Russian President Vladimir Putin articulated a theory of victory in Ukraine on June 7 that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces. Putin stated following his speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) that Russia does not need to conduct another call-up of reservists similar to Russia‘s September 2022 partial mobilization because Russia is not trying to rapidly achieve its military objectives in Ukraine.<1> Putin acknowledged that the current Russian military contingent committed to the war in Ukraine (reportedly the Russian military’s entire combat-capable ground force as of January 2024) would be insufficient for a rapid victory but suggested that Russian forces are instead pursuing a more gradual approach.<2> Putin stated that Russian forces aim to "squeeze" Ukrainian forces out "of those territories that should be under Russian control" and therefore Russia does not need to conduct another mobilization wave.<3> Putin asserted that Russian crypto-mobilization efforts are sufficient for this approach and that Russia has recruited 160,000 new personnel so far in 2024 (a figure consistent with reports that the Russian military recruits between 20,000-30,000 recruits per month).<4>

Putin's assessment that gradual Russian gains will allow Russia to achieve his goals in Ukraine is predicated on the assumption that Ukrainian forces will be unable to liberate any significant territory that Russian forces seize and that the Russian military will be able to sustain offensive operations that achieve gradual tactical gains regardless of heavy losses. Western intelligence has previously assessed that Putin assesses that US and Western support to Ukraine is “finite" and that Russian forces have blunted Ukrainian efforts to retake significant territory.<5> Putin's assessment has been reinforced by the recent months of delayed Western security assistance and corresponding Ukrainian materiel constraints, which allowed Russian forces to seize and maintain the theater-wide initiative and conduct consistent offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine that achieved gradual tactical gains.<6> Putin's June 7 comments support ISW's previous assessment that Putin's assessment of Ukrainian capabilities and how Putin’s perceived limits to Western support would incentivize Putin to pursue creeping offensive operations indefinitely if more rapid operations that lead to rapid decisive results seem unattainable.<7>

Putin's theory of victory rests on Russia's ability to outlast and overcome pledged Western security assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainian efforts to mobilize more of its economy and population for the war effort, indicating that Putin likely assesses that Russian forces will be able to leverage their advantages in manpower and materiel to overwhelm on Ukrainian forces. Putin's apparent assessment that Russia can "squeeze" Ukrainian forces out of all the lands it desires to occupy assumes that Ukraine will not acquire and sustain the manpower and materiel required to prevent indefinite Russian attempts to gradually advance along the front or needed to contest the initiative and conduct operationally significant counteroffensive operations. Ukrainian forces have previously shown that when they are well provisioned, they can prevent Russian forces from making even marginal tactical gains, force Russian offensive operations to culminate, and launch counteroffensive operations that liberate operationally significant territory.<8> Russian forces are currently leveraging the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine to dictate a tempo of fighting that generates casualties roughly equal to or slightly less than the rate of newly generated forces, which has allowed Russian forces to sustain their overall offensive tempo in Ukraine.<9> Russia is also further mobilizing its defense industrial base (DIB) and is generally far ahead of Ukraine and the West in this regard.<10> Putin and the Russian military command likely assess that Russian numerical manpower and materiel advantages will allow Russia to sustain this force generation replacement rate and field the required materiel needed to sustain indefinite creeping advances.

This strategy largely relies on Russia's ability to retain the theater-wide initiative, which Ukrainian forces can contest if Ukraine addresses its ongoing manpower challenges and receives sufficient, timely, and consistent Western security assistance.<11> Western security assistance pledges and Ukrainian force generation efforts will eventually allow Ukraine to accumulate the forces and materiel it needs to contest the initiative if ongoing Russian offensive operations are not successful in forcing Ukraine to divert manpower and materiel to defensive operations.<12>

Russian efforts to prevent Ukraine from accumulating the personnel and resources Ukraine needs to contest the initiative therefore are a part of an attritional war approach, in which the Russian military command believes that ongoing Russian offensive operations will inflict relatively more significant losses on Ukrainian forces and force Ukraine to divert manpower and materiel to stabilize the front instead of preparing for future counteroffensive efforts. This approach also requires that Russian forces avoid suffering outsized losses that would prevent Russia from sustaining offensive operations. There are limits to Russian force generation, as Putin himself admits with his continued aversion to another partial mobilization wave, and Russia's ability to expand its DIB has extensively relied on the refurbishment of extensive Soviet-era stocks, which are a finite resource.<13> Putin and the Russian military command likely calculate that these limits will not begin constraining Russia's ability to sustain its offensive tempo in Ukraine in the near-to-medium term, however. This approach requires that Ukraine is not able to inflict losses on Russian forces that decrease this offensive tempo or force Russian offensive efforts to culminate. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine should contest the initiative as soon as possible because Russian forces are reaping a variety of benefits from holding the initiative, including their ability to pursue a strategy of attritional warfare.<14>

Putin's theory of victory hinges on a critical assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine to Russian victory, either on its own accord or in response to Russian efforts to persuade the West to do so, and it is far from clear that the West will do so. Putin notably did not identify what specific goals he assesses gradual tactical Russian gains will achieve, although the Russian military command has likely previously believed that such gains would encourage Western debates about continued support for Ukraine and cause weakened Western support that exacerbates Ukrainian materiel constraints.<15> Putin also did not specify which territory "should" be under Russian control, part of continued Kremlin rhetoric that purposefully leaves open room for further territorial conquest in Ukraine.<16> The current rate of Russian advance suggests that Russian forces may pursue individual operationally significant objectives over the course of many months if not years, and efforts to not bound the Kremlin's territorial objectives likely intend to justify indefinite creeping offensive operations as long as it takes to achieve Western and Ukrainian capitulation.<17> Putin may believe that as long as Russia can prevent Ukraine from contesting the initiative he can lock in limited territorial conquests while encouraging Western debates about continued aid to Ukraine once current pledges of security assistance are expended.

The end of Western security assistance would eventually lead to the collapse of the frontline and total Russian victory in Ukraine, a reality that recent months of delayed Western security assistance has further highlighted.<18> The West must proactively provide Ukrainian forces with the necessary equipment and weapons at the scale, timing, and regularity that Ukrainian forces require for operations that liberate significant swaths of occupied Ukraine and challenge Putin's belief that he can gradually subsume Ukraine should rapid total victory appear unreachable. The West also maintains the ability to substantially disrupt Russian operations at scale by allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike Russia’s operational rear and deep rear areas in Russian territory.<19> The West must not surrender to Russia's strategic effort to destroy Western commitment to Ukrainian survival and must remember that Ukrainian victory has always been possible as long as the West remains committed to that goal.<20>

Putin indirectly indicated that Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory with Western-provided weapons do not cross a supposed Russian "red line" that would result in Russian nuclear escalation. Putin stated that Russia's nuclear doctrine calls for Russia to only use nuclear weapons in the event of "exceptional cases" of threats to Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.<21> Putin stated that he does not think such an "exceptional" case has arisen so "there is no such need" for Russia to use nuclear weapons. Ukrainian forces have struck military targets in Belgorod Oblast with US-provided HIMARS systems using GMLRS since early June 2024.<22> Putin’s June 7 statement is a significant rhetorical reversal given that Putin and other Kremlin officials have previously threatened Russian nuclear weapon use should Western states allow Ukraine to strike into Russian territory with Western-provided weapons.<23> Western and Ukrainian policies and actions have crossed Russia's supposed "red lines" several times throughout the war without drawing a significant Russian reaction, indicating that many of Russia's "red lines" are most likely information operations designed to push the West to self-deter.<24>

Putin heavily focused on proposals to solve Russia's labor shortage issues during his speech at SPIEF on June 7. Putin outlined a 10-point plan to grow the Russian economy and acknowledged that Russia is suffering from demographic challenges and labor shortages.<25> Putin called on the Russian government to enact multiple reforms to increase the labor supply and productivity, such as improving education and training, automating and digitalizing Russian industry, increasing the use of artificial intelligence (AI), and increasing spending on research and development. Putin highlighted the necessity of migrant labor to increase Russia's economic growth but stated that Russia has not yet developed a "meaningful" migration policy. Putin specified that Russia only needs skilled and educated migrant laborers with a knowledge of Russian language and culture and who will "not create any problems for local citizens in the workplace and in life." Putin ended his SPIEF appearance by stating that Russia "will treat the culture and traditions of peoples of the Russian Federation" with respect as "unity is strength." Putin has touted Russia as a unified multiethnic and multinational state, but his June 7 statements demonstrate the differing policies and perceptions towards the indigenous, federally recognized peoples of Russia and migrants.<26> Putin's migration policy proposals demonstrate how the Kremlin continues to struggle to balance Russia's need for migrants to compensate for labor shortages and wide-scale anti-migrant sentiments in Russia, particularly as the Kremlin tries to further mobilize the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).

Putin attempted to frame Russia's economic issues in a positive light, likely to prepare Russian citizens to make more personal sacrifices as Russia sustains a protracted war in Ukraine at the expense of Russian citizens’ standards of living. Putin framed Russia's labor shortages as resulting from Russia's alleged "record low" unemployment, not a consequence of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.<27> Putin stated that people who have reached retirement age have experience and knowledge that is useful to the Russian economy and that many pensioners have "aspirations" to continue working. Putin proposed that the Russian government annually increase pensions starting in February 2025 for pensioners who continue to work even after they reach retirement age. Putin met with St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov before his speech at SPIEF, during which Beglov presented the idea of increasing pensions as a direct request from working pensioners.<28> Large-scale protests erupted in Russia in 2018 when the Kremlin announced a raise in the retirement age, and Putin is likely trying to use monetary incentives to push pensioners to choose to work beyond the retirement age to help ease Russia's labor shortages.<29> Putin also highlighted the strength of Russia's DIB, claiming that Russia has increased its production of ammunition by more than 20 times in an unspecified time frame and that Russia has superior aviation and armored vehicle technology than the West.<30> Putin claimed that the Russian DIB has increased its production of civilian products by about five percent over the past two years, likely to justify Russia's increased defense spending and recent efforts to mobilize the DIB to civilians. Sberbank CEO Herman Gref, however, stated on June 7 at SPIEF that the alleged "unprecedented" growth of wages in Russia will last at most another year.<31>

Putin continued efforts to portray Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as an illegitimate president and identified the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) as a legitimate actor with which the Kremlin can negotiate instead of Zelensky. Putin’s recent statements are the latest in a series designed to obfuscate the legality of Zelensky's extended term by misrepresenting the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian laws.<32> Putin continued to claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate actor who has "usurped" power in Ukraine as the Ukrainian Constitution does not allow for a Ukrainian president to extend his term beyond the five-year fixed term.<33> Putin cherrypicked specific articles of the Ukrainian Constitution to make his argument, including articles he also recently grossly mischaracterized or took out of their legal context during a speech on May 28.<34> Putin claimed on June 7 that the Verkhovna Rada's power is extended under a period of martial law and that presidential powers should be "transferred to the speaker of the Rada" under articles 109, 110, and 111 of the Ukrainian Constitution now that Zelensky has "usurped" power.<35> Article 109 states that "the resignation of the President of Ukraine enters into force from the moment he or she personally announces the statement of resignation at a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine."<36> Article 110 states that "the inability of the President of Ukraine to exercise his or her powers for reasons of health shall be determined at a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and confirmed by a decision adopted by the majority of its constitutional composition."<37> Article 111 states that "the President of Ukraine may be removed from office by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by the procedure of impeachment, in the event that he or she commits state treason or other crime." Putin is invoking these articles to suggest that Zelensky's extended term is "illegal" and that the Verkhovna Rada is the single authority to assume power should Zelensky resign, be impeached, or otherwise leave office before the natural end of his term. Putin also invoked Article 83, which states that in the event of martial law, the Verkhovna Rada's powers are extended, and Article 103, which states that a Ukrainian president's term is five years - again claiming that presidential terms cannot be extended under martial law while the Verkhovna Rada's term can be extended.<38>

Putin claimed that the Ukrainian Constitution does not mention extending the Ukrainian presidential term, but this statement ignores the Ukrainian legal framework about martial law. Article 19 of the Ukrainian law "On the Legal Regime of Martial Law" states that presidential and Verkhovna Rada elections are prohibited under martial law and forbids the Ukrainian president from abolishing martial law as long as there exists a "threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity."<39> Article 64 of the Ukrainian constitution states that "under conditions of war or a state of emergency, specific restrictions on rights and freedoms may be established with the indication of the period of validity of these restrictions" except for the rights and freedoms stipulated by certain articles, none of which are mentioned above.<40>

Putin's recent focus on legitimizing the Verkhovna Rada and its speaker in lieu of Zelensky highlights a target for Russian destabilization operations.<41> ISW has repeatedly assessed that recent Russian information operations aim to sow multiple divisions between the Ukrainian people, military, military leadership, and political leadership to undermine domestic and international support for Zelensky and Ukraine's decision to defend against the Russian invasion.<42> Ukrainian intelligence has identified a Russian information campaign called "Maidan-3" that specifically aims to spread doubt about Zelensky's legitimacy and has projected that these information operations will peak from late May to July 2024.<43> These information operations may intend to set informational conditions to eventually declare a Kremlin-backed actor as Ukrainian president, Verkhovna Rada speaker, or another title with whom the Kremlin claims it can "legally" negotiate with instead of Zelensky.<44> Two figures previously floated as possible replacements for Zelensky have since emerged in the wake of these information operations.<45> Former pro-Russia Ukrainian MP Viktor Medvedchuk recently participated in the information operation to discredit Zelensky.<46> Former pro-Russia Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych traveled to Minsk on May 24 for an unspecified reason, and Ukrainian intelligence described Yanukovych's last trip to Minsk in 2022 as a Kremlin effort to prepare Yanukovych for a "special operation" to be reinstated as president of Ukraine.<47>

Putin attempted to introduce his children and the children of other senior Russian officials to the public sphere at SPIEF, likely to set conditions for them to eventually assume high-profile and powerful roles in the Russian government. Independent Belarusian outlet Vot Tak reported that Putin's youngest daughter Katerina Tikhonova spoke virtually on a June 6 panel about the role of defense industrial organizations and discussed Russian technological development and import substitution.<48> Vot Tak also reported that Putin's eldest daughter Maria Vorontsova spoke on a panel about biotechnology on June 7.<49> Vot Tak reported that Tikhonova spoke at SPIEF in 2021 in a panel about BRICS and that Vorontsova has only previously attended SPIEF as a guest where she did two interviews on the sidelines.<50> Kremlin newswire TASS characterized Tikhonova as Innopraktika Company General Director and notably went out of its way to promote Vorontsova’s professional titles and accolades by highlighting her position as Deputy Head of the Russian Faculty of Fundamental Medicine at Moscow State University and a member of the Russian Association for the Promotion of Science, and a Candidate of Medical Science (equivalent to a PhD of Medical Science).<51> TASS did not mention their familial connection to Putin. TASS is likely attempting to portray Tikhonova and Vorontsova as authoritative figures and to introduce them as trustworthy and knowledgeable individuals to the Russian public.

A Russian insider source claimed that the children of other senior Russian officials participated in SPIEF including: both sons of former Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head and current Russian Institute for Strategic Studies Director Mikhail Fradkov - First Deputy Administrator of the Presidential Administration Pavel Fradkov and CEO and Chairperson of Russian state-owned bank Promsvyazbank Pyotr Fradkov; Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov's daughter Yelizaveta Peskova; Presidential Aide Nikolai Patrushev's son Russian Agriculture Minister Dmitry Patrushev; Presidental Administration Head Anton Vaino's son the Kremlin's Agency for Strategic Initiatives' youth work head Alexander Vaino; Russian oligarch Boris Rotenberg's son Vice President of Gazprombank Roman Rotenberg; Presidental Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko's son Alexander Kiriyenko; Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu's daughter Ksenia Shoigu; and Putin's first cousin once removed ("niece") and Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation Chairperson Anna Tsivileva.<52>

US National Security Council Senior Director for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Pranay Vaddi stated that the US has prepared a new nuclear weapons policy specifically to deter Russia, the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran.<53> Vaddi stated at the 2024 Arms Control Association meeting that the US may have to deploy more strategic nuclear weapons in the coming years and that the US should be prepared if the US president makes such a decision.<54> Vaddi stated that the US remains committed to international arms control and non-proliferation values and agreements. Vaddi stated that Russia has repeatedly rejected talks with the US to negotiate a successor to the New START strategic arms limitation pact, which expires in 2026, and that the PRC has refused to discuss expanding its nuclear arsenal with the US.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a $225 million security assistance package for Ukraine on June 7.<55> The package includes missiles for HAWK air defense systems; Stinger anti-aircraft missiles; ammunition for HIMARS; 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds; M113 armored personnel carriers; Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; and other materiel.<56>

French President Emmanuel Macron announced on June 6 that France will provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets and equip and train a brigade of 4,500 Ukrainian soldiers.<57> Macron stated that Ukrainian pilots will likely train between five and six months on Mirage-2000-5 aircraft in France and stated that Ukraine will have Mirage-2000-5 pilots by the end of 2024.<58>

The Russian Supreme Court declared an organization that does not exist as "extremist" on June 7, consistent with previous ISW assessments that Russia seeks to expand the legal definition of "extremism" to increasingly prosecute domestic anti-war sentiment. The Russian Supreme Court declared the "Anti-Russian Separatist Movement" and its "structural divisions" as extremist in accordance with a Russian Ministry of Justice request to this effect submitted on April 26.<59> Russian opposition media has noted that no such organization exists, and Russian authorities have previously designated other non-existent organizations meant to encompass broader “social movements” as “extremist.”<60> Russian authorities likely intend to use this new extremist designation to further prosecute anti-war sentiment among Russians and within occupied Ukraine, particularly movements opposing Russia’s occupation of Ukraine and movements within ethnic minority communities advocating for better treatment of Russian military personnel and mobilized personnel from these communities.<61>

The Kremlin continues efforts to destabilize the Balkans and dismantle the 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, likely as part of a larger strategic effort that seeks to divide and distract Europe. Russian President Vladimir Putin and President of Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) Milorad Dodik met on June 6 in St. Petersburg, and Dodik attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF).<62> Dodik announced in a June 7 interview with Kremlin newswire TASS that Republika Srpska will adopt a Russia-style "foreign agents" bill, which would restrict the activities of non-profit organizations that receive foreign funding, that the government had previously withdrawn.<63> Dodik also stated Republika Srpska's intention to hold a referendum on its independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina at an unspecified date.<64> The Kremlin has previously leveraged its relationship with Republika Srpska to further influence the Balkans, sow divisions in the West, and undermine the Dayton Accords to throw the Balkans into turmoil.<65>

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin articulated a theory of victory in Ukraine on June 7 that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.
Putin's theory of victory rests on Russia's ability to outlast and overcome pledged Western security assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainian efforts to mobilize more of its economy and population for the war effort, indicating that Putin likely assesses that Russian forces will be able to leverage their advantages in manpower and materiel to overwhelm on Ukrainian forces.
Putin's theory of victory hinges on a critical assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine to Russian victory, either on its own accord or in response to Russian efforts to persuade the West to do so, and it is far from clear that the West will do so.
Putin indirectly indicated that Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory with Western-provided weapons do not cross a supposed Russian "red line" that would result in Russian nuclear escalation.
Putin heavily focused on proposals to solve Russia's labor shortage issues during his speech at SPIEF on June 7.
Putin attempted to frame Russia's economic issues in a positive light, likely to prepare Russian citizens to make more personal sacrifices as Russia sustains a protracted war in Ukraine at the expense of Russian citizens’ standards of living.
Putin continued efforts to portray Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as an illegitimate president and identified the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) as a legitimate actor with which the Kremlin can negotiate instead of Zelensky. Putin’s recent statements are the latest in a series designed to obfuscate the legality of Zelensky's extended term by misrepresenting the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian laws.
Putin attempted to introduce his children and the children of other senior Russian officials to the public sphere at SPIEF, likely to set conditions for them to eventually assume high-profile and powerful roles in the Russian government.
US National Security Council Senior Director for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Pranay Vaddi stated that the US has prepared a new nuclear weapons policy specifically to deter Russia, the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran.
The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a $225 million security assistance package for Ukraine on June 7.
French President Emmanuel Macron announced on June 6 that France will provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets and equip and train a brigade of 4,500 Ukrainian soldiers.
The Russian Supreme Court declared an organization that does not exist as "extremist" on June 7, consistent with previous ISW assessments that Russia seeks to expand the legal definition of "extremism" to increasingly prosecute domestic anti-war sentiment.
The Kremlin continues efforts to destabilize the Balkans and dismantle the 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, likely as part of a larger strategic effort that seeks to divide and distract Europe.
Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, near Chasiv Yar, and northwest of Avdiivka.

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The Russian military command is reportedly transferring an unspecified number of forces to the Ukrainian-Russian border area near Kharkiv Oblast, but it is unclear if the Russian military command plans to immediately commit these redeployed forces to combat or use them to reinforce the Northern Grouping of Forces to bring it closer to its reported planned end strength. Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov claimed in an interview with Russian state media outlet RT on June 8 that Russian authorities decided to transfer elements of the Akhmat Spetsnaz to the Kharkiv direction from unspecified areas at the end of May 2024.<1> Alaudinov claimed that the "Kashtan" detachment, formerly known as Akhmat "Kamerton" detachment and renamed after its new commander, is operating in the Kharkiv direction. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on June 8 that Akhmat forces are serving as blocking units – specialized disciplinary units that fire upon friendly forces if they engage in an unauthorized retreat – in the international border area, and it is possible that the Russian military command transferred Akhmat forces to the area solely for this purpose and not to conduct offensive operations.<2> Voloshyn also stated that the Russian military command is increasing the Russian force grouping near the border area by transferring elements of unspecified regiments and brigades from other sectors of the front, including from occupied Kherson Oblast. Voloshyn stated that the Russian military command intends to commit unspecified airborne (VDV) elements and additional elements of the 11th and 44th Army Corps (both of the Leningrad Military District ) to offensive operations in unspecified areas of the border area. Elements of the 11th and 44th Army Corps have been conducting offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and a battalion of the 98th VDV Division is reportedly operating in a border area in Kursk Oblast.<3> The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on June 8 that the Russian military command is redeploying unspecified units and drone operators from the Kherson direction to the Kharkiv direction.<4> Russian forces reportedly had roughly 35,000 personnel in the international border area as a part of the Northern Grouping of Forces when they started offensive operations on May 10, whereas Ukrainian sources have indicated that the Russian military initially sought to concentrate at least 50,000 to 70,000 personnel in the international border area as of early May.<5> It is unclear whether Russian forces have altered the planned end strength of the Northern Grouping of Forces since launching the offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast on May 10. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 6 that the Russian military command has only committed about 15,000 personnel to the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast.<6>

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted on June 8 that a fraction of the reported 30,000 personnel that Russia generates each month arrives at the front as combat force replacements and reinforcements and that Russian force generation efforts have allowed Russian forces to establish only limited operational and strategic reserves. Mashovets stated that on average each Russian operational grouping of forces receives between 1,000 to 1,500 combat personnel as replacements or reinforcements every month and may receive 2,000 if the grouping is responsible for intensified offensive operations.<7> There are six operational Russian grouping of forces operating within and near Ukraine, meaning that Mashovets is suggesting that Russian forces receive a total of 6,000 to 12,000 new combat personnel each month.<8> This figure is not incongruent with Ukrainian and Russian reports from January and April 2024 that Russia recruits 30,000 new personnel per month since a large number of these new personnel will fulfill combat support and combat service support roles or later assume combat arms roles following training.<9> Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on June 7 that Russia has recruited 160,000 new personnel so far in 2024, a figure fairly consistent with reports that the Russian military recruits about 30,000 personnel a month.<10> Russian forces have leveraged their possession of the theater-wide initiative to determine a tempo of fighting in Ukraine in recent months that appears to generate casualties roughly equal to or slightly less than the rate of newly generated forces.<11> This careful balance between Russian casualties and newly generated forces requires that Russian forces not significantly intensify offensive operations for a prolonged period of time, however. This balance becomes even more narrow when considering losses and new force generation for just Russian combat personnel.<12> ISW has observed a "pulsing" of Russian offensive operations along the front in recent months, wherein Russian forces alternate between intensified assaults and a lower operational tempo to replenish losses.<13> The availability of new combat personnel is likely one of several determining factors for when Russian forces decide to alternate between intensified offensive operations.

Mashovets stated that Russian forces have accumulated at most 60,000 personnel in operational and strategic reserves over the past six to eight months (roughly from October 2023 to June 2024).<14> Russian forces have likely not properly trained or equipped these reserves, which they have previously used largely as manpower pools for restaffing and reinforcing committed units conducting grinding, infantry-heavy assaults with occasional limited mechanized assaults.<15> ISW continues to assess that planned Russian operational- and strategic-level reserves are unlikely to be ready to act as a first-echelon penetration force or as a second-echelon exploitation force capable of conducting effective large-scale combined arms assaults.<16> These reported limited operational- and strategic-level Russian reserves likely will be insufficient to support simultaneous large-scale offensive efforts in several directions. The Russian military command will likely have to choose one main effort during its expected summer offensive effort, if it intends for these reserves to sustain a large-scale offensive operation.

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian military airfield in the North Ossetia-Alania Republic on the night of June 7 to 8. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on June 8 that its sources in the Ukrainian special services stated that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted a drone strike against an airfield in North Ossetia on the night of June 7 to 8.<17> Geolocated footage published on June 8 shows a drone targeting the Mozdok Airbase followed by a rising smoke plume.<18> North Ossetia-Alania Republic Head Sergei Menyaylo claimed that Russian forces shot down three drones targeting a military airfield in Mozdok and that unspecified objects sustained minor damage and caught fire.<19> The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed a drone over the North Ossetia-Alania Republic on the morning of June 8.<20> A Russian milblogger amplified footage of Russian forces reportedly shooting down a drone near oil infrastructure in Nogai Raion, Republic of Dagestan, but ISW has not observed further evidence of Ukrainian drone strikes in the area.<21> One Russian milblogger, however, claimed that a number of sources "erroneously" reported the strike near the Mozdok airfield as a strike against the oil field in Nogai Raion.<22>

Russian strikes have caused widespread damage to Ukraine's energy grid, and Ukraine will continue to face serious constraints on power generation capacity. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on June 7 that only 27 percent of large Ukrainian thermal power plants (TPPs) are operational and that Russian missile and drone strikes damaged or destroyed the other 73 percent.<23> Shmyhal stated that recent Russian strikes have knocked out 9.2 gigawatts of Ukrainian generation capacity and stated that this is half of the generation capacity that Ukraine used in Winter 2023-2024.<24> The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 5 that Russia has knocked out or captured over half of Ukraine's generation capacity, bringing Ukrainian energy production to below 20 gigawatts from 55 gigawatts before the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.<25> Shmyhal stated that Russian forces have destroyed 42 power generators and damaged 20 hydropower generators at Ukrainian energy generation facilities.<26> Shmyhal emphasized that Ukraine is taking steps to relieve pressure on Ukraine's energy grid and plans to restore as much energy generation capacity as possible before Winter 2024-2025.<27> Ukraine’s nuclear operator Energoatom stated on June 7 that it connected an additional reactor at an unspecified nuclear power plant to the energy grid.<28> The head of Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo, Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, stated that this will relieve Ukrainian power constraints for the next two weeks before increased summer consumption begins.<29> Shmyhal stated that Ukraine is currently importing 1.7 gigawatts from the European Union (EU) but that the EU is able to export a maximum of 2.2 gigawatts to Ukraine.<30>

US President Joe Biden met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris on June 7. Biden and Zelensky discussed the battlefield situation, Ukraine's defensive capabilities, preparations to finalize a US-Ukraine bilateral security agreement, and the upcoming Ukraine peace conference in Switzerland.<31> Biden apologized for the delay in US security assistance to Ukraine and reiterated US support for Ukraine against Russian aggression.<32> Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine needs more security assistance to strengthen its defense of Kharkiv Oblast and that Ukraine needs more opportunities to strike military targets in Russia to protect against Russian aggression from across the international border.<33> ISW continues to assess that the delays in US security assistance to Ukraine have severely constrained Ukrainian defensive capabilities in recent months and emboldened Russian forces to launch and make tactically significant gains in their new offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast and double down on operations elsewhere in the theater.<34>

Longtime Russian Central Bank Head Elvira Nabiullina is reportedly a balancing force among Russian President Vladimir Putin's economic advisors despite pressure for Russian officials to unequivocally support the long-term war effort in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on June 7 that former Russian Service for Financial Markets Head and former Central Bank Deputy Head Oleg Vyugin stated that Nabiullina has known Putin for years and has the "exclusive right" to tell Putin "what he doesn't like" because Putin views her as straightforward and uninfluenced by corruption.<35> Bloomberg reported that Nabiullina balances against Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, who advocates for Russia to shape its budget to ensure a victorious Russian war effort, and former economic aid and new Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Maxim Oreshkin, who portrays the Russian war as a global conflict against the West. Bloomberg cited a senior government official who stated that Nabiullina is raising concerns about the impacts of Russian labor shortages caused by the war and a "swollen" budget amid high defense spending. A leaked video published on March 2, 2022, showed Nabiullina speaking about her hyperfocus on the Russian economy after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and concern over greater domestic sacrifices.<36> Bloomberg reported that Putin has begun overruling Nabiullina in some cases but assessed that Putin is unlikely to remove her for the foreseeable future.<37> Bloomberg cited anonymous sources as saying that Putin wants to avoid dismissing personnel in a way that could be viewed as destabilizing or as being done under pressure.

Nabiullina is especially notable because she has previously mitigated the economic fallout of Putin's geopolitical ambitions and reportedly tried to resign from her position in May 2022 in opposition to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.<38> The Economist reported on May 31 that Nabiullina ensured the stability of the ruble after Putin's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and that in 2022 she feared that her resignation would lead to the arrests of her deputies at the Central Bank.<39> The Economist reported that Nabiullina has largely favored regulatory market reforms but that she learned early in her career in the late 1990s and early 2000s that the Russian economy can only take so much change. The Economist noted that she has navigated accordingly as she gained power under Putin, implementing some regulatory changes within the existing Russian economic system, and has shifted her focus to minimize the economic impact of the war in Ukraine on the Russian public since February 2022. Nabiullina's reported ability to speak candidly to Putin about the impact of the war on the Russian economy is especially significant given Putin's recent efforts to oust any officials who have lost Putin's favor or otherwise perceived as disloyal to Putin and his war effort.<40> Putin has recently been preoccupied with assuaging domestic concerns about Russia's economy and has attempted to portray Russia's economic issues positively, and he may be more willing to tolerate Nabiullina's candor or even appreciate her honesty given her track record for stability.<41>

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Russian opposition outlets reported that unspecified actors attempted to assassinate the former Russian occupation mayor of Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, Hennadiy Matsehora in Stary Oskol, Belgorod Oblast on June 7.<42> The GUR stated that Matsehora is in critical condition at a hospital in Moscow.<43> The Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on May 20 that Matsehora, who was originally lawfully elected as Mayor of Kupyansk in 2020, defected and helped Russian forces in February 2022 and that Ukrainian authorities will try Mateshora in absentia for treason.<44>

Key Takeaways:

The Russian military command is reportedly transferring an unspecified number of forces to the Ukrainian-Russian border area near Kharkiv Oblast, but it is unclear if the Russian military command plans to immediately commit these redeployed forces to combat or use them to reinforce the Northern Grouping of Forces to bring it closer to its reported planned end strength.
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted on June 8 that a fraction of the reported 30,000 personnel that Russia generates each month arrives at the front as combat force replacements and reinforcements and that Russian force generation efforts have allowed Russian forces to establish only limited operational and strategic reserves.
Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian military airfield in the North Ossetia-Alania Republic on the night of June 7 to 8.
Russian strikes have caused widespread damage to Ukraine's energy grid, and Ukraine will continue to face serious constraints on power generation capacity.
US President Joe Biden met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris on June 7.
Longtime Russian Central Bank Head Elvira Nabiullina is reportedly a balancing force among Russian President Vladimir Putin's economic advisors despite pressure for Russian officials to unequivocally support the long-term war effort in Ukraine.
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Russian opposition outlets reported that unspecified actors attempted to assassinate the former Russian occupation mayor of Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, Hennadiy Matsehora in Stary Oskol, Belgorod Oblast on June 7.
Russian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City, southeast of Kupyansk, within easternmost Chasiv Yar, northwest of Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City.
Russian actors are using video appeals from Russian servicemen to refute reports of high Russian losses in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

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The Biden Administration’s limited policy change permitting Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike some Russian military targets in a small area within Russian territory has reduced the size of Russia’s ground sanctuary by only 16 percent at maximum. US policy still preserves at least 84 percent of Russia's ground sanctuary – territory within range of Ukrainian ATACMS. US policy restricting Ukraine’s usage of US-provided weapons has effectively created a vast sanctuary – territory in range of US-provided weapons but that Ukrainian forces are not allowed to strike with US-provided weapons – which Russia exploits to shield its combat forces, command and control, logistics, and rear area support services that the Russian military uses to conduct its military operations in Ukraine.<1> US policy still protects the vast majority of Russia’s operational rear and deep rear, and US policy forbids Ukraine from using ATACMS anywhere in Russia.<2> US President Joe Biden’s limited policy change in late May 2024 regarding the use of US-provided weapons against military targets in Russia removed a maximum of 16 percent of Russia's ground sanctuary, assuming that Ukrainian forces can strike all legitimate Russian military targets in range of Ukrainian HIMARS using GMLRS in Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts. It is far from clear that Ukrainian forces have permission to do so, however. Senior US officials have described Ukraine’s ability to strike into Russia with GMLRS as being for counterbattery fire and geographically bounded to the Kharkiv area, and have stated that Ukrainian forces may strike Russian military objects “deployed just across the border,” suggesting that Ukraine may be prohibited from striking Russian military targets further in the rear or in other areas in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts that are still in range of GMLRS.<3> US officials’ statements also indicate that Ukrainian forces may be constrained from striking Russian military targets that are not actively involved in ground attacks and strikes against Ukraine.<4> The reduction of the sanctuary space’s area may be less than 16 percent, therefore.

Key Takeaways:

The Biden Administration’s limited policy change permitting Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike some Russian military targets in a small area within Russian territory has reduced the size of Russia’s ground sanctuary by only 16 percent at maximum. US policy still preserves at least 84 percent of Russia's ground sanctuary – territory within range of Ukrainian ATACMS.
Likely Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Su-57 fighter aircraft at the Akhtubinsk Airfield in Astrakhan Oblast between June 7 and 8.
Ukrainian forces may have struck a Russian large landing ship or patrol boat in Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of June 8 to 9.
The Kremlin's concerted effort to remove and arrest senior Russian defense officials may be extending to civilian regional administration officials.
The pro-Kremlin Moldovan Victory opposition electoral bloc held its second congress in Moscow on June 9 following a series of meetings between pro-Kremlin Moldovan opposition politicians and Russian officials from June 6 to 9.
Former pro-Russian Moldovan president and current head of the Moldovan Socialist Party Igor Dodon gave interviews to Russian state news agencies TASS and RIA Novosti on June 9 in which he promoted several known Kremlin narratives targeting the current Moldovan government – many of which Moldovan opposition politicians also promoted at the Victory bloc congress.
The Kremlin will likely try to exploit its ties to Dodon as part of its wider efforts to destabilize Moldovan democracy and influence the Moldovan government.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.
Russian officials continue efforts to coerce migrants into military service.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june- 9-2024

  

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Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against Russian air defense assets in occupied Crimea overnight on June 9 to 10, likely with ATACMS. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-400 air defense battery near occupied Dzhankoi and two S-300 batteries near occupied Chornomorske and Yevpatoria.<1> The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian strikes hit the radar stations of each battery and caused secondary ammunition detonations and that Russian air defenses did not intercept any of the Ukrainian missiles. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces launched at least 10 ATACMS missiles and that each targeted air defense installation was an element of the Russian 31st Air Defense Division (4th Guards Air Force and Air Defense Army, Southern Military District and Russian Aerospace Forces ).<2> Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted multiple Ukrainian ATACMS missiles overnight but largely did not report that any of the missiles hit their targets, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has not commented on the strikes as of the time of this publication.<3> ISW has not observed visual confirmation of the extent of damages from the Ukrainian strikes. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Schemes project published satellite imagery of burn marks at a Russian military object near a railway junction in Dzhankoi but noted that the imagery’s resolution is too low to determine specific damage.<4> A Russian milblogger who focuses on Russian air and air defense and has been largely critical of the Russian MoD criticized the Russian MoD in response to the strikes, claiming that Russian officers are falsely reporting no losses to their superiors despite actually suffering heavy losses.<5>

Ukrainian strikes against Russian military and logistics assets in connection to the United States' partial removal of Russian sanctuary in Belgorod Oblast may have compelled Russian forces to change their deployment and transport patterns. The Crimea-based Atesh Ukrainian partisan movement reported on June 10 that Russian forces recently redeployed air defense systems from occupied Crimea to Belgorod Oblast and that Russian air defenses are not completely covering Crimea as a result.<6> Footage dated June 8 shows that Russia has begun transporting fuel across the Kerch Strait across the railway bridge.<7> Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on April 29 that Russian authorities have not transported fuel across the Kerch Strait railway bridge since March 2024 due to the threat of a Ukrainian strike against the bridge as a fuel transport crossed, which could ignite and possibly destroy the bridge.<8> Ukrainian military–focused news outlet Militarnyi assessed on June 10 that Ukrainian strikes against railway barges across the Kerch Strait on May 30 prompted Russian authorities to begin transporting fuel across the railway bridge again.<9> It is unclear whether Russian authorities will continue to use the Kerch Strait railway bridge for fuel and logistics transport to occupied Crimea in the near to medium term. Doing so would likely alleviate some logistics constraints as Russia struggles to compensate for lost ferries across the strait but would leave the Kerch Strait bridge increasingly vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes, particularly if Russian air defense coverage of Crimea is degraded as Atesh reported.

Ukraine's Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk denied on June 10 a Sky News report that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Ropucha-class landing ship in the Sea of Azov on the night of June 8 to 9.<10> Pletenchuk also stated that there are three large Russian amphibious assault ships and three Buyan-M-class corvettes in the Sea of Azov as of May 10.<11> Sky News reported on June 9, citing a Ukrainian military source, that Ukrainian forces sunk or damaged a Russian Ropucha-class landing ship that Russian forces had recently moved from the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov, which ISW amplified.<12>

New Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with a select group of Russian milbloggers and military commentators on June 10, suggesting that the Kremlin seeks to partially use Belousov's replacement of widely unpopular former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to build bridges and cultivate ties with a broader milblogger community via a cadre of coopted and loyal military commentators. Russian state news agencies TASS and RIA Novosti reported on June 10 that Belousov met with several military correspondents (also known as voyenkory or milbloggers) covering the war in Ukraine and claimed that the conversation was "frank and constructive."<13> TASS and RIA noted that Belousov hopes to hold such meetings regularly. Russian insider sources and milbloggers claimed in late May and early June that Belousov was planning to meet with select milbloggers, and some of the more critical milbloggers criticized Belousov for reportedly not inviting them to the meeting.<14> Russian media confirmed on June 10 that several prominent and generally Kremlin-aligned milbloggers attended Belousov's meeting, including head of the WarGonzo social media military project Semyon Pegov, Komsomolskaya Pravda military correspondent and Kremlin-appointed member of the Human Rights Council Alexander Kots; Zvezda military correspondent Anatoly Brodkin; Russia Today (RT) military correspondent Murad Gazdiev, Readovka correspondent Maxim Dolgov, and others.<15> Gazdiev claimed on his personal Telegram channel on June 10 that the milbloggers delivered good and bad news from the front to Belousov and promised unspecified "huge changes."<16>

The Kremlin likely attempted to falsely portray Belousov as more attentive to milbloggers' criticisms than his predecessor in an effort to co-opt a larger non-Kremlin affiliated milblogger community. The Kremlin and Shoigu previously appeared at odds over milblogger reproachment—Russian President Vladimir Putin met with select milbloggers in July 2022 and June 2023 to discuss the situation on the frontline in Ukraine, while the Russian MoD continuously tried to crack down against critical milbloggers, who often used Shoigu as an informational scapegoat for Russian operational failures in Ukraine.<17> The Kremlin has long endeavored to coopt milbloggers, especially those critical of the Russian military leadership, in an effort to control the information space, as ISW previously assessed.<18> Belousov's meeting represents MoD outreach to several milbloggers who have had the Kremlin's favor for some time now and likely intended to court this group of commentators and ensure their continued loyalty to a new MoD under Belousov. Belousov's milblogger outreach is more likely to be a performative attempt to secure their loyalty than introduce systemic changes within the Russian MoD, as several Russian milbloggers who were not invited to the meeting previously noted.<19> Both the Kremlin and the Russian MoD have a vested interest in appearing open to dialogue with milbloggers, who represent a major pro-war constituency, and the Kremlin is likely aiming to portray Belousov as more cognizant of this fact than his predecessor.

Officials from Russia, Iran, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) held bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the BRICS foreign ministers meeting in Nizhny Novgorod on June 10. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke at the BRICS meeting and highlighted the organization's recent expansion.<20> Lavrov reiterated standard Kremlin narratives about how the Western rules-based order is detrimental to other states and about the supposed merits of the creation of a multipolar world. Lavrov claimed that the "winds of change" are driving BRICS forward. Lavrov met with officials from Brazil, South Africa, Ethiopia, Laos, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt during the BRICS event as well.<21>

Lavrov met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the BRICS meeting on June 10. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Chinese MFA both stated that Lavrov and Wang discussed diplomatic coordination in international organizations such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).<22> The Chinese MFA stated that developing Russo-Chinese relations are a "strategic choice" by both parties and that Lavrov and Wang "exchanged views" on the war in Ukrainian war."<23> The Russian MFA labeled the Russo-Chinese relationship as a "strategic partnership" and stated that Lavrov thanked Wang for the PRC's "balanced" line on the war in Ukraine and for not sending a representative to the June 15-16 Ukrainian peace summit in Switzerland.<24> The Russian MFA also stated that Lavrov and Wang discussed stability in the Asia-Pacific region, where they accused the US of allegedly creating anti-Russian and anti-Chinese military-political structures.<25> Lavrov also met with acting Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani on June 10 and discussed efforts to form a Russo-Iranian "strategic partnership" and create a new comprehensive intergovernmental agreement.<26> Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Kani stated that Iran "sees enormous potential for expanding and strengthening interaction."<27> Kani and Wang also met on June 10 and reportedly discussed increasing cooperation.<28> Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on June 9 that Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit North Korea, and an unspecified diplomatic source reportedly stated that the visit will occur in the coming weeks after Putin visits Vietnam.<29> ISW continues to assess that Russia, the PRC, Iran, North Korea, and Belarus are deepening their multilateral partnerships in order to confront the West.<30>

The Armenian National Assembly will likely hold an emergency session by June 17 during which the Armenian opposition parties will demand Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's and his cabinet's resignation. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Armenian Service Radio Azatutyun reported on June 10 that 33 members of the Armenian opposition factions "Armenian Alliance" and "I Have Honor" supported convening an emergency session of the National Assembly to discuss passing a resolution calling for Pashinyan's and his cabinet's resignation and the formation of a new government.<31> The opposition factions blame Pashinyan for what they see as failures to defend and secure the territorial integrity and borders of Armenia.<32> Radio Azatutyun noted that Armenian law stipulates that the National Assembly needs the support of 27 members of the 107-seat National Assembly to call an emergency session.<33> Pashinyan's Civil Contract Party's National Assembly leader Hayk Konjoryan stated that Civil Contract National Assembly members will not participate in the June 17 emergency session.<34>

The US Department of State announced on June 10 that the US and Poland jointly launched the Ukraine Communications Group (UCG) in Warsaw to counter Russian disinformation by offering fact-based reporting about the war in Ukraine.<35> Representatives of unspecified countries will reportedly collaborate with the UCG. The US Department of State emphasized that Russia often uses false narratives to obfuscate its war aims and try to fracture worldwide solidarity with Ukraine.

Finnish authorities reported that a Russian military aircraft temporarily violated Finnish airspace on June 10 amid continued Russian efforts to undermine Finnish sovereignty. The Finnish Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that it is investigating an incident in which an unspecified Russian military aircraft flew roughly 2.5 kilometers deep into Finnish airspace over the Gulf of Finland for two minutes on the morning of June 10.<36> The Russian MoD has not responded to the Finnish report as of this publication but claimed on June 10 that Russian Tu-95MS missile carriers and Tu-22M3 bombers conducted flights over neutral waters of the Baltic, Barents, and Norwegian seas.<37> This reported incursion likely forwards the ongoing Kremlin effort to undermine Finnish sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Russian MoD proposed on May 21 that the Russian government should reassess Russia's maritime borders in the Gulf of Finland, which some Western officials have warned may be part of an effort to revise maritime zones in the Baltic Sea.<38> The Kremlin has also been running a number of information operations aimed at portraying Finland as an enemy to Russia and Russians, ultimately setting information conditions to justify potential future aggression against Finland.<39>

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against Russian air defense assets in occupied Crimea overnight on June 9 to 10, likely with ATACMS.
Ukraine's Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk denied on June 10 a Sky News report that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Ropucha-class landing ship in the Sea of Azov on the night of June 8 to 9.
New Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with a select group of Russian milbloggers and military commentators on June 10, suggesting that the Kremlin seeks to partially use Belousov's replacement of widely unpopular former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to build bridges and cultivate ties with a broader milblogger community via a cadre of coopted and loyal military commentators.
Officials from Russia, Iran, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) held bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the BRICS foreign ministers meeting in Nizhny Novgorod on June 10.
The Armenian National Assembly will likely hold an emergency session by June 17 during which the Armenian opposition parties will demand Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's and his cabinet's resignation.
The US Department of State announced on June 10 that the US and Poland jointly launched the Ukraine Communications Group (UCG) in Warsaw to counter Russian disinformation by offering fact-based reporting about the war in Ukraine.
Finnish authorities reported that a Russian military aircraft temporarily violated Finnish airspace on June 10 amid continued Russian efforts to undermine Finnish sovereignty.
Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov appears to be focusing on healthcare programs for Russian servicemembers in his new role.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june- 10-2024

  

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Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide monetary and military assistance to Ukraine, including air defense systems. The Estonian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 11 that Estonia will provide an undisclosed number of Mistral man-portable short-range air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine as part of a new military assistance package.<1> European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced during the Ukrainian Recovery Conference in Berlin on June 11 that the European Union (EU) will transfer roughly 1.5 billion euros ($1.6 billion) worth of profits from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine in July, of which Ukraine will allocate 90 percent to defense spending and 10 percent to reconstruction.<2> Von der Leyen stated that the EU will also transfer an additional 1.9 billion euros ($2 billion) to Ukraine from the EU's Ukraine Facility mechanism, which is a separate fund that provides for the EU to transfer up to 50 billion euros ($53.7 billion) to Ukraine between 2024 and 2027.<3> German Chancellor Olaf Scholz reiterated during the Ukrainian Recovery Conference that Germany will deliver a Patriot air defense system to Ukraine in the coming weeks and announced that Germany will also deliver an IRIS-T air defense system, an unspecified number of Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, and an unspecified number and type of missiles and ammunition to Ukraine in the coming weeks and months.<4> The German MoD initially announced the transfer of this third Patriot system in April 2024.<5> The New York Times, citing senior US administration and military officials, reported on June 11 that US President Joe Biden recently approved the transfer of another Patriot system to Ukraine following a series of high-level meetings and internal debates regarding the best ways to meet Ukraine's need for additional air defenses.<6> Unnamed US officials stated that the new system could be deployed to the frontline within several days depending on any maintenance or modifications that the system may need, as the system is currently stationed in Poland.

The Kremlin continues efforts to codify legal instruments and repressive measures intended to broadly censor foreigners and foreign organizations in Russia. The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading on June 11 that seeks to codify the Russian government's ability to recognize "any" foreign organization as "undesirable."<7> The Duma first approved the draft version of this bill on May 27.<8> The Duma also adopted an additional bill in its first reading that introduces criminal penalties including fines and imprisonment for someone's participation in "any" organization classified as "undesirable."<9> Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin noted that this new bill will fill a gap in the existing legislation, which only has provisions to class foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as "undesirable."<10> The new bill will extend the undesirable classification to any foreign and international organizations, thereby broadening the Kremlin's discretion to target and censor a wide range of foreign organizations operating within Russia. The Kremlin has previously used the "undesirable" designation to block opposition media outlets, civil society organizations, and human rights-focused organizations from entering or operating within Russia, as ISW has previously reported.<11> Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner for Human Rights Tatiana Moskalkova also notably called on June 11 for the establishment of a legal mechanism that would allow the Russian government to prosecute foreigners for "Russophobia as a manifestation of extremism."<12> Russian authorities widely use accusations of "Russophobia" in an attempt to undermine any undesirable policy or rhetoric they deem to be "anti-Russian," and have similarly used charges of extremism with broad discretion to suppress and discourage domestic opposition.<13>

A prominent Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger channel announced that it opened a second "media school" in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, likely to support Kremlin efforts to expand its influence in the international information space, particularly in Central Asia. The Rybar Telegram channel claimed on June 11 that it is opening the "Rybar Media School" in Bishkek because Kyrgyzstan lacks military-political and industry expertise as well as a "blogosphere" and opinion journalism.<14> Rybar framed its establishment of a "media school" in Bishkek as an effort to coordinate and assert Russia's position in Central Asia and warned that Russia could be "expelled" from Central Asia in three to five years if Russia fails to assert itself and manage its informational influence in the region. Rybar's founder and manager Mikhail Zvinchuk gave a lecture to students at the Kyrgyz National University about the benefits of using Telegram to "solve problems" in the current information environment. Rybar claimed that Zvinchuk's lecture was only the first in a series of lectures and trainings for Kyrgyz media workers, students, public relations professionals, and press services to learn how to use multimedia to develop local Kyrgyz journalism. Rybar claimed that journalists from the Kyrgyz-branch of the official Russian government outlet Rossiyskaya Gazeta, "complained" about the lack of Russian journalistic work in Central Asia and claimed that the West outbalances Russia in its support for Kyrgyz journalism. Zvinchuk gave a masterclass in December 2023 on the importance of Telegram and other social media to press heads at Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec likely in an effort to normalize the war without directly involving the Kremlin or other official state bodies. Rybar announced that it opened a media school in an unspecified location in the Balkans in April 2024.<15> Rybar claimed that multiple Serbian and Republika Srpska (the Serbian entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) outlets highlighted Rybar's "debut" in the Balkans, while notably no Kyrgyz Russian- or Kyrgyz-language news outlets reported on the new "media school" in Bishkek as of this publication.<16> Rybar will likely attempt to expand its media influence in other foreign countries, and the Kremlin will likely seek to use coopted milbloggers like Rybar to expand Russian influence in international media.

Danish authorities arrested a Danish-Russian dual citizen accused of having connections to Russian intelligence services, which is likely part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to re-intensify its hybrid campaign against Western countries. The Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR) reported on June 11 that Danish authorities arrested an unidentified woman with dual Danish-Russian citizenship related to a recent investigation into the woman's connections to Russian foreign intelligence.<17> DR reported on June 3, citing leaked documents from Western intelligence services, that the women's legal aid clinic for Russian speakers received at least 338,000 Danish kroner (about $49,000) from the Russian Fund for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (Pravfond), which DR describes as closely linked to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).<18> The Guardian, which saw the same leaked documents, reported that Pravfond's leadership has multiple Russian intelligence agents, including longtime SVR officers Vladimir Pozdorovkin and Anatoly Sorokin.<19> The Guardian reported that Pravfond operates throughout Europe and that Pozdorovkin specifically oversees Pravfond's operations in Nordic and Baltic countries while Sorokin oversees operations in the Middle East, Moldova, and Transnistria.<20> DR reported and that the woman is a "central figure" in Denmark's Russian-speaking community and noted she has traveled to Russia and elsewhere for conferences with Pravfond participation or sponsorship.<21> The Kremlin has recently intensified its hybrid campaigns in Europe, and the Kremlin has been leaning into a narrative about protecting Russians and Russian-speakers outside of Russia — often called "compatriots abroad" — as part of its wider toolkit of hybrid manipulations.<22> The "compatriots abroad" narrative sets informational conditions for the Kremlin to justify hybrid operations or even direct interference against countries it claims do not adequately protect so-called Russian "compatriots" should these countries take actions unfavorable to the Kremlin. DR noted that several European intelligence sources stated that the Kremlin aims to use counseling and assistance centers — of which Pravfond funds at least 34 in 21 countries — to justify direct interference in other countries.<23>

Kremlin newswire TASS reported on June 11 that the former Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Military Academy, Grigory Molchanov, was appointed Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council.<24> Russian outlet RBK stated that Molchanov has served in the Russian military since 1973 and noted that the Security Council's first new appointment since former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu became Security Council Secretary on May 13.<25> Russian outlet RTVI noted that there are currently eight deputy secretaries and one first deputy secretary in addition to Shoigu.<26>

Key Takeaways:

Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide monetary and military assistance to Ukraine, including air defense systems.
The Kremlin continues efforts to codify legal instruments and repressive measures intended to broadly censor foreigners and foreign organizations in Russia.
A prominent Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger channel announced that it opened a second "media school" in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, likely to support Kremlin efforts to expand its influence in the international information space, particularly in Central Asia.
Danish authorities arrested a Danish-Russian dual citizen accused of having connections to Russian intelligence services, which is likely part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to re-intensify its hybrid campaign against Western countries.
Kremlin newswire TASS reported on June 11 that the former Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Military Academy, Grigory Molchanov, was appointed Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council.
Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk and northwest of Avdiivka.
Russia may have suffered a damaged or destroyed military naval vessel in the Barents Sea.
Belarusian officials continue to implicate themselves in the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Belarus and their re-education in Belarusian programs.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june- 11-2024

  

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Krieg Rußland - Ukraine [Alle anzeigen] , Rang: Warren Buffett(3421), 09.5.24 08:42
 
Subject Auszeichnungen Author Message Date ID
RE: Krieg Rußland - Ukraine
09.5.24 08:45
1
ISW - Russian forces conducted large-scale missile and ...
09.5.24 08:53
2
ISW - Putin used his May 9 Victory Day speech to relit...
10.5.24 08:11
3
      RE: ISW - Putin used his May 9 Victory Day speech to r...
10.5.24 20:52
4
      ISW - Russian forces began an offensive operation along...
11.5.24 09:26
5
      ISW - Russian forces are conducting relatively limited ...
12.5.24 12:04
6
      ISW - Putin replaced Sergei Shoigu
13.5.24 08:10
7
      ISW - Putin's Safe Space: Defeating Russia's Kharkiv Op...
13.5.24 19:30
8
      ISW - Russian forces continued to make tactically signi...
14.5.24 10:41
9
      ISW - The pace of Russian offensive operations in north...
15.5.24 07:53
10
      ISW - The tempo of Russian offensive operations in nort...
16.5.24 11:39
11
      ISW - Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian force...
17.5.24 08:16
12
      ISW - Ptin framed Russian offensive operations in north...
18.5.24 10:05
13
      ISW - ussian forces have recently intensified their eff...
19.5.24 09:19
14
      ISW - Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful ...
20.5.24 09:37
15
      ISW - Russian forces are concentrating limited, underst...
21.5.24 10:04
16
      ISW - he Kremlin continues to time its nuclear saber-ra...
22.5.24 07:57
17
      ISW - The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed on...
23.5.24 08:31
18
      ISW - From the Ukrainian Counteroffensive to Kharkiv
23.5.24 17:01
19
      ISW - The Kremlin is pursuing a concerted effort to rem...
24.5.24 08:42
20
      ISW - estern media continues to report that Russian Pre...
25.5.24 11:20
21
      ISW - Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukraini...
26.5.24 09:59
22
      ISW - Russian forces are reportedly concentrating force...
27.5.24 09:14
23
      ISW - The NATO Parliamentary Assembly called on member ...
28.5.24 07:42
24
      ISW - Putin grossly misrepresented the Ukrainian Const...
29.5.24 07:52
25
      ISW - US-provided military aid has started arriving on...
30.5.24 09:16
26
      ISW - Zelensky met with US and Singaporean officials
03.6.24 08:01
27
      ISW - Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-300/400 air ...
04.6.24 09:42
28
      ISW - Russian military commentators continue to compla...
05.6.24 08:24
29
      ISW - US officials continue to attempt to clarify US po...
06.6.24 09:54
30
      ISW - Putin sought to repackage long-standing, tired th...
07.6.24 08:26
31
     ISW - Putin articulated a theory of victory in Ukraine
08.6.24 11:37
32
      ISW - Russian military command is reportedly transferri...
09.6.24 07:20
33
      ISW - size of Russia’s ground sanctuary by only 16 per...
10.6.24 11:18
34
      ISW - Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against Russ...
11.6.24 09:24
35
      ISW - Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide mon...
12.6.24 08:13
36
      ISW - Ukrainian forces may be conducting an effort ai...
13.6.24 09:47
37
      ISW - outlined his uncompromising demands for Ukraine...
15.6.24 10:59
38
      ISW - Putin’s June 14 information operation about Russi...
16.6.24 15:05
39
      ISW - Global Peace Summit in Switzerland
17.6.24 08:02
40
      ISW - Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un signe...
20.6.24 08:38
41
      ISW - Putin launched a major information operation duri...
21.6.24 08:19
42
      ISW - Putin continues to invoke nuclear threats
22.6.24 10:17
43
      ISW - US policy continues to prohibit Ukrainian forces...
23.6.24 08:54
44
      ISW - Islamic State (IS)'s Northern Caucasus branch, W...
24.6.24 07:47
45
      ISW - Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate ...
25.6.24 09:19
46
      ISW - confirming Russia's long-term perpetration of war...
26.6.24 07:55
47
      ISW - Islamic State (IS) affiliate Wilayat Kavkaz terro...
27.6.24 09:00
48
      ISW - Russian forces have sustained the tempo of their ...
28.6.24 08:24
49
      ISW - Putin directed on June 28 the production and depl...
29.6.24 11:38
50
      ISW - addressing religious extremism in Russia
30.6.24 12:53
51
      ISW - Putin's theory of victory that Russia will be abl...
01.7.24 08:01
52
      RE: ISW - Russian mistreatment of wounded and disabled ...
02.7.24 09:07
53
      ISW - he interplay between ongoing Russian offensive op...
03.7.24 07:41
54
      ISW - Ukraine is addressing its manpower challenges and...
04.7.24 09:17
55
      ISW - Putin explicitly rejected Russian participation i...
05.7.24 07:43
56
      ISW - Putin used a meeting with Hungarian Prime Ministe...
06.7.24 09:40
57
      ISW - Viktor Orban continues to posture himself as a po...
07.7.24 09:54
58
      ISW - Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against...
08.7.24 07:53
59
      ISW - A Russian Kh-101 cruise missile hit the Okhmatdyt...
09.7.24 09:00
60
      ISW - Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is...
10.7.24 07:59
61
      ISW - Western security assistance will be crucial for ...
11.7.24 09:44
62
      ISW - Russian authorities reportedly attempted to assa...
12.7.24 07:41
63
      ISW - Ukrainian forces will continue to be on the defe...
13.7.24 09:31
64
      ISW - Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reportedly cond...
14.7.24 09:35
65
      ATTENTAT BEI AUFTRITT
14.7.24 11:59
66
      RE: ATTENTAT BEI AUFTRITT
14.7.24 12:10
67
      ISW - Russian officials and milbloggers reiterated com...
15.7.24 07:52
68
      ISW - Ukrainian drone strikes deep within Russia conti...
17.7.24 08:00
69
      ISW - Russian state news outlets editorialized comment...
18.7.24 09:13
70
      ISW - Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian coa...
19.7.24 08:22
71
      ISW - Zelensky reiterated the importance of developing...
20.7.24 10:13
72
      ISW - Zelensky spoke with former US President and Repu...
21.7.24 09:06
73
      ISW - Volodin recently visited Nicaragua and Cuba
22.7.24 08:22
74
      ISW - Russia and North Korea are pursuing increased coo...
23.7.24 08:52
75
      ISW - Duma proposed an amendment that would allow comma...
24.7.24 08:43
76
      ISW - General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that the Russian...
25.7.24 08:21
77
      ISW - Ukrainian forces blunted one of the largest Russi...
26.7.24 07:51
78
      ISW - Russian military has recently expanded the Russia...
27.7.24 09:42
79
      ISW - Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful ...
28.7.24 10:04
80
      ISW - Putin continues to use nuclear saber-rattling to ...
29.7.24 09:14
81
      ISW - The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on J...
30.7.24 08:54
82
      ISW - Russian forces conducted five platoon- to battali...
31.7.24 08:02
83
      ISW - Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that ...
01.8.24 09:17
84
      ISW - Russian forces continue to make slow, steady adv...
02.8.24 08:33
85
      ISW - Russia is pursuing an effort to force Ukraine to...
03.8.24 10:20
86
      ISW - krainian forces reportedly struck four Russian S...
04.8.24 07:31
87
      ISW - krainian forces reportedly conducted drone strik...
05.8.24 08:03
88
      ISW - Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces co...
07.8.24 09:24
89
      ISW - Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advances up...
08.8.24 08:58
90
      RE: ISW - Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advance...
08.8.24 09:02
91
      RE: ISW - Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advance...
08.8.24 10:14
92
      RE: ISW - Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advance...
08.8.24 10:23
93
      RE: ISW - Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advance...
08.8.24 10:49
94
      RE: ISW - Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advance...
08.8.24 11:00
95
      ISW - Russian sources claimed on August 9 that Ukraini...
10.8.24 11:19
96
      ISW -
11.8.24 10:12
97
      ISW - Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast has allowed ...
12.8.24 08:17
98
      RE: ISW - Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast has allo...
13.8.24 08:16
99
      ISW - Ukrainian cross-border mechanized offensive oper...
09.8.24 08:36
100
      ISW - Zelensky and other senior Ukrainian officials pr...
14.8.24 09:22
101
      ISW - Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian force...
15.8.24 09:31
102
      ISW - Russia has vulnerabilities that the West has sim...
15.8.24 16:02
103
      ISW - Ukrainian officials are taking steps to consolid...
16.8.24 08:26
104
      ISW - Ukrainian forces continued to marginally advance...
17.8.24 10:10
105
      ISW - The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and Ru...
18.8.24 09:18
106
      ISW - Ukrainian forces continued assaults throughout t...
19.8.24 07:34
107
      ISW - Ukrainian forces continued to marginally advance...
20.8.24 10:07
108
      ISW - Ukrainian forces continued attacking throughout ...
21.8.24 09:09
109
      ISW - The Kremlin appears to have launched an intricat...
22.8.24 10:59
110
      ISW - Russian military command recently redeployed elem...
23.8.24 07:49
111
      ISW - Ukrainian forces continued to marginally advance ...
24.8.24 08:06
112
      ISW - Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian mili...
25.8.24 09:55
113
      ISW - Russian forces recently regained lost positions ...
26.8.24 07:47
114
      ISW - Russia conducted one of the largest combined seri...
27.8.24 08:27
115
      ISW - Russian forces have made significant tactical adv...
28.8.24 08:01
116
      ISW - US government is prohibiting the United Kingdom (...
29.8.24 09:13
117
      ISW - ussian forces are currently pursuing two immediat...
30.8.24 07:51
118
      ISW - (EU) member state officials continue to express d...
31.8.24 08:04
119
      ISW - Russian military command may have redeployed limi...
01.9.24 10:40
120
      ISW - Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted the largest...
02.9.24 08:45
121
      ISW - Iran is expected to “imminently” deliver ballisti...
03.9.24 08:54
122
      ISW - Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure and...
04.9.24 08:36
123
      ISW - Russia appears to be relying on several countries...
05.9.24 09:10
124
      ISW - Russian forces have recently intensified their lo...
06.9.24 08:24
125
      ISW - US and European officials reported that Iran deli...
07.9.24 09:36
126
      ISW - Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast is having t...
08.9.24 08:45
127
      ISW - (CIA) William Burns cautioned the West against co...
09.9.24 08:07
128
      ISW - Lavrov attended the Russia–Gulf Cooperation Counc...
10.9.24 08:56
129
      Biden stated on September 10 that the presidential admi...
11.9.24 08:11
130
      ISW: Russian forces began counterattacks along the west...
12.9.24 11:01
131
      ISW: Russian forces continued counterattacking through...
13.9.24 09:02
132
      ISW: The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has repo...
14.9.24 10:12
133
      ISW: Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has prompted...
15.9.24 09:26
134
      ISW: Russia reportedly aims to achieve a decisive victo...
16.9.24 07:37
135
      ISW: Ukraine has taken steps to address its manpower sh...
17.9.24 08:13
136
      ISW: Shoigu arrived in Iran for an unannounced visit on...
18.9.24 07:55
137
      ISW: Ukrainian forces conducted a successful drone stri...
19.9.24 07:56
138
      ISW: Putin reportedly declined a request from the Russi...
20.9.24 07:47
139
      ISW: s (roughly $50 billion) and 35 billion euros (roug...
21.9.24 09:53
140
      ISW: Ukrainian forces conducted another successful dron...
22.9.24 08:51
141
      ISW: Ukraine's September 18 strike against a Russian mi...
23.9.24 08:19
142
      ISW: Zelensky arrived in the United States on September...
24.9.24 09:07
143
      ISW: Russian forces have reached the outskirts of Vuhle...
25.9.24 07:54
144
      ISW: Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to thre...
26.9.24 09:36
145
      ISW: Germany, France, and the US announced several imme...
27.9.24 08:01
146
      ISW: Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced battalion-s...
28.9.24 09:43
147
      ISW: Western officials continue to highlight efforts by...
29.9.24 11:33
148
      ISW: Western countries continue to invest in the growth...
30.9.24 08:38
149
      ISW: The Russian government plans to spend 17 trillion ...
01.10.24 09:22
150
      ISW: Russian forces likely seized Vuhledar as of Octobe...
02.10.24 07:52
151
      ISW: Ukraine continues efforts to expand domestic produ...
03.10.24 08:21
152
      RE: ISW: Ukraine continues efforts to expand domestic p...
04.10.24 07:55
153
      ISW: Ukrainian forces struck a fuel storage facility in...
05.10.24 11:46
154
      ISW: The Russian Government plans to allocate 90 billio...
06.10.24 09:55
155
      ISW: Russian forces have reportedly lost at least five ...
07.10.24 09:14
156
      ISW: Ukrainian forces struck an oil terminal in occupie...
08.10.24 08:43
157
      ISW: Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Shahed drone ...
11.10.24 08:27
158
      ISW: Russian forces intensified their ongoing effort to...
12.10.24 09:54
159
      ISW: Russian forces are reportedly relying on illicitly...
13.10.24 09:29
160
      ISW: Russian forces have recently resumed tactical offe...
14.10.24 08:19
161
      RE: ISW: Russian forces have recently resumed tactical ...
14.10.24 08:20
162
      ISW: ussian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov arrived in...
15.10.24 09:53
163
      ISW: The Kremlin is likely leveraging the recent June 2...
16.10.24 09:06
164
      ISW: Zelensky presented Ukraine's five-part Victory Pla...
17.10.24 08:15
165
      ISW: Russian sources reported on October 16 that unspec...
18.10.24 08:09
166
      ISW: South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) ...
19.10.24 12:01
167
      ISW: Ukrainian drones reportedly struck the
20.10.24 09:17
168
      ISW: Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against t...
21.10.24 08:38
169
      ISW: Moldova's October 20 European Union (EU) referendu...
22.10.24 09:22
170
      ISW: Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strik...
23.10.24 09:26
171
      ISW: The adoption of the Kazan Declaration on the secon...
24.10.24 08:43
172
      ISW: Putin failed to deny the presence of North Korean ...
25.10.24 08:36
173
      ISW: Zelensky warned that Russia will imminently deploy...
26.10.24 13:11
174
      ISW: Bloomberg reported on October 25, citing South Kor...
27.10.24 09:48
175
      RE: ISW: Bloomberg reported on October 25, citing South...gut analysiertgut analysiertgut analysiert
27.10.24 10:06
176
      RE: ISW: Bloomberg reported on October 25, citing South...
27.10.24 14:20
177
      ISW: Russia's economy and war effort is coming under in...
28.10.24 08:12
178
      ISW: South Korean intelligence officials shared evidenc...
29.10.24 09:30
179
      ISW: he rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has increas...
30.10.24 09:35
180
      ISW: North Korean troops are in an unspecified area in ...
31.10.24 08:19
181
      ISW: orth Korea and Russia signed an agreement on Octob...
01.11.24 08:43
182
      ISW: North Korea Joins Russia's War Against Ukraine: Op...
01.11.24 17:17
183
      ISW: Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC M...
02.11.24 08:13
184
      ISW: Ukrainian forces have reportedly struck seven Russ...
03.11.24 09:47
185
      ISW: Incumbent Moldova President Maia Sandu has claimed...
04.11.24 08:21
186
      ISW: Russian and pro-Kremlin actors launched an informa...
05.11.24 07:55
187
      ISW: North Korean forces have likely officially engaged...
06.11.24 09:11
188
      ISW: Putin is attempting to shape US President-elect Do...
08.11.24 08:56
189
      ISW: utin appears to be assuming that US President-elec...
09.11.24 10:27
190
      ISW: Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian naval...
09.11.24 13:42
191
      ISW: Russian forces reportedly lost almost 200 tanks, o...
10.11.24 09:42
192
      ISW: Ukrainian forces struck Russian ammunition warehou...
11.11.24 07:57
193
      ISW: Russian forces are successfully leveraging their r...
12.11.24 07:45
194
      ISW: Russian forces recently advanced during two compan...
13.11.24 08:46
195
      ISW: The Kremlin is attempting to dictate the terms of ...
14.11.24 08:53
196
      ISW: The Kremlin's recent economic policies indicate t...
15.11.24 08:06
197
      ISW: The Kremlin is intensifying its reflexive control...
16.11.24 12:15
198
      ISW: Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a cri...
17.11.24 09:38
199
      ISW: US President Joe Biden has authorized Ukrainian f...
18.11.24 08:11
200
      ISW: Russian officials continued to use threatening rh...
19.11.24 08:18
201
      ISW: Ukrainian forces have defended against Russia's fu...
20.11.24 08:02
202
      ISW: Ukraine conducted a successful combined strike aga...
21.11.24 10:09
203
      ISW: Putin intensified his reflexive control campaign
22.11.24 08:33
204
      ISW: Putin and Russian military leadership continue to ...
23.11.24 10:52
205
      ISW: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely atte...
24.11.24 11:36
206
      ISW: Russian forces’ recent confirmed battlefield gains...
25.11.24 08:55
207
      ISW: Russian forces continue to make significant tactic...
26.11.24 09:36
208
      ISW: Russian officials continue to demonstrate that the...
27.11.24 07:56
209
      ISW: Ukrainian forces continue to leverage Western-prov...
28.11.24 09:24
210
      ISW: Putin continues to laud the technical specificatio...
30.11.24 09:51
211
      ISW: Kremlin officials responded to Syrian opposition f...
01.12.24 10:12
212
      ISW: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly r...
02.12.24 08:00
213
      ISW: utin is uninterested in a negotiated settlement to...
03.12.24 10:07
214
      ISW: ussia is evacuating naval assets from its base in ...
04.12.24 08:26
215
      ISW: Mounting evidence continues to personally implicat...
05.12.24 09:00
216
      ISW: Kremlin is continuing to suffer significant manpow...
06.12.24 08:04
217
      ISW: Russian forces have not yet evacuated the Russian ...
07.12.24 10:56
218
      ISW: Russian forces have resumed their offensive operat...
08.12.24 11:37
219
      ISW: The rapid collapse of the Assad regime in Syria is...
09.12.24 09:00
220
      RE: ISW: The rapid collapse of the Assad regime in Syri...
09.12.24 11:12
221
      ISW: The Kremlin continues to cautiously signal that it...
10.12.24 09:15
222
      ISW: ussia's force posture around Syria continues to re...
11.12.24 08:59
223
      ISW: Russian forces continue to make tactical gains sou...
12.12.24 07:27
224
      ISW: Russia has reportedly reached an agreement with se...
13.12.24 09:16
225
      ISW: Russian forces conducted their largest series of m...
14.12.24 10:50
226
      ISW: elensky stated on December 14 that the Russian mil...
15.12.24 12:01
227
      ISW: Russian forces conducted a roughly battalion-sized...
16.12.24 07:57
228
      ISW: Putin's continued fixation on the Russian
17.12.24 08:43
229
      Syrskyj: Große russische Gegenoffensive in Kursk
18.12.24 06:27
230
      ISW: The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) killed Russi...
18.12.24 08:13
231
      ISW: Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a chemical pla...
19.12.24 08:18
232
      ISW: Putin said that he should have violated the cease...
20.12.24 07:53
233
      ISW: Russian ballistic missile strikes damaged several...
21.12.24 10:49
234
      ISW: Putin repeated his latest assertion that he shoul...
23.12.24 08:21
235
      ISW: Putin explicitly rejected a suggestion reportedly ...
27.12.24 08:29
236
      ISW: Russia has continued to expand its domestic produc...
28.12.24 11:13
237
      ISW: Putin appears to be trying to smooth over possible...
29.12.24 10:34
238
      ISW: Lavrov explicitly rejected two suggestions reporte...
30.12.24 10:35
239
      ISW: Lavrov reiterated Russia's demand that Ukraine ren...
31.12.24 10:34
240
      ISW: Russian forces gained 4,168 square kilometers
01.1.25 10:09
241
      ISW: Ukraine's decision to not renew its contract to tr...
03.1.25 08:17
242
      ISW: Zelensky outlined the conditions that must be met ...
04.1.25 18:48
243
      ISW: Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged o...
05.1.25 09:03
244
      ISW: Ukrainian forces resumed offensive operations in a...
06.1.25 09:31
245
      ISW: Ukrainian forces recently made tactical advances a...
07.1.25 08:49
246
      ISW: Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern T...
08.1.25 09:11
247
      ISW: Ukrainian forces struck Russia's state-owned Kombi...
09.1.25 08:46
248
      ISW: Ukraine's Western partners reiterated their suppor...
10.1.25 08:30
249
      ISW: Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition and d...
11.1.25 12:10
250
      ISW: Ukrainian forces reportedly captured the first Nor...
12.1.25 11:13
251
      ISW: Ukrainian forces conducted a high-precision airstr...
13.1.25 08:22
252
      ISW: Russian forces recently cut the T-0405 Pokrovsk-Ko...
14.1.25 08:57
253
      ISW: The Kremlin remains committed to achieving the ori...
15.1.25 08:03
254
      ISW: Russian forces conducted a large series of missile...
16.1.25 08:18
255
      RE: ISW: Russian forces conducted a large series of mis...
17.1.25 07:41
256
      ISW: Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian sign...
18.1.25 10:48
257
      ISW: Ukrainian forces struck two Russian oil depots in ...
19.1.25 10:14
258
      ISW: Russian forces used ammunition equipped with chemi...
20.1.25 07:38
259
      ISW: Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces...
21.1.25 08:54
260
      ISW: Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strik...
22.1.25 08:24
261
      ISW: The Kremlin has launched an information operation ...
23.1.25 09:39
262
      ISW: Russia is reportedly planning to deploy additional...
24.1.25 08:50
263
      ISW: Putin is once again attempting to obfuscate his un...
25.1.25 09:41
264
      ISW: kraine and Moldova continue to offer solutions to ...
26.1.25 13:34
265
      ISW: Russian forces recently made further advances with...
27.1.25 07:51
266
      ISW: Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone s...
28.1.25 10:06
267
      ISW: The first official Russian delegation arrived in S...
29.1.25 08:13
268
      ISW: Putin stated that Western military assistance rema...
30.1.25 09:44
269
      ISW: Kremlin's ongoing efforts to shape domestic and gl...
31.1.25 08:22
270
      ISW: (UK), Finland, and Czechia announced several immed...
01.2.25 10:06
271
      ISW: Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of ...
02.2.25 11:33
272
      ISW: Russian forces reportedly struck a dormitory hold...
03.2.25 09:10
273
      ISW: Russian forces continued to suffer high losses in ...
04.2.25 09:44
274
      ISW: (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi vis...
05.2.25 08:06
275
      ISW: Zelensky continues to demonstrate his willingness ...
06.2.25 08:04
276
      ISW: Ukraine's Kursk Incursion: Six Month Assessment
07.2.25 07:00
277
      ISW: Ukrainian forces launched a new series of battalio...
07.2.25 08:42
278
      ISW: Ukrainian forces marginally advanced during mechan...
08.2.25 10:04
279
      ISW: Russia may be providing drone and missile technolo...
09.2.25 09:47
280
      ISW: Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with...
10.2.25 07:57
281
      ISW: Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced...
11.2.25 10:20
282
      ISW: Russian officials are reportedly attempting to con...
12.2.25 08:42
283
      ISW: Trump held bilateral phone calls with Russian Pre...
13.2.25 08:28
284
      ISW: Ukraine's European partners announced new military...
14.2.25 09:11
285
      ISW: Lessons of the Minsk Deal: Breaking the Cycle of R...
14.2.25 13:30
286
      ISW: Zelensky and US Vice President JD Vance met on the...
15.2.25 10:11
287
      gelöscht
17.5.24 00:58
288
Ukraine meldet nach Angriffen schwere Schäden am Stromn...
09.5.24 11:13
289
Russisches Geld für Aufrüstung von Ukraine
09.5.24 15:20
290
Russische Bodenoffensive in Region Charkiw
11.5.24 08:03
291
Russland bestätigt Offensive bei Charkiw
12.5.24 11:33
292
Putin wechselt Verteidigungsminister
13.5.24 06:21
293
Kiew sieht Stabilisierung bei Charkiw
14.5.24 18:43
294
Ukraine meldet Rückzug von Einheiten an Charkiw-Front
15.5.24 16:34
295
Russen jagen gezielt ukrainische Sanitäter
16.5.24 23:34
296
RE: Russen jagen gezielt ukrainische Sanitäter
17.5.24 06:57
297
      RE: Russen jagen gezielt ukrainische Sanitäter
17.5.24 08:50
298
      RE: Russen jagen gezielt ukrainische Sanitäter
18.5.24 11:54
299
wiiw-Studie: Großteil ausländischer Firmen weiter in Ru...
17.5.24 08:06
300
Nur 30% der Russen wollen Ende des Kriegs, falls Putin ...
18.5.24 12:14
301
RE: Nur 30% der Russen wollen Ende des Kriegs, falls Pu...
18.5.24 14:00
302
RE: Nur 30% der Russen wollen Ende des Kriegs, falls Pu...
18.5.24 14:06
303
RE: Nur 30% der Russen wollen Ende des Kriegs, falls Pu...
18.5.24 20:29
304
Moskau meldet weitere Eroberungen
19.5.24 08:13
305
Für Medwedew gibt es nur noch legitime Ziele
20.5.24 21:33
306
RE: Für Medwedew gibt es nur noch legitime Zielewitzig
21.5.24 00:13
307
      RE: Für Medwedew gibt es nur noch legitime Ziele
23.5.24 19:54
308
Ukraine: Lage im Gebiet Donezk extrem schwierig
22.5.24 06:50
309
Ukraine: Russische Bodenoffensive in Charkiw gestoppt
24.5.24 15:32
310
Putin besucht Usbekistan
26.5.24 23:23
311
Russland produziert 3x mehr Granaten als Alliierte der ...
26.5.24 23:48
312
Ukraine überschreitet rote Linien
26.5.24 23:55
313
USA und Deutschland wütend über Ukraine
28.5.24 22:34
314
RE: USA und Deutschland wütend über Ukraine
29.5.24 05:59
315
Scholz und Macron: Ukraine darf auch Ziele in Russland ...
29.5.24 05:54
316
Ukraine macht aus dem M1 Abrams einen Frankenstein-Panz...
01.6.24 09:12
317
Ukrainische Stromtarife drastisch erhöht
01.6.24 15:41
318
Russische Zentralbank lässt Leitzins erneut bei 16 Proz...
08.6.24 16:08
319
ISW: Ukraine signed bilateral ten-year security agreeme...
14.6.24 08:24
320
Vatikan stimmt Abschlusserklärung nicht zu
16.6.24 20:49
321
RE: Vatikan stimmt Abschlusserklärung nicht zu
17.6.24 06:37
322
Kiew: 15 russische Flugabwehrsysteme auf Krim zerstört
18.6.24 07:54
323
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that NAT...
18.6.24 08:29
324
Putin published an article in North Korean state-owned ...
19.6.24 08:08
325
Ukraine-Einmarsch wegen Lithium?
23.6.24 21:19
326
200 Milliarden Euro der russischen Nationalbank bunkern...
02.7.24 09:29
327
Sanktionen beeinträchtigen Russlands Kapazitäten zur Kr...
08.7.24 09:15
328
A recent Ukrainian poll indicates that Ukrainians widel...
16.7.24 08:50
329
Berichte über Rückzug ukrainischer Truppen im Südostenwitzig
17.7.24 13:39
330
Russische Truppen melden weiteren Vormarsch im Donbas
21.7.24 18:33
331
Russland: Über 80 ukrainische Drohnen abgefangen
22.7.24 11:48
332
Selenskyj: Ukrainische Truppen im Osten schwer unter Dr...
27.7.24 08:02
333
Russland meldet Einnahme von weiterem Dorf in Ostukrain...
28.7.24 08:38
334
„Einer der größten“ Angriffe auf Kiew
31.7.24 19:05
335
Bericht: Erste F-16-Kampfjets eingetroffen
31.7.24 19:06
336
RE: Bericht: Erste F-16-Kampfjets eingetroffen
31.7.24 22:08
337
      RE: Bericht: Erste F-16-Kampfjets eingetroffen
31.7.24 22:39
338
      RE: Bericht: Erste F-16-Kampfjets eingetroffen
01.8.24 02:55
339
      RE: Bericht: Erste F-16-Kampfjets eingetroffen
01.8.24 14:15
340
      RE: Bericht: Erste F-16-Kampfjets eingetroffen
04.8.24 19:22
341
      RE: Bericht: Erste F-16-Kampfjets eingetroffengut analysiert
01.8.24 05:10
342
London: Weiter hohe russische Verluste
03.8.24 12:20
343
Selenski stellt erste F-16-Kampfjets der Ukraine vor
04.8.24 18:38
344
RE: Selenski stellt erste F-16-Kampfjets der Ukraine vo...
04.8.24 20:25
345
      RE: Selenski stellt erste F-16-Kampfjets der Ukraine vo...
04.8.24 20:55
346
      RE: Selenski stellt erste F-16-Kampfjets der Ukraine vo...gut analysiertgut analysiert
04.8.24 21:02
347
      RE: Selenski stellt erste F-16-Kampfjets der Ukraine vo...
04.8.24 21:39
348
      RE: Selenski stellt erste F-16-Kampfjets der Ukraine vo...gut analysiert
04.8.24 21:59
349
      RE: Selenski stellt erste F-16-Kampfjets der Ukraine vo...
05.8.24 01:15
350
      RE: Selenski stellt erste F-16-Kampfjets der Ukraine vo...
05.8.24 06:38
351
      RE: Selenski stellt erste F-16-Kampfjets der Ukraine vo...
05.8.24 12:25
352
Russland setzt Psychologen ein
07.8.24 15:44
353
Militärisches Vabanquespiel der Ukraine mit psychologis...
09.8.24 11:36
354
Ukraine verschifft verstärkt Getreide
12.8.24 13:38
355
Evakuierung von Teilen der russischen Region Belgorod
12.8.24 13:59
356
Kiew berichtet von Gebietsgewinn in Kursk
13.8.24 06:53
357
Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contem...
13.8.24 08:30
358
Storm Shadows wurden kastriert
13.8.24 20:07
359
Russland ruft Ausnahmezustand in Belgorod aus
14.8.24 07:39
360
Kiew meldet weiteren Vorstoß bei Kursk, Moskau dementie...
14.8.24 16:50
361
Russland ordnet weitere Evakuierungen in Kursk an
15.8.24 08:28
362
schöne Hilfs-Lkws
16.8.24 19:56
363
USA halten GB zurück
17.8.24 22:01
364
RE: USA halten GB zurück
18.8.24 08:38
365
      RE: USA halten GB zurück
18.8.24 12:36
366
      RE: USA halten GB zurückgut analysiert
18.8.24 21:55
367
Kursk: Strategisch wichtige Brücken zerstört
18.8.24 09:10
368
Kreml dementiert Verhandlungspläne
18.8.24 19:33
369
RE: Krieg Rußland - Ukraine
19.8.24 15:03
370
RE: Krieg Rußland - Ukraine
19.8.24 15:07
371
Selenskyj meldet Einnahme weiterer Orte
20.8.24 05:39
372
Munitionsmangel an Donbass-Front
20.8.24 21:39
373
Ukrainische Armee im Osten unter Druck
22.8.24 05:12
374
Bau von Bunkern in Stadt Kursk angeordnet
23.8.24 08:04
375
Russischer Treibstofftanker nach Angriff gesunken
23.8.24 08:13
376
Goldschmuggel
26.8.24 21:22
377
Verheerende Luftattacken auf Ukraine
27.8.24 05:03
378
Berichte über Kämpfe an Grenze zu Belgorod
27.8.24 18:10
379
Selenskyj: Situation nahe Pokrowsk „extrem schwierig“
29.8.24 07:09
380
Ukraine weitet Stromabschaltungen aus
30.8.24 06:18
381
Medien: Mehr als 66.000 tote russische Soldaten identif...
01.9.24 10:25
382
Ukraine greift Raffinerie und Kraftwerke an
01.9.24 16:44
383
Drohnenangriffe in Russland sinnvoll
02.9.24 16:04
384
Raytheon verkaufte militärische Geheimnisse an Russland
05.9.24 19:53
385
London liefert Kiew hunderte Luftabwehr-Raketen
06.9.24 07:53
386
RE: London liefert Kiew hunderte Luftabwehr-Raketen
06.9.24 07:58
387
Deutschland sagt Ukraine weitere Panzerhaubitzen zu
06.9.24 12:47
388
Achse des Bösen tauscht Spieler aus?
08.9.24 20:21
389
RE: Achse des Bösen tauscht Spieler aus?
08.9.24 20:47
390
      RE: Achse des Bösen tauscht Spieler aus?
08.9.24 20:58
391
      RE: Achse des Bösen tauscht Spieler aus?witzig
08.9.24 21:26
392
      RE: Achse des Bösen tauscht Spieler aus?
09.9.24 00:02
393
Russland meldet zahlreiche Drohnenangriffe mit Ziel Mos...
10.9.24 08:02
394
Waffeneinsatz gegen Russland: USA „arbeiten“ an Freigab...
11.9.24 07:17
395
Russische Armee: Gegenoffensive in Kursk gestartet
11.9.24 15:16
396
Drohnenangriff in nordrussischem Murmansk gemeldet
12.9.24 05:22
397
Selenskyj: Russland hat Gegenoffensive in Kursk gestart...
12.9.24 15:37
398
Abweichende Angaben zu Abschuss von russischem Kampfjet
12.9.24 15:41
399
Erdogan fordert Rückgabe der Krim
12.9.24 22:07
400
Selenskyj sieht keine russischen Erfolge im Gebiet Kurs...
14.9.24 11:19
401
Einsatzpläne für F-16 laut Selenskyj fertiggestellt
18.9.24 09:26
402
Ukraine: Rumänien soll russische Drohnen abschießen
18.9.24 18:39
403
Kiew: Russische Kursk-Offensive gestoppt
19.9.24 06:44
404
Putin ordnet Truppenerhöhung auf 1,5 Mio. Soldaten an
19.9.24 08:05
405
Kursk-Vorstoß: Russland hatte womöglich Hinweise
21.9.24 08:49
406
Bericht: 70.000 gefallene russische Soldaten identifizi...
21.9.24 08:51
407
Welche Summen Putin seinen Soldaten zahlen muss, damit ...
22.9.24 08:36
408
Ukraine will Russland bei Drohnenproduktion übertreffen...
22.9.24 17:29
409
Ukrainische Armee im Osten weiter stark unter Druck
24.9.24 05:43
410
Selenskyj angeblich bereit zu Waffenstillstand
10.10.24 14:13
411
RE: Selenskyj angeblich bereit zu Waffenstillstand
10.10.24 16:44
412
      RE: Selenskyj angeblich bereit zu Waffenstillstand
10.10.24 21:20
413
Ukraine Verbot von Waffenexporten könnte fallen
13.10.24 08:51
414
Selenskyj: Armee hält Stellungen in Kursk
13.10.24 09:09
415
Kiew: Angriff mit knapp 30 Panzern abgewehrt
14.10.24 06:15
416
Nordkoreanische Soldaten verstärken russische Armee
14.10.24 07:58
417
Putin plant Schlag gegen US-Dollar
22.10.24 07:15
418
Laut Kiew erste nordkoreanische Truppen in Kursk
25.10.24 07:01
419
Laut Kiew hohe russische Verluste bei Kursk
02.11.24 07:21
420
Erste nordkoreanische Verluste
08.11.24 07:53
421
Ukraine wird Einsatz von US-Waffen erlaubt
18.11.24 07:42
422
RE: Krieg Rußland - Ukraine
19.11.24 10:26
423
RE: Krieg Rußland - Ukraine
19.11.24 10:55
424
Erstmals ATACMS-Raketen auf Russland
19.11.24 15:19
425
RE: Erstmals ATACMS-Raketen auf Russland
19.11.24 16:41
426
USA wollen Kiew Anti-Personen-Minen liefern
20.11.24 12:03
427
Kiew legt gegen Russland nach
21.11.24 05:27
428
Deutschland rüstet auf
25.11.24 14:37
429
Ukrainische Ostfront bröckelt
28.11.24 05:38
430
Keith Kellogg wird Trumps Sondergesandter für die Ukrai...
28.11.24 22:05
431
Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
29.11.24 14:10
432
RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
29.11.24 16:12
433
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
29.11.24 17:27
434
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
29.11.24 18:17
435
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
29.11.24 18:26
436
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
29.11.24 19:19
437
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
29.11.24 20:14
438
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
30.11.24 00:05
439
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
30.11.24 01:33
440
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
30.11.24 12:44
441
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
30.11.24 19:37
442
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
30.11.24 07:12
443
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
30.11.24 11:22
444
Taurus werden ertüchtigt
02.12.24 14:26
445
Ukrainian war dead reaches 43,000, Zelensky says in rar...
08.12.24 18:47
446
RE: Ukrainian war dead reaches 43,000, Zelensky says in...
08.12.24 19:27
447
Laut Insidern vereinbarten Russland und Indien ihren bi...
13.12.24 08:22
448
Selenskyj: Viele Nordkoreaner bei russischen Angriffen ...
15.12.24 08:38
449
Tickende Zeitbombe: Warum die russische Bevölkerung nun...
19.12.24 07:31
450
Seoul: 1.100 nordkoreanische Soldaten getötet oder verl...
23.12.24 08:13
451
RE: Seoul: 1.100 nordkoreanische Soldaten getötet oder ...
23.12.24 11:31
452
Erster nordkoreanischer Soldat in Gefangenschaft
27.12.24 07:25
453
USA: Umfassende Verluste unter nordkoreanischen Truppen
28.12.24 10:26
454
ISW: Russland eroberte 2024 fast 4.000 Quadratkilometer
01.1.25 10:05
455
Ukraine spricht bei Kursk von russischen Verlusten
02.1.25 07:26
456
Ukraine startete Gegenoffensive in Kursk
06.1.25 08:37
457
Kreml schlägt Referendum in Grönland vor.
09.1.25 17:05
458
Russlands Öl- und Gaseinnahmen stiegen 2024 um ein Vier...
14.1.25 07:23
459
RE: Krieg Rußland - Ukraine
15.1.25 08:50
460
The Kremlin is in the endgame of a decades’ long strate...
16.1.25 08:27
461
Kanonenrohre made in Austriainteressant
20.1.25 10:34
462
RE: Kanonenrohre made in Austria
20.1.25 10:48
463
RE: Krieg Rußland - Ukraine
20.1.25 17:29
464
RE: Krieg Rußland - Ukraine
20.1.25 18:29
465
Kampfdrohnen treffen russische Raffinerie
24.1.25 13:43
466
Russische Truppen dringen in der Ostukraine vor
31.1.25 11:48
467
Kiew: Nordkoreanische Soldaten wurden wohl abgezogen
31.1.25 18:13
468
Ukrainian Drone Surge Highlights Russian Oil Refining R...
01.2.25 12:02
469
Russische Berichte über ukrainische Offensive in Kursk
06.2.25 15:54
470
'Trump peace plan for Ukraine' is 'leaked': Talks with ...
06.2.25 16:48
471
Moskau: Ukrainische Gegenoffensive in Kursk abgewehrt
07.2.25 13:35
472
USA setzen erste Schritte
08.2.25 08:52
473
Trump auf X:
12.2.25 20:00
474
RE: Trump auf X:
12.2.25 20:01
475
RE: Trump auf X:
12.2.25 22:00
476
RE: Trump auf X:
12.2.25 22:31
477
RE: Trump auf X:
13.2.25 00:30
478
RE: Trump auf X:gut analysiert
13.2.25 08:40
479
„Bild“: Berlin will Kiew 6.000 Hightech-Drohnen liefern
13.2.25 06:58
480

Thema #254592
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