Russian sources claimed on August 9 that Ukrainian forces advanced further east in Kursk Oblast but are likely no longer operating as far north or as far west as Russian sources previously claimed on August 8. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 9 that Ukrainian forces conducted another cross-border incursion northeast of Sumy City and advanced towards Kucherov (roughly one kilometer from the international border) but have not entered the settlement. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast advanced as far east as Plekhovo (southeast of Sudzha) on the left bank of the Psyol River. ISW is recessing the claimed limit of Ukrainian advances up to Snagost (south of Korenevo), given that a Russian milblogger claimed on August 8 that Russian forces began clearing the settlement. ISW is also recessing the claimed limit of Ukrainian advances to the northern outskirts of Malaya Loknya (northwest of Sudzha and roughly 13 kilometers from the international border) as Russian milbloggers claimed on August 9 that Russian forces counterattacked near the settlement.

Geolocated footage published on August 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces were recently operating west of Sudzha, within the settlement, north of Sudzha near Kazachya Loknya, and northeast of Leonidovo (northwest of Sudzha and roughly 10 kilometers from the international border) and in Dmitriukov. Russian milbloggers continued to issue contradictory statements about Ukrainian positions in Sudzha (northeast of Sumy City and roughly 10 kilometers from the international border), however. A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are not operating within Sudzha, whereas another source claimed that Ukrainian forces are located in the settlement but cannot operate freely. Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces partially control Sudzha and that the town is a contested "gray zone." Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are also operating northeast of Sudzha near Martynovka; north of Sudzha near Vtoroy Knyazhiy, Ivnitsa, Zaoleshenka, Russkoye Porechnoye (16 kilometers from the international border); and west of Sudzha near Goncharovka. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control the area near Korenevo (north of Sumy City and roughly 23 kilometers north of the international border) and denied reports of fighting on the settlement's outskirts. The Russian milblogger claimed on August 8 that Ukrainian forces control Novoivanovka (southeast of Korenevo) and Lyubimovka (southeast of Korenevo). Another Russian source claimed on August 9, however, that Russian forces regained lost positions in Novoivanovka and Leonidovo. A Russian source claimed that there is no confirmation of Ukrainian forces operating in Kromskiy Byki (30 kilometers from the international border and 13 kilometers south of Lgov), and the vast majority of Russian reporting about Kursk Oblast on August 9 is not consistent with previous claims that mobile Ukrainian groups were operating beyond 20 kilometers into Kursk Oblast.

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian military convoy east of Rylsk near Oktyabrskoye, Kursk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on August 9 shows the aftermath of the strike and destroyed Russian trucks along the 38K-017 highway. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that there were 14 Ural and KAMAZ covered trucks carrying Russian reserves intended to reinforce Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and that the strike likely killed several Russian personnel traveling in the trucks. Russian sources suggested that the column may have been transporting personnel from the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces' 44th Army Corps (Leningrad Military District) or the "Pyatnashka" Brigade. Russian milbloggers theorized about which weapons system Ukraine may have used to conduct this strike, although ISW is not prepared to comment on which system Ukraine may have used during the strike.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian sources claimed on August 9 that Ukrainian forces advanced further east in Kursk Oblast but are likely no longer operating as far north or as far west as Russian sources previously claimed on August 8.

• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian military convoy east of Rylsk near Oktyabrskoye, Kursk Oblast.

• The Russian military command appears to be relying on existing units deployed to the international border area and readily available forces in the rear, most of which are units staffed with conscripts and irregular forces, to address the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.

• These units would likely be the first to respond even if the Russian military command has decided to transfer additional, more experienced units from elsewhere in the theater.

• The Russian military command may currently be resisting operational pressures to redeploy forces from other operational directions to prevent the Ukrainian incursion from disrupting Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine.

• The Russian military command may currently be transferring more experienced and better-provisioned frontline units from eastern or southern Ukraine to Kursk Oblast, but it would likely take additional time for such units to arrive in Kursk Oblast.

• Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against a Russian military airfield in Lipetsk Oblast and other Russian military targets in occupied Crimea and Donetsk Oblast on August 9.

• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to posture itself as providing sufficient medical care to Russian servicemembers.

Institute for the Study of War

The Russian National Antiterrorism Committee announced a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts on August 9 in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. The Federal Security Service (FSB) Head and National Antiterrorism Committee Chairperson Alexander Bortnikov announced counterterrorism operations in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts in response to "sabotage and reconnaissance units" conducting "terrorist acts" in Russia and "units of the Ukrainian armed forces" conducting a "terrorist attack" in Kursk Oblast. The counterterrorism operation allows Russian authorities to take a number of measures, including suspending or restricting communications services, monitoring telecommunication channels, confiscating vehicles, and entering private property. Russian authorities previously announced a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod Oblast for one day in May 2023 in response to raids by all-Russian pro-Ukrainian elements. The Kremlin notably did not elect to declare a formal state of war against Ukraine or martial law — more serious responses that would marshal greater Russian state resources through wider, and more domestically disruptive, mobilization.

The Kremlin likely decided to declare a counterterrorism operation — as opposed to a state of war or martial law — to downplay the scale of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and prevent domestic panic or backlash — demonstrating the Kremlin's reluctance to take more drastic measures to respond to the situation. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on August 8 that a source close to the Russian Federation Council's defense committee stated that the Russian Presidential Administration recommended that Russian deputies and senators not comment on the events in Kursk Oblast "until further notice" or discuss it as briefly as possible and refer only to official statements. Russian milbloggers have been suggesting that the Kremlin formally declare war against Ukraine and criticized the Kremlin for failing to declare martial law instead of the counterterrorism operation. The declaration of martial law notably would have allowed Russian authorities to take more drastic measures, such as prohibiting rallies and demonstrations, enacting curfews, and organizing the production of defense articles for the military. Russian President Vladimir Putin has refrained from officially declaring a state of war, has repeatedly demonstrated his unwillingness to transfer Russian society fully to a war-time footing, and has forgone declaring general mobilization as part of wider efforts to prevent domestic discontent that could threaten the stability of Putin's regime.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian National Antiterrorism Committee announced a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts on August 9 in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.

• The Kremlin likely decided to declare a counterterrorism operation - as opposed to a state of war or martial law - to downplay the scale of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and prevent domestic panic or backlash - demonstrating the Kremlin's reluctance to take more drastic measures to respond to the situation.

• Putin likely appointed Bortnikov as the head of the counterterrorist operation because Bortnikov has previously proven himself to be an effective manager during crises that threatened Russian domestic stability and the Kremlin regime.

• A complicated command and control (C2) arrangement for the FSB-led counterterrorism operation under Bortnikov may degrade the effectiveness of the Russian response to Ukraine’s operation.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to be relying on a combination of Russian conscripts already operating in Kursk Oblast, elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces, and elements redeployed from lower-priority frontline areas in Ukraine to defend against the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast, likely exacerbating the disorganization of Russia’s chosen response.

• Russian forces' usage of conscripts and forces already in Kursk Oblast, nearby forces fighting in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and lateral redeployments across the theater to defend against the Ukrainian incursion is consistent with a number of likely Russian courses of action (COAs) that ISW forecasted.

• The Russian MoD appears to be relying on select, battle-hardened units to conduct offensive and defensive operations in its most critical sectors of the front.

• Russian forces appear to be more adequately defending against Ukrainian assaults following the arrival of additional conscripts and more combat effective personnel from frontline areas in Ukraine.

• Geolocated footage and Russian reporting from August 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces largely maintain previously reported positions in Kursk Oblast and have advanced slightly further than their previously confirmed positions.

• Ukraine’s cross-border operation into Kursk Oblast threatens the Kremlin with a potential political crisis regarding causalities among Russian conscripts, whom the Kremlin has increasingly relied upon to defend the Russian state border with Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian ship and a gas platform in the western Black Sea.

• Iran will reportedly deliver "hundreds" of ballistic missiles to Russia in the near future.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.

• A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has begun to form the "Black Raven" strike drone volunteer unit and asked readers to donate to the 16-million-ruble (about $184,324) goal to supply the unit with drones and equipment.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast has allowed Ukrainian forces to at least temporarily seize the battlefield initiative in one area of the frontline and contest Russia's theater-wide initiative. Russia's possession of the theater-wide initiative since November 2023 has allowed Russia to determine the location, time, scale, and requirements of fighting in Ukraine and forced Ukraine to expend materiel and manpower in reactive defensive operations. The Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast, however, has forced the Kremlin and Russian military command to react and redeploy forces and means to the sector where Ukrainian forces have launched attacks. Russian forces, however, were notably not conducting active operations in Kursk Oblast. Russia has been leveraging its possession of the theater-wide initiative to pressure Ukraine and attempt to prevent Ukrainian forces from accumulating manpower and materiel for future counteroffensive operations while determining a tempo of fighting that would allow Russian forces to sustain consistent ongoing offensive operations. Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military command likely incorrectly assessed that Ukraine lacked the capability to contest the initiative, and Ukraine's ability to achieve operational surprise and contest the theater-wide initiative is challenging the operational and strategic assumptions underpinning current Russian offensive efforts in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast and further possible Ukrainian cross-border incursions force a decision point on the Kremlin and the Russian military command about whether to view the thousand-kilometer-long international border with northeastern Ukraine as a legitimate frontline that Russia must defend instead of a dormant area of the theater as they have treated it since Fall 2022. Moscow’s response may require the Russian military command to consider the manpower and materiel requirements for defending the international border as part of its theater-wide campaign design and can therefore impose long-term operational planning constraints that Russia previously did not face. The Russian military command has essentially treated the international border with northeastern Ukraine as the dormant front of the theater following the Russian withdrawal from Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts in Spring 2022 and the Ukrainian liberation of significant territory in Kharkiv Oblast in Fall 2022. Russian and Ukrainian forces have conducted routine sabotage and reconnaissance activities, indirect fire, and cross-border strikes along the border since Fall 2022, but none of this routine activity has appeared to generate wider Russian operational concerns for defending Russian territory in the area. Russia has sought to use the threat of cross-border incursions to draw and fix Ukrainian forces along the border by concentrating rear elements in the border zone, but Ukrainian concentrations in the area do not appear to have generated such responses among Russian forces. The Russian military activated part of this "dormant frontline" when it launched the offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast in early May 2024 — a Russian effort to extend the frontline further into northeastern Ukraine to draw and fix Ukrainian forces along the border in hopes of weakening the overall Ukrainian frontline in aggregate.

Previous notable incursions into Russia did not change the Kremlin's perception of the international border area, but the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast will force the Kremlin to make a decision. All Russian pro-Ukrainian forces have conducted several cross-border raids into Russia since Fall 2022, but the Kremlin and the Russian military command resisted calls for redeploying forces to protect the border at that time. Russian President Vladimir Putin assessed at that time that those limited raids posed no medium- to long-term threat to Russian territory and that redeployments to the international border would be a less effective allocation of resources that could otherwise support large-scale defensive and offensive operations in Ukraine. The current Ukrainian incursion, however, poses significant threats to Russian military operations in Ukraine and Putin's regime stability and demands a response. The Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast will likely expand the Kremlin's consideration for what type of Ukrainian operations are possible along the border. Russia's prolonged treatment of the international border area as a dormant frontline is a strategic failure in imagination.

Russia's treatment of the international border area as a dormant front has given Russia more flexibility to accumulate and commit manpower and material to military operations in Ukraine. Russia has spent considerable resources to build fortifications along the international border area but has not allocated the manpower and materiel to significantly man and defend those fortifications. Sparsely manned and equipped border fortifications proved insufficient at preventing Ukrainian gains at the outset of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, and the Russian military command will likely conclude that further manpower and equipment commitments to the international border will be required to effectively leverage fortified positions to prevent possible future Ukrainian cross-border incursions and deter larger Ukrainian incursion efforts in the long-term. This conclusion will narrow the flexibility Russia has enjoyed in committing manpower and materiel to its ongoing offensive efforts in Ukraine, and the Russian military command will have to consider the requirements for border defense when determining what resources it can allocate to future large-scale offensive and defensive efforts in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast has allowed Ukrainian forces to at least temporarily seize the battlefield initiative in one area of the frontline and contest Russia's theater-wide initiative.

• The Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast and further possible Ukrainian cross-border incursions force a decision point on the Kremlin and the Russian military command about whether to view the thousand-kilometer-long international border with northeastern Ukraine as a legitimate frontline that Russia must defend instead of a dormant area of the theater as they have treated it since Fall 2022. Moscow’s response may require the Russian military command to consider the manpower and materiel requirements for defending the international border as part of its theater-wide campaign design and can therefore impose long-term operational planning constraints that Russia previously did not face.

• Geolocated footage and Russian and Ukrainian reporting from August 10 and 11 indicate that Ukrainian forces advanced westward and northwestward in Kursk Oblast, although Russian sources largely claimed that Russian forces have stabilized the situation.

• The hastily assembled and disparate Russian force grouping responding to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast is comprised of Russian units likely below their doctrinal end-strength and ill-prepared to establish the joint command and control (C2) structures necessary to coordinate operations.

• Russia’s redeployment of battalion and lower-level units rather than full brigades and regiments to defend in Kursk Oblast is likely contributing to Russian forces' difficulty in quickly establishing effective C2 in the area.

• Confusion about the status of Russian conscripts fighting in Kursk Oblast is a consequence of ineffective C2 and will likely continues to further strain Russia’ C2 structures to respond to the Kursk operation.

• Russian officials acknowledged that Ukrainian mobile groups advanced upwards of 25 kilometers into Belovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast on the night of August 10 to 11, but there are no indications that these groups remain in the area or that Ukrainian forces are operating beyond the immediate border area in Belovsky Raion.

• The reported rapid Ukrainian maneuver in Belovsky Raion suggests that Russian forces along the international border remain poorly prepared to respond to further Ukrainian cross-border incursions.

• Russian sources claimed on August 11 that small Ukrainian groups attempted unsuccessful limited cross-border incursions into western Belgorod Oblast.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky officially acknowledged the Ukrainian cross-border incursion into Kursk Oblast for the first time on August 10.

• A top Ukrainian defense official reportedly stated that Russian forces have somewhat reduced the intensity of assaults in eastern Ukraine but that otherwise the situation remains largely unchanged amid the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast, which is consistent with ISW's observations of Russian offensive tempo across the theater.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Donetsk City.

• Russian propagandists are attempting to use the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast to promote Russian force generation efforts.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces appear to be advancing further within Kursk Oblast despite recent milblogger claims that Russian forces were stabilizing the frontline in Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed on August 11 that Ukrainian offensive activity decreased in Kursk Oblast; however, a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger refuted these claims on August 12 and noted that Russian forces are far from stabilizing the situation, in part due to poor C2. Ukrainian forces reportedly launched new incursions into western Kursk Oblast near Slobodka-Ivanovka (northwest of Sumy City and two kilometers from the international border), Tetkino (south of Slobodka-Ivanovka along the international border), Gordeevka, Uspenka, and Viktorovka (all north of Sumy City along the international border and south of Korenevo). Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Slobodka-Ivanovka, Uspenivka, and Viktorovka. Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued near Snagost (south of Korenevo) and Kremyanoye (east of Snagost) and that Ukrainian forces are attacking north and south of Korenevo in an attempt to bypass the settlement. Geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Kremyanoye and east of Zhuravli (northeast of Korenevo), and a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Zhuravli towards Obshchy Kolodez (northeast of Korenevo and 30 kilometers from the international border). Additional geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in a forest area north and east of Semenovka (south of Lgov and roughly 24 kilometers from the international border) during a likely battalion-sized mechanized assault in the direction of Kauchuk (south of Lgov and 27 kilometers from the international border), although the exact contours of Ukraine's advance are unclear.

Geolocated footage published on August 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces were recently operating in Sudzha and northern Zaoleshenka (west of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have seized Sudzha and Spalnoye (southeast of Sudzha). Additional geolocated footage published on August 12 shows Ukrainian vehicles operating in northern Giri (southeast of Sudzha and 13 kilometers from the international border) and Russian forces ambushing Ukrainian forces in central Giri, indicating that Ukrainian forces at least temporarily advanced into the settlement, although it is unclear if Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Borki (southeast of Sudzha), suggesting that Ukrainian forces likely advanced into Giri from the west. Geolocated footage published on August 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces were recently operating in Darino (northwest of Sudzha and three kilometers from the international border). Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also conducted cross-border incursions with armored vehicle support from Sumy Oblast northwest of Grayvoron, Belgorod Oblast near Kolotilovka and Prelesye and south of Grayvoron near Bezymeno.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to portray himself as an effective and knowledgeable manager of the situation along the Ukrainian-Russian border and to shift responsibility for ongoing challenges in responding to the Ukrainian incursion in the area to other Russian military and government officials.

• The Kremlin's decision to publish footage showing Putin chastising senior Russian officials is likely a warning to other Russian officials to refrain from commenting about the Ukrainian incursion into Russia.

• Putin delegated overlapping tasks to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), Federal Security Service (FSB), and Rosgvardia in the Ukrainian-Russian border area — further highlighting how the Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast is struggling to establish the joint command and control (C2) structures necessary to coordinate operations.

• Putin offered several assessments about Ukrainian operations in Kursk Oblast, including one that undermined a long-standing Kremlin information operation falsely portraying Ukraine as unwilling to engage in legitimate, good-faith negotiations and putting the onus for peace negotiations on Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces appear to be advancing further within Kursk Oblast despite recent milblogger claims that Russian forces were stabilizing the frontline in Kursk Oblast.

• Regional Russian officials appear to be offering notably frank assessments of the ongoing Ukrainian incursion.

• Senior Ukrainian officials provided updates about the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and warned that Russian forces may stage war crimes in Kursk Oblast in order to discredit Ukraine and Western support for Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a drone strike against a Russian airbase in Moscow Oblast on the night of August 11 to 12.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) emphasized Russia's international defense ties at the Army-2024 International Military-Technical Forum in Moscow, likely in an effort to expand international military-technical cooperation and posture strong defense relations with Russia-friendly states

Institute for the Study of War