Russian forces are currently pursuing two immediate tactical efforts as part of their ongoing offensive operation to seize Pokrovsk — a tactical effort along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line east of Pokrovsk to seize Myrnohrad and advance up to Pokrovsk's outskirts, and another tactical effort along the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line southeast of Pokrovsk aimed at widening Russia's salient in the Pokrovsk direction and eliminating vulnerabilities to Ukrainian counterattacks. The Russian military command likely views both of these tactical efforts as desired prerequisites for launching an intensified offensive effort against Pokrovsk itself. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on August 29 that the most intense battles in the Pokrovsk direction are ongoing on the eastern outskirts of Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk), southwest of Hrodivka near Krasnyi Yar, within Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), and immediately east of Selydove near Mykhailivka (southeast of Pokrovsk). ISW has observed Russian gains in these areas in recent days, but Russian milbloggers have claimed that Russian forces have made more significant tactical gains in the Pokrovsk direction than what observed visually confirmed evidence currently supports. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to the southeastern outskirts of Myrnohrad (immediately east of Pokrovsk) and have begun small arms battles with Ukrainian forces in the town, although a Ukrainian military observer described the Russian forces operating in the town as sabotage and reconnaissance groups. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have advanced in much of eastern Selydove and have reached the center of the town. Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces are fighting on the northeastern outskirts of Ukrainsk (southeast of Pokrovsk), seized Memryk (immediately northeast of Ukrainsk), and entered Halitsynivka (immediately east of Ukrainsk).

Russian forces appear to be attempting to maintain their rate of advance along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line to quickly seize Myrnohrad and reach the outskirts of Pokrovsk. The reported Russian advance from Novohrodivka to Myrnohrad's outskirts likely aims to bypass what Russian sources have characterized as major Ukrainian defensive positions northwest and west of Hrodivka. Russian forces recently enveloped Ukrainian positions southeast of Pokrovsk along the Karlivske Reservoir and prompted Ukrainian forces to withdraw from limited positions in the area. Russian forces likely hope to achieve a similar effect by trying to envelop Ukrainian positions between Myrnohrad and Hrodivka, although it remains unclear if Russian forces can maintain their relatively rapid rate of advance through the comparatively larger town of Myrnohrad and its surroundings. Russian forces may attempt to fight directly through Ukrainian defensive positions along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line, despite the higher costs, in order to maintain their rate of advance and try to seize Myrnohrad more quickly. Russian efforts to seize Myrnohrad do not preclude Russian forces from advancing up to the eastern outskirts of Pokrovsk, and the Russian military will likely pursue these tactical goals in tandem.

Reported Russian advances into Selydove and in the direction of Ukrainsk and Hirnyk likely aim to eliminate a relatively large Ukrainian salient on the southern edge of the wider Russian salient in the Pokrovsk direction that could threaten Russia's offensive effort in the area. Ukrainian positions east of the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line offer Ukrainian forces opportunities to threaten the Russian rear in the Pokrovsk direction, and the Russian military command is likely concerned about Ukrainian counterattacks and fires disrupting Russian offensive efforts as Russian forces deploy logistics, artillery elements, and force concentrations westward into the forward part of the salient to support the intensified effort on Pokrovsk itself. The Russian military command also likely aims to expand and stabilize the southern flank of the Russian salient in the area in order to prevent Ukrainian forces from threatening the gains Russia has made in its 2024 offensive effort once Russian offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction culminate. The Russian salient is roughly 21 kilometers wide at its base from the Ukrainian salient east of the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line to Ukrainian positions north of Avdiivka along the H-20 (Avdiivka-Kostyantynivka) highway. Russian positions along the E-50 (Donetsk City-Pokrovsk) highway southwest of Avdiivka are roughly 13 kilometers from Avdiivka, whereas the current line of Russian advance along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line is 30 kilometers from Avdiivka. Significant Ukrainian counterattacks from the base of the salient towards Avdiivka could threaten to encircle the Russian force grouping deployed forward in the salient, and the Russian military command likely aims to preempt this possibility by eliminating the Ukrainian salient on the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction.

Russian forces likely hope that advances in the direction of Ukrainsk and Hirnyk will mutually support ongoing offensive operations west of Donetsk City and that offensive pressure from both directions will overwhelm Ukrainian forces or prompt Ukraine to withdraw from the limited positions in the rural open areas east of Ukrainsk and Hirnyk. The area north of Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) is mainly comprised of open fields with limited cover or concealment from relatively few windbreaks, and Russian advances through this terrain would likely require significant successful mechanized assaults, which Russian forces have routinely struggled to conduct. Russian forces have proven more adept at advancing from settlement to settlement with small infantry groups in the Pokrovsk direction, although it remains to be seen if Russian infantry groups can maintain their rate of advance as they approach Ukrainsk and Hirnyk.

The Russian military command likely aims to achieve both of these tactical efforts before launching the more resource-intensive effort to seize Pokrovsk itself, although Russian forces may begin urban combat in Pokrovsk regardless if progress stalls on these preparatory efforts. It remains unclear if the Russian military command intends for Russian forces to fight their way entirely through Pokrovsk in frontal urban combat, as they have through the smaller towns east and southeast of Pokrovsk, or aims to envelop or encircle the city as Russian forces previously attempted and failed to do against Bakhmut and Avdiivka.<11> The Russian military command's calculus about what preparatory actions are required for launching offensive operations on the city of Pokrovsk and how Russian forces will attempt to seize the city will likely depend on where Ukrainian forces decide to engage in significant defensive efforts. ISW will not speculate or forecast about future Ukrainian defensive efforts, however.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are currently pursuing two immediate tactical efforts as part of their ongoing offensive operation to seize Pokrovsk — a tactical effort along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka line east of Pokrovsk to seize Myrnohrad and advance up to Pokrovsk's outskirts, and another tactical effort along the Selydove-Ukrainsk-Hirnyk line southeast of Pokrovsk aimed at widening Russia's salient in the Pokrovsk direction and eliminating vulnerabilities to Ukrainian counterattacks.

• The Russian military command likely aims to achieve both of these tactical efforts before launching the more resource-intensive effort to seize Pokrovsk itself, although Russian forces may begin urban combat in Pokrovsk regardless if progress stalls on these preparatory efforts.

• Russian authorities are creating new volunteer territorial defense units in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, highlighting Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to counter the incursion more seriously with a mobilization due to the risks of societal discontent or with large-scale redeployments due to possible disruptions to Russia's ongoing offensive operations in eastern Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced north of Sudzha as Russian forces recaptured some areas of Kursk Oblast on August 29.

• The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 29 that a Ukrainian F-16 fighter jet recently crashed while defending against a large-scale Russian drone and missile strike.

• Russian authorities arrested and charged former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Pavel Popov with large-scale fraud on August 29.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin will conduct an official visit to Mongolia despite Mongolia's status as a signatory to the Rome Statue and Mongolia’s legal obligation to enforce an arrest warrant for Putin from the International Criminal Court (ICC).

• The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on August 29 that Ukrainian forces struck the Atlas Oil Refinery in Rostov Oblast and the Zenit Oil Depot in Kirov Oblast on the night of August 27 to 28.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.

• The Russian government continues to expand pathways for accused criminals to sign military service contracts.

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European Union (EU) member state officials continue to express divergent views about Ukraine's ability to use European-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia. EU High Commissioner Josep Borrell stated on August 30 that the decision to lift such restrictions is up to each EU member state individually, as not all EU states have provided Ukraine with long-range weapons. Czech President Petr Pavel stated on August 30 that Ukraine should decide how to use its Western-provided weapons in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Charter. Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur urged Western partners to lift restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to use Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia. Polish Deputy Defense Minister Pawel Zalewski stated on August 30 that Poland supports lifting restrictions on Ukraine's ability to conduct long-range strikes against military targets in Russia using Polish-provided weapons. Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani stated on August 29 that Italy will not allow Ukraine to use Italian-provided weapons for strikes against military targets on Russian territory as neither NATO nor Italy are at war with Russia. Italy has reportedly supplied Ukraine with Storm Shadow missiles. The United Kingdom reportedly seeks to allow Ukrainian forces to use UK-provided Storm Shadows for strikes into Russia, but US prohibitions are preventing the United Kingdom from unilaterally doing so. Italy's refusal to allow Ukraine to use Italian-provided Storm Shadows for such strikes suggests that Ukrainian forces may have to abide by different rules for the use of the same missile type depending on the country of origin. ISW has previously assessed that Western allies' divergent policies on weapons use complicate logistics for Ukrainian forces, who must carefully navigate the origins and guidelines of the weapons to abide by specific regulations.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces made marginal gains in Kursk Oblast on August 30. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced on the southern outskirts of Korenevo, in the fields north of Olgovka (east of Korenevo), and south of Sheptukhovka (northeast of Korenevo). Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced east of Cherkasskoye Porechnoye and Nizhnyaya Parovaya (both north of Sudzha). Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults southwest of Korenevo near Snagost and Krasnooktyabrskoye; near Korenevo itself; east of Korenevo near Kremyanoye; north of Sudzha near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, Kamyshevka, and Kireyevka; northeast of Sudzha near Martynovka; and southeast of Sudzha near Borki on August 30. Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps , Leningrad Military District ) are reportedly operating near Malaya Loknya (northwest of Sudzha).

Key Takeaways:

• European Union (EU) member state officials continue to express divergent views about Ukraine's ability to use European-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia.

• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian and Russian forces made marginal gains in Kursk Oblast on August 30.

• Russian state-owned polling agencies are recognizing limited upticks in Russian domestic discontent towards Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian authorities amid the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.

• Venezuela extradited Colombian citizens who fought as members of the Ukrainian military to Russia, demonstrating growing Russian-Venezuelan cooperation and Venezuelan support for Russia's war.

• Hungary and Russia continue to deepen their bilateral cooperation.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk as Ukrainian Air Force Commander on August 30.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.

• French outlet Le Monde reported on August 30 that about 100 mercenaries from the Russian "Bear Brigade" private military company departed Burkina Faso to join Russian forces fighting in Kursk Oblast.

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The Russian military command may have redeployed limited elements intended to reinforce Russia's priority offensive operation in the Pokrovsk direction to defend against the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast — suggesting that operational pressures from the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast are impacting Russian operations in every sector throughout the theater. Russian sources, including social media users, claimed on August 14 and 17 that at least a company of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army , Central Military District ) redeployed from the Pokrovsk direction to Kursk Oblast. Select Russian and Ukrainian open-source communities also stated that unspecified elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade redeployed to Kursk Oblast. Elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade have been committed to Russian offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction. ISW observed reports that elements of the brigade are operating east of Pokrovsk in mid-August and as recently as today. A volunteer-led OSINT organization Evocation.info stated on August 19 that Russia has also redeployed elements of the 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps ) from the Donetsk direction to Kursk Oblast, and ISW observed claims that elements of the brigade were operating in the Toretsk and Pokrovsk directions in late July and August 2024. ISW has observed no indications that these redeployed elements were previously engaged in frontline combat in Russia's assessed priority Toretsk and Pokrovsk direction, and the Russian military command likely remains extremely averse to pulling combat effective units from frontline areas in these directions. The redeployed units were likely reserve units that the Russian military command intended to use to reinforce the Russian grouping in these directions and stave off the threat of pre-mature operational culmination, however.

The Russian military command's decision to redeploy limited elements to Kursk Oblast instead of committing the elements to the operation to seize Pokrovsk or Toretsk suggests that the Russian military command has not been able to fully insulate its priority offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast from the manpower demands brought about by the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast. The Russian military command thus far has avoided redeploying any forces slated to participate in offensive operations in the Toretsk or Pokrovsk directions to defensive operations in Kursk Oblast and thus far mainly has pulled forces from lower priority directions — northern Kharkiv Oblast, the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and western Zaporizhia Oblast. The redeployment of limited elements of the 15th and 1st motorized rifle brigades will not have an immediate impact on the battlefield situation in the Pokrovsk or Toretsk directions, as these are small forces, however. It remains unclear if the Russian military command has already or will redeploy additional reserve forces intended for Russia's offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions to address the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.

Ukrainian forces continued to conduct assaults in Kursk Oblast on August 31, but there were no confirmed or claimed Ukrainian advances. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults southwest of Korenevo near Komarovka and Krasnooktyabrskoye; south of Korenevo near Snagost; near Korenevo itself; east of Korenevo near Matveyevka and Kremyanoye; northwest of Sudzha near Bakhtinka and Malaya Loknya; north of Sudzha near Kamyshevka and Kireyevka; northeast of Sudzha near Nechayev and Martynovka; south of Sudzha near Plekhovo; and southeast of Sudzha near Borki and Cherkasskaya Konopelka. Select Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of Nizhnyaya Parovaya (northeast of Sudzha), while another milblogger claimed that the settlement is a contested "gray zone." Russian sources claimed that Russian forces regained 1.5 kilometers of territory near Korenevo and pushed Ukrainian forces out of Nechayev. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces reported that Ukrainian unmanned systems and rocket artillery conducted a combined mission and struck a Russian pontoon crossing over the Seim River, likely in Glushkovo Raion. Elements of the "Kashtan" detachment (Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz), the "Arbat" detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps), the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Troops), and unspecified Ossetian volunteer elements are reportedly operating near Nechayev. Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), 11th and 83rd Airborne (VDV) brigades, 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), and "Shir" detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian military command may have redeployed limited elements intended to reinforce Russia's priority offensive operation in the Pokrovsk direction to defend against the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast — suggesting that operational pressures from the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast are impacting Russian operations in every sector throughout the theater.

• Ukrainian forces continued to conduct assaults in Kursk Oblast on August 31, but there were no confirmed or claimed Ukrainian advances.

• Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov reported on August 30 that Russian forces continue to use airfields in Russia within Ukrainian ATACMS range — further highlighting how US restrictions against Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia are allowing Russia to leverage sanctuary space in deep rear areas to support military operations against Ukraine.

• The Russian military command reportedly reorganized the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics’ (DNR and LNR) 1st and 2nd army corps (AC) to create two new combined arms armies (CAA): the 51st CAA and 3rd CAA, respectively.

• The Kremlin continues efforts to define Russia's traditional and cultural values as part of ongoing efforts to codify a Russian state ideology.

• The Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) announced on August 31 that Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi officially appointed Captain First Rank Roman Hladkyi as the Chief of Staff of the newly created Unmanned Systems Forces.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.

• Russian forces are reportedly unable to fight in Ukraine at full strength due to manpower and equipment shortages that resulted from the Kremlin’s ineffective wartime policies.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted the largest series of drone strikes against targets within Russia on the night of August 31 to September 1. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses destroyed 158 Ukrainian drones over 16 oblasts: 46 drones over Kursk Oblast, 34 over Bryansk Oblast, 28 over Voronezh Oblast, 14 over Belgorod Oblast, nine over Moscow City and Oblast, eight over Ryazan Oblast, five over Kaluga Oblast, four over Lipetsk Oblast, three over Tula Oblast, two over Tambov and Smolensk oblasts each, and a drone each over Oryol, Tver, and Ivanovo oblasts. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed that Russian forces shot down two Ukrainian drones near the Moscow Oil Refinery in Kapotnya and that drone debris damaged a technical room at the facility and caused a fire. Russian sources posted footage of the Ukrainian drone striking the Moscow Oil Refinery and a small fire in the area, although some characterized the fire as a normal gas flare at the facility. Kashira Raion Head Mikhail Shuvalov stated that Ukrainian forces targeted the Kashira State District Power Plant in Kashira Raion, Moscow Oblast with three drones, and Russian sources amplified footage of Russian air defense activating and explosions near the plant. The Tver Oblast press service stated that a Ukrainian drone caused a fire in Konakovo Raion, and Russian sources amplified footage of the drone striking the Konakovo State District Power Plant, a subsequent large fire at the plant, and damage within the plant. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that there was also a fire at the Konakovo gas distribution network along the "KGMO-Konakovo" main gas pipeline following Ukrainian drone strikes in Tver Oblast. Kaluga Oblast Governor Vladislav Shapsha claimed that a Ukrainian drone damaged a cell tower in Tarusa Raion, Kaluga Oblast. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii noted that data available from NASA FIRMS shows heat anomalies at the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant (NLMK) in Lipetsk Oblast, a military facility for a unit of the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division in Tula Oblast, two cement plants in Voskresensk and Kolomna, Moscow Oblast, and the Ferzikovo cement plant in Kaluga Oblast on the night of August 31 to September 1. Only the FIRMS data from the site in Tula Oblast appears to be anomalous, as the other facilities routinely give off heat signatures due to normal industrial activities.

Ukrainian forces continued to conduct assaults in Kursk Oblast on September 1, but there were no confirmed Ukrainian advances. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults near Korenevo; east of Korenevo near Matveyevka; northeast of Korenevo near Aleksandrovka; northwest of Sudzha near Malaya Loknya and Pogrebki; north of Sudzha near Kamyshevka; and northeast of Sudzha near Nizhnyaya Parovaya, Bakhtinka, and Nechayev. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced west of Pogrebki, and geolocated footage published on September 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces were recently operating within Pogrebki. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces failed to establish a foothold in Borki (southeast of Sudzha) and continue to attack Ukrainian positions within the settlement. A Russian source claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces back from Korenevo, cleared Komarovka (southwest of Korenevo), and counterattacked near Kauchuk (northeast of Korenevo). Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz's "Varvar" detachment are reportedly operating near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha). Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Southern Military District ), the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District ), the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), and the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz's "Aida" group are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.


Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted the largest series of drone strikes against targets within Russia on the night of August 31 to September 1.

• Ukrainian forces continued to conduct assaults in Kursk Oblast on September 1, but there were no confirmed Ukrainian advances.

• Recent Russian domestic polls suggest that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has not yet degraded Russian domestic support of the war in Ukraine in the short-term following the Kursk incursion and that Russian support for the war has remained high since 2022.

• Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed at an August 31 press conference that "Armenia has frozen its participation in the CSTO at all levels," after Armenia has effectively abstained from participating in the CSTO for nearly a year.

• Russian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City, southeast of Kupyansk, southeast of Pokrovsk, and southwest of Donetsk City.

Institute for the Study of War

Iran is expected to “imminently” deliver ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine. NOTE: A version of this text appears in the September 2 ISW-CTP Iran Update. An unspecified European official told Bloomberg on September 2 that Iran could begin shipping ballistic missiles to Russia "within a matter of days.” European intelligence sources previously told Reuters in August 2024 that Iran and Russia signed a contract in December 2023 for Iran to deliver Ababil close-range ballistic missiles and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to Russia. The intelligence sources added that dozens of Russian military personnel are currently in Iran training to operate Fateh-360 missiles. Russia’s acquisition of Ababil or Fateh-360 ballistic missiles would likely allow Russian forces to strike Ukrainian near-rear targets while preserving Russia's stockpiles of domestically-produced missiles, such as Iskanders, for deep-rear Ukrainian targets, as CTP-ISW previously assessed.

Russian President Vladimir Putin gave an interview to Mongolian outlet Unuudur ahead of his visit to Mongolia on September 2-3, emphasizing historical and modern Russian-Mongolian relations and current trilateral economic and energy initiatives with Mongolia and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Putin emphasized Soviet-Mongolian relations and the 2019 Russian-Mongolian comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in the interview published on September 2. Putin also highlighted economic and energy cooperation initiatives to deepen relations between Russia, Mongolia, and the PRC and expressed confidence in developing the Russia-Mongolia-China Economic Corridor and the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, which will run from Russia through Mongolia to the PRC upon its completion. Putin also asserted that the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Mongolia have made significant progress in drafting a temporary free trade agreement. Putin notably published articles in North Korean and Vietnamese state newspapers before his visits to the countries in June 2024 and is likely attempting to pursue stronger relations with countries that historically had friendly ties to the Soviet Union to form a coalition to act as an alternative to the West.

Russian authorities detained Leningrad Military District (LMD) Deputy Commander Major General Valery Mumindzhanov on corruption charges on September 2. Kremlin newswire TASS reported that the Russian Investigative Committee suspects that Mumindzhanov accepted bribes worth over 20 million rubles (about $222,000) while he was the Resource Provision Head within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and oversaw contracts for the supply of Russian military uniforms. A Russian insider source, who has previously correctly predicted several command changes within the Russian MoD, claimed that Mumindzhanov was a direct subordinate of former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Dmitry Bulgakov, whom Russian authorities arrested on corruption charges on July 26. The insider source also claimed that Mumindzhanov had ties to current Russian Security Council Secretary and former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. A prominent, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Mumindzhanov's arrest indicates that the Kremlin does not intend to curtail current Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov's efforts to "cleanse" the Russian MoD and that arrests are not limited to several high-profile MoD officials but have been ongoing for five months. The milblogger also claimed that continued investigations into high-ranking Russian MoD officials will satisfy the public's demand for justice and the fight against corruption.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran is expected to “imminently” deliver ballistic missiles to Russia to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin gave an interview to Mongolian outlet Unuudur ahead of his visit to Mongolia on September 2-3, emphasizing historical and modern Russian-Mongolian relations and current trilateral economic and energy initiatives with Mongolia and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

• Russian and Mongolian officials indicated that the International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant for Putin's arrest will not impact Putin's ongoing visit to Mongolia, despite Mongolia's legal obligation to enforce this warrant.

• Russian authorities detained Leningrad Military District (LMD) Deputy Commander Major General Valery Mumindzhanov on corruption charges on September 2.

• Russian forces recently regained lost positions east of Korenevo amid continued Ukrainian assaults in Kursk Oblast on September 2.

• Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk, Chasiv Yar, and Pokrovsk directions and southwest of Donetsk City.

• Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials are highlighting Russian military training capabilities, likely in an attempt to promote military recruitment and as part of long-term efforts to rebuild the Russian officer corps.

• Russian occupation officials announced the start of the school year in occupied Ukraine, highlighting Russia's various efforts to coopt the educational system and forcibly Russify and militarize Ukrainian children and youth.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure and a military educational facility in Poltava City with two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, killing and wounding a significant number of people, as part of a wider strike series on the night of September 2 to 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea, a Kh-59/69 cruise missile from Kursk Oblast, and 35 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 27 Shahed drones over Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Poltava, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts, that six Shaheds did not strike their target, and that two Shahed drones flew toward Belgorod Oblast and occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that two Iskander missiles struck a military educational institution and a nearby hospital in Poltava City, partially destroying a building at the Poltava Military Communications Institute. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated the strike killed at least 51 and injured at least 271. Zelensky highlighted Ukraine's need for more air defense systems and interceptors and called on Western countries to lift restrictions on Ukrainian forces conducting long-range strikes against military targets within Russia as such restrictions inhibit Ukraine from defending against long-range Russian strikes. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba told CNN on September 3 that only Patriot and SAMP/T air defense systems are capable of intercepting Russia's ballistic missiles. Russian milbloggers celebrated the strike and amplified footage of the strike and its aftermath.

The wider impacts of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on the war and any envisioned diplomatic solution to the war are not yet clear, and assessments of these impacts are premature. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during an interview with NBC on September 3 that Ukrainian forces are "conceptually" planning to hold territory in Kursk Oblast for an unspecified period of time, but did not offer further details about Ukraine's objectives for the incursion due to concerns about operational security. Zelensky reiterated that the Ukrainian incursion is an aspect of Ukraine's "victory plan" to end the war on just terms and bring Russia to the negotiating table. Zelensky noted that Ukraine intends to exchange Russian prisoners of war (POWs) captured in Kursk Oblast for Ukrainian POWs currently in Russian captivity and reiterated that one of the goals of the incursion was to force Russia to redeploy troops from the frontline throughout Ukraine, particularly eastern Ukraine. Zelensky stated that Russia has diverted roughly 60,000 troops from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast, and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on August 27 that Russia has redeployed over 30,000 troops from the frontline in Ukraine to Kursk Oblast. ISW has observed indications for several weeks that the Russian military command was redeploying forces from northern Kharkiv Oblast, the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and western Zaporizhia Oblast to Kursk Oblast and recently observed indications that the Russian military command is redeploying forces likely intended for future higher priority offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction to Kursk Oblast. Russian President Vladimir Putin has thus far avoided redeploying the type of combat effective and experienced frontline units that will likely be necessary to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast, and Zelensky's statement suggests that Ukrainian forces will likely maintain positions in the over 1,100 square kilometers of territory where Ukrainian forces are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast until Putin chooses to commit such forces. ISW assesses that Putin is attempting to preserve the Russian drive on Pokrovsk at the expense of delaying the clearing of Kursk but that the incursion is likely to have a variety of other important impacts on Russian military operations over various time periods regardless of its impact on the current Pokrovsk operation.

While the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast appears to be having operational-level impacts on the Russian military, the incursion has likely not yet shifted Putin's strategic-level thinking. ISW assesses that Putin maintains that Russia can slowly and indefinitely subsume Ukraine through grinding advances and that Russia can achieve its goals through a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces and by outlasting Western support for Ukraine — assessments that make Putin averse to peace negotiations on terms other than Ukrainian and Western capitulation to his demands.

Attempts to assess the impacts of the Ukrainian incursion at this premature stage will likely come to partial and inaccurate conclusions about Ukraine's ability to change the trajectory of the conflict and the Kremlin's appetite for peace negotiations on acceptable terms. Ukrainian counteroffensives in Fall 2022 both successfully pushed the frontline back from Kharkiv City – Ukraine's second largest city – and liberated Kherson City and established a defensible frontline along the Dnipro River. Ukraine demonstrated its ability to conduct operationally significant counteroffensive operations and liberate large swaths of territory when properly aided and equipped by the West in Fall 2022, and the assumption that Ukraine is permanently unable to conduct future counteroffensive operations that result in operationally significant gains with timely and reliable deliveries of Western aid is premature. Delays in the provision of Western aid, among other factors, hindered the Ukrainian 2023 counteroffensive and generated a military crisis in Ukraine in 2024 from which Ukraine is still attempting to recover. Russian forces were able to make tactically significant advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast and Donetsk Oblast in Spring and early Summer 2024 in large part because of the shortages of artillery and air defense munitions caused by the suspension of US military assistance. ISW continues to assess that prompt and reliable Western security assistance will be critical to Ukraine's ability to conduct future counteroffensive operations, and that the US and wider Western alliance can make decisions to redress Ukrainian materiel constraints caused by delays in Western security assistance.


Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure and a military educational facility in Poltava City with two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, killing and wounding a significant number of people, as part of a wider strike series on the night of September 2 to 3.

• The wider impacts of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on the war and any envisioned diplomatic solution to the war are not yet clear, and assessments of these impacts are premature.

• Attempts to assess the impacts of the Ukrainian incursion at this premature stage will likely come to partial and inaccurate conclusions about Ukraine's ability to change the trajectory of the conflict and the Kremlin's appetite for peace negotiations on acceptable terms.

• Reuters reported that the US is considering providing Ukraine with long range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs) but that Ukraine would not receive the missiles for months.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin concluded his trip to Mongolia by signing agreements that strengthen bilateral economic ties and trilateral energy relations between Russia, Mongolia and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

• South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping issued a joint statement praising each other’s purported efforts to address the war in Ukraine.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk and southwest of Donetsk City.

• Russian occupation authorities continue to advertise Russian military service to civilians in occupied Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia appears to be relying on several countries, including India, Serbia, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as part of its efforts to evade Western sanctions. The Financial Times (FT) reported on September 4, citing leaks from Russian state correspondence, that Russia’s Industry and Trade Ministry devised a plan to spend nearly $1 billion on securing critical electronic components in October 2022, which reportedly included the possibility of building facilities in India to gain access to such components. FT reported that the leaked documents reveal that Russia has been covertly acquiring sensitive dual-use electronics from India with “significant reserves” of Indian rupees amassed by Russian banks from increasing oil sales to India. The extent to which Russia has implemented this plan remains unclear, although ISW assesses Russia is engaged in a wider effort to evade Western sanctions and procure sanctioned electronic components and machinery necessary for Russia's defense industry production via foreign actors.

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin on September 4 on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai. Putin and Vulin discussed the removal of bilateral trade barriers to reverse declining trade levels, and Vulin stated that Serbia will not impose sanctions on Russia and will not allow its territory to be used for “anti-Russian” actions. Vulin’s comment may have been intended in part to avert some of Putin’s annoyance following Serbia’s recent purchase of 12 Rafale jets from France in a likely effort to diversify the country’s arms suppliers away from Russia. Putin stated that he hopes to see Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic at the upcoming October 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan. Putin also met PRC Vice President Han Zheng on September 4 and emphasized that the EEF serves as a valuable platform for enhancing mutual understanding and fostering Russia–PRC economic cooperation. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on September 3 that Putin briefed PRC officials about the outcomes of his recent trip to Mongolia, during which Putin emphasized growing regional trade and cooperation with the PRC and Mongolia. ISW has previously observed indications that foreign companies and banks, including in the PRC, have been increasingly reluctant to conduct transactions with Russian actors due to fears of Western secondary sanctions, which could be affecting Russia's sanctions evasion efforts.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia appears to be relying on several countries, including India, Serbia, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as part of its efforts to evade Western sanctions.

• Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Lviv City, Lviv Oblast and Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast during another mid-sized combined drone and missile strike on the night of September 3 to 4.

• Ukrainian authorities are investigating another report of apparent Russian war crimes against Ukrainian soldiers.

• German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced on September 4 that Germany will provide 17 additional IRIS-T air defense systems to Ukraine by 2026.

• Ukrainian officials announced a series of resignations and appointments among senior members of the Ukrainian cabinet on September 3 and 4.

• Ukrainian forces reportedly made marginal advances in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting throughout the Ukrainian salient on September 4.

• Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Pokrovsk and southwest of Donetsk City, and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions west of Donetsk City.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to portray itself as suitably addressing its obligations towards Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces have recently intensified their longstanding offensive effort to eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient west and southwest of Donetsk City and advance up to and along the H-15 (Donetsk City-Zaporizhzhia City) highway. Apparently coordinated Russian offensive operations from the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction to the western flank of the Ukrainian defense around Vuhledar likely aim to increase pressure on Ukrainian forces defending in western Donetsk Oblast and set conditions for further gains in Russia's prioritized offensive effort in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces have recently significantly intensified their offensive operations near Vuhledar as of September 1 (southwest of Donetsk City) and have so far made marginal tactical gains in the area. Geolocated footage published on September 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into central Prechystivka (west of Vuhledar) during a roughly company-sized mechanized assault. Additional geolocated footage published on September 5 shows reported elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District ) raising a Russian flag in northwestern Prechystivka, indicating that Russian forces have likely seized the settlement. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from Zolota Nyva (immediately west of Prechystivka) and that Russian forces are continuing to advance in the area. Geolocated footage published on September 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced immediately east of Vuhledar near the Pivdennodonbaska Mine No. 1. A Ukrainian open-source account published additional footage showing Russian forces conducting several platoon-sized mechanized assaults near Makarivka (south of Velyka Novosilka and west of Vuhledar) and Prechystivka in recent days. The Ukrainian account stated that elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army , EMD), 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD), and 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) attacked near Makarivka and that elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade, 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD), 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD), and 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized unit) are attacking near Prechystivka. Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged the intensified Russian offensive operations in the area during a speech at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai on September 5, claiming that the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces (responsible for the front roughly from Vuhledar to Hulyaipole) seized "a triangle" of territory five to seven kilometers deep on September 3.

Russian forces are conducting relatively intensified offensive operations elsewhere southwest and west of Donetsk City, and the intensification of Russian offensive operations near Vuhledar likely does not presage decreased Russian offensive tempo elsewhere in western Donetsk Oblast in the near-term. A Ukrainian airborne brigade operating southwest of Donetsk City published footage on September 4 of Ukrainian forces repelling a reinforced company-sized Russian mechanized assault comprised of four tanks and 17 armored combat vehicles near Kostyantynivka. Russian forces intensified both the regularity and size of mechanized assaults west and southwest of Donetsk City in late July 2024 and have since routinely conducted relatively large mechanized assaults in the area — although these assaults have only resulted in marginal tactical gains. Russian forces appeared to initially intensify offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City in late July in order to achieve their longstanding tactical objective of cutting the 0-0532 (Kostyantynivka-Vuhledar) highway, but have since continued large mechanized assaults in the area after achieving this objective. Intensified Russian efforts to exploit gains in the Pokrovsk direction and Russian redeployments in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast have yet to disrupt the Russian offensive tempo west and southwest of Donetsk City, however. Continued large and costly Russian mechanized assaults suggest that the Russian military command has tasked elements of both the Eastern and Southern Grouping of Forces in the area with a wider operational objective.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces have recently intensified their longstanding offensive effort to eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient west and southwest of Donetsk City and advance up to and along the H-15 (Donetsk City-Zaporizhzhia City) highway.

• Apparently coordinated Russian offensive operations from the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction to the western flank of the Ukrainian defense around Vuhledar likely aim to increase pressure on Ukrainian forces defending in western Donetsk Oblast and set conditions for further gains in Russia's prioritized offensive effort in the Pokrovsk direction.

• Russian forces are conducting relatively intensified offensive operations elsewhere southwest and west of Donetsk City, and the intensification of Russian offensive operations near Vuhledar likely does not presage decreased Russian offensive tempo elsewhere in western Donetsk Oblast in the near-term.

• Russian forces intensified offensive operations near Vuhledar shortly after starting to widen the southern flank of the Pokrovsk salient, suggesting that Russian forces intend to conduct mutually reinforcing offensive operations along the southern flank of the Pokrovsk direction, immediately west of Donetsk City, along the 0-0532 highway, and near Vuhledar.

• The Russian military command likely aims for the intended seizure of Kurakhove and Vuhledar to allow Russian forces to make more rapid tactical gains up to and along the H-15 highway, although Russian forces will likely face challenges in leveraging the envisioned seizure of these settlements to eliminate the broad Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast.

• The Russian military command continues to prioritize the offensive effort on Pokrovsk and will likely treat the intensified effort in western Donetsk Oblast as a secondary effort. The Russian military command likely intends for this secondary effort, regardless of its success, to fix Ukrainian forces in western Donetsk Oblast and prevent Ukrainian redeployments to reinforce the defense of Pokrovsk.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to downplay the theater-wide operational impacts of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and continues efforts to convince the Russian people that the Kremlin's delayed and disorganized response to the Kursk incursion is an acceptable price to pay for further Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast.

• The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has had theater-wide impacts and these impacts will likely continue to affect Russian offensive and defensive capabilities beyond the culmination of the Pokrovsk offensive.

• Putin's informational efforts are likely intended to convince the Russian public that an ongoing Ukrainian presence in Kursk Oblast is tolerable in exchange for the Russian seizure of Pokrovsk.

• Russian offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast do not portend the imminent collapse of the frontline throughout Ukraine, despite Putin's efforts to portray the advances in Donetsk Oblast as dramatic.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, southeast of Kupyansk, and in the Kherson direction and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions north of Kharkiv City.

• Russian forces continue to forcibly redeploy mobilized Russian military personnel from occupied Ukraine to frontline positions to bolster Russia's crypto-mobilization efforts.

Institute for the Study of War

US and European officials reported that Iran delivered hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia to support Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. An anonymous US official confirmed to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) that Iran delivered the missiles to Russia and a senior European official stated that more shipments of Iranian missiles to Russia are expected. Iran and Russia previously signed a contract in December 2023 to send Iranian Ababil close-range ballistic missiles and Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia. It is unclear, however, exactly what kind of missiles are included in the recently delivered shipment to Russia. Reuters reported on July 7 that Iran expanded at least two of its defense industrial sites outside Tehran since August and October 2023 to support the production of drones and missiles, some of which are meant to go to Russia. Russia recently intensified missile and drone attacks against Ukraine, notably continuing to use Iranian-developed Shahed-131/136 drones and North Korean ballistic missiles. Russia will likely use Iranian-provided ballistic missiles to target Ukrainian energy. military, and civilian infrastructure over the coming fall and winter to further destabilize Ukrainian society and disrupt Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB).

US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated on September 6 that no specific weapon would be a "game changer" for Ukraine and that allowing Ukrainian forces to use US-provided weapons for long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia would not change the status of the war. Austin is correct that no single weapon system will change the course of the war, but his comments ignore how weapon systems and their accompanying rules of engagement do affect Ukrainian capabilities, and that changes in capabilities can change the course of wars. Western military assistance remains crucial for Ukraine's ability to defend itself, and Austin’s statement ignores the Ukrainian long-range strike capability requirement necessary to disrupt Russian rear staging areas. Austin reiterated a Biden Administration talking point that since Russia has moved aircraft conducting glide bomb strikes out of range of US-provided ATACMS missiles, it somehow renders Ukraine’s request to use ATACMS in Russian territory against hundreds of known stationary military objects moot. ISW has previously noted there are at least 209 of 245 (over 85 percent) known Russian military objects in range of ATACMS that are not air bases and not within range of US-provided HIMARS that the US does allow Ukraine to use in Russia under limited circumstances. Austin also argued that Ukraine has its own domestically produced capabilities that can attack Russian targets well beyond the range of Western-provided Storm Shadow cruise missiles. Most of Ukraine's long-range strike capabilities come from domestically produced long-range drones, which Ukraine cannot use to cause the same level of damage as long-range missiles due to drone payload limitations. Russian forces can also more easily harden facilities against Ukrainian drones than Western-provided missiles. Ukraine has begun to produce and successfully field long-range precision weapons with payloads more comparable to Western-provided long-range missiles but currently lacks the quantity of these domestically produced systems to significantly threaten Russian military targets within Russia at scale.

Ukraine therefore can only use a limited number of domestically produced long-range strike systems and Western-provided HIMARS to significantly threaten a limited number of Russian military objects within Russia. This scarcity is not reflective of all the long-range strike capabilities that Ukraine possesses, and Western decision-making continues to artificially suppress Ukraine's overall long-range strike capability. ISW has assessed at length that long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia would degrade Russia's ability to leverage sanctuary space in Russia for offensive operations in Ukraine and place significant operational pressures on the deployment of Russian air defense, electronic warfare (EW), logistics, command and control (C2), and military support assets. Russia, on the contrary, continues to actively expand its ability to maintain deep precision strikes against Ukraine by increasingly procuring ballistic missiles from Iran and North Korea, and continuing to expand its missile production.

Key Takeaways:

• US and European officials reported that Iran delivered hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia to support Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.

• The transfer of Iranian ballistic missiles is part of the deepening strategic partnership between Iran and Russia.

• US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated on September 6 that no specific weapon would be a "game changer" for Ukraine and that allowing Ukrainian forces to use US-provided weapons for long-range strikes against Russian military targets within Russia would not change the status of the war.

• Austin is correct that no single weapon system will change the course of the war, but his comments ignore how weapon systems and their accompanying rules of engagement do affect Ukrainian capabilities, and that changes in capabilities can change the course of wars. Western military assistance remains crucial for Ukraine's ability to defend itself, and Austin’s statement ignores the Ukrainian long-range strike capability requirement necessary to disrupt Russian rear staging areas.

• Ukraine's Western partners pledged additional military aid to Ukraine during the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Airbase in Germany on September 6, a significant portion of which will reportedly not be delivered in the immediate future.

• Russian forces are increasingly executing surrendering Ukrainian soldiers throughout the frontline likely in part because Russian commanders appear to be endorsing the proliferation of such war crimes.

• Russian officials attempted to use a meeting with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi to pursue longstanding efforts to legitimize Russia's occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and Zaporizhia Oblast, while also promoting false narratives about a Ukrainian threat to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) to weaken Western support for Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.

• Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor published and immediately deleted a draft procedure to implement a recently adopted law designed to deanonymize Russian Telegram channels, possibly after receiving backlash from the Russian ultranationalist Telegram community.

• The Kremlin signaled its commitment to establish full control over the Russian information space in the future and will likely reattempt to deanonymize Russian social media and Telegram channels even though Roskomnadzor withdrew its recently proposed regulations for now.

• The Kremlin continues to appoint Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko to positions overseeing Russia's informational efforts as part of efforts aimed at shaping Russian identity and ideology.

• Russia continues efforts to develop a capability to use information operations on social media platforms to trigger kinetic activity and has been using the Ukrainian information space for several years to hone this capability.

• Russian forces recently regained lost positions in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting throughout the Ukrainian salient on September 6.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk.

• Open-source tracking of confirmed Russian military deaths in Ukraine suggests that more Russian volunteers have died in Ukraine than Russian convict recruits and mobilized personnel.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov noted that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast is having theater-wide impacts on Russian offensive operations in Ukraine and addressed the prospects for continued Russian offensive operations in Winter 2024–2025. Budanov stated during an interview published on September 7 that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast complicated Russia's plans for offensive operations in August 2024 and later this fall. Budanov noted that the Russian military command is committing any available manpower and equipment to achieve their objective in Russia's "main direction," likely referring to the seizure of Pokrovsk, and that Russian forces are focusing their attention on this direction. Russian forces recently intensified offensive operations and made further advances near Pokrovsk and west and southwest of Donetsk City, but ISW has not observed intensified Russian offensive operations in other frontline areas in Ukraine. The Russian military command has almost certainly decided to prioritize Russian advances near Pokrovsk and is committing available manpower and materiel to the area at the expense of Russian offensive operations in other directions. A Russian milblogger claimed that manpower constraints are forcing the Russian military command to adjust their plans in Donetsk and Kursk oblasts and that Russian officials do not have a "systemic solution" to generate the forces necessary to reinforce offensive operations in Ukraine and repel Ukraine‘s incursion into Kursk Oblast. The milblogger noted that Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction have begun to slow as Russian units are suffering personnel losses and are increasingly understaffed and that Russian forces are continuing offensive operations in the area despite being "exhausted." The Russian military command will likely be able to funnel enough forces into the area to continue Russia's ongoing offensive operations and possibly eventually seize Pokrovsk, although Russian forces may culminate before seizing the city.

Budanov noted during the interview that winter weather conditions will likely complicate Russian offensive operations in the coming months, but that this does not mean that Russian forces will completely stop assaults on Ukrainian positions. The fall mud season has historically hampered Russian and Ukrainian ground maneuver, but periods of prolonged freezing temperatures that typically begin in late December freeze the ground and allow armored vehicles to move more easily than in autumn and spring months. Russian forces notably fought to seize the initiative and pursued offensive operations in Fall 2023 during the most challenging weather conditions of the year instead of waiting for improved weather conditions later in Winter 2023–2024, however. Fall and winter weather conditions will likely complicate Russian and Ukrainian battlefield activity but are very unlikely to completely stall activity along the frontline.

Iran reportedly recently delivered more than 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia. UK outlet The Times, citing a Ukrainian military intelligence source, reported on September 6 that a Russian ship delivered the Fateh-360 missiles to an undisclosed port in the Caspian Sea on September 4. US and European officials recently confirmed that Iran began supplying Russia with short-range ballistic missiles, and ISW assessed that Russian forces will likely use the Iranian-supplied missiles to target Ukrainian energy, military, and civilian infrastructure over the coming fall and winter.


Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov noted that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast is having theater-wide impacts on Russian offensive operations in Ukraine and addressed the prospects for continued Russian offensive operations in Winter 2024–2025.

• Iran reportedly recently delivered more than 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia.

• Ukraine continues to successfully adapt and develop its anti-drone capabilities, allowing Ukrainian forces to leverage lower-end systems to offset Russian pressures on Ukraine's limited air defense umbrella.

• Russian forces recently regained territory and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in the area on September 7.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City and in the Dnipro River Delta.

• Russian officers continue to mistreat and abuse their subordinates likely due to poor command training and discipline.

Institute for the Study of War

Central Intelligence Agency Director (CIA) William Burns cautioned the West against concern about boilerplate Russian nuclear saber-rattling, which ISW has long identified as part of a Kremlin effort to promote Western self-deterrence and influence key moments in Western policy debates about support for Ukraine. Burns stated during a panel with United Kingdom Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) Chief Richard Moore on September 7 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will continue to issue periodic threats of direct confrontation against the West but that these threats should not intimidate the West. Burns stated that the CIA had assessed that Russian forces may have considered using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine in the fall of 2022 and that he was in contact with Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergei Naryshkin on the matter. The CIA's assessment of possible Russian readiness to use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine in the fall of 2022 corresponded with intensified Russian rhetoric about nuclear confrontation amid the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in Kherson and Kharkiv oblasts. This rhetoric was likely more a part of a routine information operation designed to deter Western security assistance to Ukraine than an indicator of Russian readiness to use nuclear weapons, however. The Kremlin has repeatedly invoked thinly veiled threats of a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West during key moments in Western political discussions about further military assistance to Ukraine, such as in the fall of 2022, to induce fear among decision makers. ISW continues to assess that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere.

Ukrainian officials continued to announce a series of appointments among senior members of the Ukrainian cabinet on September 8. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed presidential decrees on September 8 appointing Iryna Vereshchuk and Viktor Mykyta to the positions of Deputy Heads of the Presidential Office and appointing Oleksandr Kamyshin and Dmytro Lytvyn as his advisors. Kamyshin will advise Zelensky on strategic issues, and Lytvyn will advise him on communications. Zelensky reassigned Mykyta from his previous position as the Head of the Zakarpattia Oblast Military Administration on September 8 and Vereshchuk resigned from her previous post as Ukrainian Minister for Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories (TOT) on September 3.

Key Takeaways:

• Central Intelligence Agency Director (CIA) William Burns cautioned the West against concern about boilerplate Russian nuclear saber-rattling, which ISW has long identified as part of a Kremlin effort to promote Western self-deterrence and influence key moments in Western policy debates about support for Ukraine.

• Russian milbloggers continue to offer insights into how the Kremlin is co-opting select milbloggers to regulate the spread of information in Russia.

• The Kremlin has not yet succeeded in co-opting or silencing all Russian milbloggers, however.

• The milbloggers’ insights into such incidents suggest that the Kremlin is attempting to co-opt milbloggers or encourage them to self-censor, as opposed to a more aggressive policy of direct censorship.

• The Russian Investigative Committee is investigating a "mass brawl" between Russian ultranationalists and Central Asian residents in Afipsky, Krasnodar Krai, amid increased xenophobia against migrants and ethnic minorities in Russia.

• Ukrainian officials continued to announce a series of appointments among senior members of the Ukrainian cabinet on September 8.

• Russian forces conducted counterattacks in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in the area on September 8.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and marginally advanced near Chasiv Yar.

• A Russian milblogger who formerly served as a "Storm-Z" unit instructor claimed on September 8 that the Russian military needs to improve the training of drone unit commanders.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attended the Russia–Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Joint Ministerial Meeting of Strategic Dialogue in Saudi Arabia on September 9, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to advance the creation of its envisioned “Eurasian security architecture.” Lavrov held talks with GCC Secretary General Jasem Mohamed Al-Budaiwi, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan, and Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammad bin Salman on the sidelines of the Russia-GCC Strategic Dialogue and emphasized Russia’s interest in enhancing cooperation with Gulf states. Lavrov and Saudi officials discussed strengthening trade, cultural relations, and bilateral investments, and Lavrov invited bin Salman to the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia in October 2024. Lavrov claimed in July 2024 that Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are advocating within the GCC for the creation of a Eurasian security architecture, and Lavrov likely used his meetings with Gulf state leaders to promote this agenda. ISW previously assessed that Russia's proposal of a Eurasian security architecture is consistent with Russia's long-term strategic goal of disbanding Western unity, disbanding NATO from within, and destroying the current world order.

Kremlin officials are likely trying to shape international peace mediation efforts in the war in Ukraine while demonstrating Russia's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira and Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on the sidelines of the Russia-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) meeting in Saudi Arabia on September 9. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that Lavrov discussed the war in Ukraine with Vieira and Jaishankar but did not offer details. Brazil and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have promoted their "Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis" six-point peace plan — whose key principles favor Russia — since May 2024. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi notably recently reaffirmed India's support for peace in Ukraine based on principles of international law such as respect for territorial integrity and the sovereignty of states. Lavrov, however, reiterated boilerplate Kremlin narratives on September 9 demonstrating Russia's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine, claiming that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's Peace Formula — which is indeed based on principles of international law — is an "ultimatum" and that Russia has never seriously considered the plan. Ukrainian officials have openly invited a Russian representative to attend Ukraine's second peace summit later in 2024.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attended the Russia-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Joint Ministerial Meeting of Strategic Dialogue in Saudi Arabia on September 9, likely as part of Kremlin efforts to advance the creation of its envisioned “Eurasian security architecture.”

• Kremlin officials are likely trying to shape international peace mediation efforts in the war in Ukraine while demonstrating Russia's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.

• The Kremlin leveraged Russian regional elections from September 6 to 8 to integrate trusted Russian military veterans of the war in Ukraine into the Russian government, likely as part of an ongoing attempt to appease Russian servicemembers, boost domestic support for the war, and build out a cadre of Kremlin-affiliated local officials.

• The Kremlin refrained from replacing Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov during the Russian regional elections, likely in support of an ongoing effort to downplay the societal impacts of Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast.

• Ukrainian officials continue to warn that Russian forces are increasingly using chemical weapons in Ukraine.

• Russian forces recently regained lost positions in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in the area on September 9.

• Russian forces recently advanced along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Siversk, near Pokrovsk, and southwest of Donetsk City, and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions near Siversk.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin expanded Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov’s powers on September 9 by allowing him to grant eligible parties within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) access to Russian state secrets (classified information).

Institute for the Study of War

US President Joe Biden stated on September 10 that the presidential administration is working on lifting restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use US-provided weapons to strike military objects within Russia. Biden stated that his administration is "working that out now," in response to a question about whether the United States would lift restrictions prohibiting Ukraine from using US-provided long-range weapons to strike within Russia. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated earlier on September 10 during a press conference with UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy that Biden and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer will likely discuss lifting these restrictions during a meeting on September 13. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Michael McCaul stated on September 10 that he believes that Blinken will use the visit to Kyiv to inform Ukrainian officials that the United States will allow Ukrainian forces to use US-provided ATACMS missiles to strike within Russia.

Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) continue to pursue various avenues of military-technical cooperation. US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell told POLITICO on September 10 that the PRC is giving Russia's defense industry "very substantial" support in exchange for secretive Russian military technologies. Campbell emphasized that the PRC is not just supplying dual-use products to Russia but is instead engaged in a "substantial effort....to help sustain, build, and diversify elements of the Russian war machine." Campbell warned that Russia is sending the PRC safeguarded submarine, aeronautical design, and missile technologies in return, which Russia has previously been reluctant to share with Beijing. PRC officials continue to deny their support for the Russian war effort and claim that the PRC remains "impartial" when it comes to Russia's war in Ukraine, despite frequent Western reporting of the PRC's material support for Russian defense industrial output and geospatial intelligence capabilities. Reports of more direct PRC support to Russia come against the backdrop of the Russia-led "Okean-2024" international naval exercises, which are currently taking place in the Pacific and Arctic oceans and Mediterranean, Caspian, and Baltic seas with the involvement of three ships, one vessel, and 15 aircraft of the PRC's People's Liberation Army (PLA). Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the start of Okean-2024 on September 10 and accused the US of placing pressure on Russia and the PRC, necessitating the conduct of joint naval exercises. PLA and Russian forces are also currently conducting the "Northern/Interaction-2024" joint "strategic collaboration" exercise, comprised of air force and naval drills in the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk, and a joint maritime patrol in the Pacific.

Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes in Russia on the night of September 9 to 10. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces intercepted 144 Ukrainian drones in total, including 72 drones over Bryansk Oblast, 20 drones over Moscow Oblast, 14 drones over Kursk Oblast, 13 drones over Tula Oblast, eight drones over Belgorod Oblast, seven drones over Kaluga Oblast, five drones over Voronezh Oblast, four drones over Lipetsk Oblast, and one drone over Oryol Oblast. Footage published on September 10 reportedly shows the aftermath of a drone strike in Ramenskoye, Moscow Oblast, and Ramenskoye Urban Raion Acting Head Eduard Malyshev claimed that Ukrainian drones damaged two buildings in the raion. Moscow Oblast Governor Andrei Vorobyov claimed that Russian forces shot down 14 drones near Podolsk, Ramenskoye, Lyubertsy, Domodedovo, and Kolomna. Domodedovo Urban Raion Head Yevgenia Krustaleva claimed that falling drone debris blocked a section of the Kashirskoye Highway from Domodedovo to Moscow City. Russian Federal Aviation Agency Rosaviatsiya stated that it introduced temporary restrictions at the Vnukovo, Domodedovo, and Zhukovsky airports near Moscow City and limited airport operations in Kazan, Tatarstan Republic in response to the drone strikes. Tula Oblast authorities stated that drone debris fell on an unspecified fuel and energy facility in an unspecified location in Tula Oblast but did not damage the facility. Russian milbloggers criticized Russian regional authorities for claiming that falling "debris" caused damage to infrastructure during the strikes and reiterated calls for Russian authorities to allow the Russian military, Rosgvardia, border guards, and private security companies to create mobile fire groups to repel drone strikes.

Key Takeaways:
• US Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed on September 10 that Iran has sent short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to Russia amid growing international condemnation of Tehran's support for Russia's war in Ukraine.
• Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) continue to pursue various avenues of military-technical cooperation.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes in Russia on the night of September 9 to 10.
• US President Joe Biden stated on September 10 that the presidential administration is working on lifting restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use US-provided weapons to strike military objects within Russia.
• The Kremlin is reportedly allocating roughly 59 billion rubles (about $648 million) to strengthen its technical ability to restrict internet traffic on its sovereign internet.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in the area on September 10.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.
• The German-based Kiel Institute for the World Economy published a report on September 9 warning that Russia has significantly increased its defense industrial base (DIB) capabilities since 2022 and that depleting weapons and equipment stockpiles may not significantly impact future Russian DIB production.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces began counterattacks along the western edge of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and reportedly seized several settlements northeast and south of Korenevo on September 10 and 11. The size, scale, and potential prospects of the September 11 Russian counterattacks in Kursk Oblast are unclear and the situation remains fluid as of this report. It is premature to draw conclusions about Russia’s new counterattacks and ISW will continue following the situation. Geolocated footage published on September 11 indicates that Russian forces retook positions east of Zhuravli (northeast of Korenevo). Additional geolocated footage published on September 10 indicates that elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) advanced north and northeast of Snagost (south of Korenevo) during a company-sized mechanized assault. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces launched the mechanized counterattack from the north near Korenevo and that Russian forces quickly advanced into Snagost. Several Russian sources claimed that Russian forces fully seized Snagost, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims. Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 51st VDV Regiment and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District ) advanced northwest of Snagost and seized Krasnooktyabrskoye; advanced west of Snagost and seized Komarovka and Vishnevka; advanced southwest of Snagost and seized Apanasovka and 10-y Oktyabr; advanced southeast of Snagost and seized Obukhovka; and advanced south of Snagost and seized Byakhovo, Vnezapnoye, and Gordeevka. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps , Leningrad Military District ) seized Olgovka (just east of Korenevo).

Ukrainian forces reportedly began new attacks against the Russian counterattack west of Snagost and throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. A Ukrainian brigade reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast reported on September 11 that Ukrainian forces began attacking Russian forces' flank west of Snagost after the initial Russian counterattack into Snagost. An open-source X (formerly Twitter) user claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating near Kulbaki (southwest of Snagost and roughly five kilometers from the international border), suggesting that Ukrainian forces recently advanced near the settlement, reportedly after crossing the international border. Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces are conducting small mechanized cross-border assaults into Glushkovo Raion near Medvezhye (southwest of Snagost and along the international border) and in another unspecified area along the international border. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks south of Snagost near Apanasovka; east of Korenevo near Kremyanoye; and southeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskaya Konopelka, Fanaseyevka, and Borki. It remains unclear how much force Ukraine has committed to the reported Ukrainian counterattack.

Available visual evidence suggests that Russian forces counterattacking in Kursk Oblast are operating in company-sized units and may be using elements of more combat-experienced units to conduct counterattacks. Geolocated footage published on September 10 shows elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) conducting a company-seized mechanized assault north of Snagost. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian naval infantry and airborne "battalion tactical groups" (BTGs) are conducting offensive operations in Kursk Oblast, although ISW has only observed geolocated footage of a company-sized mechanized assault. The milblogger could be referring to a BTG-sized force (roughly a unit with the strength of a reinforced battalion but not necessarily operating in the structure of a traditional BTG), and Russian forces could theoretically deploy a detached company from a BTG. Russian forces notably have not utilized BTGs at scale on the battlefield since mid-2022, following the widespread failure of BTGs to accomplish Russian offensive objectives in the early stages of the war, as well as damage accrued to BTGs during costly Russian offensive operations on Kyiv, Severodonetsk, Mariupol, and Lysychansk. The Russian military has transitioned away from using BTGs in the past two years as a task-organized unit and their re-emergence in Kursk Oblast, if confirmed, would be a noteworthy inflection. ISW has not observed any confirmation that Russian forces in Kursk Oblast are operating BTG as of this publication. Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District ) are operating in Kursk Oblast and involved in the counterattacks. The Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade most notably participated in the failed Russian push for Vuhledar in late 2022 to early 2023, then fought southwest of Donetsk City near Marinka, and deployed to participate in the Russian offensive north of Kharkiv City in May 2024 — largely without significant rest, and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade has been degraded to the point of being reconstituted several times. Elements of the 56th VDV Regiment participated in repelling Ukrainian counteroffensive operations near Verbove in Summer 2023 and were reportedly still operating in the area as of July 2024. The Russian military may be relying on relatively combat-experienced units to conduct assault operations in Kursk Oblast, although it is unclear how effective these operations will be since these units, especially units which have been heavily degraded and reconstituted many times, like the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade. It is also unclear if Russian forces have enough forces necessary to fully repel Ukrainian forces — or defend against reported Ukrainian counterattacks — from Kursk Oblast since the Russian military command likely deployed elements of these units, instead of the entire formations, to Kursk Oblast, making it premature to assess the longer-term strategic-level effects of the Ukrainian incursion.

Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces began counterattacks along the western edge of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and reportedly seized several settlements northeast and south of Korenevo on September 10 and 11.
• Available visual evidence suggests that Russian forces counterattacking in Kursk Oblast are operating in company-sized units and may be using elements of more combat-experienced units to conduct counterattacks.
• Russian forces may intend to temporarily bisect the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast before beginning a more organized and well-equipped effort to push Ukrainian forces out of Russian territory.
• US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and UK Foreign Secretary Davit Lammy arrived in Kyiv on September 11 and reiterated support for Ukraine but did not clarify current Western policy on Ukraine’s ability to strike military objects in Russia with Western-provided weapons.
• The People's Republic of China (PRC) continues to promote its alternative peace plan for the war in Ukraine.
• Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated his support for Ukraine on September 11.
• Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk, near Toretsk, and near Pokrovsk.
• Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vitaly Sarantsev reported on September 11 that Russian forces are replenishing their tactical, operational, and strategic reserves.
• Russian occupation authorities illegally held regional elections in occupied Crimea on September 6 to 8 and likely fabricated increased voter turnout numbers to claim that residents broadly support Russia's illegal occupation of Crimea.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces continued counterattacking throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on September 12 but made only marginal gains, likely due to continued Ukrainian offensive operations and defensive counterattacks in the area. Geolocated footage published on September 12 indicates that Russian forces made marginal advances west of Vishnevka (southwest of Korenevo) and in northern Krasnooktyabrskoye (southwest of Korenevo). The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces have recaptured 10 settlements south and southwest of Korenevo since starting counterattacks on the night of September 10 to 11, including Apanasovka, Byakhovo, Vishnevka, Viktorovka, Vnezapnoye, Gordeevka, Krasnooktyabrskoye, Obukhovka, Snagost, and 10-y Oktyabr. All of these settlements are within the existing claimed limit of Russian advances, and ISW has yet to observe visual confirmation that Russian forces have recaptured any of these settlements except parts of Snagost and Krasnooktyabrskoye. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued advancing southeast of Korenevo and northeast of Snagost (southwest of Korenevo), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims. Ukrainian forces continued counterattacking in areas where Russian forces have launched counterattacks and launched additional attacks outside of the salient, making gains in Glushkovsky Raion (west of Korenevsky Raion). Geolocated footage published September 12 indicates that Ukrainian infantry have advanced across the border and into southwestern Tetkino (about 40km southwest of the current Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast). Additional geolocated footage published on September 12 shows Ukrainian armored vehicles and infantry bypassing Russian dragon's teeth anti-tank obstacles on the Russian-Ukrainian border southwest of Novy Put (southwest of Glushkovo) unopposed, indicating that Ukrainian forces have advanced in the area and that Russian forces were not prepared to leverage the obstacles to repel cross-border Ukrainian assaults. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults near Novy Put, Medvezhye (southeast of Glushkovo), Snagost, Olgovka (east of Korenevo), and Fanaseyevka (southeast of Sudzha).

Russian forces have so far advanced in areas of Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces were not yet fully controlling nor attempting to control, and Russian forces will likely face more difficulty when counterattacking further into areas of the salient where Ukrainian forces do have control. ISW uses the doctrinal definition of "control" when referring to control of terrain in which "control is a tactical mission task that requires a commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations." Russian forces have advanced roughly 58 square kilometers in areas where ISW has observed either maximalist claims or visual evidence of Ukrainian forces operating since starting counterattacks on the night of September 10 to 11. ISW previously was not mapping control of terrain within the Ukrainian salient in Russia, and Russian forces have not advanced in recent days through areas which ISW formally assessed were under Ukrainian control. ISW has been mapping the maximalist extent of claims and unverified reports about Ukrainian advances, however, and ISW's mapping never excluded the possibility that Russian forces were operating in areas within the maximalist extent of claimed Ukrainian advances. Ukrainian forces have not attempted to consolidate positions everywhere in their salient in Kursk Oblast, and it is likely that Ukrainian forces had fewer consolidated positions in forward areas at the edges of the salient where Russian forces have recently advanced. Ukrainian forces most certainly control territory within some areas of the salient in Kursk Oblast, although ISW will continue to refrain from mapping Ukrainian control of terrain in Russia. Russian counterattacks against better prepared and consolidated positions in territory where Ukrainian forces exert control will likely be far less successful than the counterattacks Russian forces launched on September 10 to 11.

Key Takeaways:
• Russian forces continued counterattacking throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on September 12 but made only marginal gains, likely due to continued Ukrainian offensive operations and defensive counterattacks in the area.
• Russian forces have so far advanced in areas of Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces were not yet fully controlling nor attempting to control, and Russian forces will likely face more difficulty when counterattacking further into areas of the salient where Ukrainian forces do have control.
• A Ukrainian HIMARS strike reportedly damaged a temporary pontoon bridge across the Seym River and wounded a group of nearby Russian troops on September 12.
• Russian authorities have reportedly deployed additional elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division to Kursk Oblast and may begin redeploying more combat experienced forces to support ongoing Russian counterattacks and future counteroffensive operations against Ukrainian forces in Russia.
• The United Kingdom (UK) will reportedly allow Ukraine to use UK-provided long-range Storm Shadow missiles to strike military objects in Russia in the coming days.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues rhetorical efforts aimed at influencing the ongoing Western policy debate about granting Ukraine permission to use Western-provided weapons against military objects in Russia, although Russia has not previously escalated militarily against perceived Western violations of Russia's "red lines."
• Russian forces struck a civilian cargo ship transiting through the Ukrainian grain corridor in the western Black Sea on September 11, likely as part of a renewed Russian effort to undermine international confidence in the safety of the corridor.
• Russia continued its efforts to enhance relations with non-Western countries at the meeting of BRICS high-ranking security officials and advisors in St. Petersburg.
• Iran and Russia are downplaying their disagreement over the Zangezur Corridor project in the Caucasus.
• Russia is continuing to balance its relationships with Iran and the Gulf states.
• Russian investigative outlet Dossier Center published an investigation on September 12 into the Kremlin's efforts to consolidate its influence over the Russian information space via Telegram ahead of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently north of Chasiv Yar, southeast of Pokrovsk, and west of Donetsk City.
• Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin claimed on September 12 that the first group of the newly-formed "BARS-Sarmat" volunteer detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) signed military service contracts with the Russian MoD and are training for deployment to the frontline in Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has reportedly spoiled planned Russian offensive operations along the international border area that likely aimed to expand the area of active combat operations across a broader front in northeastern Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 13 that the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast stopped Russian plans to create several buffer zones along the Ukrainian border "from the east to the north," including in Sumy Oblast. Zelensky stated that Russian forces wanted to launch major offensives to seize regional centers, likely referring to the regional capitals of Sumy and Kharkiv cities. Sumy and Kharkiv cities are roughly 25 and 30 kilometers from the international border, respectively – significantly further than the approximately six to 10 kilometers that Russian forces currently occupy near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) and Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).

Zelensky's statement suggests that Russian forces planned to start new offensive operations aimed at penetrating at least 25 kilometers deep into Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts and activating along a much wider front between at least Sumy and Kharkiv cities. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi similarly stated on September 5 that the Ukrainian incursion spoiled a planned Russian attack into Sumy Oblast and "reduced the threat" of Russian incursions into northern Ukraine. ISW previously assessed that the Russian offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast aimed to fix Ukrainian manpower and materiel along the northern border, granting Russian forces opportunities to re-intensify offensive operations in other higher-priority areas of the theater. Ukrainian forces have largely stabilized the frontline in the Kharkiv direction since Summer 2024 and continue to contest the tactical initiative through counterattacks that have regained limited positions in northern Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian military command may have intended for additional offensive operations along a wider and more continuous front in northeastern Ukraine to significantly stretch Ukrainian forces along the international border following the Ukrainian stabilization of the frontline north and northeast of Kharkiv City.

Zelensky noted that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has also impacted Russian offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast. Zelensky stated that the Ukrainian incursion "slowed" Russian advances throughout Donetsk Oblast and reduced the advantage in artillery ammunition that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction had over Ukrainian forces from 12-to-1 to 2.5-to-1. ISW is unable to verify Zelensky’s statement, though the rate of Russian advance in the Pokrovsk area has notably slowed since the start of September 2024. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated during an interview published on September 7 that Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast complicated Russia's plans for offensive operations, including in Russia's "main direction" (likely referring to the Pokrovsk direction), in August 2024 and later this fall. ISW has recently observed indications that Russian authorities have transferred limited elements of likely Russian reserve units from Donetsk Oblast, including from the Pokrovsk direction, to Kursk Oblast to counter the Ukrainian incursion. Such limited redeployments are unlikely to have an immediate impact on the tempo of Russian offensive operations, although Russian forces may struggle to maintain their current offensive tempo into the future if Russian authorities conduct additional redeployments from reserve forces in Donetsk Oblast.

Russian forces continue to counterattack throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, but the Russian military will likely have to redeploy additional elements from elsewhere in the theater to Kursk Oblast to establish a force grouping capable of pursuing a sustained counteroffensive operation. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on September 13 that Russian forces have begun counteroffensive operations in Kursk Oblast, and Pentagon Spokesperson Major General Patrick Ryder stated on September 12 that the US has observed Russian units beginning to try to conduct "some type of counteroffensive" operation that Ryder described as "marginal." ISW continues to track observable Russian counterattacks in Kursk Oblast but has not yet observed large-scale combat operations indicating that Russian forces have started a large-scale concerted counteroffensive operation aimed at completely expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.

Zelensky stated that Russian forces have concentrated 40,000 personnel in Kursk Oblast but did not specify the composition of the Russian grouping, and it remains unclear whether Zelensky’s count is representative exclusively of combat-effective Russian soldiers or a joint force that includes contract soldiers, plus less effective conscripts, irregular forces, border guards, Rosgvardia elements, and Russian Interior Ministry forces. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on September 13 that there are roughly 33,000 to 35,000 Russian personnel in Kursk Oblast. Zelensky stated that the Russian military command intends to concentrate 60,000 to 70,000 personnel in Kursk Oblast, a number notably higher than the 50,000 personnel that US officials reportedly assessed that Russia would need to push Ukrainians out of Kursk Oblast. Russian authorities have largely relied on poorly-trained and equipped conscripts and small elements of Russian regular and irregular forces to address the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast thus far, and it is unlikely that most of the current Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast is comprised of combat experienced units.

A Russian counteroffensive operation to retake territory seized by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast will very likely require even more manpower and materiel than Russia has already concentrated in the area — especially if most of the already committed units lack combat experience. Russian Airborne (VDV) forces that recently redeployed to Kursk Oblast from the frontline in Ukraine currently appear to be heavily responsible for counterattacks in Kursk Oblast, suggesting that the Russian military command may intend to field units perceived to be more "elite" or combat effective to regain territory. The Russian military will most certainly have to redeploy units already committed to ongoing offensive operations or operational reserves from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast in order to field the combat-effective units needed for a large counteroffensive operation and then subsequently guard the international border against future Ukrainian incursion.

Key Takeaways:

The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has reportedly spoiled planned Russian offensive operations along the international border area that likely aimed to expand the area of active combat operations across a broader front in northeastern Ukraine.

Russian forces continue to counterattack throughout the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, but the Russian military will likely have to redeploy additional elements from elsewhere in the theater to Kursk Oblast to establish a force grouping capable of pursuing a sustained counteroffensive operation.

Russian forces appear to be testing more effective mechanized assault tactics west of Donetsk City, although Russian armored vehicles remain vulnerable to Ukrainian strike and drone capabilities.

Ukraine and Russia conducted their second prisoner of war (POW) exchange since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on September 13.

Russia continues efforts to strengthen strategic military ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran to support its war effort in Ukraine.

Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued Russian and Ukrainian assaults in the area on September 13.

Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

Russian authorities continue attempts to coerce minorities and Ukrainian youth living in occupied Ukraine to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to avoid conducting a wider mobilization.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian officials and sources indicated that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has prompted the Russian authorities to increase the size of the Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast by upwards of a factor of three. Ukrainian Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated on September 14 that Russian forces had 11,000 personnel deployed in Kursk Oblast at the start of Ukraine's incursion in early August 2024. Mysnyk stated that there are various estimates that place the current size of the Russian grouping in Kursk Oblast between 30,000 and 45,000 personnel. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 13 that Russian forces have concentrated 40,000 personnel in Kursk Oblast and aim to concentrate a total of 60,000 to 70,000 personnel in the area. The individual number breakdown for each of the Russian services (Rosgvardia, border guards, regular units, irregular units, and conscript forces) contributing to these figures remains unclear. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on September 14 that there are roughly 61 various Russian units of various sizes comprised of roughly 35,500 Russian personnel within the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces' Kursk Group (which has responsibility for Glushkovsky, Korenevsky, Sudzhansky, Rylsky, Lgovsky, Kurchatovsky, and Kursky raions). The reported growth in the size of the Russian grouping in Kursk Oblast is reflective of how operational pressures caused by the incursion have forced the Russian military command to redeploy elements from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast and commit newly generated forces from within Russia to the area instead of the frontline in Ukraine. A Russian counteroffensive operation to retake territory seized by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast will very likely require even more manpower and materiel than Russia has already concentrated in the area and therefore additional Russian redeployments from Ukraine.

Ukraine and Russia conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on September 14 — the third POW exchange since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, which appears to have generated the short-term effect of increasing incentives for Russia to engage in POW exchanges. Ukrainian officials reported that Russia returned 103 prisoners to Ukraine including Ukrainian servicemembers who defended the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol in early 2022, servicemembers of the Ukrainian National Police and State Border Service, servicemembers of the Ukrainian State Transport Special Service, and other Ukrainian military personnel. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 14 that Ukraine returned 103 individuals to Russia whom Ukrainian forces captured in Kursk Oblast. Russian sources suggested that the returned Russian prisoners were conscripts. The POW swap directly follows a similar exchange that Russia and Ukraine conducted on September 13, during which they returned 49 prisoners each. Ukrainian officials have repeatedly emphasized that the Kursk incursion has enhanced Ukraine’s negotiating power in POW exchanges with Russia, following the Kremlin's consistent rejection of Ukraine's attempt to negotiate exchanges. The frequency of POW exchanges between Ukraine and Russia has significantly increased since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on August 6, with both sides exchanging a total of 267 POWs each in three separate exchanges. Russia and Ukraine only conducted three other POW exchanges, encompassing roughly 405 Ukrainian POWs and 423 Russian POWs, between January 1 and August 6, 2024.

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian officials and sources indicated that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has prompted the Russian authorities to increase the size of the Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast by upwards of a factor of three.

Ukraine and Russia conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on September 14 — the third POW exchange since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, which appears to have generated the short-term effect of increasing incentives for Russia to engage in POW exchanges.

Some Russian field commanders continue to make decisions that degrade the overall quality of their subordinate forces—prioritizing infantry-led frontal assault tactics over cultivating technical specialists who would allow the Russian military to better field technologies and innovations in combat operations.

The Kremlin continues efforts to leverage global informational instruments of influence to develop new capabilities to conduct election interference, destabilization measures, and sanctions evasion schemes.

Officials of Georgia’s ruling Georgia Dream party continue to elevate narratives echoing Kremlin information operations justifying Russia’s occupation of internationally recognized Georgian territories.

Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.

Russian forces are reportedly repairing captured Soviet-era Ukrainian equipment to replenish Russian vehicle stocks.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia reportedly aims to achieve a decisive victory in Ukraine by 2026 before likely medium- to long-term economic and force generation constraints begin to significantly degrade Russia's ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov announced on September 15 at the 20th Yalta European Strategy meeting in Kyiv that the Kremlin considers 2025 to be a pivotal year because failure to secure a victory in Ukraine by early 2026 will undermine Russia’s aspirations of remaining a global superpower for the next 30 years. Budanov noted that Russia anticipates a worsening economic and socio-political situation by mid-2025, alongside increasing difficulties with military recruitment. Budanov stated that the Russian military is experiencing personnel shortages and a decrease in the number of new volunteers signing contracts. Recent significant rises in one-time payments to contract military personnel (kontraktniki), with at least 36 Russian federal subjects (regions) reportedly having increased their one-time payments to kontraktniki in 2024 and at least 11 federal subjects paying Russian kontraktniki one million rubles ($11,000) or more, are likely evidence of mounting costs and difficulties with the Russian military's ability to continue recruiting personnel. Budanov also stated that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, coupled with constant Ukrainian strikes into Russian territories, has demoralized Russian citizens and eroded the Russian public’s perception of Russian invincibility. Budanov assessed that mounting issues will force Russian President Vladimir Putin to make a critical decision: either launch another risky and controversial mobilization or reduce the intensity of combat operations in Ukraine. Budanov’s assessment implicitly assumes that Western states will maintain support for Ukraine at current levels over the next one to two years. It remains unclear what Putin may do between now and 2026 or how effective Putin’s efforts to offset the impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine, including via foreign partners like Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC), will be. ISW continues to assess that Putin remains averse to announcing another partial mobilization out of fear of domestic discontent and will likely continue to instruct the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to pursue ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts until such efforts begin to fall far short of operational requirements in Ukraine. Putin maintains the option to call another round of mobilization - as he did in Fall 2022 - despite his desire to avoid having to do so. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is also unwilling to accept reducing the intensity of Russian forces’ combat operations because the Kremlin sees maintaining the theater-wide initiative as a strategic imperative. It remains unclear whether Putin will respond with another round of mobilization if faced with another crisis similar to or worse than the crisis the Kremlin faced in Fall 2022, as Russia’s investments to grow Russia’s force generation system, war economy, and international defense relationships have matured over the past two years, and likely will continue to do so through 2026.

Key Takeaways:

- Russia reportedly aims to achieve a decisive victory in Ukraine by 2026 before likely medium- to long-term economic and force generation constraints begin to significantly degrade Russia's ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine.

-Russia will likely face growing challenges in the production and procurement of the materiel that Russian operations in Ukraine require, and the Kremlin will likely become increasingly reliant on foreign partners to meet its materiel needs.

-Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksandr Kamyshin stated on September 15 that Ukraine has started domestic serial production of 155mm artillery shells.

-The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) promptly responded to ultranationalists' outcry surrounding the controversial deaths of two drone operators in Ukraine, highlighting how Russian authorities continue to be highly attentive to backlash from the ultranationalist community.

-Russian ultranationalist milbloggers praised the Russian MoD's response to the drone operators' deaths but expressed concern about the MoD's ability to solve the systemic issues that led to the deaths.

-Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov aggravated Kremlin efforts to conduct prisoner of war (POW) exchanges for soldiers who defended against the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast while balancing his attempts to appeal to both the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and hardline facets of Chechen society.

-Ukrainian forces reportedly advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces reportedly recently recaptured territory in the area as of September 15. Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations throughout their salient in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced in the salient.

-Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Siversk, and Donetsk City.

-Russian authorities continue to strengthen coercive mechanisms to support ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts in order to avoid conducting a wider mobilization.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukraine has taken steps to address its manpower shortages, but delays and insufficiencies in Western military aid to Ukraine continue to limit its ability to generate effective combat units that can defend critical areas and contest the theater-wide initiative. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with CNN on September 13 that Ukraine "needs 14 brigades to be ready" for an unspecified requirement and that Ukraine has not been able to equip "even four" of these brigades with slowly arriving Western aid. Zelensky noted that Ukraine has been increasing its domestic production of drones and transferring equipment from warehouses or reserve brigades to attempt to offset insufficient Western military assistance to Ukraine. Zelensky stated that these insufficient provisions, particularly of armored vehicles and artillery ammunition, have led to Ukrainian personnel losses. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Defense Committee Chairperson Oleksandr Zavitnevych told the Financial Times on September 16 that Ukrainian mobilization is "on track" and that newly trained forces could "impact" the battlefield likely in three months. Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated in May 2024 that Ukraine was working to stand up 10 new Ukrainian brigades but that equipment, not manpower, was the main bottleneck in Ukraine's defensive operations. ISW has long assessed that Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian offensive operations and challenge the theater-wide initiative heavily depends on both the Western provision of miliary aid and Ukraine's efforts to reconstitute existing units and create new ones — the latter of which Ukraine has taken significant steps to resolve. Ukrainian forces have partially mitigated the artillery ammunition shortages that resulted from delays in Western aid provisions by using first-person view (FPV) drones to blunt Russian infantry and armored vehicle assaults, but current FPV drones are unable to offset the tactical requirements of traditional field artillery. Ukraine has taken steps to boost its domestic production of 155mm artillery ammunition, but Ukraine has had to build these industries largely from scratch during wartime. Ukraine has also been working to increase its production of armored vehicles, including armored personnel carriers (APCs), since 2022, but Ukraine cannot manufacture complete tanks. The US and other foreign allies likely can greatly increase the effectiveness of Ukrainian force-generation and force-reconstitution efforts by providing Ukrainian forces with more mechanized equipment, such as M113 armored personnel carriers, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and main battle tanks. Ukraine’s 155th Infantry Brigade was recently upgraded to a mechanized infantry brigade after the brigade was equipped with Leopard tanks, for example. The generation of more Ukrainian infantry without a commensurate increase in mechanized equipment will not substantially increase Ukraine’s combat power or increase Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities.

Key Takeaways:
• Ukraine has taken steps to address its manpower shortages, but delays and insufficiencies in Western military aid to Ukraine continue to limit its ability to generate effective combat units that can defend critical areas and contest the theater-wide initiative.
• Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has forced Russia to redirect some resources from Ukraine to defend in Russia but that Ukraine still needs sufficient resources and Western permission to strike military targets in Russia to mitigate the theater-wide strain on Ukrainian forces.
• Russia continues to build out its long-term military capacity by gradually increasing the size of its armed forces.
• Iran is simultaneously setting conditions to build a nuclear weapon while continuing to signal its willingness to resume nuclear negotiations with the West.
• Select Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials continue to face corruption charges as the Russian military leadership is undertaking a wider effort to root out corruption in the MoD.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recaptured territory in the area as of September 16. Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kursk salient.
• Ukrainian forces regained territory near Kharkiv City and Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces advanced near Kreminna, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.
• Russia reportedly continues to coerce migrants to fight in the Russian military.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu arrived in Iran for an unannounced visit on September 17 following recent visits to Syria and North Korea amid ongoing Russian efforts to secure military cooperation and support from non-Western allies. Shoigu met with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian during a previously unannounced visit to Tehran on September 17 and conveyed an unspecified message from Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) reported that Shoigu and Ahmadian discussed upcoming bilateral agreements and emphasized that Iran continues to support Iran's official policy regarding corridors and communication routes with Azerbaijan. Pezeshkian told Shoigu that the Iranian government will work to increase cooperation and deepen bilateral relations between the two countries to reduce the impact of Western sanctions. Shoigu also met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus, Syria on September 16 and discussed strengthening bilateral relations and regional and international security issues. Shoigu previously recently visited Pyongyang, North Korea on September 13 and met with North Korean President Kim Jong Un for unspecified bilateral discussions. Shoigu's international visits are coming against the backdrop of Iran's recent delivery of over 200 Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to Russia, ongoing North Korean military support for the Russian war in Ukraine, and Ukrainian reports that Russia is hiring Syrian mercenaries to fight in Ukraine. Russia’s deepening engagement with the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran is part of a wider Kremlin effort to establish a coalition of friendly states which can bolster Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) and secure strategic economic cooperation to support its war in Ukraine.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui in Moscow on September 17. Lavrov and Choe discussed further developing Russian-North Korean bilateral relations in unspecified manners, and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) noted that Choe will attend the BRICS Women's Forum on the sidelines of the Eurasian Women's Forum in St. Petersburg on September 18-20. Lavrov has recently fostered increased dialogue and cooperation with Russia's non-Western partners through various meetings on the ministerial level, including with Saudi Minister of Hajj and Umrah Tawfiq bin Fawzan Al-Rabieh on September 11, a BRICS foreign ministers meeting on September 12, and a meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty on September 16.

Key Takeaways:

-The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office opened an investigation into another case of apparent Russian abuse and execution of a Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW).

-Leaked documents outlining large-scale Kremlin information operation campaigns targeting Ukraine and the West continue to demonstrate the Kremlin's commitment to leveraging its global information instruments to advance Moscow’s interests using social media.

-Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu arrived in Iran for an unannounced visit following recent visits to Syria and North Korea amid ongoing Russian efforts to secure military cooperation and support from non-Western allies.

-Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui in Moscow.

-Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk and southwest of Donetsk City.

-Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 17 that Russia continues to recruit citizens from Syria to fight in Ukraine.


Originalbeitrag
RE: ISW: Ukraine has taken steps to address its manpower shortages
Ukraine has taken steps to address its manpower shortages, but delays and insufficiencies in Western military aid to Ukraine continue to limit its ability to generate effective combat units that can defend critical areas and contest the theater-wide initiative. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with CNN on September 13 that Ukraine "needs 14 brigades to be ready" for an unspecified requirement and that Ukraine has not been able to equip "even four" of these brigades with slowly arriving Western aid. Zelensky noted that Ukraine has been increasing its domestic production of drones and transferring equipment from warehouses or reserve brigades to attempt to offset insufficient Western military assistance to Ukraine. Zelensky stated that these insufficient provisions, particularly of armored vehicles and artillery ammunition, have led to Ukrainian personnel losses. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Defense Committee Chairperson Oleksandr Zavitnevych told the Financial Times on September 16 that Ukrainian mobilization is "on track" and that newly trained forces could "impact" the battlefield likely in three months. Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated in May 2024 that Ukraine was working to stand up 10 new Ukrainian brigades but that equipment, not manpower, was the main bottleneck in Ukraine's defensive operations. ISW has long assessed that Ukraine's ability to defend against Russian offensive operations and challenge the theater-wide initiative heavily depends on both the Western provision of miliary aid and Ukraine's efforts to reconstitute existing units and create new ones — the latter of which Ukraine has taken significant steps to resolve. Ukrainian forces have partially mitigated the artillery ammunition shortages that resulted from delays in Western aid provisions by using first-person view (FPV) drones to blunt Russian infantry and armored vehicle assaults, but current FPV drones are unable to offset the tactical requirements of traditional field artillery. Ukraine has taken steps to boost its domestic production of 155mm artillery ammunition, but Ukraine has had to build these industries largely from scratch during wartime. Ukraine has also been working to increase its production of armored vehicles, including armored personnel carriers (APCs), since 2022, but Ukraine cannot manufacture complete tanks. The US and other foreign allies likely can greatly increase the effectiveness of Ukrainian force-generation and force-reconstitution efforts by providing Ukrainian forces with more mechanized equipment, such as M113 armored personnel carriers, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and main battle tanks. Ukraine’s 155th Infantry Brigade was recently upgraded to a mechanized infantry brigade after the brigade was equipped with Leopard tanks, for example. The generation of more Ukrainian infantry without a commensurate increase in mechanized equipment will not substantially increase Ukraine’s combat power or increase Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities.

Key Takeaways:
• Ukraine has taken steps to address its manpower shortages, but delays and insufficiencies in Western military aid to Ukraine continue to limit its ability to generate effective combat units that can defend critical areas and contest the theater-wide initiative.
• Zelensky reiterated that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has forced Russia to redirect some resources from Ukraine to defend in Russia but that Ukraine still needs sufficient resources and Western permission to strike military targets in Russia to mitigate the theater-wide strain on Ukrainian forces.
• Russia continues to build out its long-term military capacity by gradually increasing the size of its armed forces.
• Iran is simultaneously setting conditions to build a nuclear weapon while continuing to signal its willingness to resume nuclear negotiations with the West.
• Select Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials continue to face corruption charges as the Russian military leadership is undertaking a wider effort to root out corruption in the MoD.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recaptured territory in the area as of September 16. Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kursk salient.
• Ukrainian forces regained territory near Kharkiv City and Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces advanced near Kreminna, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.
• Russia reportedly continues to coerce migrants to fight in the Russian military.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces conducted a successful drone strike against a Russian missile and ammunition storage facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast on September 18. A source within Ukrainian special services told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on September 18 that drone operators from Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) struck a facility at the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Main Missile and Artillery Directorate's 107th Arsenal in Toropets, Tver Oblast. Suspilne's sources stated the facility stores Iskander missiles, Tochka-U ballistic missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, and artillery ammunition and that there were significant secondary detonations following the initial Ukrainian drone strike. Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation, Andriy Kovalenko, stated that Russian forces may have also stored ammunition for Grad multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), S-300 and S-400 air defense missiles, and North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles at the facility. Footage published on September 16 shows large secondary detonations, presumably of missile stockpiles and artillery ammunition, following the initial drone strike. Geolocated footage published on September 18 shows several large smoke plumes over the facility and satellite imagery shows significant damage to the building in the southern part of the facility, although most of the facility is obscured by smoke. Russian authorities claimed that wreckage from a downed Ukrainian drone struck the facility and prompted the secondary detonations, and Russian authorities temporarily evacuated the area near the facility. Russian milbloggers largely criticized Russian authorities for poorly constructing the facility and accused Russian forces of possibly mishandling missiles and artillery ammunition stockpiles at the facility. Milbloggers accused the detained former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Dmitri Bulgakov of engaging in corrupt practices leading to poor construction quality at the facility.

Continued Ukrainian strikes against rear Russian logistics facilities within Russia will generate wider operational pressures on the Russian military beyond the individual destruction of ammunition stockpiles and logistics facilities. Suspilne's sources noted that Ukrainian strikes are undermining Russia's ability to conduct long-range missile strikes against Ukraine. Ukrainian forces conducted a series of HIMARS strikes against Russian ammunition depots throughout occupied Ukraine in Summer 2022, prompting Russian forces to disperse ammunition storage facilities and degrading the efficiency of Russian logistics at the time. Repeated strikes against ammunition depots within Russia that cause similar levels of damage to the strike in Toropets may force a similar decision point on the Russian military command to reorganize and disperse support and logistics systems within Russia to mitigate the impact of such strikes. Russian forces may not have addressed vulnerabilities at many logistics facilities within Russia due to the sanctuary space that restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons have generated, although the Toropets facility is not within range of Western systems fired from Ukraine. The lifting of restrictions on the use of Western systems and the continued development of Ukraine's own long-range strike capabilities may allow Ukrainian forces to more effectively exploit such Russian vulnerabilities. Ukrainian forces struck another Russian ammunition depot near Sergeevka, Voronezh Oblast in July 2024 and continued Ukrainian strikes against Russian ammunition and missile storage facilities could also destroy an important portion of Russia's materiel reserves. Ukrainian strikes against facilities within Russia could impact offensive operations throughout the theater in Ukraine if Ukrainian forces have the materiel, capabilities, and permission to conduct such a strike campaign against logistics and supports facilities within Russia at scale.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted a successful drone strike against a Russian missile and ammunition storage facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast on September 18.
• Continued Ukrainian strikes against rear Russian logistics facilities within Russia will generate wider operational pressures on the Russian military beyond the individual destruction of ammunition stockpiles and logistics facilities.
• Russian authorities arrested the head of the Central Military District (CMD)'s armor service on September 18 on suspicion of receiving a large bribe, marking yet another corruption case against a high-ranking Russian military official since the April 2024 appointment of Andrei Belousov as Russian Defense Minister.
• An unsuccessful armed assault against several offices of Russia's largest online retailer Wildberries in Moscow City highlights the fragility of Russia's domestic stability.
• Armenian officials continue to criticize the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) amid worsening Armenia-Russia bilateral relations.
• Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova condemned Israel for simultaneously detonating thousands of pagers belonging to Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) members across Lebanon and Syria on September 17, signaling Russia's continued rhetorical alignment with Iran's Axis of Resistance against Israel.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kursk Oblast salient.
• Russian forces regained positions within Kursk Oblast salient.
• Russian forces recently advanced along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, within Toretsk, east and southeast of Pokrovsk, southwest of Donetsk City, and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian State Duma announced on September 18 that it approved a bill in its first reading that proposes releasing Russian servicemembers serving in Ukraine from criminal punishment associated with cases actively being tried in Russia courts.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly declined a request from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to offset Russian losses by declaring another mobilization wave in spring 2024 likely to avoid political costs associated with involuntary reserve call-ups. Putin has since remained committed to his crypto mobilization campaign, constraining Russia's mobilization potential. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), citing a source “briefed” on an exchange between Putin and Russian MoD officials several months prior to the presidential inauguration in May 2024, reported that Putin dismissed the Russian MoD’s calls for another mobilization wave. The source claimed that Putin instead stated his intent to only recruit people who were voluntarily signing military service contracts but that more Russian officials are convinced that mobilization is inevitable. The source added that the Russian military's current manpower is insufficient to achieve Russia's long-term goal of occupying all of Ukraine, degrading overall Ukrainian combat capability, and protecting the Russian state border. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reiterated that Russia continues to rapidly recruit contract servicemen (kontraktniki) and volunteers and that these forces are sufficient for Russia's aggression against Ukraine in response to a request from WSJ. Putin has avoided declaring another partial mobilization call-up of reservists since his decision to mobilize 300,000 troops in late September 2022 in response to successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, and Russia appears to lack the necessary manpower resources to simultaneously sustain the scale and tempo of Russian offensive operations in Ukraine and defensive efforts in Russian border regions. A mobilized Russian servicemember and milblogger claimed in late August 2024 that the Russian government continues to rely on the remnants of regular military forces, mobilized personnel, and deceived short-term volunteers to continue Russian offensive operations in Ukraine, even though these elements are ill-prepared and have been suffering significant losses since October 2023.

Mobilization in Russia remains unlikely in the near to medium term due to Putin’s personal fear that mobilization is a direct threat to his regime’s stability. ISW observed reports speculating about the possibility of Russia declaring another mobilization wave prior to Putin’s inauguration and following the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024, but Putin has not yet authorized such mobilization. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that sources close to the Russian government claimed that the Kremlin entertained the idea of mobilization immediately after Ukraine's incursion, but that the Russian Cabinet of Ministers and Kremlin-affiliated businessmen opposed these considerations. Putin has also been consistently signaling throughout the incursion his commitment to recruiting volunteers by boasting about the number of volunteers interested in fighting in Ukraine and meeting with Russian volunteers in response to the incursion. Putin notably did not seize on the incursion as an opportunity to condition Russian society for mobilization in the immediate to medium term, instead choosing to form new irregular formations and expand Russian volunteer recruitment efforts. The Kremlin and the Russian MoD notably shocked Russian society with the declaration of partial mobilization in late September 2022, and Putin likely seeks to avoid societal backlash in response to a new mobilization wave at this time.

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly declined a request from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to offset Russian losses by declaring another mobilization wave in spring 2024 likely to avoid political costs associated with involuntary reserve call-ups. Putin has since remained committed to his crypto mobilization campaign, constraining Russia's mobilization potential.

Mobilization in Russia remains unlikely in the near to medium term due to Putin’s personal fear that mobilization is a direct threat to his regime’s stability.

Russian authorities have reportedly tasked Russian forces with pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast by mid-October 2024 and establishing a "buffer zone" into Ukrainian border areas along the international border with Russia in northeastern Ukraine by the end of October — significant undertakings that the Russian military is very unlikely to achieve in such a short period of time.

The Kremlin continues to signal its commitment to improving Russian drone operations in Ukraine and drone production capabilities amid efforts to offset the social and economic impacts of a protracted Russian war effort.

Putin claimed that Russia must ensure that there are "no barriers" to the movement of Russian citizens between mainland Russia and Kaliningrad Oblast.

The reported transfer of Indian artillery shells through European intermediaries to Ukraine is reportedly generating tensions within the Russian-Indian relationship.

The European Parliament called on member states to lift restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided long-range systems to strike military objects in Russia.

Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in Kursk Oblast.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kharkiv City, Svatove, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.

Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated during a meeting on the development of the Russian Armed Forces on September 18 that the Kremlin aims to improve Russia's federal level training system.

Institute for the Study of War

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced two new loan mechanisms worth up to 45 billion euros (roughly $50 billion) and 35 billion euros (roughly $39 billion) respectively during a visit to Kyiv on September 20. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with von der Leyen in Kyiv and stated afterward that Ukraine will use part of the 35 billion euro European loan to purchase domestically produced long-range missiles and drones, address Ukraine's energy needs, and construct bomb shelters to defend Ukrainian schools against Russian strikes. The European Commission will distribute the 35 billion euro loan to Ukraine in one installment before December 31, 2024, and Ukraine can further disburse the money in one or more tranches before December 31, 2025. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on September 14 that Ukraine will be able to domestically produce $20 billion worth of defense equipment in 2025 if Ukraine receives additional funding from its partners. Umerov noted that Ukraine's defense industrial production capabilities significantly exceed the amount of investment that Ukraine can provide alone.

Russian authorities were reportedly aware of the threat of a future Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in the months leading up to August 2024 but failed to take adequate steps to address such a threat. The Guardian, citing Russian government and military documents that Ukrainian forces seized in Kursk Oblast, reported on September 20 that Russian forces stationed in Kursk Oblast repeatedly warned the Russian military command about the possibility of a Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast beginning in late 2023. The documents, which The Guardian reviewed but could not independently verify, show that local military commanders repeatedly ordered additional training exercises for Russian military personnel serving in Kursk Oblast, the construction of additional fortifications, and the preparation of decoy trenches and military equipment in preparation for a future Ukrainian incursion. One of the documents noted that Russian military units stationed along the international border were only staffed at between 60 and 70 percent of their intended end strength on average and were primarily staffed by poorly trained reservists as of June 2024. Russian authorities do not appear to have made any substantive efforts to improve the preparedness of the Russian military units serving in border areas of Kursk Oblast or construct additional fortifications along the international border prior to the incursion, and Russian authorities may have decided to ignore these requests due to a miscalculation of Ukraine's ability to advance deep into Kursk Oblast.

These documents support ISW's recent assessment that Ukrainian forces achieved operational surprise during the incursion into Kursk Oblast despite Russian authorities' reported awareness of the possibility of an incursion. The American doctrinal definition of surprise is to "attack the enemy in a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared." Although Russian forces were likely aware of various points along the international border at which Ukraine could conduct an incursion, Ukrainian forces were able to leverage ambiguity around their operational intent and capabilities to maintain operational surprise. Ukrainian forces also reportedly experimented with innovative techniques integrating ground activity and unmanned systems that ISW will not cover in-depth to maintain Ukrainian operational security. ISW has previously noted that both Russian and Ukrainian forces have struggled to achieve operational surprise over the past year and a half due to the partially transparent battlefield in Ukraine. Ukraine's campaign in Kursk Oblast demonstrates that surprise is still possible even on a partially transparent battlefield where an adversary can observe force concentrations but not reliably discern an enemy's operational intent and capabilities.

Key Takeaways:

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced two new loan mechanisms worth up to 45 billion euros (roughly $50 billion) and 35 billion euros (roughly $39 billion) respectively during a visit to Kyiv on September 20.

Russian authorities were reportedly aware of the threat of a future Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in the months leading up to August 2024 but failed to take adequate steps to address such a threat.

These documents support ISW's recent assessment that Ukrainian forces achieved operational surprise during the incursion into Kursk Oblast despite Russian authorities' reported awareness of the possibility of an incursion.

Russian officials attempted to use a meeting with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to legitimize Russia's occupation of Ukraine and promote false narratives about alleged Ukrainian human rights abuses.

Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Kreminna, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk, and Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in Vovchansk and Siversk.

Russian state media is increasingly emphasizing the participation of foreign nationals in the Russian war effort in Ukraine, likely to reassure domestic audiences that Russia continues to recruit sufficient manpower and will not need to declare another mobilization wave.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces conducted another successful drone strike against Russian missile and ammunition storage facilities as well as a mobile radar system in Russia overnight on September 20 to 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 21 that drone operators of the Ukrainian military, Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), Special Operations Forces (SSO), and Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Tikhoretsk Arsenal just north of Kamenny, Krasnodar Krai and the Russian Main Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of Defense's (MoD) 23rd Arsenal near Oktyabrsky, Tver Oblast (14km south of Toropets). Footage published on September 20 and 21 shows explosions and secondary detonations at both arsenals, and fires continued at both locations during the day on September 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Tikhoretsk Arsenal contained at least 2,000 tons of munitions, including munitions from North Korea, at the time of the strike. An SBU source told Ukrainian outlet Hromadske that the Russian 23rd Arsenal contained Iskander and Tochka-U ballistic missiles and that Ukrainian forces also struck the Shaykovka Airfield in Kaluga Oblast, and Hromadske included footage of an explosion though it is unclear whether the footage shows the Shaykovka Airfield. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces intercepted 101 Ukrainian drones overnight, including 18 drones over Krasnodar Krai and three drones over Tver Oblast. Krasnodar Krai regional authorities blamed the Tikhoretsk Arsenal explosion on falling Ukrainian drone debris, declared a local state of emergency, altered railway schedules and routes, and evacuated about 1,200 civilians from the area. The United Kingdom (UK) MoD reported that the Russian Main Artillery Directorate's 103rd Arsenal near Toropets, which Ukrainian forces struck on September 17 to 18, had recently undergone modernization because Russian forces had been improperly storing munitions at their arsenals, causing explosions at several depots.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian Podlet K1 mobile long-range radar system that was protecting the Tikhoretsk Arsenal, and this system is at least the fifth Podlet K1 system that Ukrainian forces have reportedly damaged or destroyed since February 2022. The Podlet K1 system can detect up to 200 aerial targets simultaneously at a range of up to 300 kilometers and the Russian military introduced the system into service in 2015. Russian forces use the Podlet K1 system to detect air targets at low and very low altitudes for Russian air defenses, including S-300 and S-400 systems. Ukrainian forces have reportedly damaged or destroyed at least four other Russian Podlet K1 systems since the onset of the full-scale invasion, including in Lazurne, Kherson Oblast as of July 20, 2022; near Zelenotropynske, Kherson Oblast as of July 24, 2022; in Belgorod Oblast as of November 1, 2023; and in an unspecified location as of April 27, 2024. Ukrainian forces also found a destroyed Russian Podlet K1 system in Chornobaivka, Kherson Oblast on November 14, 2022, following Ukraine's liberation of west (right) bank Kherson Oblast as of November 11, 2022, though the cause of this Podlet K1's destruction was unclear.


Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces conducted another successful drone strike against Russian missile and ammunition storage facilities as well as a mobile radar system in Russia overnight on September 20 to 21.

The Kremlin appears to be reorganizing Russia's decentralized, regional volunteer recruitment campaigns into a federal effort, indicating that Russia is struggling to meet the manpower demands of its war in Ukraine despite previous claims that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast caused a spike in Russia's volunteer recruitment.

The Russian military leadership and government are continuing to reduce the class of semi-independent Russian military innovators, specialists, and irregular commanders to advance force centralization objectives, maintain the offensive tempo in Donetsk Oblast, and compensate for personnel shortages.

Iran reportedly did not send mobile launchers for the Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles it recently supplied to Russia, likely due a decision to prioritize sending additional missiles over bulky and easily replaceable launchers.

Russian officials have designated 47 countries as having opposing and dangerous moral attitudes to Russia, highlighting that the Kremlin is reviving a Soviet era tactic and mindset that defines a clear ideological division in the world.

Russian milblogger analyses of Russia’s war in Ukraine continue to suggest that the Kremlin perceives Western commitment to Ukraine as feeble.

Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.

Russian forces advanced north of Kharkiv City and near Kupyansk, Kreminna, Tortesk, and southwest of Donetsk City.

The Kremlin has not fully suppressed localized protests organized by wives of Russian mobilized servicemen since declaring partial mobilization on September 21, 2022.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukraine's September 18 strike against a Russian missile and ammunition storage facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast reportedly destroyed enough Russian munitions to affect Russian operations in the coming months. Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center Head Colonel Ants Kiviselg stated on September 20 that the strike caused 30,000 tons of munitions to explode, noting that the size of the explosion equates to 750,000 artillery shells and that Russian forces on average fire 10,000 shells per week. His calculations suggest the Ukrainian strike destroyed two to three months of Russia’s ammunition supply. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on September 18 that a source within Ukrainian special services stated that the Toropets facility stored Iskander missiles, Tochka-U ballistic missiles, glide bombs, and artillery ammunition. It is unclear if Kiviselg's statement about 30,000 tons of explosives includes both missiles and artillery ammunition, but the strike destroyed significant Russian materiel stockpiles in any case. ISW continues to assess that continued Ukrainian strikes against rear Russian logistics facilities within Russia will generate wider operational pressures on the Russian military, including forcing the Russian military command to reorganize and disperse support and logistics systems within Russia to mitigate the impact of such strikes.

The Kremlin is reportedly reconsidering the effectiveness of nuclear saber-rattling as part of its efforts to influence the ongoing Western policy debate about supporting Ukraine and specifically permitting Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons against military objects in Russia. The Washington Post, citing officials close to senior Russian diplomats, stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be realizing that Russian nuclear threats are starting to lose their power over Western officials and that Putin may be developing an unspecified more nuanced and limited informational response to future Western approval of long-range strikes into Russia. An unnamed Russian official claimed that Russian officials have realized that nuclear threats "don't frighten anyone," and a Russian academic with close ties to senior Russian diplomats claimed that Russia's partners in the "Global South" are dissatisfied with Russia's nuclear threats. ISW cannot independently verify the veracity of the Washington Post's sources, but these reports are consistent with ISW's various assessments about how the Kremlin uses nuclear saber-rattling to promote Western self-deterrence and that such statements are not an indication of Russia's willingness to use nuclear weapons. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin's thinly veiled threats of nuclear confrontation are aimed at disrupting and delaying key decision points in Western political discussions about further military assistance to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere.

Key Takeaways:

Ukraine's September 18 strike against a Russian missile and ammunition storage facility near Toropets, Tver Oblast reportedly destroyed enough Russian munitions to affect Russian operations in the coming months.

The Kremlin is reportedly reconsidering the effectiveness of nuclear saber-rattling as part of its efforts to influence the ongoing Western policy debate about supporting Ukraine and specifically permitting Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons against military objects in Russia.

Satellite imagery of damage at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome in Arkhangelsk Oblast captured on September 21 suggests that the Russian military recently conducted an unsuccessful RS-28 "Sarmat" nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on September 21 that Ukraine will increase its production of drones by "several times" in 2025 in order to maintain Ukraine's quantitative superiority over Russian drone production.

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova announced on September 22 that Russia will not participate in Ukraine's second peace summit later in 2024 or in any "such summits."

Russia is reportedly expanding intelligence operations in Mexico to undermine the United States and support for Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Svatove. Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, southwest of Donetsk City, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.

A Ukrainian officer in a drone crew stated on September 22 that the Russian military command is forcing soldiers to dig trenches at Russian positions in unspecified areas of Ukraine without weapons and sometimes without armor, helmets, or military uniforms.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in the United States on September 23 and reiterated Ukraine's need for timely and uninterrupted US military assistance. Zelensky visited the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant in Pennsylvania and discussed the need for timely delivery of Western aid to Ukraine, the importance of starting joint American-Ukrainian weapons production in Ukraine as well as the possibility of US investments in the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB). The Scranton plant significantly increased its production of 155mm artillery shells in 2024, and Zelensky noted that the plant employs 400 people. Ukrainian Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov met with Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro and signed a cooperation agreement between Zaporizhzhia Oblast and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that calls for interaction between state bodies, scientific institutions, civil society organizations, and businesses in the fields of energy, agriculture, digital technologies, and defense. The agreement also calls for Pennsylvania to support the reconstruction of Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Ukraine has signed five similar agreements with US states previously: between Kyiv Oblast and Washington and Utah, between Zhytomyr Oblast and Indiana, and between Chernihiv Oblast and Minnesota.

The Kremlin continues to publicly signal its disinterest in any peace settlement short of total capitulation of the Ukrainian government and destruction of the Ukrainian state. Zelensky stated in an interview with the New Yorker about Ukraine’s “Victory Plan” published on September 22 that Russia is not interested in ending the war on any reasonable terms and is feigning interest in negotiations. Zelensky highlighted that Ukraine invited Russia to attend Ukraine's second peace summit but that the Kremlin had not demonstrated any interest in participating. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov notably stated on September 22 that there is "no alternative" to Russian victory in Ukraine, reiterating Russia's unwillingness to negotiate on terms other than Ukrainian capitulation. Peskov also identified NATO and the West as a “collective enemy.” Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova recently announced that Russia will not participate in the second Ukrainian peace summit or any "such summits." ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is not interested in good faith peace negotiations with Ukraine and that the Kremlin will only invoke the concept of “peace plans” and “negotiations” to prompt the West to pressure Ukraine into preemptive concessions on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in the United States on September 23 and reiterated Ukraine's need for timely and uninterrupted US military assistance.

The Kremlin continues to publicly signal its disinterest in any peace settlement short of total capitulation of the Ukrainian government and destruction of the Ukrainian state.

Russian forces conducted glide bomb strikes against Zaporizhzhia City for the first time overnight on September 22 to 23.

A high-ranking Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) commander reportedly recently committed suicide due to conflicts within his unit's leadership.

Russian forces recently advanced near Hlyboke, Kupyansk, and Pokrovsk. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.

The Russian government informally supported a bill on September 23 that would allow Russian authorities to fine individuals who promote “child-free propaganda,” likely as part of an ongoing Kremlin effort to address Russia’s demographic problem.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces have reached the outskirts of Vuhledar amid what appears to be an intensified offensive push near the settlement, but the capture of Vuhledar is unlikely to afford Russian forces any particular operational edge for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on September 24 shows that Russian forces advanced into eastern Vuhledar up to 12 Desantnykiv Street, confirming reports from Russian and Ukrainian sources that Russian troops broke into eastern Vuhledar between September 23 and 24. Russian forces are additionally trying to advance on Vuhledar's northeast flank via Vodyane and southwestern flank via Prechystivka, likely in an effort to encircle the Ukrainian grouping in Vuhledar and force it to withdraw. ISW geolocated footage published on September 24 that additionally indicates that Russian forces, likely assault elements of the 29th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Eastern Military District ), seized the Pivdennodonbaska Mine No. 3 in western Vodyane, which creates a sharper salient about five kilometers north of Vuhledar in the area west of Vodyane. Several Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have fire control (the ability to prosecute close-range artillery fires on an area to inhibit movement) over the C-051134 Vuhledar-Bohoyavlenka road, which is reportedly Ukraine's final supply route into Vuhledar. Western media and Ukrainian military experts and journalists widely warned on September 23 and 24 that constant Russian assaults and advances on the flanks of Vuhledar are threatening to encircle the Ukrainian garrison within the settlement, which may force Ukrainian troops to withdraw from the area, which has been an important Ukrainian stronghold for over two years.

Russian forces may manage to seize all of Vuhledar, but how quickly or easily they are able to do so will likely be contingent partially on Ukrainian decision-making. If the Ukrainian command decides that the risk of a Russian encirclement of Vuhledar or the costs of defending the settlement itself in urban combat are too great, Ukrainian forces may withdraw, allowing Russian forces to seize Vuhledar relatively rapidly and without engaging in close combat fighting. If Ukrainian forces decide to defend Vuhledar and can prevent Russian efforts to envelop or encircle it, however. Russian forces may struggle to fight through a settlement that Ukrainian forces have had over two years to fortify. If the Russians do not take the settlement relatively rapidly, Russian maneuver along the flanks of Vuhledar may also be impacted by the onset of autumn rains, which would make it much more difficult for Russian forces to advance through the mainly rural and agricultural terrain surrounding Vuhledar as it becomes much muddier. Russian milbloggers have identified Vuhledar's fortifications and the terrain along its flanks as major obstacles to Russia's ability to advance in the area, both during previous offensive efforts and during the current set of attacks. Russia attempted at least two major offensive efforts to seize Vuhledar in late 2022 and early 2023, both of which led to considerable Russian personnel and equipment losses while affording Ukrainian forces the ability to further commit to fortifying the settlement and observe how the Russian grouping in this area plans and prosecutes offensive operations. Elements of the EMD, particularly the Pacific Fleet's 40th Naval Infantry Brigade, have notably been committed to this area and engaged in offensive efforts on Vuhledar since 2022, and the Ukrainian brigade and other Ukrainian formations that have been defending Vuhledar during the same time period have likely learned certain valuable lessons about how these Russian formations fight.

Russia's potential seizure of Vuhledar is unlikely to fundamentally alter the course of offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast, however. Vuhledar is not a particularly crucial logistics node—Russian forces already control most of the main roads running into Vuhledar (the T0509 Vuhledar-Prechystivka road, the C050524 Pavlivka-Vuhledar road, and the T0524 Vuhledar-Marinka road) and are likely already credibly threatening the C051134 route into Bohoyavlenka with close range artillery fires, so the capture of the settlement would not immediately offer Russian forces access to a new roadway, nor cut Ukrainian forces off from a roadway that is crucial to their logistical supply. The potential seizure of Vuhledar will also not necessarily afford Russian forces a beneficial position from which to launch subsequent offensive operations elsewhere in western Donetsk Oblast. Vuhledar is 23 kilometers south of the H-15 highway, which runs from Donetsk City to the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, but the area between Vuhledar and the highway is mainly comprised of open fields that would require Russian forces to conduct successful mechanized assaults across areas that may soon become too muddy to make more rapid tactical gains. Vuhledar is also about 30 kilometers south of the areas southeast of Pokrovsk that Russian forces are currently prioritizing, and Russian forces would have to maneuver across more than 30 kilometers of open terrain to meaningfully support offensive efforts southeast of Pokrovsk. ISW previously assessed that Russian offensive efforts near Vuhledar and Pokrovsk are mutually reinforcing and intended to stretch Ukrainian forces along a wider front in Donetsk Oblast, but the hypothetical Russian seizure of Vuhledar would not necessarily be operationally significant enough to stretch Ukrainian forces even further in this area.

Recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian rear ammunition depots demonstrate the extent to which Russian military logistics still benefit from Western-provided sanctuary that secures Russia’s rear. Maxar collected satellite imagery demonstrating dramatic damage to three large Russian ammunition depots in western and southwestern Russia following Ukrainian strikes in September 2024. The imagery of the damage at the Oktyabrskii and Toropets depots in Tver Oblast and the Tikhoretsk depot in Krasnodar Krai depicts the destruction of dozens of ammunition storage buildings, rail cars that Russian forces likely used to transport ammunition to the depots, and masses of probable rocket canisters and other material that Russian forces had haphazardly left in the open. Such a crowded disposition of massed materiel underscores the lack of operational security in Russia’s rear supply depots, demonstrating the extent to which Western restrictions prohibiting Ukraine from firing Western-provided weapons into Russia has granted the Russian command flexibility to not properly protect its rear areas. This flexibility has granted Russia the ability to optimize large rear staging facilities to marshal massed materiel to Ukraine at scale.

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces have reached the outskirts of Vuhledar amid what appears to be an intensified offensive push near the settlement, but the capture of Vuhledar is unlikely to afford Russian forces any particular operational edge for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast.

Recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian rear ammunition depots demonstrate the extent to which Russian military logistics still benefit from Western-provided sanctuary that secures Russia’s rear.

Russia continues to expand and leverage its bilateral relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in order to support its war effort in Ukraine.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has failed to appease the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community by downplaying the Russian military command’s responsibility for its insistence on misusing technical specialists in infantry-led frontal assaults in eastern Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of the Kursk Oblast salient.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk and in eastern Toretsk.

Russian opposition outlet Meduza, citing its own conversations with various unspecified Russian officials close to the Russian Presidential Administration, an interlocutor in the federal government, and regional officials, reported on September 24 that mobilization is a very sensitive topic among Kremlin officials.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to threaten the possibility of a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West in order to exert further control over Western decision-making and discourage the West from allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike military objects in Russia. Putin claimed during the first public meeting of the Russian Security Council's standing conference on nuclear deterrence on September 25 that Russia is adjusting its nuclear doctrine to introduce "clarifications" regarding necessary preconditions for Russia to use a nuclear weapon. Putin shared two "clarifications" to the nuclear doctrine: that the Kremlin will consider using nuclear weapons in the case of "aggression against Russia by a non-nuclear state with support or participation from a nuclear state" or in the case of "the receipt of reliable information about the massive launch of air and space weapons" against Russia and these weapons crossing Russia's borders. Putin specified that these "air and space weapons" that could justify Russian nuclear weapons use include strategic and tactical aviation, cruise missiles, drones, and/or hypersonic missiles. Putin likely intends for the hyper-specificity of his nuclear threats to breathe new life into the Kremlin's tired nuclear saber-rattling information operation and generate a new wave of panic among Western policymakers during a particularly critical moment in Western policy discussions about Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided weapons. Kremlin officials routinely invoke thinly veiled threats of nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West during key moments in Western political debates regarding further military assistance to Ukraine — such as the ongoing debate about Ukraine's right to use Western-provided systems to conduct long-range strikes against Russian military objects — to induce fear among decision makers. US Central Intelligence Agency Director (CIA) William Burns cautioned Western policymakers on September 7 against fearing boilerplate Russian nuclear saber-rattling, and ISW has long identified Russia's nuclear saber-rattling as part of the Kremlin's effort to promote Western self-deterrence and not as indicative of Russia's willingness to use nuclear weapons. ISW continues to assess that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing for potential strikes against Ukraine’s three remaining operational nuclear power plants ahead of the coming winter, highlighting the Kremlin's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations and continued commitment to the destruction of the Ukrainian state and its people. Zelensky gave speeches to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA) on September 25 stating that Ukrainian intelligence found that Russia aims to target Ukraine's three operational nuclear power plants in order to degrade Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and power generation capacity before winter 2024–2025 and cause “nuclear disaster.” Zelensky recently noted that Russia is using unspecified Chinese satellites to photograph Ukraine’s nuclear power plants in preparation for strikes and emphasized in his UNGA speech that Russia's previous winter strike campaigns against Ukrainian energy infrastructure have already destroyed Ukraine's thermal power generation capacity and severely degraded its hydroelectric power generation capacity. Russian authorities and sources have repeatedly falsely accused Ukrainian forces of targeting Russian and Russian-occupied nuclear power plants likely as part of Russia’s overarching informational effort to falsely paint Ukraine and the Zelensky government as illegitimate actors and war criminals with whom Russia cannot engage in peace negotiations. Zelensky’s UN speeches also emphasized the principles of international law and the UN Charter as the main avenue through which Ukraine can achieve peace and highlighted the illegality of Russia’s war under international law alongside Russia’s ongoing destabilizing global efforts to enhance its war in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to threaten the possibility of a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West in order to exert further control over Western decision-making and discourage the West from allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike military objects in Russia.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing for potential strikes against Ukraine’s three remaining operational nuclear power plants ahead of the coming winter, highlighting the Kremlin's unwillingness to engage in good-faith negotiations and continued commitment to the destruction of the Ukrainian state and its people.

A Russian company is reportedly collaborating with entities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to develop an attack drone for Russia's war in Ukraine.

Russia continues to deepen its relationship with Iran's Axis of Resistance, this time reportedly via Iran-brokered talks facilitating Russian missile transfers to Yemen's Houthi rebels.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances in Kursk Oblast.

Ukrainian forces continued to regain positions in Vovchansk.

Russian forces advanced northwest of Kreminna, in Toretsk, and southeast of Pokrovsk.

Russian forces reportedly advanced within and around Vuhledar (southwest of Donetsk City) amid continued offensive efforts to seize the settlement.

Veterans of Russia's war in Ukraine continue to commit crimes upon returning to Russia.

Institute for the Study of War

Germany, France, and the US announced several immediate and more long-term aid packages for Ukraine on September 25 and 26. The German Ministry of Development announced on September 25 that it will provide support to Ukraine this winter for heat and energy in a package totaling around 70 million euros ($78.2 million). Germany will provide Ukrainian cities and municipalities with combined heat and power plants, boiler systems, generators, and solar-power systems to support communities that have been most affected by heat and electricity shortages resulting from heavy Russian strikes. The German Bundestag also announced on September 25 a 400 million euro ($447 million) increase in military funding for Ukraine to enable the purchase of additional air defense systems, tanks, drones, ammunition, and spare parts. French President Emmanuel Macron said during a meeting with Zelensky on September 25 that France will train and fully equip a Ukrainian brigade in the "near future."

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on September 25 that the Pentagon will send an additional military assistance package to Ukraine worth roughly $375 million and that the package will include: air-to-ground munitions; HIMARS ammunition; 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition; Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; M1117 armored security vehicles; Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles; light tactical vehicles; armored bridging systems; small arms, patrol boats; demolitions equipment and munitions; and other miscellaneous equipment and support materiel. US President Joe Biden announced on September 26 that he directed the DoD to allocate all of the remaining security assistance funding to Ukraine (roughly $8 billion) by the end of Biden's presidential term, including funding from the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, and that he authorized $5.5 billion in Presidential Drawdown Authority to fund the drawdown of US equipment for Ukraine and replenish US stockpiles. Biden stated that the DoD will also announce an additional assistance package worth $2.4 billion to provide Ukraine with additional air defense systems, unmanned aerial systems, and air-to-ground munitions; strengthen Ukraine's defense industry; and support Ukraine's maintenance and sustainment requirements. Biden also announced that the US will provide Ukraine with Joint Standoff Weapon (JOW) long-range munitions, a refurbished Patriot air defense battery, and additional Patriot missiles and will expand F-16 training capabilities to accommodate training 18 additional Ukrainian pilots in 2025. Biden noted that he will also convene a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in October 2024 to coordinate further Western support for Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

Germany, France, and the United States announced several immediate and more long-term aid packages for Ukraine on September 25 and 26.

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is reportedly struggling to coordinate combat tasks with the Russian military despite having control over the counterterrorism operation against the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast.

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued assaults in Kursk Oblast but neither side made further advances in the area.

Russian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City and Chasiv Yar and east and southeast of Pokrovsk.

Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian military command for holding joint military exercises with Laos, arguing that such exercises demonstrate that Russia is not learning from its battlefield experience in Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced battalion-size Russian mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction on September 26 — the first large Russian mechanized assault along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line since Winter 2024. A Ukrainian battalion operating near Pishchane (northwest of Svatove and southeast of Kupyansk) posted geolocated footage on September 26 showing Ukrainian forces repelling the reinforced battalion-size Russian mechanized assault in fields around Pishchane and reported that Russian forces attacked in the direction of Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka (west of Pishchane and directly on the Oskil River). The Ukrainian battalion reported that Russian forces used 50 armored vehicles in the assault, and the Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces Command reported that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions in two columns, one with 37 armored vehicles and the other with 13. The Ukrainian battalion reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed three tanks and 11 armored vehicles and damaged 10 tanks and 16 armored vehicles. The Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces Command posted footage showing damaged and destroyed Russian armored vehicles crowded close to one another, suggesting that Russian armored vehicles attacked in tight columns and became jammed once Ukrainian fire elements started to strike the column— a common occurrence in failed Russian mechanized assaults. Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian forces back to their starting positions near Pishchane, and none of the geolocated footage that ISW has observed of the assault indicates that Russian forces advanced during the assault.

The Russian Western Grouping of Forces conducted several large mechanized assaults between January and February 2024 at the start of the Russian offensive operation along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, with the last observed battalion-size Russian mechanized assault occurring west of Kreminna in late January. Russian forces have since conducted infantry assaults and occasional roughly platoon-size mechanized assaults along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and the tempo of the Russian offensive operation along this sector of the front has generally been much lower than Russian offensive operations elsewhere in Ukraine.

Russian forces may be intensifying their efforts to reach the Oskil River, although Russian advances on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River will likely continue to be relatively gradual. Russian forces have created a small tactical salient around Pishchane in recent weeks and have focused on advancing toward Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka. Russian forces advanced along a ravine running east of Pishchane and in fields south and north of the settlement but have struggled to advance in the fields immediately east of Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka. The command of the Western Grouping of Forces may have intended for the large mechanized assault to allow Russian forces to advance rapidly through these fields and consolidate positions within Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka and enable Russian infantry to establish a more enduring foothold within the two settlements on the Oskil River.

Russian forces are likely focusing on establishing a foothold directly on the Oskil River because it would allow Russian forces to envelop Ukrainian positions on the east bank of the river both to the north and south - creating a narrower Ukrainian salient between Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and Hlushkivka and a wider Ukrainian salient south of Kruhlyakivka since the Oskil River acts as a barrier. The Western Grouping of Forces has conducted the offensive operation along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in four mutually supporting axes of advance (northeast of Kupyansk, northwest of Svatove, southwest of Svatove, and west of Kreminna) specifically so that Russian territorial gains on any route of advance would generate opportunities to create Ukrainian salients on the east bank of the Oskil River and envelop Ukrainian positions both to the north and south of any advance. The desired Russian seizure of Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka does not ensure that Russian forces would be able to more quickly reduce the potential Ukrainian salient between Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and Hlushkivka nor increase the pace of advance south of Kruhlyakivka, however. Russian forces have not demonstrated the ability to quicken the pace of their advance along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in recent months, and Russian forces have also failed to make even marginal gains on other axes of advance, notably spending weeks to enter small settlements like Nevske and Makiivka (both northwest of Kreminna). Russian sources claimed as of September 27 that Ukrainian forces are actively counterattacking near Nevske, and Ukrainian forces have previously conducted tactically successful counterattacks in the Kreminna area — suggesting that Ukrainian forces have more flexibility to contest the tactical initiative in the area than elsewhere in eastern Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced battalion-size Russian mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction on September 26 — the first large Russian mechanized assault along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line since Winter 2024.

Russian forces may be intensifying their efforts to reach the Oskil River, although Russian advances on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River will likely continue to be relatively gradual.

The Russian military command has demonstrated that it will likely accept continued gradual gains along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, however.

The Western Grouping of Forces likely has limited capacity to maintain an intensified offensive effort along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line or conduct effective combat operations that result in more rapid gains.

Russian authorities appear to be expending a significant amount of effort to influence the Western debate about allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to conduct long-range strikes against military objects in Russia. This Russian effort suggests a deep concern with the operational pressures that such strikes into Russia would generate on Russian offensive operations in Ukraine, although US officials remain hesitant to permit Ukraine to conduct such strikes.

The benefits of allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided long-range strike systems against Russia may outweigh the risk of Russian retaliation more than Western policymakers are currently considering.

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers on September 27, likely as part of the ongoing Kremlin effort to coopt Russian milbloggers and downplay recent backlash in the ultranationalist information space over the death of two prominent drone operators.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) announced a new initiative to draw international support for its alternative peace plan for Ukraine amid increasing cooperation with Russia.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continued to meet with US officials about the war in Ukraine during his visit to the US on September 26 and 27.

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued assaults in Kursk Oblast, but neither side made further advances.

Russian forces recently advanced within and around Toretsk and southeast of Pokrovsk.

Russian authorities continue to threaten Russian frontline soldiers' ad-hoc communications networks.

Institute for the Study of War

Western officials continue to highlight efforts by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to support the Russian war effort in Ukraine. The Times reported on September 27 that Western officials revealed that an unspecified PRC company is sending a range of military drones to Russia for testing and eventual use by Russian forces in Ukraine. A Western official reportedly stated that the PRC company signed the agreement with Russia in 2023 and that there is "clear evidence that PRC companies are supplying Russia with deadly weapons for use in Ukraine." The Times reported that the Western official confirmed a September 25 report from Reuters about Russia's secret weapons program in the PRC to develop long-range attack drones for use in Ukraine. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated on September 27 that roughly 70 percent of Russian imports of machine tools and 90 percent of microelectronic imports come from the PRC and Hong Kong and that Russia is using these imports to produce missiles, rockets, armored vehicles, and munitions. Blinken stated that the PRC's actions do not "add up" since the PRC speaks about wanting peace in Ukraine but is allowing PRC companies to take actions that are helping the Russian war effort. The PRC has repeatedly attempted to depict itself as a neutral mediator in the war in Ukraine, and continued reports of PRC aid to Russia's war effort undermine this claim.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) strongly condemned on September 28 Israel’s “political assassination” of Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. The Russian MFA responded to the Israeli airstrike on Beirut, Lebanon that killed Nasrallah and advocated for an immediate cessation to hostilities, stating that Israel will bear full responsibility for any subsequent escalation in the Middle East. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also issued a joint condemnation of Israel’s airstrikes in Syria on September 28 during a meeting with the Turkish and Iranian foreign ministers.

Key Takeaways:

Western officials continue to highlight efforts by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to support the Russian war effort in Ukraine.

Ukrainian media reported on September 28 that unspecified Russian resistance movements, in coordination with the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), killed the Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) 924th State Center for Unmanned Aviation Colonel Aleksei Kolomeystev in Koloma, Moscow Oblast.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) strongly condemned on September 28 Israel’s “political assassination” of Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah.

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in Kursk Oblast.

Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Selydove, and Vuhledar.

Russia is reportedly implementing legislation that allows Russian authorities to release those accused of crimes from criminal liabilities if the accused signs a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Institute for the Study of War

Western countries continue to invest in the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB). The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD), in collaboration with the Danish DIB, announced on September 29 the establishment of a defense industrial hub at the Danish embassy in Kyiv with the aim of enhancing Danish-Ukrainian defense industrial cooperation. The Danish initiative aims to support Danish defense and dual-use companies that want to establish production or partnerships with Ukraine. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and Danish Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Troels Lund Poulsen also signed a Letter of Intent on September 29 that pledges Danish financial support for defense production in Ukraine. Denmark will allocate a total of 575 million euros ($641 million) for investment in the Ukrainian DIB, with 175 million euros ($195 million) coming directly from the Danish budget and an additional 400 million euros ($446 million) from profits from frozen Russian assets. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on September 14 that Ukraine will be able to domestically produce $20 billion worth of defense equipment in 2025 if Ukraine receives additional funding from its partners. ISW has assessed the importance of sustained and timely Western military support for Ukraine, particularly Western assistance to develop Ukraine’s DIB, so that Ukraine can become more self-sufficient and reduce its reliance on Western military aid in the long-term.

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian ammunition depot and missile storage facility near Kotluban, Volgograd Oblast on September 29. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian media reported on September 29 that drone operators of the Unmanned Systems Forces, Special Operations Forces (SSO), Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) struck the facility and suggested that a shipment of an unspecified number of Iranian missiles recently arrived at the facility. The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the strike caused a fire and secondary ammunition denotations at the facility. Satellite imagery captured on September 29 shows that the strikes likely caused a fire just northwest of the facility, and data available from NASA FIRMS shows heat anomalies in this area. Kotluban Head Igor Davydenko stated that Ukrainian drones attempted to strike the area but did not cause any damage to the facility, although a local Volgograd Oblast outlet reported that firefighters extinguished a fire caused by falling drone debris near an unspecified military facility. Russian opposition outlet Astra noted that internet sources are falsely attributing footage from a 2021 explosion in Dubai, United Arab Emirates to the Kutluban strike. Astra also reported that its sources in Rostov Oblast's emergency services stated that Russian forces shot down over 20 Ukrainian drones targeting the Millerovo Air Base on the night of September 28 to 29 and noted that data available from NASA FIRMS shows heat anomalies near the air base. Footage published on September 29 purportedly shows a fire near the Millerovo Air Base. A Russian insider source published footage purportedly showing a fire near the Yeysk Air Base in Krasnodar Krai, but ISW cannot confirm the authenticity of this footage. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces shot down 125 Ukrainian drones on the night of September 28 to 29, including 67 drones over Volgograd Oblast, 17 drones over Voronezh Oblast, and 18 drones over Rostov Oblast.

Key Takeaways:

Western countries continue to invest in the growth of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian ammunition depot and missile storage facility near Kotluban, Volgograd Oblast on September 29.

The Russian government is reportedly planning to further increase defense spending in 2025, although Kremlin officials appear to be highlighting planned social spending while avoiding discussions of increased defense spending.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, west of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk and Pokrovsk directions.

Institute for the Study of War

The Russian government plans to spend 17 trillion rubles ($183 billion) on national security and defense in 2025 — about 41 percent of its annual expenditures. The Russian government submitted a bill on the federal budget for 2025 to 2027 to the State Duma on September 30. The bill projects federal revenues to be 40.3 trillion rubles ($433 billion) in 2025 and federal expenditures to amount to 41.5 trillion rubles ($446 billion). The budget calls for 13.5 trillion rubles ($145 billion) to go towards "National Defense" expenditures in 2025 and projects that defense spending will decrease to 12.8 trillion rubles ($137 billion) in 2026 but increase to 13 trillion rubles ($139 billion) in 2027. The 2025 budget also calls for 3.5 trillion rubles ($37 billion) towards "National Security" — meaning that Russia plans to commit about 41 percent of its expenditures in 2025 to combined "defense" and "security" expenses. The budget notably allocates 14.03 billion rubles ($151 million) annually from 2025 to 2027 to the creation of a mobilization reserve in the Russian Armed Forces. The bill calls for about 40 billion rubles ($430 million) in 2025 to fund the "Defenders of the Fatherland Fund," which supports Russian veterans and their families. The Russian government is also earmarking significant funding towards developing new technologies. The 2025–2027 budget allocates 6.1 trillion rubles ($65 billion) for measures to "achieve technological leadership," 234.4 billion rubles ($2.5 billion) for machine-tool production, 112.1 billion rubles ($1.2 billion) for the "Unmanned Aircraft Systems" production project, 46.9 billion rubles ($504 million) for the development of new nuclear and energy technologies, and 175.3 billion rubles ($1.8 billion) for the development of radio and microelectronics. Increases in defense spending do not necessarily equate to increased military capabilities, however, especially when significant funding is going towards paying benefits to Russian soldiers, veterans, and their families.

The Russian budget will continue to support various social programs, including the Kremlin's pro-natalist programs, but a continued focus on defense spending is likely affecting the effectiveness and sustainability of these programs. The "Social Policy" section of the 2025 budget accounts for 6.4 trillion rubles ($69 billion). The bill allocates about 4 trillion rubles ($43 billion) between 2025 and 2027 for payments to people with children and about 1.7 trillion rubles ($18 billion) for Russia's maternity capital program through 2030. The budget accounts for 1.57 trillion rubles ($16 billion) for education in 2025, and healthcare spending accounts for 1.86 trillion rubles ($20 billion) in 2025 and 2026. The Russian government has allocated 824 billion rubles ($8.8 million) for the payment of state pensions in 2025 and 1.36 trillion rubles ($14 billion) for recently announced pension increases. Russian opposition outlet Meduza noted that the Russian government press release highlighted funding for pregnant women, families with children, national projects, and regional support but did not mention defense spending. Kremlin officials similarly highlighted social spending while avoiding discussions of increased defense spending on September 29 when the Cabinet of Ministers initially approved the draft federal budget, likely due to the Kremlin's wariness about war fatigue among the Russian population. Sustained high levels of defense spending in the coming years during a protracted war in Ukraine and continued military preparations for a possible conflict with NATO will make it more difficult for the Kremlin to sustain funding for the social programs that the Russian population cares about, such as pension increases and healthcare. Increased defense spending will also affect the long-term effectiveness of the Kremlin's efforts to use financial incentives to increase Russia's birth rate and reverse Russia's demographic crisis. Popular demands for increased social and decreased defense funding in the future may also hamper the Kremlin's ability to sustain its war in Ukraine as Russian President Vladimir Putin must take his regime's stability and domestic support into account.

Key Takeaways:

The Russian government plans to spend 17 trillion rubles ($183 billion) on national security and defense in 2025 — about 41 percent of its annual expenditures. The Russian budget will continue to support various social programs, including the Kremlin's pronatalist programs, but a continued focus on defense spending is likely affecting the effectiveness and sustainability of these programs.

Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted Presidential Aide and close personal ally Alexei Dyumin to the Russian Security Council alongside three other officials.

The Kremlin continues to use state and regional awards to coopt previously critical milbloggers as part of wider efforts to gain control over the information space.
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin arrived in Tehran on September 30 to meet with various Iranian officials and highlight Russo-Iranian economic cooperation.

Russian forces recently advanced in Glushkvosky Raion, Kursk Oblast, and Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.

Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed on September 30 the decree on Russia’s usual semi-annual fall conscription for 133,000 draftees.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces likely seized Vuhledar as of October 1 following a reported Ukrainian withdrawal from the settlement, though it is unclear if Russian forces will make rapid gains beyond Vuhledar in the immediate future. Geolocated footage published on September 30 and October 1 shows Russian forces planting Russian flags and freely operating in various parts of Vuhledar, and Russian milbloggers claimed on October 1 that Russian forces seized the settlement. A Ukrainian servicemember reported on October 1 that a part of the Ukrainian force grouping conducted a planned withdrawal from Vuhledar to avoid encirclement, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces began to withdraw from Vuhledar as of the end of September 30. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces did not completely interdict Ukrainian egress routes before Ukrainian forces withdrew but that Russian artillery and drones inflicted unspecified losses on withdrawing Ukrainian personnel. The scale of Ukrainian casualties is unknown at this time, however, but the widespread reports of Ukrainian withdrawal suggest that the larger Ukrainian contingent likely avoided a Russian encirclement that would have generated greater casualties. Russian sources credited elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District ), 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army , EMD), 5th Tank Brigade and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both part of 36th CAA, EMD), 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized unit of the 29th CAA), and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Special Forces of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces ) for directly seizing or assisting in the seizure of Vuhledar. Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces continued to advance west of Vodyane (northeast of Vuhledar).

The Russian seizure of Vuhledar follows a series of costly, failed Russian assaults near the settlement over the past two and a half years. A prominent Russian milblogger celebrated reports of Vuhledar’s seizure by recalling an alleged conversation he had with a Russian high-ranking officer, who told him that the Russian decision to attack in the Vuhledar direction in March 2022 was ill-advised because Russian forces would get “stuck” on the settlement. The milblogger implied that the officer was wrong given that Russian forces eventually seized Vuhledar, although the milblogger failed to acknowledge that Russian forces struggled to advance in the Vuhledar area for over two years. Russia attempted at least two major offensive efforts to seize Vuhledar in October-November 2022 and January-February 2023, both of which resulted in heavy personnel and military equipment losses. Russia's previous defeats around Vuhledar notably resulted in the attrition of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD).

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces likely seized Vuhledar as of October 1 following a reported Ukrainian withdrawal from the settlement, though it is unclear if Russian forces will make rapid gains beyond Vuhledar in the immediate future.

Some Russian sources expressed doubts that Russian forces would be able to rapidly advance and achieve operationally-significant breakthroughs immediately after seizing Vuhledar.

Ukrainian officials continue to highlight how Ukraine is reducing Russia's battlefield artillery ammunition advantage, likely in part due to recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian ammunition depots.

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) issued its June-August 2024 report detailing Ukrainian civilian casualties, systemic Russian mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), and limited Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs. The UN OHCHR report highlighted the difference between official Russian and Ukrainian reactions to the mistreatment of POWs, and Russian state media largely misrepresented the report by ignoring assessments about Russia's systemic mistreatment of Ukrainian POWs.

The Russian federal budget for 2025-2027 has carved out funding to support online platforms belonging to a prominent Kremlin propagandist and a former opposition outlet, further highlighting the Kremlin's efforts to adapt its propaganda machine to Russians’ growing reliance on social media for information.

Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.

Russian authorities are reportedly planning to increase recruitment within Russian pre-trial detention centers.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukraine continues efforts to expand domestic production of significant military equipment and maintain its drone advantage over Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 1 that Ukrainian companies can currently produce four million drones annually and that Ukraine has already contracted the domestic production of 1.5 million drones (presumably in 2024). Russian President Vladimir Putin recently claimed that Russia plans to increase drone production by tenfold to 1.4 million drones in 2024, which will be lower than the two million drones that Ukraine aims to produce in 2024. Zelensky also stated that Ukraine can produce 15 "Bohdan" self-propelled artillery systems every month and recently conducted a successful flight test for an unspecified domestically produced ballistic missile. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on October 2 that Ukraine will continue prioritizing domestic production of drones and long-range missiles, including ballistic missiles. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on October 2 that Ukraine has allocated $7 billion for the purchase of weapons and military equipment in the Ukrainian draft 2025 state budget — a 65 percent increase from the 2024 state budget. Shmyhal stated that Ukraine increased domestic weapons production by a factor of three in 2023 and by factor of two in the first eight months of 2024. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian efforts to expand domestic military production will allow Ukraine to reduce its dependence on Western military assistance in the long-term, but that Ukraine still requires considerable Western assistance for the next several years in order to defend against Russian aggression and liberate strategically vital areas that Russian forces currently occupy.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov condemned the Israel Defense Force's (IDF) ground operation in southern Lebanon during a meeting with the Lebanese ambassador to Russia on October 1. Bogdanov met with Lebanese Ambassador Shawki Bou Nassar and discussed the military-political situation in the Middle East. Bogdanov expressed "strong condemnation of Israel's ground invasion of Lebanon and emphasized Russia's opposition to alleged Israeli political assassinations. Bogdanov highlighted the importance of providing humanitarian assistance to Lebanon and safely evacuating Russian citizens from Lebanon. Russian Ambassador to Israel Anatoly Viktorov called for an immediate end to the conflict in the Middle East, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with ambassadors of unspecified Arab states and called for the immediate end of military operations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict area. The Kremlin likely seeks to take advantage of the conflict in the Middle East to promote Russian-dominated international structures, including some connected to the Kremlin's effort to establish an alternative "Eurasian security architecture." Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated on October 2 that Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas has accepted Russia's invitation to attend the BRICS summit in Kazan on October 22–24 and that participants will discuss the situation in the Middle East. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) recently condemned Israel’s “political assassination” of Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Israel's decision to simultaneously detonate thousands of pagers belonging to Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) members across Lebanon and Syria, and previous Israeli strikes against Iran.


Key Takeaways:

Ukraine continues efforts to expand domestic production of significant military equipment and maintain its drone advantage over Russia.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov condemned the Israel Defense Force's (IDF) ground operation in southern Lebanon during a meeting with the Lebanese ambassador to Russia on October 1.

Latvian forces enhanced air defense near the Russian border following a recent Russian drone crash in the country.

Russian and Ukrainian forces continued assaults in Kursk Oblast.

Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Svatove, Siversk, and Vuhledar and east and southeast of Pokrovsk

Russian defense enterprises are recruiting tens of thousands of new workers due to acute personnel shortages amid increased production of weapons due to the war in Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

The Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine that began in fall 2023 continues to produce gradual Russian tactical gains in specific sectors of the front, but operationally significant gains will likely continue to elude Russian forces. Ukrainian forces are conducting an effective defense in depth along the frontline, inflicting significant losses upon Russian forces while slowly giving ground but preventing the Russian military from making more rapid gains on the battlefield. Ukrainian forces do face serious operational challenges and constraints, which are providing Russian forces with opportunities to pursue tactically significant gains. Russian forces do not have the available manpower and materiel to continue intensified offensive efforts indefinitely, however, and current Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine will likely culminate in the coming months, if not weeks, as Ukrainian officials and ISW have previously assessed.

Russian forces have recently made notable tactical gains but have not demonstrated a capacity to seize operationally significant objectives. ISW distinguishes between tactical gains, which are relevant at the tactical level of war in the near vicinity of the fighting, and operational gains, which are significant at the operational level of war and affect large sectors of the entire frontline. Russian forces seized Vuhledar in western Donetsk Oblast as of October 1, and the settlement will likely afford Russian forces an improved tactical position for pursuing their operational effort to advance towards the H-15 (Donetsk City–Zaporizhzhia City) highway and eliminate the wide Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast. The Russian seizure of Vuhledar will not on its own radically change the operational situation in western Donetsk Oblast, however, and Russian forces will likely struggle to achieve their operational objectives in the area during the ongoing offensive operation in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian offensive operations that are pursuing operationally significant objectives, like the Russian effort to seize Chasiv Yar or to push Ukrainian forces off the left (east) bank of the Oskil River, have either stalled or are resulting in particularly gradual gains over long stretches of time, respectively. Russian forces continue to prioritize their offensive push towards Pokrovsk, and the operational significance of seizing the city will likely in part depend on the Russian military's ability to leverage the city in wider operational maneuver in Donetsk Oblast.Russian forces have tried and failed to conduct wide operational maneuver across several axes throughout Donetsk Oblast on several occasions during the full-scale invasion and are currently conducting intensified offensive operations in pursuit of more limited objectives on only two mutually supporting sectors of the frontline in Donetsk Oblast (western Donetsk Oblast and the Pokrovsk direction).

Key Takeaways:

The Russian offensive effort in eastern Ukraine that began in fall 2023 continues to produce gradual Russian tactical gains in specific sectors of the front, but operationally significant gains will likely continue to elude Russian forces.

Ukrainian forces are conducting an effective defense in depth along the frontline, inflicting significant losses upon Russian forces while slowly giving ground but preventing the Russian military from making more rapid gains on the battlefield.

Ukrainian forces do face serious operational challenges and constraints, which are providing Russian forces with opportunities to pursue tactically significant gains.

Russian forces do not have the available manpower and materiel to continue intensified offensive efforts indefinitely, however, and current Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine will likely culminate in the coming months, if not weeks, as Ukrainian officials and ISW have previously assessed.

Russian forces have recently made notable tactical gains but have not demonstrated a capacity to seize operationally significant objectives.

The Russian military command prepared the ongoing Russian summer 2024 offensive operation for months in advance and accumulated operational reserves and resources for the operation that the recent months of attritional fighting have likely heavily degraded.

Russian forces have reportedly committed a significant portion of their intended operational reserves to offensive operations in Donetsk and northern Kharkiv oblasts, indicating that the Russian military command may have prioritized forming operational reserves to support offensive operations in priority sectors of the frontline over developing theater-wide strategic reserves for the entire offensive campaign in Ukraine.

The Russian military command is continuing to prioritize offensive operations in priority sectors of the frontline over long-term planning for Russia's theater-wide campaign in Ukraine, but the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast appears to have significantly complicated the development of Russia's operational reserves.

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be using the "Time of Heroes" veteran support program to militarize regional and local government administrations and further solidify a pro-war ideology into the Russian state and society.

Russian authorities continue to arrest Russian officials on charges related to mismanagement and corruption within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Strikes reportedly targeted an ammunition depot near Russia's Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia Province, Syria overnight on October 2 to 3.

Russian forces recently advanced south of Siversk and east and southeast of Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast.

Russian authorities continue to nationalize Russian enterprises for the benefit of the federal government.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces struck a fuel storage facility in Anna, Voronezh Oblast on the night of October 3 to 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and Ukrainian military struck at least one vertical fuel reservoir at the Annaneftprodukt fuel and oil storage facility and that Ukrainian military officials are still clarifying the damage at the facility. Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed that Russian electronic warfare (EW) interference caused a Ukrainian drone to fall onto the fuel storage facility and start a fire at an empty fuel reservoir. Footage published on October 4 shows a fire at a purported fuel storage facility near Anna.

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces struck a fuel storage facility in Anna, Voronezh Oblast on the night of October 3 to 4.

Russian forces recently advanced in Vovchansk, near Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.

Institute for the Study of War

The Russian Government plans to allocate 90 billion rubles ($948 million) to one-time payments for concluding a military contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) between 2025 and 2027, indicating that the Kremlin plans to continue relying on ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts to meet the manpower requirements of its war in Ukraine for as long as the crypto-mobilization system works. The Russian federal government currently offers 400,000 rubles ($4,200) one-time payments for signing a military contract (in addition to one-time payments offered by regional governments, some of which recently exceed one million rubles), suggesting that the Kremlin intends to recruit 225,000 new personnel through contract service between 2025 and 2027, assuming current rates hold, which is unlikely given these rates have steadily increased since 2022. Russian authorities have significantly increased financial incentives, particularly one-time payments, in recent months for signing military contracts, and the Kremlin may have allocated 90 billion rubles to one-time payments with the intent of further raising federal payments between 2025 and 2027. Russian authorities have reportedly expressed concerns that ongoing recruitment efforts are producing diminishing results, however, and the significant increase in financial incentives in recent months suggests that existing recruitment efforts were insufficient for maintaining the consistent generation of new forces that the Russian military relies on for sustaining its offensive tempo in Ukraine. ISW assesses that there are medium- to long-term constraints on how many recruits the ongoing Russian crypto-mobilization campaign can generate, and increased financial incentives are unlikely to significantly address these constraints. Russian President Vladimir Putin remains committed to the ongoing crypto-mobilization campaign in order to avoid declaring another widely unpopular partial mobilization call-up of reservists, although he maintains the option to call another round of partial mobilization — as he did in Fall 2022. Putin and the Russian military command appear unwilling to accept reducing the intensity of Russian combat operations in Ukraine since they view maintaining the theater-wide initiative as a strategic imperative, and it remains unclear whether Putin will respond with another round of mobilization if faced with another crisis similar to or worse than the crisis the Kremlin faced in Fall 2022.

A recent Ukrainian missile strike near occupied Donetsk City reportedly killed several North Korean military officials. Unspecified sources in Ukraine's intelligence community told the Kyiv Post that an October 3 Ukrainian missile strike near occupied Donetsk City killed 20 Russian soldiers, including six unidentified North Korean officers "who came to confer with their Russian counterparts," and injured three other North Korean soldiers. The Kyiv Post, citing Russian social media posts, reported that Russian forces were demonstrating infantry assault and defense training to the North Korean military personnel. ISW cannot independently confirm the presence of North Korean military officials in occupied Donetsk City. ISW has previously observed unconfirmed reports in June 2024 that North Korea planned to dispatch a large-scale engineering force to occupied Donetsk Oblast as early as July 2024. ISW also observed reports in July 2024 that a delegation from North Korea's Kim Il Sung Military University visited Russia, which against the backdrop of deepening bilateral relations, suggests that the North Korean military likely intends to learn from the Russian military's experience in the war in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

The Russian Government plans to allocate 90 billion rubles ($948 million) to one-time payments for concluding a military contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) between 2025 and 2027, indicating that the Kremlin plans to continue relying on ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts to meet the manpower requirements of its war in Ukraine for as long as the crypto-mobilization system works.

Ukrainian officials continue to provide statistics regarding Russian war crimes, shedding light on the extent of violations committed by Russian forces and authorities.

The Russian government appears to have amended its plan to deanonymize Russian social media accounts following significant backlash within the Russian ultranationalist information space.

A recent Ukrainian missile strike near occupied Donetsk City reportedly killed several North Korean military officials.

Russian forces recently advanced within the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, near Toretsk, near Pokrovsk, and southwest of Donetsk City.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces have reportedly lost at least five divisions’ worth of armored vehicles and tanks in Pokrovsk Raion since beginning their offensive operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and during intensified Russian offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast in Summer 2024. An open-source X (formerly Twitter) user tracking visually confirmed Russian vehicle and equipment losses in Ukraine stated on October 4 that the user has confirmed that Russian forces have lost 1,830 pieces of heavy equipment in Pokrovsk Raion since October 9, 2023. The X user stated that Russian forces have lost a total of 539 tanks (roughly a division and a half's worth of Russian tanks) and 1,020 infantry fighting vehicles (roughly four to five mechanized infantry divisions’ worth of vehicles) during offensive operations in Pokrovsk Raion and specified that Ukrainian forces destroyed 381 of the 539 Russian tanks and 835 of the 1,020 armored vehicles. The X user noted that Russian forces have also lost 26 infantry mobility vehicles, 22 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), 11 towed artillery systems, and 92 unarmored trucks. The X user noted that he confirmed that Russian forces lost 25 tanks and 59 armored vehicles (roughly two battalions' worth of mechanized equipment) in Pokrovsk Raion since September 6, 2024. Russian forces launched an intensified four-month-long offensive operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and later continued assaults west of Avdiivka and west and southwest of Donetsk City in spring and summer 2024, and the user's data should reflect Russian vehicle losses accrued during these offensive efforts. The X user’s assessment based on visually confirmed vehicle losses is likely conservative given that not all Russian vehicle losses are visually documented. The actual number of Russian vehicle losses in the Pokrovsk area is likely higher than reported.

The Russian military command may not be willing or able to accept the current scale and rate of vehicle loss in the coming months and years given the constraints in Russia's defense industrial production, limits to Russia’s Soviet-era vehicle stockpiles, and the Russian military's failure to achieve operationally significant territorial advances through mechanized maneuver. Russian forces expended a significant number of armored vehicles during the first weeks of their offensive effort to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and later limited their armored vehicle usage while fighting within Avdiivka's administrative boundaries. Russian forces appear to have limited their armored vehicle use in the area immediately west of Avdiivka in recent months, although Russian forces have simultaneously intensified their offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk city and frequently conduct largely unsuccessful platoon- and company-sized mechanized assaults in the area. Russian forces have conducted several battalion-sized mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast since July 2024, the majority of which resulted in significant armored vehicle losses in exchange for marginal territorial advances. The commander of a Ukrainian bridge operating in the Donetsk direction recently reported that Russian forces are losing up to 90 percent of the vehicles used in mechanized assaults in the Donetsk direction. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank previously estimated that Russian forces were losing over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles annually as of February 2024, although Russia's current rate of armored vehicle losses may be higher given that the X user's data notably does not account for Russian equipment losses throughout the entire frontline. Russian forces have only advanced about 40 km in the Avdiivka/Pokrovsk operational direction since October 2023 and a loss of over five divisions’ worth of equipment for such tactical gains is not sustainable indefinitely without a fundamental shift in Russia‘s capability to resource its war.

Russian forces have likely accumulated a large amount of equipment for these assaults, although the medium- to long-term constraints of Russia's armored vehicle stocks and production rates alongside mounting equipment losses may force the Russian military to rethink the benefit of intensified mechanized activity in this sector over Russia's longer-term war effort in Ukraine. The Russian military command's willingness to pursue limited tactical advances in exchange for significant armored vehicle losses will become increasingly costly as Russian forces burn through finite Soviet-era weapons and equipment stocks in the coming months and years. Russia will likely struggle to adequately supply its units with materiel in the long term without transferring the Russian economy to a wartime footing and significantly increasing Russia's defense industrial production rates — a move that Russian President Vladimir Putin has sought to avoid thus far.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces have reportedly lost at least five divisions’ worth of armored vehicles and tanks in Pokrovsk Raion since beginning their offensive operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023 and during intensified Russian offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast in Summer 2024.

• The Russian military command may not be willing or able to accept the current scale and rate of vehicle loss in the coming months and years given the constraints in Russia's defense industrial production, limits to Russia’s Soviet-era vehicle stockpiles, and the Russian military's failure to achieve operationally significant territorial advances through mechanized maneuver.

• Ukrainian officials continue to document and prosecute Russian war crimes committed against Ukrainian forces.

• Russian authorities reportedly arrested the administrator of the Russian Telegram channel Thirteenth, who has previously criticized the Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), on October 5.

• Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Pokrovsk.

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Ukrainian forces struck an oil terminal in occupied Feodosia, Crimea on the night of October 6 to 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 7 that Ukrainian forces struck an oil terminal in occupied Feodosia causing a fire near the facility and that Ukrainian authorities are clarifying the damage to the facility. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Feodosia houses the largest oil terminal in occupied Crimea and that Russia uses this terminal to transport petroleum products to the Russian military. Feodosia occupation mayor Igor Tkachenko acknowledged the fire at the oil depot and claimed that it did not cause an oil spill. A Crimea-focused source claimed that the Russian military had deployed a Pantsir-S1 air defense system to the area in June 2024 to protect the Feodosia oil terminal. Footage published on October 7 shows a fire purportedly at the Feodosia oil terminal.

Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets reported on October 7 that Ukrainian authorities are investigating another case of Russian forces' unjust abuse and execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). Lyubinets reported that he sent letters to the United Nations (UN) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in response to recent aerial footage of Russian forces torturing and executing three unarmed Ukrainian POWs near Niu York, Donetsk Oblast. Lyubinets noted that a Ukrainian brigade operating in the area published the footage on October 6 and highlighted that the highest levels of the Russian military command appear to be tolerating Russian war crimes in Ukraine. The Geneva Convention on POWs prohibits the "mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture" of POWs, as well as the execution of POWs or persons who are clearly rendered hors de combat. Head of the Ukrainian Department for Combating Crimes in Conditions of Armed Conflict Yuri Bilousov stated on October 4 that Ukrainian sources documented evidence indicating that Russian forces have executed 93 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) on the battlefield since the start of the full-scale invasion and that 80 percent of the recorded cases occurred in 2024. Bilousov noted on October 5 that these war crimes are systemic and that Russian authorities clearly condone these crimes. ISW has extensively reported on previous footage and reports of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and observed a wider trend of Russian abuses against Ukrainian POWs across various sectors of the front that appeared to be enabled, if not explicitly endorsed, by individual Russian commanders and unpunished by Russian field commanders.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck an oil terminal in occupied Feodosia, Crimea on the night of October 6 to 7.

• Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets reported on October 7 that Ukrainian authorities are investigating another case of Russian forces' unjust abuse and execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).

• Russian authorities announced an "unprecedented" cyberattack against Russian state media infrastructure on October 7.

• Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast, in Donetsk Oblast, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

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Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Shahed drone storage facility in Krasnodar Krai and an ammunition warehouse in the Republic of Adygea on October 9 and 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 9 that Ukrainian naval forces and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) struck a Russian Shahed drone storage facility near Oktyabrsky, Krasnodar Krai and that Russian forces stored around 400 Shahed drones at the facility. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that there were secondary detonations at the facility immediately following the strike, and footage published on October 10 shows a large fire and secondary detonations near the facility. Krasnodar Krai officials stated on October 9 that Ukrainian drone strikes damaged several houses near Oktyabrsky and that unspecified warehouses in the area caught fire but claimed that the strike did not significantly damage the facilities. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 10 that drone operators from the SBU, Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) struck an ammunition warehouse at the Khanskaya Air Base in the Republic of Adygea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces base Su-34 fighter-bombers and Su-27 fighter aircraft at the Khanskaya Air Base, and Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that sources within Ukrainian special services stated that there were 57 Russian training and combat aircraft and helicopters at the airfield at the time of the strike. Suspilne's sources stated that Russian forces use the Khanskaya Air Base to refuel planes during air strikes against frontline Ukrainian units and settlements. Ukrainian forces are still determining the extent of the strike's damage to the airfield, and it is unclear whether Ukrainian forces struck any Russian aircraft at the Khanskaya Air Base as of the time of this report. Russian sources published footage on October 10 purportedly showing Ukrainian drones striking the airfield and noted that the Russian 272nd Training Aviation Base of the Krasnodar Higher Military Aviation School of Pilots is based at the Khanskaya Air Base.

Russian forces have reportedly struck three civilian vessels docked in Ukrainian ports since October 5, likely as part of intensified Russian military, political, and economic pressure to undermine confidence in Ukraine's grain corridor, Western support for Ukraine, and push Ukraine into premature negotiations. Ukrainian Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper stated on October 9 that Russian ballistic missiles struck port infrastructure in Odesa Raion and that Russian missiles struck a civilian container ship under the flag of Panama. Kiper noted that this was the third Russian strike on a civilian vessel in the last four days and stated that these strikes are an attempt to disrupt Ukraine's grain corridor, kill civilians, and destroy Ukrainian infrastructure. Ukrainian officials reported that a Russian ballistic missile struck a civilian vessel under the flag of Palau in Odesa's port on October 7 and that Russian missiles damaged a civilian cargo ship on the night of October 5 to 6 near Odesa City. Russian sources have attempted to justify the recent Russian strikes against civilian ships by claiming that the ships were carrying weapons, but ISW has not observed independent confirmation of these claims. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted a cruise missile strike against a civilian cargo ship under the flag of St. Kitts and Nevis transporting Ukrainian wheat to Egypt as it was leaving Ukrainian territorial waters in the Black Sea on the night of September 11. Russian forces have previously heavily targeted Ukrainian ports and grain infrastructure in southern Ukraine and have engaged in threatening military posturing in the Black Sea in an effort to damage Ukrainian grain exports and undermine international confidence in Ukraine's grain corridor. Russian strikes against civilian vessels in the grain corridor are almost certainly intended to undermine confidence in Ukraine's ability to enforce and defend the corridor, influence ongoing Western discussions about long-term Western support for Ukraine, and negatively impact Ukraine's efforts to economically recover amid the ongoing war.|

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Shahed drone storage facility in Krasnodar Krai and an ammunition warehouse in the Republic of Adygea on October 9 and 10.

• Russian forces have reportedly struck three civilian vessels docked in Ukrainian ports since October 5, likely as part of intensified Russian military, political, and economic pressure to undermine confidence in Ukraine's grain corridor, Western support for Ukraine, and push Ukraine into premature negotiations.

• An unspecified senior US defense official stated on October 9 that Russian forces have suffered over 600,000 casualties since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 — a stark increase from a prior US intelligence assessment that Russian forces suffered about 315,000 casualties in Ukraine as of December 2023.

• An Iranian outlet affiliated with former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohsen Rezaei claimed on October 8 that Russia provided Iran with an S-400 air defense system and a squadron of Su-35 fighter jets but provided no evidence for this claim.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, southeast of Pokrovsk, and southwest of Donetsk City.

• The Russian military appears to be increasingly recruiting older Russian volunteers in order to sustain ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.

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Russian forces intensified their ongoing effort to dislodge Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast around the evening of October 10 and have recently advanced further into the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast while reportedly eliminating almost the entirety of the smaller Ukrainian salient in Glushkovsky Raion. Russian forces reportedly simultaneously intensified counterattacks in Glushkovksy Raion, on the left flank of the main Ukrainian salient in Korenevsky Raion, and on the right flank of the main Ukrainian salient in Sudzhansky Raion on the evening of October 10. Geolocated footage published on October 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into central Kremyanoye (east of Korenevo) and to the northern outskirts of Zeleny Shlyakh (southeast of Korenevo) and enveloped Ukrainian positions near Lyubimovka (southeast of Korenevo). Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating in Korenevsky Raion seized Olgovka (east of Korenevo) and Nizhny Klin (southeast of Korenevo and Lyubimovka), advanced up the outskirts of Tolsty Lug and Novoivanovka (both southeast of Korenevo), and broke through Ukrainian defenses near Lyubimovka during an alleged battalion-sized mechanized assault.

ISW has yet to observe confirmation that Russian forces recently conducted a battalion-sized mechanized assault in the area or recaptured any settlements. Russian milbloggers widely claimed that Russian forces enveloped Ukrainian forces in Lyubimovka and Tolsty Lug, although some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have encircled up to two Ukrainian battalions in Korenevsky Raion. ISW has not observed confirmation that Russian forces have encircled any Ukrainian units in Kursk Oblast, however. Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District ) and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Southern Military District ) are reportedly conducting these intensified counterattacks in Korenevsky Raion.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating in Sudzhansky Raion broke through Ukrainian defenses near Martynovka and Mykhailivka (both northeast of Sudzha), advanced two kilometers deep north of Malaya Loknya (north of Sudzha), and are enveloping Ukrainian positions near Plekhovo (southeast of Sudzha). A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade advanced up to the northwestern outskirts of Sudzha, although a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger repeatedly denied these reports. ISW has not observed any visual confirmation of Russian advances in Sudzhansky Raion since the start of intensified Russian counterattacks in the area on the evening of October 10. Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade, 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD), 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 1220th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized unit), and unspecified Chechen Akhmat units are reportedly conducting the intensified counterattacks in Sudzhansky Raion.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of most of Glushkovksy Raion on October 10 and 11, although ISW has yet to observe visual confirmation of these alleged Russian advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating south of Glushkovo pushed Ukrainian forces back from Veseloye, advanced near Medvezhye, and approached the international border with Sumy Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces only retain limited positions near Krasnooktyabrskoye and on the outskirts of Novy Put (both south of Glushkovo and immediately on the border with Sumy Oblast) and declared the Ukrainian offensive effort in Glushkovsky Raion a failure. Ukrainian forces began ground assaults into Glushkovsky Raion on September 11, 2024, following the start of Russian counterattacks in Kursk Oblast on September 10, 2024, but have not yet established a significant foothold in the area. Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, 1434th Akhmat "Chechnya" Regiment, 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), 83rd VDV Brigade, and 106th VDV Division are reportedly conducting intensified counterattacks in Glushkovsky Raion.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces intensified their ongoing effort to dislodge Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast around the evening of October 10 and have recently advanced further into the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast while reportedly eliminating almost the entirety of the smaller Ukrainian salient in Glushkovsky Raion.

• Intensified Russian counterattacks likely aim to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast before poor weather conditions in Fall 2024 and early Winter 2024-2025 begin to constrain battlefield maneuver.

• The Russian military command likely aims to rapidly push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast in order to free up combat power for its priority offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast and to ease the theater-wide operational pressures that the Ukrainian incursion has generated.

• South Korean and Ukrainian officials reportedly continue to identify North Korean military personnel already fighting in Ukraine as well as training in Russia for possible future deployments alongside the Russian military.

• Western partners continue to announce and provide new military assistance to Ukraine.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues diplomatic efforts to establish and clarify Ukraine’s strategic vision for peace.

• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov declared a "blood feud" against Russian legislators, suggesting that Kadyrov is becoming increasingly emboldened in his personal political disputes.

• Ukrainian officials confirmed that Ukrainian journalist Viktoriya Roshchyna died in Russian captivity.

• Ukrainian officials announced new appointments in the Ministry of Defense (MoD).

• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Kurakhove.

• The Kremlin is deceptively recruiting young African women to assemble Iranian-designed Shahed drones in the Republic of Tatarstan, likely to address labor shortages in Russia.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces are reportedly relying on illicitly obtained Starlink terminals to improve combat coordination and the effectiveness of their tactical reconnaissance strike complex (TRSC) in Ukraine as part of an overarching effort to reach technological parity with Ukrainian forces. Ukrainian military personnel operating in Donetsk Oblast told the Washington Post in an article published on October 12 that Starlink terminals have increasingly appeared at Russian frontline positions and that the illicitly obtained technology is helping Russian forces fix persisting issues with combat coordination and communications while improving the precision of Russian tactical fires. The commander of a Ukrainian drone platoon operating near Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) told the Washington Post that Ukrainian reconnaissance drones started widely recording Starlink terminals at Russian positions in the area in September 2024 and that the arrival of the terminals corresponded with a decrease in intercepted Russian radio transmissions in which Russian soldiers relayed incomplete or incorrect battlefield information to their commanders. Another Ukrainian soldier reportedly stated that Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction appear to have enough Starlink terminals to give individual tactical groups their own terminal. Ukrainian soldiers reportedly credited recent Russian battlefield gains, including the Russian seizure of Vuhledar in late September 2024, partially to the Russian use of Starlink terminals. Russian forces have mainly relied on radio and other insecure communication technologies for organizing combat coordination and relaying targeting information to fire and strike elements, and Russian forces have yet to field modern battlefield management systems at scale to organize their TRSC as many Ukrainian units have. Ukrainian access to Starlink has afforded Ukrainian forces a technological edge to conduct more effective combat coordination and field new developments in the TRSC ahead of Russian forces, and Russian forces are likely trying to degrade these Ukrainian advantages by scaling up their own use of the terminals. Ukraine is currently pursuing a strategy to offset Russian manpower and materiel advantages through technological innovation and adaptation, and technological parity between Ukrainian and Russian forces will undermine this effort.

A Russian milblogger claimed that a Ukrainian F-16 downed a Russian Su-34 fighter aircraft in an unspecified area of the theater on October 12. ISW cannot verify the claim that a Ukrainian F-16 was involved in the reported loss of the Russian Su-34. A Russian milblogger closely affiliated with Russian aviation published a tribute to a lost Su-34 aircraft on October 12 but did not provide additional details about the incident. A prominent Russian milblogger also confirmed that the Su-34 crew died but claimed that this loss was not related to Ukrainian activity, and other milbloggers speculated that the Su-34 could have crashed as a result of technical malfunction or human error. A Russian Telegram channel, which claims to be managed by Russian airborne (VDV) officers and staff of the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces, claimed that a Ukrainian F-16 fighter jet presumably shot down the Russian Su-34 fighter aircraft while the Su-34 was dropping FAB glide bombs with unified planning and correction modules (UMPC) at a distance of about 50 kilometers from the frontline. The Telegram channel later responded to the claims that the Su-34 could have crashed due to technical malfunction or human error, noting that such hypothetical scenarios still highlight a problem with the wear and tear of Russian aircraft, unprofessionalism among pilots, and pilot exhaustion. The Telegram channel accused Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers of lying about the Su-34 crash and preventing Russian forces from developing plans to counter the Ukrainian F-16 threat. The Telegram channel claimed in March 2024 that Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor filed a complaint against the channel for “discrediting” a Russian military commander. ISW cannot independently confirm the Telegram channel’s claim, but if confirmed, this incident would mark the first Ukrainian shootdown of a Russian manned aircraft with a Western-provided F-16 fighter jet.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are reportedly relying on illicitly obtained Starlink terminals to improve combat coordination and the effectiveness of their tactical reconnaissance strike complex (TRSC) in Ukraine as part of an overarching effort to reach technological parity with Ukrainian forces.

• A Russian milblogger claimed that a Ukrainian F-16 downed a Russian Su-34 fighter aircraft in an unspecified area of the theater on October 12, but ISW cannot verify the claim that a Ukrainian F-16 was involved in the reported loss of the Russian Su-34.

• Unknown actors opened fire on personnel of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs' (MVD) Center for Combating Extremism in Nazran, Republic of Ingushetia on the night of October 11.

• Indian enterprises are reportedly increasing exports of dual-use technologies to Russia, in part thanks to large Russian reserves of rupees from oil sales to India.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Donetsk City, and Robotyne.

• Russian forces are reportedly struggling to conduct effective counterbattery fires.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces have recently resumed tactical offensive attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and have made tactical gains in localized assaults, but this activity so far does not appear to be a part of a larger operational offensive effort to support the wider Russian offensive operation in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated on October 12 and 13 that elements of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet, Leningrad Military District ) and the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army , Eastern Military District ) launched assaults near Levadne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and broke through Ukrainian defenses. A Ukrainian military observer noted that Russian forces reached the outskirts of Levadne and advanced in the direction of Novodarivka (southwest of Novodarivka). Russian milbloggers widely claimed that Russian forces seized Levadne and advanced up to the southern outskirts of Novodarivka, although ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims.

These tactical gains are not the result of a sudden or unexpected Russian breakthrough. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces began conducting renewed ground assaults southwest of Velyka Novosilka beginning around October 11. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on October 3 that Russian forces were preparing assaults groups for offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast in the near future but that Ukrainian forces had not identified large Russian force concentrations in southern Ukraine. Voloshyn added that the planned Russian offensive activity aimed to improve Russian tactical positions and establish tactical footholds for continued offensive actions. Russian forces activated on a long dormant sector of the front in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Kamyanske (south of Stepnohirsk) in early October, but this activity has so far been limited and has resulted in only marginal tactical gains. Russian forces may be reactivating in less active sectors of the front in southern Ukraine to divert Ukrainian attention away from Russia's priority offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast and to fix Ukrainian forces along the front in southern Ukraine and prevent Ukraine from redeploying forces to Donetsk Oblast.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces have recently resumed tactical offensive attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and have made tactical gains in localized assaults, but this activity so far does not appear to be a part of a larger operational offensive effort to support the wider Russian offensive operation in western Donetsk Oblast.

• Russian forces recently executed nine Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Kursk Oblast amid a theater-wide increase in Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs.

• Russian milbloggers largely glorified the Russian execution of the Ukrainian POWs, reinforcing a cultural norm to justify and celebrate war crimes within the broader Russian ultranationalist community.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Selydove, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Donetsk City, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

>• Russian forces recently executed nine Ukrainian prisoners of
>war (POWs) in Kursk Oblast amid a theater-wide increase in
>Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs.
>
>• Russian milbloggers largely glorified the Russian execution
>of the Ukrainian POWs, reinforcing a cultural norm to justify
>and celebrate war crimes within the broader Russian
>ultranationalist community.


Und nachher wird in Rußland dann keiner etwas davon gewußt haben.

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov arrived in the People's Republic of China (PRC) for an official visit on October 14, highlighting continued Russia-PRC defense cooperation against the backdrop of bilateral naval exercises in the Pacific Ocean. Belousov met with PRC Defense Minister Dong Jun in Beijing on August 14 and discussed the role of bilateral cooperation in enhancing each state's respective defensive capabilities and maintaining global security and regional stability. Dong emphasized that Russia and the PRC share a common desire to develop military cooperation and open new avenues for unspecified joint defense cooperation. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) notably published footage on October 14 of ongoing joint Russia-PRC People's Liberation Army (PLA) anti-submarine naval exercises in the northwestern Pacific Ocean and claimed that a detachment of Russian and PLA naval vessels are conducting a joint patrol of the Asia–Pacific region. Such joint naval exercises are manifestations of intensified Russia-PRC defense cooperation, as each party can learn valuable lessons from one another during combined exercises, improving interoperability and potentially shaping military doctrine in the future. Russian forces have experience repelling Ukrainian autonomous naval drone strikes against Russian naval and port infrastructure, and the PLA may hope to absorb some of these lessons in planning for the PRC's potential future actions against Taiwan. Taiwan's MoD warned that the PRC launched "massive military drills" encircling Taiwan with warships on October 14, which overlapped with Belousov's visit.

Russian forces struck civilian vessels docked at Ukrainian ports for the fourth time since October 5, part of an apparent Russian strike campaign targeting port areas to undermine Ukraine's grain corridor, spoil international support for Ukraine, and push Ukraine into premature negotiations. Odesa Oblast officials reported that Russian forces struck the port of Odesa with a ballistic missile during the day on October 14, hitting the civilian vessels NS Moon flying the Belize flag and the Optima dry cargo vessel flying the Palau flag, as well as port infrastructure and a grain warehouse. The officials stated that Russian strikes on October 7 already damaged the Optima. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces most recently struck civilian vessels docked at the port of Odesa overnight on October 5 to 6 and on October 7 and 9. Russian ultranationalist milbloggers responded to the October 9 strike with rhetoric supporting existing Kremlin narratives aimed at undermining confidence in the grain corridor as well as attempting to justify the strike. Milbloggers explicitly called for further Russian strikes against Ukrainian grain infrastructure, civilian vessels at Ukrainian ports, and other targets that would further degrade Ukraine's economic potential. ISW recently assessed that Russian strikes against civilian vessels and other grain corridor infrastructure are almost certainly intended to undermine Western confidence in Ukraine's ability to enforce and defend the corridor, influence ongoing Western discussions about long-term support for Ukraine, and impede Ukraine's ability to survive economically during the war.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov arrived in the People's Republic of China (PRC) for an official visit on October 14, highlighting continued Russia-PRC defense cooperation against the backdrop of bilateral naval exercises in the Pacific Ocean.

• Russian forces struck civilian vessels docked at Ukrainian ports for the fourth time since October 5, part of an apparent Russian strike campaign targeting port areas to undermine Ukraine's grain corridor, spoil international support for Ukraine, and push Ukraine into premature negotiations.

• Russian sources claimed that Russian forces recaptured positions in Kursk Oblast.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained positions in central Toretsk.

• Russian forces recently conducted a reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Kurakhove direction and recently made confirmed advances northeast of Vuhledar.

• Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on October 11 that sources within the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" program, which places veterans of the war in Ukraine into government positions after returning to Russia, is meant to increase the popularity of contract military service and boost recruitment.

• Russian occupation officials continue to pathologize Ukrainian identity in an effort to indoctrinate children in occupied Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

The Kremlin is likely leveraging the recent June 2024 Russia-North Korea comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in part to offset Russian force generation and border security requirements—further cementing Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to avoiding mobilization for as long as possible. Ukrainian outlets Suspilne and Liga reported on October 15, citing anonymous military intelligence sources, that the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade is forming a 3,000-person “battalion” staffed by North Korean citizens (the numerical strength is far beyond a battalion’s). Ukrainian intelligence sources assessed that the “battalion” will likely be involved in ongoing Russian defensive operations in Kursk Oblast and reported that up to 18 North Korean soldiers have already deserted their positions in Bryansk and Kursk oblasts before the unit has been committed to combat operations. ISW cannot independently confirm the veracity of these reports, but Russian officials notably did not deny them on October 15. Putin submitted the text of the Russia-North Korea comprehensive strategic partnership agreement, which both countries signed in June 2024, to the Russian State Duma for ratification on October 14. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov emphasized in a comment to Kremlin newswire TASS that the Russia-North Korea agreement is "unambiguous" in its provision of "mutual defense and security cooperation." The Kremlin is likely using the "mutual defense" provision of the agreement to provide the legal justification for the deployment of North Korean soldiers to the combat zone in Russia in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. ISW has recently observed reports that a small contingent of North Korean personnel was operating near occupied Donetsk City.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is likely leveraging the recent June 2024 Russia-North Korea comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in part to offset Russian force generation and border security requirements—further cementing Russian President Vladimir Putin's commitment to avoiding mobilization for as long as possible.

• The Kremlin has elected to address the recent controversy regarding its reliance on conscripts to repel Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast by offering financial incentives to any personnel involved in defending the state border.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law allowing Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin to stay in his position despite reaching retirement age (again) demonstrating Putin's continued preference for keeping curated loyalists from his inner circle in positions of power.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

• A former Russian Storm-Z instructor and milblogger heavily criticized Russian forces' reliance on the partially-encrypted communications platform Discord following Russia's recent ban of the platform.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky presented Ukraine's five-part Victory Plan aimed at winning the war by the end of 2025 to the Verkhovna Rada on October 16, which includes a promise to contribute experienced Ukrainian troops to defending NATO's eastern flank following the resolution of the war in Ukraine. Zelensky stated that Ukraine's Victory Plan is intended to end the war "no later than" 2025 and is composed of five points, including: an immediate invitation to join NATO; continued Western support and aid including equipping Ukrainian brigades, supporting Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia and increasing intelligence sharing with Ukraine; Western and Ukrainian non-nuclear strategic deterrence against Russia; Western investment in Ukraine's strategic economic growth; and a promise that Ukrainian forces will "replace" certain Western military contingents currently stationed in Europe after the war's conclusion. Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces will use their experience in the war to strengthen NATO's defense and ensure security in Europe and noted that Ukrainian units could replace unspecified contingents of US forces in Europe in the future. Zelensky noted that there are several secret aspects of the plan that he has shared with Ukraine's Western allies. Zelensky stated that Ukraine's fate is connected to the fate of its neighbors in the Baltics, Balkans, Caucasus, and Central Asia and warned that Ukraine and the West must support Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity or risk future Russian aggression. Ukrainian and Western officials expressed support for Zelensky's plan on October 16, and Zelensky noted that he will present the plan to the European Council on October 17.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky presented Ukraine's five-part Victory Plan aimed at winning the war by the end of 2025 to the Verkhovna Rada on October 16, which includes a promise to contribute experienced Ukrainian troops to defending NATO's eastern flank following the resolution of the war in Ukraine.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin's current theory of victory in Ukraine seeks to protract the war and posits that Russian forces can outlast Western support for Ukraine and collapse Ukrainian resistance by winning a war of attrition. Russia will likely face serious medium- and long-term constraints that will undermine this strategic effort, however.

• Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin notably questioned the Kremlin's articulated theory of victory and assessed that 2025 and possibly late 2024 will be “a serious test” for Russia because the Kremlin has yet to address medium- to long-term force-generation and defense-industrial-capacity constraints.

• Girkin also assessed that Russian Summer–Fall 2024 offensive campaign did not accomplish its goals in the entire theater and is unlikely to do so ahead of the muddy season, although Russian forces are continuing intense offensive operations in several operational directions in Ukraine.

• US President Joe Biden announced a new military assistance package for Ukraine worth $425 million following a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on October 16.

• The South Korean Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on October 16 that it is "closely" monitoring indications that North Korean troops are directly supporting Russia's war effort in Ukraine amid reports that the Russian military is training North Korean soldiers.

• Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast, near Kreminna, near Siversk, and near Toretsk.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian sources reported on October 16 that unspecified actors killed the deputy commander of Russia's Special Operations Forces (SSO) Training Center, Nikita Klenkov, near Moscow City. Klenkov reportedly fought in the war in Ukraine as part of military unit 43292 and was a high-ranking officer of the Russian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GRU). Russian authorities claimed that Klenkov's murder was a planned contract killing and opened a criminal investigation into the murder but have yet to accuse Ukraine or other Western actors of being involved in the murder. ISW cannot independently verify these claims.

The European Union (EU) issued a statement on October 16 condemning Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and noted that at least 177 Ukrainian POWs have died in Russian captivity since February 2022. The EU called Russia's increasingly frequent executions of Ukrainian POWs a grave breach of the Geneva Convention, highlighting that the executions demonstrate Russia’s systemic disregard for international law. The Geneva Convention on POWs prohibits the inhumane treatment and execution of POWs or persons who are clearly rendered hors de combat. ISW has recently observed an increase in Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout the theater of war. Head of the Ukrainian Department for Combating Crimes in Conditions of Armed Conflict Yuri Bilousov stated on October 4 that Ukrainian sources documented evidence indicating that Russian forces have executed 93 Ukrainian POWs on the battlefield since the start of the full-scale invasion and that 80 percent of the recorded cases occurred in 2024.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian sources reported on October 16 that unspecified actors killed the deputy commander of Russia's Special Operations Forces (SSO) Training Center, Nikita Klenkov, near Moscow City.

• The European Union (EU) issued a statement on October 16 condemning Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and noted that at least 177 Ukrainian POWs have died in Russian captivity since February 2022.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

Institute for the Study of War

South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) reported that North Korea transferred roughly 1,500 North Korean special forces to eastern Russia, where they are reportedly training before deploying to participate in Russia's war against Ukraine. The NIS stated on October 18 that seven Russian Pacific Fleet ships transported roughly 1,500 North Korean special forces from Chongjin, Hamhung, and Musudan in North Korea to Vladivostok, Russia between October 8 and 13 and that North Korea will send a second batch of military personnel to Russia soon. The NIS stated that North Korean servicemembers are currently stationed in Vladivostok, Ussuriysk, Khabarovsk, and Blagoveshchensk in eastern Russia. The NIS stated that the Russian military has issued the North Korean personnel Russian uniforms, weapons, and fake identification cards claiming that the North Koreans are residents of the Sakha and Buryatia republics. The NIS posted satellite imagery showing a Russian transport ship near North Korea and an estimated 640 North Korean personnel gathered at Russian military facilities in Ussuryisk and Khabarovsk on October 16. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on October 18 that the NIS also stated that North Korea recently decided to send four brigades totaling 12,000 personnel to the war in Ukraine. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told The War Zone on October 17 that there are nearly 11,000 North Korean infantry troops training in eastern Russia and that they will be ready to fight in Ukraine by November 1. Budanov stated that the first cadre of 2,600 North Korean soldiers will deploy to Kursk Oblast but that it is unclear where the remaining troops will deploy. ISW cannot independently verify these statements but has no basis to question the veracity of these intelligence reports, which are consistent with previous reports from South Korean and Ukrainian officials about North Korean troops training in Russia before deploying to the war in Ukraine, including to Kursk Oblast. ISW has also observed recent reports that a limited number of North Korean military personnel, mainly engineering personnel, are likely operating near occupied Donetsk City.

A number of sources provided footage purporting to substantiate these intelligence reports. The footage appears consistent with reports of North Korean troop deployments to Russia but does not independently validate the intelligence reports. A Russian Telegram channel posted footage on October 18 purportedly showing North Korean soldiers marching at a Russian training ground, and the footage was later geolocated to Sergeevka, Primorsky Krai. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne, along with Vox Ukraine's fact-checking project VoxCheck, reported that they could neither confirm nor deny that the soldiers in the footage are North Korean as the speech in the video is hard to hear and there are no clear external signs to indicate that the soldiers are North Korean. The Ukrainian Center for Strategic Communications (Stratcom) posted additional footage on October 18 reportedly showing Russian forces outfitting North Korean troops with Russian uniforms and equipment at the Sergeevka training ground. ISW cannot independently verify the presence of North Korean troops in either of the videos and cannot verify the location of the second video.

Suspilne stated that the footage of North Korean troops marching was filmed at the base of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) in Sergeevka. ISW has observed reports that elements of the 127th Division's 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment were operating in Kursk Oblast as of late August 2024, while other elements of the division, including its 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment, have been operating in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area since at least June 2024. Both the 394th and 143rd motorized rifle regiments are based in Sergeevka. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is likely leveraging its June 2024 Russia-North Korea comprehensive strategic partnership agreement, which Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted for ratification on October 14, to in part offset Russian force generation and border security requirements – further cementing Putin's commitment to avoiding mobilization for as long as possible.

Key Takeaways:

• South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) reported that North Korea transferred roughly 1,500 North Korean special forces to eastern Russia, where they are reportedly training before deploying to participate in Russia's war against Ukraine.

• A number of sources provided footage purporting to substantiate these intelligence reports. The footage appears consistent with reports of North Korean troop deployments to Russia but does not independently validate the intelligence reports.

• Russian forces appear to be further intensifying mechanized activity in western Donetsk Oblast amid initial reports of the start of autumnal muddy ground conditions.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to signal his disinterest in meaningful peace negotiations with Ukraine while using the upcoming BRICS summit to legitimize Kremlin information operations falsely portraying Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate.

• Putin used ongoing conversations about security guarantees in Ukraine's Victory Plan to further boilerplate nuclear saber-ratting information operations that aim to discredit Ukraine to its Western partners and prevent Western aid to Ukraine.

• Western partners continue to announce new military assistance to Ukraine.

• The US Department of State (DoS) program Rewards for Justice offered a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the identification or location of foreigners involved in interfering in US elections, including members of prominent Kremlin-awarded milblogger channel Rybar.

• Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on October 18 that Ukraine has recorded more than 100 confirmed cases of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) amid a recent theater-wide increase in Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Kreminna, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian drones reportedly struck the "Kremniy El" microelectronic plant in Bryansk City on the night of October 18 to 19. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on October 19 that Ukrainian drones struck the plant and noted that "Kremniy El" is one of Russia's largest microelectronic manufacturers and that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is one of the company's main customers. Head of the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko acknowledged the report of the strike and stated that the plant manufactures microelectronics for Russian Pantsir air defense systems, Iskander missiles, radars, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and drones. Ukrainian outlet RBC Ukraine and Ukrainian open-source intelligence group CyberBoroshno published photos showing the aftermath of the strike and damage to a building at the plant. Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed on October 19 that debris from a downed Ukrainian drone struck and caused a fire at a "non-residential building" in Bryansk Oblast, possibly referring to the plant.

Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on October 18 - the fourth exchange since the start of Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast in August 2024. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on October 19 that Ukraine returned 95 POWs, including Ukrainian servicemembers who defended the Azovstal Steel Plant in Mariupol in early 2022, Ukrainian National Guardsmen, servicemembers of the Ukrainian State Border Service, and other Ukrainian military personnel. The Russian MoD claimed on October 18 that Russian authorities also returned 95 Russian POWs and that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchange. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs noted that many of the returned Ukrainian POWs had serious illnesses and severe injuries and experienced weight loss due to torture and malnutrition in Russian captivity. ISW previously observed that the frequency of POW exchanges between Ukraine and Russia has significantly increased since the start of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast on August 6, with both sides exchanging a total of 267 POWs each in three separate exchanges prior to the most recent October 18 POW exchange. Russia and Ukraine only conducted three POW exchanges between January 1 and August 6, 2024, in comparison. ISW continues to assess that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has likely increasingly incentivized Russia to engage in POW exchanges.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian drones reportedly struck the "Kremniy El" microelectronic plant in Bryansk City on the night of October 18 to 19.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted a one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on October 18 - the fourth exchange since the start of Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast in August 2024.

• Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office reported on October 18 that Ukrainian authorities opened an investigation into the execution of a Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW) in Bakhmut Raion in September 2024.

• Russian forces recently advanced within the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against the Lipetsk-2 Air Base near Lipetsk City and Russian state-owned defense enterprise Sverdlov in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast on the night of October 19 to 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that forces from Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and Special Operations Forces (SSO) struck the Lipetsk-2 Air Base and caused a fire and secondary explosions. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces targeted ammunition depots, fuel storage, and aircraft and noted that the Russian military bases Su-34 fighter-bomber, Su-35 fighter, and MiG-31 interceptor/fighter fixed-wing aircraft at the base. Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed that Russian forces intercepted drones over Lipetsk City and Oblast and that a crashed drone caused a fire in an unspecified area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that forces from Ukraine's SBU, GUR, and SSO also struck the Sverdlov Plant, causing secondary explosions. The Sverdlov plant produces chemicals for artillery ammunition and stores and produces glide bombs, and sources in Ukrainian intelligence told Western and Ukrainian news outlets that the plant is one of Russia's largest explosives factories. Geolocated footage published on October 20 shows an explosion near the Sverdlov Plant. The US imposed sanctions on the Sverdlov Plant in July 2023 for its support of Russia's war effort in Ukraine. Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike on the Dzerzhinsk industrial zone and that several plant employees received minor injuries.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against the Lipetsk-2 Air Base near Lipetsk City and Russian state-owned defense enterprise Sverdlov in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast on the night of October 19 to 20.

• Moldovan authorities have yet to announce the results of the October 20 presidential election and European Union (EU) referendum, but both the election and referendum have passed the required voter turnout threshold to be valid.

• Russian sources claimed on October 20 that former Russian Yukos Oil Company Vice President for Corporate Management Mikhail Rogachev was found dead in a possible suicide after falling from a window in Moscow.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Sudzha and Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Toretsk and Selydove.

Institute for the Study of War

Moldova's October 20 European Union (EU) referendum passed by an extremely narrow margin in large part due to support from the Moldovan diaspora, and current Moldovan President Maia Sandu will face Alexandr Stoianoglo in a second round of voting on November 3. Several Moldovan and European officials reported potential Russian interference in the election, and the Kremlin and its affiliates in Moldova will likely continue their malign influence efforts in the leadup to the November 3 runoff. The Moldovan Central Election Commission (CEC) completed the vote count on October 21 and reported that 50.46 percent (751,235) voted in favor of the EU referendum and that 49.54 percent (737,639) voted against — a difference of only 13,596 votes. The CEC reported that Sandu took first place in the presidential election with 42.45 percent (656,354) and Stoianoglo took second with 25.98 percent (401,726). Sandu failed to gain the majority vote required to win in the first round, and she and Stoianoglo will move to the second round. Moldovan authorities counted votes from polling stations abroad last, during which the number of votes in favor of the referendum and Sandu greatly increased. Sandu stated early on October 21 while Moldovan authorities were still counting votes that "criminal groups" and "foreign forces" — likely referring to Russia and Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politician Ilan Shor — used tens of millions of euros to spread propaganda to destabilize Moldova. Sandu stated that Moldovan authorities have evidence that the criminal groups wanted to buy 300,000 Moldovan votes and that the scale of fraud was "unprecedented." The European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations' (ENEMO) International Election Observation Mission reported on October 21 that it found "massive malign foreign interference attempts" ahead of the October 20 election despite Moldovan authorities' efforts to counter misinformation and vote buying schemes. The BBC reported that it witnessed at least one instance of vote buying at a polling station in the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic of Transnistria after a voter exited the poll and asked where she would receive her promised payment. Moldovan authorities previously reported that Shor used a Russian state bank to distribute at least $15 million to Shor-affiliated regional leaders and voters in Moldova in September 2024 alone.

Kremlin officials and Russian milbloggers claimed that Moldovan authorities falsified the results of the election and referendum and continued to promote long-standing Kremlin narratives targeting Moldova's path towards European integration. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that Moldovan authorities used "totalitarian" methods during the election campaign and that the number of votes supporting the referendum "inexplicably" began to increase during the later stages of counting. Zakharova claimed that the West is trying to turn Moldova into a "Russophobic NATO appendage deprived of sovereignty." Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused Moldovan authorities of persecuting opposition forces and claimed that Russian authorities are monitoring the allegedly questionable increase in the number of votes for Sandu and in support of the referendum. Several Russian milbloggers, including Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers, claimed that Moldovan authorities falsified the election results and adjusted the referendum's voter turnout numbers. One milblogger called for Russian authorities to create a network of "analytical and information centers" that will study how to influence processes in Moldova and promote Russia's state interests in Russia.

Key Takeaways:

• Moldova's October 20 European Union (EU) referendum passed by an extremely narrow margin in large part due to support from the Moldovan diaspora, and current Moldovan President Maia Sandu will face Alexandr Stoianoglo in a second round of voting on November 3. Several Moldovan and European officials reported potential Russian interference in the election, and the Kremlin and its affiliates in Moldova will likely continue their malign influence efforts in the leadup to the November 3 runoff.

• Kremlin officials and Russian milbloggers claimed that Moldovan authorities falsified the results of the election and referendum and continued to promote long-standing Kremlin narratives targeting Moldova's path towards European integration.

• US Secretary of Defense Llyod Austin travelled to Kyiv on October 21 and announced a new $400 million military aid package for Ukraine.

• Russia appears to be scrambling to reduce tensions with South Korea following credible reports of intensified North Korean cooperation with Russia, including South Korean and Ukrainian intelligence warnings that a contingent of North Korean troops has deployed for training to Russia.

• Russian forces continue to systematically perpetrate war crimes, including the continued executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and use of chemical weapons.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the western part of the Kursk Oblast salient.

• Russian forces advanced west of Kreminna, southeast of Pokrovsk, and southeast of Kurakhove.

• Russian forces recently conducted several mechanized attacks of various echelons in the Kurakhove direction.

• Russian occupation authorities continue to coerce occupied Ukrainian populations into signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes on the night of October 21 to 22 targeting distilleries in Russia that reportedly manufacture products for the Russian military. Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged distilleries in Yefremov and Luzhlovsky. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that the Ukrainian drone strike also damaged local Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Federal Security Service (FSB) buildings near the distillery in Yefremov. Russian opposition and insider sources posted footage showing a fire near the Yefremov distillery, synthetic rubber plant (just northwest of the distillery), and thermal power plant (just northeast of the distillery). Tambov Oblast Governor Maksim Egorov claimed that a drone struck the Biokhim enterprise in Rasskozovo, starting a fire. Biokhim produces ethyl alcohol, and its website claims that it manufactures products that are of "strategic importance to the state." Voronezh Oblast Governor Aleksander Gusev claimed that Russian forces "suppressed" a drone that then fell on an unspecified industrial enterprise in Voronezh Oblast, damaging a workshop. Head of the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Andriy Kovalenko stated that Russia uses alcohol factories to manufacture fuel for military needs and explosives.

South Korea may be considering directly sending weapons and intelligence personnel to Ukraine in response to the reported deployment of North Korean troops to Russia to participate in Russia's war in Ukraine. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on October 22 that a South Korean government source stated that South Korea is considering sending South Korean military personnel, likely from intelligence units, to Ukraine to monitor North Korean forces' tactics and combat capabilities and to question captured North Koreans. The source also reportedly stated that South Korea will prioritize giving Ukraine defensive weapons over lethal aid but, if South Korea were to provide lethal weapons, Seoul will first try to find a way to provide them indirectly to Ukraine. South Korean National Security Director Chang Ho-jin stated on June 20 following the initial creation of the Russian-North Korean strategic partnership agreement on June 19 that the agreement had encouraged South Korea to change its long-standing policy prohibiting the transfer of arms to Ukraine, and Yonhap News Agency reported on June 21 that South Korea was considering sending 155mm artillery shells and unspecified air defense systems to Ukraine. South Korea's continued consideration of sending lethal aid to Ukraine comes against the backdrop of threats from Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 20, when Putin stated that Seoul would be making "a very big mistake" if it decided to supply arms to Ukraine.

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told The War Zone on October 22 that the first North Korean military personnel are expected to arrive in Kursk Oblast on October 23 but that it is unclear how large the force grouping will be or how they will be equipped. Newsweek reported that a South Korean government official stated that North Korea sent fighter pilots to Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai in September 2024, possibly to train on Russian combat aircraft that Russia has allegedly supplied to North Korea, or to supplement Russia's pilot shortages.

Thirty-six world leaders, including from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India, South Africa, and Iran, arrived in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, for the 16th annual BRICS summit held from October 22 to 24 during which Russia will likely seek to establish mechanisms to enhance its war effort in Ukraine. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, the Taliban’s Minister of Trade and Industry Nooruddin Azizi, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and other world leaders also arrived in Kazan on October 22. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with PRC President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS summit during which both leaders emphasized the importance of multifaceted Russia-PRC relations while Xi highlighted BRICS as a format for global strategic cooperation. Putin also met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa with whom he discussed bilateral ties, the creation of a multipolar world order, and the use of national currencies in mutual trade settlements. Modi reiterated the need to find "the earliest possible" peaceful solution to the war in Ukraine and reaffirmed India’s role as a potential mediator.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes on the night of October 21 to 22 targeting distilleries in Russia that reportedly manufacture products for the Russian military.

• South Korea may be considering directly sending weapons and intelligence personnel to Ukraine in response to the reported deployment of North Korean troops to Russia to participate in Russia's war in Ukraine.

• Thirty-six world leaders, including from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India, South Africa, and Iran, arrived in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, for the 16th annual BRICS summit held from October 22 to 24 during which Russia will likely seek to establish mechanisms to enhance its war effort in Ukraine.

• A recent Russian opinion poll suggests that Russian President Vladimir Putin enjoys widespread support among Russian citizens even though many do not agree with some of the Kremlin's policies, including about the war.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kurakhove and Vuhledar.

• Russian forces conducted multilateral military exercises with international partners. Iran hosted Russian and Omani naval forces as part of the "IMEX 2024" naval drills, which took place between October 19-20 in the Indian Ocean.

Institute for the Study of War

The adoption of the Kazan Declaration on the second day of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on October 23 demonstrated that Russia has not yet secured the international support nor created the alternative security structure that the Kremlin desires. The Kazan Declaration notably only mentioned Russia's war in Ukraine once. The declaration states that all signatories should act in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter — including the provision on respect for territorial integrity — and that BRICS states welcome "relevant" offers of mediation aimed at ensuring a peaceful settlement of the war through dialogue and diplomacy. Ukraine has emphasized that the "principles of the UN Charter" is a main avenue through which Ukraine can achieve peace and highlighted the illegality of Russia's war under international law. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) responded to the Kazan Declaration, stating that it shows that Russia failed to "export" its views on changing the world order and global security architecture to BRICS summit participant states. The Ukrainian MFA stated that the declaration also demonstrates that BRICS states are not unified around Russia's war against Ukraine, likely since many of these countries support the UN Charter's principles. Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service similarly assessed that the BRICS summit will not result in the international community's approval of an alternative system of international settlements that Russia wants and stated that India, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Brazil, and South Africa opposed the transformation of BRICS into an anti-US coalition.

People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping reiterated the PRC’s longstanding position calling for de-escalation in Russia’s war in Ukraine and discouraged the involvement of third parties in the war amid reports of Russia preparing to deploy North Korean troops to Ukraine. Xi emphasized the need to promote “a rapid de-escalation" of Russia’s war in Ukraine and avoid “adding fuel to the fire” during the 16th annual BRICS summit in Kazan on October 23. Xi also stated that BRICS members must prevent the spreading of the war to “third parties” and avoid the escalation of hostilities. Xi stated that the PRC, Brazil and countries of the Global South created a group of “Friends of Peace,” which aims to unite voices in support of a peaceful resolution of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Xi had previously called for de-escalation of the war and attempted to position the PRC as an impartial third-party mediator for a negotiated peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine. Russia has been increasingly leveraging partnerships with North Korea and Iran, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has accused Russia of directly involving North Korea in the war amid reports of North Korean combat forces training in Russia for possible participation in the war.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated Iran’s intentions to increase ties with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23. NOTE: This text also appears in ISW-CTP's October 23 Iran Update. Pezeshkian met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss Russo-Iranian economic and strategic relations on the sidelines of the summit. Pezeshkian stated that the two officials will finalize and sign memorandums soon, suggesting that both states will sign the new comprehensive strategic partnership agreement. Putin authorized the signing of the deal on September 18. It is in Iran’s interests to have a formalized agreement with Russia. Iran presumably will seek greater international support as Israel’s ground and air offensives on the Gaza Strip and Lebanon have disrupted some elements of Iran’s proxy network. This disruption is particularly notable given that Hezbollah’s capabilities — which now appear degraded by Israeli action at a minimum — have long served as Iran’s principal deterrence against Israeli attack. Russia has discouraged Israeli attack on nuclear facilities, demonstrating the advantages of strong Iranian relations with Russia. The Pezeshkian administration’s policy continues former President Ebrahim Raisi’s "neighborhood policy.” This policy is centered on building relations with regional and extra-regional states, thus demonstrating the administration’s efforts to mitigate the impact of international sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy. The Iranian regime calculates that mitigating the impact of sanctions increases domestic stability and regime credibility. Russo-Iranian cooperation has accelerated since the start of Russia’s offensive campaign in Ukraine due to Iran’s military support in the war.

Key Takeaways:

• The adoption of the Kazan Declaration on the second day of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on October 23 demonstrated that Russia has not yet secured the international support nor created the alternative security structure that the Kremlin desires.

• People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping reiterated the PRC’s longstanding position calling for de-escalation in Russia’s war in Ukraine and discouraged the involvement of third parties in the war amid reports of Russia preparing to deploy North Korean troops to Ukraine.

• Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated Iran’s intentions to increase ties with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23.

• Russian forces have made significant tactical advances into and around Selydove in recent days, but the Russian military command's apparent focus on securing Selydove has come at the expense of Russian forces' ability to sustain a meaningful offensive drive directly on Pokrovsk — Russia's self-defined operational objective on this sector of the front.

• The Pentagon and White House confirmed the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia.

• Russia and Belarus announced plans to conduct the “Zapad-2025” command staff exercise on an unspecified date in 2025 against the backdrop of deepening Russian-Belarusian security integration within the Union State framework.

• Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.

• The Russian military is reportedly coercing Russian conscripts into contract service in the Russian military by issuing enlistment bonuses to conscripts who never signed military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin failed to deny the presence of North Korean military personnel in Russia on October 24, amid official Ukrainian reports that the first North Korean military units arrived in Kursk Oblast on October 23. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on October 24 that the first units of North Korean personnel arrived in Kursk Oblast on October 23. The GUR reported that the North Korean personnel trained at the Baranovsky military training ground in Ussuriysk, Primorsky Krai; the Donguz military training ground in Ulan-Ude, Republic of Buryatia; the Yekaterinoslavsky military training ground in Yekaterinslavka, Amur Oblast; the 248th military training ground in Knyazye-Volkonskoye, Khabarovsk Krai; and the 249th military training ground in Primorsky Krai. The GUR reported that the Russian military spent several weeks coordinating with the North Korean military units. The GUR reported that North Korea has transferred roughly 12,000 North Korean personnel, including 500 officers and three generals, to Russia and that Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov is responsible for overseeing the training and adaptation of the North Korean military personnel. The GUR noted that the Russian military is providing ammunition and other personal kit to the North Korean personnel. Russian President Vladimir Putin responded to a question at a press conference after the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, regarding recently released South Korean intelligence satellite imagery reportedly showing North Korean troops in Russia. Putin wryly responded that "photos are a serious thing" and "reflect something." Putin reiterated the mutual defense article in the Russian-North Korean strategic partnership agreement with North Korea, announced in June 2024 and officially ratified by the Russian State Duma on October 24, 2024.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko strongly hinted that Belarusian forces will not fight in Ukraine and appeared to question Russian President Vladimir Putin's likely efforts to introduce North Korean forces into Russia's war against Ukraine in the process. Lukashenko answered a question from the BBC on October 23 about reports of North Korean troops going to fight alongside Russian forces in Ukraine, claiming that these reports are "rubbish," that Russian President Vladimir Putin would "never try to persuade" another state to involve its army in Russia's war in Ukraine, and that the deployment of armed forces from any state – including from Belarus – to the frontline in Ukraine would be a "step towards the escalation" of the war. Lukashenko claimed that if "we" (Belarussians) got involved in the war, this would be the "path to escalation" and that NATO would deploy forces to Ukraine in response to another country's involvement. Lukashenko continued to deny that Belarus was involved in the Russia's launch of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in part from Belarussian territory. Lukashenko also gave an interview on October 23 to Russian state-run TV channel Rossiya 1 in which he claimed that he did not think that the Russian leadership or military needs North Korean troops as there are enough Russian forces on the front and Russia has significant mobilization resources. Lukashenko claimed that Moscow understands that the deployment of North Korean forces to the war would be "undesirable for Russia" and that the West will respond by sending NATO troops to Ukraine. Kremlin newswire TASS notably did not report on Lukashenko's statements about how the use of North Korean forces in Russia's war against Ukraine is not in Russia's interests and only reported on his claims that NATO would deploy troops to Ukraine in response to the participation of North Korean forces in the war.

The Kremlin is reportedly attempting to portray the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan as evidence of widespread international support for Russia – especially to domestic audiences in Russia. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on October 24 that it reviewed the Russian Presidential Administration's manual to Russian state media and propagandists with guidelines about how to frame the ongoing BRICS summit in Kazan. The manual reportedly highlighted three themes: Russian President Vladimir Putin is the "informal lead of the world majority," Western elites are "panicking," and "anxiety" is prevalent in the West generally. The Kremlin reportedly told media outlets to report that the BRICS summit "has the world's attention" and proves that "attempts to isolate" Russia after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine have "failed." Meduza reported that media outlets are supposed to highlight how Putin establishes "strategic ties that are not limited to one direction" in contrast to the West's alleged "fleeting alliances" (NATO celebrated its 75th anniversary this year). Russian state media and propagandists recently published articles highlighting many of these themes, sometimes even word for word as reportedly written in the manual." Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on October 24 that pro-Russian bots on Russian social media site VKontakte (VK) have left over 10,000 comments in two days about the BRICS summit – reportedly one of the largest Kremlin bot efforts recently. The bots were promoting the idea that Russia is not internationally isolated, that BRICS' influence is growing, that anti-Russian sanctions are decreasing in importance, and that Russian forces are achieving successes in Ukraine. A Russian insider source claimed on October 24 that unspecified Kremlin-linked sources stated that BRICS states largely do not support Russia's position on its war in Ukraine, forcing the Kremlin to push this topic into the background in order to achieve some kind of "serious international association." The insider source claimed that multiple meetings during the summit discussed the People's Republic of China's (PRC) and Brazil's peace proposals – which favor Russia – but that these discussions "ultimately led to nothing." ISW assessed on October 23 that the adoption of the Kazan Declaration on the second day of the BRICS summit demonstrated that Russia has not yet secured the international support nor created the alternative security structure that the Kremlin desires.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin failed to deny the presence of North Korean military personnel in Russia on October 24, amid official Ukrainian reports that the first North Korean military units arrived in Kursk Oblast on October 23.

• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko strongly hinted that Belarusian forces will not fight in Ukraine and appeared to question Russian President Vladimir Putin's likely efforts to introduce North Korean forces into Russia's war against Ukraine in the process.

• The Kremlin is reportedly attempting to portray the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan as evidence of widespread international support for Russia – especially to domestic audiences in Russia.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to project Russian confidence in the Russian military's ability to repel the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast at a press conference after the BRICS summit on October 24.

• Ukrainian authorities are investigating another execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) by Russian forces in the Pokrovsk direction against the backdrop of Russian forces' increasingly frequent POW executions across the theater.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna and Siversk.

• The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), Ministry of Defense (MoD), and Rosgvardia reportedly each have their own Akhmat units that perform different functions in different sectors of the front and rear.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia will imminently deploy North Korean forces to unspecified combat zones on October 27 and 28, as Russian and North Korean officials continued to issue vague yet suggestive statements regarding the possible presence of North Korean troops in Russia. Zelensky stressed that Russia's involvement of North Korean forces in combat is an escalatory step and urged the international community to apply pressure on Moscow and Pyongyang. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans confirmed on October 25 that Dutch intelligence assesses that Russia is deploying at least 1,500 North Korean forces likely to Kursk Oblast. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published an intercepted audio recording on October 25 in which elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Southern Military District ) operating in Kursk Oblast reportedly expressed concerns about the ability of North Korean troops to adjust to Russian command culture and language upon their deployment to the region. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian air assault brigade operating in the Kursk direction stated that Ukrainian forces have not yet observed North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast and emphasized that North Korean forces do not have experience fighting in large-scale, technologically-driven wars. Head of Ukraine’s Center for Military Legal Research Oleksandr Mysyenko stated on October 25 that Russia’s efforts to directly involve North Korean forces in the war are ultimately indicative of Russia's inability to recruit sufficient personnel amid systematic yet likely unsuccessful attempts to recruit volunteers domestically.

North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Jong Gyu failed to deny reports of North Korean troop deployments to Russia but claimed that such deployments would be in line with principles of international law. Russian President Vladimir Putin once again failed to deny the presence of the North Korean troops in Russia during an interview with Russian state TV channel Rossiya 1 on October 25 following the conclusion of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan and stated that it is Russia’s sovereign decision to activate the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and North Korea signed on June 18, 2024. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov similarly claimed that the provision of military assistance under the treaty is a signal of deterrence and that military assistance will be activated only in the event of “aggression” against any of the parties to the treaty. The participation of North Korean troops in combat operations in Kursk Oblast or frontline areas in Ukraine would make North Korea an active combatant and belligerent in Russia's war in Ukraine. The Kremlin may be setting information operations to accuse Ukraine of being the aggressor in Russia's invasion of Ukraine to justify its use of North Korean forces as combatants in its war.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signaled that Western “Ukraine fatigue” is encouraging Russia to continue its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and pursue its theory of victory predicated on Russia outlasting Western support for Ukraine. Putin responded to a question during an interview with Russian state TV channel Rossiya 1 on October 25 following the conclusion of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on whether exhausted Ukrainian troops, Western war fatigue, or Russian military’s power is contributing to the success of Russian theater-wide offensive operations. Putin responded by stating that Russia should continue to double down on its war effort in Ukraine and not pay attention to discussions of the enemy's fatigue. Putin added that the West is “beginning to realistically assess the situation around Ukraine” and “change its rhetoric” about the need for Russia’s “strategic defeat,” and that Russia can “only praise” the West for this rhetorical shift away from complete Russian defeat in Ukraine. Putin later stated in the interview that any outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine must be in Russia’s favor and be based on the "realities on the battlefield," indicating that Russia remains committed to its original goal of forcing the Ukrainian government to capitulate and destroying Ukraine’s statehood and military and that Western hesitance in support for Ukraine only encourages Russia's commitment to this goal. ISW continues to assess that Putin’s theory of victory rests on a critical assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine to Russian victory, either of its own accord or in response to Russian efforts to persuade the West to do so, and that it is far from clear that the West will do so.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia will imminently deploy North Korean forces to unspecified combat zones on October 27 and 28, as Russian and North Korean officials continued to issue vague yet suggestive statements regarding the possible presence of North Korean troops in Russia.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin signaled that Western “Ukraine fatigue” is encouraging Russia to continue its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and pursue its theory of victory predicated on Russia outlasting Western support for Ukraine.

• Putin also continued to exaggerate Russian progress in Kursk Oblast, likely in an attempt to reassure domestic audiences of the Russian military's ability to suppress Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Sparta” Battalion Commander and Plenipotentiary Representative in the Urals Lieutenant Colonel Artyom Zhoga to the Russian Security Council, likely in an ongoing effort to establish younger, pro-war figures within the Kremlin.

• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia does not seek to “influence” elections of other countries "unlike the West" amid continued evidence to the contrary.

• Russian authorities swiftly responded to xenophobic riots in Korkino, Chelyabinsk Oblast on October 25, a marked change from Russian authorities' slow and disorganized response to the October 2023 antisemitic riots in the Republic of Dagestan.

• German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced on October 24 that it recently delivered 20 additional Marder infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine and noted that Germany financed the delivery of the vehicles.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Borki and regained lost territory near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.

• Russian forces advanced near Siversk, Pokrovsk, and regained territory near Obukhovka.

• The Kremlin is continuing to forge new state-affiliated veteran societies and organizations likely in an ongoing effort to replace veteran organizations that have been critical of Russia’s conduct of war in Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

Bloomberg reported on October 25, citing South Korean intelligence documents, that a second group of North Korean soldiers will soon deploy to Russia. Bloomberg reported that it viewed South Korean intelligence documents from an unspecified date that assessed that the first group of 1,500 North Korean "elite special forces" had arrived in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai between October 8 and 13 and that this first group was part of a planned deployment of roughly 10,000 North Korean soldiers in total. Bloomberg also reported that the documents assessed that North Korea has sent roughly 8 million rounds of 122mm and 152mm shells to Russia since August 2023, roughly 100 KN-23 Hwasong-11 ballistic missiles, and an unspecified number of Bulsae-4 anti-tank weapons. Bloomberg, citing two people familiar with the matter, stated that South Korean officials will share South Korea's assessments about North Korean-Russian cooperation with NATO officials at an October 28 NATO meeting. The New York Times (NYT), citing one unnamed Ukrainian official and two unnamed US officials, reported on October 25 that "several thousand" North Korean soldiers arrived at Kursk Oblast to participate in an upcoming Russian counteroffensive operation to push Ukrainian forces from their salient in Kursk Oblast. The officials stated that North Korean forces have not engaged in combat operations yet and that the North Korean forces' task in Kursk oblast is unclear. The officials noted that a significant contingent of North Korean forces would help the Russian military to avoid pulling additional forces from eastern Ukraine to participate in counteroffensive operations in Kursk Oblast. A senior Ukrainian official told the NYT that a maximum number of 5,000 elite North Korean troops had likely arrived in Russia by October 21. The participation of North Korean troops in combat operations in Kursk Oblast or frontline areas in Ukraine would make North Korea an active combatant and belligerent in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced preparations to open additional defense industrial plants in Ukraine. Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger announced on October 26 that Rheinmetall already opened one plant in Ukraine that serves as a maintenance and production facility for infantry fighting vehicles and main battle tanks and is on track to build a powder factory and a munitions manufacturing plant in Ukraine. Papperger added that Rheinmetall expects to begin the production of the Lynx infantry fighting vehicles at the recently operational plant in Ukraine by the end of 2024. Rheinmetall also reportedly plans to open a joint production facility for air defense systems in Ukraine. Rheinmetall announced in March 2024 that it plans to open at least four weapons manufacturing plants in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Bloomberg reported on October 25, citing South Korean intelligence documents, that a second group of North Korean soldiers will soon deploy to Russia.
• German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced preparations to open additional defense industrial plants in Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast and near Pokrovsk and Vuhledar.
• Russian military command is reportedly continuing to commit military specialists to assault operations and incurring unnecessary losses, likely in an effort to centralize control over Russian forces and maintain the tempo of Russian offensive operations throughout the theater.

Institute for the Study of War

Was sagt die Wagenknecht….
die Russen kriegen von den Iranern Drohnen, Raketen, usw, die Chinesen liefern die Elektronik und alles mögliche an Ausrüstung, die Nordkoreaner Soldaten, dies alles ohne Fragen und sogenannte rote Linien.
Und die Ukrainer betteln seit Monaten, dass sie Raketen auf militärische Ziele in Russland richten dürfen, von denen sie täglich mit Bomben und Drohnen attackiert werden.
Israel? verstehe das muss man differenziert betrachten
Die Ukrainer können einem echt leid tun.

>die Russen kriegen von den Iranern Drohnen, Raketen, usw, die
>Chinesen liefern die Elektronik und alles mögliche an
>Ausrüstung, die Nordkoreaner Soldaten, dies alles ohne Fragen
>und sogenannte rote Linien.


Ja, aber wenn beide Seiten massiv aufrüsten kommt es auch nicht zum Frieden. Wie ich schon vor einiger Zeit gesagt habe, du kannst gegen solche Mächte(Russland, China etc.) auf Dauer, ohne wirklicher Ausrüstung und Armee, keinen Krieg führen. Oder wie US-Senatoren drauf bestehen "bis zum letzten Mann".

Russia's economy and war effort is coming under increasing strain, which will pose increasingly acute challenges to Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to sustain the war over the long term. The Washington Post reported on October 27 that the Russian economy is "in danger of overheating," noting that Russia's excessively high military spending has fueled economic growth in a way that has forced Russian companies to artificially raise their salaries in order to fulfill labor demands by remaining competitive with Russia’s high military salaries. The Washington Post quoted Russian Central Bank Head Elvira Nabiullina, who warned in July 2024 that Russia's labor force and production capacity are "almost exhausted." The Washington Post noted that private Russian companies are struggling to keep up with Russian military salaries and are increasingly having to offer wages several times higher than the typical industry averages. ISW has recently reported that Russian regional authorities are significantly increasing the one-time signing bonuses for Russian contract servicemembers in order to sustain Russia’s rate of force generation (roughly 30,000 troops per month), which underscores the fact that Russia does not have an indefinite pool of manpower and must financially and socially reckon with the ever-growing costs of replenishing its frontline losses via various force-generation avenues. The Washington Post also noted that Russia's stringent migration policies, particularly after the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack, have further depleted Russia's labor pool and amplified economic frictions. This has particularly become the case as migrant workers are increasingly identifying Russia as a hostile and unattractive place to relocate for work. ISW has reported at length on the balance that Putin is trying to strike between catering to his pro-war ultranationalist constituency, which espouses extreme anti-migrant sentiments, and his practical need to leverage migrant labor both economically and militarily.

Putin very likely assesses that calling another partial mobilization wave, or introducing general mobilization, will be too costly to his regime, and has therefore resorted to crypto-mobilization efforts that appear to be placing greater and greater strains on the Russian wartime economy. The recent appearance of North Korean troops in Russia, and their reported deployment to the combat zone in Kursk Oblast, further suggests that Putin's entire force-generation system is very tenuous. The costs of fueling the war will increase as Russia continues to burn through manpower and materiel on the frontline. Russian resources are finite, and Putin cannot reckon with these costs indefinitely. Russia's economy will reach a burnout point. That burnout point will inflict great costs on Russian society, which may force Putin to make major decisions about how to resource Russia’s war or change Russia’s mode of warfighting to preserve his regime’s stability.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia's economy and war effort is coming under increasing strain, which will pose increasingly acute challenges to Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to sustain the war over the long term.

• Ukrainian and Russian forces both advanced within the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.

• Russian forces advanced in and near Selydove and northwest of Vuhledar.

• Russian authorities are using Cossack organizations to militarize Russian children and build out Russia's force generation reserve in the long term.

Institute for the Study of War

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced that South Korean intelligence officials shared evidence with NATO officials on October 28 that North Korean units are operating in Kursk Oblast. Rutte stated that senior representatives from South Korea's National Intelligence Service and Ministry of National Defense and other Western allies shared intelligence assessments during a meeting on the morning of October 28 about North Korea's growing involvement in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Rutte stated that the deployment of North Korean forces represented a significant escalation in North Korea's involvement in Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a breach of United National Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, and a “dangerous expansion” of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Rutte, on behalf of NATO, called for Russia and North Korea to immediately cease these actions and stated that he will meet with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov later on October 28. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on October 27 that Russian forces are transferring North Korean military personnel along the E38 Kursk-Voronezh highway in vehicles with civilian license plates. Ukraine's Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated on October 28 that Ukrainian forces have not engaged North Korean forces in combat or taken North Korean forces as prisoners of war (POWs), although Ukrainian intelligence has information indicating that North Korean forces have been transferred to Kursk Oblast. ISW previously noted that the involvement of North Korean troops in combat operations in Kursk Oblast or frontline areas in Ukraine would make North Korea an active combatant and belligerent in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces conducted another series of drone strikes against Russian distilleries on the night of October 27 to 28, reportedly to reduce Russian aviation capabilities. Voronezh Oblast Governor Aleksander Gusev claimed that falling drone debris damaged two unspecified industrial enterprises in Anninsky and Novokhopersky raions. Geolocated footage shows a fire in Krasnoye, Novokhopersky Raion. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian drones struck the Ethanol Spirit distillery in Krasnoye. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Andriy Kovalenko posted footage of a drone strike against a distillery in Krasnoye and noted that Russian distilleries produce rocket fuel and fuel for aviation brake systems, technical needs, and anti-icing agents. Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian strikes against Russian distilleries are meant to reduce Russian aviation capabilities. Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes on the night of October 21 to 22 targeting distilleries in Tula Oblast.

Key Takeaways:

• NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced that South Korean intelligence officials shared evidence with NATO officials on October 28 that North Korean units are operating in Kursk Oblast.

• Ukrainian forces conducted another series of drone strikes against Russian distilleries on the night of October 27 to 28, reportedly to reduce Russian aviation capabilities.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin briefly acknowledged Russia's labor shortages on October 28, but highlighted Russia's low unemployment rates in an attempt to reframe this challenge in a beneficial light and claim that the Russian economy is able to sustain a long war in Ukraine.

• The Moldovan Constitutional Court stated it that it will review the results of the October 20 European Union (EU) referendum on October 31, and the third runner up in the first round of the presidential election announced that he would not endorse a candidate in the runoff.

• Georgian civil society, opposition, and international election observers continue to reject the results of the 2024 Georgian parliament elections amid a large-scale demonstration in Tbilisi on October 28.

• Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Kupyansk, southeast of Pokrovsk, and southwest of Donetsk City.

Institute for the Study of War

The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has increased in recent weeks but remains slow and consistent with positional warfare rather than with rapid mechanized maneuver—emphasizing how generally stagnant Russian advances have been after over two and half years of war. Recent Western reporting linking the Russian rate of advance in September 2024 with Russian advances at the start of the war is highly misleading. ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced at an average rate of 1,265 square kilometers per day in March 2022—roughly 90 times the roughly 14 square kilometers that ISW calculates that Russian forces have taken per day in September 2024. Rapid Russian advances deep into Ukrainian territory, including the temporary seizure of large portions of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts characterized the first month of the Russian full-scale invasion, whereas more recent Russian advances have been characterized by small-scale, localized, tactical advances. Russian forces have been making gains in eastern Ukraine recently, but comparing those gains to the initial deep Russian penetration into Ukraine at the start of the war misleadingly frames these most recent advances. For example, Russian forces seized the settlement of Vuhledar as of October 1, 2024, have continued to advance north and northwest of Vuhledar, and have made significant tactical gains in and near Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk) over the course of the past week. These respective advances are tactically significant but do not represent a general increase in the pace of Russian advances across the frontline, much of which remains relatively stagnant, nor are they within two orders of magnitude of the rate of Russian advance in the first stage of the war. The current rate of Russian advances is consistent, rather, with ISW's recent assessment that the Russian command has likely ordered Russian forces to significantly increase their tempo of mechanized attacks throughout the theater before the full onset of muddy ground conditions in the fall months.

Russian officials and milbloggers are conducting information operations that falsely portray the Georgian opposition's peaceful and legal challenges to the conduct of the October 26 parliamentary election results as a Western- and Ukrainian-sponsored illegal coup d'état. Russian state media claimed on October 29 that the West is supporting the transfer of Ukraine-trained snipers to Georgia in order to organize false flag provocations and trigger a pro-Western coup akin to the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity that started in 2013, which Russian actors have often labeled a Western-instigated illegal coup. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev called on October 28 for the arrest of Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili, falsely claiming that she “called for a coup.” Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova baselessly suggested that the West ordered the opposition protests, which they claim are trying to destabilize Georgia. Russian milbloggers also widely claimed that the West and Ukraine are sponsoring a revolution via the Georgian opposition and Zourabicvhili and that Georgian opposition reports of Russian interference in the Georgian elections are false, Western-backed talking points.

The Russian information space continues to closely echo the rhetoric of the ruling Georgian Dream party. Georgian Prime Minister Kobakhidze rejected the claims of election irregularities on October 28, and Georgian Dream member of parliament and Vice-Speaker of Parliament Nino Tsilosani claimed on October 29 that the opposition is attempting to organize a coup. ISW previously assessed that Georgian Dream’s rhetoric has increasingly echoed that of the Kremlin, particularly the Kremlin's narratives that aim to justify Russia's violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of post-Soviet countries that seek greater Western integration, including Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:
• The rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has increased in recent weeks but remains slow and consistent with positional warfare rather than with rapid mechanized maneuver—emphasizing how generally stagnant Russian advances have been after over two and half years of war.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to use an annual Russian nuclear deterrence exercise to further boilerplate nuclear saber-rattling information operations that aim to influence Western decision making.
• Recent Russian polling suggests that Russian domestic support for local government entities has somewhat declined over the past year, most likely in response to increased crypto-mobilization force generation efforts at the regional level.
• Russian officials and milbloggers are conducting information operations that falsely portray the Georgian opposition's peaceful and legal challenges to the conduct of the October 26 parliamentary election results as a Western- and Ukrainian-sponsored illegal coup d'état.
• The Georgian protests have been peaceful and legal - far from the Russian claims of an illegal coup.
• These concerted Russian efforts to baselessly discredit the Georgian pro-Western opposition and civil society are part of a common Kremlin tactic aimed at framing the valid and legal concerns of pro-Western political entities in the post-Soviet space as illegitimate and violent.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Toretsk, and Russian forces made advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and southwest of Donetsk City.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) continues to rely on Russia's prison population to replace depleted Russian units on the frontline.

Institute for the Study of War

Western intelligence officials reportedly stated that North Korean troops are in an unspecified area in occupied Ukraine. CNN, citing two unspecified Western intelligence officials, reported on October 30 that a small number of North Korean personnel are in occupied Ukraine but did not specify their location — the first such confirmation from Western sources. The intelligence officials stated that they expect the number of North Korean personnel in Ukraine to grow as they complete training in Russia. Ukrainian and South Korean officials reported in early October 2024 the presence of a limited number of North Korean personnel in occupied Donetsk City, mainly engineering personnel, who were likely repairing or somehow improving the quality of a large amount of low-quality ammunition that North Korea provided to the Russian military. The reports from Western intelligence officials could refer to the same group of North Korean personnel or similar specialists conducting engineering work in occupied Ukraine. Financial Times reported on October 30 that senior unspecified Ukrainian intelligence officials have stated that Russian authorities transferred about 3,000 North Korean personnel to western Kursk Oblast from other areas in Russia in civilian vehicles and that the group consisted of a few hundred special forces servicemembers and regular troops. North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui visited Russia on October 29 but did not specify the purpose of the visit. AP, citing South Korean intelligence, reported on October 29 that Choe might have visited Russia to discuss the deployment of additional North Korean troops to Russia. Russian Foreign ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that the arrival of the North Korean foreign minister was pre-planned, in line with Russia–North Korea cooperation.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted enhanced Ukraine–South Korea cooperation amid since-retracted reports that South Korea would consider providing direct military assistance to Ukraine. Zelensky reported on October 29 that he had discussed enhanced intelligence cooperation with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol in order to develop an action plan and propose a set of countermeasures in response to Russian and North Korean escalation of the war. Zelensky announced that the two countries will soon exchange delegations to coordinate their actions and that they will involve common partners in their proposed intelligence cooperation. South Korean news outlet The Dong-A Ilbo reported on October 30 that the South Korean government was considering providing 155mm artillery shells directly to Ukraine, but the South Korean presidential office denied these reports, stating that Ukrainian officials have not requested such assistance.

Key Takeaways:

• Western intelligence officials reportedly stated that North Korean troops are in an unspecified area in occupied Ukraine.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted enhanced Ukraine-South Korea cooperation amid since-retracted reports that South Korea would consider providing direct military assistance to Ukraine.

• The Kremlin is reportedly struggling to prepare for the September 2026 Russian State Duma elections campaign due to uncertainty about the course of the war in the Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin is not confident that Russia will be able to win the war over the next two years.

• The Kremlin simultaneously continues to militarize various levels of Russian government, likely in preparation for long-term war efforts in Ukraine and confrontation against NATO despite the reported lack of preparation for the Duma elections.

• The US Treasury and State departments sanctioned nearly 400 entities and individuals from over a dozen countries on October 30 in one of the largest concerted efforts to address Russian sanctions evasions via third parties to date.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained positions near Pokrovsk.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kreminna, Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

• Russian occupation authorities continue to advertise Russian military service to civilians in occupied Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

North Korea and Russia signed an agreement on October 30 to cooperate in the sphere of digital communications — the latest development in Russian-North Korean cooperation likely aimed at enhancing the Kremlin's digital authoritarianism tools to increase domestic repressions. The North Korean Ministry of Information Technology and the Russian Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media signed a cooperation agreement on October 30 that includes cooperation in the fields of communications, information technology, and digital development. Russia and North Korea signed an agreement on joint work between the Russian and North Korean prosecutor generals' offices in July 2024, after which Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov stated that Russia wanted to learn about North Korean judicial practice, particularly in the spheres of communication and information technology. ISW previously assessed that the North Korean-Russian judicial agreement was likely part of Kremlin efforts to increase Russia's arsenal of domestic control methods and consolidate control over the Russian information space, including via messaging platforms and virtual private network (VPN) services. The details of the October 30 digital communications agreement are unclear, but it is likely similarly aimed at increasing Russia's tools for domestic information space repression.

The South Korean government reportedly intends to send an unspecified number of South Korean personnel to Ukraine to monitor North Korean troops. South Korean newspaper Hankyoreh reported on October 31 that a senior South Korean presidential office official stated on October 30 that South Korea has a "legitimate need" to analyze North Korean military activities in the war in Ukraine and "feels the need" to establish a team to monitor North Korean troops and the battlefield situation. South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun reportedly stated on October 31 that the South Korean defense minister can make the decision about the monitoring team's deployment without parliamentary approval. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on October 22 that a South Korean government source stated that South Korea was considering sending South Korean military personnel, likely from intelligence units, to Ukraine to monitor North Korean forces' tactics and combat capabilities and to question captured North Koreans. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 29 that he discussed enhanced intelligence cooperation with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol.

Key Takeaways:

• North Korea and Russia signed an agreement on October 30 to cooperate in the sphere of digital communications — the latest development in Russian-North Korean cooperation likely aimed at enhancing the Kremlin's digital authoritarianism tools to increase domestic repressions.

• The South Korean government reportedly intends to send an unspecified number of South Korean personnel to Ukraine to monitor North Korean troops.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to communicate that he is uninterested in a negotiated ceasefire and is committed to achieving his goal of destroying Ukrainian statehood.

• Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide military aid to Ukraine and ensure future aid provisions over the long-term.

• The Russian military command continues to commit seriously wounded personnel to highly attritional infantry-led “meat” assaults in the Kurakhove direction as Russian President Vladimir Putin attempts to posture himself as deeply concerned with the medical treatment of Russian veterans.

• The Moldovan Constitutional Court confirmed on October 31 the passing of the October 20 European Union (EU) referendum with a 50.72 percent turnout rate.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Svatove, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar, and Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kurakhove.

Institute for the Study of War

North Korea Joins Russia's War Against Ukraine: Operational and Strategic Implications in Ukraine and Northeast Asia

North Korea has deployed a contingent of troops to Russia in support of Russia's war in Ukraine —the latest development in intensified cooperation between the two countries since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The Kremlin is likely to leverage North Korean manpower to support its ongoing offensive efforts and offset requirements of Russia's domestic force generation capacity. The impacts of the deployment of North Korean troops into the Ukrainian theater of operations extend far beyond the battlefield in Ukraine, however. Pyongyang likely hopes that North Korean military personnel will gain combat experience in the conditions of contemporary war — experience that it may hope to apply to future conflicts it may fight. The alignment between North Korea and Russia poses the distinct possibility of threatening the long-term stability of the Korean Peninsula and the broader Asia-Pacific region.

Key takeaways:

• The implications of a long-term alignment between Russia and North Korea extend far beyond the battlefield in Ukraine and may have long-term impacts on the stability of the Korean Peninsula and Asia-Pacific region.

• The war in Ukraine will change the character of all future wars, and Pyongyang has evidently identified this fact as a vital learning opportunity for its forces. North Korea's military has not experienced large-scale conventional combat since 1953 and understands that its doctrine is unprepared to fight in a modern war, especially against a sophisticated adversary such as South Korea.

• North Korea likely hopes that its forces will have the opportunity to refine offensive doctrine, test their weapons systems against a Western-provisioned adversary, gain command and control experience, and learn how to operate drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems on the modern battlefield. Pyongyang likely hopes that any skills its troops learn in the Ukraine war will give it an offensive edge in future conflicts, including on the Korean Peninsula.

• The actual ability of North Korean forces to absorb, disseminate, and institutionalize lessons learned on the battlefield is entirely contingent on how the Russian command uses North Korean manpower. If Russia uses North Korean personnel as "cannon fodder," the casualties that North Korean troops are sure to accrue will undermine whatever battlefield lessons Pyongyang hopes to learn.

• North Korea may be using its increasing alignment with Russia to reduce its reliance on the People's Republic of China (PRC), therefore reducing Beijing’s leverage over the North Korean regime. A reduction of PRC leverage over North Korea will likely reduce the stability of the Korean Peninsula and endanger the broader Asia-Pacific region, because the PRC uses its leverage to restrain North Korea’s aggression.

• North Korea’s recent partnership agreement and strengthening relations with Russia may help it advance the development of its nuclear weapons program, even if Russian aid does not take the form of direct technical assistance to the program.

• Pyongyang may be trying to secure Russian defense commitments in the case of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula as part of the larger quid pro quo for committing such a large contingent of North Korean troops to an entirely foreign conflict. The 2024 Russia-North Korea mutual defense agreement may allow Russia to avoid committing troops to an inter-Korean war, however.

• North Korea’s defense agreement with Russia increases the credibility and effectiveness of its threats and coercion toward South Korea.


Institute for the Study of War

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukrai ne-operational-and-strategic-implications

Patriarch Kirill, head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP), highlighted ongoing social and ideological divides within Russian society while reiterating boilerplate justifications for the war in Ukraine during a speech on October 31. Kirill offered his assessment of the main external and internal threats to the Russian state during a meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the World Russian People's Council, which include ethno-religious conflict, migration, and Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Kirill noted that while the war in Ukraine is the "most pressing threat" to the Russian state, some people within Russian society "prefer to ignore" what is happening on the frontline in Ukraine and the struggles of people who live in Russian border areas closer to the combat zone. Kirill criticized Russians who are unwilling to "give up their personal comforts" and who are relying on "frivolous entertainment" to distract them from the reality of the war.

Kirill's rebuke of Russians who are apathetic and disinterested in the war suggests that the Kremlin may be increasingly concerned about the sustainability of Russian society's support for the war. Recent Russian opinion polls have suggested that support for local Russian government entities and some Kremlin policies, including the invasion of Ukraine, may be wavering, although Russian citizens continue to widely support Russian President Vladimir Putin. Additional polling has suggested that most Russians, particularly Russians who have not personally lost family members in Ukraine, are largely apathetic to the invasion and are able to avoid thinking about the invasion entirely as long as it does not personally affect them. The Kremlin may be concerned about the growing cleavage between Russian citizens who have been immediately impacted by the invasion and Russians who have successfully insulated themselves and their families from the invasion. The Kremlin may also be concerned about apathy towards the invasion in the context of the possible societal reaction to conducting a second wave of mobilization, to which most Russians remain averse. Kirill has previously acted as a key figure in injecting Kremlin narratives into the Russian information space, and the Kremlin may be in the early stages of justifying and preparing Russian society to support a future wave of mobilization.

Kirill also highlighted the growing trend of brutality and cruelty in the Russian military and attempted to excuse this trend as the emergence of a “neo-pagan” cult. Kirill stated on October 31 that neo-pagan preachers are trying to revive paganism and instill a "cult of brute force and cruelty” in Russia. Kirill added that neo-pagans are introducing a false belief that Christianity discourages personal heroism and valor and that "holy" Russian servicemen disprove this belief with their conduct, but he then noted that "neo-paganism" is present in the Russian army. Kirill concluded the segment by criticizing Halloween celebrations in Russia, and Kirill likely used the occasion to introduce a discussion about Russian servicemen committing brutal and cruel acts on the frontlines or upon their return to Russia from the frontlines.

ISW has observed numerous instances of Russian military personnel, especially former Wagner Group fighters, committing gruesome acts against fellow Russian servicemen on the frontlines, Ukrainian forces and civilians, and Russian citizens upon their return from the frontlines. Russia is likely to see a significant rise of brutality and cruelty in its communities upon the arrival of more traumatized Russian servicemen home as long as it continues to brutalize its soldiers; refuses to provide the necessary psychological assistance to returning veterans; and militarizes its society, educational institutions, and government.

Russian authorities also continue to identify conflict between ethnic Russians and minority groups as a critical issue. Kirill identified "issues with migrants" and ethno-religious tensions as key internal threats to the Russian state during his October 31 speech, and Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev noted on October 31 that Russia needs to address its migration issues. Medvedev suggested that Russia should introduce "digital migrant profile," which would reportedly allow Russian authorities to stop foreigners at any time and identify foreigners via electronic immigration or travel documents. ISW has reported at length on the balance that Putin is trying to strike between catering to his pro-war ultranationalist constituency, which espouses extreme anti-migrant sentiments, and his practical need to leverage migrant labor both economically and militarily.

Key Takeaways:

• Patriarch Kirill, head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP), highlighted ongoing social and ideological divides within Russian society while reiterating boilerplate justifications for the war in Ukraine during a speech on October 31.

• Kirill also highlighted the growing trend of brutality and cruelty in the Russian military and attempted to excuse this trend as the emergence of a “neo-pagan” cult.

• Russian authorities also continue to identify conflict between ethnic Russians and minority groups as a critical issue.

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with his North Korean counterpart Choe Son-hui in Moscow on November 1, securing strong affirmations of North Korea's support for Russia amid updated Western reports on the number of North Korean troops deployed to Russia.

• North Korean troops are unlikely to present Russia with a long-term solution to its manpower concerns, despite Choe's comments about Pyongyang's indefinite commitment to Russia's war effort.

• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new tranche of military assistance valued at $425 million to Ukraine on November 1.

• Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor failed to enforce its plan to deanonymize Russian social media accounts by its stated November 1 deadline.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Sudzha.

• Both Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced within central Vovchansk. Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Kupyansk and northwest of Kreminna.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) introduced a new system on November 1 allowing Russian veterans and their families to confirm their veteran statuses digitally.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces have reportedly struck seven Russian radars and air defense systems since the night of October 20 to 21. A Russian Telegram user, who claims to be an employee of an unspecified branch of the Russian special services, claimed on November 2 that Ukrainian forces conducted an ATACMS strike against a Russian S-300/400 air defense system near occupied Mospyne (just southeast of Donetsk City) and that their sources are still clarifying the damage to the system. The Telegram user claimed that Ukrainian forces targeted the air defense systems with six ATACMS missiles and that Russian forces downed three of the missiles. The Telegram user claimed on October 31 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian "Podlet" radar station near occupied Cape Tarkhankut, Crimea with a drone on October 23 and that Russian forces have not evacuated the damaged station for repairs yet. A Ukrainian division posted footage on October 31 purportedly showing a successful Ukrainian strike against a Russian Buk air defense system in an unspecified frontline area, and the footage showed secondary detonations consistent with a successful strike against such a system. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 25 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system and destroyed the radar system of another Buk-M2 air defense system in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of October 24 to 25. Official Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Buk-M2 system in southern Ukraine on October 23 and a Buk-M3 air defense system on the night of October 20 to 21 in an unspecified frontline area. ISW has previously observed indications that Russia has struggled to source the microelectronic components necessary to produce complex weapons and air defense systems due to Western sanctions, and Russia may not be able to produce or repair a sufficient number of air defense systems to maintain the current density of Russia's air defense coverage over occupied Ukraine if Ukraine destroys a significant number of Russian systems. Further degradation of Russia's air defense umbrella, particularly over occupied Ukraine, may impact how close to the frontline Russian pilots are willing to operate and could limit Russia's ability to effectively use glide bombs against both frontline areas and rear Ukrainian cities.

South Korea signaled possible readiness to increase support for Ukraine amid continued Ukrainian intelligence on the deployment of North Korean forces near the Russian border with Ukraine. South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul stated on November 1 that "all possible scenarios are under consideration" in response to a question about possibly sending weapons to Ukraine following the deployment of North Korean troops in Russia. Cho emphasized that South Korea will monitor North Korean troop involvement in Russia and the "benefits" that North Korea receives from Russia to determine a course of action. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 2 that Russian forces transferred 7,000 additional North Korean personnel to unspecified areas near the border with Ukraine in the last week (since about October 26). The GUR reported that Russian forces have armed North Korean soldiers with 60mm mortars, AK-12 assault rifles, RPK/PKM machine guns, SVD/SVCh sniper rifles, Phoenix anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers and have equipped North Korean forces with some night vision devices, thermal imagers, and other optical equipment.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces have reportedly struck seven Russian radars and air defense systems since the night of October 20 to 21.

• South Korea signaled possible readiness to increase support for Ukraine amid continued Ukrainian intelligence on the deployment of North Korean forces near the Russian border with Ukraine.

• Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor implemented its plan to deanonymize Russian social media accounts on November 2.

• Ukrainian and Russian forces marginally advanced north of Sudzha, Kursk Oblast.

• Russian forces marginally advanced north of Kurakhove in Donetsk Oblast.

• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed to have rescinded an order for his Akhmat Spetsnaz soldiers to not take Ukrainian servicemembers as prisoners in the war in Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

Incumbent Moldova President Maia Sandu has claimed victory in the Moldovan presidential runoff election held on November 3, 2024. Preliminary results reported by the Moldovan Central Election Commission (CEC) show that Maia Sandu has won around 55 percent of the vote, defeating Kremlin-friendly presidential candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo. The Moldovan CEC reported on November 3 that over 54 percent of the Moldovan electorate voted in the presidential runoff elections compared to the approximately 51 percent voter turnout during the first election round held on October 20, 2024. The reported voter turnout for the runoff election is also over the minimum legal turnout requirement of 20 percent. ISW will cover the final result of the runoff Moldovan presidential elections on November 4 after the Moldovan CEC finishes counting all votes, including votes from the Moldovan diaspora voters whose votes take longer to count due to time zone differences.

Moldovan authorities reported extensive Russian interference and sabotage efforts during the runoff presidential elections held on November 3, 2024, in a likely effort to favor pro-Kremlin Stoianoglo. Sandu’s National Security Advisor Stanislav Secrieru warned on November 3 of significant Russian interference in the runoff election, noting the organization of voter transport in Transnistria (which is illegal under Moldovan law); the organization of buses and charter flights from Russia to polling stations in Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Belarus; the distribution of vouchers to Moldovan voters in Moscow; and cyberattacks against the Moldova CEC's voter education site. Moldovan Independent Press Agency IPN reported on November 2 that Russian authorities preemptively transported 150 Moldovan citizens from Russia to Moldova via Turkey for free in a concerted effort to maximize the voter base of Kremlin-friendly Stoianoglo. Moldovan authorities also notified numerous Western countries about Russian efforts to disrupt Moldovan diaspora voting abroad by creating false bomb threats at polling stations. The Moldovan diaspora notably largely favored Sandu in the first round of the presidential elections. Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean stated that Moldovans throughout the country had received anonymous “death threats” through phone calls, likely as part of a scare tactic to sway election results. ISW previously reported on large-scale Russian intervention efforts in the first round of the 2024 Moldovan presidential elections in order to enhance the outcome in favor of Stoianoglo and against Moldova’s European Union (EU) referendum vote, which ultimately passed by a small margin. Sandu stated on October 21 that "criminal groups" and "foreign forces" — likely referring to Russia and Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politician Ilan Shor — used tens of millions of euros to spread propaganda to destabilize Moldova. Sandu also stated that Moldovan authorities had evidence that the criminal groups wanted to buy 300,000 Moldovan votes during the first round of presidential elections and that the scale of fraud was "unprecedented.”

Key Takeaways:

• Incumbent Moldova President Maia Sandu has claimed victory in the Moldovan presidential runoff election held on November 3, 2024.

• Moldovan authorities reported extensive Russian interference and sabotage efforts during the runoff presidential elections held on November 3, 2024, in a likely effort to favor pro-Kremlin Stoianoglo.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) efforts to centralize control over informal Russian drone operation units may degrade the effectiveness of Russian drone capabilities.

• Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets refuted a Russian information operation about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges aimed at destabilizing Ukrainian society and undermining Ukrainians' trust in their government.

• Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets refuted a Russian information operation about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges aimed at destabilizing Ukrainian society and undermining Ukrainians' trust in their government.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar in Donetsk Oblast.

• A Ukrainian official reported that Russian naval infantry units cannot be considered “elite” due to a lack of specialized training for new recruits and because Ukrainian forces have destroyed the main core of the Russian professional army since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian and pro-Kremlin actors launched an information operation on November 4 to discredit incumbent Moldovan President Maia Sandu’s victory in the Moldovan presidential elections. The Moldovan Central Election Commission (CEC) confirmed on November 4 that Sandu won 55.35 percent of the vote, defeating Kremlin-friendly opponent Alexandr Stoianoglo. Numerous world leaders congratulated Sandu on November 3 and 4, and international election observers largely commended the conduct of the elections in spite of Russian attempts to sway the outcomes against Sandu. Pro-Russian opposition parties and officials attempted to discredit Sandu’s victory, with the Moldovan Socialist party calling her “an illegitimate president”; Kremlin-affiliated Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor telling Russian state TV channel Rossiya-24 that the Moldovan opposition has 'evidence' of mass falsifications in favor of Sandu; and pro-Kremlin former Moldovan president Igor Dodon telling Kremlin newswire TASS that Sandu only won because of the Moldovan diaspora vote. The Russian information space, including Russian milbloggers, echoed the words of the pro-Russian Moldovan opposition claiming that Moldovan elections were controlled by 'European bureaucrats' and that Moldovans had no agency in determining the outcome of the elections. ISW previously reported on Russia’s systematic efforts to interfere in the Moldovan election in order to derail the passage of Moldova’s European Union (EU) referendum and Sandu’s victory.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian and pro-Kremlin actors launched an information operation on November 4 to discredit incumbent Moldovan President Maia Sandu’s victory in the Moldovan presidential elections.

• Georgian civil society and opposition resumed peaceful demonstrations on November 4 against the highly contested October 26 Georgian parliamentary elections, calling for continued resistance and further investigations into large-scale voting irregularities.

• Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's (RFE/RL) Sistema project released an investigation on November 4 detailing Russia's initial 2022 demands for Ukraine's total capitulation, further supporting ISW's long-standing assessment that Russia has never been willing to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine on any terms but its own.

• Russian drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in Summer 2024 reportedly significantly impacted Ukrainian electrical generation capacity compared to March 2024, though it is unclear whether Russia had been able to inflict significant further damage on the Ukrainian energy grid since.

• The Kremlin-awarded founder and director of the prominent Rybar Telegram channel and social media project attempted to falsely portray himself as a non-Kremlin actor in the Western media and confirmed the Kremlin’s efforts to establish “media schools” abroad.

• Russian authorities arrested Rosgvardia's Deputy Head of Logistics Major General Mirza Mirzaev for bribery on November 3.

• Russian forces advanced near Novy Put, Kursk Oblast.

• Ukrainian forces advanced in Kharkiv Oblast and Russian forces advanced in the Kupyansk, Kreminna, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues attempts to form a cadre of loyal military journalists in an effort to control the pro-war Russian information space and centralize control over Russia’s war coverage.

Institute for the Study of War

The first North Korean forces have likely officially engaged in combat against Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated in an interview with South Korean national broadcaster KBS on November 5 that Ukrainian forces engaged in "small-scale" clashes with North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast but emphasized that it will take more time for the entire contingent of North Korean forces to deploy to Kursk Oblast and enter combat. A source in Ukraine's special services also told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the first combat clashes between Ukrainian and North Korean forces have occurred but stated that these are not "large connections" between Ukrainian and North Korean forces. Umerov noted that it would be difficult for Ukrainian forces to quickly ascertain North Korean casualty counts from the initial fighting because North Korean soldiers have been "mixed in" with the Russian army and are "disguised" as soldiers from the Republic of Buryatia, which notably suggests that the Russian military is trying to integrate North Korean combat power into the Russian force structure, as opposed to maintaining separate North Korean units fighting under Russian command. North Korean force structure under Russia’s command remains unclear, however. Umerov forecasted that more North Korean personnel will finish deploying within a few weeks once they complete training in the Russian Far East. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky estimated on November 4 that there are already 11,000 North Korean personnel in Kursk Oblast, although the majority of this number is likely not yet on the frontline. ISW continues to assess that Russia will likely leverage North Korean manpower to first and foremost repel the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, and that in return North Korean troops hope to gain combat and military-technical experience in the conditions for a contemporary and technologically driven war.

Key Takeaways:

• The first North Korean forces have likely officially engaged in combat against Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast.

• The Kremlin appointed the first-ever "Time of Heroes" program participant to a federal-level position, furthering its ongoing effort to staff government positions with pro-war veterans and set long-term conditions for the militarization of Russian government bodies from local to federal levels.

• Russia launched two Iranian-made satellites into orbit on November 5 via a Russian space-launch vehicle, furthering a trend of Russian-Iranian bilateral space cooperation.

• Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk, northwest of Kreminna, in Chasiv Yar, near Toretsk, southeast of Pokrovsk, northeast of Kurakhove, near Vuhledar, and north of Robotyne.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions south of Chasiv Yar.

• The Russian military is struggling to maintain a sufficient number of quality personnel within traditionally elite forces.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to shape US President-elect Donald Trump's foreign policy and achieve another Russia–US reset on Russia's terms. Putin addressed the 21st annual meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club on November 7 and advocated for a reset of US–Russia relations. Putin implied that that Trump’s presidential campaign expressed a "desire to restore relations with Russia, to help end the Ukrainian crisis" and later noted that Russia is open to the "possibility of restoring relations with the United States." Putin attempted to blame the United States for undermining US–Russia relations, noting that the United States imposed sanctions and restrictions on Russia, and chose to support Kyiv — without mentioning that these measures were in response to Russia’s illegal and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin's statement implies that Russia would only accept any reset in US–Russia relations if the US dropped sanctions and restrictions against Russia and stopped supporting Ukraine — effectively entirely on terms that benefit Russia at the expense of US interests. Putin reiterated the boilerplate narrative that NATO is a "blatant anachronism," accused the West of maintaining a bloc-oriented mentality, and deliberately misrepresented his invasion of Ukraine as NATO's efforts to remain relevant. Putin attempted to frame BRICS as a non-bloc alternative to NATO and falsely implied that Russia is not interested in becoming a hegemon, despite the fact that the Kremlin has been forming a new anti-Western bloc composed of Iran, North Korea, and China.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to shape US President-elect Donald Trump's foreign policy and achieve another Russia–US reset on Russia's terms.

• A recent failed Russian assault northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka prompted outrage from some Russian ultranationalist milbloggers over Russian command failures and the pervasive Russian military culture of exaggerating battlefield successes.

• A Russian brigade commander and a sniper platoon commander were reported killed in combat recently in the Kurakhove and Chasiv Yar directions.

• Ukrainian authorities continue to report systematic Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), noting a clear increase in such executions in 2024.

• Ukrainian strikes on Russia and Western sanctions are reportedly disrupting Russia's energy industry.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

• Russian authorities are reportedly creating "fake" non-combat volunteer battalions in occupied Ukraine and merging them with existing Cossack organizations led by occupation administrations.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be assuming that US President-elect Donald Trump will defer to the Kremlin's interests and preferences without the Kremlin offering any concessions or benefits in return. Putin stated during his November 7 Valdai Club address that he is open to discussions meant to "restore" US-Russia relations but that the United States must initiate these negotiations, and implied that Russia will only consider a reset in US-Russia relations if the United States drops sanctions against Russia and ceases supporting Ukraine – terms that exclusively benefit Russia and offer no benefit to the United States. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov noted on November 8 that Putin's statement about negotiating with the United States does not mean that Russia's military goals in Ukraine have changed and that instead, Russia's goals remain the same. Putin may be attempting to posture himself as reaching out to Trump, but Putin is signaling to his domestic audiences that the Kremlin is unwilling to concede any aspect of its maximalist objectives in Ukraine or the wider global arena.

Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that the Kremlin issued a manual to state and pro-Kremlin media with instructions to cover Putin's Valdai statements by highlighting the special role Russia plays in bringing about a proposed "new world order" and portraying Putin as the "world's greatest leader" whose deep thinking, "breadth of political thought," and role as the "voice of the global majority and new world order" distinguish him from Western political leaders, presumably including Trump. Meduza noted that, by contrast, the manual does not mention reporting Putin's statements about Trump or possible future negotiations with the United States about the war in Ukraine, even though Putin largely aimed his Valdai statements at shaping Trump's foreign policy and achieving another reset in US-Russian relations on Russia's terms.

Putin's proposed "new world order" emphasizes an interconnected international system without great powers or security blocs, but the Kremlin's actions contradict and undermine his proposed ideals and principles. Putin presented a six-point plan for his "new world order," which includes: an openness among states to interact with each other; the absence of universal dogmas; an accounting for all countries' perspectives when making global decisions; the rejection of security blocs that unite groups of states; "justice for all," including eradicating xenophobia and intolerance; and the "sovereign equality" of all states. Putin's proposal ignores the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to increase its power and influence in neighboring countries, including destabilization efforts in Moldova and Georgia; courting a group of anti-Western states such as North Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Iran; and conducting its illegal and unprovoked war of aggression in Ukraine. The Kremlin likely aims to use this rhetoric to distract from and provide plausible deniability against the very real Russian efforts to undermine pro-Western governments and exert its influence internationally, as well as promote the expansion of BRICS and the so-called "new Eurasian security architecture" that the Kremlin has created to oppose NATO.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be assuming that US President-elect Donald Trump will defer to the Kremlin's interests and preferences without the Kremlin offering any concessions or benefits in return.

• Putin's proposed "new world order" emphasizes an interconnected international system without great powers or security blocs, but the Kremlin's actions contradict and undermine his proposed ideals and principles.

• Putin also acknowledged that Russia is dealing with a serious labor shortage and is largely reliant on migrants to address it.

• Putin doubled down on an existing information operation falsely claiming that Ukraine violated its neutral status in an attempt to justify Russia's illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

• Putin notably attempted to downplay Russia's burgeoning relationship with North Korea during his November 7 Valdai Club statements, likely in an effort to maintain some semblance of a relationship with South Korea and discourage South Korean support for Ukraine.

• The Kremlin continues to build its relationship with Venezuela as a means of consolidating and expanding its influence in the Western hemisphere.

• The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 8 that Ukrainian forces recorded 323 cases of Russian forces using ammunition equipped with chemical agents banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in October 2024 alone.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Novoivanovka, Kursk Oblast.

• Russian forces recently advanced south of Chasiv Yar, southeast of Kurakhove, and north of Vuhledar.

• Regional Russian authorities continued to promote the expansion of newly established regional territorial defense formations by highlighting efforts to recruit women.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian naval base in Kaspiysk, Republic of Dagestan for the first time on November 6 damaging several missile ships of the Russia Caspian Sea Flotilla. Ukrainian media outlets, citing Ukraine’s military intelligence, reported that the Ukrainian drones struck a naval base in damaging the Tatarstan and Dagestan Gepard-class frigates (Project 11661) and possibly damaging several nearby Buyan-class corvettes (Project 21631). Republic of Dagestan Head Sergei Melikov claimed on November 6 that Russian forces downed a Ukrainian drone over Kaspiysk without specifying the consequences. Satellite imagery collected on November 6 indicates the presence of three likely Russian Buyan-class vessels, two likely Buyan-M-class vessels, one likely Tarantul-class vessel, one likely Gepard-class vessel, and one likely Karakurt-class vessel present on the day of the strike in the port of Kaspiysk, although the images are insufficient for identifying damage to ships or naval piers. Geolocated footage published on November 6 shows drones striking near port infrastructure in Kaspiysk.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian naval base in Kaspiysk, Republic of Dagestan for the first time on November 6 damaging several missile ships of the Russia Caspian Sea Flotilla.

• Ukrainian authorities reported that Russian forces executed at least 109 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) since the start of the full-scale invasion amid new reports of Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs.

• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk, Svatove, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions.

• A prominent Russian brigade commander and official indicated that Russian commanders and civilian leadership explicitly view Russian military volunteers as expendable resources, consistent with high casualty rates across the frontline.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces reportedly lost almost 200 tanks, over 650 armored vehicles, and suffered an estimated 80,000 casualties in taking roughly 1,500 square kilometers during a period of intensified Russian offensive operations in September and October 2024. United Kingdom (UK) Defense Secretary John Healey told UK outlet The Telegraph on November 9 that UK defense intelligence estimates that Russian casualties "reached a new high" in October 2024 and that Russian forces suffered an average daily casualty rate of 1,345 troops per day or about 41,980 casualties in October 2024. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD), citing data from the Ukrainian General Staff, previously reported that Russian forces suffered a record-high average daily casualty rate of 1,271 troops per day or about 38,130 casualties in September 2024. Russian forces have thus suffered an estimated 80,110 casualties over the last two months – roughly 20,000 more casualties than US forces suffered during almost 20 years of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Data compiled by Oryx founder Jakub Janovsky indicates that Russian forces also lost 197 tanks, 661 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 65 artillery systems larger than 100mm throughout the frontline in September and October 2024. Russian forces seized and recaptured a total of 1,517 square kilometers--an area less than a third the size of Delaware--throughout Ukraine and Kursk Oblast over the last two months in exchange for these losses. Russian forces have intensified offensive operations near Kupyansk in Kharkiv Oblast and Selydove, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar in Donetsk Oblast over the last two months and have managed to advance at a marginally faster rate than Russian forces have advanced over the last two years. Russian forces recently seized Vuhledar and Selydove but have yet to make operationally significant advances, and Russian forces have made most of their advances during this time through open fields and small settlements.

Russian forces will eventually make operationally significant gains if Ukrainian forces do not stop ongoing Russian offensive operations, but the Russian military cannot sustain such loss rates indefinitely, especially not for such limited gains. ISW previously observed data indicating that Russian forces have lost at least five divisions' worth of armored vehicles and tanks in Pokrovsk Raion alone since October 2023. Russian forces have likely accumulated a large amount of equipment in priority frontline areas, but dwindling Soviet-era tank and armored vehicle stockpiles and current armored vehicle production rates will likely make such losses prohibitive over the longer term. US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated on October 31 that Russian forces are suffering roughly 1,200 casualties per day or about 36,000 casualties per month, and ISW has recently observed indications that the Russian military has been struggling to recruit enough soldiers to replace its frontline losses. Russian President Vladimir Putin notably acknowledged Russia's ongoing labor shortages and dependence on migrants to meet these labor shortages during his September 7 Valdai Club address, and ISW noted that Russia also depends on coercing migrants to join the Russian military to meet its manpower requirements. The Russian military almost certainly cannot indefinitely sustain a daily casualty rate of over 1,200 people so long as Putin remains committed to avoiding another involuntary call-up of reservists. Even an involuntary reserve mobilization will not resolve the larger problem Putin apparently faces in finding enough people to work in Russia's industries while also feeding the front.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces reportedly lost almost 200 tanks, over 650 armored vehicles, and suffered an estimated 80,000 casualties in taking roughly 1,500 square kilometers during a period of intensified Russian offensive operations in September and October 2024.

• Russian forces will eventually make operationally significant gains if Ukrainian forces do not stop ongoing Russian offensive operations, but the Russian military cannot sustain such loss rates indefinitely, especially not for such limited gains.

• Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes on the Aleksin Chemical Plant in Tula Oblast on the night of November 8 to 9.

• Russian authorities are reportedly considering merging Russia's three largest oil companies -- Rosneft, Gazprom Neft, and Lukoil, likely to help Russia reach more advantageous energy deals with non-Western states.

• Russian authorities arrested a former Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) construction official for fraud on November 9.

• The US Department of Defense (DOD) reportedly stated on November 8 that it will send a "small number" of US defense contractors to rear areas of Ukraine to repair US-provided weapons and equipment.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained positions near Siversk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

• Ukraine's Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha stated on November 9 that Ukrainian intelligence assesses that Russia will be able to produce 30 percent more artillery shells than all European Union (EU) countries combined in 2025 should the EU fail to implement additional measures, such as sanctions, against Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces struck Russian ammunition warehouses in Bryansk Oblast during a large-scale Ukrainian drone strike against Russia on the night of November 9 and 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that drone operators of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces and Ukrainian Armed Forces struck Russian ammunition warehouses at the Russian military's 1060th Logistics Center (formerly Russia's 120th Main Missile and Artillery Management Arsenal) in Bryansk Oblast, causing initial explosions and secondary detonations at the facility. Geolocated imagery published on November 9 and 10 shows two large fires burning near the facility. Russian authorities claimed that Russian forces downed 32 to 34 Ukrainian drones over Moscow Oblast and that debris from downed Ukrainian drones damaged civilian infrastructure in Ramenskoye Raion. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 84 Ukrainian drones over Russia in total, and Russian milbloggers noted that this was one of the largest strikes against Moscow Oblast since February 2022.

Ukrainian officials continue to report Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs). The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office reported on November 9 that it was investigating a video showing Russian forces executing a captured and unarmed Ukrainian servicemember in violation of the Geneva Convention on POWs. Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated that he sent a letter to the United Nations (UN) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) concerning the reported war crime. ISW has extensively reported on previous footage and reports of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian POWs and observed a wider trend of Russian abuses against Ukrainian POWs across various sectors of the front that appeared to be enabled, if not explicitly endorsed, by individual Russian commanders and unpunished by Russian field commanders.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces struck Russian ammunition warehouses in Bryansk Oblast during a large-scale Ukrainian drone strike against Russia on the night of November 9 and 10.

• Ukrainian officials continue to report Russian executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).

• Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces are successfully leveraging their recent seizure of Vuhledar to make tactically significant gains south of Kurakhove in support of ongoing Russian offensive operations that aim to level the frontline and eliminate the Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces intensified offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast in early September 2024 and are currently attempting to envelop Kurakhove from the north and south and to level the frontline between Sontsivka (northwest of Kurakhove) and Shakhtarske (northwest of Vuhledar). Russian forces seized Vuhledar as of October 1 and have advanced north and northwest of Vuhledar in a series of successful mechanized and infantry assaults over the last month. Russian forces have also marginally advanced northeast of Vuhledar near Antonivka and Katerynivka, but ISW is yet to observe confirmation of Russian advances into Yelizavetivka and further west along the C051104 highway. Russian forces are currently several kilometers south of the Romanivka-Uspenivka-Sukhyi Yar line — a string to settlements north of Vuhledar that could pose a notable challenge to Russian forces should Ukrainian forces be able to establish defenses in these settlements. Russian forces appear to be attempting to bypass this line of settlements, however, as geolocated footage published on November 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Dalne (south of Kurakhove and northwest of Yelizavetivka) and likely hold positions in the fields east and southeast of Dalne. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into Dalne itself, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these maximalist claims. Further Russian advances into Dalne and west of Dalne could force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from positions in the pocket north and northeast of Vuhledar and allow Russian forces to advance along the C051104 highway relatively uncontested. Such advances would allow Russian forces to further pressure Ukrainian positions in Kurakhove from the south. ISW is revising its previous assessment that Russian forces would not likely be able to take advantage of the seizure of Vuhledar for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast. That assessment was incorrect.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are successfully leveraging their recent seizure of Vuhledar to make tactically significant gains south of Kurakhove in support of ongoing Russian offensive operations that aim to level the frontline and eliminate the Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast.

• ISW is revising its previous assessment that Russian forces would not likely be able to take advantage of the seizure of Vuhledar for further offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast. That assessment was incorrect.

• Russian forces reportedly continue to advance in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and Russian advances northwest of Vuhledar and south of Velyka Novosilka may begin to pressure Ukrainian positions in Velyka Novosilka.

• Russian forces have advanced in western Donetsk Oblast at a moderate tempo, but Russian forces remain highly unlikely to be able to conduct rapid mechanized maneuver that could successfully encircle Ukrainian forces.

• Ukrainian and Russian sources stated on November 11 that damage to a dam of the Kurakhivske Reservoir is causing limited flooding in nearby settlements.

• Ukrainian and Russian sources disagreed about who was responsible for damaging the dam, but Russian forces reportedly struck the dam in September 2024.

• Russian forces may have struck the dam in order to cause significant, long-lasting flooding west of Kurakhivske Reservoir that could facilitate Russian efforts to envelop Ukrainian forces north and south of Kurakhove.

• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied on November 11 reports of a recent phone conversation between Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President-elect Donald Trump.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kreminna and Kurakhove.

• Russian regional governments continue to commit large portions of their social budgets towards payments to Russian veterans, likely as part of ongoing efforts to incentivize Russian military service.

Institute for the Study of War

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces recently advanced during two company-sized mechanized assaults within and south of Kurakhove in western Donetsk Oblast.
Geolocated footage confirms reports that an explosion damaged the Ternivska Dam at the Kurakhivske Reservoir on November 11.
Recent Western and Ukrainian estimates about the size of the Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast do not represent a significant inflection, as Russian forces have spent several months gathering forces for a future counteroffensive effort to expel Ukrainian forces from Russian territory.
Ukrainian military officials warned that Russian forces may intensify assaults in Zaporizhia Oblast in the near future.
Select Russian defense officials appear to be contradicting Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent assertion that Russia is not interested in forming a unified security bloc against the West.
Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Kurakhove and in Kursk Oblast.
The Russian military reportedly continues to coerce conscripts into signing Russian military service contracts, likely as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.

The Kremlin is attempting to dictate the terms of any potential "peace" negotiations with Ukraine in advance of US President-elect Donald Trump's inauguration. The manner in which the Kremlin is trying to set its terms for negotiations strongly signals that Russia's objectives remain unchanged and still amount to full Ukrainian capitulation. The Kremlin does not appear any more willing to make concessions to the incoming Trump administration than it was to the current administration.
Lavrov's pre-emptive rejection of the potential suggestion to freeze the current frontline further indicates that Russia is not interested in softening its approach or demands in negotiations and maintains its objective of total Ukrainian capitulation, which Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly outlined in June 2024.
Ukrainian security services reportedly assassinated a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) official in occupied Crimea on November 13.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian oil executives reportedly rejected a proposal to merge Russia's three largest oil companies. Contradictory reporting on the proposed Russian oil merger highlights a possible factional struggle between close affiliates of Putin and Russian energy executives.
South Korean and US intelligence separately confirmed that North Korean troops have deployed into combat alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast.
Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions near Chasiv Yar.
Russian forces continue to heavily rely on refurbished tanks and armored vehicles pulled from storage to replace vehicle losses during ongoing combat operations, but likely will not be able to sustain these losses in the long term.

Institute for the Study of War

Key Takeaways:

The Kremlin's recent economic policies indicate that the Russian economy will likely face significant challenges in 2025 and that Russian President Vladimir Putin is worried about Russia's economic stability in the long term.
Putin modified compensation promised for Russian servicemen wounded while fighting in Ukraine — a clear indicator that the Kremlin is trying to cut the mounting short- and long-term costs of the war and restore balance to the Russian economy.
The Kremlin's efforts to combat inflation and high interest rates are also reportedly impacting the expansion of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and prospects for mobilizing the economy.
The Russian DIB is unlikely to match the production rate necessary to replace Russian weapons losses under these monetary policies.
The Kremlin is also adopting policies aimed at bolstering the domestic population in the long term, signaling mounting concerns over declining demographics and labor shortages that could threaten the sustainable operations of the Russian DIB.
Russian forces recently advanced into Kupyansk during a likely roughly company-sized mechanized assault, although ISW does not assess that Russian forces control the area.
A recent Russian state-affiliated poll suggests that most Russian residents feel largely unaffected by the war in Ukraine, supporting reports of growing concerns among Russian officials and elites that many citizens remain indifferent towards the war.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on November 14 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is personally dealing with issues concerning Ukraine and that he requires no special envoys, likely in response to reports that US President-elect Donald Trump will "soon" appoint a "Ukrainian peace envoy to lead negotiations on ending the war."
Russian forces advanced in the Ukrainian main salient in Kursk Oblast, west of Ukraine's main salient in Kursk Oblast in Glushkovsky Raion, in the Chasiv Yar direction, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
Russian sources are speculating that North Korea may have provided North Korean-produced 170mm M1989 "Koksan" self-propelled artillery systems to Russia. Russian milbloggers published images showing a train transporting alleged North Korean 170mm M1989 “Koksan” self-propelled artillery systems in Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai.

Institute for the Study of War

The Kremlin is intensifying its reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing Western decision-making in Russia's favor ahead of or in lieu of possible future negotiations about the resolution of the war in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin had a phone call with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on November 15 and reiterated several Kremlin information operations aimed at influencing the German government and other Western states to pressure Ukraine into premature peace negotiations instead of providing Ukraine with further military support. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called the Scholz-Putin call "Pandora's box" and warned that the call helps Putin achieve his key goals: reducing his isolation in the international community and bringing about negotiations on Russia’s preferred terms "that will lead to nothing."

Putin and other senior Russian officials have recently intensified rhetoric aimed at influencing the foreign policy of the incoming US government under President-elect Donald Trump. The Kremlin has also recently reiterated its unwillingness to compromise on the terms of any possible future negotiations while strongly indicating that the Kremlin's longstanding goal of complete Ukrainian capitulation remains unchanged. The Kremlin likely aims to take advantage of uncertainty about the future US policy regarding Ukraine by intensifying its reflexive control campaign against Ukraine's European allies. Senior Russian officials, including Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu and Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, have notably used phone calls with Western political and defense officials to spread Kremlin information operations and attempt to threaten the West into making premature concessions on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity since 2022.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is intensifying its reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing Western decision-making in Russia's favor ahead of or in lieu of possible future negotiations about the resolution of the war in Ukraine.

• Abkhazian oppositionists protested an agreement between the de facto government of Georgia’s Abkhazia region with Russia aimed at enhancing Russian investors’ rights in Abkhazia on November 15.

• Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide Ukraine with military support via various means and platforms.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kurakhove, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.

• The Kremlin continues efforts to expand its "Time of Heroes" program to create a new social class comprised of veterans loyal to Russian President Vladimir Putin's regime and ideology.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and preventing Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing manpower constraints. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during an interview with Ukrainian media published on November 16 that Russian forces are currently advancing along the frontline due in part to decreased Ukrainian morale exacerbated by delays in staffing and equipping new Ukrainian brigades and granting frontline Ukrainian defenders necessary rest and rotation. Zelensky stressed the importance of standing up new brigades to replace and reinforce Ukrainian forces currently serving on the frontline but noted that Russian forces also continue to take significant manpower losses in exchange for minimal gains. Zelensky estimated that Russian forces are currently losing between 1,500 and 2,000 troops per day in Ukraine and assessed that Russian forces cannot maintain their rate of advance while taking losses at this scale.

Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine must enter any future negotiations from a position of strength as Russian President Vladimir Putin is not interested in a negotiated settlement — no matter the negotiating platform or mediator — that results in anything less than Ukrainian capitulation. Zelensky stated that Ukraine must be "strengthened by some important elements" to negotiate with Putin, emphasizing that Ukraine cannot enter negotiations from a position of weakness. Zelensky stated that Putin does not want peace but would still be willing to come to the negotiating table in order to reduce Russia's diplomatic isolation and to secure concessions and Ukraine's capitulation. Zelensky stated that it is important that any negotiation platform and potential meditators remember that Russia violated Ukrainian territorial integrity and international law by invading Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 and remarked that his conversations with US President-elect Donald Trump demonstrate that Trump is "on the side of supporting Ukraine" and has listened to Ukraine's position. Zelensky concluded that Ukraine must do everything to end the war by diplomatic means in 2025. ISW recently assessed that the Kremlin is trying to dictate the terms of any potential "peace" negotiations with Ukraine in advance of US President-elect Donald Trump's inauguration. The Kremlin has consistently demonstrated that it is unwilling to compromise on the terms of any possible negotiations while strongly indicating that the Kremlin's longstanding goal of complete Ukrainian capitulation remains unchanged. Any future negotiations, no matter the platform or mediator, will require Ukraine to enter talks from a position of strength that forces Putin to change his calculus, engage in good faith talks, and accept compromises.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and preventing Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing manpower constraints.

• Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine must enter any future negotiations from a position of strength as Russian President Vladimir Putin is not interested in a negotiated settlement – no matter the negotiating platform or mediator - that results in anything less than Ukrainian capitulation.

• Russian forces are innovating their long-range strike packages to include decoy Shahed drones and Shahed drones with thermobaric warheads, likely to confuse and exhaust Ukrainian air defenses and increase the damages of long-range strikes.

• North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un has ordered North Korean defense industrial enterprises to begin serial production of likely tactical strike drones – an example of how increasing Russian-North Korean military cooperation allows North Korea to learn from Russia's war in Ukraine.

• The Russian military command reportedly arrested and removed several commanders within the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army following inaccurate reports they made about alleged Russian advances near Bilohorivka and repeated outcries from the Russian milblogger community.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Kreminna, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

• Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported that the Russian Central Bank has recently issued significantly more loan deferments (credit holidays) for Russian military personnel, indicating that Russian military recruitment rates may have increased.

Institute for the Study of War

The New York Times (NYT) and Washington Post reported that US President Joe Biden has authorized Ukrainian forces to use US-provided ATACMS in limited strikes against Russian and North Korean military targets within Kursk Oblast. The NYT and Washington Post reported on November 17 that unspecified US officials expect Ukrainian forces to initially conduct strikes against Russian and North Korean forces within Kursk Oblast and that the Biden Administration could expand this authorization to use ATACMS against targets elsewhere in Russia in the future. The US officials stated that the US authorized these limited Ukrainian strikes in response to the deployment of North Korean forces to the battlefield in Kursk Oblast to deter North Korea from deploying more forces to Russia. The US officials stated that the partial lifting of restrictions aims to generate a "specific and limited" battlefield effect and will not change the course of the war. French outlet Le Figaro reported on November 17 that France and the United Kingdom (UK) have authorized Ukrainian forces to use French and UK-provided SCALP/Storm Shadow missiles to strike within Russia. Le Figaro did not state if France and the UK had authorized Ukraine's SCALP/Storm Shadow usage only within Kursk Oblast. The partial lifting of restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided long-range weapons against military objects within Kursk Oblast will not completely deprive Russian forces of their sanctuary in Russian territory, as hundreds of military objects remain within ATACMS range in other Russian border regions. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will benefit from any partial sanctuary if Western states continue to impose restrictions on Ukraine's ability to defend itself and that the US should allow Ukraine to strike all legitimate military targets within Russia's operational and deep-rear within range of US-provided weapons – not just those in Kursk Oblast.

Russian forces damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure during the largest missile and drone strike since August 2024 on the night of November 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 90 Shahed and strike drones of an unspecified type (possibly referring to decoy drones) from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and Kursk and Oryol oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 120 missiles, including one Zirkon 3M22 hypersonic cruise missile, eight Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, 101 Kh-101 and Kalibr cruise missiles, one Iskander-M ballistic missile, four Kh-22/Kh-31P cruise/anti-radiation missiles, and five Kh-59/69 cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 42 drones and one Zirkon, seven Kinzhal, 85 Kalibr and Kh-101, two Kh-22/31P, and five Kh-59/69 missiles. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian F-16 pilots shot down roughly 10 aerial targets during the strike. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 41 drones were "lost" in Ukrainian airspace, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, and that two drones flew into Russian and Russian-occupied Ukrainian airspace. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that air defense was active in almost all Ukrainian oblasts. Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo stated that Russian strikes damaged energy facilities in several oblasts and noted that energy recovery work is ongoing in Odesa, Volyn, and Rivne oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that a Russian missile strike caused a fire at an infrastructure facility in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, damaged critical infrastructure in Rivne Oblast, and targeted energy infrastructure in Odesa Oblast. Private Ukrainian energy enterprise DTEK stated that Russian strikes seriously damaged an unspecified DTEK thermal power plant (TPP) and noted that this was the eighth mass strike on a DTEK energy facility in 2024. Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko stated that the strikes caused power outages in many areas of Ukraine. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi stated that Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities forced Ukrainian authorities to reduce the energy production levels of several nuclear power plants (NPPs). Grossi reported that Russian strikes damaged several electrical substations that are connected to the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs, although the strikes did not damage the NPPs themselves. Grossi stated that six out of the nine reactors at the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs are currently operating at reduced capacity. Ukrainian state railway company Ukrzaliznytsia reported that Russian forces struck a railway depot in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and that Russian strikes de-energized sections of several railway lines in southern, western, and northeastern Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes also damaged civilian infrastructure in Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Rivne, and Odesa oblasts.

Key Takeaways:

• The New York Times (NYT) and Washington Post reported that US President Joe Biden has authorized Ukrainian forces to use US-provided ATACMS in limited strikes against Russian and North Korean military targets within Kursk Oblast.

• Russian forces damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure during the largest missile and drone strike since August 2024 on the night of November 16 to 17.

• Russian forces continue to innovate their long-range strike packages and likely included relatively ineffective sea-launched Kalibr cruise missiles in the November 16 to 17 strike package as decoys to distract and exhaust Ukrainian air defenses.

• Ukrainian forces struck a defense industrial factory in the Udmurt Republic for the first time on the morning of November 17.

• North Korea reportedly continues to provide military support to Russia, including the provision of rocket and artillery systems and potential additional troop deployments, which is likely to impact Russia's military operations in the short term, but its long-term benefits likely remain limited.

• Russian forces will likely focus on seizing frontline Ukrainian towns and cities during Winter 2024-2025 through urban combat amid efforts to offset Ukrainian drone advantages and possible Russian armored vehicle constraints.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin's maximalist objectives demanding full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged, but a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger appears to be trying to repackage longstanding Kremlin territorial claims to southern Ukraine as less severe "peace proposals" that would actually militarily threaten Ukraine, Moldova, and NATO.

• Abkhazian oppositionists continued protests on November 17 calling for the resignation of the de facto Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.

• Russian milbloggers continued to applaud their reported role in removing frontline 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps ) commanders after the commanders submitted false reports about Russian advances in the Siversk direction.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian officials continued to use threatening rhetoric as part of efforts to deter the United States from publicly authorizing Ukraine's use of US-provided ATACMS in limited strikes against Russian and North Korean military targets in Kursk Oblast. This US authorization, if officially confirmed, would notably be a mild response to Russia's escalatory introduction of North Korean troops as active combatants in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on November 18 that the United States is "adding fuel to the fire" and that the US authorization of Ukrainian ATACMS strikes against Russian military targets would be a "qualitatively new round of tension" and a "qualitative" change in US participation in the war. Peskov reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's September 12 claims that Ukrainian strikes against Russia using Western-provided weapons would represent an escalation and directly involve Western countries in the war. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova also reiterated Putin's September statements and further claimed that Ukrainian long-range missile strikes on Russia would be a "radical change in the essence and nature" of the war and that the Russian response would be "adequate and tangible." Russian State Duma and Federation Council deputies made similar threats, claiming that Russia would be "forced" to respond to this "escalation," including with strikes against Ukraine using unspecified "new" weapons systems, and that Russia's new nuclear doctrine will outline the consequences of this US decision. Russia has not previously escalated militarily against any perceived Western violations of Russia's "red lines" — as ISW has repeatedly observed.

Select Russian officials and propagandists heavily emphasized that US officials have not yet formally confirmed the ATACMS strike authorization, likely in an attempt to convince the United States to back out of the decision and deny the media reports of the authorization. Zakharova stated that it is unclear if Western media outlets reporting on the US authorization are citing official sources, and Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov similarly questioned the credibility of the US media reports.

Neither Ukrainian nor US officials have confirmed reports of the US authorization of Ukrainian ATACMS strikes, but US officials noted that Russia escalated the war with the deployment of North Korean forces alongside Russian forces on the battlefield. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky did not directly confirm media reports of the US authorization of limited ATACMS strikes, but stated on November 17 that "strikes are not carried out with words" and "such things are not announced," but that "the missiles will speak for themselves." US Deputy National Security Advisor Jonathan Finer also did not confirm the US strike authorization but noted that Russia escalated the war with the deployment of North Korean forces to the battlefield and the massive drone and missile strike series against Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of November 16 to 17. Finer directly responded to Peskov, stating that Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine "lit the fire." US outlet Axios reported on November 17 that a source with knowledge of the matter stated that the Biden administration granted Ukraine permission to use ATACMS in order to deter North Korea from sending more troops to Russia for the war. Axios reported that US officials hope that North Korea might reconsider its decision to deploy military personnel to Russia if Ukrainian forces strike North Korean forces in Kursk Oblast.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials continued to use threatening rhetoric as part of efforts to deter the United States from publicly authorizing Ukraine's use of US-provided ATACMS in limited strikes against Russian and North Korean military targets in Kursk Oblast. This US authorization, if officially confirmed, would notably be a mild response to Russia's escalatory introduction of North Korean troops as active combatants in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

• Putin's introduction of North Korea as a new belligerent in his invasion of Ukraine was a major escalation. Allowing Ukraine to use US missiles against legitimate military targets in Russian territory in accord with all international laws and laws of armed conflict is a very limited response and cannot reasonably be characterized as an escalation in itself.

• French and British sources clarified on November 18 that the reported US permissions regarding Ukraine's ability to use ATACMS for limited strikes within Russia do not inherently extend to Ukraine's ability to use French and UK-provided SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles for long-range strikes in Russia.

• The Kremlin continues to state its unwillingness to accept any compromises, including those that would "freeze" the conflict along the current frontline – further demonstrating the Kremlin's insistence on complete Ukraine capitulation.

• Russian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, in Kupyansk, west of Kreminna, and in the Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar directions.

• The Kremlin is continuing to militarize different levels of the Russian government by expanding the "Time of Heroes" program that aims to place veterans of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in positions in local, regional, and federal governments.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) illegally conscripted Ukrainian youth in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts as part of Russia's Fall 2024 conscription cycle.

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