
bribery on November 3.
• Russian forces advanced near Novy Put, Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in Kharkiv Oblast and Russian forces advanced in the Kupyansk, Kreminna,
Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)
continues attempts to form a cadre of loyal military journalists in an effort to control the pro-war
Russian information space and centralize control over Russia’s war coverage.
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The first North Korean forces have likely officially engaged in combat against Ukrainian troops in Kursk
Oblast. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated in an interview with South Korean national
broadcaster KBS on November 5 that Ukrainian forces engaged in "small-scale" clashes with North Korean
troops in Kursk Oblast but emphasized that it will take more time for the entire contingent of North
Korean forces to deploy to Kursk Oblast and enter combat. A source in Ukraine's special services also
told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the first combat clashes between Ukrainian and North Korean forces
have occurred but stated that these are not "large connections" between Ukrainian and North Korean
forces. Umerov noted that it would be difficult for Ukrainian forces to quickly ascertain North Korean
casualty counts from the initial fighting because North Korean soldiers have been "mixed in" with the
Russian army and are "disguised" as soldiers from the Republic of Buryatia, which notably suggests that
the Russian military is trying to integrate North Korean combat power into the Russian force structure,
as opposed to maintaining separate North Korean units fighting under Russian command. North Korean force
structure under Russia’s command remains unclear, however. Umerov forecasted that more North Korean
personnel will finish deploying within a few weeks once they complete training in the Russian Far East.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky estimated on November 4 that there are already 11,000 North Korean
personnel in Kursk Oblast, although the majority of this number is likely not yet on the frontline. ISW
continues to assess that Russia will likely leverage North Korean manpower to first and foremost repel
the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, and that in return North Korean troops hope to gain combat and
military-technical experience in the conditions for a contemporary and technologically driven war.
Key Takeaways:
• The first North Korean forces have likely officially engaged in
combat against Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast.
• The Kremlin appointed the first-ever "Time
of Heroes" program participant to a federal-level position, furthering its ongoing effort to staff
government positions with pro-war veterans and set long-term conditions for the militarization of Russian
government bodies from local to federal levels.
• Russia launched two Iranian-made satellites
into orbit on November 5 via a Russian space-launch vehicle, furthering a trend of Russian-Iranian
bilateral space cooperation.
• Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk,
northwest of Kreminna, in Chasiv Yar, near Toretsk, southeast of Pokrovsk, northeast of Kurakhove, near
Vuhledar, and north of Robotyne.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions south of
Chasiv Yar.
• The Russian military is struggling to maintain a sufficient number of quality
personnel within traditionally elite forces.
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Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to shape US President-elect Donald Trump's foreign policy
and achieve another Russia–US reset on Russia's terms. Putin addressed the 21st annual meeting of the
Valdai Discussion Club on November 7 and advocated for a reset of US–Russia relations. Putin implied that
that Trump’s presidential campaign expressed a "desire to restore relations with Russia, to help end the
Ukrainian crisis" and later noted that Russia is open to the "possibility of restoring relations with the
United States." Putin attempted to blame the United States for undermining US–Russia relations, noting
that the United States imposed sanctions and restrictions on Russia, and chose to support Kyiv — without
mentioning that these measures were in response to Russia’s illegal and unprovoked full-scale invasion of
Ukraine. Putin's statement implies that Russia would only accept any reset in US–Russia relations if the
US dropped sanctions and restrictions against Russia and stopped supporting Ukraine — effectively
entirely on terms that benefit Russia at the expense of US interests. Putin reiterated the boilerplate
narrative that NATO is a "blatant anachronism," accused the West of maintaining a bloc-oriented
mentality, and deliberately misrepresented his invasion of Ukraine as NATO's efforts to remain relevant.
Putin attempted to frame BRICS as a non-bloc alternative to NATO and falsely implied that Russia is not
interested in becoming a hegemon, despite the fact that the Kremlin has been forming a new anti-Western
bloc composed of Iran, North Korea, and China.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President
Vladimir Putin is attempting to shape US President-elect Donald Trump's foreign policy and achieve
another Russia–US reset on Russia's terms.
• A recent failed Russian assault northeast of
Siversk near Bilohorivka prompted outrage from some Russian ultranationalist milbloggers over Russian
command failures and the pervasive Russian military culture of exaggerating battlefield successes.
• A Russian brigade commander and a sniper platoon commander were reported killed in combat
recently in the Kurakhove and Chasiv Yar directions.
• Ukrainian authorities continue to
report systematic Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), noting a clear increase in
such executions in 2024.
• Ukrainian strikes on Russia and Western sanctions are reportedly
disrupting Russia's energy industry.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk,
Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Russian authorities are reportedly creating "fake" non-combat
volunteer battalions in occupied Ukraine and merging them with existing Cossack organizations led by
occupation administrations.
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Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be assuming that US President-elect Donald Trump will defer
to the Kremlin's interests and preferences without the Kremlin offering any concessions or benefits in
return. Putin stated during his November 7 Valdai Club address that he is open to discussions meant to
"restore" US-Russia relations but that the United States must initiate these negotiations, and implied
that Russia will only consider a reset in US-Russia relations if the United States drops sanctions
against Russia and ceases supporting Ukraine – terms that exclusively benefit Russia and offer no benefit
to the United States. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov noted on November 8 that Putin's statement about
negotiating with the United States does not mean that Russia's military goals in Ukraine have changed and
that instead, Russia's goals remain the same. Putin may be attempting to posture himself as reaching out
to Trump, but Putin is signaling to his domestic audiences that the Kremlin is unwilling to concede any
aspect of its maximalist objectives in Ukraine or the wider global arena.
Russian opposition
outlet Meduza reported that the Kremlin issued a manual to state and pro-Kremlin media with instructions
to cover Putin's Valdai statements by highlighting the special role Russia plays in bringing about a
proposed "new world order" and portraying Putin as the "world's greatest leader" whose deep thinking,
"breadth of political thought," and role as the "voice of the global majority and new world order"
distinguish him from Western political leaders, presumably including Trump. Meduza noted that, by
contrast, the manual does not mention reporting Putin's statements about Trump or possible future
negotiations with the United States about the war in Ukraine, even though Putin largely aimed his Valdai
statements at shaping Trump's foreign policy and achieving another reset in US-Russian relations on
Russia's terms.
Putin's proposed "new world order" emphasizes an interconnected international
system without great powers or security blocs, but the Kremlin's actions contradict and undermine his
proposed ideals and principles. Putin presented a six-point plan for his "new world order," which
includes: an openness among states to interact with each other; the absence of universal dogmas; an
accounting for all countries' perspectives when making global decisions; the rejection of security blocs
that unite groups of states; "justice for all," including eradicating xenophobia and intolerance; and the
"sovereign equality" of all states. Putin's proposal ignores the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to increase
its power and influence in neighboring countries, including destabilization efforts in Moldova and
Georgia; courting a group of anti-Western states such as North Korea, the People's Republic of China
(PRC), and Iran; and conducting its illegal and unprovoked war of aggression in Ukraine. The Kremlin
likely aims to use this rhetoric to distract from and provide plausible deniability against the very real
Russian efforts to undermine pro-Western governments and exert its influence internationally, as well as
promote the expansion of BRICS and the so-called "new Eurasian security architecture" that the Kremlin
has created to oppose NATO.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin
appears to be assuming that US President-elect Donald Trump will defer to the Kremlin's interests and
preferences without the Kremlin offering any concessions or benefits in return.
• Putin's
proposed "new world order" emphasizes an interconnected international system without great powers or
security blocs, but the Kremlin's actions contradict and undermine his proposed ideals and principles.
• Putin also acknowledged that Russia is dealing with a serious labor shortage and is largely
reliant on migrants to address it.
• Putin doubled down on an existing information operation
falsely claiming that Ukraine violated its neutral status in an attempt to justify Russia's illegal and
unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.
• Putin notably attempted to downplay Russia's burgeoning
relationship with North Korea during his November 7 Valdai Club statements, likely in an effort to
maintain some semblance of a relationship with South Korea and discourage South Korean support for
Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues to build its relationship with Venezuela as a means of
consolidating and expanding its influence in the Western hemisphere.
• The Ukrainian General
Staff reported on November 8 that Ukrainian forces recorded 323 cases of Russian forces using ammunition
equipped with chemical agents banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in October 2024 alone.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Novoivanovka, Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced south of Chasiv Yar, southeast of Kurakhove, and north of Vuhledar.
• Regional Russian authorities continued to promote the expansion of newly established
regional territorial defense formations by highlighting efforts to recruit women.
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Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian naval base in Kaspiysk, Republic of Dagestan for the first
time on November 6 damaging several missile ships of the Russia Caspian Sea Flotilla. Ukrainian media
outlets, citing Ukraine’s military intelligence, reported that the Ukrainian drones struck a naval base
in damaging the Tatarstan and Dagestan Gepard-class frigates (Project 11661) and possibly damaging
several nearby Buyan-class corvettes (Project 21631). Republic of Dagestan Head Sergei Melikov claimed on
November 6 that Russian forces downed a Ukrainian drone over Kaspiysk without specifying the
consequences. Satellite imagery collected on November 6 indicates the presence of three likely Russian
Buyan-class vessels, two likely Buyan-M-class vessels, one likely Tarantul-class vessel, one likely
Gepard-class vessel, and one likely Karakurt-class vessel present on the day of the strike in the port of
Kaspiysk, although the images are insufficient for identifying damage to ships or naval piers. Geolocated
footage published on November 6 shows drones striking near port infrastructure in Kaspiysk.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian naval base in Kaspiysk,
Republic of Dagestan for the first time on November 6 damaging several missile ships of the Russia
Caspian Sea Flotilla.
• Ukrainian authorities reported that Russian forces executed at least
109 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) since the start of the full-scale invasion amid new reports of
Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk,
Svatove, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions.
• A prominent Russian brigade
commander and official indicated that Russian commanders and civilian leadership explicitly view Russian
military volunteers as expendable resources, consistent with high casualty rates across the frontline.
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Russian forces reportedly lost almost 200 tanks, over 650 armored vehicles, and suffered an estimated
80,000 casualties in taking roughly 1,500 square kilometers during a period of intensified Russian
offensive operations in September and October 2024. United Kingdom (UK) Defense Secretary John Healey
told UK outlet The Telegraph on November 9 that UK defense intelligence estimates that Russian casualties
"reached a new high" in October 2024 and that Russian forces suffered an average daily casualty rate of
1,345 troops per day or about 41,980 casualties in October 2024. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD), citing
data from the Ukrainian General Staff, previously reported that Russian forces suffered a record-high
average daily casualty rate of 1,271 troops per day or about 38,130 casualties in September 2024. Russian
forces have thus suffered an estimated 80,110 casualties over the last two months – roughly 20,000 more
casualties than US forces suffered during almost 20 years of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Data
compiled by Oryx founder Jakub Janovsky indicates that Russian forces also lost 197 tanks, 661 armored
personnel carriers (APCs), and 65 artillery systems larger than 100mm throughout the frontline in
September and October 2024. Russian forces seized and recaptured a total of 1,517 square kilometers--an
area less than a third the size of Delaware--throughout Ukraine and Kursk Oblast over the last two months
in exchange for these losses. Russian forces have intensified offensive operations near Kupyansk in
Kharkiv Oblast and Selydove, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar in Donetsk Oblast over the last two months and have
managed to advance at a marginally faster rate than Russian forces have advanced over the last two years.
Russian forces recently seized Vuhledar and Selydove but have yet to make operationally significant
advances, and Russian forces have made most of their advances during this time through open fields and
small settlements.
Russian forces will eventually make operationally significant gains if
Ukrainian forces do not stop ongoing Russian offensive operations, but the Russian military cannot
sustain such loss rates indefinitely, especially not for such limited gains. ISW previously observed data
indicating that Russian forces have lost at least five divisions' worth of armored vehicles and tanks in
Pokrovsk Raion alone since October 2023. Russian forces have likely accumulated a large amount of
equipment in priority frontline areas, but dwindling Soviet-era tank and armored vehicle stockpiles and
current armored vehicle production rates will likely make such losses prohibitive over the longer term.
US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated on October 31 that Russian forces are suffering roughly 1,200
casualties per day or about 36,000 casualties per month, and ISW has recently observed indications that
the Russian military has been struggling to recruit enough soldiers to replace its frontline losses.
Russian President Vladimir Putin notably acknowledged Russia's ongoing labor shortages and dependence on
migrants to meet these labor shortages during his September 7 Valdai Club address, and ISW noted that
Russia also depends on coercing migrants to join the Russian military to meet its manpower requirements.
The Russian military almost certainly cannot indefinitely sustain a daily casualty rate of over 1,200
people so long as Putin remains committed to avoiding another involuntary call-up of reservists. Even an
involuntary reserve mobilization will not resolve the larger problem Putin apparently faces in finding
enough people to work in Russia's industries while also feeding the front.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces reportedly lost almost 200 tanks, over 650 armored vehicles, and suffered an
estimated 80,000 casualties in taking roughly 1,500 square kilometers during a period of intensified
Russian offensive operations in September and October 2024.
• Russian forces will eventually
make operationally significant gains if Ukrainian forces do not stop ongoing Russian offensive
operations, but the Russian military cannot sustain such loss rates indefinitely, especially not for such
limited gains.
• Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes on the Aleksin Chemical Plant in
Tula Oblast on the night of November 8 to 9.
• Russian authorities are reportedly considering
merging Russia's three largest oil companies -- Rosneft, Gazprom Neft, and Lukoil, likely to help Russia
reach more advantageous energy deals with non-Western states.
• Russian authorities arrested a
former Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) construction official for fraud on November 9.
• The
US Department of Defense (DOD) reportedly stated on November 8 that it will send a "small number" of US
defense contractors to rear areas of Ukraine to repair US-provided weapons and equipment.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained positions near Siversk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently
advanced near Kreminna, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• Ukraine's Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha
stated on November 9 that Ukrainian intelligence assesses that Russia will be able to produce 30 percent
more artillery shells than all European Union (EU) countries combined in 2025 should the EU fail to
implement additional measures, such as sanctions, against Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).
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Ukrainian forces struck Russian ammunition warehouses in Bryansk Oblast during a large-scale Ukrainian
drone strike against Russia on the night of November 9 and 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that
drone operators of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces and Ukrainian Armed Forces struck Russian
ammunition warehouses at the Russian military's 1060th Logistics Center (formerly Russia's 120th Main
Missile and Artillery Management Arsenal) in Bryansk Oblast, causing initial explosions and secondary
detonations at the facility. Geolocated imagery published on November 9 and 10 shows two large fires
burning near the facility. Russian authorities claimed that Russian forces downed 32 to 34 Ukrainian
drones over Moscow Oblast and that debris from downed Ukrainian drones damaged civilian infrastructure in
Ramenskoye Raion. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 84 Ukrainian
drones over Russia in total, and Russian milbloggers noted that this was one of the largest strikes
against Moscow Oblast since February 2022.
Ukrainian officials continue to report Russian
executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office reported on
November 9 that it was investigating a video showing Russian forces executing a captured and unarmed
Ukrainian servicemember in violation of the Geneva Convention on POWs. Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro
Lubinets stated that he sent a letter to the United Nations (UN) and the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) concerning the reported war crime. ISW has extensively reported on previous footage and
reports of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian POWs and observed a wider trend of Russian abuses
against Ukrainian POWs across various sectors of the front that appeared to be enabled, if not explicitly
endorsed, by individual Russian commanders and unpunished by Russian field commanders.
Key
Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces struck Russian ammunition warehouses in Bryansk Oblast during a
large-scale Ukrainian drone strike against Russia on the night of November 9 and 10.
• Ukrainian officials continue to report Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
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Russian forces are successfully leveraging their recent seizure of Vuhledar to make tactically
significant gains south of Kurakhove in support of ongoing Russian offensive operations that aim to level
the frontline and eliminate the Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces intensified
offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast in early September 2024 and are currently attempting to
envelop Kurakhove from the north and south and to level the frontline between Sontsivka (northwest of
Kurakhove) and Shakhtarske (northwest of Vuhledar). Russian forces seized Vuhledar as of October 1 and
have advanced north and northwest of Vuhledar in a series of successful mechanized and infantry assaults
over the last month. Russian forces have also marginally advanced northeast of Vuhledar near Antonivka
and Katerynivka, but ISW is yet to observe confirmation of Russian advances into Yelizavetivka and
further west along the C051104 highway. Russian forces are currently several kilometers south of the
Romanivka-Uspenivka-Sukhyi Yar line — a string to settlements north of Vuhledar that could pose a notable
challenge to Russian forces should Ukrainian forces be able to establish defenses in these settlements.
Russian forces appear to be attempting to bypass this line of settlements, however, as geolocated footage
published on November 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Dalne (south of
Kurakhove and northwest of Yelizavetivka) and likely hold positions in the fields east and southeast of
Dalne. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into Dalne itself, but ISW has not
observed visual confirmation of these maximalist claims. Further Russian advances into Dalne and west of
Dalne could force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from positions in the pocket north and northeast of
Vuhledar and allow Russian forces to advance along the C051104 highway relatively uncontested. Such
advances would allow Russian forces to further pressure Ukrainian positions in Kurakhove from the south.
ISW is revising its previous assessment that Russian forces would not likely be able to take advantage of
the seizure of Vuhledar for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast. That assessment was
incorrect.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces are successfully leveraging their recent
seizure of Vuhledar to make tactically significant gains south of Kurakhove in support of ongoing Russian
offensive operations that aim to level the frontline and eliminate the Ukrainian salient in western
Donetsk Oblast.
• ISW is revising its previous assessment that Russian forces would not likely
be able to take advantage of the seizure of Vuhledar for further offensive operations in western Donetsk
Oblast. That assessment was incorrect.
• Russian forces reportedly continue to advance in the
Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and Russian advances northwest of Vuhledar and south of Velyka
Novosilka may begin to pressure Ukrainian positions in Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian forces have
advanced in western Donetsk Oblast at a moderate tempo, but Russian forces remain highly unlikely to be
able to conduct rapid mechanized maneuver that could successfully encircle Ukrainian forces.
• Ukrainian and Russian sources stated on November 11 that damage to a dam of the Kurakhivske Reservoir
is causing limited flooding in nearby settlements.
• Ukrainian and Russian sources disagreed
about who was responsible for damaging the dam, but Russian forces reportedly struck the dam in September
2024.
• Russian forces may have struck the dam in order to cause significant, long-lasting
flooding west of Kurakhivske Reservoir that could facilitate Russian efforts to envelop Ukrainian forces
north and south of Kurakhove.
• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied on November 11
reports of a recent phone conversation between Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President-elect
Donald Trump.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast. Russian forces recently
advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kreminna and Kurakhove.
• Russian regional governments
continue to commit large portions of their social budgets towards payments to Russian veterans, likely as
part of ongoing efforts to incentivize Russian military service.
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Key Takeaways:
Russian forces recently advanced during two company-sized mechanized assaults
within and south of Kurakhove in western Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage confirms reports that an
explosion damaged the Ternivska Dam at the Kurakhivske Reservoir on November 11. Recent Western and
Ukrainian estimates about the size of the Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast do not represent a
significant inflection, as Russian forces have spent several months gathering forces for a future
counteroffensive effort to expel Ukrainian forces from Russian territory. Ukrainian military
officials warned that Russian forces may intensify assaults in Zaporizhia Oblast in the near future. Select Russian defense officials appear to be contradicting Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent
assertion that Russia is not interested in forming a unified security bloc against the West. Russian
forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Kurakhove and in Kursk Oblast. The Russian military
reportedly continues to coerce conscripts into signing Russian military service contracts, likely as part
of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.
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The Kremlin is attempting to dictate the terms of any potential "peace" negotiations with Ukraine in
advance of US President-elect Donald Trump's inauguration. The manner in which the Kremlin is trying to
set its terms for negotiations strongly signals that Russia's objectives remain unchanged and still
amount to full Ukrainian capitulation. The Kremlin does not appear any more willing to make concessions
to the incoming Trump administration than it was to the current administration. Lavrov's pre-emptive
rejection of the potential suggestion to freeze the current frontline further indicates that Russia is
not interested in softening its approach or demands in negotiations and maintains its objective of total
Ukrainian capitulation, which Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly outlined in June 2024. Ukrainian security services reportedly assassinated a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) official in
occupied Crimea on November 13. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian oil executives
reportedly rejected a proposal to merge Russia's three largest oil companies. Contradictory reporting on
the proposed Russian oil merger highlights a possible factional struggle between close affiliates of
Putin and Russian energy executives. South Korean and US intelligence separately confirmed that
North Korean troops have deployed into combat alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast. Russian
forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast
border area, and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions near Chasiv Yar. Russian forces
continue to heavily rely on refurbished tanks and armored vehicles pulled from storage to replace vehicle
losses during ongoing combat operations, but likely will not be able to sustain these losses in the long
term.
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Key Takeaways:
The Kremlin's recent economic policies indicate that the Russian economy will
likely face significant challenges in 2025 and that Russian President Vladimir Putin is worried about
Russia's economic stability in the long term. Putin modified compensation promised for Russian
servicemen wounded while fighting in Ukraine — a clear indicator that the Kremlin is trying to cut the
mounting short- and long-term costs of the war and restore balance to the Russian economy. The
Kremlin's efforts to combat inflation and high interest rates are also reportedly impacting the expansion
of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and prospects for mobilizing the economy. The Russian
DIB is unlikely to match the production rate necessary to replace Russian weapons losses under these
monetary policies. The Kremlin is also adopting policies aimed at bolstering the domestic population
in the long term, signaling mounting concerns over declining demographics and labor shortages that could
threaten the sustainable operations of the Russian DIB. Russian forces recently advanced into
Kupyansk during a likely roughly company-sized mechanized assault, although ISW does not assess that
Russian forces control the area. A recent Russian state-affiliated poll suggests that most Russian
residents feel largely unaffected by the war in Ukraine, supporting reports of growing concerns among
Russian officials and elites that many citizens remain indifferent towards the war. Kremlin
Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on November 14 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is personally
dealing with issues concerning Ukraine and that he requires no special envoys, likely in response to
reports that US President-elect Donald Trump will "soon" appoint a "Ukrainian peace envoy to lead
negotiations on ending the war." Russian forces advanced in the Ukrainian main salient in Kursk
Oblast, west of Ukraine's main salient in Kursk Oblast in Glushkovsky Raion, in the Chasiv Yar direction,
and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. Russian sources are speculating that North Korea
may have provided North Korean-produced 170mm M1989 "Koksan" self-propelled artillery systems to Russia.
Russian milbloggers published images showing a train transporting alleged North Korean 170mm M1989
“Koksan” self-propelled artillery systems in Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai.
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The Kremlin is intensifying its reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing Western decision-making
in Russia's favor ahead of or in lieu of possible future negotiations about the resolution of the war in
Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin had a phone call with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on November
15 and reiterated several Kremlin information operations aimed at influencing the German government and
other Western states to pressure Ukraine into premature peace negotiations instead of providing Ukraine
with further military support. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called the Scholz-Putin call
"Pandora's box" and warned that the call helps Putin achieve his key goals: reducing his isolation in the
international community and bringing about negotiations on Russia’s preferred terms "that will lead to
nothing."
Putin and other senior Russian officials have recently intensified rhetoric aimed at
influencing the foreign policy of the incoming US government under President-elect Donald Trump. The
Kremlin has also recently reiterated its unwillingness to compromise on the terms of any possible future
negotiations while strongly indicating that the Kremlin's longstanding goal of complete Ukrainian
capitulation remains unchanged. The Kremlin likely aims to take advantage of uncertainty about the future
US policy regarding Ukraine by intensifying its reflexive control campaign against Ukraine's European
allies. Senior Russian officials, including Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu and Defense Minister
Andrei Belousov, have notably used phone calls with Western political and defense officials to spread
Kremlin information operations and attempt to threaten the West into making premature concessions on
Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity since 2022.
Key Takeaways:
• The
Kremlin is intensifying its reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing Western decision-making in
Russia's favor ahead of or in lieu of possible future negotiations about the resolution of the war in
Ukraine.
• Abkhazian oppositionists protested an agreement between the de facto government of
Georgia’s Abkhazia region with Russia aimed at enhancing Russian investors’ rights in Abkhazia on
November 15.
• Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide Ukraine with military support
via various means and platforms.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near
Kurakhove, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and
Vuhledar.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to expand its "Time of Heroes" program to create a
new social class comprised of veterans loyal to Russian President Vladimir Putin's regime and
ideology.
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Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver
and preventing Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing manpower constraints. Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during an interview with Ukrainian media published on November 16
that Russian forces are currently advancing along the frontline due in part to decreased Ukrainian morale
exacerbated by delays in staffing and equipping new Ukrainian brigades and granting frontline Ukrainian
defenders necessary rest and rotation. Zelensky stressed the importance of standing up new brigades to
replace and reinforce Ukrainian forces currently serving on the frontline but noted that Russian forces
also continue to take significant manpower losses in exchange for minimal gains. Zelensky estimated that
Russian forces are currently losing between 1,500 and 2,000 troops per day in Ukraine and assessed that
Russian forces cannot maintain their rate of advance while taking losses at this scale.
Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine must enter any future negotiations from a position of strength as
Russian President Vladimir Putin is not interested in a negotiated settlement — no matter the negotiating
platform or mediator — that results in anything less than Ukrainian capitulation. Zelensky stated that
Ukraine must be "strengthened by some important elements" to negotiate with Putin, emphasizing that
Ukraine cannot enter negotiations from a position of weakness. Zelensky stated that Putin does not want
peace but would still be willing to come to the negotiating table in order to reduce Russia's diplomatic
isolation and to secure concessions and Ukraine's capitulation. Zelensky stated that it is important that
any negotiation platform and potential meditators remember that Russia violated Ukrainian territorial
integrity and international law by invading Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 and remarked that his conversations
with US President-elect Donald Trump demonstrate that Trump is "on the side of supporting Ukraine" and
has listened to Ukraine's position. Zelensky concluded that Ukraine must do everything to end the war by
diplomatic means in 2025. ISW recently assessed that the Kremlin is trying to dictate the terms of any
potential "peace" negotiations with Ukraine in advance of US President-elect Donald Trump's inauguration.
The Kremlin has consistently demonstrated that it is unwilling to compromise on the terms of any possible
negotiations while strongly indicating that the Kremlin's longstanding goal of complete Ukrainian
capitulation remains unchanged. Any future negotiations, no matter the platform or mediator, will require
Ukraine to enter talks from a position of strength that forces Putin to change his calculus, engage in
good faith talks, and accept compromises.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian drone
operations continue to play a critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and preventing
Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing manpower constraints.
• Zelensky
emphasized that Ukraine must enter any future negotiations from a position of strength as Russian
President Vladimir Putin is not interested in a negotiated settlement – no matter the negotiating
platform or mediator - that results in anything less than Ukrainian capitulation.
• Russian
forces are innovating their long-range strike packages to include decoy Shahed drones and Shahed drones
with thermobaric warheads, likely to confuse and exhaust Ukrainian air defenses and increase the damages
of long-range strikes.
• North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un has ordered North Korean defense
industrial enterprises to begin serial production of likely tactical strike drones – an example of how
increasing Russian-North Korean military cooperation allows North Korea to learn from Russia's war in
Ukraine.
• The Russian military command reportedly arrested and removed several commanders
within the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army following inaccurate reports they made about alleged
Russian advances near Bilohorivka and repeated outcries from the Russian milblogger community.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Kreminna, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and
Kurakhove.
• Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported that the Russian Central Bank has
recently issued significantly more loan deferments (credit holidays) for Russian military personnel,
indicating that Russian military recruitment rates may have increased.
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The New York Times (NYT) and Washington Post reported that US President Joe Biden has authorized
Ukrainian forces to use US-provided ATACMS in limited strikes against Russian and North Korean military
targets within Kursk Oblast. The NYT and Washington Post reported on November 17 that unspecified US
officials expect Ukrainian forces to initially conduct strikes against Russian and North Korean forces
within Kursk Oblast and that the Biden Administration could expand this authorization to use ATACMS
against targets elsewhere in Russia in the future. The US officials stated that the US authorized these
limited Ukrainian strikes in response to the deployment of North Korean forces to the battlefield in
Kursk Oblast to deter North Korea from deploying more forces to Russia. The US officials stated that the
partial lifting of restrictions aims to generate a "specific and limited" battlefield effect and will not
change the course of the war. French outlet Le Figaro reported on November 17 that France and the United
Kingdom (UK) have authorized Ukrainian forces to use French and UK-provided SCALP/Storm Shadow missiles
to strike within Russia. Le Figaro did not state if France and the UK had authorized Ukraine's
SCALP/Storm Shadow usage only within Kursk Oblast. The partial lifting of restrictions on Ukraine's use
of Western-provided long-range weapons against military objects within Kursk Oblast will not completely
deprive Russian forces of their sanctuary in Russian territory, as hundreds of military objects remain
within ATACMS range in other Russian border regions. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will
benefit from any partial sanctuary if Western states continue to impose restrictions on Ukraine's ability
to defend itself and that the US should allow Ukraine to strike all legitimate military targets within
Russia's operational and deep-rear within range of US-provided weapons – not just those in Kursk
Oblast.
Russian forces damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure during the largest missile and
drone strike since August 2024 on the night of November 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Russian forces launched 90 Shahed and strike drones of an unspecified type (possibly referring to decoy
drones) from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and Kursk and Oryol oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force
reported that Russian forces launched 120 missiles, including one Zirkon 3M22 hypersonic cruise missile,
eight Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, 101 Kh-101 and Kalibr cruise missiles, one Iskander-M
ballistic missile, four Kh-22/Kh-31P cruise/anti-radiation missiles, and five Kh-59/69 cruise missiles.
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 42 drones and one Zirkon, seven Kinzhal,
85 Kalibr and Kh-101, two Kh-22/31P, and five Kh-59/69 missiles. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky
stated that Ukrainian F-16 pilots shot down roughly 10 aerial targets during the strike. The Ukrainian
Air Force reported that 41 drones were "lost" in Ukrainian airspace, likely due to Ukrainian electronic
warfare (EW) interference, and that two drones flew into Russian and Russian-occupied Ukrainian airspace.
The Ukrainian Air Force noted that air defense was active in almost all Ukrainian oblasts. Ukrainian
state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo stated that Russian strikes damaged energy facilities
in several oblasts and noted that energy recovery work is ongoing in Odesa, Volyn, and Rivne oblasts.
Ukrainian officials reported that a Russian missile strike caused a fire at an infrastructure facility in
Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, damaged critical infrastructure in Rivne Oblast, and targeted energy
infrastructure in Odesa Oblast. Private Ukrainian energy enterprise DTEK stated that Russian strikes
seriously damaged an unspecified DTEK thermal power plant (TPP) and noted that this was the eighth mass
strike on a DTEK energy facility in 2024. Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko stated that the
strikes caused power outages in many areas of Ukraine. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director
General Rafael Mariano Grossi stated that Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities forced Ukrainian
authorities to reduce the energy production levels of several nuclear power plants (NPPs). Grossi
reported that Russian strikes damaged several electrical substations that are connected to the
Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs, although the strikes did not damage the NPPs themselves.
Grossi stated that six out of the nine reactors at the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs are
currently operating at reduced capacity. Ukrainian state railway company Ukrzaliznytsia reported that
Russian forces struck a railway depot in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and that Russian strikes de-energized
sections of several railway lines in southern, western, and northeastern Ukraine. Ukrainian officials
reported that Russian strikes also damaged civilian infrastructure in Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Rivne, and Odesa
oblasts.
Key Takeaways:
• The New York Times (NYT) and Washington Post reported
that US President Joe Biden has authorized Ukrainian forces to use US-provided ATACMS in limited strikes
against Russian and North Korean military targets within Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces
damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure during the largest missile and drone strike since August 2024 on
the night of November 16 to 17.
• Russian forces continue to innovate their long-range strike
packages and likely included relatively ineffective sea-launched Kalibr cruise missiles in the November
16 to 17 strike package as decoys to distract and exhaust Ukrainian air defenses.
• Ukrainian
forces struck a defense industrial factory in the Udmurt Republic for the first time on the morning of
November 17.
• North Korea reportedly continues to provide military support to Russia,
including the provision of rocket and artillery systems and potential additional troop deployments, which
is likely to impact Russia's military operations in the short term, but its long-term benefits likely
remain limited.
• Russian forces will likely focus on seizing frontline Ukrainian towns and
cities during Winter 2024-2025 through urban combat amid efforts to offset Ukrainian drone advantages and
possible Russian armored vehicle constraints.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin's maximalist
objectives demanding full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged, but a prominent Kremlin-affiliated
milblogger appears to be trying to repackage longstanding Kremlin territorial claims to southern Ukraine
as less severe "peace proposals" that would actually militarily threaten Ukraine, Moldova, and NATO.
• Abkhazian oppositionists continued protests on November 17 calling for the resignation of the
de facto Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk,
Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.
• Russian milbloggers continued to applaud their reported
role in removing frontline 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps
) commanders after the commanders submitted false reports about Russian advances in the Siversk
direction.
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Russian officials continued to use threatening rhetoric as part of efforts to deter the United States
from publicly authorizing Ukraine's use of US-provided ATACMS in limited strikes against Russian and
North Korean military targets in Kursk Oblast. This US authorization, if officially confirmed, would
notably be a mild response to Russia's escalatory introduction of North Korean troops as active
combatants in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on November 18
that the United States is "adding fuel to the fire" and that the US authorization of Ukrainian ATACMS
strikes against Russian military targets would be a "qualitatively new round of tension" and a
"qualitative" change in US participation in the war. Peskov reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's
September 12 claims that Ukrainian strikes against Russia using Western-provided weapons would represent
an escalation and directly involve Western countries in the war. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova also reiterated Putin's September statements and further claimed that
Ukrainian long-range missile strikes on Russia would be a "radical change in the essence and nature" of
the war and that the Russian response would be "adequate and tangible." Russian State Duma and Federation
Council deputies made similar threats, claiming that Russia would be "forced" to respond to this
"escalation," including with strikes against Ukraine using unspecified "new" weapons systems, and that
Russia's new nuclear doctrine will outline the consequences of this US decision. Russia has not
previously escalated militarily against any perceived Western violations of Russia's "red lines" — as ISW
has repeatedly observed.
Select Russian officials and propagandists heavily emphasized that US
officials have not yet formally confirmed the ATACMS strike authorization, likely in an attempt to
convince the United States to back out of the decision and deny the media reports of the authorization.
Zakharova stated that it is unclear if Western media outlets reporting on the US authorization are citing
official sources, and Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov similarly questioned the credibility of the
US media reports.
Neither Ukrainian nor US officials have confirmed reports of the US
authorization of Ukrainian ATACMS strikes, but US officials noted that Russia escalated the war with the
deployment of North Korean forces alongside Russian forces on the battlefield. Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky did not directly confirm media reports of the US authorization of limited ATACMS
strikes, but stated on November 17 that "strikes are not carried out with words" and "such things are not
announced," but that "the missiles will speak for themselves." US Deputy National Security Advisor
Jonathan Finer also did not confirm the US strike authorization but noted that Russia escalated the war
with the deployment of North Korean forces to the battlefield and the massive drone and missile strike
series against Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of November 16 to 17. Finer directly
responded to Peskov, stating that Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine "lit the fire." US outlet Axios
reported on November 17 that a source with knowledge of the matter stated that the Biden administration
granted Ukraine permission to use ATACMS in order to deter North Korea from sending more troops to Russia
for the war. Axios reported that US officials hope that North Korea might reconsider its decision to
deploy military personnel to Russia if Ukrainian forces strike North Korean forces in Kursk Oblast.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian officials continued to use threatening rhetoric as part of
efforts to deter the United States from publicly authorizing Ukraine's use of US-provided ATACMS in
limited strikes against Russian and North Korean military targets in Kursk Oblast. This US authorization,
if officially confirmed, would notably be a mild response to Russia's escalatory introduction of North
Korean troops as active combatants in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
• Putin's introduction of
North Korea as a new belligerent in his invasion of Ukraine was a major escalation. Allowing Ukraine to
use US missiles against legitimate military targets in Russian territory in accord with all international
laws and laws of armed conflict is a very limited response and cannot reasonably be characterized as an
escalation in itself.
• French and British sources clarified on November 18 that the reported
US permissions regarding Ukraine's ability to use ATACMS for limited strikes within Russia do not
inherently extend to Ukraine's ability to use French and UK-provided SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles for
long-range strikes in Russia.
• The Kremlin continues to state its unwillingness to accept any
compromises, including those that would "freeze" the conflict along the current frontline – further
demonstrating the Kremlin's insistence on complete Ukraine capitulation.
• Russian forces
recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, in Kupyansk, west of Kreminna, and in
the Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar directions.
• The Kremlin is continuing to militarize
different levels of the Russian government by expanding the "Time of Heroes" program that aims to place
veterans of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in positions in local, regional, and federal
governments.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) illegally conscripted Ukrainian youth in
occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts as part of Russia's Fall 2024 conscription
cycle.
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Ukrainian forces have defended against Russia's full-scale invasion for 1,000 days and continue to
demonstrate incredible resilience against Russian aggression. Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022
under the incorrect assumption that Ukraine would fail to defend itself and that Russian forces would be
able to seize Kyiv City and install a pro-Russian proxy government in three days. One thousand days
later, Ukrainian forces have successfully pushed Russian forces from their most forward points of advance
in Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kherson, Poltava, and Mykolaiv oblasts and continue their
daily fight to liberate occupied territory in Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and
Kherson oblasts and Crimea. Russian forces are currently advancing throughout eastern Ukraine, and
Ukrainian officials have recently warned about the possibility of an imminent Russian offensive operation
in Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian President Vladimir Putin is simultaneously waging an informational war
against the West, Ukraine, and the Russian population aimed at convincing the world that Russian victory
is inevitable, and that Ukraine stands no chance. This informational effort is born out of Putin's fear
and understanding that sustained Western military, economic, and diplomatic support for Ukraine will turn
the tide of the war against Russia.
Russia has accumulated a significant amount of risk and a
number of ever-increasing constraints on its warfighting capabilities over the last 1,000 days. Russia
began the war with a poorly organized and understaffed military comprised of contract military personnel
and limited number of conscripts due to his incorrect assumption that Ukraine would fold and fear that
general mobilization could threaten the stability of his regime. Russia largely relied on a combination
of volunteer contract servicemembers, mobilized personnel, and irregular formations (such as the Donetsk
and Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps , the Wagner Group, and Russian Volunteer Corps) to
wage Putin's war without general mobilization. This system has provided the Kremlin the manpower
necessary to support operations so far, but there are mounting indicators that this system is beginning
to teeter. Recent Western estimates of Russian manpower losses suggest that Russian forces are currently
losing more troops per month than Russia’s ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts can sustain, and
open-source evidence indicates that Russia may not be able to sustain its current rate of armored vehicle
and tank losses in the medium term as Russia burns through its stockpiles of Soviet-era equipment. The
upcoming 2025 year will only increase the manpower and materiel constraints on the Russian military if
Russia attempts to sustain its current offensive tempo, and Putin continues to appear averse to such
measures given Russian society's growing disinterest in fighting in Russia’s war, the Russian economy’s
limitations including a significant labor deficit and high inflation, and continual aversion to bearing
the burden of additional wartime costs. Russia cannot maintain its current tempo indefinitely. Putin will
likely need to take disruptive and drastic measures - including another involuntary call up of the
mobilization reserve - to overcome these growing limitations as the war protracts.
Ukraine,
meanwhile, continues to improve its warfighting capabilities and prepare itself to be self-sustainable in
the long term. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky presented Ukraine's "Internal Resilience Plan" to
the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) on November 19. The plan is comprised of 10 points that establish
Ukraine's strategic objectives during and after the end of Russia's full-scale invasion. The core points
of the plan outline Ukraine's focus on maintaining unity and cooperation with its partners; specific
measures to stabilize the frontline and increase Ukrainian military's technological efficiency; the
expansion of Ukraine's domestic industrial base (DIB) production capabilities and joint DIB partnerships;
the establishment of an economic policy to support Ukrainian industries and businesses; the protection of
Ukraine's energy infrastructure; and the establishment of a new internal and border security system. The
plan also outlines a vision to create effective local administrations, improve social and veteran
policies, and strengthen Ukraine's cultural sovereignty both domestically and abroad. Zelensky emphasized
in his speech to the Verkhovna Rada that Ukraine has taken many steps to improve its DIB and has already
produced over 2.5 million mortar and artillery rounds in 2024. Zelensky added that Ukraine plans to
produce at least 3,000 cruise missiles and 30,000 long-range drones in 2025 and that Ukrainian brigades
should raise their own funding to appropriately supply themselves with drones without bureaucratic
limitations. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced on November 19 that the Verkhovna Rada
approved the 2025 defense and security budget of 2.23 trillion hryvnias (around $54 billion) and
allocated a record-breaking 739 billion hryvnias (around $17.9 billion) for the Ukrainian DIB and weapon
procurement. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine has a chance to dramatically expand its DIB and stand
on its own two feet in the future if its partners empower Ukraine now.
Ukrainian forces
conducted the first ATAMCS strike on Russian territory overnight on November 18 to 19, hitting a Russian
ammunition depot in Karachev, Bryansk Oblast – days after obtaining permission to conduct such strikes.
Ukrainian military officials, including the Ukrainian General Staff, reported on November 19 that
Ukrainian forces struck the Russian military's 67th Main Military and Artillery Directorate (GRAU)
arsenal of the 1046th Logistics Support Center near Karachev on the night of November 18 to 19 and that
the strike caused an initial detonation and 12 secondary explosions. A Ukrainian military source told
Ukrainian outlet RBK-Ukraine on November 19 that Ukrainian forces used US-provided ATACMS missiles to
conduct the strike. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko
stated that the 67th GRAU arsenal contained artillery ammunition, including North Korean-provided shells,
as well as guided glide bombs, air defense missiles, and rockets for multiple launch rocket launchers
(MLRS). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces launched six ballistic
missiles, including ATACMS, at a military facility in Bryansk Oblast and that Russian S-400 and Pantsir
air defense systems shot down five missiles and damaged one. The Russian MoD claimed that missile
fragments fell onto a military facility in Bryansk Oblast, causing a fire, but that the strike did not
cause any damages or casualties. Russian opposition outlet Astra stated that Ukrainian forces also struck
the "Veza" ventilation plant and buildings in Karachev, Podsosonki, and Baykova. Russian sources posted
footage purportedly showing the ATACMS strike and its aftermath.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukrainian forces have defended against Russia's full-scale invasion for 1,000 days and continue to
demonstrate incredible resilience against Russian aggression.
• Ukraine continues to improve
its warfighting capabilities and prepare itself to be self-sustainable in the long term.
• Ukrainian forces conducted the first ATAMCS strike on Russian territory overnight on November 18 to
19, hitting a Russian ammunition depot in Karachev, Bryansk Oblast — days after obtaining permission to
conduct such strikes.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Russia's updated nuclear
doctrine on November 19 in a clear response to the Biden Administration's decision to greenlight
long-range strikes into Russia and as part of Putin's ongoing efforts to influence Western
decision-makers into shying away from providing additional support to Ukraine.
• Russia’s
adoption of an amended nuclear doctrine is the latest iteration of now-frequent Russian nuclear
saber-rattling and does not represent a substantial change in Russia’s nuclear posture, doctrine, or the
threat of the employment of nuclear weapons.
• The Kremlin has continuously attempted to use
nuclear saber-rattling to deter Western military support for Ukraine, and the Kremlin's ongoing efforts
to inject nuclear threats into the information space indicates that the Kremlin is concerned about the
battlefield impacts of Ukrainian strikes into Russia with Western-provided weapons.
• Ukraine
only recently has started receiving the weapons systems and military capabilities necessary to wage
modern large-scale combat operations, and Ukraine may be able to conduct operationally significant
counteroffensives in the future, provided the West reinforces building Ukrainian capabilities at
scale.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and in
the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City.
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Ukraine conducted a successful combined strike against military assets in the Russian rear on the night
of November 19 to 20 using drones and Western-provided long-range weapons. The Guardian and Bloomberg
both reported on November 20, citing anonymous sources, that Ukrainian forces have conducted the first
strikes against military targets within Russia using UK-provided Storm Shadow missiles. Geolocated
footage published on November 20 shows the aftermath of a likely Storm Shadow strike near Marino, Kursk
Oblast. Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces launched up to 12 Storm Shadow missiles
at Kursk Oblast, fragments of which struck Marino. The geolocated footage of the strike suggests that the
Ukrainian target may have been the Baryatinsky Estate in Marino, which the Ukrainian defense-focused
outlet Defense Express suggested was housing a command post for Russian and North Korean troops operating
in Kursk Oblast. ISW cannot confirm this claim at this time, but Marino is about 30km from the current
Kursk Oblast salient, which would be an appropriate distance for an operational headquarters for troops
conducting offensives along the salient.
Ukrainian forces also conducted a large-scale drone
strike against the Russian rear on the night of November 19 to 20, particularly targeting military and
defense industrial assets in Voronezh, Belgorod, and Novgorod oblasts. The Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD) claimed that Russian air defense systems destroyed or intercepted a total of 44 Ukrainian drones as
of the morning of November 20, including 20 over Novgorod Oblast; five over Kursk Oblast; four over Oryol
Oblast; three each over Belgorod, Tula, and Tver oblasts; and two each over Bryansk, Moscow, and Smolensk
oblasts. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on
November 20 that Ukrainian drones struck the 13th Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) arsenal
near Kotovo, Novgorod Oblast, at which Russian forces were reportedly storing ammunition for tube
artillery; mortar mines; "Grad," "Smerch," and "Uragan" multi-launch rocket systems (MLRS) missiles;
Iskander ballistic missiles; S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missiles; North Korean provided KN-23
ballistic missiles; and Tor surface-to-air system missiles. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence
Directorate (GUR) reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a command post of the Russian "Sever"
(Nothern) Grouping of Forces in Gubkin, Belgorod Oblast. Ukrainian and Russian sources additionally
posted footage of the aftermath of a reported Ukrainian drone strike against the EFKO Factory in
Alekseyevka, Belgorod Oblast, which Kovalenko stated produces cargo drones for the Russian military.
Russian sources reported that Ukrainian drones also hit an unspecified industrial enterprise in Voronezh
Oblast and targeted an oil depot in Sosnovka, Samara Oblast.
The November 19 to 20 strike
series indicates that Ukraine has already begun leveraging Western-provided long-range weapons systems to
assemble more complex and effective strike packages. Ukrainian forces notably utilized both long-range
strike drones and Storm Shadow missiles in the November 19-20 strike and struck a diverse range of
military targets across the Russian rear.
ISW has long assessed that the systems and
capabilities that Western partners are providing Ukraine, alongside Ukraine's indigenous defense
industrial production and innovation efforts, are all constituent components of wider capabilities that
Ukraine requires to successfully wage a multi-domain large-scale modern war. Ukraine has already proven
itself effective in using often domestically-produced drones to strike a variety of military targets in
the Russian rear, including air bases, command headquarters, and artillery depots. Ukraine's arsenal
already includes aerial and naval drones and Western-provided systems such as F-16s, HIMARS, and ATACMS,
although the conditions of use on the latter systems have been restricted enough to limit the benefit
Ukraine can accrue by using them. The addition of more powerful and precise Western-provided systems,
such as JASSMs and additional ATACMS, Storm Shadows, and SCALP systems, is crucial in enabling Ukraine to
scale up the effects it can generate through long-range strikes against the Russian rear.
Russian forces, in contrast, have been experimenting and diversifying their strike packages to inflict
maximum damage on Ukrainian critical infrastructure, conducting frequent strikes with a combination of
Iranian-provided or Russian-produced Shahed drones and drone variants, North Korean-provided and
domestically produced ballistic and cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, and aerial bombs.
Western restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided weapons to strike within Russian
territory have limited Ukrainian capabilities in developing commensurate strike packages. Ukraine
requires continued Western military assistance, as well as domestic innovation and production, in order
to continue building and utilizing strike packages to target the Russian rear and generate tactical to
operational-level impacts on the battlefield.
Key Takeaways:
• Ukraine conducted a
successful combined strike against military assets in the Russian rear on the night of November 19 to 20
using drones and Western-provided long-range weapons. The November 19 to 20 strike series indicates that
Ukraine has already begun leveraging Western-provided long-range weapons systems to assemble more complex
and effective strike packages.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces have been able to
conduct optimized operational maneuver since Winter 2022-2023 due to legacy doctrinal and resource
limitations, but both are learning, innovating, and adapting their respective tactics on the battlefield,
emphasizing the dynamic nature of the current war.
• The US and Germany announced additional
military assistance for Ukraine on November 20.
• Ukrainian officials continue to launch
investigations into Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and provide statistics on
Ukrainians living under Russian captivity.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions
near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Kurakhove, and
Vuhledar and in Kursk Oblast.
• The Russian military command's lack of proper treatment of
Russian soldiers and continued reliance on "meat assaults" is likely contributing to mass desertions.
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Russian President Vladimir Putin intensified his reflexive control campaign aimed at Ukraine and its
Western partners by conducting an ostentatious ballistic missile strike against Ukraine that used
multiple reentry vehicles on November 21. Russian forces conducted a complex strike against critical
infrastructure and industrial enterprises in Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, on the morning of
November 21, that reportedly included a Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ballistic missile fired from Tambov Oblast, seven
Kh-101 cruise missiles fired from Volgograd Oblast, and an experimental medium-range ballistic missile
with reentry vehicles – likely a modified RS-26 “Rubezh” intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) –
fired from Astrakhan Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed six Kh-101
cruise missiles and that the remaining missiles did not cause significant damage. Ukrainian officials
reported that the strike damaged an unspecified industrial enterprise (likely Ukraine’s Pivdenmash
factory that manufactures missiles and space rockets), a medical facility, and residential areas in
Dnipro City, and reported that a Russian missile also damaged residential areas in Kryvyi Rih,
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Western officials told Western media that the ballistic missile that targeted
Dnipro City was not an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and was more likely a ballistic missile
with a shorter range.
Putin explicitly threatened that Russia may attack Western countries
that support Ukrainian deep strikes in Russia and rhetorically connected the November 21 ballistic
missile strike to Russian nuclear capabilities — a marked intensification of an existing Russian
information operation that aims to use explicit threats and nuclear saber-rattling to discourage
continued Western military support for Ukraine. Putin gave an address on the evening of November 21
claiming that Russian forces conducted a combined missile strike against Dnipro City, including with a
new "Oreshnik" non-nuclear ballistic missile (which is reportedly an experimental variant of the RS-26
missile), framing the strike as a direct response to recent Ukrainian ATACMS and Storm Shadow strikes
against military objects in Russia and alleged "aggressive actions" of NATO states against Russia. Putin
threatened to strike the military facilities of Western countries that allow Ukraine to conduct strikes
into Russia. Putin's November 21 rhetoric is consistent with prior official Kremlin statements defining
“red lines” that the Kremlin has attempted to use to deter Western states from supporting Ukraine.
Putin’s November 21 statement demonstrates that Moscow’s constant saber-rattling largely remains
rhetorical. Putin's recent threats against the West have centered against Western states allowing Ukraine
to conduct long-range strikes into “Russian territory,” but Ukrainian forces have been striking what the
Kremlin illegally defines as “Russian territory” for a long time. The Kremlin has illegally defined
occupied Crimea as part of Russia since Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, and Ukrainian
forces have routinely struck Crimea with US-provided ATACMS and UK-provided Storm Shadow missiles since
April 2023. The Kremlin's application of its "red lines" rhetoric has been wildly inconsistent,
undermining the overall Russian escalation narrative. Putin consistently escalates the war on his own
without regard to Western decisions and has consistently declined to retaliate every time Western states
have deepened their support of Ukraine. Putin previously threatened severe retaliation if Western states
provided Ukraine with rocket artillery, tanks, warplanes, and the ability to strike into Russia, and
Putin has constantly shifted the goalposts every time the West has called Putin’s bluff.
Neither the Oreshnik ballistic missile strike nor Putin's November 21 statement represent a significant
inflection in Russian strike capabilities or likeliness to use a nuclear weapon. Russian forces fire
nuclear-capable Iskander ballistic missiles, Kinzhal hypersonic ballistic missiles, and nuclear-capable
Kh-101 cruise missiles against Ukraine on a regular basis. Previous Russian missile strikes have targeted
industrial and critical infrastructure including within Dnipro City that caused greater damage. The only
fundamentally new characteristic of the Russian strikes against Dnipro City on November 21 was the
Oreshnik missile itself, which ostentatiously showcased reentry vehicles to amplify the spectacle of the
strike and further imply a nuclear threat. The West maintains credible deterrence options and Putin's
nuclear saber-rattling should not constrain Western officials from choosing to further aid Ukraine. US
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Bill Burns cautioned Western policymakers against fearing
Putin's nuclear rhetoric in September 2024, describing Putin as a "bully" who will "continue to saber
rattle from time to time."
The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its full commitment to use the
prospect of "negotiations" with Ukraine and the West to pursue nothing short of the total destruction of
the Ukrainian state despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to posture himself as amenable to
peace negotiations. Ukrainian outlet Interfax Ukraine, citing Ukrainian intelligence sources, reported on
November 20 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) drafted a document forecasting global
military-political developments until 2045 and proposing Russia's vision of the future of Ukraine — which
completely erases any semblance of a free and independent Ukrainian state or Ukrainian territorial
sovereignty. The Russian MoD document advocates partitioning Ukraine into three different parts: one
acknowledging the full Russian annexation of occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts
and occupied Crimea; another establishing a pro-Russian puppet state centered in Kyiv under Russian
military occupation; and a third part designating Ukraine's western regions as "disputed territories" to
be divided among Ukraine's westernmost neighboring countries. The document also outlines future global
scenarios, prioritizing those where Russia defeats Ukraine and secures a Russian-led multipolar
international order. ISW cannot confirm the existence of such a document and has not observed the content
of the reported document itself, but the Interfax Ukraine report is consistent with ISW's ongoing
assessments of the Kremlin's intent to impose full Ukrainian capitulation and disinterest in good-faith
negotiations. The content also reveals that the Kremlin, regardless of the US administration or Western
actors, maintains the same uncompromising strategic objectives in its war of dismantling Ukrainian
sovereignty and bringing about the waning of Western influence globally.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin intensified his reflexive control campaign aimed at Ukraine
and its Western partners by conducting an ostentatious ballistic missile strike against Ukraine that used
multiple reentry vehicles on November 21.
• Putin explicitly threatened that Russia may attack
Western countries that support Ukrainian deep strikes in Russia and rhetorically connected the November
21 ballistic missile strike to Russian nuclear capabilities — a marked intensification of an existing
Russian information operation that aims to use explicit threats and nuclear saber-rattling to discourage
continued Western military support for Ukraine.
• Putin’s November 21 statement demonstrates
that Moscow’s constant saber-rattling largely remains rhetorical.
• Neither the Oreshnik
ballistic missile strike nor Putin's November 21 statement represent a significant inflection in Russian
strike capabilities or likeliness to use a nuclear weapon.
• The Kremlin continues to
demonstrate its full commitment to use the prospect of "negotiations" with Ukraine and the West to pursue
nothing short of the total destruction of the Ukrainian state despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's
efforts to posture himself as amenable to peace negotiations.
• North Korean troops are
reportedly training alongside Russian naval infantry and airborne (VDV) units.
• North Korea's
ability to learn and integrate lessons from fighting alongside Russia is likely to be significantly
degraded if the Russian military command uses North Korean troops in the same highly attritional
infantry-led assaults that it uses most Russian personnel.
• Russian forces recently
marginally advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast southeast of Sudzha.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Vuhledar. Russian forces recently advanced northwest of
Kreminna, southeast of Chasiv Yar, in Toretsk, southeast of Kurakhove, northeast of Vuhledar, and likely
advanced northeast of Velyka Novosilka.
• The Russian State Duma adopted a three-year federal
budget with record defense expenditures from 2025-2027.
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Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian military leadership continue to extol the ballistic missile
that Russian forces launched at Ukraine on November 21, likely in an effort to artificially inflate
expectations of Russian capabilities and encourage Western and Ukrainian self-deterrence. Putin held a
meeting on November 22 with Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) leadership, Russian defense industrial base
representatives, and Russian missile developers, congratulating the Russian military for conducting a
"successful" test of the Oreshnik ballistic missile in response to "those who are trying to blackmail"
Russia. Putin emphasized that the Oreshnik missile is not a modernization of an old Soviet missile and
claimed that Russian designers created it "on the basis of modern, cutting-edge developments." Putin
reiterated claims that no system exists to defend against the Oreshnik and reported that Russia is
already planning to serialize its production. Commander of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces Colonel
General Sergei Karakayev told Putin that the Oreshnik can strike targets across Europe and stressed that
there are no analogues to the Oreshnik anywhere in the world.
US and Ukrainian reporting on
the November 21 ballistic missile strike, however, emphasized that the Oreshnik missile is not inherently
a novel Russian capability. White House and Pentagon officials confirmed that Russia launched an
intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) at Ukraine, and Pentagon Spokesperson Sabrina Singh stated
that Russia based the IRBM on the existing Russian RS-26 Rubezh intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
model. Singh also reiterated that Ukraine has already faced Russian attacks with missiles that have
"significantly larger" warheads than the Oreshnik. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR)
stated on November 22 that Ukraine assesses that the IRBM that Russia launched on November 21 is actually
a "Kedr" missile, which Russia has been developing since 2018-2019 in an effort to update the Yars ICBM
model for shorter distances. GUR Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov clarified that Ukraine believes
that "Oreshnik" is the codename of the missile research and development project for the Kedr missile. ISW
cannot independently confirm these GUR statements, but it is noteworthy and consistent with ISW's
assessment that the November 21 Russian ballistic missile strike does not represent a fundamentally novel
Russian capability. Russia benefits from the rhetorical fanfare surrounding the November 21 strike and
likely hopes that stoking concerns over the Oreshnik missile launch will prompt the West to dial back its
support for Ukraine.
Russia may additionally conduct test launches of the same or similar
ballistic missiles in the coming days to accomplish the same rhetorical effect. Russian sources claimed
that Russia will close part of its airspace on November 23 to 24 for a missile test, but did not specify
what type of missile Russian forces are testing. GUR Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi warned
on November 22 that Russia likely possesses up to 10 Oreshnik missiles and that Russia will likely
conduct test launches for all these missiles in the future.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian military leadership continue to extol the ballistic
missile that Russian forces launched at Ukraine on November 21, likely in an effort to artificially
inflate expectations of Russian capabilities and encourage Western and Ukrainian self-deterrence.
• Russia may additionally conduct test launches of the same or similar ballistic missiles in the
coming days to accomplish the same rhetorical effect.
• Russia has reportedly provided North
Korea with over one million barrels of oil and an unspecified number and type of air defense systems and
missiles in return for North Korea's provision of manpower for Russia's war effort in Ukraine.
• The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office opened an investigation against another instance of Russian
forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian forces
recently advanced west of Svatove, south of Chasiv Yar, south of Toretsk, northeast of Vuhledar, and
northeast of Velyka Novosilka.
• Russia continues to build its training capacity by
establishing new service academies in occupied Ukraine.
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Key Takeaways:
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely attempted to cover up the recent
removal of the acting commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Colonel General Gennady Anashkin
following widespread accusations within the Russian information space that Anashkin's subordinates
submitted false frontline progress reports to superiors. Ukrainian military officials denied claims
of North Korean personnel's presence in Kharkiv Oblast amid new unconfirmed reports that North Korean
"technical advisers" are operating in occupied Mariupol. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk
Oblast and near Velyka Novosilka. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia does not
currently need to conduct another partial involuntary reserve callup as Russian authorities continue
leaning into crypto-mobilization efforts.
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Key Takeaways:
Russian forces’ recent confirmed battlefield gains near Vuhledar and Velyka
Novosilka demonstrate that the war in Ukraine is not stalemated. The frontline in Donetsk Oblast is
becoming increasingly fluid as Russian forces recently have been advancing at a significantly quicker
rate than they did in the entirety of 2023. Russian advances in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Vuhledar,
and Velyka Novosilka directions present the Russian military command with several courses of action
(COAs) that the Russian command may attempt in the coming weeks and months. COA 1: Russian forces
advance southwest, east, and northeast of Velyka Novosilka to envelop the settlement from its flanks,
bypassing the area immediately south of Velyka Novosilka. COA 2: Russian forces advance to Andriivka
(along the H15 highway and west of Kurakhove) from the south in support of Russian efforts to close the
Ukrainian pockets near Kurakhove and level the frontline. COA 3: Russian forces advance west and
southwest from Selydove along the Pustynka-Sontsivka line in the direction of Andriivka to collapse the
Ukrainian pocket north of Kurakhove and threaten Ukrainian egress routes. The Russian military
command is likely planning on how to advance into the southeasternmost part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in
support of Russia's longstanding objective to seize all of Donetsk Oblast. Elements of the Russian
Central, Eastern, and Southern military districts (CMD, EMD, and SMD) are conducting simultaneous,
mutually supportive offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast and have recently made relatively rapid
tactical advances. The Russian military command may be learning from some battlefield mistakes after
three years of war, but the extent of this learning is currently unclear. The Russian military
command appears to be planning more complex operations, but Russian forces have yet to be able to restore
operational maneuver to the battlefield and are instead still relying on their ability to identify and
exploit vulnerabilities in the Ukrainian defensive lines to make gradual, tactical advances. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-400 air defense system radar in an unspecified area in Kursk Oblast
on the night of November 23 to 24. Russia reportedly recruited hundreds of Yemeni nationals to fight
in the Russian military amid growing cooperation between Russia, Iran, and Iran-backed Houthi
movement. Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk
Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, Vuhledar, and Velyka Novosilka.
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Key Takeaways:
Russian forces continue to make significant tactical advances in western
Donetsk Oblast and are coming closer to enveloping Velyka Novosilka and advancing towards important
Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supplying the rest of western Donetsk Oblast and running
into eastern Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts. Russian advances in western Donetsk Oblast may
become operationally significant if the Russian command properly exploits these recent tactical
successes, which is not a given. Russian advances in western Donetsk Oblast do not automatically portend
the collapse of the Ukrainian frontline. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot in Kaluga
Oblast and an airbase in Kursk Oblast on the night of November 24 to 25. Ukrainian military
officials continue to warn of potential Russian ground operations against Zaporizhzhia City, though the
timeline and scale of this offensive operation remain unclear due to the operational constraints imposed
by ongoing Russian operations in Kursk and Donetsk oblasts. North Korea is reportedly expanding a
key weapons facility likely used to supply Russia with ballistic missiles. The Kremlin signaled that
it would remove the Taliban from its list of prohibited organizations amid intensified Russia-Taliban
rapprochement. Russian forces recently advanced in southwestern Toretsk and south and southeast of
Pokrovsk. Russian command posts are reportedly relying on Chinese-made radios for internal
communications because Russia cannot domestically produce enough quality radios for the Russian
military.
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Key Takeaways:
Russian officials continue to demonstrate that the Kremlin aims to seize more
territory in Ukraine than it currently occupies and is unwilling to accept compromises or engage in good
faith negotiations, no matter who mediates such talks. The Russian military's rate of advance since
Fall 2024 has notably increased recently compared to its rate of advance in 2023 and the rest of 2024,
but recent Western media reports comparing recent Russian gains to those at the start of Russia's
full-scale invasion continue to mischaracterize the gradual and tactical nature of Russia's recent
advances. US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby confirmed Ukraine's usage of
US-provided ATACMS against Russia amid official Russian confirmation of recent Ukrainian ATACMS
strikes. Russian forces launched a record number of drones against Ukraine on the night of November
25 to 26 as Russia continue to increase their use of decoy drones in long-range strike packages targeting
Ukrainian energy infrastructure in order to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems. Russian state
media reported that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) replaced former Russian Southern Military
District (SMD) and Southern Grouping of Forces commander Colonel General Gennady Anashkin with Eastern
Military District (EMD) acting commander Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik. Russian forces
continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) amid a surge of recent Russian war crimes. The
Russian State Duma is preparing the legal mechanisms to remove the Taliban from the Russian government’s
official list of banned terrorist organizations. Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions
near Kreminna, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka. A Russian milblogger complained on November 25 that Russian forces often operate artillery without
coordinating between different Russian elements, highlighting significant communications issues between
armored vehicle and infantry units. Russian authorities continue to incentivize service in Ukraine
through one-time payment offers, likely in order to avoid conducting another partial involuntary reserve
callup.
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Key Takeaways:
Ukrainian forces continue to leverage Western-provided weapons to conduct
strikes using more complex strike packages against military objects in Russia's deep rear. Russian
President Vladimir Putin and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met in Astana on November 27 and
signed a joint statement deepening the Russian-Kazakh strategic partnership within the framework of
Russia's efforts to establish a "new world order." The Russian military command may have imposed
controversial restrictions on the use of personal vehicles by Russian volunteers delivering military and
humanitarian aid to Russian troops on the frontlines, likely as part of an ongoing force centralization
effort. Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in
the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions, and within the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. The
Kremlin continues to promote the "Time of Heroes" program that aims to militarize the Russian government
at the local, regional, and federal levels as a way to prevent the return of "Afghan syndrome" in
Russia.
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Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to laud the technical specifications of the recently launched
Oreshnik ballistic missile and threaten additional Oreshnik strikes against Ukraine as part of an
intensified Russian reflexive control campaign aimed at forcing the West and Ukraine into
self-deterrence. Putin addressed members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization's (CSTO) Security
Council in Astana, Kazakhstan, on November 28 and reiterated several claims about the Oreshnik ballistic
missile, with which Russian forces struck Dnipro City on November 21. Putin's November 28 statements
closely resembled the speeches he gave on November 21 and 22 immediately following the Oreshnik strike,
again presenting the Oreshnik strike as the commensurate Russian response to recent Ukrainian strikes on
Russian territory using Western-provided long-range missile systems such as ATACMS and Storm
Shadow/SCALPs. Putin detailed the purported technical specifications of the Oreshnik during his CSTO
speech and subsequent press conference with journalists on November 28, highlighting the size and maximum
internal temperature of its warhead, its launch speed, and its blast radius, and compared the Oreshnik to
both a "nuclear weapon" and a "meteorite" in terms of the damage it can cause. Putin threateningly
claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian General Staff are "selecting targets for
destruction" in Ukraine, including "decision-making centers in Kyiv," and later responded to a question
about whether these are military or political targets by stating that "everything is possible."
Russian forces conducted a large series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine’s energy grid and
major defense industrial facilities on the nights of November 27 to 28 and 28 to 29. The Ukrainian Air
Force reported that Russian forces launched 188 drones and missiles against Ukraine on the night of
November 27 to 28, including: three S-300 air defense missiles from Belgorod Oblast targeting Kharkiv
Oblast; 57 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Volgograd Oblast; 28 Kalibr cruise missiles from
vessels in the Black Sea; three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from airspace over the Black Sea; and 97 Shahed
drones and unknown other strike drones (likely referring to decoy drones) from Kursk, Oryol, and Rostov
oblasts and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai as of 1030 local time on November 28. The Ukrainian Air
Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 76 Kh-101 missiles, three Kh-59/69 missiles, and 35 drones,
and 62 Russian drones became “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. The
Ukrainian Air Force noted that Ukrainian forces also downed 90 percent of the Russian Kalibr missiles and
that at least 12 Russian drones and missiles successfully struck Ukrainian fuel and energy objects.
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 132 Shahed drones and unknown other
strike drones (likely referring to decoy drones) from Oryol, Rostov, and Kursk oblasts and
Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of November 28 to 29 and that Ukrainian forces downed 88
drones over Kyiv, Chernihiv, Cherkassy, Sumy, Kharkiv, Poltava, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, and
Odesa oblasts at of 900 local time on November 29. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 41 Russian
drones became ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian EW interference, and that one Russian drone returned to
Russian air space. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones and missiles damaged residential
buildings and critical infrastructure in Chernihiv, Chernivitsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi,
Kyiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Volyn oblasts on November 28 and 29. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that Russian
forces have used large numbers of missiles and drones during recent strikes to overwhelm Ukrainian air
defenses and that Russian forces are launching thermal and radar interference devices and placing EW
systems directly on missiles to defend against Ukrainian countermeasures. The Ukrainian Air Force
reported that Russian forces have also recently seized on poor weather conditions to conduct strikes
under dense fog and cloud cover.
Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against four
Russian air defense systems and radars in occupied Ukraine and two oil depots in Russia on November 28
and 29. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 29 that Ukrainian
drone units recently destroyed a Russian Zoopark radar system in an unspecified area of Russia or
occupied Ukraine, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Buk-M3 air
defense system in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The GUR reported on November 28 that Ukrainian forces
destroyed a ”Podlyot” mobile radar system — which identifies targets for S-300/400 air defense systems —
near occupied Kotovske, Crimea (north of Yevpatoria on Crimea‘s northwestern coast). Geolocated footage
published on November 29 purportedly shows Ukrainian forces also striking an S-400 air defense system
near occupied Simferopol, Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 29 that Ukrainian
drones struck the Atlas Oil Depot in Rostov Oblast and caused a fire at the oil depot. The Ukrainian
General Staff noted that the Atlas Oil Depot supplies petrol products to the Russian military. Russian
sources posted imagery claiming to show a fire near the Atlas Oil Depot and claimed that Ukrainian forces
also conducted a drone strike likely against an oil depot near Slavyansk-on-Kuban, Krasnodar Krai on
November 28. Ukrainian forces previously conducted a drone strike against the Atlas Oil Depot in August
2024.
Key Takeaways: • Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to laud the technical
specifications of the recently launched Oreshnik ballistic missile and threaten additional Oreshnik
strikes against Ukraine as part of an intensified Russian reflexive control campaign aimed at forcing the
West and Ukraine into self-deterrence.
• There is nothing particularly novel about the
capabilities of the Oreshnik missile, and US and Ukrainian officials indicated that the Oreshnik missile
does not portend a Russian escalation in the war. Putin's constant flaunting of the Oreshnik and Russian
missile capabilities therefore remains part of the Kremlin's reflexive control information operation and
is unlikely to presage the development of particularly novel Russian deep strike capabilities.
• The Russian military is considering establishing a separate service branch for unmanned systems,
likely as part of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) in a belated effort to catch up to the
establishment of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) in February 2024.
• Russian
forces conducted a large series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine’s energy grid and major
defense industrial facilities on the nights of November 27 to 28 and 28 to 29.
• Ukrainian
forces conducted a series of strikes against four Russian air defense systems and radars in occupied
Ukraine and two oil depots in Russia on November 28 and 29.
• Russian Defense Minister Andrei
Belousov made an unannounced visit to Pyongyang, North Korea on November 29 amid intensifying
Russian-North Korean cooperation.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly appointed
Colonel General Rustam Muradov as First Deputy Commander of the Russian Ground Forces.
• The
Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office opened additional investigations on November 28 into the apparent
Russian execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky the appointment of Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi as
Ukraine's new Ground Forces Commander on November 29, replacing Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk.
• Georgians protested in Tbilisi, Georgia in response to an initiative by the ruling pro-Kremlin
Georgian Dream party to delay European Union (EU) accession negotiations, prompting the Russian
information space to resurrect information operations falsely framing the protests and Georgian
opposition parties as potential threats to Georgian sovereignty.
• Ukrainian forces recently
advanced northeast of Vuhledar.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, in Toretsk,
near Pokrovsk, and near Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian opposition outlets Mediazona and BBC
Russian Service reported that they have confirmed that at least 80,937 Russian soldiers have died in
Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022.
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Kremlin officials responded to Syrian opposition forces' offensive into Syrian regime-held territory on
November 29 and 30 and expressed interest in using the Astana Process to respond to the situation.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on November 29 that the Syrian opposition forces' offensive is
an "encroachment on Syria's sovereignty" and that Russia advocates for Syrian authorities to restore
"constitutional order." Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke on the phone with Turkish Foreign
Minister Hakan Fidan on November 30 to discuss the situation in Syria. The Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) claimed that both parties expressed serious concerns about the "dangerous developments" in
Aleppo and Idlib provinces. Lavrov and Fidan reportedly discussed the need to coordinate joint
Russian-Turkish actions to stabilize the situation, primarily through the Astana Process that Russia,
Turkey, and Iran launched in December 2016. (The Astana Process is a rival political process to the
United Nations -led Geneva Process under UN Security Council Resolution 2254.) Iranian Foreign
Minister Abbas Araghchi also reportedly initiated a telephone conversation with Lavrov on November 30,
during which Lavrov and Araghchi expressed "extreme concern" about the "dangerous escalation" in Syria.
Lavrov reportedly reaffirmed Russia's strong support for Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity,
and both agreed to intensify joint efforts to stabilize and review the situation through the Astana
Process. It remains unclear whether the Kremlin will be able to deploy additional assets to support
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime given the high tempo and operational requirements for Russia to
continue conducting operations in Ukraine – the Kremlin’s priority theater. Russia withdrew S-300 systems
from Syria back to Russia in 2022, likely to support Russian operations in Ukraine. ISW collected
unconfirmed reports in March 2022 that Russia withdrew Russian soldiers and Wagner militants from Syria,
likely to support Russian operations in Ukraine.
Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met
with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un during his unannounced trip to Pyongyang on November 30. Belousov
and Kim discussed the Russia-North Korea strategic partnership and relations between the Russian and
North Korean militaries. Kim reiterated support for Russia's war in Ukraine and boilerplate rhetoric that
the Kremlin uses to forward its reflexive control campaign aimed at forcing the West into
self-deterrence.
Key Takeaways:
• Kremlin officials responded to Syrian opposition
forces' offensive into Syrian regime-held territory on November 29 and 30 and expressed interest in using
the Astana Process to respond to the situation.
• Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met
with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un during his unannounced trip to Pyongyang on November 30.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions north of Kharkiv City, and Russian forces recently
advanced near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.
• Russian milbloggers continued to criticize
poor Russian military command decisions and poor training and discipline among Russian personnel.
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The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly replaced Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel with Colonel
General Alexander Chaiko who will reprise his previous assignment as commander of the Russian Force
Grouping in Syria, though it remains unclear how Russian operations in Syria may change. Russian
ultranationalist milbloggers, including the Kremlin-linked Rybar Telegram channel, claimed on November 30
and December 1 that the MoD removed Kisel as Commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria and
replaced him with Chaiko. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 1
that Chaiko replaced Kisel and that Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Alexander Moiseyev arrived in
Tartus, Syria. Chaiko served as chief of staff of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria from 2015 to 2017
and served as overall commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria in September 2019 to November
2020, February to June 2021, and September to December 2022. It is unclear what Chaiko’s assignment was
between December 2022 until present. Kisel has reportedly commanded the Russian Force Grouping in Syria
since at least May 2024. Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Kisel's removal will not significantly
change the situation or Russian operations in Syria because the Russian military command has routinely
rotated commanders to positions in Syria after battlefield failures in Ukraine. ISW is unable to
independently confirm this reported command change at this time.
Russian President Vladimir
Putin signed a decree approving the 2025 federal budget and the 2026–2027 draft federal budget on
December 1. The 2025 budget allocates about 41 percent of Russia's annual expenditures to national
security and defense. ISW continues to assess that the increased Russian defense spending, while
dangerous, does not necessarily equate to a one-to-one increase in Russian military capabilities,
especially given that significant funding is going towards paying benefits to Russian soldiers, veterans,
and their families. Russia's continued focus on defense spending is likely also affecting the
effectiveness and sustainability of Russian social programs, which may affect the Kremlin's ability to
sustain its war in Ukraine, given mounting pressures on the Russian economy and Putin’s observed tendency
to avoid risking his regime's stability.
Key Takeaways:
• The Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) reportedly replaced Lieutenant General Sergei Kisel with Colonel General Alexander Chaiko
who will reprise his previous assignment as commander of the Russian Force Grouping in Syria, though it
remains unclear how Russian operations in Syria may change.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin
signed a decree approving the 2025 federal budget and the 2026–2027 draft federal budget on December
1.
• Russian state media reported that the Russian military command appointed Colonel General
Rustam Muradov as the First Deputy Commander of the Russian Ground Forces.
• The Georgian
opposition continues to contest the legitimacy of Georgia's ruling Georgian Dream party's electoral
victory following Georgian Dream's suspension of Georgia's European Union (EU) membership accession
talks.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently
advanced near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole.
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Prominent voices within the Russian information space continue to emphasize that Russian President
Vladimir Putin is uninterested in a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine that results in anything
less than total Ukrainian capitulation. Kremlin-affiliated Russian oligarch and Orthodox nationalist and
founder of the ultranationalist Tsargrad outlet Konstantin Malofeev told the Financial Times (FT) in an
interview published on December 2 that Putin will likely reject any plan for peace negotiations that US
President-elect Donald Trump puts forth unless the plan accounts for Russia's "security concerns."
Malofeev claimed that the Kremlin will only consider peace negotiations with the Trump administration if
Trump reverses the US policy allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided long-range weapons to strike into
Russia; "removes" Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from office; and agrees to meet with Putin to
discuss the situation in Ukraine, the future European security, the conflict in the Middle East, and
Russia's growing alliance with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Putin may intend to use such a
meeting to extract future US policy concessions on these issues from Trump. Malofeev also claimed that
the war in Ukraine has helped strengthen Russia's relationships with the PRC, Iran, and North Korea and
has revitalized Russia’s economy and defense industry. However, ISW continues to observe macroeconomic
indications that Russia's economy is struggling to bear the weight of inflation, ongoing international
sanctions, and labor shortages and will face significant challenges in 2025 assuming Russia’s war in
Ukraine continues at the current tempo.
Putin and other senior Russian officials have recently
issued similar statements. Malofeev's interview further indicates that the Kremlin is not interested in
good faith negotiations, no matter who mediates such talks. Malofeev does not currently hold an official
position within the Russian government, but his rhetoric is important given his relationships with
high-level Kremlin officials and the influence of Tsargrad among Russian ultranationalists. Malofeev has
previously used Tsargrad to promote Kremlin narratives justifying Russia's invasion and occupation of
Ukraine and continues to be an outspoken supporter of Putin. Zelensky recently acknowledged that Ukraine
must find diplomatic solutions to end the war and secure the return of some parts of occupied Ukraine
(including Crimea) in the future, but Malofeev's comments indicate that Putin remains averse to good
faith negotiations and is committed to destroying the Ukrainian state through military means.
Key Takeaways:
• Prominent voices within the Russian information space continue to emphasize
that Russian President Vladimir Putin is uninterested in a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine
that results in anything less than total Ukrainian capitulation.
• Russia's increased domestic
production of Shahed-type drones has allowed Russia to increase the number of drones it is using in
strike packages launched at Ukraine, but Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) innovations are enabling
Ukrainian forces to more effectively respond to Russian strike packages.
• The Kremlin
continues efforts to minimize the war’s social impacts on the Russian populace while tacitly resetting
the goalposts for what the Kremlin initially defined as victory in Ukraine.
• Pro-Kremlin
Russian Telegram channel operators continue to resist Russian government efforts to deanonymize Russian
social media accounts.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, and Russian
forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.
• The Russian military
command is focusing on training additional Russian forces and improving Russian forces' tactical assault
operations.
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Russia is evacuating naval assets from its base in Tartus, Syria, which may suggest that Russia does not
intend to send significant reinforcements to support Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime in the
near term. OSINT analyst MT Anderson reported on December 2 that satellite imagery from November 30 and
December 1 showed that the Russian Admiral Gorshkov and Admiral Golovko Gorskhov-class frigates, the
Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate, the Novorossiysk Kilo-class submarine, the Yelnya
Altay-class oiler, and the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler were at the Russian base in Tartus.
Anderson then reported that satellite imagery from December 3 showed that Russia removed the three
frigates, the submarine, and two unnamed auxiliary vessels (likely the Yelnya and Vyazma) from the base —
amounting to all of the vessels that Russia had stationed at Tartus. Russia cannot redeploy these vessels
to its Black Sea ports because Turkey is enforcing the Montreux Convention, which prevents Russian
warships from passing through the Turkish Straits. Russia will likely therefore redeploy the vessels to
its bases in northwestern Russia and Kaliningrad Oblast. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate
(GUR) reported on December 3 that the Russian military command has likely deployed a force grouping of an
unspecified size from its Africa Corps — the organization that the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD)
created to supplant the Wagner Group's operations in Africa following Wagner financier Yevgeny
Prigozhin's death in August 2023 — to Syria. ISW cannot independently confirm reports of Africa Corps
elements deploying to Syria, but these reports, if true, would indicate that the Russian military command
is avoiding redeploying regular Russian military forces from its priority theater in Ukraine to Syria.
The Russian evacuation of Tartus and the reported deployment of Africa Corps forces to Syria suggest that
Russia is worried that Syrian opposition forces may advance southward to Hama (roughly 80 kilometers
northeast of Tartus) and threaten the Tartus base but that the Russian military command will not deploy
significant reinforcements to Syria in the near term to prevent such advances. The Critical Threats
Project's (CTP) Africa File will cover Syria's impact on Russian activity in Africa and the Mediterranean
in its upcoming update.
The United States announced additional military assistance worth $725
million for Ukraine on December 2. The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced its 71st tranche of
military assistance under the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), including Stinger man-portable
air-defense system (MANPADS) missiles; HIMARS ammunition; 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition; munitions
for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS); Tube-launched, Optically-tracked,
Wire-guided (TOW) missiles; Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS) equipment and munitions; and AT-4 and
Javelin anti-armor systems. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated on December 2 that US
President Joe Biden has asked the DoD to deliver the aid rapidly and that the United States "will deliver
hundreds of thousands of additional artillery rounds, thousands of additional rockets, and other critical
capabilities" to Ukraine between early December 2024 and mid-January 2025.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia is evacuating naval assets from its base in Tartus, Syria, which may suggest that Russia
does not intend to send significant reinforcements to support Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime
in the near term.
• The US announced additional military assistance worth $725 million for
Ukraine on December 2.
• Russian officials continue to perpetuate information operations about
prisoner-of-war (POW) exchanges in order to portray Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate and to undermine
Ukrainians' trust in their government.
• India is reportedly attempting to decouple its
defense industry from Russia as it increases cooperation with Western defense companies and builds up its
own defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and
regained lost positions near Kupyansk. Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and
Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian forces reportedly continued to suffer significant personnel and
armored vehicle losses throughout November 2024 as they attempted to maintain intensified offensive
operations in eastern Ukraine.
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Mounting evidence continues to personally implicate Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior
Kremlin officials in the forced deportation and "re-education" of Ukrainian children in Russia. The US
Department of State and Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab published a report on December 3
detailing the role of Putin, Kremlin Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, members of
Russia's ruling United Russia party, Russia's Ministry of Education, and occupation officials in Donetsk
and Luhansk oblasts in at least 314 confirmed cases of child deportation from occupied Ukraine. The
report states that Putin maintains primary control over and is the main decision-maker for Russia's
deportation program and that Lvova-Belova acts as Putin's executive officer who oversees the
implementation of the program. The report notes that Russian authorities have used military transport
aircraft and aircraft under Putin's personal control to deport children from occupied Ukraine to
intermediary holding facilities in Russia. The report states that Russian and occupation authorities have
primarily deported to Russia children whom Russian authorities claim to be orphans or children without
parental care and that Russian authorities have placed most of the children in Russian foster or adoptive
families. The report assesses that it is highly likely that most, if not all, deported Ukrainian children
have been naturalized as Russian citizens and that Russian authorities force the children to participate
in a patriotic re-education program intended to Russify, militarize, and indoctrinate them into Russian
cultural and historical narratives and forcibly separate them from their Ukrainian heritage. The report
notes that the true number of Ukrainian children that Russia has forcibly deported to Russia remains
unclear and that the number is significantly higher than the 314 children identified in the report. ISW
has reported extensively on Russia's crimes in occupied Ukraine, including the forced deportation of
Ukrainian youth to Russia. The Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide defines "forcibly transferring children of a group to another group" as an act constituting
genocide.
Key Takeaways:
• Mounting evidence continues to personally implicate
Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Kremlin officials in the forced deportation and
"re-education" of Ukrainian children in Russia.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues
to posture Russian economic stability and growth while high interest rates and efforts to combat
inflation suggest that the Kremlin is worried about economic stability in the long-term.
• Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced on December 4 that Armenia has effectively reached
"the point of no return" in its ties with the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO).
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in Toretsk and near Velyka
Novosilka. Russian forces recently advanced in Chasiv Yar, near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Vuhledar, Velyka
Novosilka, and in Kursk Oblast.
• The Kremlin continues to use its "Time of Heroes" program
to place veterans of the war in Ukraine in leadership positions within the Russian government and major
state companies.
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The Kremlin is continuing to suffer significant manpower losses to make tactical advances in western
Donetsk Oblast at the expense of Russia's ongoing war effort and the medium-term viability of the Russian
economy. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD), citing data from the Ukrainian General Staff,
reported on December 5 that the average daily Russian personnel casualties reached a new all-time high of
1,523 casualties per day in November 2024. The UK MoD noted that Russian forces suffered just over 2,000
casualties in a single day for the first time on November 28, 2024. Russian forces suffered an estimated
45,690 total casualties throughout November 2024, and the UK MoD noted that November 2024 was the fifth
consecutive month that Russian casualties increased. ISW has observed geolocated evidence to assess that
Russian forces advanced at a rate of roughly 27.96 square kilometers per day and seized a total of 839
square kilometers in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast in November 2024. ISW previously reported that Russian
forces suffered increased casualties in September and October 2024 as well and that Russian casualties
totaled an estimated 80,110 troops in exchange for roughly 1,517 square kilometers of gains in Ukraine
and Kursk Oblast in those two months. Russian forces have thus suffered an estimated 125,800 casualties
during a period of intensified offensive operations in September, October, and November 2024 in exchange
for 2,356 square kilometers of gains. (Or approximately 53 Russian casualties per square kilometer of
Ukrainian territory seized.)
Key Takeaways:
• The Kremlin is continuing to suffer
significant manpower losses to make tactical advances in western Donetsk Oblast at the expense of
Russia's ongoing war effort and the medium-term viability of the Russian economy.
• Russia's
constrained labor pool is likely unable to sustain this increased casualty rate in the medium-term, and
continued Western military support for Ukraine remains vital to Ukraine's ability to inflict losses at
this rate.
• Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov undermined the
Kremlin's information operation to portray Russia's November 21 Oreshnik ballistic missile strike against
Ukraine as a defensive response to the US permitting Ukraine to conduct strikes in Russia with
US-provided ATACMS missiles.
• Russian-North Korean military cooperation will likely continue
to intensify in the coming months following the formal commencement of their comprehensive strategic
partnership agreement on December 4.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues to
publicly position himself as a defender of migrants and Russian ethnic minorities in opposition to other
senior Russian security officials, suggesting that senior Russian officials may be increasingly divided
over Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to promote an inclusive Russian civic nationalism that
ensures interethnic and interreligious harmony in Russia.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced
in Kursk and northern Kharkiv oblasts, and Russian forces advanced in the Toretsk, Kurakhove, and
Vuhledar directions.
• Russian forces are reportedly increasingly recruiting women for combat
and logistics functions.
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Russian forces have not yet evacuated the Russian naval base in Tartus, Syria as of December 6, but it
remains unclear whether Russia will keep its vessels at the port as Syrian rebels continue to advance
swiftly across regime-held territory. Former Norwegian Navy officer and independent OSINT analyst Thord
Are Iversen assessed that the Russian Novorossiysk Kilo-class submarine, a Gorshkov-class frigate, the
Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate, and possibly the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler have
returned to the port in Tartus based on satellite imagery collected on December 6. Satellite imagery
collected on December 3 showed that Russia had removed all of its ships stationed at Tartus - the Admiral
Grigorovich frigate, the Novorossisysk submarine, the Admiral Gorshkov and Admiral Golovko Gorskhov-class
frigates, and likely the Vyazma oiler and the Yelnya Altay-class oiler - from the port sometime between
December 1 and 3. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on December 3 that ten Russian naval
vessels, including the Admiral Gorshkov and Admiral Golovko frigates and Novorossiysk submarine,
participated in hypersonic and cruise missile launch exercises in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, and
Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov reportedly informed the US about Russian
exercises in the Mediterranean during a call on November 27. It is unclear if Russia removed the Admiral
Grigorovich and the two oilers from Tartus as part of the exercise as well. Some of the vessels that
Russian forces removed from Tartus between December 1 and 3 have not returned to port as of December
6.
Bloomberg reported on December 6 that a person close to the Kremlin stated that Russia does
not have a plan to save Syrian President Bashar al Assad and that Russia is unlikely to create such a
plan as long as pro-regime forces continue to abandon their positions. The Russian Embassy in Syria
notably announced on December 6 that Russian citizens living in Syria should leave the country on
commercial flights due to the "difficult military and political situation" in Syria. It remains unclear
whether Russia plans to continue to maintain all of these vessels at Tartus or is planning to evacuate
all or some of them elsewhere.
Russia appears to be redeploying at least some of its air
defense assets that were defending Russia's Khmeimim Air Base in Syria, but the reason for this
redeployment remains unclear at this time. Geolocated footage published on December 6 shows Russian
forces transporting S-300 or S-400 and Tor-M1 air defense systems near Baniyas along the M1
Lakatia-Tartus highway. A Russian milblogger posted the same footage on December 6 and claimed that it
showed Russian forces moving an S-400 system and a Tor-M2 system that Russian forces had deployed near
Masyaf (about 50 kilometers southeast of Khmeimin Air Base) in 2017 to protect Khmeimin Air Base. The
milblogger claimed that Russian forces are either redeploying the air defense systems to Khmeimim Air
Base or Tartus due to Syrian rebel groups' recent seizure of Hama City (roughly 35 kilometers east of
Masyaf). It is unclear if Russian forces are redeploying the air defense systems to new positions within
western Syria in order to improve their survivability or if Russian forces are moving the air defense
systems for evacuation from Syria through Tartus.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces
have not yet evacuated the Russian naval base in Tartus, Syria as of December 6, but it remains unclear
whether Russia will keep its vessels at the port as Syrian rebels continue to advance swiftly across
regime-held territory.
• Russia appears to be redeploying at least some of its air defense
assets that were defending Russia's Khmeimim Air Base in Syria, but the reason for this redeployment
remains unclear at this time.
• The Kremlin continues to advance its strategic effort to de
facto annex Belarus and further expand the Russian military’s presence in Belarus through the Union State
framework.
• Lukashenko is likely trying to preserve Belarusian sovereignty against Moscow by
advocating that Belarus control Russian weapons deployed in Belarus - an endeavor Lukashenko has
historically failed at.
• The deployment of the Oreshnik missiles to Belarus does not
significantly increase the immediate risks of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strikes against
Ukraine or NATO states despite the Kremlin’s intensified nuclear saber-rattling.
• The Kremlin
is scapegoating former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov for Russia's failure to adequately respond to
Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used his
interview with an American media personality to reiterate Kremlin talking points that are intended to
shape American foreign policy and achieve a US-Russia reset detrimental to US interests and on the
Kremlin's terms.
• Western sanctions are reportedly degrading the overall quality of Russian
drones, indicating that targeted sanctions are having some negative effects on the Russian defense
industrial base (DIB).
• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove,
and Vuhledar.
• The Russian military continues to lose parts of its officer corps, a resource
that is difficult to replenish, as part of Russia's ever-increasing casualties.
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Russian forces have resumed their offensive operations directly aimed at seizing Pokrovsk through a
turning maneuver from the south after successfully widening their salient south and southeast of the
town. Russian forces, including elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army
, Central Military District ), began advancing further west and northwest of Selydove
(southeast of Pokrovsk) along the Petrivka-Pustynka-Zhovte line south of Pokrovsk in late November 2024
after mainly focusing their offensive efforts on widening the salient south of Selydove and eliminating
the Ukrainian pockets north and south of Kurakhove. Russian forces recently seized Novopustynka
(southwest of Pokrovsk and west of Zhovte) and advanced near the southern outskirts of Shevchenko (north
of Zhovte), and geolocated footage published on December 6 indicates that Russian forces recently
advanced north of Novotroitske (just west of Novopustynka) and along the T-05-15 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynopil
highway towards Shevchenko. Russian milbloggers claimed on December 6 and 7 that fighting is ongoing
towards Shevchenko and within the center of the settlement and that Russian forces have either advanced
into northern Novotroitske or seized the entire settlement. ISW has not observed confirmation of these
claims, however. Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces have resumed attacks east of
Myrnohrad (just east of Pokrovsk) near Hrodivka and Mykolaivka, are advancing southeast of Pokrovsk near
Dachenske (east of Shevchenko), and are attacking with armored vehicle support near Sukhyi Yar and
Lysivka (both northeast of Dachenske). Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in late
November 2024 that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) — a formation that the
Russian military command often redeploys to priority sectors and uses to exploit tactical gains — are
attacking along the Novotroitske-Ukrainka line. Russian forces' turn north towards Shevchenko marks a
notable inflection in the orientation of the Russian attacks in this area, as Russian forces mainly
focused on advancing further west of Selydove in November 2024. The redeployment of elements of the 90th
Tank Division and intensified Russian assaults near Dachenske and east of Myrnohrad further indicate a
reprioritization of this sector of the frontline.
The Russian military command likely assesses
that they have allocated sufficient manpower and materiel to the efforts to seize Kurakhove and seize or
bypass Velyka Novosilka and level the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast in the coming weeks. Mashovets
stated on December 6 that Russian forces likely seized Stari Terny (northwest of Kurakhove and on the
northern shore of the Kurakhivske Reservoir), suggesting that Russian forces have likely almost
completely eliminated the Ukrainian pocket north of the reservoir. Russian forces have continued to use
frontal mechanized and dismounted infantry assaults to advance slowly but gradually into eastern and
central Kurakhove and south of Kurakhove into Dalne, which supports larger Russian efforts to eliminate
the remaining Ukrainian pocket between Dalne and Kurakhove. The Russian command may be satisfied with
recent Russian advances northwest of Vuhledar into Kostyantynopolske and Uspenivka and up to Sukhi Yaly
(all along the C-051104 highway) such that the Russian military command assesses that Russian forces will
be able to close the Ukrainian pocket extending from Kostyantynopolske to Dalne and level the frontline
in western Donetsk Oblast along the Dachne-Sukhi Yaly line in the coming weeks. Russian forces have also
advanced north, east, and south of Velyka Novosilka in recent weeks as part of their ongoing efforts to
envelop the settlement. The Russian military command likely assesses that Russian forces can now relaunch
offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk due to Russian tactical gains in collapsing the Ukrainian pockets
north and south of Kurakhove and north of Vuhledar.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces
have resumed their offensive operations directly aimed at seizing Pokrovsk through a turning maneuver
from the south after successfully widening their salient south and southeast of the town.
• The Russian military command likely assesses that they have allocated sufficient manpower and
materiel to the efforts to seize Kurakhove and seize or bypass Velyka Novosilka and level the frontline
in western Donetsk Oblast in the coming weeks.
• Russian forces are likely attempting to flank
Pokrovsk from the west and force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in order to
minimize Russia's need to conduct frontal assaults on the towns’ eastern and southern approaches.
• The Russian military command will likely continue to trade Russian materiel and manpower for
tactical territorial gains at an unsustainable rate during their offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk
into 2025.
• Ukrainian forces continue to use drone strikes to contest Russia's presence in
the northwestern Black Sea, including near gas extraction platforms.
• Ukrainian forces will
reportedly receive increased access to Starshield, a more secure satellite network for Starlink
terminals, which may give Ukrainian forces an advantage in the technological innovation arms race in
which Ukrainian and Russian forces are currently engaged.
• Russian federal censor
Roskomnadzor appears to be testing the Russian sovereign internet in Russian regions populated by ethnic
minorities.
• Roskomnadzor indicated that it may intend to force Russians to migrate their
websites from Western hosting providers to Russian hosting providers likely to better enforce Russian
censorship laws.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and reportedly advanced
near Velyka Novosilka while Russian forces advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to forcibly impress migrants into signing military service
contracts with the Ministry of Defense (MoD) as part of ongoing cryptomobilization efforts.
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The rapid collapse of the Assad regime in Syria – a regime that the Kremlin helped prop up since 2015 –
is a strategic political defeat for Moscow and has thrown the Kremlin into a crisis as it seeks to retain
its strategic military basing in Syria. Russia intervened on behalf of former Syrian President Bashar al
Assad in 2015 in order to secure Assad's regime after mass protests began in 2011 as part of the larger
Arab Spring movement, which triggered the Syrian Civil War and threatened to oust Assad. Russian
President Vladimir Putin has long viewed the "color revolutions" that ushered in new democratic
governments in former Soviet states as a threat to his own regime's stability and security. Putin has
also more widely opposed democratic movements to oust Kremlin-allied authoritarian rulers worldwide as he
views these movements as hindering his efforts to create his envisioned multipolar world where Russia and
Russia's key authoritarian allies and partners play a major role. Russia's inability or decision to not
reinforce Assad's regime as the Syrian opposition offensive made rapid gains throughout the country will
also hurt Russia's credibility as a reliable and effective security partner throughout the world, which
will in turn negatively affect Putin's ability to garner support throughout the world for his desired
multipolar world.
Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 8 that a Kremlin source stated
that Assad and his family fled to Moscow and that Russian authorities granted them asylum. Putin has been
able to ensure the survivability of Assad himself, but Putin intervened in the Syrian Civil War with the
primary objective of bolstering Assad's regime and preventing his loss of power – an objective that the
Kremlin has failed to achieve. Putin also intervened on behalf of Assad in 2015 to secure Russian
military bases in Syria, support Russia's wider efforts to project power in the Mediterranean and Red
Seas, increase its global footprint in the Middle East and Africa, and threaten NATO's southern flank.
Russia is attempting to secure its bases in Syria as opposition forces come to power, but Russia's
continued military presence in the country is not guaranteed, especially as Russia's actions in support
of Assad over the past nine years have likely undermined Moscow's ability to form a lasting, positive
relationship with ruling Syrian opposition groups.
Key Takeaways:
• The rapid
collapse of the Assad regime in Syria – a regime that the Kremlin helped prop up since 2015 – is a
strategic political defeat for Moscow and has thrown the Kremlin into a crisis as it seeks to retain its
strategic military basing in Syria.
• The Kremlin reportedly secured an agreement on December
8 with unspecified Syrian opposition leaders to ensure the security of Russian military bases in Syria,
but the contours of this arrangement and its longevity remain unclear given a volatile and rapidly
evolving political situation on the ground in Syria.
• ISW has collected strong indicators
that Russia has been setting conditions to evacuate its military assets from Syria and that Russian
military basing is not secure.
• The loss of Russian bases in Syria will have major
implications for Russia’s global military footprint and ability to operate in Africa.
• Russian ultranationalist milbloggers – many of whom fought in or covered the Syrian war – are upset
about the fall of the Assad regime, criticizing it as yet another failure of Russian foreign policy to
exert and maintain influence in areas of strategic importance.
• The US Department of Defense
(DoD) announced on December 7 an additional military aid package for Ukraine worth $988 million.
• Russian authorities detained alleged terrorists in the Republic of Dagestan on December 7 amid
growing Russian milblogger claims that the fall of former Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime in
Syria will foster terrorism in Russia.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and
the Pokrovsk and Vuhledar directions.
• One of Russia's largest microchip manufacturers has
reportedly begun bankruptcy proceedings.
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>• The loss of Russian bases in Syria will have major >implications for Russia’s
global military footprint and >ability to operate in Africa.
Eine Wohltat für alle von
den Wagner Söldner und ihren korrupten Geschäften gebeutelten Staaten.
Wieder mal hat sich
gezeigt, dass die militärische Potenz der Russen überschätzt wurde (und weiterhin wird).
Dass
sie der pro russ. georgischen Regierung nicht schon längst zur Hilfe kommen, zeigt, dass da nicht mehr
viel übrig ist.
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The Kremlin continues to cautiously signal that it can ensure the security of Russian military bases in
Syria in the short-term but notably has expressed uncertainty about the long-term future of the military
bases against the backdrop of the volatile and rapidly evolving political situation in Syria. Kremlin
Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on December 9 that the Russian military is taking all necessary
precautions to ensure the security of Russian military bases in Syria and that Russia is "doing
everything possible" to establish contact with those who can ensure the safety of Russian military
personnel in Syria. Peskov noted that the Kremlin will host "serious discussions" with the future Syrian
authorities about Russia's military bases in Khmeimim and Tartus at an unspecified future date but noted
that it is currently too early to discuss maintaining these bases since such a discussion involves "those
who will lead Syria." Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 9, citing an unspecified source in
Latakia Governorate, that Syrian opposition forces have full control over Latakia Governorate and Tartus
City, but that Syrian opposition forces have not and do not intend to "invade" the Russian Khmeimim Air
Base near Latakia City and the naval base at the Port of Tartus. The source added that both Russian bases
are functioning normally. Russian state outlet RBK reported on December 9 that the Syrian National
Coordination Committee's Foreign Relations Head Ahmed al Asrawi stated during a discussion about Russia's
military bases in Syria that Syria would continue to uphold agreements that are in Syria's interest and
would "never" take a hostile position toward Russia or any other friendly country. Russian milbloggers
continued to debate the future of the Russian bases in Syria on December 8 and 9, expressing uncertainty
about whether Russian forces will be able to maintain their presence in the country or will have to
conduct a full evacuation. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) continues to assess that the potential loss
of Russian bases in Syria will have major implications for Russia’s ability to project power in the
Mediterranean Sea, threaten NATO's southern flank, and operate in Africa.
Russia has removed
some vessels from the Port of Tartus to a nearby area offshore. Satellite imagery taken on December 9
shows that all Russian ships and submarines have left the Port of Tartus. OSINT analyst MT Anderson
reported that satellite imagery taken on December 9 also shows that Russian vessels — likely the Admiral
Gorshkov Gorskhov-class frigate, Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate, Novorossiysk Kilo-class
submarine, and Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler – are in a holding pattern in the roadstead about eight
kilometers west of the port. The location of the other ships that were reportedly previously docked in
the Port of Tartus, including the Admiral Golovko Gorskhov-class frigates and the Yelnya Altay-class
oiler, is unclear. Syrian opposition leaders reportedly guaranteed on December 8 the security of Russian
military institutions in Syria, and Syrian Prime Minister Mohammad Ghazi al Jalali stated on December 8
that the new Syrian authorities would make the decisions about the future of Russia's military bases in
Syria. The current and future security of the Russian military bases in Syria remains unclear as Moscow
continues to hold talks with the new Syrian authorities, and it is also unclear at this time if Russia is
removing the vessels from the Port of Tartus as part of a wider evacuation or to better protect these
military assets.
Key Takeaways:
• The Kremlin continues to cautiously signal that
it can ensure the security of Russian military bases in Syria in the short-term but notably has expressed
uncertainty about the long-term future of the military bases against the backdrop of the volatile and
rapidly evolving political situation in Syria.
• Russia has removed some vessels from the Port
of Tartus to a nearby area offshore.
• The Syrian Embassy in Moscow confirmed to Kremlin
newswire TASS on December 9 that former Syrian President Bashar al Assad is in Moscow.
• Russia continues to face staggering costs required to maintain its war effort against Ukraine, with
mounting economic strain, labor shortages, and systemic corruption threatening the sustainability of the
Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
• Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted Chechen
Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov and Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov amid
ongoing Kremlin efforts to shift blame for Russia's inadequate response to Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk
Oblast onto local government officials and away from the military.
• The Russian government
claimed to have returned the bodies of deceased Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) who were allegedly
killed in the January 24 Russian Il-76 military transport aircraft crash in Belgorod Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velyka Novosilka.
• Russian President
Vladimir Putin continues to highlight Russian officials who sponsor Russian volunteer units in Ukraine
and the "Time of Heroes program," which places veterans of the war in Ukraine in leadership positions
within the Russian federal and regional governments.
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Russia's force posture around Syria continues to reflect the Kremlin's current cautious and indecisive
response to the fall of Bashar al Assad's regime. Sentinel-2 satellite imagery from December 10 shows
that Russian ships have still not returned to Syria's Port of Tartus and that the Russian Mediterranean
Sea Flotilla is still in a holding pattern about eight to 15km away from Tartus. Open-source analyst MT
Anderson identified four Russian ships within this radius as of December 10—the Admiral Golovko
Gorshkov-class frigate, the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate, the Novorossiysk Improved
Kilo-class submarine, and the Vyazma Kaliningradneft-class oiler. Satellite imagery from December 9
indicated that the Admiral Grigorovich, Novorossiysk, and Vyazma were in the same holding pattern as they
are as of December 10. Other open-source analysts noted that the Baltic Fleet's Alexander Shabalin
Project 775 large landing ship exited the Baltic Sea maritime zone on December 10, potentially to
facilitate the removal of some Russian military assets from Tartus to the Mediterranean (potentially
Tobruk, Libya). A Russian milblogger claimed that as of the end of the day on December 9 "the status of
Hmeimim (Air Base) and Tartus is up in the air," and Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov emphasized
that it is "difficult to predict" what will happen in Syria but that Russia will continue a dialogue with
all countries that share interests with Russia. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR)
reported on December 10 that Russian forces are still disassembling equipment and weapons and removing
troops from Hmeimim in An-124 and Il-76 military transport aircraft and are "dismantling" equipment at
Tartus under the supervision of recently-deployed Russian Spetsnaz. Maxar satellite imagery from December
10 shows that Russian aircraft, helicopters, and associated military equipment remain in place at the
Hmeimim Air Base (see embedded imagery below). The continued lack of a coherent Russian response, both in
terms of military posture and rhetorical overtures, suggests that the Kremlin is still waiting to
formulate a path forward in Syria as it observes the situation on the ground. The Kremlin is very likely
hesitant to completely evacuate all military assets from Syria in the event that it can establish a
relationship with Syrian opposition forces and the transitional government and continue to ensure the
security of its basing and personnel in Syria.
Russia intends to supply North Korea with
fighter jets amid growing military partnership between the two countries. US Indo-Pacific Command
(INDOPACOM) commander Admiral Samuel Paparo revealed on December 10 that Russia and North Korea struck a
deal in which Russia agreed to send MiG-29 and Su-27 fighter aircraft to Pyongyang in exchange for North
Korea deploying troops to Russia to support Russia's war in Ukraine. Paparo highlighted that North
Korea's receipt of these aircraft will enhance its military capabilities and that Pyongyang likely
expects additional military equipment and technologies from Russia, including ballistic missile reentry
vehicles, submarine technologies, and air defense systems, as part of the agreement. Paparo noted that
North Korean soldiers remain in combat zones, likely in reference to Kursk Oblast, but are not yet
actively fighting. South Korean network TV Chosun published an exclusive report on October 21 stating
that North Korea dispatched an unspecified number of fighter pilots to Vladivostok before the deployment
of ground troops to Russia in early October likely in an effort to train its pilots to fly Russian
fighter jets. North Korean pilots are trained on Russian Su-25 attack aircraft (which are already part of
the Korean People's Army Air Force fleet) further indicating that a Russian delivery of fighter
jets will benefit and expand North Korea's military capabilities, especially in the air domain. ISW
continues to assess that military cooperation between Russia and North Korea has particularly intensified
since the two countries signed their Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in June 2024, and
especially since it entered into force on December 4.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia's
force posture around Syria continues to reflect the Kremlin's current cautious and indecisive response to
the fall of Bashar al Assad's regime.
• Russia intends to supply North Korea with fighter jets
amid a growing military partnership between the two countries.
• Russian President Vladimir
Putin met with Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh in Moscow on December 10 as India continues efforts
to balance military technical cooperation with Russia and maintain good relations with key Western
allies.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Vuhledar direction, and Russian forces
recently advanced in Kursk and Kharkiv oblasts and in the Svatove, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove,
Vuhledar, and Velyka Novosilka directions.
• The Russian government continues efforts to
formalize irregular Russian military units and veterans from the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics
army corps (DNR and LNR ACs) and formally integrate them under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
• Russia continues to utilize Western-produced high-tech components in Russian weapons systems
despite Western sanctions against Russia and cobelligerent states.
• A Russian insider source
who has previously correctly predicted command changes within the Russian MoD claimed on December 9 that
Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted the Russian Deputy Defense Minister, Pavel Fradkov, to the rank
of Major General.
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Russian forces continue to make tactical gains south of Pokrovsk as they attack into Ukrainian weak
points and attempt to conduct a turning maneuver to directly assault Pokrovsk from the south. Geolocated
footage published on December 10 indicates that Russian forces have advanced in western Novyi Trud and
along the E50 highway south of Dachenske, narrowing the small pocket west of the E50 highway and south of
the Novyi Trud-Dachenske line. This advance places Russian forces about six kilometers south of Pokrovsk.
Russian forces will likely continue efforts to close the pocket between Novyi Trud and Dachenske in the
coming days, as doing so will provide them a stronger position from which to assault Shevchenko (just
northwest of Novyi Trud and southwest of Pokrovsk). Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson
Colonel Nazar Voloshyn noted on December 11 that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian fortifications west of
Novyi Trud, south of Novotroitske (southwest of Shevchenko), and on the southwestern outskirts of
Shevchenko itself. Voloshyn reported that Ukrainian forces lost two positions during these attacks and
are working to restore them. A Ukrainian battalion commander operating near Pokrovsk characterized the
situation in this direction as "critical," largely because each Russian battalion-sized formation
receives about 200 fresh personnel per month. The Ukrainian commander also emphasized that Russian forces
are attacking Ukrainian positions up to 30 times per day and have an advantage in artillery
fires—suggesting that Russian forces are currently relying on a superior number of personnel and
artillery ammunition to secure tactical gains in the Pokrovsk direction. ISW recently assessed that the
Russian command has resumed offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk via a turning maneuver from the south,
but that this maneuver is coming at a massive cost to Russian manpower and equipment. Another Ukrainian
brigade officer reported that Russian forces lost nearly 3,000 personnel in the Pokrovsk direction in two
weeks. Continued Russian losses at this scale will impose a mounting cost on Russia's already-strained
force generation apparatus. Russian forces may well continue making gains towards Pokrovsk, but the
losses they are taking to do so will temper their ability to translate these gains into more far-reaching
offensive operations.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces continue to make tactical
gains south of Pokrovsk as they attack into Ukrainian weak points and attempt to conduct a turning
maneuver to directly assault Pokrovsk from the south.
• US intelligence had warned that Russia
may fire a second "Oreshnik" ballistic missile at Ukraine in the near future, likely in a continued
effort to dissuade the West from providing further military assistance to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian
forces struck an oil depot in Bryansk Oblast and an aircraft repair plant in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast on
the night of December 10 to 11.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and in the
Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions.
• The Kremlin continues to leverage its "Time of
Heroes" program to integrate Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine into leadership positions within
Russian regional administrations.
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Russia has reportedly reached an agreement with select elements of the Syrian opposition about control
over Russian military bases in Syria, but it remains unclear if the alleged agreement ensures the
security of Russia's bases in Syria in the long-term. Bloomberg reported on December 12 that unspecified
sources with knowledge of the matter stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) thinks it has an
"informal understanding" with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) that would allow Russian forces to stay at
Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus but noted that the situation could change due to instability in
Syria. Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated on December 12 that Russia has
established contacts with HTS in Damascus and that Russian bases "continue to be located on Syrian
territory." Bogdanov expressed hesitancy in response to a question about whether Russia expects its bases
to remain in Syria, stating that the bases will "probably" remain but that there are no other decisions
yet on the matter. Bogdanov implied that Russia's continued presence in Syria is important for the
ongoing fight against terrorism in the country, likely as part of efforts to convince Syrian authorities
to allow Russia to continue to operate its bases in the long-term. Russia has been using the cover of
"fighting terrorism" as an excuse for military activities primarily aimed at supporting the Bashar
al-Assad regime since it entered the Syrian Civil War in 2015. A Russian milblogger claimed on December
11 that Syrian "militants" have surrounded Hmeimim Air Base and are periodically attempting to conduct
provocations and shell the facility. The milblogger claimed that Russia reached a "preliminary" agreement
about the continued presence of Russian forces in Syria but that the agreement only lasts for 75 days,
after which Russia will withdraw from Syria. It is unclear if the reported Russian agreement with Syrian
authorities is permanent or temporary. The Syrian opposition encompasses several factions with varying
ideologies and political objectives, and it is unclear if Russia is in contact with all the Syrian
opposition factions necessary to guarantee the safety of Russian military bases in Syria.
Russia is reportedly moving four ships from Russian ports to Syria, possibly to facilitate evacuations
—further demonstrating the Kremlin's current cautious response to the developing situation in Syria.
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 12 that Russian forces from
throughout Syria are withdrawing to Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus and that Russian forces are
flying four to five miliary transport sorties daily between Hmeimim and unspecified airfields in Russia.
The GUR stated that Russia is moving its Ivan Gren Ivan Gren-class large landing ship and the Aleksandr
Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship to Tartus to evacuate weapons and equipment. The GUR stated that
the two ships are currently in the Norwegian Sea and are scheduled to pass the English Channel in "a few
days." The GUR stated that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships also left Baltiysk, Kaliningrad
Oblast and St. Petersburg, respectively, and are heading to Tartus. It will likely be weeks until these
ships reach the Mediterranean Sea and arrive at the Port of Tartus, and Russia may be moving these ships
as a precaution should Moscow decide to conduct wider evacuations of the Port of Tartus and Hmeimim Air
Base in the coming weeks. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is very likely hesitant to completely
evacuate all military assets from Syria in the event that it can establish a relationship with Syrian
opposition forces and the transitional government and continue to ensure the security of its basing and
personnel in Syria.
Key Takeaways:
• Russia has reportedly reached an agreement
with select elements of the Syrian opposition about control over Russian military bases in Syria, but it
remains unclear if the alleged agreement ensures the security of Russia's bases in Syria in the
long-term.
• Russia is reportedly moving four ships from Russian ports to Syria, possibly to
facilitate evacuations — further demonstrating the Kremlin's current cautious response to the developing
situation in Syria.
• Ukrainian officials denied Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's claim
that Ukraine rejected his offer to mediate a Christmas ceasefire and a large-scale prisoner of war (POW)
exchange with Russia.
• People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping continues to
provide Kremlin officials with a platform from which to articulate their uncompromising demands on
Ukrainian sovereignty.
• India continues to preserve and enhance its economic relations with
Russia despite recent efforts to reduce its reliance on Russia as a security partner. • Russian
authorities are set to equate the violation of Russian censorship laws with extremism and terrorism,
furthering the Kremlin's effort to establish a pseudo-state ideology.
• Russian President
Vladimir Putin awarded the Russian “Golden Star” Medal to a military correspondent for the first time
since World War II as the Kremlin continues to use state awards to co-opt milbloggers and gain control
over the Russian information space.
• Actors affiliated with Ukraine’s Main Military
Intelligence Directorate (GUR) likely assassinated the Deputy General Designer and Functional Software
Department Head of the Russian Rosatom-owned “Mars” design bureau Mikhail Shatsky in Russia on December
12.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and in
the Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.
• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost
positions near Svatove.
• The Russian military command's efforts to ensure operational
security amongst Russian forces continue to draw ire from select milbloggers, who derided these efforts
as disruptive overreach.
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Russian forces conducted their largest series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine since the
start of the war overnight on December 12 to 13, largely targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure. The
Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 94 missiles and 193 Shahed and other drones at
Ukraine, including four Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal" aeroballistic missiles; two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, one
KN-23 ballistic missile, 55 Kh-101 and Kh-55SM cruise missiles, 24 Kalibr cruise missiles, seven
Iskander-K cruise missiles, and one Kh-59/69 cruise missile. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that Ukrainian
forces downed 80 Kh-101, Kh-55SM, Kalibr, and Iskander-K cruise missiles; one Iskander-M; and 80 drones
and that 105 other drones became "lost" due to Ukrainian countermeasures and six drones flew into Russian
and Belarusian airspace as of 1130 local time.
Ukrainian energy operator DTEK reported that
the strike caused severe damage to DTEK's thermal power plants (TPPs), and Ukrainian authorities reported
that the Russian strikes targeted energy and critical infrastructure in Kyiv, Odesa, Chernihiv,
Vinnytsia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Ternopil oblasts. Ukrainian authorities reported rolling blackouts
throughout much of the country following the strike. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated
that five of the nine nuclear reactors in Ukrainian-controlled territory reduced their output due to the
Russian strikes, of which two nuclear reactors were already producing power at a reduced output due to
the residual effects of Russian strikes in late November 2024 and the remaining three returned to full
capacity on December 13.
Russia's strike series targeting Ukrainian energy facilities is part
of a broader campaign aimed at freezing out Ukraine in Winter 2024-2025 and compelling Ukraine and the
West to self-deter into making policy decisions that benefit Russia. Russia has repeatedly targeted
Ukrainian infrastructure during the fall and winter since launching the full-scale invasion in 2022 and
conducted large-scale strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure on November 16 to 17 and 25 to 26. The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces conducted the December 12 to 13 strike in
retribution for a Ukrainian strike against Taganrog, Rostov Oblast on December 11 using Western-provided
ATACMS, although Russian forces were likely planned to conduct such a strike regardless and are
conveniently using the December 11 strike to justify ongoing Russian strikes against Ukrainian critical
infrastructure. This Russian messaging is likely aimed at assuaging the Russian ultranationalist
community's calls for retribution for Ukrainian strikes into Russia and intended to support the Kremlin's
reflexive control campaign aimed at compelling Western countries to make decisions about Ukraine's use of
Western-provided weapons and future peace negotiations that benefit Russia.
Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces conducted their largest series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine
since the start of the war overnight on December 12 to 13, largely targeting Ukrainian energy
infrastructure.
• Russia's strike series targeting Ukrainian energy facilities is part of a
broader campaign aimed at freezing out Ukraine in Winter 2024-2025 and compelling Ukraine and the West to
self-deter into making policy decisions that benefit Russia.
• Ukrainian strikes against
military airfields in Russia and Russian air defense systems in near rear areas may be prompting a
decrease in Russian air operations and glide bomb strikes against Ukraine.
• Russia is
evacuating elements of its force grouping in Syria while continuing negotiations with select Syrian
groups about Russia's longer-term military presence in the country.
• The status of Russia's
helicopter base at Qamishli in northeastern Syria remains unclear, however.
• The US
Department of Defense (DoD) announced on December 12 a new military aid package for Ukraine valued at
$500 million.
• A Russian insider source who has previously correctly predicted command
changes within the Russian military responded to recent claims that the Russian military command removed
3rd Combined Arms Army (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps) commander Major General Dmitry
Ovcharov.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Vuhledar.
• Russian
President Vladimir Putin awarded Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov with the Hero of Russia award.
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