Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-300/400 air defense battery in Belgorod Oblast likely with HIMARS on
June 1 or 2. Geolocated imagery published on June 3 shows two destroyed launchers and a damaged command
post of a Russian S-300/400 air defense system in a field east of Kiselyovo (just north of Belgorod
City).<1> Russian sources widely speculated that Ukrainian forces used US-provided HIMARS, but Ukrainian
officials have yet to comment on the strike.<2> The S-300/400 air defense system was located roughly 60
kilometers from the current frontline in northern Kharkiv Oblast and over 80 kilometers from Kharkiv
City, which is within the range of HIMARS but exceeds the range of other MLRS systems that Ukrainian
forces reportedly use to conduct strikes into Belgorod Oblast.<3> Russian sources have increasingly
claimed that Ukrainian forces are using HIMARS to strike Belgorod Oblast since the US partially lifted
its restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use US-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russian
border areas with Kharkiv Oblast.<4> Russian sources will likely continue to characterize any successful
strike in Belgorod Oblast as a HIMARS strike regardless of the system used.
The People's
Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are reportedly in disagreement about economic issues such as the
proposed Power of Siberia 2 (PS-2) pipeline despite publicly portraying themselves as diplomatically
aligned. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 2 that three unspecified sources familiar with the
matter stated that the PRC and Russia disagree about the details of the PS-2 gas pipeline, with the PRC
wanting to pay prices near Russia's subsidized domestic gas prices and to only commit to buying a small
part of the pipeline's planned capacity.<5> Gazprom Head Alexei Miller reportedly did not accompany
Russian President Vladimir Putin on his recent visit to the PRC due to these disagreements over the
pipeline. FT reported that Putin asked PRC President Xi Jinping during their May 2024 meetings to come to
an agreement on the pipeline, but FT reported that sources said that a pipeline agreement "remains
distant." FT noted that Russia needs the pipeline to launch as expected more than the PRC. FT reported
that it gained access to an unreleased report by an unspecified major Russian bank that stated that if
the PS-2 pipeline does not launch in 2029, Gazprom's profits are forecasted to drop by almost 15 percent,
which is especially significant following Gazprom's $6.9 billion loss in 2023, its largest loss in more
than 25 years. FT, citing a recent report by Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy, also
stated that the PRC will mostly or entirely be able to meet its projected increased demand for imported
gas with existing supply contracts until 2030, but that the PRC's demand for imported gas will exceed the
capacity of its existing contracts by about 150 billion cubic meters by 2040.<6> The PRC is likely aware
of Russia's more immediate need for the pipeline and is using Beijing's upper hand in the energy sphere
to extract concessions from Russia on the issue.
Putin also reportedly asked Xi in May 2024 to
"snub" the upcoming Ukrainian peace conference in Switzerland amid continued Russian efforts to discredit
and otherwise undermine the peace conference.<7> Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated on June
3 that Russia is trying to discredit the upcoming Ukrainian peace summit by convincing other states that
the summit is insignificant, that they should not participate, and that if they do they should
participate at the lowest possible level.<8> Other Ukrainian officials have recently emphasized that it
is imperative for both the United States and the PRC to attend the June 2024 peace summit as their
participation is "decisive" in compelling Russia to participate in the process of restoring peace and
security.<9> The PRC announced on May 31 that it would not be joining the peace summit, and Saudi Arabia
has reportedly decided not to attend.<10>
Russian forces continue to abuse Ukrainian prisoners
of war (POWs) in violation of the Geneva Convention on POWs. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights
Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets amplified footage on June 2 showing a group of three Russian servicemen
beating, threatening, and harassing a group of four Ukrainian POWs.<11> The footage shows one Russian
serviceman shooting the ground immediately next to a POW's head and the Russian servicemen forcing the
POWs to sing the Russian national anthem. Lyubinets stated the preliminary information suggests that the
incident was filmed in the Kharkiv direction, where Russian forces recently began offensive operations.
The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office reported on June 3 that it opened an investigation into the
incident.<12> Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii identified the Russian serviceman who filmed the
video as Alexei Kirpin, a former soldier in the far-right "Rusich" assault formation.<13> Ukraine-based
ZMINA Human Rights Center reported that Russian authorities are also mistreating and beating Ukrainian
POWs in pre-trial detention centers in Russia.<14> ISW has observed evidence of widespread violations of
the Geneva Convention on POWs committed by the Russian military in recent months, including Russian
forces executing Ukrainian POWs and using POWs as human shields on the battlefield.<15>
Russian military and political leadership continues to pursue increased military, political, and
economic cooperation with several African states. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov
traveled to Benghazi, Libya on May 31 and met with Libyan National Army (LNA) Commander-in-Chief Khalifa
Haftar at the Ar Rajma military base in eastern Libya.<16> Yevkurov promised to enhance LNA capabilities
in eastern Libya.<17> Russia has recently reinforced its military presence in eastern Libya and increased
deployments of Russian military personnel and supplies to the area since at least March 2024.<18> The
American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project (CTP) previously assessed that the intensified
Russian military efforts in Libya are likely partially contributing to the wider Kremlin effort to secure
a naval base in Tobruk, Libya, and that Yevkurov has been particularly involved in negotiations with LNA
officials over Russian naval basing in Libya since August 2023.<19> Yevkurov also traveled to Niger on
June 3 to meet with Nigerien junta head Abdirahmane Tiani, Nigerien junta defense minister Salifou Modi,
and Nigerian junta interior minister Mohamed Toumba, reportedly signing a "multi-sectoral cooperation"
memorandum of understanding.<20> Russia has recently increased its military presence in Niger—the Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s Africa Corps deployed to Niger in April 2023 and stated its intentions to
replace US forces in northern Niger, then entered a base housing US military personnel in the country in
May 2024.<21> The US notably intends to remove all American troops from Niger by September 15, 2024.<22>
Alongside increased Russian military presence in Niger and efforts to supplant US forces, Russia is also
reportedly seeking to take over uranium assets in Niger currently held by French state-controlled company
Orano SA, and the "multi-sectoral cooperation" agreement signed by Yevkurov and his Nigerien counterparts
may support this Russian effort.<23>
While Yevkurov primarily pursues military cooperation
with African states, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is also visiting Africa to discuss Russian
political and economic engagement with various African partners. Lavrov met with Guinean junta officials
in Conarky, Guinea, on June 3 to discuss Russian-Guinean relations.<24> The Guinean junta's relationship
with Russia is complicated, but the Kremlin maintains substantial economic and resource-based interests
in Guinea. Russia depends on Guinea for a significant share of its bauxite, a refined-mineral-based
material that is used in the production of spark plug insulators and other circuit and furnace related
industrial goods.<25> The Kremlin may desire to maintain access to bauxite to support the Russian defense
industrial base (DIB). Lavrov also met Congolese officials in Ollombo, Congo on the evening of June 3, to
discuss the situation in Libya, as Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso’s is the head of the African
Union High-Level Committee on the Crisis in Libya.<26> Russian officials have attempted to maintain firm
relations with Congo over the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, with Lavrov visiting Congo in 2022 and
Russian President Vladimir Putin calling Neguesso in March 2024.<27> Lavrov is also expected to travel to
Chad on June 5 and Burkina Faso sometime in the coming days as well.<28> Lavrov's visit to Chad in
particular continues Russian efforts to grow ties with the Chadian regime since Putin met with Chadian
President Mahamat Déby in Moscow in January 2024, and Russia likely aims to establish itself as the
primary security partner across the Sahel to advance Russia’s economic and military interests in the
region.<29> CTP previously forecast that aligning with Russia and the Russia-backed Sahelian juntas could
pave the way for the Chadian junta to expand its defense and economic ties with Russia to address its own
regime security needs and internal pressure to distance itself from the West.<30>
The Russian
military is reportedly forcibly sending Russian servicemembers who refused to fight to the front in
Ukraine from Russia instead of standing trial for their refusal to participate in combat. Russian
opposition outlet Verstka reported on June 3 that Russian military authorities began forcibly sending
hundreds of Russian servicemembers who refused to take part in Russian combat operations to the front in
Ukraine, including to northern Kharkiv Oblast and Donetsk Oblast, in May 2024.<31> Verstka stated that
the Russian military holds the servicemembers at military unit basepoints in Russia as they await trial
for crimes related to their refusal to fight before suddenly cancelling their trials and immediately
sending them to Ukraine. Verstka reported that Russian authorities used physical abuse to coerce some
soldiers into volunteering to go to Ukraine before forcing others from their holding cells at gunpoint
and transporting them to the frontlines. Verstka reported that Sverdlovsk Oblast Commissioner for Human
Rights Tatyana Merzlyankova claimed on May 6 that she visited a collection point for servicemembers who
refused to fight but that management stated that there were no violations of the servicemembers' civil
rights. Verstka reported that Russian authorities cancelled the trials of at least 170 servicemembers who
refused to fight and deployed them to Ukraine and that investigators, prosecutors, and lawyers were all
unaware of this. Verstka reported that several sources, including one source from the Russian
presidential administration, stated that the Russian military sends conscripts and "incompetent"
reservists, who have signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), to noncombat roles in
Russia's border forces to free up experienced military personnel for the Russian offensive operation in
northern Kharkiv Oblast, but that the Russian military is also sending deserters to fight. A Russian
lawyer, who specializes in cases related to servicemembers refusing to fight, reportedly stated that the
Russian MoD may be stopping criminal cases to send such servicemembers to the front due to a shortage of
forces needed to fight in northern Kharkiv Oblast. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely
launched the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast when the Northern Grouping of Forces was
understrength, and the Russian MoD may be sending servicemembers awaiting their trials to the front in
Kharkiv Oblast to strengthen the limited forces in the area.<32>
Georgian Parliament Speaker
Shalva Papuashvili signed the Russian-style "foreign agents" bill into law on June 3 amid continued
protests.<33> The Georgian Parliament overwhelmingly overrode Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili's
veto of the law on May 28, and Georgian Dream Secretary General Kakha Kaladze stated on June 3 that
Georgian officials will fine and seize the property of any organizations that refuse to register under
the law.<34>
Key Takeaways:
Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-300/400 air defense
battery in Belgorod Oblast likely with HIMARS on June 1 or 2. The People's Republic of China (PRC)
and Russia are reportedly in disagreement about economic issues such as the proposed Power of Siberia 2
(PS-2) pipeline despite publicly portraying themselves as diplomatically aligned. Putin also
reportedly asked Xi in May 2024 to "snub" the upcoming Ukrainian peace conference in Switzerland amid
continued Russian efforts to discredit and otherwise undermine the peace conference. Russian forces
continue to abuse Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of the Geneva Convention on POWs. Russian military and political leadership continues to pursue increased military, political, and
economic cooperation with several African states. The Russian military is reportedly forcibly
sending Russian servicemembers who refused to fight to the front in Ukraine from Russia instead of
standing trial for their refusal to participate in combat. Georgian Parliament Speaker Shalva
Papuashvili signed the Russian-style "foreign agents" bill into law on June 3 amid continued protests. Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyptsi,
Avdiivka, and Velyka Novoslika and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. The family members of mobilized
Russian personnel continue to protest for the demobilization of their relatives.
Select Russian military commentators continue to complain about superior Ukrainian drone and electronic
warfare (EW) capabilities on the battlefield, continuing to highlight the rapid and constant tactical and
technological innovation cycles that are shaping the battlespace in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger who
formerly served as a "Storm-Z" unit instructor posted a list of complaints on June 4 detailing the
challenges that Russian forces face in repelling Ukrainian drones and claimed that effective and
pervasive Ukrainian drone use is now the "leading factor" in Ukraine's ability to repel Russian offensive
actions.<1> The milblogger made six points about the Russian-Ukrainian drone disparity, claiming first
and foremost that Ukrainian troops have a large numerical advantage in first person view (FPV) drones and
FPV drone operators. The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian assault groups have a 3-4:1 FPV drone
advantage over Russian assault units, while Ukrainian mechanized groups have a 6-10:1 FPV drone advantage
over comparable Russian units. The milblogger noted that Ukraine also has specialized and centralized
drone units within existing Ukrainian ground units, which allows Ukrainian forces to better integrate
reconnaissance and attack drone capabilities into basic tactical maneuvers. Russian forces, by contrast,
lack the centralized and organized drone-unit system and adequate EW and electronic reconnaissance (ER)
capabilities to counter Ukrainian drones.<2> Another milblogger, whose initial post from May 31 spurred
the former Storm-Z instructor to weigh in on the issue, noted that specialized Ukrainian drone units have
heavily targeted and destroyed unprotected Russian armored equipment in the Avdiivka direction,
inhibiting Russian offensive prospects in the area.<3> The milblogger emphasized that the provision of
FPV drones and required EW and ER systems to Russian forces is done on an ad hoc volunteer basis, as
there is no centralized supply mechanism from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). These remarks on
Russia's need to centralize its drone warfare capabilities echo recent calls made by a cadre of Russian
commentators, including former Russian Space Agency (Roscosmos) head Dmitry Rogozin.<4> As Ukrainian
forces adapt and better integrate new technologies into their force, Russian forces will likely feel
pressured to do the same in order to retain technological and tactical parity on the battlefield. This
offense-defense and capability scaling race is central to the development of combat means in a
contemporary war.
Ukraine and its partners have reportedly drafted a document for the Global
Peace Summit in Switzerland on June 15 that calls for future engagement with Russia on a limited number
of issues connected to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, although the Kremlin remains unlikely to engage in
meaningful negotiations on the proposal or any wider settlement to the war in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported
on June 4 that the draft document aims to generate consensus among summit participants on nuclear safety,
food security, and the return of abducted Ukrainian civilians and children.<5> The document reportedly
states that this consensus will serve as a "confidence building measure" for future engagement with
Russian officials on these issues.<6> The reported document specifically deems nuclear threats as
"inadmissible" and calls for the return of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to Ukrainian
control, and freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov so that Ukrainian agricultural
products can reach third parties and the return of all deported and unlawfully displaced Ukrainian
children and civilians to Ukraine.<7>
Russian officials have routinely been explicitly hostile
to engagement with Ukraine on many of these issues, however. The Kremlin frequently threatens Ukraine and
the West with nuclear weapons in order to promote Western self-deterrence. The Kremlin also uses nuclear
rhetoric as a common tool of its reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing Western
decision-making.<8> Russian officials have repeatedly attempted to use Russia’s physical control over the
ZNPP to try to force international organizations to legitimize Russia's occupation of the ZNPP and by
extension Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory.<9> Russia withdrew from the Black Sea Grain
Initiative, which facilitated limited agricultural exports from Ukrainian ports, in July 2023 and has
since routinely targeted Ukrainian ports and agricultural infrastructure in southern Ukraine in an effort
to constrain Ukraine's ability to provide grain and other agricultural products to its partners.<10>
Russian officials have shown very limited openness to the return of Ukrainian children from Russia and
occupied Ukraine to Ukraine through mediation with third parties.<11> The Kremlin and Russian occupation
officials continue to deport Ukrainian civilians and children from occupied Ukraine, however, and there
is no indication that Russia is willing to stop this campaign or return deported and unlawfully displaced
Ukrainians back to Ukraine at scale.<12> The Kremlin continues to feign interest in meaningful
negotiations with Ukraine in an effort to push the West to make concessions on Ukraine's sovereignty and
territorial integrity and the Kremlin may use engagement on these more limited issues to pursue similar
concessions.<13>
Russia is conducting a wide-scale hybrid warfare campaign targeting NATO
states in tandem with Russian efforts to augment its conventional military capabilities in preparation
for a potential conflict with NATO. Bloomberg reported on June 3 that Norwegian Chief of Defense Eirik
Kristoffersen stated that NATO has a window of two to three years to rebuild its forces and stocks before
Russia has rebuilt its own ability to conduct a conventional attack, presumably against NATO.<14>
Kristoffersen stated that this expedited time frame is due to Russia's current elevated defense
industrial base (DIB) output. Western officials also continue to highlight Russia's current engagement in
hybrid warfare activities across Europe. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 4 that Western
governments are trying to formulate a response to the growing series of Russian-backed sabotage attempts
on military bases and civilian infrastructure in Europe.<15> FT reported that an unspecified Western
defense advisor stated that Russia has a "highly developed lexicon" for hybrid warfare, including
information and psychological operations and sabotage. The defense advisor noted that Russia is learning
from and adapting its hybrid warfare operations, stating that Russia is "constantly observing" the West's
reactions to these hybrid warfare operations and "testing to see which of actions work." FT
reported that Russia has resorted to using proxies, such as operatives from criminal gangs, to conduct
the sabotage attacks after European governments expelled hundreds of Russian diplomats and spies. NATO
and its member states have repeatedly warned about intensifying Russian hybrid operations on NATO member
territory.<16>
A joint investigation by Russian opposition student journal DOXA and
open-source outlet Kidmapping highlights the role of the Kremlin-backed Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in
Russifying Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have deported to Russia.<17> DOXA found that from
the early days of Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian officials deported children from
orphanages and boarding schools in occupied Donetsk Oblast to Russia's Rostov Oblast, where they were
visited by Metropolitan Mercury (Igor Ivanov) of Rostov and Novocherkassk, who spoke to them about the
ROC and seemingly enticed them to consider baptism into the ROC.<18> ROC clergy have also called for the
baptism of deported Ukrainian children into the ROC and reportedly encouraged them to join various
"military-patriotic" youth organizations in Russia.<19> DOXA and Kidmapping also found that deported
children from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts stayed at shelters run by the ROC in Voronezh Oblast,
where ROC clergy and affiliated officials hold "military-patriotic" events for the deported children in
order to encourage pro-Russian and pro-ROC sentiment and cut the children off from their Ukrainian
identities.<20> ISW has previously assessed that the ROC is instrumental in enacting the Kremlin's
occupation plan for Ukraine, and this appears to extend to Russian efforts to Russify deported Ukrainian
children living in Russia.<21> Kremlin-appointed Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova,
against whom the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant due to her role in
facilitating the deportation of Ukrainian children, is notably married to an ROC priest.<22> Lvova-Belova
and her husband have themselves adopted a deported Ukrainian child from Mariupol, highlighting the
personal involvement of the ROC and other Kremlin officials in the deportation of Ukrainian children.<23>
ISW continues to assess that the deportation of Ukrainian children, with the intent to destroy their
Ukrainian identities via such Russification projects, amounts to a violation of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which prohibits "forcibly transferring children of a
group to another group" on grounds that it is an act of genocide.<24>
Russian President
Vladimir Putin named First Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council and United Russia Secretary Andrei
Turchak the acting governor of the Altai Republic on June 4.<25> Turchak chaired the Russian State Duma
"Special Military Operation" Working Group dedicated to resolving issues with Russia's war effort in
Ukraine and reported on the working group's efforts directly to Putin.<26> Former Altai Republic Head
Oleg Khorokhordin resigned on June 4 reportedly to transition to a new, unspecified position.<27> Putin
met with Turchak via videoconference to discuss Turchak's new position and stated that the Altai Republic
is a "promising but difficult" multinational republic where the Russian government wants to develop the
tourism industry.<28> Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on June 3 that three sources close to the Russian
presidential administration stated that the Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative in the Ural
Federal District Vladimir Yakushev may replace Turchak as United Russia Secretary.<29>
Russian
sources speculated on the meaning behind Turchak's appointment. Russian opposition outlet Meduza stated
that sources close to the presidential administration noted that Putin offered Turchak the position
during a videoconference, not during a personal meeting as Putin usually does.<30> Meduza's sources
reportedly stated that Turchak's new position is a demotion, comparing it to an "execution" and
"deportation to a colony settlement." A source reportedly stated that Turchak lost his position in the
"power vertical" and that Turchak must have "seriously screwed up." Meduza reported that a source close
to the St. Petersburg government claimed that Putin moved Turchak because Turchak was "too active" in St.
Petersburg and St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov complained to Putin — a version with which other
Meduza sources reportedly disagreed. A Russian milblogger refuted claims that Turchak's appointment is
"political exile" and claimed that the Altai Republic is geographically important given its position near
Central Asia and Xinjiang, China.<31> The milblogger claimed that the West is active in Central Asia and
that Russia will need logistics hubs and a strong executive power in the area if there are "serious
showdowns" in Central Asia between the West and Russia. A Russian insider source claimed that the Russian
government may launch a new association of federal subjects that Turchak will supervise.<32> The insider
source claimed that the Russian government may hold a referendum, which Turchak will also oversee, to
unify the Altai Republic and neighboring Altai Krai. There are multiple defense industrial enterprises in
Altai Krai, and if the insider source's claim about plans to unify Altai Republic and Altai Krai are
true, the Kremlin may have appointed Turchak to oversee Russian defense industrial efforts in the region
as part of a wider Kremlin effort to increase Russia's defense industrial production.<33> Putin may have
also moved Turchak in an effort to sideline and demote him without having to make a public show of the
demotion, especially if Putin was displeased with Turchak's advocacy for Russian servicemembers fighting
in Ukraine.
Newly appointed Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov reportedly invited select
Russian war correspondents and milbloggers to meet with him to coopt several Russian information space
actors, prompting limited criticism from a prominent Russian milblogger. A Russian insider source claimed
on May 26 that Belousov planned to meet with milbloggers and military correspondents to demonstrate that
he has "nothing in common with his predecessor Sergei
Shoigu."<34> The Russian information space largely celebrated Belousov's appointment as Defense Minister
and expressed hope that his appointment would foster positive changes to the endemic problems that
persisted under Shoigu's MoD, such as the Shoigu MoD’s tendency to lie about Russia’s military
performance in Ukraine and failures to adequately supply frontline forces.<35> ISW has previously
observed that the Kremlin began efforts to coopt Russian milbloggers critical of the Russian military's
poor performance in the war in Ukraine by offering them state awards and government positions starting in
November 2022 in an effort to regain control over the Russian information space.<36> A prominent Russian
milblogger, who has previously criticized the Russian MoD and routinely posts complaints on his Telegram
channel from Russian servicemen on the frontlines, claimed that Belousov invited a limited number of
already-respected military correspondents, whom the Kremlin has coopted and likely deemed to be "safe,"
and milbloggers to meet with him.<37> The milblogger further claimed that he would not be surprised if
Russian MoD employees from the "old team," likely referring to Shoigu's affiliates at the Russian MoD,
organized the meeting and expressed doubt that the Russian MoD would listen to milblogger suggestions.
Russian milbloggers appear to be experimenting with different ways to express critical opinions of the
Russian MoD following Belousov's appointment, and Belousov may be meeting with military correspondents to
constrain this criticism.<38>
Key Takeaways:
Select Russian military commentators
continue to complain about superior Ukrainian drone and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities on the
battlefield, continuing to highlight the rapid and constant tactical and technological innovation cycles
that are shaping the battlespace in Ukraine. Ukraine and its partners have reportedly drafted a
document for the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland on June 15 that calls for future engagement with
Russia on a limited number of issues connected to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, although the Kremlin
remains unlikely to engage in meaningful negotiations on the proposal or any wider settlement to the war
in Ukraine. Russia is conducting a wide-scale hybrid warfare campaign targeting NATO states in
tandem with Russian efforts to augment its conventional military capabilities in preparation for a
potential conflict with NATO A joint investigation by Russian opposition student journal DOXA and
open-source outlet Kidmapping highlights the role of the Kremlin-backed Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in
Russifying Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have deported to Russia. Russian President
Vladimir Putin named First Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council and United Russia Secretary Andrei
Turchak the acting governor of the Altai Republic on June 4. Newly appointed Russian Defense
Minister Andrei Belousov reportedly invited select Russian war correspondents and milbloggers to meet
with him to coopt several Russian information space actors, prompting limited criticism from a prominent
Russian milblogger. Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Siversk, and Donetsk City. The Russian military reportedly continues to forcibly send Russian military personnel, including those
with serious medical issues, to fight in Ukraine. Russia continues efforts to militarize deported
Ukrainian youth and prepare them for future service in the Russian armed forces.
US officials continue to attempt to clarify US policy regarding Ukraine's ability to strike a limited
subset of Russian military targets within Russia with US-provided weapons, but public communications
about US policy remain unclear. US National Security Spokesperson John Kirby stated during a press
conference on June 4 that "there's never been a restriction on the Ukrainians shooting down hostile
aircraft, even if those aircraft are not necessarily in Ukrainian airspace."<1> Kirby made this statement
in response to a question about whether America's recent partial lifting of restrictions on Ukraine's
ability to strike targets within Russia with US-provided weapons pertains to strikes against Russian
aircraft operating in Russian airspace. Kirby suggested that Ukrainian forces can shoot down Russian
aircraft within Russian airspace if they "pose an impending threat" to Ukraine and stated that Ukrainian
forces already have done so since the beginning of the war. It remains unclear what the official US
policy on what Russian aircraft constitute "an impending threat" to Ukraine, and Kirby's statements did
not elucidate how the US administration views this issue. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's ability
to defend itself against devastating Russian glide bomb strikes is heavily contingent on Ukraine's
ability to target Russian aircraft within Russian airspace using US-provided air defense systems before
Russian aircraft can launch strikes at Ukrainian cities, critical infrastructure, and frontline
positions.<2> The current lack of clarity in US restrictions on Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons to
strike Russian military assets within Russia has routinely missed the opportunity to force Russia to
self-deter against conducting such strikes on Ukrainian territory from Russian airspace.<3> Russian
forces continued to conduct intense glide bomb attacks against Ukraine on June 5, likely largely from
Russian airspace.<4>|
Kirby also stated during the press conference that the US cannot confirm
if Ukraine has already used US-provided weapons in strikes on Russia since the US partially loosened its
restrictions on May 30, but the Associated Press (AP) reported on June 5, citing an unnamed US senator
and Western official, that Ukraine has used US-provided weapons to strike Russia "in recent days."<5> ISW
has observed geolocated footage from June 1 or 2 that shows a likely Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian
S-300/400 air defense system in Belgorod Oblast.<6>
Western-provided artillery ammunition has
reportedly started arriving to Ukrainian forces on the frontline, although not at a scale that would
allow Ukrainian forces to fully challenge the Russian military's current artillery shell advantage.
Ukrainian soldiers operating near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) told the Telegraph in an article
published on June 5 that Western-provided ammunition started to reach their sector of the frontline, but
that Russian forces in the area still maintain a munitions advantage.<7> One Ukrainian soldier told the
Telegraph that Russian forces still maintain a five-to-one artillery advantage. A Ukrainian soldier
operating in an unspecified area of the frontline told Estonian outlet ERR that Western-provided
ammunition began to "trickle" to the frontline but has not arrived at scale.<8> The Ukrainian soldier
stated that Russian forces continue to have a "significant advantage" in munitions. ISW continues to
assess that Russian forces are attempting to make tactically and operationally significant gains before
US military assistance arrives to Ukrainian forces at the frontline at scale, and that the initial
arrival of Western-provided weaponry will take some time to have tactical to operational effect on the
frontline.<9>
Russian missile and drone strikes have caused significant long-term damage to
Ukraine's energy grid, and Ukraine will reportedly face even greater energy constraints in summer 2024.
The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 5 that Russia has knocked out or captured over half of
Ukraine's power generation capacity, bringing Ukrainian energy production to below 20 gigawatts (likely
meaning per year) from 55 gigawatts per year before the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.<10>
European Union (EU) Ambassador to Ukraine Katarina Matherovna told FT that Russia has destroyed 9.2
gigawatts of annual Ukrainian generation capacity since resuming large scale missile and drone strikes
against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in late March 2024.<11> A Ukrainian official told FT that Russian
forces damaged 1.2 gigawatts of annual Ukrainian generation capacity alone during strikes against energy
infrastructure on the night of May 31 to June 1.<12> Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator
Ukrenergo stated on June 5 that it expects the Ukrainian energy system to face its most difficult period
in the middle of summer 2024 as energy consumption increases due to the heat.<13> The Russian military
has attempted to exploit degraded Ukrainian air defense capabilities in spring 2024 to collapse Ukraine's
energy grid and constrain Ukraine's defense industrial capacity.<14> Russia will likely continue periodic
large-scale strikes against energy infrastructure to cause significant long-term damage that degrades
Ukrainian war fighting capabilities while setting conditions for pronounced humanitarian pressures in
winter 2024–2025.
Ukrainian outlet Liga reported on June 4 that a source in Ukraine's Main
Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that there are roughly 550,000 Russian military and
paramilitary personnel concentrated in occupied Ukraine and near the international border.<15> The GUR
source reportedly stated that there are about 32,000 Rosgvardia, Russian Federal Security Service (FSB),
and other law enforcement personnel operating in occupied Ukraine, in addition to about 520,000 Russian
military personnel in and around Ukraine. ISW cannot independently confirm these figures, and the numbers
likely encompass combat and other non-combat military personnel who perform support functions and do not
represent Russia's immediate combat power. Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr
Pavlyuk stated that as of May 3 there were roughly 510,000 to 515,000 Russian personnel deployed in
Ukraine.<16> Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in December 2023 that there were 617,000 Russian
personnel in the “combat zone,” likely referring to all Russian military personnel in the zone of the
“special military operation,” which includes staging areas in border areas within Russia.<17> GUR
Spokesperson Andriy Yusov reported in January 2024 that there are 35,000 Rosgvardia personnel in occupied
Ukraine and that Russian authorities are considering deploying more Rosgvardia personnel to occupied
areas.<18>
Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on June 4 that former Russian Defense
Minister and Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu will coordinate efforts to increase Russian
defense industrial capacity alongside former Tula Oblast Governor and Presidential Aide Alexei Dyumin and
Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev.<19> Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov stated that
Shoigu, Dyumin, and Medvedev will each oversee an unspecified aspect of the effort to increase Russian
defense industrial capacity.<20> Shoigu's roughly equivalent position with Dyumin and Medvedev further
indicates that the Kremlin has demoted Shoigu following his removal from defense minister and suggests
that he is a secondary figure in newly appointed Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov's task to
significantly mobilize the Russian economy and DIB for a protracted war in Ukraine.<21> Putin routinely
rotates Kremlin officials in and out of his personal favor with the aim of incentivizing them to strive
to regain his support, and Putin may have tasked Dyumin and Shoigu with DIB efforts in order to maintain
their devotion following Shoigu's demotion from his prior long-term role as defense minister and rebukes
against Dyumin's possible effort to become defense minister in the aftermath of the Wagner Group's
rebellion in June 2023.<22> Shoigu is currently working with the Presidential Administration's
Military-Industrial Complex Commission and the Federal Service for Cooperation with Foreign Countries,
suggesting that Shoigu is likely involved in the Kremlin's efforts to leverage relationships with Iran,
North Korea, Belarus, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) to help Russia procure the components and
materiel it needs for increasing military industrial capacity.<23> Putin recently appointed Dyumin to the
board of state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec and specifically tasked Dyumin with assisting Russian
efforts to provide the Russian military with necessary weapons and equipment.<24> It remains to be seen
how involved Shoigu, Dyumin, and Medvedev will be in efforts to expand Russia's DIB, however, and their
roles may be at most nominal.
The apparent demotion of former First Deputy Speaker of the
Federation Council and United Russia Secretary Andrei Turchak on June 4 is likely part of Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s ongoing effort to remove from power the political and military figures that
violated his trust in 2023. The Russian Federal Council terminated Turchak’s powers on June 5 after Putin
appointed Turchak to become the governor of Altai Republic on June 4.<25> Chairperson of the Russian
Federation Council Valentina Matviyenko wryly stated in a farewell message that Turchak will turn Altai
Republic into a “tourist Mecca.”<26> Russian insider sources and political bloggers widely claimed that
Putin most likely removed Turchak from his position in Moscow for his allegedly close relationship with
deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and conflict with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)
over the control of occupied Ukrainian territories.<27> Some Russian insider sources and political
bloggers also claimed that Putin may have also been dissatisfied with Turchak’s execution of a Kremlin
effort to have Russian veterans participate in the Russian primaries in his role as the Chairperson of
the Russian State Duma "Special Military Operation" Working Group, although some Russian sources pointed
out that this failure was unlikely to have warranted Turchak’s exile to one of the most economically
depressed regions in Russia over 4,000 kilometers from the Kremlin.<28> Some Russian sources also
speculated that Turchak was demoted for his excessive involvement in local St. Petersburg political
drama, and many sources cited Turchak’s tendency to intervene in Kremlin intrigues in an effort to
improve his own political standing including by partnering up with former Russian Defense Minister Sergei
Shoigu.<29>
Putin had likely exiled Turchak from the Kremlin because he perceived Turchak to
be disloyal to the regime. ISW previously observed Russian insider reports that Prigozhin used Turchak to
directly deliver Wagner Group complaints about the Russian military failures in winter 2023 to Putin in
hopes that this information would prompt Putin to reappoint Wagner-affiliated commanders.<30> Turchak
reportedly delivered a blunt briefing about Russian military failures in February 2023 but did not
convince Putin to initiate military command changes, likely because Putin perceived Turchak’s briefing as
an act of disloyalty. ISW continues to assess that Putin values loyalty over competence and had
previously interpreted Prigozhin’s complaints about supply shortages and military failures as acts of
disloyalty.<31> A former Russian intelligence source notably revealed that Putin began to distance
himself from Wagner after Prigozhin scolded him in October 2022.<32> One Russian political commentator
connected Turchak’s demotion to the recent arrest of the former commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army
(CAA) Major General Ivan Popov.<33> Popov published an audio recording in July 2023 in which he stated
that he was fired after raising concerns over the need for troop rotations among Russian forces receiving
the summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive.<34> Russian State Duma Deputy and former Deputy Commander of
the Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev leaked Popov’s audio message, and
Turchak notably implied that Popov was not involved in the leak.<35> ISW assessed that Popov likely
deliberately recorded this message to appeal to the Kremlin to trigger a military command change within
the Russian General Staff.<36> Popov also equated himself with a rebellion leader less than a month after
the Wagner mutiny, and Turchak’s expressed support for Popov may have further convinced Putin of
Turchak’s disloyalty.<37>
A recent meeting of the Kremlin-appointed Russian Human Rights
Council (HRC) on Russia's migration policy reflects Russia's competing imperatives of attracting migrants
to offset Russian labor shortages while also catering to its ultranationalist anti-migrant constituency.
The HRC held a meeting on June 4 on "ensuring the rights of Russian citizens in the implementation of
migration policy" and discussed several initiatives to strengthen Russian federal control over migrant
communities living within Russia.<38> The HRC discussed making Russian language tests mandatory for all
children of migrants hoping to enroll in schools and kindergartens; creating "social adaptation centers"
for migrants to learn the Russian language; and recognizing children who do not speak Russian at the
legally mandated level as having "special educational needs," all of which would require federal
oversight and funding in order to ease the integration of migrants into the Russian social sphere.<39>
Some participants of the HRC meeting proposed much harsher policy changes. For example, Kaluga Oblast
Minster of Internal Policy Oleg Kalugin called for a rule prohibiting labor migrants from bringing their
families to Russia in the first place, suggesting that the cost of helping integrate the families of
migrants into Russian society is not worth the social burden on Russian society.<40> Russian
business-focused outlet Kommersant noted that these policies are mainly targeted at migrant communities
from Armenia and Central Asia, predominantly Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.<41> The meeting’s
focus on migrant policy as a means to protect Russian citizens (mostly insinuated to be ethnic Russians
or naturalized foreign citizens) rhetorically sets a strong wedge between "Russians" and "migrants" as
opposing camps, and specifically identifies Central Asian migrants as potentially threatening the rights
of Russian citizens. Russian domestic policy is increasingly trying to balance a heavy reliance on
migrant labor, particularly from Central Asia, to maintain its domestic economy as it continues to
compensate for economic shortfalls resulting from its war in Ukraine, while also disenfranchising migrant
communities to cater to its vocal and influential ultranationalist constituency.<42> The HRC will
similarly have to balance fostering a policy that encourages and attracts migrants to move to Russia in
the hopes of obtaining economic benefit while also appeasing the cadre of commentators that espouse
anti-migrant and xenophobic views that hold that migration policy is a threat to ethnic Russians.
Chechen Republic Rosgvardia Head and Russian State Duma Deputy Adam Delimkhanov accused State
Duma Deputy Chairman and New People Party Head Vladislav Davankov of contradicting the Russian
Constitution and attempting to divide Russian society, exposing continued tension between Chechen efforts
to operate autonomously and the Russian state’s efforts to regulate perceived Islamic extremist threats
from migrant and indigenous Muslim communities. Davankov submitted a bill to the State Duma on May 28
that would allow educational institutions and regional authorities to ban religious clothing that
"partially or completely hides the face" from municipal and public spaces.<43> Delimkhanov responded to
Davankov's proposal by claiming that the Russian Constitution guarantees religious freedom and noting
that the hijab, which he claims is a religious obligation for Muslim women, does not cover the face.<44>
Delimkhanov claimed that Chechens are against niqab, which covers the face, however. Delimkhanov further
asserted that Davankov's bill could cause a rift in Russian society since he raised "one of the most
sensitive topics" without "proper consideration of the subject." Delimkhanov also observed that Russian
Orthodox Christianity expects women to wear headscarves for piety and humility. Davankov defended himself
against Delimkhanov's criticisms citing Russia's secular education system and claimed that parents
demanded the ban in schools given that migrant children "have difficulty speaking Russian, let alone
wearing religious clothing."<45> Davankov also noted that the Russian Supreme Court upheld a ban against
wearing religious garments in schools in the Mordovia Republic in 2015.<46> Delimkhanov's immediate
criticism of Davankov highlights continued tension between the Chechen Republic and the Russian
government's long-term efforts to subjugate Chechnya, likely exacerbated by intensified Kremlin
crackdowns against indigenous and migrant Muslim communities following the March 22 Crocus City Hall
terrorist attack.<47> The renewed debate on restrictions against Islamic religious clothing will likely
continue to foster division along ethnic and religious lines, despite the Kremlin's efforts to portray
Russia as a harmonious and united multiethnic and multi-confessional country.<48>
Russian
state-owned gas company Gazprom reportedly assesses that it is unlikely to recover gas sales it lost
following the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, illustrating how Western sanctions are
achieving some long-term impacts against Russian revenue streams supporting Russia's war effort. The
Financial Times (FT) reported on June 5 that Gazprom's leadership commissioned a report at the end of
2023 on the long-term prospects for gas sales, which found that Gazprom's annual exports to Europe by
2035 will average 50 billion to 75 billion cubic meters — roughly a third of its annual exports to Europe
before the full-scale invasion.<49> Gazprom reportedly noted that a new pipeline to the People's Republic
of China (PRC) aims to offset lost export volume to Europe but will only have the capacity to transport
50 billion cubic meters of gas per year.<50> Russia has relied on oil revenues to buoy federal budgets
amid increased spending on its war in Ukraine, and long-term constraints on other energy exports will
likely limit additional significant sources of funding for the Kremlin.<51> Russia has managed to rely on
oil revenues to support a record level of defense spending in 2024 by engaging in a concerted effort to
circumvent the G7's price cap on Russian oil and petroleum products.<52> The West is expanding sanctions
to curtail Russian efforts to skirt the G7 price cap, and significant constraints on Russian oil exports
could also achieve substantial impacts on Russian state revenue.<53>
Russian investigative
outlet the Insider and Moldovan outlet Little Country published an investigation on June 5 detailing how
former Moldovan Chief of the General Staff Igor Gorgan operated as an agent on behalf of the Russian
General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU). The Insider and Little Country reported that they obtained access
to Telegram correspondence between Gorgan and his GRU handler Colonel Alexei Makarov which shows that
Gorgan regularly reported on internal Moldovan matters and the visits of Ukrainian Ministry of Defense
(MoD) representatives to Moldova since 2019.<54> The Insider reported that an unspecified military
intelligence source stated that GRU's active contact with Gorgan began when Gorgan served on a NATO
mission in 2004.<55> Gorgan served as Moldovan Chief of the General Staff in 2013 and from 2019 to 2021
and reportedly offered GRU information on Moldovan military capabilities and activities, requests from
the Ukrainian MoD, and information about internal Moldovan politics.<56> Gorgan reportedly assured the
GRU that he still has contacts in the Moldovan MoD who can continue to supply him with
information.<57>Gorgan also reportedly routinely told Makarov that Moldova was ready for the arrival of
Russian forces and that he would keep "the whole situation in the army under control" and help Russia
"deal with politicians."<58> The GRU's response to Gorgan's offers is currently unclear. The
Kremlin is engaged in efforts to destabilize Moldova and prevent Moldova's European Union accession, and
Gorgan's relationship with the GRU illustrates how Russia is leveraging pro-Russian Moldovan actors in
these efforts and how Russia could rely on such actors to conduct future hybrid operations or support
conventional military aggression against Moldova.<59>
Key Takeaways:
US officials
continue to attempt to clarify US policy regarding Ukraine's ability to strike a limited subset of
Russian military targets within Russia with US-provided weapons, but public communications about US
policy remain unclear. Western-provided artillery ammunition has reportedly started arriving to
Ukrainian forces on the frontline, although not at a scale that would allow Ukrainian forces to fully
challenge the Russian military's current artillery shell advantage. Russian missile and drone
strikes have caused significant long-term damage to Ukraine's energy grid, and Ukraine will reportedly
face even greater energy constraints in summer 2024. Ukrainian outlet Liga reported on June 4 that a
source in Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that there are roughly 550,000
Russian military and paramilitary personnel concentrated in occupied Ukraine and near the international
border. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on June 4 that former Russian Defense Minister and
Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu will coordinate efforts to increase Russian defense
industrial capacity alongside former Tula Oblast Governor and Presidential Aide Alexei Dyumin and
Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev. The apparent demotion of former First Deputy
Speaker of the Federation Council and United Russia Secretary Andrei Turchak on June 4 is likely part of
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ongoing effort to remove from power the political and military figures
that violated his trust in 2023. A recent meeting of the Kremlin-appointed Russian Human Rights
Council (HRC) on Russia's migration policy reflects Russia's competing imperatives of attracting migrants
to offset Russian labor shortages while also catering to its ultranationalist anti-migrant
constituency. Chechen Republic Rosgvardia Head and Russian State Duma Deputy Adam Delimkhanov
accused State Duma Deputy Chairman and New People Party Head Vladislav Davankov of contradicting the
Russian Constitution and attempting to divide Russian society, exposing continued tension between Chechen
efforts to operate autonomously and the Russian state’s efforts to regulate perceived Islamic extremist
threats from migrant and indigenous Muslim communities. Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom
reportedly assesses that it is unlikely to recover gas sales it lost following the start of Russia's
full-scale invasion of Ukraine, illustrating how Western sanctions are achieving some long-term impacts
against Russian revenue streams supporting Russia's war effort. Russian investigative outlet the
Insider and Moldovan outlet Little Country published an investigation on June 5 detailing how former
Moldovan Chief of the General Staff Igor Gorgan operated as an agent on behalf of the Russian General
Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU). Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk, near Chasiv
Yar, west of Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City. The Kremlin likely authorized the Crimean
branch of the Kremlin-created "Defenders of Fatherland" state fund to help grant combatants in Russian
private military companies (PMCs) legal veteran statuses, possibly as part of an ongoing state effort to
centralize control over irregular formations operating in Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to repackage long-standing, tired threats about direct
confrontation with the West by claiming that Russia will provide long-range strike capabilities to
unspecified actors for strikes against the West. Putin's threat aims to influence Western decision-making
about Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia using Western-provided weapons but
notably does not threaten escalation in Ukraine or through direct confrontation, suggesting that the
Kremlin may be adjusting to select Western perceptions about the credibility of such Russian threats.
Putin stated during a meeting with the heads of foreign press organizations on the sidelines of the St.
Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 5 that Russia could begin supplying long-range
weapons to unspecified adversaries of the West as a "symmetrical response" to the lifting of some Western
restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets within Russia.<1>
Putin rhetorically asked why Russia should not have the right to supply weapons of a similar class
(compared to those the West has allowed Ukraine to use for strikes on Russian territory) to unspecified
actors that will conduct strikes on Western "sensitive targets."<2> Kremlin actors routinely threaten to
directly strike Western targets in an effort to use Western fears of escalation with Russia to encourage
the West to self-deter its support for Ukraine, and Putin's June 5 threat is not a notable inflection in
this regard.<3>
Putin may assess that select Western actors will be more concerned about
Russia providing long-range strike capabilities to actors willing to attack the West than the Kremlin's
tired rhetoric about direct confrontation between the West and Russia. Russia is very unlikely to
directly provide scarce high-end long-range strike capabilities to other actors, however, since it uses
many of these systems for large-scale strikes against Ukraine. It is also unclear what systems Putin
means by weapons of a "similar class." The United Kingdom lifted restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use
Storm Shadow cruise missiles with a range of over 250 kilometers for strikes against military targets
within Russia, which is the Western system with the longest range that Ukrainian forces are currently
permitted to use for such strikes.<4> The kinds of long-range strike systems Russia could ostensibly give
other actors would be limited if Putin's "proportional" threat is credible. Russia's likely unwillingness
to provide long-range systems does not preclude Russian efforts to help the West's adversaries acquire
long-range strike capabilities, however. Russia is reportedly providing North Korea with ballistic
missile technology in return for North Korea's provision of artillery munition to Russia, for example.<5>
Putin and the Kremlin have threatened escalation at every critical juncture in Western debates about
support for Ukraine, and this latest threat aims to constrain the easing of remaining Western
restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia using Western weapons.<6>
Lifting remaining restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western weapons can allow Ukrainian forces to
substantially degrade Russian operations by eliminating Russia's ability to use Russian territory as a
sanctuary space to optimize its rear areas to support Russia’s campaign to destroy Ukrainian
statehood.<7>
Russian naval vessels will make a port call in Cuba on June 12–17, likely as
part of a larger effort to invoke the historical memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis as part of Russia’s
reflexive control campaign to encourage US self-deterrence. The Cuban Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces announced on June 6 that four Russian vessels from the Northern Fleet – the Admiral Gorshkov
frigate, the Kazan nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine, the Academic Pashin replenishment oiler, and
the Nikolai Chiker rescue tug – will make an official visit to the port of Havana from June 12 to 17.<8>
Reuters reported that a senior US official stated that the Russian vessels may also stop in Venezuela on
an unspecified date in Summer 2024.<9> The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Russia’s
objective is to ensure a Russian naval presence in "operationally important areas of the far ocean
zone."<10> Russian media noted that the Admiral Gorshkov is carrying Zircon hypersonic missiles, which
the Kremlin has touted as capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.<11> The Cuban Ministry of Revolutionary
Armed Forces specifically claimed, however, that none of the vessels are carrying nuclear weapons, so the
Russian port call "does not represent a threat to the region."<12> ISW is unable to verify this Cuban
assertion. The Russian Navy's port calls in states in the Western hemisphere that have historically
strained relationships with the US aim to highlight Russia's strong relations with these states and are
likely part of Russia's reflexive control campaign to force the US to self-deter and not enact policies
that offer further support to Ukraine. Putin has repeatedly used nuclear saber-rattling to push the West
to self-deter during times when the West has faced key moments on critical policy decisions in how to
best support Ukraine.<13> The Kremlin likely hopes that the clear allusion to the Cuban Missile Crisis
and the inclusion of a reportedly nuclear weapons–capable ship will force the West to engage in
self-deterrence. The Kremlin likely coordinated the announcement of the Russian navy's port calls in Cuba
with Putin's threats to provide long-range strike capabilities to unspecified actors for strikes against
the West, as both activities can instill fear in the West. Putin notably did not threaten escalation in
Ukraine or direct confrontation between Russia and the West.
Putin inadvertently indicated on
June 5 that Russian forces may be suffering roughly 20,000 monthly casualties in Ukraine, which, if
accurate, would be roughly equal to or just below the number of new personnel that Russia reportedly
generates per month. Putin inadvertently suggested that roughly 5,000 Russian personnel are killed in
action in Ukraine each month, which further suggests that roughly 15,000 Russian personnel are wounded in
action, assuming a standard three-to-one wounded-to-killed casualty ratio.<14> ISW cannot confirm Putin's
suggested casualty rate and his apparent inadvertent admission does not serve as a clear claim about
Russian casualties in Ukraine. Putin's suggested figure does align somewhat with the lower end of
Ukrainian reporting about Russian casualty rates, however. Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant
General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated on May 2 that Russian forces suffer about 25,000 to 30,000 killed and
wounded personnel per month.<15> Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief
Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on January 15, 2024, that Russia recruits around 30,000 personnel
per month.<16> Ruslan Pukhov, the head of the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and
Technologies and a member of a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) civilian advisory board, similarly
claimed in mid-April 2024 that current Russian crypto-mobilization efforts are generating roughly 30,000
new personnel each month.<17> Russian officials are reportedly concerned about decreasing recruitment
rates ahead of the expected Russian Summer 2024 offensive effort, and it is unclear if the Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) has maintained the roughly 30,000 recruitment rate it reportedly had in January
and April of 2024.<18>
Russian forces have notably established a more sustainable force
generation apparatus in recent months for ongoing offensive operations and have intensified efforts to
establish operational- and strategic-level reserves.<19> Russian forces have leveraged their possession
of the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine to dictate a tempo of fighting in recent months that would
generate casualties roughly equal to or slightly less than the rate of newly generated forces.<20> This
has allowed Russian forces to immediately replenish losses along the frontline and sustain their overall
offensive tempo in Ukraine but has set limits on the extent to which Russian forces can intensify
offensive operations in any given direction.<21> The marginal amount of additional newly generated forces
not immediately committed to the front as reinforcements has allowed Russian forces to gradually
establish operational reserves.<22> Pavlyuk stated in early May 2024 that Russian forces intended to
generate about 100,000 more personnel for use in offensive operations this June and July and 300,000 more
personnel by the end of 2024.<23> Russia will likely fall far short of this immediate and near-term goal,
even at the lower limit of reported or suggested monthly Russian casualties and the upper limit of
reported monthly Russian force generation. ISW continues to assess that likely poorly trained and
equipped Russian operational- and strategic-level reserves are unlikely to be ready to act as a
first-echelon penetration force or as a second-echelon exploitation force capable of conducting
large-scale assaults in 2024 if Ukrainian forces have the wherewithal to resist them.<24>
Limitations on Western capabilities to train partner pilots on F-16 fighter jets are reportedly
creating bottlenecks that will affect Ukraine's ability to effectively field F-16s in the future.
Politico reported that Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium plan to send over 60 F-16 aircraft
to Ukraine in Summer 2024.<25> Politico reported on June 5 that US, European, and Ukrainian officials and
lawmakers stated that US, Danish, and Romanian F-16 pilot training facilities can only train a limited
number of Ukrainian pilots, however. Politico reported that US Air Force Spokesperson Laurel Falls stated
that the US National Guard is planning to train 12 Ukrainian pilots by the end of September 2024. The
Danish training facility is reportedly training eight Ukrainian pilots, but this facility will reportedly
close in November 2024, and the Romanian training facility is reportedly not yet operational. A full
squadron of 20 aircraft requires 40 pilots. A former DoD official reportedly stated that if the current
training constraints continue, Ukraine will only have enough pilots for a full squadron at the end of
2025. Ukraine will not be able to use all the Western-provided aircraft as effectively as possible until
the necessary number of Ukrainian pilots complete training.
Select Western countries have
indicated that Ukraine will be permitted to use F-16s for strikes within Russia but Ukraine's ability to
operate F-16s near the international border is contingent on Ukraine's ability to destroy air defense
assets in Russia.<26> Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 18 that Ukraine needs about
120–130 advanced fighter aircraft to achieve air parity with Russia but that Russia's biggest advantage
is Western-imposed restrictions prohibiting Ukraine from using Western-provided weapons to strike
military targets in Russia.<27> Ukraine may be able to set conditions to have Ukrainian aviation operate
in the air domain to support Ukrainian ground operations if Ukraine is able to sufficiently destroy
Russian air defense assets within Russia using Western long-range strike capabilities, obtain a
sufficient cadre of pilots capable of flying F-16s, and receive a timely delivery and a sufficient number
of F-16 airframes.
French authorities are investigating multiple recent pro-Russian sabotage
and societal influence operations in France amid continued Russian hybrid war measures against NATO
states and France aimed at weakening support for Ukraine. French media reported on June 5 and 6 that
French authorities detained a man with pro-Russian beliefs and dual Ukrainian-Russian citizenship at a
hotel on the outskirts of Paris after the man sustained injuries from making explosives in his hotel
room.<28> French media reported that French authorities assess that the man sought to attack French
security assistance allocated to Ukraine and that authorities found additional explosives, materials to
make explosives, small arms, money, and passports in the man's hotel room. The man reportedly fought with
the Russian military for two years in an unspecified location (presumably in Ukraine) prior to this
incident.<29> NBC reported that a source within the French National Anti-Terrorist Prosecutor’s Office
stated that it is "too early for us to say" whether the incident is connected to a Russian sabotage
campaign, though French and other European intelligence agencies have recently warned about a projected
increase in Russian sabotage operations in the coming weeks.<30> Macron plans to meet with Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky on June 7 in Paris and Reuters reported that French officials may use the
visit to announce the transfer of French military trainers to Ukraine.<31> Russian actors may be
attempting to use sabotage attacks to degrade French support for Ukraine or disrupt French efforts to
prepare materiel and military trainers for deployment to Ukraine. French authorities are also
investigating potential Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) involvement in recent incidents likely
aimed at fomenting domestic unrest and distrust of Macron.<32>
The Russian Investigative
Committee announced the arrest of a French citizen on June 6 following the early June arrest in France.
The Russian Investigative Committee announced and published footage of Russian authorities detaining an
unspecified French citizen under charges of failing to provide proper documentation required by law for
legally designated "foreign agents." The Russian Investigative Committee claimed in its report that the
French citizen also spent "several years" on multiple trips to Russia collecting information about the
Russian military that "can be used against the security of the state" if "foreign sources"
obtain this information, essentially accusing the man of espionage but not yet formally charging him with
espionage-related offenses.<33> Reuters reported that Swiss-based nonprofit Center for Humanitarian
Dialogue stated that Russian authorities arrested Laurent Vinatier, who worked as a Russia and Eurasia
advisor for the center, and that French President Emmanuel Macron also confirmed Vinatier's
arrest.<34>
Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Rostov Oblast and reportedly struck an
oil depot in Belgorod Oblast on the night of June 5 to 6.<35> Rostov Oblast Governor Vasily Golubov
acknowledged that a fire started at the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery after a drone strike.<36> Geolocated
footage published on June 6 shows a fire at the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery in Rostov Oblast.<37> Radio
Svoboda published satellite imagery on June 6 showing that the Ukrainian strike hit a liquified
hydrocarbon gas production site.<38> Radio Svoboda reported that the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery has a
capacity of five million tons per year, and a prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the facility is
mostly export oriented.<39> Ukrainian forces previously struck the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery in June
2022 and March 2023.<40> Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov claimed on June 6 that a Ukrainian
drone strike caused a fire at an oil depot in Starooskolsky Gorodskoy Okrug.<41> ISW has not observed
visual confirmation of the reported Ukrainian strike on the oil depot in Starooskolsky Raion.
Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Committee on Human Rights, Deoccupation, and Reintegration Deputy Chairperson
Ruslan Horbenko estimated that the Ukrainian military will recruit roughly 120,000 personnel in 2024,
although the apparent slow arrival of Western security assistance will likely limit Ukraine's ability to
sufficiently provision and equip these forces at scale in the near-term.<42> Horbenko stated in an
interview with Ukrainian outlet Ukrinform published on June 6 that the Ukrainian military command and
frontline commanders stated that the Ukrainian military needs 100,000 to 110,000 recruits in 2024.
Western military aid to Ukraine is unlikely to provision and equip these forces with sufficient materiel
given the current rate and limited scale at which Western military aid is arriving in Ukraine. Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky recently acknowledged that the slow arrival of US security assistance is
complicating Ukrainian efforts to commit reserves to ongoing Ukrainian defensive operations since the
Ukrainian military is unable to sufficiently equip reserve brigades to conduct rotations for frontline
units.<43> The arrival of US and Western military assistance to Ukrainian forces on the frontline at
scale will likely aid Ukrainian efforts to bring reserves closer to their intended end strength and
sufficiently provision new planned brigades.
Russian and Taliban officials expressed interest
in bilateral cooperation, indicating that Russia will likely soon delist the Taliban as a prohibited
organization in Russia. Taliban acting Minister of Labor and Social Relations Abdul Umari gave an
interview to Kremlin newswire TASS at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 6 in which he
expressed interest in expanding economic and energy ties with Russia and stated that the Taliban is
"looking forward to Russia's decision to exclude from the list of banned organizations ."<44> Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed support for delisting the Taliban on May 28,
ahead of the Taliban delegation's visit to Russia.<45> Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu
stated at a meeting with the security council secretaries of Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) member states that Russia is concerned about the situation in Afghanistan and claimed that there
are unspecified "new militant training camps" in Afghanistan and unspecified terrorists are moving from
Syria and Iraq to Afghanistan.<46> Shoigu's statement indicates that Russia is likely interested in
cooperating with the Taliban to degrade the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP), an adversary of the
Taliban and the perpetrators of the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow.<47>
Key
Takeaways:
Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to repackage longstanding, tired threats
about direct confrontation with the West by claiming that Russian will provide long-range strike
capabilities to unspecified actors for strikes against the West. Putin's threat aims to influence Western
decision-making about Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia using Western-provided
weapons but notably does not threaten escalation in Ukraine or through direct confrontation, suggesting
that the Kremlin may be adjusting to select Western perceptions about the credibility of such Russian
threats. Russian naval vessels will make a port call in Cuba on June 12–17, likely as part of a
larger effort to invoke the historical memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis as part of Russia’s reflexive
control campaign to encourage US self-deterrence. Putin inadvertently indicated on June 5 that
Russian forces may be suffering roughly 20,000 monthly casualties in Ukraine, which, if accurate, would
be roughly equal to or just below the number of new personnel that Russia reportedly generates per
month. Limitations on Western capabilities to train partner pilots on F-16 fighter jets are
reportedly creating bottlenecks that will affect Ukraine's ability to effectively field F-16s in the
future. French authorities are investigating multiple recent pro-Russian sabotage and societal
influence operations in France amid continued Russian hybrid war measures against NATO states and France
aimed at weakening support for Ukraine. The Russian Investigative Committee announced the arrest of
a French citizen on June 6 following the early June arrest in France. Ukrainian forces struck an oil
refinery in Rostov Oblast and reportedly struck an oil depot in Belgorod Oblast on the night of June 5 to
6. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Committee on Human Rights, Deoccupation, and Reintegration Deputy
Chairperson Ruslan Horbenko estimated that the Ukrainian military will recruit roughly 120,000 personnel
in 2024, although the apparent slow arrival of Western security assistance will likely limit Ukraine's
ability to sufficiently provision and equip these forces at scale in the near-term. Russian and
Taliban officials expressed interest in bilateral cooperation, indicating that Russia will likely soon
delist the Taliban as a prohibited organization in Russia. Russian forces recently advanced within
Vovchansk, southeast of Kupyansk, northeast of Siversk, northwest of Avdiivka, south of Velyka Novosilka,
and near Krynky. Russia's continued demographic crisis will present long-term constraints on human
capital within Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin articulated a theory of victory in Ukraine on June 7 that assumes that
Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from
conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition
against Ukrainian forces. Putin stated following his speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic
Forum (SPIEF) that Russia does not need to conduct another call-up of reservists similar to Russia‘s
September 2022 partial mobilization because Russia is not trying to rapidly achieve its military
objectives in Ukraine.<1> Putin acknowledged that the current Russian military contingent committed to
the war in Ukraine (reportedly the Russian military’s entire combat-capable ground force as of January
2024) would be insufficient for a rapid victory but suggested that Russian forces are instead pursuing a
more gradual approach.<2> Putin stated that Russian forces aim to "squeeze" Ukrainian forces out "of
those territories that should be under Russian control" and therefore Russia does not need to conduct
another mobilization wave.<3> Putin asserted that Russian crypto-mobilization efforts are sufficient for
this approach and that Russia has recruited 160,000 new personnel so far in 2024 (a figure consistent
with reports that the Russian military recruits between 20,000-30,000 recruits per month).<4>
Putin's assessment that gradual Russian gains will allow Russia to achieve his goals in Ukraine is
predicated on the assumption that Ukrainian forces will be unable to liberate any significant territory
that Russian forces seize and that the Russian military will be able to sustain offensive operations that
achieve gradual tactical gains regardless of heavy losses. Western intelligence has previously assessed
that Putin assesses that US and Western support to Ukraine is “finite" and that Russian forces have
blunted Ukrainian efforts to retake significant territory.<5> Putin's assessment has been reinforced by
the recent months of delayed Western security assistance and corresponding Ukrainian materiel
constraints, which allowed Russian forces to seize and maintain the theater-wide initiative and conduct
consistent offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine that achieved gradual tactical gains.<6>
Putin's June 7 comments support ISW's previous assessment that Putin's assessment of Ukrainian
capabilities and how Putin’s perceived limits to Western support would incentivize Putin to pursue
creeping offensive operations indefinitely if more rapid operations that lead to rapid decisive results
seem unattainable.<7>
Putin's theory of victory rests on Russia's ability to outlast and
overcome pledged Western security assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainian efforts to mobilize more of its
economy and population for the war effort, indicating that Putin likely assesses that Russian forces will
be able to leverage their advantages in manpower and materiel to overwhelm on Ukrainian forces. Putin's
apparent assessment that Russia can "squeeze" Ukrainian forces out of all the lands it desires to occupy
assumes that Ukraine will not acquire and sustain the manpower and materiel required to prevent
indefinite Russian attempts to gradually advance along the front or needed to contest the initiative and
conduct operationally significant counteroffensive operations. Ukrainian forces have previously shown
that when they are well provisioned, they can prevent Russian forces from making even marginal tactical
gains, force Russian offensive operations to culminate, and launch counteroffensive operations that
liberate operationally significant territory.<8> Russian forces are currently leveraging the theater-wide
initiative in Ukraine to dictate a tempo of fighting that generates casualties roughly equal to or
slightly less than the rate of newly generated forces, which has allowed Russian forces to sustain their
overall offensive tempo in Ukraine.<9> Russia is also further mobilizing its defense industrial base
(DIB) and is generally far ahead of Ukraine and the West in this regard.<10> Putin and the Russian
military command likely assess that Russian numerical manpower and materiel advantages will allow Russia
to sustain this force generation replacement rate and field the required materiel needed to sustain
indefinite creeping advances.
This strategy largely relies on Russia's ability to retain the
theater-wide initiative, which Ukrainian forces can contest if Ukraine addresses its ongoing manpower
challenges and receives sufficient, timely, and consistent Western security assistance.<11> Western
security assistance pledges and Ukrainian force generation efforts will eventually allow Ukraine to
accumulate the forces and materiel it needs to contest the initiative if ongoing Russian offensive
operations are not successful in forcing Ukraine to divert manpower and materiel to defensive
operations.<12>
Russian efforts to prevent Ukraine from accumulating the personnel and
resources Ukraine needs to contest the initiative therefore are a part of an attritional war approach, in
which the Russian military command believes that ongoing Russian offensive operations will inflict
relatively more significant losses on Ukrainian forces and force Ukraine to divert manpower and materiel
to stabilize the front instead of preparing for future counteroffensive efforts. This approach also
requires that Russian forces avoid suffering outsized losses that would prevent Russia from sustaining
offensive operations. There are limits to Russian force generation, as Putin himself admits with his
continued aversion to another partial mobilization wave, and Russia's ability to expand its DIB has
extensively relied on the refurbishment of extensive Soviet-era stocks, which are a finite resource.<13>
Putin and the Russian military command likely calculate that these limits will not begin constraining
Russia's ability to sustain its offensive tempo in Ukraine in the near-to-medium term, however. This
approach requires that Ukraine is not able to inflict losses on Russian forces that decrease this
offensive tempo or force Russian offensive efforts to culminate. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine
should contest the initiative as soon as possible because Russian forces are reaping a variety of
benefits from holding the initiative, including their ability to pursue a strategy of attritional
warfare.<14>
Putin's theory of victory hinges on a critical assumption that the West will
abandon Ukraine to Russian victory, either on its own accord or in response to Russian efforts to
persuade the West to do so, and it is far from clear that the West will do so. Putin notably did not
identify what specific goals he assesses gradual tactical Russian gains will achieve, although the
Russian military command has likely previously believed that such gains would encourage Western debates
about continued support for Ukraine and cause weakened Western support that exacerbates Ukrainian
materiel constraints.<15> Putin also did not specify which territory "should" be under Russian control,
part of continued Kremlin rhetoric that purposefully leaves open room for further territorial conquest in
Ukraine.<16> The current rate of Russian advance suggests that Russian forces may pursue individual
operationally significant objectives over the course of many months if not years, and efforts to not
bound the Kremlin's territorial objectives likely intend to justify indefinite creeping offensive
operations as long as it takes to achieve Western and Ukrainian capitulation.<17> Putin may believe that
as long as Russia can prevent Ukraine from contesting the initiative he can lock in limited territorial
conquests while encouraging Western debates about continued aid to Ukraine once current pledges of
security assistance are expended.
The end of Western security assistance would eventually lead
to the collapse of the frontline and total Russian victory in Ukraine, a reality that recent months of
delayed Western security assistance has further highlighted.<18> The West must proactively provide
Ukrainian forces with the necessary equipment and weapons at the scale, timing, and regularity that
Ukrainian forces require for operations that liberate significant swaths of occupied Ukraine and
challenge Putin's belief that he can gradually subsume Ukraine should rapid total victory appear
unreachable. The West also maintains the ability to substantially disrupt Russian operations at scale by
allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike Russia’s operational rear and deep rear areas
in Russian territory.<19> The West must not surrender to Russia's strategic effort to destroy Western
commitment to Ukrainian survival and must remember that Ukrainian victory has always been possible as
long as the West remains committed to that goal.<20>
Putin indirectly indicated that Ukrainian
strikes on Russian territory with Western-provided weapons do not cross a supposed Russian "red line"
that would result in Russian nuclear escalation. Putin stated that Russia's nuclear doctrine calls for
Russia to only use nuclear weapons in the event of "exceptional cases" of threats to Russia's sovereignty
and territorial integrity.<21> Putin stated that he does not think such an "exceptional" case has arisen
so "there is no such need" for Russia to use nuclear weapons. Ukrainian forces have struck military
targets in Belgorod Oblast with US-provided HIMARS systems using GMLRS since early June 2024.<22> Putin’s
June 7 statement is a significant rhetorical reversal given that Putin and other Kremlin officials have
previously threatened Russian nuclear weapon use should Western states allow Ukraine to strike into
Russian territory with Western-provided weapons.<23> Western and Ukrainian policies and actions have
crossed Russia's supposed "red lines" several times throughout the war without drawing a significant
Russian reaction, indicating that many of Russia's "red lines" are most likely information operations
designed to push the West to self-deter.<24>
Putin heavily focused on proposals to solve
Russia's labor shortage issues during his speech at SPIEF on June 7. Putin outlined a 10-point plan to
grow the Russian economy and acknowledged that Russia is suffering from demographic challenges and labor
shortages.<25> Putin called on the Russian government to enact multiple reforms to increase the labor
supply and productivity, such as improving education and training, automating and digitalizing Russian
industry, increasing the use of artificial intelligence (AI), and increasing spending on research and
development. Putin highlighted the necessity of migrant labor to increase Russia's economic growth but
stated that Russia has not yet developed a "meaningful" migration policy. Putin specified that Russia
only needs skilled and educated migrant laborers with a knowledge of Russian language and culture and who
will "not create any problems for local citizens in the workplace and in life." Putin ended his SPIEF
appearance by stating that Russia "will treat the culture and traditions of
peoples of the Russian Federation" with respect as "unity is strength." Putin has touted
Russia as a unified multiethnic and multinational state, but his June 7 statements demonstrate the
differing policies and perceptions towards the indigenous, federally recognized peoples of Russia and
migrants.<26> Putin's migration policy proposals demonstrate how the Kremlin continues to struggle to
balance Russia's need for migrants to compensate for labor shortages and wide-scale anti-migrant
sentiments in Russia, particularly as the Kremlin tries to further mobilize the Russian defense
industrial base (DIB).
Putin attempted to frame Russia's economic issues in a positive light,
likely to prepare Russian citizens to make more personal sacrifices as Russia sustains a protracted war
in Ukraine at the expense of Russian citizens’ standards of living. Putin framed Russia's labor shortages
as resulting from Russia's alleged "record low" unemployment, not a consequence of Russia's full-scale
invasion of Ukraine.<27> Putin stated that people who have reached retirement age have experience and
knowledge that is useful to the Russian economy and that many pensioners have "aspirations" to continue
working. Putin proposed that the Russian government annually increase pensions starting in February 2025
for pensioners who continue to work even after they reach retirement age. Putin met with St. Petersburg
Governor Alexander Beglov before his speech at SPIEF, during which Beglov presented the idea of
increasing pensions as a direct request from working pensioners.<28> Large-scale protests erupted in
Russia in 2018 when the Kremlin announced a raise in the retirement age, and Putin is likely trying to
use monetary incentives to push pensioners to choose to work beyond the retirement age to help ease
Russia's labor shortages.<29> Putin also highlighted the strength of Russia's DIB, claiming that Russia
has increased its production of ammunition by more than 20 times in an unspecified time frame and that
Russia has superior aviation and armored vehicle technology than the West.<30> Putin claimed that the
Russian DIB has increased its production of civilian products by about five percent over the past two
years, likely to justify Russia's increased defense spending and recent efforts to mobilize the DIB to
civilians. Sberbank CEO Herman Gref, however, stated on June 7 at SPIEF that the alleged "unprecedented"
growth of wages in Russia will last at most another year.<31>
Putin continued efforts to
portray Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as an illegitimate president and identified the Ukrainian
Verkhovna Rada (parliament) as a legitimate actor with which the Kremlin can negotiate instead of
Zelensky. Putin’s recent statements are the latest in a series designed to obfuscate the legality of
Zelensky's extended term by misrepresenting the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian laws.<32> Putin
continued to claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate actor who has "usurped" power in Ukraine as the
Ukrainian Constitution does not allow for a Ukrainian president to extend his term beyond the five-year
fixed term.<33> Putin cherrypicked specific articles of the Ukrainian Constitution to make his argument,
including articles he also recently grossly mischaracterized or took out of their legal context during a
speech on May 28.<34> Putin claimed on June 7 that the Verkhovna Rada's power is extended under a period
of martial law and that presidential powers should be "transferred to the speaker of the Rada" under
articles 109, 110, and 111 of the Ukrainian Constitution now that Zelensky has "usurped" power.<35>
Article 109 states that "the resignation of the President of Ukraine enters into force from the moment he
or she personally announces the statement of resignation at a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine."<36> Article 110 states that "the inability of the President of Ukraine to exercise his or her
powers for reasons of health shall be determined at a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and
confirmed by a decision adopted by the majority of its constitutional composition."<37> Article 111
states that "the President of Ukraine may be removed from office by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by the
procedure of impeachment, in the event that he or she commits state treason or other crime." Putin is
invoking these articles to suggest that Zelensky's extended term is "illegal" and that the Verkhovna Rada
is the single authority to assume power should Zelensky resign, be impeached, or otherwise leave office
before the natural end of his term. Putin also invoked Article 83, which states that in the event of
martial law, the Verkhovna Rada's powers are extended, and Article 103, which states that a Ukrainian
president's term is five years - again claiming that presidential terms cannot be extended under martial
law while the Verkhovna Rada's term can be extended.<38>
Putin claimed that the Ukrainian
Constitution does not mention extending the Ukrainian presidential term, but this statement ignores the
Ukrainian legal framework about martial law. Article 19 of the Ukrainian law "On the Legal Regime of
Martial Law" states that presidential and Verkhovna Rada elections are prohibited under martial law and
forbids the Ukrainian president from abolishing martial law as long as there exists a "threat of attack
or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity."<39> Article 64 of the
Ukrainian constitution states that "under conditions of war or a state of emergency, specific
restrictions on rights and freedoms may be established with the indication of the period of validity of
these restrictions" except for the rights and freedoms stipulated by certain articles, none of which are
mentioned above.<40>
Putin's recent focus on legitimizing the Verkhovna Rada and its speaker
in lieu of Zelensky highlights a target for Russian destabilization operations.<41> ISW has repeatedly
assessed that recent Russian information operations aim to sow multiple divisions between the Ukrainian
people, military, military leadership, and political leadership to undermine domestic and international
support for Zelensky and Ukraine's decision to defend against the Russian invasion.<42> Ukrainian
intelligence has identified a Russian information campaign called "Maidan-3" that specifically aims to
spread doubt about Zelensky's legitimacy and has projected that these information operations will peak
from late May to July 2024.<43> These information operations may intend to set informational conditions
to eventually declare a Kremlin-backed actor as Ukrainian president, Verkhovna Rada speaker, or another
title with whom the Kremlin claims it can "legally" negotiate with instead of Zelensky.<44> Two figures
previously floated as possible replacements for Zelensky have since emerged in the wake of these
information operations.<45> Former pro-Russia Ukrainian MP Viktor Medvedchuk recently participated in the
information operation to discredit Zelensky.<46> Former pro-Russia Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych
traveled to Minsk on May 24 for an unspecified reason, and Ukrainian intelligence described Yanukovych's
last trip to Minsk in 2022 as a Kremlin effort to prepare Yanukovych for a "special operation" to be
reinstated as president of Ukraine.<47>
Putin attempted to introduce his children and the
children of other senior Russian officials to the public sphere at SPIEF, likely to set conditions for
them to eventually assume high-profile and powerful roles in the Russian government. Independent
Belarusian outlet Vot Tak reported that Putin's youngest daughter Katerina Tikhonova spoke virtually on a
June 6 panel about the role of defense industrial organizations and discussed Russian technological
development and import substitution.<48> Vot Tak also reported that Putin's eldest daughter Maria
Vorontsova spoke on a panel about biotechnology on June 7.<49> Vot Tak reported that Tikhonova spoke at
SPIEF in 2021 in a panel about BRICS and that Vorontsova has only previously attended SPIEF as a guest
where she did two interviews on the sidelines.<50> Kremlin newswire TASS characterized Tikhonova as
Innopraktika Company General Director and notably went out of its way to promote Vorontsova’s
professional titles and accolades by highlighting her position as Deputy Head of the Russian Faculty of
Fundamental Medicine at Moscow State University and a member of the Russian Association for the Promotion
of Science, and a Candidate of Medical Science (equivalent to a PhD of Medical Science).<51> TASS did not
mention their familial connection to Putin. TASS is likely attempting to portray Tikhonova and Vorontsova
as authoritative figures and to introduce them as trustworthy and knowledgeable individuals to the
Russian public.
A Russian insider source claimed that the children of other senior Russian
officials participated in SPIEF including: both sons of former Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head
and current Russian Institute for Strategic Studies Director Mikhail Fradkov - First Deputy Administrator
of the Presidential Administration Pavel Fradkov and CEO and Chairperson of Russian state-owned bank
Promsvyazbank Pyotr Fradkov; Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov's daughter Yelizaveta Peskova;
Presidential Aide Nikolai Patrushev's son Russian Agriculture Minister Dmitry Patrushev; Presidental
Administration Head Anton Vaino's son the Kremlin's Agency for Strategic Initiatives' youth work head
Alexander Vaino; Russian oligarch Boris Rotenberg's son Vice President of Gazprombank Roman Rotenberg;
Presidental Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko's son Alexander Kiriyenko; Security Council
Secretary Sergei Shoigu's daughter Ksenia Shoigu; and Putin's first cousin once removed ("niece") and
Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation Chairperson Anna Tsivileva.<52>
US National Security
Council Senior Director for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Pranay Vaddi stated that the
US has prepared a new nuclear weapons policy specifically to deter Russia, the People's Republic of China
(PRC), North Korea, and Iran.<53> Vaddi stated at the 2024 Arms Control Association meeting that the US
may have to deploy more strategic nuclear weapons in the coming years and that the US should be prepared
if the US president makes such a decision.<54> Vaddi stated that the US remains committed to
international arms control and non-proliferation values and agreements. Vaddi stated that Russia has
repeatedly rejected talks with the US to negotiate a successor to the New START strategic arms limitation
pact, which expires in 2026, and that the PRC has refused to discuss expanding its nuclear arsenal with
the US.
The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a $225 million security assistance
package for Ukraine on June 7.<55> The package includes missiles for HAWK air defense systems; Stinger
anti-aircraft missiles; ammunition for HIMARS; 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds; M113 armored personnel
carriers; Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor
systems; and other materiel.<56>
French President Emmanuel Macron announced on June 6 that
France will provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets and equip and train
a brigade of 4,500 Ukrainian soldiers.<57> Macron stated that Ukrainian pilots will likely train between
five and six months on Mirage-2000-5 aircraft in France and stated that Ukraine will have Mirage-2000-5
pilots by the end of 2024.<58>
The Russian Supreme Court declared an organization that does
not exist as "extremist" on June 7, consistent with previous ISW assessments that Russia seeks to expand
the legal definition of "extremism" to increasingly prosecute domestic anti-war sentiment. The Russian
Supreme Court declared the "Anti-Russian Separatist Movement" and its "structural divisions" as extremist
in accordance with a Russian Ministry of Justice request to this effect submitted on April 26.<59>
Russian opposition media has noted that no such organization exists, and Russian authorities have
previously designated other non-existent organizations meant to encompass broader “social movements” as
“extremist.”<60> Russian authorities likely intend to use this new extremist designation to further
prosecute anti-war sentiment among Russians and within occupied Ukraine, particularly movements opposing
Russia’s occupation of Ukraine and movements within ethnic minority communities advocating for better
treatment of Russian military personnel and mobilized personnel from these communities.<61>
The Kremlin continues efforts to destabilize the Balkans and dismantle the 1995 Dayton Accords that
ended the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, likely as part of a larger strategic effort that seeks to divide and
distract Europe. Russian President Vladimir Putin and President of Republika Srpska (the Serbian
political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) Milorad Dodik met on June 6 in St. Petersburg, and Dodik
attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF).<62> Dodik announced in a June 7
interview with Kremlin newswire TASS that Republika Srpska will adopt a Russia-style "foreign agents"
bill, which would restrict the activities of non-profit organizations that receive foreign funding, that
the government had previously withdrawn.<63> Dodik also stated Republika Srpska's intention to hold a
referendum on its independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina at an unspecified date.<64> The Kremlin has
previously leveraged its relationship with Republika Srpska to further influence the Balkans, sow
divisions in the West, and undermine the Dayton Accords to throw the Balkans into turmoil.<65>
Key Takeaways:
Russian President Vladimir Putin articulated a theory of victory in Ukraine
on June 7 that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances
indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive
operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces. Putin's theory of victory rests on
Russia's ability to outlast and overcome pledged Western security assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainian
efforts to mobilize more of its economy and population for the war effort, indicating that Putin likely
assesses that Russian forces will be able to leverage their advantages in manpower and materiel to
overwhelm on Ukrainian forces. Putin's theory of victory hinges on a critical assumption that the
West will abandon Ukraine to Russian victory, either on its own accord or in response to Russian efforts
to persuade the West to do so, and it is far from clear that the West will do so. Putin indirectly
indicated that Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory with Western-provided weapons do not cross a
supposed Russian "red line" that would result in Russian nuclear escalation. Putin heavily focused
on proposals to solve Russia's labor shortage issues during his speech at SPIEF on June 7. Putin
attempted to frame Russia's economic issues in a positive light, likely to prepare Russian citizens to
make more personal sacrifices as Russia sustains a protracted war in Ukraine at the expense of Russian
citizens’ standards of living. Putin continued efforts to portray Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky as an illegitimate president and identified the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) as a
legitimate actor with which the Kremlin can negotiate instead of Zelensky. Putin’s recent statements are
the latest in a series designed to obfuscate the legality of Zelensky's extended term by misrepresenting
the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian laws. Putin attempted to introduce his children and the
children of other senior Russian officials to the public sphere at SPIEF, likely to set conditions for
them to eventually assume high-profile and powerful roles in the Russian government. US National
Security Council Senior Director for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Pranay Vaddi stated
that the US has prepared a new nuclear weapons policy specifically to deter Russia, the People's Republic
of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran. The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a $225 million
security assistance package for Ukraine on June 7. French President Emmanuel Macron announced on
June 6 that France will provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets and
equip and train a brigade of 4,500 Ukrainian soldiers. The Russian Supreme Court declared an
organization that does not exist as "extremist" on June 7, consistent with previous ISW assessments that
Russia seeks to expand the legal definition of "extremism" to increasingly prosecute domestic anti-war
sentiment. The Kremlin continues efforts to destabilize the Balkans and dismantle the 1995 Dayton
Accords that ended the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, likely as part of a larger strategic effort that seeks to
divide and distract Europe. Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, near Chasiv Yar, and
northwest of Avdiivka.
The Russian military command is reportedly transferring an unspecified number of forces to the
Ukrainian-Russian border area near Kharkiv Oblast, but it is unclear if the Russian military command
plans to immediately commit these redeployed forces to combat or use them to reinforce the Northern
Grouping of Forces to bring it closer to its reported planned end strength. Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz
Commander Apty Alaudinov claimed in an interview with Russian state media outlet RT on June 8 that
Russian authorities decided to transfer elements of the Akhmat Spetsnaz to the Kharkiv direction from
unspecified areas at the end of May 2024.<1> Alaudinov claimed that the "Kashtan" detachment, formerly
known as Akhmat "Kamerton" detachment and renamed after its new commander, is operating in the Kharkiv
direction. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on
June 8 that Akhmat forces are serving as blocking units – specialized disciplinary units that fire upon
friendly forces if they engage in an unauthorized retreat – in the international border area, and it is
possible that the Russian military command transferred Akhmat forces to the area solely for this purpose
and not to conduct offensive operations.<2> Voloshyn also stated that the Russian military command is
increasing the Russian force grouping near the border area by transferring elements of unspecified
regiments and brigades from other sectors of the front, including from occupied Kherson Oblast. Voloshyn
stated that the Russian military command intends to commit unspecified airborne (VDV) elements and
additional elements of the 11th and 44th Army Corps (both of the Leningrad Military District ) to
offensive operations in unspecified areas of the border area. Elements of the 11th and 44th Army Corps
have been conducting offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and a battalion of the 98th VDV
Division is reportedly operating in a border area in Kursk Oblast.<3> The Ukrainian Resistance Center
stated on June 8 that the Russian military command is redeploying unspecified units and drone operators
from the Kherson direction to the Kharkiv direction.<4> Russian forces reportedly had roughly 35,000
personnel in the international border area as a part of the Northern Grouping of Forces when they started
offensive operations on May 10, whereas Ukrainian sources have indicated that the Russian military
initially sought to concentrate at least 50,000 to 70,000 personnel in the international border area as
of early May.<5> It is unclear whether Russian forces have altered the planned end strength of the
Northern Grouping of Forces since launching the offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast on May
10. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 6 that the Russian military command has only committed about
15,000 personnel to the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast.<6>
Ukrainian military
observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted on June 8 that a fraction of the reported 30,000 personnel that
Russia generates each month arrives at the front as combat force replacements and reinforcements and that
Russian force generation efforts have allowed Russian forces to establish only limited operational and
strategic reserves. Mashovets stated that on average each Russian operational grouping of forces receives
between 1,000 to 1,500 combat personnel as replacements or reinforcements every month and may receive
2,000 if the grouping is responsible for intensified offensive operations.<7> There are six operational
Russian grouping of forces operating within and near Ukraine, meaning that Mashovets is suggesting that
Russian forces receive a total of 6,000 to 12,000 new combat personnel each month.<8> This figure is not
incongruent with Ukrainian and Russian reports from January and April 2024 that Russia recruits 30,000
new personnel per month since a large number of these new personnel will fulfill combat support and
combat service support roles or later assume combat arms roles following training.<9> Russian President
Vladimir Putin stated on June 7 that Russia has recruited 160,000 new personnel so far in 2024, a figure
fairly consistent with reports that the Russian military recruits about 30,000 personnel a month.<10>
Russian forces have leveraged their possession of the theater-wide initiative to determine a tempo of
fighting in Ukraine in recent months that appears to generate casualties roughly equal to or slightly
less than the rate of newly generated forces.<11> This careful balance between Russian casualties and
newly generated forces requires that Russian forces not significantly intensify offensive operations for
a prolonged period of time, however. This balance becomes even more narrow when considering losses and
new force generation for just Russian combat personnel.<12> ISW has observed a "pulsing" of Russian
offensive operations along the front in recent months, wherein Russian forces alternate between
intensified assaults and a lower operational tempo to replenish losses.<13> The availability of new
combat personnel is likely one of several determining factors for when Russian forces decide to alternate
between intensified offensive operations.
Mashovets stated that Russian forces have
accumulated at most 60,000 personnel in operational and strategic reserves over the past six to eight
months (roughly from October 2023 to June 2024).<14> Russian forces have likely not properly trained or
equipped these reserves, which they have previously used largely as manpower pools for restaffing and
reinforcing committed units conducting grinding, infantry-heavy assaults with occasional limited
mechanized assaults.<15> ISW continues to assess that planned Russian operational- and strategic-level
reserves are unlikely to be ready to act as a first-echelon penetration force or as a second-echelon
exploitation force capable of conducting effective large-scale combined arms assaults.<16> These reported
limited operational- and strategic-level Russian reserves likely will be insufficient to support
simultaneous large-scale offensive efforts in several directions. The Russian military command will
likely have to choose one main effort during its expected summer offensive effort, if it intends for
these reserves to sustain a large-scale offensive operation.
Ukrainian forces conducted a
drone strike against a Russian military airfield in the North Ossetia-Alania Republic on the night of
June 7 to 8. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on June 8 that its sources in the Ukrainian special
services stated that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted a drone strike
against an airfield in North Ossetia on the night of June 7 to 8.<17> Geolocated footage published on
June 8 shows a drone targeting the Mozdok Airbase followed by a rising smoke plume.<18> North
Ossetia-Alania Republic Head Sergei Menyaylo claimed that Russian forces shot down three drones targeting
a military airfield in Mozdok and that unspecified objects sustained minor damage and caught fire.<19>
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed a drone over the North
Ossetia-Alania Republic on the morning of June 8.<20> A Russian milblogger amplified footage of Russian
forces reportedly shooting down a drone near oil infrastructure in Nogai Raion, Republic of Dagestan, but
ISW has not observed further evidence of Ukrainian drone strikes in the area.<21> One Russian milblogger,
however, claimed that a number of sources "erroneously" reported the strike near the Mozdok airfield as a
strike against the oil field in Nogai Raion.<22>
Russian strikes have caused widespread damage
to Ukraine's energy grid, and Ukraine will continue to face serious constraints on power generation
capacity. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on June 7 that only 27 percent of large Ukrainian
thermal power plants (TPPs) are operational and that Russian missile and drone strikes damaged or
destroyed the other 73 percent.<23> Shmyhal stated that recent Russian strikes have knocked out 9.2
gigawatts of Ukrainian generation capacity and stated that this is half of the generation capacity that
Ukraine used in Winter 2023-2024.<24> The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 5 that Russia has knocked
out or captured over half of Ukraine's generation capacity, bringing Ukrainian energy production to below
20 gigawatts from 55 gigawatts before the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.<25> Shmyhal stated
that Russian forces have destroyed 42 power generators and damaged 20 hydropower generators at Ukrainian
energy generation facilities.<26> Shmyhal emphasized that Ukraine is taking steps to relieve pressure on
Ukraine's energy grid and plans to restore as much energy generation capacity as possible before Winter
2024-2025.<27> Ukraine’s nuclear operator Energoatom stated on June 7 that it connected an additional
reactor at an unspecified nuclear power plant to the energy grid.<28> The head of Ukrainian state
electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo, Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, stated that this will relieve
Ukrainian power constraints for the next two weeks before increased summer consumption begins.<29>
Shmyhal stated that Ukraine is currently importing 1.7 gigawatts from the European Union (EU) but that
the EU is able to export a maximum of 2.2 gigawatts to Ukraine.<30>
US President Joe Biden met
with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris on June 7. Biden and Zelensky discussed the
battlefield situation, Ukraine's defensive capabilities, preparations to finalize a US-Ukraine bilateral
security agreement, and the upcoming Ukraine peace conference in Switzerland.<31> Biden apologized for
the delay in US security assistance to Ukraine and reiterated US support for Ukraine against Russian
aggression.<32> Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine needs more security assistance to strengthen its defense
of Kharkiv Oblast and that Ukraine needs more opportunities to strike military targets in Russia to
protect against Russian aggression from across the international border.<33> ISW continues to assess that
the delays in US security assistance to Ukraine have severely constrained Ukrainian defensive
capabilities in recent months and emboldened Russian forces to launch and make tactically significant
gains in their new offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast and double down on operations elsewhere
in the theater.<34>
Longtime Russian Central Bank Head Elvira Nabiullina is reportedly a
balancing force among Russian President Vladimir Putin's economic advisors despite pressure for Russian
officials to unequivocally support the long-term war effort in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on June 7 that
former Russian Service for Financial Markets Head and former Central Bank Deputy Head Oleg Vyugin stated
that Nabiullina has known Putin for years and has the "exclusive right" to tell Putin "what he doesn't
like" because Putin views her as straightforward and uninfluenced by corruption.<35> Bloomberg reported
that Nabiullina balances against Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, who advocates for Russia to
shape its budget to ensure a victorious Russian war effort, and former economic aid and new Kremlin
Deputy Chief of Staff Maxim Oreshkin, who portrays the Russian war as a global conflict against the West.
Bloomberg cited a senior government official who stated that Nabiullina is raising concerns about the
impacts of Russian labor shortages caused by the war and a "swollen" budget amid high defense spending. A
leaked video published on March 2, 2022, showed Nabiullina speaking about her hyperfocus on the Russian
economy after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and concern over greater domestic
sacrifices.<36> Bloomberg reported that Putin has begun overruling Nabiullina in some cases but assessed
that Putin is unlikely to remove her for the foreseeable future.<37> Bloomberg cited anonymous sources as
saying that Putin wants to avoid dismissing personnel in a way that could be viewed as destabilizing or
as being done under pressure.
Nabiullina is especially notable because she has previously
mitigated the economic fallout of Putin's geopolitical ambitions and reportedly tried to resign from her
position in May 2022 in opposition to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.<38> The Economist reported on
May 31 that Nabiullina ensured the stability of the ruble after Putin's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and
that in 2022 she feared that her resignation would lead to the arrests of her deputies at the Central
Bank.<39> The Economist reported that Nabiullina has largely favored regulatory market reforms but that
she learned early in her career in the late 1990s and early 2000s that the Russian economy can only take
so much change. The Economist noted that she has navigated accordingly as she gained power under Putin,
implementing some regulatory changes within the existing Russian economic system, and has shifted her
focus to minimize the economic impact of the war in Ukraine on the Russian public since February 2022.
Nabiullina's reported ability to speak candidly to Putin about the impact of the war on the Russian
economy is especially significant given Putin's recent efforts to oust any officials who have lost
Putin's favor or otherwise perceived as disloyal to Putin and his war effort.<40> Putin has recently been
preoccupied with assuaging domestic concerns about Russia's economy and has attempted to portray Russia's
economic issues positively, and he may be more willing to tolerate Nabiullina's candor or even appreciate
her honesty given her track record for stability.<41>
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence
Directorate (GUR) and Russian opposition outlets reported that unspecified actors attempted to
assassinate the former Russian occupation mayor of Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, Hennadiy Matsehora in Stary
Oskol, Belgorod Oblast on June 7.<42> The GUR stated that Matsehora is in critical condition at a
hospital in Moscow.<43> The Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on May 20 that
Matsehora, who was originally lawfully elected as Mayor of Kupyansk in 2020, defected and helped Russian
forces in February 2022 and that Ukrainian authorities will try Mateshora in absentia for treason.<44>
Key Takeaways:
The Russian military command is reportedly transferring an unspecified
number of forces to the Ukrainian-Russian border area near Kharkiv Oblast, but it is unclear if the
Russian military command plans to immediately commit these redeployed forces to combat or use them to
reinforce the Northern Grouping of Forces to bring it closer to its reported planned end strength. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted on June 8 that a fraction of the reported 30,000
personnel that Russia generates each month arrives at the front as combat force replacements and
reinforcements and that Russian force generation efforts have allowed Russian forces to establish only
limited operational and strategic reserves. Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a
Russian military airfield in the North Ossetia-Alania Republic on the night of June 7 to 8. Russian
strikes have caused widespread damage to Ukraine's energy grid, and Ukraine will continue to face serious
constraints on power generation capacity. US President Joe Biden met with Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris on June 7. Longtime Russian Central Bank Head Elvira Nabiullina is
reportedly a balancing force among Russian President Vladimir Putin's economic advisors despite pressure
for Russian officials to unequivocally support the long-term war effort in Ukraine. Ukraine's Main
Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Russian opposition outlets reported that unspecified actors
attempted to assassinate the former Russian occupation mayor of Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, Hennadiy
Matsehora in Stary Oskol, Belgorod Oblast on June 7. Russian forces recently advanced north of
Kharkiv City, southeast of Kupyansk, within easternmost Chasiv Yar, northwest of Avdiivka, and southwest
of Donetsk City. Russian actors are using video appeals from Russian servicemen to refute reports of
high Russian losses in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
The Biden Administration’s limited policy change permitting Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike
some Russian military targets in a small area within Russian territory has reduced the size of Russia’s
ground sanctuary by only 16 percent at maximum. US policy still preserves at least 84 percent of Russia's
ground sanctuary – territory within range of Ukrainian ATACMS. US policy restricting Ukraine’s usage of
US-provided weapons has effectively created a vast sanctuary – territory in range of US-provided weapons
but that Ukrainian forces are not allowed to strike with US-provided weapons – which Russia exploits to
shield its combat forces, command and control, logistics, and rear area support services that the Russian
military uses to conduct its military operations in Ukraine.<1> US policy still protects the vast
majority of Russia’s operational rear and deep rear, and US policy forbids Ukraine from using ATACMS
anywhere in Russia.<2> US President Joe Biden’s limited policy change in late May 2024 regarding the use
of US-provided weapons against military targets in Russia removed a maximum of 16 percent of Russia's
ground sanctuary, assuming that Ukrainian forces can strike all legitimate Russian military targets in
range of Ukrainian HIMARS using GMLRS in Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts. It is far from clear that
Ukrainian forces have permission to do so, however. Senior US officials have described Ukraine’s ability
to strike into Russia with GMLRS as being for counterbattery fire and geographically bounded to the
Kharkiv area, and have stated that Ukrainian forces may strike Russian military objects “deployed just
across the border,” suggesting that Ukraine may be prohibited from striking Russian military
targets further in the rear or in other areas in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts that are still in range of
GMLRS.<3> US officials’ statements also indicate that Ukrainian forces may be constrained from striking
Russian military targets that are not actively involved in ground attacks and strikes against Ukraine.<4>
The reduction of the sanctuary space’s area may be less than 16 percent, therefore.
Key
Takeaways:
The Biden Administration’s limited policy change permitting Ukraine to use
US-provided weapons to strike some Russian military targets in a small area within Russian territory has
reduced the size of Russia’s ground sanctuary by only 16 percent at maximum. US policy still preserves at
least 84 percent of Russia's ground sanctuary – territory within range of Ukrainian ATACMS. Likely
Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Su-57 fighter aircraft at the Akhtubinsk Airfield in Astrakhan Oblast
between June 7 and 8. Ukrainian forces may have struck a Russian large landing ship or patrol boat
in Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of June 8 to 9. The Kremlin's concerted effort to remove and
arrest senior Russian defense officials may be extending to civilian regional administration
officials. The pro-Kremlin Moldovan Victory opposition electoral bloc held its second congress in
Moscow on June 9 following a series of meetings between pro-Kremlin Moldovan opposition politicians and
Russian officials from June 6 to 9. Former pro-Russian Moldovan president and current head of the
Moldovan Socialist Party Igor Dodon gave interviews to Russian state news agencies TASS and RIA Novosti
on June 9 in which he promoted several known Kremlin narratives targeting the current Moldovan government
– many of which Moldovan opposition politicians also promoted at the Victory bloc congress. The
Kremlin will likely try to exploit its ties to Dodon as part of its wider efforts to destabilize Moldovan
democracy and influence the Moldovan government. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk,
Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City. Russian officials continue efforts to coerce
migrants into military service.
Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against Russian air defense assets in occupied Crimea overnight on
June 9 to 10, likely with ATACMS. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces
struck a Russian S-400 air defense battery near occupied Dzhankoi and two S-300 batteries near occupied
Chornomorske and Yevpatoria.<1> The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian strikes hit the radar
stations of each battery and caused secondary ammunition detonations and that Russian air defenses did
not intercept any of the Ukrainian missiles. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian
forces launched at least 10 ATACMS missiles and that each targeted air defense installation was an
element of the Russian 31st Air Defense Division (4th Guards Air Force and Air Defense Army, Southern
Military District and Russian Aerospace Forces ).<2> Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian
air defenses intercepted multiple Ukrainian ATACMS missiles overnight but largely did not report that any
of the missiles hit their targets, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has not commented on the
strikes as of the time of this publication.<3> ISW has not observed visual confirmation of the extent of
damages from the Ukrainian strikes. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Schemes project published satellite
imagery of burn marks at a Russian military object near a railway junction in Dzhankoi but noted that the
imagery’s resolution is too low to determine specific damage.<4> A Russian milblogger who focuses on
Russian air and air defense and has been largely critical of the Russian MoD criticized the Russian MoD
in response to the strikes, claiming that Russian officers are falsely reporting no losses to their
superiors despite actually suffering heavy losses.<5>
Ukrainian strikes against Russian
military and logistics assets in connection to the United States' partial removal of Russian sanctuary in
Belgorod Oblast may have compelled Russian forces to change their deployment and transport patterns. The
Crimea-based Atesh Ukrainian partisan movement reported on June 10 that Russian forces recently
redeployed air defense systems from occupied Crimea to Belgorod Oblast and that Russian air defenses are
not completely covering Crimea as a result.<6> Footage dated June 8 shows that Russia has begun
transporting fuel across the Kerch Strait across the railway bridge.<7> Ukrainian Southern Operational
Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on April 29 that Russian authorities
have not transported fuel across the Kerch Strait railway bridge since March 2024 due to the threat of a
Ukrainian strike against the bridge as a fuel transport crossed, which could ignite and possibly destroy
the bridge.<8> Ukrainian military–focused news outlet Militarnyi assessed on June 10 that Ukrainian
strikes against railway barges across the Kerch Strait on May 30 prompted Russian authorities to begin
transporting fuel across the railway bridge again.<9> It is unclear whether Russian authorities will
continue to use the Kerch Strait railway bridge for fuel and logistics transport to occupied Crimea in
the near to medium term. Doing so would likely alleviate some logistics constraints as Russia struggles
to compensate for lost ferries across the strait but would leave the Kerch Strait bridge increasingly
vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes, particularly if Russian air defense coverage of Crimea is degraded as
Atesh reported.
Ukraine's Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro
Pletenchuk denied on June 10 a Sky News report that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Ropucha-class
landing ship in the Sea of Azov on the night of June 8 to 9.<10> Pletenchuk also stated that there are
three large Russian amphibious assault ships and three Buyan-M-class corvettes in the Sea of Azov as of
May 10.<11> Sky News reported on June 9, citing a Ukrainian military source, that Ukrainian forces sunk
or damaged a Russian Ropucha-class landing ship that Russian forces had recently moved from the Black Sea
to the Sea of Azov, which ISW amplified.<12>
New Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met
with a select group of Russian milbloggers and military commentators on June 10, suggesting that the
Kremlin seeks to partially use Belousov's replacement of widely unpopular former Defense Minister Sergei
Shoigu to build bridges and cultivate ties with a broader milblogger community via a cadre of coopted and
loyal military commentators. Russian state news agencies TASS and RIA Novosti reported on June 10 that
Belousov met with several military correspondents (also known as voyenkory or milbloggers) covering the
war in Ukraine and claimed that the conversation was "frank and constructive."<13> TASS and RIA noted
that Belousov hopes to hold such meetings regularly. Russian insider sources and milbloggers claimed in
late May and early June that Belousov was planning to meet with select milbloggers, and some of the more
critical milbloggers criticized Belousov for reportedly not inviting them to the meeting.<14> Russian
media confirmed on June 10 that several prominent and generally Kremlin-aligned milbloggers attended
Belousov's meeting, including head of the WarGonzo social media military project Semyon Pegov,
Komsomolskaya Pravda military correspondent and Kremlin-appointed member of the Human Rights Council
Alexander Kots; Zvezda military correspondent Anatoly Brodkin; Russia Today (RT) military correspondent
Murad Gazdiev, Readovka correspondent Maxim Dolgov, and others.<15> Gazdiev claimed on his personal
Telegram channel on June 10 that the milbloggers delivered good and bad news from the front to Belousov
and promised unspecified "huge changes."<16>
The Kremlin likely attempted to falsely portray
Belousov as more attentive to milbloggers' criticisms than his predecessor in an effort to co-opt a
larger non-Kremlin affiliated milblogger community. The Kremlin and Shoigu previously appeared at odds
over milblogger reproachment—Russian President Vladimir Putin met with select milbloggers in July 2022
and June 2023 to discuss the situation on the frontline in Ukraine, while the Russian MoD continuously
tried to crack down against critical milbloggers, who often used Shoigu as an informational scapegoat for
Russian operational failures in Ukraine.<17> The Kremlin has long endeavored to coopt milbloggers,
especially those critical of the Russian military leadership, in an effort to control the information
space, as ISW previously assessed.<18> Belousov's meeting represents MoD outreach to several milbloggers
who have had the Kremlin's favor for some time now and likely intended to court this group of
commentators and ensure their continued loyalty to a new MoD under Belousov. Belousov's milblogger
outreach is more likely to be a performative attempt to secure their loyalty than introduce systemic
changes within the Russian MoD, as several Russian milbloggers who were not invited to the meeting
previously noted.<19> Both the Kremlin and the Russian MoD have a vested interest in appearing open to
dialogue with milbloggers, who represent a major pro-war constituency, and the Kremlin is likely aiming
to portray Belousov as more cognizant of this fact than his predecessor.
Officials from
Russia, Iran, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) held bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the
BRICS foreign ministers meeting in Nizhny Novgorod on June 10. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
spoke at the BRICS meeting and highlighted the organization's recent expansion.<20> Lavrov reiterated
standard Kremlin narratives about how the Western rules-based order is detrimental to other states and
about the supposed merits of the creation of a multipolar world. Lavrov claimed that the "winds of
change" are driving BRICS forward. Lavrov met with officials from Brazil, South Africa, Ethiopia, Laos,
Thailand, Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt during the BRICS event as well.<21>
Lavrov met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the BRICS meeting on June 10. The
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Chinese MFA both stated that Lavrov and Wang discussed
diplomatic coordination in international organizations such as the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC).<22> The Chinese MFA stated that developing Russo-Chinese relations are a "strategic choice" by
both parties and that Lavrov and Wang "exchanged views" on the war in Ukrainian war."<23> The Russian MFA
labeled the Russo-Chinese relationship as a "strategic partnership" and stated that Lavrov thanked Wang
for the PRC's "balanced" line on the war in Ukraine and for not sending a representative to the June
15-16 Ukrainian peace summit in Switzerland.<24> The Russian MFA also stated that Lavrov and Wang
discussed stability in the Asia-Pacific region, where they accused the US of allegedly creating
anti-Russian and anti-Chinese military-political structures.<25> Lavrov also met with acting Iranian
Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani on June 10 and discussed efforts to form a Russo-Iranian
"strategic partnership" and create a new comprehensive intergovernmental agreement.<26> Kremlin newswire
TASS reported that Kani stated that Iran "sees enormous potential for expanding and strengthening
interaction."<27> Kani and Wang also met on June 10 and reportedly discussed increasing
cooperation.<28> Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on June 9 that Russian Ambassador to North Korea
Alexander Matsegora stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit North Korea, and an
unspecified diplomatic source reportedly stated that the visit will occur in the coming weeks after Putin
visits Vietnam.<29> ISW continues to assess that Russia, the PRC, Iran, North Korea, and Belarus are
deepening their multilateral partnerships in order to confront the West.<30>
The Armenian
National Assembly will likely hold an emergency session by June 17 during which the Armenian opposition
parties will demand Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's and his cabinet's resignation. Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty's Armenian Service Radio Azatutyun reported on June 10 that 33 members of the
Armenian opposition factions "Armenian Alliance" and "I Have Honor" supported convening an emergency
session of the National Assembly to discuss passing a resolution calling for Pashinyan's and his
cabinet's resignation and the formation of a new government.<31> The opposition factions blame Pashinyan
for what they see as failures to defend and secure the territorial integrity and borders of Armenia.<32>
Radio Azatutyun noted that Armenian law stipulates that the National Assembly needs the support of 27
members of the 107-seat National Assembly to call an emergency session.<33> Pashinyan's Civil Contract
Party's National Assembly leader Hayk Konjoryan stated that Civil Contract National Assembly members will
not participate in the June 17 emergency session.<34>
The US Department of State announced on
June 10 that the US and Poland jointly launched the Ukraine Communications Group (UCG) in Warsaw to
counter Russian disinformation by offering fact-based reporting about the war in Ukraine.<35>
Representatives of unspecified countries will reportedly collaborate with the UCG. The US Department of
State emphasized that Russia often uses false narratives to obfuscate its war aims and try to fracture
worldwide solidarity with Ukraine.
Finnish authorities reported that a Russian military
aircraft temporarily violated Finnish airspace on June 10 amid continued Russian efforts to undermine
Finnish sovereignty. The Finnish Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that it is investigating an incident
in which an unspecified Russian military aircraft flew roughly 2.5 kilometers deep into Finnish airspace
over the Gulf of Finland for two minutes on the morning of June 10.<36> The Russian MoD has not responded
to the Finnish report as of this publication but claimed on June 10 that Russian Tu-95MS missile carriers
and Tu-22M3 bombers conducted flights over neutral waters of the Baltic, Barents, and Norwegian seas.<37>
This reported incursion likely forwards the ongoing Kremlin effort to undermine Finnish sovereignty and
territorial integrity. The Russian MoD proposed on May 21 that the Russian government should reassess
Russia's maritime borders in the Gulf of Finland, which some Western officials have warned may be part of
an effort to revise maritime zones in the Baltic Sea.<38> The Kremlin has also been running a number of
information operations aimed at portraying Finland as an enemy to Russia and Russians, ultimately setting
information conditions to justify potential future aggression against Finland.<39>
Key
Takeaways:
Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against Russian air defense assets in occupied
Crimea overnight on June 9 to 10, likely with ATACMS. Ukraine's Southern Operational Command
Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk denied on June 10 a Sky News report that Ukrainian
forces struck a Russian Ropucha-class landing ship in the Sea of Azov on the night of June 8 to 9. New Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with a select group of Russian milbloggers and
military commentators on June 10, suggesting that the Kremlin seeks to partially use Belousov's
replacement of widely unpopular former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to build bridges and cultivate ties
with a broader milblogger community via a cadre of coopted and loyal military commentators. Officials from Russia, Iran, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) held bilateral meetings on the
sidelines of the BRICS foreign ministers meeting in Nizhny Novgorod on June 10. The Armenian
National Assembly will likely hold an emergency session by June 17 during which the Armenian opposition
parties will demand Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's and his cabinet's resignation. The US
Department of State announced on June 10 that the US and Poland jointly launched the Ukraine
Communications Group (UCG) in Warsaw to counter Russian disinformation by offering fact-based reporting
about the war in Ukraine. Finnish authorities reported that a Russian military aircraft temporarily
violated Finnish airspace on June 10 amid continued Russian efforts to undermine Finnish sovereignty. Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border
area. Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov appears to be focusing on healthcare programs for
Russian servicemembers in his new role.
Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide monetary and military assistance to Ukraine, including air
defense systems. The Estonian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 11 that Estonia will provide an
undisclosed number of Mistral man-portable short-range air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine as
part of a new military assistance package.<1> European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen
announced during the Ukrainian Recovery Conference in Berlin on June 11 that the European Union (EU) will
transfer roughly 1.5 billion euros ($1.6 billion) worth of profits from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine
in July, of which Ukraine will allocate 90 percent to defense spending and 10 percent to
reconstruction.<2> Von der Leyen stated that the EU will also transfer an additional 1.9 billion euros
($2 billion) to Ukraine from the EU's Ukraine Facility mechanism, which is a separate fund that provides
for the EU to transfer up to 50 billion euros ($53.7 billion) to Ukraine between 2024 and 2027.<3> German
Chancellor Olaf Scholz reiterated during the Ukrainian Recovery Conference that Germany will deliver a
Patriot air defense system to Ukraine in the coming weeks and announced that Germany will also deliver an
IRIS-T air defense system, an unspecified number of Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, and an
unspecified number and type of missiles and ammunition to Ukraine in the coming weeks and months.<4> The
German MoD initially announced the transfer of this third Patriot system in April 2024.<5> The New York
Times, citing senior US administration and military officials, reported on June 11 that US President Joe
Biden recently approved the transfer of another Patriot system to Ukraine following a series of
high-level meetings and internal debates regarding the best ways to meet Ukraine's need for additional
air defenses.<6> Unnamed US officials stated that the new system could be deployed to the frontline
within several days depending on any maintenance or modifications that the system may need, as the system
is currently stationed in Poland.
The Kremlin continues efforts to codify legal instruments
and repressive measures intended to broadly censor foreigners and foreign organizations in Russia. The
Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading on June 11 that seeks to codify the Russian
government's ability to recognize "any" foreign organization as "undesirable."<7> The Duma first approved
the draft version of this bill on May 27.<8> The Duma also adopted an additional bill in its first
reading that introduces criminal penalties including fines and imprisonment for someone's participation
in "any" organization classified as "undesirable."<9> Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin noted that this
new bill will fill a gap in the existing legislation, which only has provisions to class foreign
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as "undesirable."<10> The new bill will extend the undesirable
classification to any foreign and international organizations, thereby broadening the Kremlin's
discretion to target and censor a wide range of foreign organizations operating within Russia. The
Kremlin has previously used the "undesirable" designation to block opposition media outlets, civil
society organizations, and human rights-focused organizations from entering or operating within Russia,
as ISW has previously reported.<11> Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner for Human Rights Tatiana
Moskalkova also notably called on June 11 for the establishment of a legal mechanism that would allow the
Russian government to prosecute foreigners for "Russophobia as a manifestation of extremism."<12> Russian
authorities widely use accusations of "Russophobia" in an attempt to undermine any undesirable policy or
rhetoric they deem to be "anti-Russian," and have similarly used charges of extremism with broad
discretion to suppress and discourage domestic opposition.<13>
A prominent Kremlin-awarded
Russian milblogger channel announced that it opened a second "media school" in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan,
likely to support Kremlin efforts to expand its influence in the international information space,
particularly in Central Asia. The Rybar Telegram channel claimed on June 11 that it is opening the "Rybar
Media School" in Bishkek because Kyrgyzstan lacks military-political and industry expertise as well as a
"blogosphere" and opinion journalism.<14> Rybar framed its establishment of a "media school" in Bishkek
as an effort to coordinate and assert Russia's position in Central Asia and warned that Russia could be
"expelled" from Central Asia in three to five years if Russia fails to assert itself and manage its
informational influence in the region. Rybar's founder and manager Mikhail Zvinchuk gave a lecture to
students at the Kyrgyz National University about the benefits of using Telegram to "solve problems" in
the current information environment. Rybar claimed that Zvinchuk's lecture was only the first in a series
of lectures and trainings for Kyrgyz media workers, students, public relations professionals, and press
services to learn how to use multimedia to develop local Kyrgyz journalism. Rybar claimed that
journalists from the Kyrgyz-branch of the official Russian government outlet Rossiyskaya Gazeta,
"complained" about the lack of Russian journalistic work in Central Asia and claimed that the West
outbalances Russia in its support for Kyrgyz journalism. Zvinchuk gave a masterclass in December 2023 on
the importance of Telegram and other social media to press heads at Russian state-owned defense
conglomerate Rostec likely in an effort to normalize the war without directly involving the Kremlin or
other official state bodies. Rybar announced that it opened a media school in an unspecified location in
the Balkans in April 2024.<15> Rybar claimed that multiple Serbian and Republika Srpska (the Serbian
entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) outlets highlighted Rybar's "debut" in the Balkans, while notably
no Kyrgyz Russian- or Kyrgyz-language news outlets reported on the new "media school" in Bishkek as of
this publication.<16> Rybar will likely attempt to expand its media influence in other foreign countries,
and the Kremlin will likely seek to use coopted milbloggers like Rybar to expand Russian influence in
international media.
Danish authorities arrested a Danish-Russian dual citizen accused of
having connections to Russian intelligence services, which is likely part of the Kremlin's continued
efforts to re-intensify its hybrid campaign against Western countries. The Danish Broadcasting
Corporation (DR) reported on June 11 that Danish authorities arrested an unidentified woman with dual
Danish-Russian citizenship related to a recent investigation into the woman's connections to Russian
foreign intelligence.<17> DR reported on June 3, citing leaked documents from Western intelligence
services, that the women's legal aid clinic for Russian speakers received at least 338,000 Danish kroner
(about $49,000) from the Russian Fund for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living
Abroad (Pravfond), which DR describes as closely linked to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service
(SVR).<18> The Guardian, which saw the same leaked documents, reported that Pravfond's leadership has
multiple Russian intelligence agents, including longtime SVR officers Vladimir Pozdorovkin and Anatoly
Sorokin.<19> The Guardian reported that Pravfond operates throughout Europe and that Pozdorovkin
specifically oversees Pravfond's operations in Nordic and Baltic countries while Sorokin oversees
operations in the Middle East, Moldova, and Transnistria.<20> DR reported and that the woman is a
"central figure" in Denmark's Russian-speaking community and noted she has traveled to Russia and
elsewhere for conferences with Pravfond participation or sponsorship.<21> The Kremlin has recently
intensified its hybrid campaigns in Europe, and the Kremlin has been leaning into a narrative about
protecting Russians and Russian-speakers outside of Russia — often called "compatriots abroad" — as part
of its wider toolkit of hybrid manipulations.<22> The "compatriots abroad" narrative sets informational
conditions for the Kremlin to justify hybrid operations or even direct interference against countries it
claims do not adequately protect so-called Russian "compatriots" should these countries take actions
unfavorable to the Kremlin. DR noted that several European intelligence sources stated that the Kremlin
aims to use counseling and assistance centers — of which Pravfond funds at least 34 in 21 countries — to
justify direct interference in other countries.<23>
Kremlin newswire TASS reported on June 11
that the former Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Military Academy, Grigory Molchanov, was
appointed Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council.<24> Russian outlet RBK stated that Molchanov
has served in the Russian military since 1973 and noted that the Security Council's first new appointment
since former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu became Security Council Secretary on May 13.<25>
Russian outlet RTVI noted that there are currently eight deputy secretaries and one first deputy
secretary in addition to Shoigu.<26>
Key Takeaways:
Ukraine's Western allies
continue to provide monetary and military assistance to Ukraine, including air defense systems. The
Kremlin continues efforts to codify legal instruments and repressive measures intended to broadly censor
foreigners and foreign organizations in Russia. A prominent Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger
channel announced that it opened a second "media school" in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, likely to support
Kremlin efforts to expand its influence in the international information space, particularly in Central
Asia. Danish authorities arrested a Danish-Russian dual citizen accused of having connections to
Russian intelligence services, which is likely part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to re-intensify
its hybrid campaign against Western countries. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on June 11 that the
former Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Military Academy, Grigory Molchanov, was appointed
Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council. Russian forces recently advanced southeast of
Kupyansk and northwest of Avdiivka. Russia may have suffered a damaged or destroyed military naval
vessel in the Barents Sea. Belarusian officials continue to implicate themselves in the illegal
deportation of Ukrainian children to Belarus and their re-education in Belarusian programs.