Russian President Vladimir Putin articulated a theory of victory in Ukraine on June 7 that assumes that
Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from
conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition
against Ukrainian forces. Putin stated following his speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic
Forum (SPIEF) that Russia does not need to conduct another call-up of reservists similar to Russia‘s
September 2022 partial mobilization because Russia is not trying to rapidly achieve its military
objectives in Ukraine.<1> Putin acknowledged that the current Russian military contingent committed to
the war in Ukraine (reportedly the Russian military’s entire combat-capable ground force as of January
2024) would be insufficient for a rapid victory but suggested that Russian forces are instead pursuing a
more gradual approach.<2> Putin stated that Russian forces aim to "squeeze" Ukrainian forces out "of
those territories that should be under Russian control" and therefore Russia does not need to conduct
another mobilization wave.<3> Putin asserted that Russian crypto-mobilization efforts are sufficient for
this approach and that Russia has recruited 160,000 new personnel so far in 2024 (a figure consistent
with reports that the Russian military recruits between 20,000-30,000 recruits per month).<4>
Putin's assessment that gradual Russian gains will allow Russia to achieve his goals in Ukraine is
predicated on the assumption that Ukrainian forces will be unable to liberate any significant territory
that Russian forces seize and that the Russian military will be able to sustain offensive operations that
achieve gradual tactical gains regardless of heavy losses. Western intelligence has previously assessed
that Putin assesses that US and Western support to Ukraine is “finite" and that Russian forces have
blunted Ukrainian efforts to retake significant territory.<5> Putin's assessment has been reinforced by
the recent months of delayed Western security assistance and corresponding Ukrainian materiel
constraints, which allowed Russian forces to seize and maintain the theater-wide initiative and conduct
consistent offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine that achieved gradual tactical gains.<6>
Putin's June 7 comments support ISW's previous assessment that Putin's assessment of Ukrainian
capabilities and how Putin’s perceived limits to Western support would incentivize Putin to pursue
creeping offensive operations indefinitely if more rapid operations that lead to rapid decisive results
seem unattainable.<7>
Putin's theory of victory rests on Russia's ability to outlast and
overcome pledged Western security assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainian efforts to mobilize more of its
economy and population for the war effort, indicating that Putin likely assesses that Russian forces will
be able to leverage their advantages in manpower and materiel to overwhelm on Ukrainian forces. Putin's
apparent assessment that Russia can "squeeze" Ukrainian forces out of all the lands it desires to occupy
assumes that Ukraine will not acquire and sustain the manpower and materiel required to prevent
indefinite Russian attempts to gradually advance along the front or needed to contest the initiative and
conduct operationally significant counteroffensive operations. Ukrainian forces have previously shown
that when they are well provisioned, they can prevent Russian forces from making even marginal tactical
gains, force Russian offensive operations to culminate, and launch counteroffensive operations that
liberate operationally significant territory.<8> Russian forces are currently leveraging the theater-wide
initiative in Ukraine to dictate a tempo of fighting that generates casualties roughly equal to or
slightly less than the rate of newly generated forces, which has allowed Russian forces to sustain their
overall offensive tempo in Ukraine.<9> Russia is also further mobilizing its defense industrial base
(DIB) and is generally far ahead of Ukraine and the West in this regard.<10> Putin and the Russian
military command likely assess that Russian numerical manpower and materiel advantages will allow Russia
to sustain this force generation replacement rate and field the required materiel needed to sustain
indefinite creeping advances.
This strategy largely relies on Russia's ability to retain the
theater-wide initiative, which Ukrainian forces can contest if Ukraine addresses its ongoing manpower
challenges and receives sufficient, timely, and consistent Western security assistance.<11> Western
security assistance pledges and Ukrainian force generation efforts will eventually allow Ukraine to
accumulate the forces and materiel it needs to contest the initiative if ongoing Russian offensive
operations are not successful in forcing Ukraine to divert manpower and materiel to defensive
operations.<12>
Russian efforts to prevent Ukraine from accumulating the personnel and
resources Ukraine needs to contest the initiative therefore are a part of an attritional war approach, in
which the Russian military command believes that ongoing Russian offensive operations will inflict
relatively more significant losses on Ukrainian forces and force Ukraine to divert manpower and materiel
to stabilize the front instead of preparing for future counteroffensive efforts. This approach also
requires that Russian forces avoid suffering outsized losses that would prevent Russia from sustaining
offensive operations. There are limits to Russian force generation, as Putin himself admits with his
continued aversion to another partial mobilization wave, and Russia's ability to expand its DIB has
extensively relied on the refurbishment of extensive Soviet-era stocks, which are a finite resource.<13>
Putin and the Russian military command likely calculate that these limits will not begin constraining
Russia's ability to sustain its offensive tempo in Ukraine in the near-to-medium term, however. This
approach requires that Ukraine is not able to inflict losses on Russian forces that decrease this
offensive tempo or force Russian offensive efforts to culminate. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine
should contest the initiative as soon as possible because Russian forces are reaping a variety of
benefits from holding the initiative, including their ability to pursue a strategy of attritional
warfare.<14>
Putin's theory of victory hinges on a critical assumption that the West will
abandon Ukraine to Russian victory, either on its own accord or in response to Russian efforts to
persuade the West to do so, and it is far from clear that the West will do so. Putin notably did not
identify what specific goals he assesses gradual tactical Russian gains will achieve, although the
Russian military command has likely previously believed that such gains would encourage Western debates
about continued support for Ukraine and cause weakened Western support that exacerbates Ukrainian
materiel constraints.<15> Putin also did not specify which territory "should" be under Russian control,
part of continued Kremlin rhetoric that purposefully leaves open room for further territorial conquest in
Ukraine.<16> The current rate of Russian advance suggests that Russian forces may pursue individual
operationally significant objectives over the course of many months if not years, and efforts to not
bound the Kremlin's territorial objectives likely intend to justify indefinite creeping offensive
operations as long as it takes to achieve Western and Ukrainian capitulation.<17> Putin may believe that
as long as Russia can prevent Ukraine from contesting the initiative he can lock in limited territorial
conquests while encouraging Western debates about continued aid to Ukraine once current pledges of
security assistance are expended.
The end of Western security assistance would eventually lead
to the collapse of the frontline and total Russian victory in Ukraine, a reality that recent months of
delayed Western security assistance has further highlighted.<18> The West must proactively provide
Ukrainian forces with the necessary equipment and weapons at the scale, timing, and regularity that
Ukrainian forces require for operations that liberate significant swaths of occupied Ukraine and
challenge Putin's belief that he can gradually subsume Ukraine should rapid total victory appear
unreachable. The West also maintains the ability to substantially disrupt Russian operations at scale by
allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike Russia’s operational rear and deep rear areas
in Russian territory.<19> The West must not surrender to Russia's strategic effort to destroy Western
commitment to Ukrainian survival and must remember that Ukrainian victory has always been possible as
long as the West remains committed to that goal.<20>
Putin indirectly indicated that Ukrainian
strikes on Russian territory with Western-provided weapons do not cross a supposed Russian "red line"
that would result in Russian nuclear escalation. Putin stated that Russia's nuclear doctrine calls for
Russia to only use nuclear weapons in the event of "exceptional cases" of threats to Russia's sovereignty
and territorial integrity.<21> Putin stated that he does not think such an "exceptional" case has arisen
so "there is no such need" for Russia to use nuclear weapons. Ukrainian forces have struck military
targets in Belgorod Oblast with US-provided HIMARS systems using GMLRS since early June 2024.<22> Putin’s
June 7 statement is a significant rhetorical reversal given that Putin and other Kremlin officials have
previously threatened Russian nuclear weapon use should Western states allow Ukraine to strike into
Russian territory with Western-provided weapons.<23> Western and Ukrainian policies and actions have
crossed Russia's supposed "red lines" several times throughout the war without drawing a significant
Russian reaction, indicating that many of Russia's "red lines" are most likely information operations
designed to push the West to self-deter.<24>
Putin heavily focused on proposals to solve
Russia's labor shortage issues during his speech at SPIEF on June 7. Putin outlined a 10-point plan to
grow the Russian economy and acknowledged that Russia is suffering from demographic challenges and labor
shortages.<25> Putin called on the Russian government to enact multiple reforms to increase the labor
supply and productivity, such as improving education and training, automating and digitalizing Russian
industry, increasing the use of artificial intelligence (AI), and increasing spending on research and
development. Putin highlighted the necessity of migrant labor to increase Russia's economic growth but
stated that Russia has not yet developed a "meaningful" migration policy. Putin specified that Russia
only needs skilled and educated migrant laborers with a knowledge of Russian language and culture and who
will "not create any problems for local citizens in the workplace and in life." Putin ended his SPIEF
appearance by stating that Russia "will treat the culture and traditions of
peoples of the Russian Federation" with respect as "unity is strength." Putin has touted
Russia as a unified multiethnic and multinational state, but his June 7 statements demonstrate the
differing policies and perceptions towards the indigenous, federally recognized peoples of Russia and
migrants.<26> Putin's migration policy proposals demonstrate how the Kremlin continues to struggle to
balance Russia's need for migrants to compensate for labor shortages and wide-scale anti-migrant
sentiments in Russia, particularly as the Kremlin tries to further mobilize the Russian defense
industrial base (DIB).
Putin attempted to frame Russia's economic issues in a positive light,
likely to prepare Russian citizens to make more personal sacrifices as Russia sustains a protracted war
in Ukraine at the expense of Russian citizens’ standards of living. Putin framed Russia's labor shortages
as resulting from Russia's alleged "record low" unemployment, not a consequence of Russia's full-scale
invasion of Ukraine.<27> Putin stated that people who have reached retirement age have experience and
knowledge that is useful to the Russian economy and that many pensioners have "aspirations" to continue
working. Putin proposed that the Russian government annually increase pensions starting in February 2025
for pensioners who continue to work even after they reach retirement age. Putin met with St. Petersburg
Governor Alexander Beglov before his speech at SPIEF, during which Beglov presented the idea of
increasing pensions as a direct request from working pensioners.<28> Large-scale protests erupted in
Russia in 2018 when the Kremlin announced a raise in the retirement age, and Putin is likely trying to
use monetary incentives to push pensioners to choose to work beyond the retirement age to help ease
Russia's labor shortages.<29> Putin also highlighted the strength of Russia's DIB, claiming that Russia
has increased its production of ammunition by more than 20 times in an unspecified time frame and that
Russia has superior aviation and armored vehicle technology than the West.<30> Putin claimed that the
Russian DIB has increased its production of civilian products by about five percent over the past two
years, likely to justify Russia's increased defense spending and recent efforts to mobilize the DIB to
civilians. Sberbank CEO Herman Gref, however, stated on June 7 at SPIEF that the alleged "unprecedented"
growth of wages in Russia will last at most another year.<31>
Putin continued efforts to
portray Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as an illegitimate president and identified the Ukrainian
Verkhovna Rada (parliament) as a legitimate actor with which the Kremlin can negotiate instead of
Zelensky. Putin’s recent statements are the latest in a series designed to obfuscate the legality of
Zelensky's extended term by misrepresenting the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian laws.<32> Putin
continued to claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate actor who has "usurped" power in Ukraine as the
Ukrainian Constitution does not allow for a Ukrainian president to extend his term beyond the five-year
fixed term.<33> Putin cherrypicked specific articles of the Ukrainian Constitution to make his argument,
including articles he also recently grossly mischaracterized or took out of their legal context during a
speech on May 28.<34> Putin claimed on June 7 that the Verkhovna Rada's power is extended under a period
of martial law and that presidential powers should be "transferred to the speaker of the Rada" under
articles 109, 110, and 111 of the Ukrainian Constitution now that Zelensky has "usurped" power.<35>
Article 109 states that "the resignation of the President of Ukraine enters into force from the moment he
or she personally announces the statement of resignation at a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine."<36> Article 110 states that "the inability of the President of Ukraine to exercise his or her
powers for reasons of health shall be determined at a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and
confirmed by a decision adopted by the majority of its constitutional composition."<37> Article 111
states that "the President of Ukraine may be removed from office by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by the
procedure of impeachment, in the event that he or she commits state treason or other crime." Putin is
invoking these articles to suggest that Zelensky's extended term is "illegal" and that the Verkhovna Rada
is the single authority to assume power should Zelensky resign, be impeached, or otherwise leave office
before the natural end of his term. Putin also invoked Article 83, which states that in the event of
martial law, the Verkhovna Rada's powers are extended, and Article 103, which states that a Ukrainian
president's term is five years - again claiming that presidential terms cannot be extended under martial
law while the Verkhovna Rada's term can be extended.<38>
Putin claimed that the Ukrainian
Constitution does not mention extending the Ukrainian presidential term, but this statement ignores the
Ukrainian legal framework about martial law. Article 19 of the Ukrainian law "On the Legal Regime of
Martial Law" states that presidential and Verkhovna Rada elections are prohibited under martial law and
forbids the Ukrainian president from abolishing martial law as long as there exists a "threat of attack
or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity."<39> Article 64 of the
Ukrainian constitution states that "under conditions of war or a state of emergency, specific
restrictions on rights and freedoms may be established with the indication of the period of validity of
these restrictions" except for the rights and freedoms stipulated by certain articles, none of which are
mentioned above.<40>
Putin's recent focus on legitimizing the Verkhovna Rada and its speaker
in lieu of Zelensky highlights a target for Russian destabilization operations.<41> ISW has repeatedly
assessed that recent Russian information operations aim to sow multiple divisions between the Ukrainian
people, military, military leadership, and political leadership to undermine domestic and international
support for Zelensky and Ukraine's decision to defend against the Russian invasion.<42> Ukrainian
intelligence has identified a Russian information campaign called "Maidan-3" that specifically aims to
spread doubt about Zelensky's legitimacy and has projected that these information operations will peak
from late May to July 2024.<43> These information operations may intend to set informational conditions
to eventually declare a Kremlin-backed actor as Ukrainian president, Verkhovna Rada speaker, or another
title with whom the Kremlin claims it can "legally" negotiate with instead of Zelensky.<44> Two figures
previously floated as possible replacements for Zelensky have since emerged in the wake of these
information operations.<45> Former pro-Russia Ukrainian MP Viktor Medvedchuk recently participated in the
information operation to discredit Zelensky.<46> Former pro-Russia Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych
traveled to Minsk on May 24 for an unspecified reason, and Ukrainian intelligence described Yanukovych's
last trip to Minsk in 2022 as a Kremlin effort to prepare Yanukovych for a "special operation" to be
reinstated as president of Ukraine.<47>
Putin attempted to introduce his children and the
children of other senior Russian officials to the public sphere at SPIEF, likely to set conditions for
them to eventually assume high-profile and powerful roles in the Russian government. Independent
Belarusian outlet Vot Tak reported that Putin's youngest daughter Katerina Tikhonova spoke virtually on a
June 6 panel about the role of defense industrial organizations and discussed Russian technological
development and import substitution.<48> Vot Tak also reported that Putin's eldest daughter Maria
Vorontsova spoke on a panel about biotechnology on June 7.<49> Vot Tak reported that Tikhonova spoke at
SPIEF in 2021 in a panel about BRICS and that Vorontsova has only previously attended SPIEF as a guest
where she did two interviews on the sidelines.<50> Kremlin newswire TASS characterized Tikhonova as
Innopraktika Company General Director and notably went out of its way to promote Vorontsova’s
professional titles and accolades by highlighting her position as Deputy Head of the Russian Faculty of
Fundamental Medicine at Moscow State University and a member of the Russian Association for the Promotion
of Science, and a Candidate of Medical Science (equivalent to a PhD of Medical Science).<51> TASS did not
mention their familial connection to Putin. TASS is likely attempting to portray Tikhonova and Vorontsova
as authoritative figures and to introduce them as trustworthy and knowledgeable individuals to the
Russian public.
A Russian insider source claimed that the children of other senior Russian
officials participated in SPIEF including: both sons of former Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head
and current Russian Institute for Strategic Studies Director Mikhail Fradkov - First Deputy Administrator
of the Presidential Administration Pavel Fradkov and CEO and Chairperson of Russian state-owned bank
Promsvyazbank Pyotr Fradkov; Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov's daughter Yelizaveta Peskova;
Presidential Aide Nikolai Patrushev's son Russian Agriculture Minister Dmitry Patrushev; Presidental
Administration Head Anton Vaino's son the Kremlin's Agency for Strategic Initiatives' youth work head
Alexander Vaino; Russian oligarch Boris Rotenberg's son Vice President of Gazprombank Roman Rotenberg;
Presidental Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko's son Alexander Kiriyenko; Security Council
Secretary Sergei Shoigu's daughter Ksenia Shoigu; and Putin's first cousin once removed ("niece") and
Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation Chairperson Anna Tsivileva.<52>
US National Security
Council Senior Director for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Pranay Vaddi stated that the
US has prepared a new nuclear weapons policy specifically to deter Russia, the People's Republic of China
(PRC), North Korea, and Iran.<53> Vaddi stated at the 2024 Arms Control Association meeting that the US
may have to deploy more strategic nuclear weapons in the coming years and that the US should be prepared
if the US president makes such a decision.<54> Vaddi stated that the US remains committed to
international arms control and non-proliferation values and agreements. Vaddi stated that Russia has
repeatedly rejected talks with the US to negotiate a successor to the New START strategic arms limitation
pact, which expires in 2026, and that the PRC has refused to discuss expanding its nuclear arsenal with
the US.
The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a $225 million security assistance
package for Ukraine on June 7.<55> The package includes missiles for HAWK air defense systems; Stinger
anti-aircraft missiles; ammunition for HIMARS; 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds; M113 armored personnel
carriers; Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor
systems; and other materiel.<56>
French President Emmanuel Macron announced on June 6 that
France will provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets and equip and train
a brigade of 4,500 Ukrainian soldiers.<57> Macron stated that Ukrainian pilots will likely train between
five and six months on Mirage-2000-5 aircraft in France and stated that Ukraine will have Mirage-2000-5
pilots by the end of 2024.<58>
The Russian Supreme Court declared an organization that does
not exist as "extremist" on June 7, consistent with previous ISW assessments that Russia seeks to expand
the legal definition of "extremism" to increasingly prosecute domestic anti-war sentiment. The Russian
Supreme Court declared the "Anti-Russian Separatist Movement" and its "structural divisions" as extremist
in accordance with a Russian Ministry of Justice request to this effect submitted on April 26.<59>
Russian opposition media has noted that no such organization exists, and Russian authorities have
previously designated other non-existent organizations meant to encompass broader “social movements” as
“extremist.”<60> Russian authorities likely intend to use this new extremist designation to further
prosecute anti-war sentiment among Russians and within occupied Ukraine, particularly movements opposing
Russia’s occupation of Ukraine and movements within ethnic minority communities advocating for better
treatment of Russian military personnel and mobilized personnel from these communities.<61>
The Kremlin continues efforts to destabilize the Balkans and dismantle the 1995 Dayton Accords that
ended the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, likely as part of a larger strategic effort that seeks to divide and
distract Europe. Russian President Vladimir Putin and President of Republika Srpska (the Serbian
political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) Milorad Dodik met on June 6 in St. Petersburg, and Dodik
attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF).<62> Dodik announced in a June 7
interview with Kremlin newswire TASS that Republika Srpska will adopt a Russia-style "foreign agents"
bill, which would restrict the activities of non-profit organizations that receive foreign funding, that
the government had previously withdrawn.<63> Dodik also stated Republika Srpska's intention to hold a
referendum on its independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina at an unspecified date.<64> The Kremlin has
previously leveraged its relationship with Republika Srpska to further influence the Balkans, sow
divisions in the West, and undermine the Dayton Accords to throw the Balkans into turmoil.<65>
Key Takeaways:
Russian President Vladimir Putin articulated a theory of victory in Ukraine
on June 7 that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances
indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive
operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces. Putin's theory of victory rests on
Russia's ability to outlast and overcome pledged Western security assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainian
efforts to mobilize more of its economy and population for the war effort, indicating that Putin likely
assesses that Russian forces will be able to leverage their advantages in manpower and materiel to
overwhelm on Ukrainian forces. Putin's theory of victory hinges on a critical assumption that the
West will abandon Ukraine to Russian victory, either on its own accord or in response to Russian efforts
to persuade the West to do so, and it is far from clear that the West will do so. Putin indirectly
indicated that Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory with Western-provided weapons do not cross a
supposed Russian "red line" that would result in Russian nuclear escalation. Putin heavily focused
on proposals to solve Russia's labor shortage issues during his speech at SPIEF on June 7. Putin
attempted to frame Russia's economic issues in a positive light, likely to prepare Russian citizens to
make more personal sacrifices as Russia sustains a protracted war in Ukraine at the expense of Russian
citizens’ standards of living. Putin continued efforts to portray Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky as an illegitimate president and identified the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) as a
legitimate actor with which the Kremlin can negotiate instead of Zelensky. Putin’s recent statements are
the latest in a series designed to obfuscate the legality of Zelensky's extended term by misrepresenting
the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian laws. Putin attempted to introduce his children and the
children of other senior Russian officials to the public sphere at SPIEF, likely to set conditions for
them to eventually assume high-profile and powerful roles in the Russian government. US National
Security Council Senior Director for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Pranay Vaddi stated
that the US has prepared a new nuclear weapons policy specifically to deter Russia, the People's Republic
of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran. The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a $225 million
security assistance package for Ukraine on June 7. French President Emmanuel Macron announced on
June 6 that France will provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets and
equip and train a brigade of 4,500 Ukrainian soldiers. The Russian Supreme Court declared an
organization that does not exist as "extremist" on June 7, consistent with previous ISW assessments that
Russia seeks to expand the legal definition of "extremism" to increasingly prosecute domestic anti-war
sentiment. The Kremlin continues efforts to destabilize the Balkans and dismantle the 1995 Dayton
Accords that ended the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, likely as part of a larger strategic effort that seeks to
divide and distract Europe. Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, near Chasiv Yar, and
northwest of Avdiivka.
The Russian military command is reportedly transferring an unspecified number of forces to the
Ukrainian-Russian border area near Kharkiv Oblast, but it is unclear if the Russian military command
plans to immediately commit these redeployed forces to combat or use them to reinforce the Northern
Grouping of Forces to bring it closer to its reported planned end strength. Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz
Commander Apty Alaudinov claimed in an interview with Russian state media outlet RT on June 8 that
Russian authorities decided to transfer elements of the Akhmat Spetsnaz to the Kharkiv direction from
unspecified areas at the end of May 2024.<1> Alaudinov claimed that the "Kashtan" detachment, formerly
known as Akhmat "Kamerton" detachment and renamed after its new commander, is operating in the Kharkiv
direction. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on
June 8 that Akhmat forces are serving as blocking units – specialized disciplinary units that fire upon
friendly forces if they engage in an unauthorized retreat – in the international border area, and it is
possible that the Russian military command transferred Akhmat forces to the area solely for this purpose
and not to conduct offensive operations.<2> Voloshyn also stated that the Russian military command is
increasing the Russian force grouping near the border area by transferring elements of unspecified
regiments and brigades from other sectors of the front, including from occupied Kherson Oblast. Voloshyn
stated that the Russian military command intends to commit unspecified airborne (VDV) elements and
additional elements of the 11th and 44th Army Corps (both of the Leningrad Military District ) to
offensive operations in unspecified areas of the border area. Elements of the 11th and 44th Army Corps
have been conducting offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and a battalion of the 98th VDV
Division is reportedly operating in a border area in Kursk Oblast.<3> The Ukrainian Resistance Center
stated on June 8 that the Russian military command is redeploying unspecified units and drone operators
from the Kherson direction to the Kharkiv direction.<4> Russian forces reportedly had roughly 35,000
personnel in the international border area as a part of the Northern Grouping of Forces when they started
offensive operations on May 10, whereas Ukrainian sources have indicated that the Russian military
initially sought to concentrate at least 50,000 to 70,000 personnel in the international border area as
of early May.<5> It is unclear whether Russian forces have altered the planned end strength of the
Northern Grouping of Forces since launching the offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast on May
10. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 6 that the Russian military command has only committed about
15,000 personnel to the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast.<6>
Ukrainian military
observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted on June 8 that a fraction of the reported 30,000 personnel that
Russia generates each month arrives at the front as combat force replacements and reinforcements and that
Russian force generation efforts have allowed Russian forces to establish only limited operational and
strategic reserves. Mashovets stated that on average each Russian operational grouping of forces receives
between 1,000 to 1,500 combat personnel as replacements or reinforcements every month and may receive
2,000 if the grouping is responsible for intensified offensive operations.<7> There are six operational
Russian grouping of forces operating within and near Ukraine, meaning that Mashovets is suggesting that
Russian forces receive a total of 6,000 to 12,000 new combat personnel each month.<8> This figure is not
incongruent with Ukrainian and Russian reports from January and April 2024 that Russia recruits 30,000
new personnel per month since a large number of these new personnel will fulfill combat support and
combat service support roles or later assume combat arms roles following training.<9> Russian President
Vladimir Putin stated on June 7 that Russia has recruited 160,000 new personnel so far in 2024, a figure
fairly consistent with reports that the Russian military recruits about 30,000 personnel a month.<10>
Russian forces have leveraged their possession of the theater-wide initiative to determine a tempo of
fighting in Ukraine in recent months that appears to generate casualties roughly equal to or slightly
less than the rate of newly generated forces.<11> This careful balance between Russian casualties and
newly generated forces requires that Russian forces not significantly intensify offensive operations for
a prolonged period of time, however. This balance becomes even more narrow when considering losses and
new force generation for just Russian combat personnel.<12> ISW has observed a "pulsing" of Russian
offensive operations along the front in recent months, wherein Russian forces alternate between
intensified assaults and a lower operational tempo to replenish losses.<13> The availability of new
combat personnel is likely one of several determining factors for when Russian forces decide to alternate
between intensified offensive operations.
Mashovets stated that Russian forces have
accumulated at most 60,000 personnel in operational and strategic reserves over the past six to eight
months (roughly from October 2023 to June 2024).<14> Russian forces have likely not properly trained or
equipped these reserves, which they have previously used largely as manpower pools for restaffing and
reinforcing committed units conducting grinding, infantry-heavy assaults with occasional limited
mechanized assaults.<15> ISW continues to assess that planned Russian operational- and strategic-level
reserves are unlikely to be ready to act as a first-echelon penetration force or as a second-echelon
exploitation force capable of conducting effective large-scale combined arms assaults.<16> These reported
limited operational- and strategic-level Russian reserves likely will be insufficient to support
simultaneous large-scale offensive efforts in several directions. The Russian military command will
likely have to choose one main effort during its expected summer offensive effort, if it intends for
these reserves to sustain a large-scale offensive operation.
Ukrainian forces conducted a
drone strike against a Russian military airfield in the North Ossetia-Alania Republic on the night of
June 7 to 8. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on June 8 that its sources in the Ukrainian special
services stated that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted a drone strike
against an airfield in North Ossetia on the night of June 7 to 8.<17> Geolocated footage published on
June 8 shows a drone targeting the Mozdok Airbase followed by a rising smoke plume.<18> North
Ossetia-Alania Republic Head Sergei Menyaylo claimed that Russian forces shot down three drones targeting
a military airfield in Mozdok and that unspecified objects sustained minor damage and caught fire.<19>
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed a drone over the North
Ossetia-Alania Republic on the morning of June 8.<20> A Russian milblogger amplified footage of Russian
forces reportedly shooting down a drone near oil infrastructure in Nogai Raion, Republic of Dagestan, but
ISW has not observed further evidence of Ukrainian drone strikes in the area.<21> One Russian milblogger,
however, claimed that a number of sources "erroneously" reported the strike near the Mozdok airfield as a
strike against the oil field in Nogai Raion.<22>
Russian strikes have caused widespread damage
to Ukraine's energy grid, and Ukraine will continue to face serious constraints on power generation
capacity. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on June 7 that only 27 percent of large Ukrainian
thermal power plants (TPPs) are operational and that Russian missile and drone strikes damaged or
destroyed the other 73 percent.<23> Shmyhal stated that recent Russian strikes have knocked out 9.2
gigawatts of Ukrainian generation capacity and stated that this is half of the generation capacity that
Ukraine used in Winter 2023-2024.<24> The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 5 that Russia has knocked
out or captured over half of Ukraine's generation capacity, bringing Ukrainian energy production to below
20 gigawatts from 55 gigawatts before the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.<25> Shmyhal stated
that Russian forces have destroyed 42 power generators and damaged 20 hydropower generators at Ukrainian
energy generation facilities.<26> Shmyhal emphasized that Ukraine is taking steps to relieve pressure on
Ukraine's energy grid and plans to restore as much energy generation capacity as possible before Winter
2024-2025.<27> Ukraine’s nuclear operator Energoatom stated on June 7 that it connected an additional
reactor at an unspecified nuclear power plant to the energy grid.<28> The head of Ukrainian state
electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo, Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, stated that this will relieve
Ukrainian power constraints for the next two weeks before increased summer consumption begins.<29>
Shmyhal stated that Ukraine is currently importing 1.7 gigawatts from the European Union (EU) but that
the EU is able to export a maximum of 2.2 gigawatts to Ukraine.<30>
US President Joe Biden met
with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris on June 7. Biden and Zelensky discussed the
battlefield situation, Ukraine's defensive capabilities, preparations to finalize a US-Ukraine bilateral
security agreement, and the upcoming Ukraine peace conference in Switzerland.<31> Biden apologized for
the delay in US security assistance to Ukraine and reiterated US support for Ukraine against Russian
aggression.<32> Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine needs more security assistance to strengthen its defense
of Kharkiv Oblast and that Ukraine needs more opportunities to strike military targets in Russia to
protect against Russian aggression from across the international border.<33> ISW continues to assess that
the delays in US security assistance to Ukraine have severely constrained Ukrainian defensive
capabilities in recent months and emboldened Russian forces to launch and make tactically significant
gains in their new offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast and double down on operations elsewhere
in the theater.<34>
Longtime Russian Central Bank Head Elvira Nabiullina is reportedly a
balancing force among Russian President Vladimir Putin's economic advisors despite pressure for Russian
officials to unequivocally support the long-term war effort in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on June 7 that
former Russian Service for Financial Markets Head and former Central Bank Deputy Head Oleg Vyugin stated
that Nabiullina has known Putin for years and has the "exclusive right" to tell Putin "what he doesn't
like" because Putin views her as straightforward and uninfluenced by corruption.<35> Bloomberg reported
that Nabiullina balances against Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, who advocates for Russia to
shape its budget to ensure a victorious Russian war effort, and former economic aid and new Kremlin
Deputy Chief of Staff Maxim Oreshkin, who portrays the Russian war as a global conflict against the West.
Bloomberg cited a senior government official who stated that Nabiullina is raising concerns about the
impacts of Russian labor shortages caused by the war and a "swollen" budget amid high defense spending. A
leaked video published on March 2, 2022, showed Nabiullina speaking about her hyperfocus on the Russian
economy after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and concern over greater domestic
sacrifices.<36> Bloomberg reported that Putin has begun overruling Nabiullina in some cases but assessed
that Putin is unlikely to remove her for the foreseeable future.<37> Bloomberg cited anonymous sources as
saying that Putin wants to avoid dismissing personnel in a way that could be viewed as destabilizing or
as being done under pressure.
Nabiullina is especially notable because she has previously
mitigated the economic fallout of Putin's geopolitical ambitions and reportedly tried to resign from her
position in May 2022 in opposition to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.<38> The Economist reported on
May 31 that Nabiullina ensured the stability of the ruble after Putin's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and
that in 2022 she feared that her resignation would lead to the arrests of her deputies at the Central
Bank.<39> The Economist reported that Nabiullina has largely favored regulatory market reforms but that
she learned early in her career in the late 1990s and early 2000s that the Russian economy can only take
so much change. The Economist noted that she has navigated accordingly as she gained power under Putin,
implementing some regulatory changes within the existing Russian economic system, and has shifted her
focus to minimize the economic impact of the war in Ukraine on the Russian public since February 2022.
Nabiullina's reported ability to speak candidly to Putin about the impact of the war on the Russian
economy is especially significant given Putin's recent efforts to oust any officials who have lost
Putin's favor or otherwise perceived as disloyal to Putin and his war effort.<40> Putin has recently been
preoccupied with assuaging domestic concerns about Russia's economy and has attempted to portray Russia's
economic issues positively, and he may be more willing to tolerate Nabiullina's candor or even appreciate
her honesty given her track record for stability.<41>
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence
Directorate (GUR) and Russian opposition outlets reported that unspecified actors attempted to
assassinate the former Russian occupation mayor of Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, Hennadiy Matsehora in Stary
Oskol, Belgorod Oblast on June 7.<42> The GUR stated that Matsehora is in critical condition at a
hospital in Moscow.<43> The Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on May 20 that
Matsehora, who was originally lawfully elected as Mayor of Kupyansk in 2020, defected and helped Russian
forces in February 2022 and that Ukrainian authorities will try Mateshora in absentia for treason.<44>
Key Takeaways:
The Russian military command is reportedly transferring an unspecified
number of forces to the Ukrainian-Russian border area near Kharkiv Oblast, but it is unclear if the
Russian military command plans to immediately commit these redeployed forces to combat or use them to
reinforce the Northern Grouping of Forces to bring it closer to its reported planned end strength. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted on June 8 that a fraction of the reported 30,000
personnel that Russia generates each month arrives at the front as combat force replacements and
reinforcements and that Russian force generation efforts have allowed Russian forces to establish only
limited operational and strategic reserves. Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a
Russian military airfield in the North Ossetia-Alania Republic on the night of June 7 to 8. Russian
strikes have caused widespread damage to Ukraine's energy grid, and Ukraine will continue to face serious
constraints on power generation capacity. US President Joe Biden met with Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris on June 7. Longtime Russian Central Bank Head Elvira Nabiullina is
reportedly a balancing force among Russian President Vladimir Putin's economic advisors despite pressure
for Russian officials to unequivocally support the long-term war effort in Ukraine. Ukraine's Main
Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Russian opposition outlets reported that unspecified actors
attempted to assassinate the former Russian occupation mayor of Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, Hennadiy
Matsehora in Stary Oskol, Belgorod Oblast on June 7. Russian forces recently advanced north of
Kharkiv City, southeast of Kupyansk, within easternmost Chasiv Yar, northwest of Avdiivka, and southwest
of Donetsk City. Russian actors are using video appeals from Russian servicemen to refute reports of
high Russian losses in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
The Biden Administration’s limited policy change permitting Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike
some Russian military targets in a small area within Russian territory has reduced the size of Russia’s
ground sanctuary by only 16 percent at maximum. US policy still preserves at least 84 percent of Russia's
ground sanctuary – territory within range of Ukrainian ATACMS. US policy restricting Ukraine’s usage of
US-provided weapons has effectively created a vast sanctuary – territory in range of US-provided weapons
but that Ukrainian forces are not allowed to strike with US-provided weapons – which Russia exploits to
shield its combat forces, command and control, logistics, and rear area support services that the Russian
military uses to conduct its military operations in Ukraine.<1> US policy still protects the vast
majority of Russia’s operational rear and deep rear, and US policy forbids Ukraine from using ATACMS
anywhere in Russia.<2> US President Joe Biden’s limited policy change in late May 2024 regarding the use
of US-provided weapons against military targets in Russia removed a maximum of 16 percent of Russia's
ground sanctuary, assuming that Ukrainian forces can strike all legitimate Russian military targets in
range of Ukrainian HIMARS using GMLRS in Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts. It is far from clear that
Ukrainian forces have permission to do so, however. Senior US officials have described Ukraine’s ability
to strike into Russia with GMLRS as being for counterbattery fire and geographically bounded to the
Kharkiv area, and have stated that Ukrainian forces may strike Russian military objects “deployed just
across the border,” suggesting that Ukraine may be prohibited from striking Russian military
targets further in the rear or in other areas in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts that are still in range of
GMLRS.<3> US officials’ statements also indicate that Ukrainian forces may be constrained from striking
Russian military targets that are not actively involved in ground attacks and strikes against Ukraine.<4>
The reduction of the sanctuary space’s area may be less than 16 percent, therefore.
Key
Takeaways:
The Biden Administration’s limited policy change permitting Ukraine to use
US-provided weapons to strike some Russian military targets in a small area within Russian territory has
reduced the size of Russia’s ground sanctuary by only 16 percent at maximum. US policy still preserves at
least 84 percent of Russia's ground sanctuary – territory within range of Ukrainian ATACMS. Likely
Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Su-57 fighter aircraft at the Akhtubinsk Airfield in Astrakhan Oblast
between June 7 and 8. Ukrainian forces may have struck a Russian large landing ship or patrol boat
in Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of June 8 to 9. The Kremlin's concerted effort to remove and
arrest senior Russian defense officials may be extending to civilian regional administration
officials. The pro-Kremlin Moldovan Victory opposition electoral bloc held its second congress in
Moscow on June 9 following a series of meetings between pro-Kremlin Moldovan opposition politicians and
Russian officials from June 6 to 9. Former pro-Russian Moldovan president and current head of the
Moldovan Socialist Party Igor Dodon gave interviews to Russian state news agencies TASS and RIA Novosti
on June 9 in which he promoted several known Kremlin narratives targeting the current Moldovan government
– many of which Moldovan opposition politicians also promoted at the Victory bloc congress. The
Kremlin will likely try to exploit its ties to Dodon as part of its wider efforts to destabilize Moldovan
democracy and influence the Moldovan government. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk,
Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City. Russian officials continue efforts to coerce
migrants into military service.
Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against Russian air defense assets in occupied Crimea overnight on
June 9 to 10, likely with ATACMS. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces
struck a Russian S-400 air defense battery near occupied Dzhankoi and two S-300 batteries near occupied
Chornomorske and Yevpatoria.<1> The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian strikes hit the radar
stations of each battery and caused secondary ammunition detonations and that Russian air defenses did
not intercept any of the Ukrainian missiles. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian
forces launched at least 10 ATACMS missiles and that each targeted air defense installation was an
element of the Russian 31st Air Defense Division (4th Guards Air Force and Air Defense Army, Southern
Military District and Russian Aerospace Forces ).<2> Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
air defenses intercepted multiple Ukrainian ATACMS missiles overnight but largely did not report that any
of the missiles hit their targets, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has not commented on the
strikes as of the time of this publication.<3> ISW has not observed visual confirmation of the extent of
damages from the Ukrainian strikes. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Schemes project published satellite
imagery of burn marks at a Russian military object near a railway junction in Dzhankoi but noted that the
imagery’s resolution is too low to determine specific damage.<4> A Russian milblogger who focuses on
Russian air and air defense and has been largely critical of the Russian MoD criticized the Russian MoD
in response to the strikes, claiming that Russian officers are falsely reporting no losses to their
superiors despite actually suffering heavy losses.<5>
Ukrainian strikes against Russian
military and logistics assets in connection to the United States' partial removal of Russian sanctuary in
Belgorod Oblast may have compelled Russian forces to change their deployment and transport patterns. The
Crimea-based Atesh Ukrainian partisan movement reported on June 10 that Russian forces recently
redeployed air defense systems from occupied Crimea to Belgorod Oblast and that Russian air defenses are
not completely covering Crimea as a result.<6> Footage dated June 8 shows that Russia has begun
transporting fuel across the Kerch Strait across the railway bridge.<7> Ukrainian Southern Operational
Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on April 29 that Russian authorities
have not transported fuel across the Kerch Strait railway bridge since March 2024 due to the threat of a
Ukrainian strike against the bridge as a fuel transport crossed, which could ignite and possibly destroy
the bridge.<8> Ukrainian military–focused news outlet Militarnyi assessed on June 10 that Ukrainian
strikes against railway barges across the Kerch Strait on May 30 prompted Russian authorities to begin
transporting fuel across the railway bridge again.<9> It is unclear whether Russian authorities will
continue to use the Kerch Strait railway bridge for fuel and logistics transport to occupied Crimea in
the near to medium term. Doing so would likely alleviate some logistics constraints as Russia struggles
to compensate for lost ferries across the strait but would leave the Kerch Strait bridge increasingly
vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes, particularly if Russian air defense coverage of Crimea is degraded as
Atesh reported.
Ukraine's Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro
Pletenchuk denied on June 10 a Sky News report that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Ropucha-class
landing ship in the Sea of Azov on the night of June 8 to 9.<10> Pletenchuk also stated that there are
three large Russian amphibious assault ships and three Buyan-M-class corvettes in the Sea of Azov as of
May 10.<11> Sky News reported on June 9, citing a Ukrainian military source, that Ukrainian forces sunk
or damaged a Russian Ropucha-class landing ship that Russian forces had recently moved from the Black Sea
to the Sea of Azov, which ISW amplified.<12>
New Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met
with a select group of Russian milbloggers and military commentators on June 10, suggesting that the
Kremlin seeks to partially use Belousov's replacement of widely unpopular former Defense Minister Sergei
Shoigu to build bridges and cultivate ties with a broader milblogger community via a cadre of coopted and
loyal military commentators. Russian state news agencies TASS and RIA Novosti reported on June 10 that
Belousov met with several military correspondents (also known as voyenkory or milbloggers) covering the
war in Ukraine and claimed that the conversation was "frank and constructive."<13> TASS and RIA noted
that Belousov hopes to hold such meetings regularly. Russian insider sources and milbloggers claimed in
late May and early June that Belousov was planning to meet with select milbloggers, and some of the more
critical milbloggers criticized Belousov for reportedly not inviting them to the meeting.<14> Russian
media confirmed on June 10 that several prominent and generally Kremlin-aligned milbloggers attended
Belousov's meeting, including head of the WarGonzo social media military project Semyon Pegov,
Komsomolskaya Pravda military correspondent and Kremlin-appointed member of the Human Rights Council
Alexander Kots; Zvezda military correspondent Anatoly Brodkin; Russia Today (RT) military correspondent
Murad Gazdiev, Readovka correspondent Maxim Dolgov, and others.<15> Gazdiev claimed on his personal
Telegram channel on June 10 that the milbloggers delivered good and bad news from the front to Belousov
and promised unspecified "huge changes."<16>
The Kremlin likely attempted to falsely portray
Belousov as more attentive to milbloggers' criticisms than his predecessor in an effort to co-opt a
larger non-Kremlin affiliated milblogger community. The Kremlin and Shoigu previously appeared at odds
over milblogger reproachment—Russian President Vladimir Putin met with select milbloggers in July 2022
and June 2023 to discuss the situation on the frontline in Ukraine, while the Russian MoD continuously
tried to crack down against critical milbloggers, who often used Shoigu as an informational scapegoat for
Russian operational failures in Ukraine.<17> The Kremlin has long endeavored to coopt milbloggers,
especially those critical of the Russian military leadership, in an effort to control the information
space, as ISW previously assessed.<18> Belousov's meeting represents MoD outreach to several milbloggers
who have had the Kremlin's favor for some time now and likely intended to court this group of
commentators and ensure their continued loyalty to a new MoD under Belousov. Belousov's milblogger
outreach is more likely to be a performative attempt to secure their loyalty than introduce systemic
changes within the Russian MoD, as several Russian milbloggers who were not invited to the meeting
previously noted.<19> Both the Kremlin and the Russian MoD have a vested interest in appearing open to
dialogue with milbloggers, who represent a major pro-war constituency, and the Kremlin is likely aiming
to portray Belousov as more cognizant of this fact than his predecessor.
Officials from
Russia, Iran, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) held bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the
BRICS foreign ministers meeting in Nizhny Novgorod on June 10. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
spoke at the BRICS meeting and highlighted the organization's recent expansion.<20> Lavrov reiterated
standard Kremlin narratives about how the Western rules-based order is detrimental to other states and
about the supposed merits of the creation of a multipolar world. Lavrov claimed that the "winds of
change" are driving BRICS forward. Lavrov met with officials from Brazil, South Africa, Ethiopia, Laos,
Thailand, Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt during the BRICS event as well.<21>
Lavrov met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the BRICS meeting on June 10. The
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Chinese MFA both stated that Lavrov and Wang discussed
diplomatic coordination in international organizations such as the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC).<22> The Chinese MFA stated that developing Russo-Chinese relations are a "strategic choice" by
both parties and that Lavrov and Wang "exchanged views" on the war in Ukrainian war."<23> The Russian MFA
labeled the Russo-Chinese relationship as a "strategic partnership" and stated that Lavrov thanked Wang
for the PRC's "balanced" line on the war in Ukraine and for not sending a representative to the June
15-16 Ukrainian peace summit in Switzerland.<24> The Russian MFA also stated that Lavrov and Wang
discussed stability in the Asia-Pacific region, where they accused the US of allegedly creating
anti-Russian and anti-Chinese military-political structures.<25> Lavrov also met with acting Iranian
Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani on June 10 and discussed efforts to form a Russo-Iranian
"strategic partnership" and create a new comprehensive intergovernmental agreement.<26> Kremlin newswire
TASS reported that Kani stated that Iran "sees enormous potential for expanding and strengthening
interaction."<27> Kani and Wang also met on June 10 and reportedly discussed increasing
cooperation.<28> Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on June 9 that Russian Ambassador to North Korea
Alexander Matsegora stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit North Korea, and an
unspecified diplomatic source reportedly stated that the visit will occur in the coming weeks after Putin
visits Vietnam.<29> ISW continues to assess that Russia, the PRC, Iran, North Korea, and Belarus are
deepening their multilateral partnerships in order to confront the West.<30>
The Armenian
National Assembly will likely hold an emergency session by June 17 during which the Armenian opposition
parties will demand Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's and his cabinet's resignation. Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty's Armenian Service Radio Azatutyun reported on June 10 that 33 members of the
Armenian opposition factions "Armenian Alliance" and "I Have Honor" supported convening an emergency
session of the National Assembly to discuss passing a resolution calling for Pashinyan's and his
cabinet's resignation and the formation of a new government.<31> The opposition factions blame Pashinyan
for what they see as failures to defend and secure the territorial integrity and borders of Armenia.<32>
Radio Azatutyun noted that Armenian law stipulates that the National Assembly needs the support of 27
members of the 107-seat National Assembly to call an emergency session.<33> Pashinyan's Civil Contract
Party's National Assembly leader Hayk Konjoryan stated that Civil Contract National Assembly members will
not participate in the June 17 emergency session.<34>
The US Department of State announced on
June 10 that the US and Poland jointly launched the Ukraine Communications Group (UCG) in Warsaw to
counter Russian disinformation by offering fact-based reporting about the war in Ukraine.<35>
Representatives of unspecified countries will reportedly collaborate with the UCG. The US Department of
State emphasized that Russia often uses false narratives to obfuscate its war aims and try to fracture
worldwide solidarity with Ukraine.
Finnish authorities reported that a Russian military
aircraft temporarily violated Finnish airspace on June 10 amid continued Russian efforts to undermine
Finnish sovereignty. The Finnish Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that it is investigating an incident
in which an unspecified Russian military aircraft flew roughly 2.5 kilometers deep into Finnish airspace
over the Gulf of Finland for two minutes on the morning of June 10.<36> The Russian MoD has not responded
to the Finnish report as of this publication but claimed on June 10 that Russian Tu-95MS missile carriers
and Tu-22M3 bombers conducted flights over neutral waters of the Baltic, Barents, and Norwegian seas.<37>
This reported incursion likely forwards the ongoing Kremlin effort to undermine Finnish sovereignty and
territorial integrity. The Russian MoD proposed on May 21 that the Russian government should reassess
Russia's maritime borders in the Gulf of Finland, which some Western officials have warned may be part of
an effort to revise maritime zones in the Baltic Sea.<38> The Kremlin has also been running a number of
information operations aimed at portraying Finland as an enemy to Russia and Russians, ultimately setting
information conditions to justify potential future aggression against Finland.<39>
Key
Takeaways:
Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against Russian air defense assets in occupied
Crimea overnight on June 9 to 10, likely with ATACMS. Ukraine's Southern Operational Command
Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk denied on June 10 a Sky News report that Ukrainian
forces struck a Russian Ropucha-class landing ship in the Sea of Azov on the night of June 8 to 9. New Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with a select group of Russian milbloggers and
military commentators on June 10, suggesting that the Kremlin seeks to partially use Belousov's
replacement of widely unpopular former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to build bridges and cultivate ties
with a broader milblogger community via a cadre of coopted and loyal military commentators. Officials from Russia, Iran, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) held bilateral meetings on the
sidelines of the BRICS foreign ministers meeting in Nizhny Novgorod on June 10. The Armenian
National Assembly will likely hold an emergency session by June 17 during which the Armenian opposition
parties will demand Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's and his cabinet's resignation. The US
Department of State announced on June 10 that the US and Poland jointly launched the Ukraine
Communications Group (UCG) in Warsaw to counter Russian disinformation by offering fact-based reporting
about the war in Ukraine. Finnish authorities reported that a Russian military aircraft temporarily
violated Finnish airspace on June 10 amid continued Russian efforts to undermine Finnish sovereignty. Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border
area. Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov appears to be focusing on healthcare programs for
Russian servicemembers in his new role.
Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide monetary and military assistance to Ukraine, including air
defense systems. The Estonian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 11 that Estonia will provide an
undisclosed number of Mistral man-portable short-range air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine as
part of a new military assistance package.<1> European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen
announced during the Ukrainian Recovery Conference in Berlin on June 11 that the European Union (EU) will
transfer roughly 1.5 billion euros ($1.6 billion) worth of profits from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine
in July, of which Ukraine will allocate 90 percent to defense spending and 10 percent to
reconstruction.<2> Von der Leyen stated that the EU will also transfer an additional 1.9 billion euros
($2 billion) to Ukraine from the EU's Ukraine Facility mechanism, which is a separate fund that provides
for the EU to transfer up to 50 billion euros ($53.7 billion) to Ukraine between 2024 and 2027.<3> German
Chancellor Olaf Scholz reiterated during the Ukrainian Recovery Conference that Germany will deliver a
Patriot air defense system to Ukraine in the coming weeks and announced that Germany will also deliver an
IRIS-T air defense system, an unspecified number of Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, and an
unspecified number and type of missiles and ammunition to Ukraine in the coming weeks and months.<4> The
German MoD initially announced the transfer of this third Patriot system in April 2024.<5> The New York
Times, citing senior US administration and military officials, reported on June 11 that US President Joe
Biden recently approved the transfer of another Patriot system to Ukraine following a series of
high-level meetings and internal debates regarding the best ways to meet Ukraine's need for additional
air defenses.<6> Unnamed US officials stated that the new system could be deployed to the frontline
within several days depending on any maintenance or modifications that the system may need, as the system
is currently stationed in Poland.
The Kremlin continues efforts to codify legal instruments
and repressive measures intended to broadly censor foreigners and foreign organizations in Russia. The
Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading on June 11 that seeks to codify the Russian
government's ability to recognize "any" foreign organization as "undesirable."<7> The Duma first approved
the draft version of this bill on May 27.<8> The Duma also adopted an additional bill in its first
reading that introduces criminal penalties including fines and imprisonment for someone's participation
in "any" organization classified as "undesirable."<9> Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin noted that this
new bill will fill a gap in the existing legislation, which only has provisions to class foreign
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as "undesirable."<10> The new bill will extend the undesirable
classification to any foreign and international organizations, thereby broadening the Kremlin's
discretion to target and censor a wide range of foreign organizations operating within Russia. The
Kremlin has previously used the "undesirable" designation to block opposition media outlets, civil
society organizations, and human rights-focused organizations from entering or operating within Russia,
as ISW has previously reported.<11> Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner for Human Rights Tatiana
Moskalkova also notably called on June 11 for the establishment of a legal mechanism that would allow the
Russian government to prosecute foreigners for "Russophobia as a manifestation of extremism."<12> Russian
authorities widely use accusations of "Russophobia" in an attempt to undermine any undesirable policy or
rhetoric they deem to be "anti-Russian," and have similarly used charges of extremism with broad
discretion to suppress and discourage domestic opposition.<13>
A prominent Kremlin-awarded
Russian milblogger channel announced that it opened a second "media school" in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan,
likely to support Kremlin efforts to expand its influence in the international information space,
particularly in Central Asia. The Rybar Telegram channel claimed on June 11 that it is opening the "Rybar
Media School" in Bishkek because Kyrgyzstan lacks military-political and industry expertise as well as a
"blogosphere" and opinion journalism.<14> Rybar framed its establishment of a "media school" in Bishkek
as an effort to coordinate and assert Russia's position in Central Asia and warned that Russia could be
"expelled" from Central Asia in three to five years if Russia fails to assert itself and manage its
informational influence in the region. Rybar's founder and manager Mikhail Zvinchuk gave a lecture to
students at the Kyrgyz National University about the benefits of using Telegram to "solve problems" in
the current information environment. Rybar claimed that Zvinchuk's lecture was only the first in a series
of lectures and trainings for Kyrgyz media workers, students, public relations professionals, and press
services to learn how to use multimedia to develop local Kyrgyz journalism. Rybar claimed that
journalists from the Kyrgyz-branch of the official Russian government outlet Rossiyskaya Gazeta,
"complained" about the lack of Russian journalistic work in Central Asia and claimed that the West
outbalances Russia in its support for Kyrgyz journalism. Zvinchuk gave a masterclass in December 2023 on
the importance of Telegram and other social media to press heads at Russian state-owned defense
conglomerate Rostec likely in an effort to normalize the war without directly involving the Kremlin or
other official state bodies. Rybar announced that it opened a media school in an unspecified location in
the Balkans in April 2024.<15> Rybar claimed that multiple Serbian and Republika Srpska (the Serbian
entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) outlets highlighted Rybar's "debut" in the Balkans, while notably
no Kyrgyz Russian- or Kyrgyz-language news outlets reported on the new "media school" in Bishkek as of
this publication.<16> Rybar will likely attempt to expand its media influence in other foreign countries,
and the Kremlin will likely seek to use coopted milbloggers like Rybar to expand Russian influence in
international media.
Danish authorities arrested a Danish-Russian dual citizen accused of
having connections to Russian intelligence services, which is likely part of the Kremlin's continued
efforts to re-intensify its hybrid campaign against Western countries. The Danish Broadcasting
Corporation (DR) reported on June 11 that Danish authorities arrested an unidentified woman with dual
Danish-Russian citizenship related to a recent investigation into the woman's connections to Russian
foreign intelligence.<17> DR reported on June 3, citing leaked documents from Western intelligence
services, that the women's legal aid clinic for Russian speakers received at least 338,000 Danish kroner
(about $49,000) from the Russian Fund for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living
Abroad (Pravfond), which DR describes as closely linked to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service
(SVR).<18> The Guardian, which saw the same leaked documents, reported that Pravfond's leadership has
multiple Russian intelligence agents, including longtime SVR officers Vladimir Pozdorovkin and Anatoly
Sorokin.<19> The Guardian reported that Pravfond operates throughout Europe and that Pozdorovkin
specifically oversees Pravfond's operations in Nordic and Baltic countries while Sorokin oversees
operations in the Middle East, Moldova, and Transnistria.<20> DR reported and that the woman is a
"central figure" in Denmark's Russian-speaking community and noted she has traveled to Russia and
elsewhere for conferences with Pravfond participation or sponsorship.<21> The Kremlin has recently
intensified its hybrid campaigns in Europe, and the Kremlin has been leaning into a narrative about
protecting Russians and Russian-speakers outside of Russia — often called "compatriots abroad" — as part
of its wider toolkit of hybrid manipulations.<22> The "compatriots abroad" narrative sets informational
conditions for the Kremlin to justify hybrid operations or even direct interference against countries it
claims do not adequately protect so-called Russian "compatriots" should these countries take actions
unfavorable to the Kremlin. DR noted that several European intelligence sources stated that the Kremlin
aims to use counseling and assistance centers — of which Pravfond funds at least 34 in 21 countries — to
justify direct interference in other countries.<23>
Kremlin newswire TASS reported on June 11
that the former Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Military Academy, Grigory Molchanov, was
appointed Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council.<24> Russian outlet RBK stated that Molchanov
has served in the Russian military since 1973 and noted that the Security Council's first new appointment
since former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu became Security Council Secretary on May 13.<25>
Russian outlet RTVI noted that there are currently eight deputy secretaries and one first deputy
secretary in addition to Shoigu.<26>
Key Takeaways:
Ukraine's Western allies
continue to provide monetary and military assistance to Ukraine, including air defense systems. The
Kremlin continues efforts to codify legal instruments and repressive measures intended to broadly censor
foreigners and foreign organizations in Russia. A prominent Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger
channel announced that it opened a second "media school" in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, likely to support
Kremlin efforts to expand its influence in the international information space, particularly in Central
Asia. Danish authorities arrested a Danish-Russian dual citizen accused of having connections to
Russian intelligence services, which is likely part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to re-intensify
its hybrid campaign against Western countries. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on June 11 that the
former Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Military Academy, Grigory Molchanov, was appointed
Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council. Russian forces recently advanced southeast of
Kupyansk and northwest of Avdiivka. Russia may have suffered a damaged or destroyed military naval
vessel in the Barents Sea. Belarusian officials continue to implicate themselves in the illegal
deportation of Ukrainian children to Belarus and their re-education in Belarusian programs.