Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-300/400 air defense battery in Belgorod Oblast likely with HIMARS on June 1 or 2. Geolocated imagery published on June 3 shows two destroyed launchers and a damaged command post of a Russian S-300/400 air defense system in a field east of Kiselyovo (just north of Belgorod City).<1> Russian sources widely speculated that Ukrainian forces used US-provided HIMARS, but Ukrainian officials have yet to comment on the strike.<2> The S-300/400 air defense system was located roughly 60 kilometers from the current frontline in northern Kharkiv Oblast and over 80 kilometers from Kharkiv City, which is within the range of HIMARS but exceeds the range of other MLRS systems that Ukrainian forces reportedly use to conduct strikes into Belgorod Oblast.<3> Russian sources have increasingly claimed that Ukrainian forces are using HIMARS to strike Belgorod Oblast since the US partially lifted its restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use US-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russian border areas with Kharkiv Oblast.<4> Russian sources will likely continue to characterize any successful strike in Belgorod Oblast as a HIMARS strike regardless of the system used.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are reportedly in disagreement about economic issues such as the proposed Power of Siberia 2 (PS-2) pipeline despite publicly portraying themselves as diplomatically aligned. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 2 that three unspecified sources familiar with the matter stated that the PRC and Russia disagree about the details of the PS-2 gas pipeline, with the PRC wanting to pay prices near Russia's subsidized domestic gas prices and to only commit to buying a small part of the pipeline's planned capacity.<5> Gazprom Head Alexei Miller reportedly did not accompany Russian President Vladimir Putin on his recent visit to the PRC due to these disagreements over the pipeline. FT reported that Putin asked PRC President Xi Jinping during their May 2024 meetings to come to an agreement on the pipeline, but FT reported that sources said that a pipeline agreement "remains distant." FT noted that Russia needs the pipeline to launch as expected more than the PRC. FT reported that it gained access to an unreleased report by an unspecified major Russian bank that stated that if the PS-2 pipeline does not launch in 2029, Gazprom's profits are forecasted to drop by almost 15 percent, which is especially significant following Gazprom's $6.9 billion loss in 2023, its largest loss in more than 25 years. FT, citing a recent report by Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy, also stated that the PRC will mostly or entirely be able to meet its projected increased demand for imported gas with existing supply contracts until 2030, but that the PRC's demand for imported gas will exceed the capacity of its existing contracts by about 150 billion cubic meters by 2040.<6> The PRC is likely aware of Russia's more immediate need for the pipeline and is using Beijing's upper hand in the energy sphere to extract concessions from Russia on the issue.

Putin also reportedly asked Xi in May 2024 to "snub" the upcoming Ukrainian peace conference in Switzerland amid continued Russian efforts to discredit and otherwise undermine the peace conference.<7> Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated on June 3 that Russia is trying to discredit the upcoming Ukrainian peace summit by convincing other states that the summit is insignificant, that they should not participate, and that if they do they should participate at the lowest possible level.<8> Other Ukrainian officials have recently emphasized that it is imperative for both the United States and the PRC to attend the June 2024 peace summit as their participation is "decisive" in compelling Russia to participate in the process of restoring peace and security.<9> The PRC announced on May 31 that it would not be joining the peace summit, and Saudi Arabia has reportedly decided not to attend.<10>

Russian forces continue to abuse Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of the Geneva Convention on POWs. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets amplified footage on June 2 showing a group of three Russian servicemen beating, threatening, and harassing a group of four Ukrainian POWs.<11> The footage shows one Russian serviceman shooting the ground immediately next to a POW's head and the Russian servicemen forcing the POWs to sing the Russian national anthem. Lyubinets stated the preliminary information suggests that the incident was filmed in the Kharkiv direction, where Russian forces recently began offensive operations. The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office reported on June 3 that it opened an investigation into the incident.<12> Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii identified the Russian serviceman who filmed the video as Alexei Kirpin, a former soldier in the far-right "Rusich" assault formation.<13> Ukraine-based ZMINA Human Rights Center reported that Russian authorities are also mistreating and beating Ukrainian POWs in pre-trial detention centers in Russia.<14> ISW has observed evidence of widespread violations of the Geneva Convention on POWs committed by the Russian military in recent months, including Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs and using POWs as human shields on the battlefield.<15>

Russian military and political leadership continues to pursue increased military, political, and economic cooperation with several African states. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov traveled to Benghazi, Libya on May 31 and met with Libyan National Army (LNA) Commander-in-Chief Khalifa Haftar at the Ar Rajma military base in eastern Libya.<16> Yevkurov promised to enhance LNA capabilities in eastern Libya.<17> Russia has recently reinforced its military presence in eastern Libya and increased deployments of Russian military personnel and supplies to the area since at least March 2024.<18> The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project (CTP) previously assessed that the intensified Russian military efforts in Libya are likely partially contributing to the wider Kremlin effort to secure a naval base in Tobruk, Libya, and that Yevkurov has been particularly involved in negotiations with LNA officials over Russian naval basing in Libya since August 2023.<19> Yevkurov also traveled to Niger on June 3 to meet with Nigerien junta head Abdirahmane Tiani, Nigerien junta defense minister Salifou Modi, and Nigerian junta interior minister Mohamed Toumba, reportedly signing a "multi-sectoral cooperation" memorandum of understanding.<20> Russia has recently increased its military presence in Niger—the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s Africa Corps deployed to Niger in April 2023 and stated its intentions to replace US forces in northern Niger, then entered a base housing US military personnel in the country in May 2024.<21> The US notably intends to remove all American troops from Niger by September 15, 2024.<22> Alongside increased Russian military presence in Niger and efforts to supplant US forces, Russia is also reportedly seeking to take over uranium assets in Niger currently held by French state-controlled company Orano SA, and the "multi-sectoral cooperation" agreement signed by Yevkurov and his Nigerien counterparts may support this Russian effort.<23>

While Yevkurov primarily pursues military cooperation with African states, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is also visiting Africa to discuss Russian political and economic engagement with various African partners. Lavrov met with Guinean junta officials in Conarky, Guinea, on June 3 to discuss Russian-Guinean relations.<24> The Guinean junta's relationship with Russia is complicated, but the Kremlin maintains substantial economic and resource-based interests in Guinea. Russia depends on Guinea for a significant share of its bauxite, a refined-mineral-based material that is used in the production of spark plug insulators and other circuit and furnace related industrial goods.<25> The Kremlin may desire to maintain access to bauxite to support the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). Lavrov also met Congolese officials in Ollombo, Congo on the evening of June 3, to discuss the situation in Libya, as Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso’s is the head of the African Union High-Level Committee on the Crisis in Libya.<26> Russian officials have attempted to maintain firm relations with Congo over the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, with Lavrov visiting Congo in 2022 and Russian President Vladimir Putin calling Neguesso in March 2024.<27> Lavrov is also expected to travel to Chad on June 5 and Burkina Faso sometime in the coming days as well.<28> Lavrov's visit to Chad in particular continues Russian efforts to grow ties with the Chadian regime since Putin met with Chadian President Mahamat Déby in Moscow in January 2024, and Russia likely aims to establish itself as the primary security partner across the Sahel to advance Russia’s economic and military interests in the region.<29> CTP previously forecast that aligning with Russia and the Russia-backed Sahelian juntas could pave the way for the Chadian junta to expand its defense and economic ties with Russia to address its own regime security needs and internal pressure to distance itself from the West.<30>

The Russian military is reportedly forcibly sending Russian servicemembers who refused to fight to the front in Ukraine from Russia instead of standing trial for their refusal to participate in combat. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on June 3 that Russian military authorities began forcibly sending hundreds of Russian servicemembers who refused to take part in Russian combat operations to the front in Ukraine, including to northern Kharkiv Oblast and Donetsk Oblast, in May 2024.<31> Verstka stated that the Russian military holds the servicemembers at military unit basepoints in Russia as they await trial for crimes related to their refusal to fight before suddenly cancelling their trials and immediately sending them to Ukraine. Verstka reported that Russian authorities used physical abuse to coerce some soldiers into volunteering to go to Ukraine before forcing others from their holding cells at gunpoint and transporting them to the frontlines. Verstka reported that Sverdlovsk Oblast Commissioner for Human Rights Tatyana Merzlyankova claimed on May 6 that she visited a collection point for servicemembers who refused to fight but that management stated that there were no violations of the servicemembers' civil rights. Verstka reported that Russian authorities cancelled the trials of at least 170 servicemembers who refused to fight and deployed them to Ukraine and that investigators, prosecutors, and lawyers were all unaware of this. Verstka reported that several sources, including one source from the Russian presidential administration, stated that the Russian military sends conscripts and "incompetent" reservists, who have signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), to noncombat roles in Russia's border forces to free up experienced military personnel for the Russian offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast, but that the Russian military is also sending deserters to fight. A Russian lawyer, who specializes in cases related to servicemembers refusing to fight, reportedly stated that the Russian MoD may be stopping criminal cases to send such servicemembers to the front due to a shortage of forces needed to fight in northern Kharkiv Oblast. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely launched the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast when the Northern Grouping of Forces was understrength, and the Russian MoD may be sending servicemembers awaiting their trials to the front in Kharkiv Oblast to strengthen the limited forces in the area.<32>

Georgian Parliament Speaker Shalva Papuashvili signed the Russian-style "foreign agents" bill into law on June 3 amid continued protests.<33> The Georgian Parliament overwhelmingly overrode Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili's veto of the law on May 28, and Georgian Dream Secretary General Kakha Kaladze stated on June 3 that Georgian officials will fine and seize the property of any organizations that refuse to register under the law.<34>

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-300/400 air defense battery in Belgorod Oblast likely with HIMARS on June 1 or 2.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are reportedly in disagreement about economic issues such as the proposed Power of Siberia 2 (PS-2) pipeline despite publicly portraying themselves as diplomatically aligned.
Putin also reportedly asked Xi in May 2024 to "snub" the upcoming Ukrainian peace conference in Switzerland amid continued Russian efforts to discredit and otherwise undermine the peace conference.
Russian forces continue to abuse Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of the Geneva Convention on POWs.
Russian military and political leadership continues to pursue increased military, political, and economic cooperation with several African states.
The Russian military is reportedly forcibly sending Russian servicemembers who refused to fight to the front in Ukraine from Russia instead of standing trial for their refusal to participate in combat.
Georgian Parliament Speaker Shalva Papuashvili signed the Russian-style "foreign agents" bill into law on June 3 amid continued protests.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyptsi, Avdiivka, and Velyka Novoslika and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The family members of mobilized Russian personnel continue to protest for the demobilization of their relatives.

Institute for the Study of War

  

Beitrag dem Admin melden | Urheberrechtsverletzung melden

Select Russian military commentators continue to complain about superior Ukrainian drone and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities on the battlefield, continuing to highlight the rapid and constant tactical and technological innovation cycles that are shaping the battlespace in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger who formerly served as a "Storm-Z" unit instructor posted a list of complaints on June 4 detailing the challenges that Russian forces face in repelling Ukrainian drones and claimed that effective and pervasive Ukrainian drone use is now the "leading factor" in Ukraine's ability to repel Russian offensive actions.<1> The milblogger made six points about the Russian-Ukrainian drone disparity, claiming first and foremost that Ukrainian troops have a large numerical advantage in first person view (FPV) drones and FPV drone operators. The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian assault groups have a 3-4:1 FPV drone advantage over Russian assault units, while Ukrainian mechanized groups have a 6-10:1 FPV drone advantage over comparable Russian units. The milblogger noted that Ukraine also has specialized and centralized drone units within existing Ukrainian ground units, which allows Ukrainian forces to better integrate reconnaissance and attack drone capabilities into basic tactical maneuvers. Russian forces, by contrast, lack the centralized and organized drone-unit system and adequate EW and electronic reconnaissance (ER) capabilities to counter Ukrainian drones.<2> Another milblogger, whose initial post from May 31 spurred the former Storm-Z instructor to weigh in on the issue, noted that specialized Ukrainian drone units have heavily targeted and destroyed unprotected Russian armored equipment in the Avdiivka direction, inhibiting Russian offensive prospects in the area.<3> The milblogger emphasized that the provision of FPV drones and required EW and ER systems to Russian forces is done on an ad hoc volunteer basis, as there is no centralized supply mechanism from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). These remarks on Russia's need to centralize its drone warfare capabilities echo recent calls made by a cadre of Russian commentators, including former Russian Space Agency (Roscosmos) head Dmitry Rogozin.<4> As Ukrainian forces adapt and better integrate new technologies into their force, Russian forces will likely feel pressured to do the same in order to retain technological and tactical parity on the battlefield. This offense-defense and capability scaling race is central to the development of combat means in a contemporary war.

Ukraine and its partners have reportedly drafted a document for the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland on June 15 that calls for future engagement with Russia on a limited number of issues connected to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, although the Kremlin remains unlikely to engage in meaningful negotiations on the proposal or any wider settlement to the war in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on June 4 that the draft document aims to generate consensus among summit participants on nuclear safety, food security, and the return of abducted Ukrainian civilians and children.<5> The document reportedly states that this consensus will serve as a "confidence building measure" for future engagement with Russian officials on these issues.<6> The reported document specifically deems nuclear threats as "inadmissible" and calls for the return of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to Ukrainian control, and freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov so that Ukrainian agricultural products can reach third parties and the return of all deported and unlawfully displaced Ukrainian children and civilians to Ukraine.<7>

Russian officials have routinely been explicitly hostile to engagement with Ukraine on many of these issues, however. The Kremlin frequently threatens Ukraine and the West with nuclear weapons in order to promote Western self-deterrence. The Kremlin also uses nuclear rhetoric as a common tool of its reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing Western decision-making.<8> Russian officials have repeatedly attempted to use Russia’s physical control over the ZNPP to try to force international organizations to legitimize Russia's occupation of the ZNPP and by extension Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory.<9> Russia withdrew from the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which facilitated limited agricultural exports from Ukrainian ports, in July 2023 and has since routinely targeted Ukrainian ports and agricultural infrastructure in southern Ukraine in an effort to constrain Ukraine's ability to provide grain and other agricultural products to its partners.<10> Russian officials have shown very limited openness to the return of Ukrainian children from Russia and occupied Ukraine to Ukraine through mediation with third parties.<11> The Kremlin and Russian occupation officials continue to deport Ukrainian civilians and children from occupied Ukraine, however, and there is no indication that Russia is willing to stop this campaign or return deported and unlawfully displaced Ukrainians back to Ukraine at scale.<12> The Kremlin continues to feign interest in meaningful negotiations with Ukraine in an effort to push the West to make concessions on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and the Kremlin may use engagement on these more limited issues to pursue similar concessions.<13>

Russia is conducting a wide-scale hybrid warfare campaign targeting NATO states in tandem with Russian efforts to augment its conventional military capabilities in preparation for a potential conflict with NATO. Bloomberg reported on June 3 that Norwegian Chief of Defense Eirik Kristoffersen stated that NATO has a window of two to three years to rebuild its forces and stocks before Russia has rebuilt its own ability to conduct a conventional attack, presumably against NATO.<14> Kristoffersen stated that this expedited time frame is due to Russia's current elevated defense industrial base (DIB) output. Western officials also continue to highlight Russia's current engagement in hybrid warfare activities across Europe. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 4 that Western governments are trying to formulate a response to the growing series of Russian-backed sabotage attempts on military bases and civilian infrastructure in Europe.<15> FT reported that an unspecified Western defense advisor stated that Russia has a "highly developed lexicon" for hybrid warfare, including information and psychological operations and sabotage. The defense advisor noted that Russia is learning from and adapting its hybrid warfare operations, stating that Russia is "constantly observing" the West's reactions to these hybrid warfare operations and "testing to see which of actions work." FT reported that Russia has resorted to using proxies, such as operatives from criminal gangs, to conduct the sabotage attacks after European governments expelled hundreds of Russian diplomats and spies. NATO and its member states have repeatedly warned about intensifying Russian hybrid operations on NATO member territory.<16>

A joint investigation by Russian opposition student journal DOXA and open-source outlet Kidmapping highlights the role of the Kremlin-backed Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Russifying Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have deported to Russia.<17> DOXA found that from the early days of Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian officials deported children from orphanages and boarding schools in occupied Donetsk Oblast to Russia's Rostov Oblast, where they were visited by Metropolitan Mercury (Igor Ivanov) of Rostov and Novocherkassk, who spoke to them about the ROC and seemingly enticed them to consider baptism into the ROC.<18> ROC clergy have also called for the baptism of deported Ukrainian children into the ROC and reportedly encouraged them to join various "military-patriotic" youth organizations in Russia.<19> DOXA and Kidmapping also found that deported children from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts stayed at shelters run by the ROC in Voronezh Oblast, where ROC clergy and affiliated officials hold "military-patriotic" events for the deported children in order to encourage pro-Russian and pro-ROC sentiment and cut the children off from their Ukrainian identities.<20> ISW has previously assessed that the ROC is instrumental in enacting the Kremlin's occupation plan for Ukraine, and this appears to extend to Russian efforts to Russify deported Ukrainian children living in Russia.<21> Kremlin-appointed Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, against whom the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant due to her role in facilitating the deportation of Ukrainian children, is notably married to an ROC priest.<22> Lvova-Belova and her husband have themselves adopted a deported Ukrainian child from Mariupol, highlighting the personal involvement of the ROC and other Kremlin officials in the deportation of Ukrainian children.<23> ISW continues to assess that the deportation of Ukrainian children, with the intent to destroy their Ukrainian identities via such Russification projects, amounts to a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which prohibits "forcibly transferring children of a group to another group" on grounds that it is an act of genocide.<24>

Russian President Vladimir Putin named First Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council and United Russia Secretary Andrei Turchak the acting governor of the Altai Republic on June 4.<25> Turchak chaired the Russian State Duma "Special Military Operation" Working Group dedicated to resolving issues with Russia's war effort in Ukraine and reported on the working group's efforts directly to Putin.<26> Former Altai Republic Head Oleg Khorokhordin resigned on June 4 reportedly to transition to a new, unspecified position.<27> Putin met with Turchak via videoconference to discuss Turchak's new position and stated that the Altai Republic is a "promising but difficult" multinational republic where the Russian government wants to develop the tourism industry.<28> Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on June 3 that three sources close to the Russian presidential administration stated that the Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative in the Ural Federal District Vladimir Yakushev may replace Turchak as United Russia Secretary.<29>

Russian sources speculated on the meaning behind Turchak's appointment. Russian opposition outlet Meduza stated that sources close to the presidential administration noted that Putin offered Turchak the position during a videoconference, not during a personal meeting as Putin usually does.<30> Meduza's sources reportedly stated that Turchak's new position is a demotion, comparing it to an "execution" and "deportation to a colony settlement." A source reportedly stated that Turchak lost his position in the "power vertical" and that Turchak must have "seriously screwed up." Meduza reported that a source close to the St. Petersburg government claimed that Putin moved Turchak because Turchak was "too active" in St. Petersburg and St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov complained to Putin — a version with which other Meduza sources reportedly disagreed. A Russian milblogger refuted claims that Turchak's appointment is "political exile" and claimed that the Altai Republic is geographically important given its position near Central Asia and Xinjiang, China.<31> The milblogger claimed that the West is active in Central Asia and that Russia will need logistics hubs and a strong executive power in the area if there are "serious showdowns" in Central Asia between the West and Russia. A Russian insider source claimed that the Russian government may launch a new association of federal subjects that Turchak will supervise.<32> The insider source claimed that the Russian government may hold a referendum, which Turchak will also oversee, to unify the Altai Republic and neighboring Altai Krai. There are multiple defense industrial enterprises in Altai Krai, and if the insider source's claim about plans to unify Altai Republic and Altai Krai are true, the Kremlin may have appointed Turchak to oversee Russian defense industrial efforts in the region as part of a wider Kremlin effort to increase Russia's defense industrial production.<33> Putin may have also moved Turchak in an effort to sideline and demote him without having to make a public show of the demotion, especially if Putin was displeased with Turchak's advocacy for Russian servicemembers fighting in Ukraine.

Newly appointed Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov reportedly invited select Russian war correspondents and milbloggers to meet with him to coopt several Russian information space actors, prompting limited criticism from a prominent Russian milblogger. A Russian insider source claimed on May 26 that Belousov planned to meet with milbloggers and military correspondents to demonstrate that he has "nothing in common with his predecessor Sergei Shoigu."<34> The Russian information space largely celebrated Belousov's appointment as Defense Minister and expressed hope that his appointment would foster positive changes to the endemic problems that persisted under Shoigu's MoD, such as the Shoigu MoD’s tendency to lie about Russia’s military performance in Ukraine and failures to adequately supply frontline forces.<35> ISW has previously observed that the Kremlin began efforts to coopt Russian milbloggers critical of the Russian military's poor performance in the war in Ukraine by offering them state awards and government positions starting in November 2022 in an effort to regain control over the Russian information space.<36> A prominent Russian milblogger, who has previously criticized the Russian MoD and routinely posts complaints on his Telegram channel from Russian servicemen on the frontlines, claimed that Belousov invited a limited number of already-respected military correspondents, whom the Kremlin has coopted and likely deemed to be "safe," and milbloggers to meet with him.<37> The milblogger further claimed that he would not be surprised if Russian MoD employees from the "old team," likely referring to Shoigu's affiliates at the Russian MoD, organized the meeting and expressed doubt that the Russian MoD would listen to milblogger suggestions. Russian milbloggers appear to be experimenting with different ways to express critical opinions of the Russian MoD following Belousov's appointment, and Belousov may be meeting with military correspondents to constrain this criticism.<38>

Key Takeaways:

Select Russian military commentators continue to complain about superior Ukrainian drone and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities on the battlefield, continuing to highlight the rapid and constant tactical and technological innovation cycles that are shaping the battlespace in Ukraine.
Ukraine and its partners have reportedly drafted a document for the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland on June 15 that calls for future engagement with Russia on a limited number of issues connected to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, although the Kremlin remains unlikely to engage in meaningful negotiations on the proposal or any wider settlement to the war in Ukraine.
Russia is conducting a wide-scale hybrid warfare campaign targeting NATO states in tandem with Russian efforts to augment its conventional military capabilities in preparation for a potential conflict with NATO
A joint investigation by Russian opposition student journal DOXA and open-source outlet Kidmapping highlights the role of the Kremlin-backed Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Russifying Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have deported to Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin named First Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council and United Russia Secretary Andrei Turchak the acting governor of the Altai Republic on June 4.
Newly appointed Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov reportedly invited select Russian war correspondents and milbloggers to meet with him to coopt several Russian information space actors, prompting limited criticism from a prominent Russian milblogger.
Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Siversk, and Donetsk City.
The Russian military reportedly continues to forcibly send Russian military personnel, including those with serious medical issues, to fight in Ukraine.
Russia continues efforts to militarize deported Ukrainian youth and prepare them for future service in the Russian armed forces.

Institute for the Study of War

  

Beitrag dem Admin melden | Urheberrechtsverletzung melden

US officials continue to attempt to clarify US policy regarding Ukraine's ability to strike a limited subset of Russian military targets within Russia with US-provided weapons, but public communications about US policy remain unclear. US National Security Spokesperson John Kirby stated during a press conference on June 4 that "there's never been a restriction on the Ukrainians shooting down hostile aircraft, even if those aircraft are not necessarily in Ukrainian airspace."<1> Kirby made this statement in response to a question about whether America's recent partial lifting of restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike targets within Russia with US-provided weapons pertains to strikes against Russian aircraft operating in Russian airspace. Kirby suggested that Ukrainian forces can shoot down Russian aircraft within Russian airspace if they "pose an impending threat" to Ukraine and stated that Ukrainian forces already have done so since the beginning of the war. It remains unclear what the official US policy on what Russian aircraft constitute "an impending threat" to Ukraine, and Kirby's statements did not elucidate how the US administration views this issue. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's ability to defend itself against devastating Russian glide bomb strikes is heavily contingent on Ukraine's ability to target Russian aircraft within Russian airspace using US-provided air defense systems before Russian aircraft can launch strikes at Ukrainian cities, critical infrastructure, and frontline positions.<2> The current lack of clarity in US restrictions on Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons to strike Russian military assets within Russia has routinely missed the opportunity to force Russia to self-deter against conducting such strikes on Ukrainian territory from Russian airspace.<3> Russian forces continued to conduct intense glide bomb attacks against Ukraine on June 5, likely largely from Russian airspace.<4>|

Kirby also stated during the press conference that the US cannot confirm if Ukraine has already used US-provided weapons in strikes on Russia since the US partially loosened its restrictions on May 30, but the Associated Press (AP) reported on June 5, citing an unnamed US senator and Western official, that Ukraine has used US-provided weapons to strike Russia "in recent days."<5> ISW has observed geolocated footage from June 1 or 2 that shows a likely Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian S-300/400 air defense system in Belgorod Oblast.<6>

Western-provided artillery ammunition has reportedly started arriving to Ukrainian forces on the frontline, although not at a scale that would allow Ukrainian forces to fully challenge the Russian military's current artillery shell advantage. Ukrainian soldiers operating near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) told the Telegraph in an article published on June 5 that Western-provided ammunition started to reach their sector of the frontline, but that Russian forces in the area still maintain a munitions advantage.<7> One Ukrainian soldier told the Telegraph that Russian forces still maintain a five-to-one artillery advantage. A Ukrainian soldier operating in an unspecified area of the frontline told Estonian outlet ERR that Western-provided ammunition began to "trickle" to the frontline but has not arrived at scale.<8> The Ukrainian soldier stated that Russian forces continue to have a "significant advantage" in munitions. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are attempting to make tactically and operationally significant gains before US military assistance arrives to Ukrainian forces at the frontline at scale, and that the initial arrival of Western-provided weaponry will take some time to have tactical to operational effect on the frontline.<9>

Russian missile and drone strikes have caused significant long-term damage to Ukraine's energy grid, and Ukraine will reportedly face even greater energy constraints in summer 2024. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 5 that Russia has knocked out or captured over half of Ukraine's power generation capacity, bringing Ukrainian energy production to below 20 gigawatts (likely meaning per year) from 55 gigawatts per year before the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.<10> European Union (EU) Ambassador to Ukraine Katarina Matherovna told FT that Russia has destroyed 9.2 gigawatts of annual Ukrainian generation capacity since resuming large scale missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in late March 2024.<11> A Ukrainian official told FT that Russian forces damaged 1.2 gigawatts of annual Ukrainian generation capacity alone during strikes against energy infrastructure on the night of May 31 to June 1.<12> Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo stated on June 5 that it expects the Ukrainian energy system to face its most difficult period in the middle of summer 2024 as energy consumption increases due to the heat.<13> The Russian military has attempted to exploit degraded Ukrainian air defense capabilities in spring 2024 to collapse Ukraine's energy grid and constrain Ukraine's defense industrial capacity.<14> Russia will likely continue periodic large-scale strikes against energy infrastructure to cause significant long-term damage that degrades Ukrainian war fighting capabilities while setting conditions for pronounced humanitarian pressures in winter 2024–2025.

Ukrainian outlet Liga reported on June 4 that a source in Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that there are roughly 550,000 Russian military and paramilitary personnel concentrated in occupied Ukraine and near the international border.<15> The GUR source reportedly stated that there are about 32,000 Rosgvardia, Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), and other law enforcement personnel operating in occupied Ukraine, in addition to about 520,000 Russian military personnel in and around Ukraine. ISW cannot independently confirm these figures, and the numbers likely encompass combat and other non-combat military personnel who perform support functions and do not represent Russia's immediate combat power. Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated that as of May 3 there were roughly 510,000 to 515,000 Russian personnel deployed in Ukraine.<16> Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in December 2023 that there were 617,000 Russian personnel in the “combat zone,” likely referring to all Russian military personnel in the zone of the “special military operation,” which includes staging areas in border areas within Russia.<17> GUR Spokesperson Andriy Yusov reported in January 2024 that there are 35,000 Rosgvardia personnel in occupied Ukraine and that Russian authorities are considering deploying more Rosgvardia personnel to occupied areas.<18>

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on June 4 that former Russian Defense Minister and Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu will coordinate efforts to increase Russian defense industrial capacity alongside former Tula Oblast Governor and Presidential Aide Alexei Dyumin and Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev.<19> Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov stated that Shoigu, Dyumin, and Medvedev will each oversee an unspecified aspect of the effort to increase Russian defense industrial capacity.<20> Shoigu's roughly equivalent position with Dyumin and Medvedev further indicates that the Kremlin has demoted Shoigu following his removal from defense minister and suggests that he is a secondary figure in newly appointed Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov's task to significantly mobilize the Russian economy and DIB for a protracted war in Ukraine.<21> Putin routinely rotates Kremlin officials in and out of his personal favor with the aim of incentivizing them to strive to regain his support, and Putin may have tasked Dyumin and Shoigu with DIB efforts in order to maintain their devotion following Shoigu's demotion from his prior long-term role as defense minister and rebukes against Dyumin's possible effort to become defense minister in the aftermath of the Wagner Group's rebellion in June 2023.<22> Shoigu is currently working with the Presidential Administration's Military-Industrial Complex Commission and the Federal Service for Cooperation with Foreign Countries, suggesting that Shoigu is likely involved in the Kremlin's efforts to leverage relationships with Iran, North Korea, Belarus, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) to help Russia procure the components and materiel it needs for increasing military industrial capacity.<23> Putin recently appointed Dyumin to the board of state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec and specifically tasked Dyumin with assisting Russian efforts to provide the Russian military with necessary weapons and equipment.<24> It remains to be seen how involved Shoigu, Dyumin, and Medvedev will be in efforts to expand Russia's DIB, however, and their roles may be at most nominal.

The apparent demotion of former First Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council and United Russia Secretary Andrei Turchak on June 4 is likely part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ongoing effort to remove from power the political and military figures that violated his trust in 2023. The Russian Federal Council terminated Turchak’s powers on June 5 after Putin appointed Turchak to become the governor of Altai Republic on June 4.<25> Chairperson of the Russian Federation Council Valentina Matviyenko wryly stated in a farewell message that Turchak will turn Altai Republic into a “tourist Mecca.”<26> Russian insider sources and political bloggers widely claimed that Putin most likely removed Turchak from his position in Moscow for his allegedly close relationship with deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and conflict with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) over the control of occupied Ukrainian territories.<27> Some Russian insider sources and political bloggers also claimed that Putin may have also been dissatisfied with Turchak’s execution of a Kremlin effort to have Russian veterans participate in the Russian primaries in his role as the Chairperson of the Russian State Duma "Special Military Operation" Working Group, although some Russian sources pointed out that this failure was unlikely to have warranted Turchak’s exile to one of the most economically depressed regions in Russia over 4,000 kilometers from the Kremlin.<28> Some Russian sources also speculated that Turchak was demoted for his excessive involvement in local St. Petersburg political drama, and many sources cited Turchak’s tendency to intervene in Kremlin intrigues in an effort to improve his own political standing including by partnering up with former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.<29>

Putin had likely exiled Turchak from the Kremlin because he perceived Turchak to be disloyal to the regime. ISW previously observed Russian insider reports that Prigozhin used Turchak to directly deliver Wagner Group complaints about the Russian military failures in winter 2023 to Putin in hopes that this information would prompt Putin to reappoint Wagner-affiliated commanders.<30> Turchak reportedly delivered a blunt briefing about Russian military failures in February 2023 but did not convince Putin to initiate military command changes, likely because Putin perceived Turchak’s briefing as an act of disloyalty. ISW continues to assess that Putin values loyalty over competence and had previously interpreted Prigozhin’s complaints about supply shortages and military failures as acts of disloyalty.<31> A former Russian intelligence source notably revealed that Putin began to distance himself from Wagner after Prigozhin scolded him in October 2022.<32> One Russian political commentator connected Turchak’s demotion to the recent arrest of the former commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Major General Ivan Popov.<33> Popov published an audio recording in July 2023 in which he stated that he was fired after raising concerns over the need for troop rotations among Russian forces receiving the summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive.<34> Russian State Duma Deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev leaked Popov’s audio message, and Turchak notably implied that Popov was not involved in the leak.<35> ISW assessed that Popov likely deliberately recorded this message to appeal to the Kremlin to trigger a military command change within the Russian General Staff.<36> Popov also equated himself with a rebellion leader less than a month after the Wagner mutiny, and Turchak’s expressed support for Popov may have further convinced Putin of Turchak’s disloyalty.<37>

A recent meeting of the Kremlin-appointed Russian Human Rights Council (HRC) on Russia's migration policy reflects Russia's competing imperatives of attracting migrants to offset Russian labor shortages while also catering to its ultranationalist anti-migrant constituency. The HRC held a meeting on June 4 on "ensuring the rights of Russian citizens in the implementation of migration policy" and discussed several initiatives to strengthen Russian federal control over migrant communities living within Russia.<38> The HRC discussed making Russian language tests mandatory for all children of migrants hoping to enroll in schools and kindergartens; creating "social adaptation centers" for migrants to learn the Russian language; and recognizing children who do not speak Russian at the legally mandated level as having "special educational needs," all of which would require federal oversight and funding in order to ease the integration of migrants into the Russian social sphere.<39> Some participants of the HRC meeting proposed much harsher policy changes. For example, Kaluga Oblast Minster of Internal Policy Oleg Kalugin called for a rule prohibiting labor migrants from bringing their families to Russia in the first place, suggesting that the cost of helping integrate the families of migrants into Russian society is not worth the social burden on Russian society.<40> Russian business-focused outlet Kommersant noted that these policies are mainly targeted at migrant communities from Armenia and Central Asia, predominantly Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.<41> The meeting’s focus on migrant policy as a means to protect Russian citizens (mostly insinuated to be ethnic Russians or naturalized foreign citizens) rhetorically sets a strong wedge between "Russians" and "migrants" as opposing camps, and specifically identifies Central Asian migrants as potentially threatening the rights of Russian citizens. Russian domestic policy is increasingly trying to balance a heavy reliance on migrant labor, particularly from Central Asia, to maintain its domestic economy as it continues to compensate for economic shortfalls resulting from its war in Ukraine, while also disenfranchising migrant communities to cater to its vocal and influential ultranationalist constituency.<42> The HRC will similarly have to balance fostering a policy that encourages and attracts migrants to move to Russia in the hopes of obtaining economic benefit while also appeasing the cadre of commentators that espouse anti-migrant and xenophobic views that hold that migration policy is a threat to ethnic Russians.

Chechen Republic Rosgvardia Head and Russian State Duma Deputy Adam Delimkhanov accused State Duma Deputy Chairman and New People Party Head Vladislav Davankov of contradicting the Russian Constitution and attempting to divide Russian society, exposing continued tension between Chechen efforts to operate autonomously and the Russian state’s efforts to regulate perceived Islamic extremist threats from migrant and indigenous Muslim communities. Davankov submitted a bill to the State Duma on May 28 that would allow educational institutions and regional authorities to ban religious clothing that "partially or completely hides the face" from municipal and public spaces.<43> Delimkhanov responded to Davankov's proposal by claiming that the Russian Constitution guarantees religious freedom and noting that the hijab, which he claims is a religious obligation for Muslim women, does not cover the face.<44> Delimkhanov claimed that Chechens are against niqab, which covers the face, however. Delimkhanov further asserted that Davankov's bill could cause a rift in Russian society since he raised "one of the most sensitive topics" without "proper consideration of the subject." Delimkhanov also observed that Russian Orthodox Christianity expects women to wear headscarves for piety and humility. Davankov defended himself against Delimkhanov's criticisms citing Russia's secular education system and claimed that parents demanded the ban in schools given that migrant children "have difficulty speaking Russian, let alone wearing religious clothing."<45> Davankov also noted that the Russian Supreme Court upheld a ban against wearing religious garments in schools in the Mordovia Republic in 2015.<46> Delimkhanov's immediate criticism of Davankov highlights continued tension between the Chechen Republic and the Russian government's long-term efforts to subjugate Chechnya, likely exacerbated by intensified Kremlin crackdowns against indigenous and migrant Muslim communities following the March 22 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack.<47> The renewed debate on restrictions against Islamic religious clothing will likely continue to foster division along ethnic and religious lines, despite the Kremlin's efforts to portray Russia as a harmonious and united multiethnic and multi-confessional country.<48>

Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom reportedly assesses that it is unlikely to recover gas sales it lost following the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, illustrating how Western sanctions are achieving some long-term impacts against Russian revenue streams supporting Russia's war effort. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 5 that Gazprom's leadership commissioned a report at the end of 2023 on the long-term prospects for gas sales, which found that Gazprom's annual exports to Europe by 2035 will average 50 billion to 75 billion cubic meters — roughly a third of its annual exports to Europe before the full-scale invasion.<49> Gazprom reportedly noted that a new pipeline to the People's Republic of China (PRC) aims to offset lost export volume to Europe but will only have the capacity to transport 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year.<50> Russia has relied on oil revenues to buoy federal budgets amid increased spending on its war in Ukraine, and long-term constraints on other energy exports will likely limit additional significant sources of funding for the Kremlin.<51> Russia has managed to rely on oil revenues to support a record level of defense spending in 2024 by engaging in a concerted effort to circumvent the G7's price cap on Russian oil and petroleum products.<52> The West is expanding sanctions to curtail Russian efforts to skirt the G7 price cap, and significant constraints on Russian oil exports could also achieve substantial impacts on Russian state revenue.<53>

Russian investigative outlet the Insider and Moldovan outlet Little Country published an investigation on June 5 detailing how former Moldovan Chief of the General Staff Igor Gorgan operated as an agent on behalf of the Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU). The Insider and Little Country reported that they obtained access to Telegram correspondence between Gorgan and his GRU handler Colonel Alexei Makarov which shows that Gorgan regularly reported on internal Moldovan matters and the visits of Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) representatives to Moldova since 2019.<54> The Insider reported that an unspecified military intelligence source stated that GRU's active contact with Gorgan began when Gorgan served on a NATO mission in 2004.<55> Gorgan served as Moldovan Chief of the General Staff in 2013 and from 2019 to 2021 and reportedly offered GRU information on Moldovan military capabilities and activities, requests from the Ukrainian MoD, and information about internal Moldovan politics.<56> Gorgan reportedly assured the GRU that he still has contacts in the Moldovan MoD who can continue to supply him with information.<57>Gorgan also reportedly routinely told Makarov that Moldova was ready for the arrival of Russian forces and that he would keep "the whole situation in the army under control" and help Russia "deal with politicians."<58> The GRU's response to Gorgan's offers is currently unclear. The Kremlin is engaged in efforts to destabilize Moldova and prevent Moldova's European Union accession, and Gorgan's relationship with the GRU illustrates how Russia is leveraging pro-Russian Moldovan actors in these efforts and how Russia could rely on such actors to conduct future hybrid operations or support conventional military aggression against Moldova.<59>

Key Takeaways:

US officials continue to attempt to clarify US policy regarding Ukraine's ability to strike a limited subset of Russian military targets within Russia with US-provided weapons, but public communications about US policy remain unclear.
Western-provided artillery ammunition has reportedly started arriving to Ukrainian forces on the frontline, although not at a scale that would allow Ukrainian forces to fully challenge the Russian military's current artillery shell advantage.
Russian missile and drone strikes have caused significant long-term damage to Ukraine's energy grid, and Ukraine will reportedly face even greater energy constraints in summer 2024.
Ukrainian outlet Liga reported on June 4 that a source in Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that there are roughly 550,000 Russian military and paramilitary personnel concentrated in occupied Ukraine and near the international border.
Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on June 4 that former Russian Defense Minister and Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu will coordinate efforts to increase Russian defense industrial capacity alongside former Tula Oblast Governor and Presidential Aide Alexei Dyumin and Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev.
The apparent demotion of former First Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council and United Russia Secretary Andrei Turchak on June 4 is likely part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ongoing effort to remove from power the political and military figures that violated his trust in 2023.
A recent meeting of the Kremlin-appointed Russian Human Rights Council (HRC) on Russia's migration policy reflects Russia's competing imperatives of attracting migrants to offset Russian labor shortages while also catering to its ultranationalist anti-migrant constituency.
Chechen Republic Rosgvardia Head and Russian State Duma Deputy Adam Delimkhanov accused State Duma Deputy Chairman and New People Party Head Vladislav Davankov of contradicting the Russian Constitution and attempting to divide Russian society, exposing continued tension between Chechen efforts to operate autonomously and the Russian state’s efforts to regulate perceived Islamic extremist threats from migrant and indigenous Muslim communities.
Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom reportedly assesses that it is unlikely to recover gas sales it lost following the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, illustrating how Western sanctions are achieving some long-term impacts against Russian revenue streams supporting Russia's war effort.
Russian investigative outlet the Insider and Moldovan outlet Little Country published an investigation on June 5 detailing how former Moldovan Chief of the General Staff Igor Gorgan operated as an agent on behalf of the Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU).
Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk, near Chasiv Yar, west of Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City.
The Kremlin likely authorized the Crimean branch of the Kremlin-created "Defenders of Fatherland" state fund to help grant combatants in Russian private military companies (PMCs) legal veteran statuses, possibly as part of an ongoing state effort to centralize control over irregular formations operating in Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

  

Beitrag dem Admin melden | Urheberrechtsverletzung melden

Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to repackage long-standing, tired threats about direct confrontation with the West by claiming that Russia will provide long-range strike capabilities to unspecified actors for strikes against the West. Putin's threat aims to influence Western decision-making about Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia using Western-provided weapons but notably does not threaten escalation in Ukraine or through direct confrontation, suggesting that the Kremlin may be adjusting to select Western perceptions about the credibility of such Russian threats. Putin stated during a meeting with the heads of foreign press organizations on the sidelines of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 5 that Russia could begin supplying long-range weapons to unspecified adversaries of the West as a "symmetrical response" to the lifting of some Western restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets within Russia.<1> Putin rhetorically asked why Russia should not have the right to supply weapons of a similar class (compared to those the West has allowed Ukraine to use for strikes on Russian territory) to unspecified actors that will conduct strikes on Western "sensitive targets."<2> Kremlin actors routinely threaten to directly strike Western targets in an effort to use Western fears of escalation with Russia to encourage the West to self-deter its support for Ukraine, and Putin's June 5 threat is not a notable inflection in this regard.<3>

Putin may assess that select Western actors will be more concerned about Russia providing long-range strike capabilities to actors willing to attack the West than the Kremlin's tired rhetoric about direct confrontation between the West and Russia. Russia is very unlikely to directly provide scarce high-end long-range strike capabilities to other actors, however, since it uses many of these systems for large-scale strikes against Ukraine. It is also unclear what systems Putin means by weapons of a "similar class." The United Kingdom lifted restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use Storm Shadow cruise missiles with a range of over 250 kilometers for strikes against military targets within Russia, which is the Western system with the longest range that Ukrainian forces are currently permitted to use for such strikes.<4> The kinds of long-range strike systems Russia could ostensibly give other actors would be limited if Putin's "proportional" threat is credible. Russia's likely unwillingness to provide long-range systems does not preclude Russian efforts to help the West's adversaries acquire long-range strike capabilities, however. Russia is reportedly providing North Korea with ballistic missile technology in return for North Korea's provision of artillery munition to Russia, for example.<5> Putin and the Kremlin have threatened escalation at every critical juncture in Western debates about support for Ukraine, and this latest threat aims to constrain the easing of remaining Western restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia using Western weapons.<6> Lifting remaining restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western weapons can allow Ukrainian forces to substantially degrade Russian operations by eliminating Russia's ability to use Russian territory as a sanctuary space to optimize its rear areas to support Russia’s campaign to destroy Ukrainian statehood.<7>

Russian naval vessels will make a port call in Cuba on June 12–17, likely as part of a larger effort to invoke the historical memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis as part of Russia’s reflexive control campaign to encourage US self-deterrence. The Cuban Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces announced on June 6 that four Russian vessels from the Northern Fleet – the Admiral Gorshkov frigate, the Kazan nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine, the Academic Pashin replenishment oiler, and the Nikolai Chiker rescue tug – will make an official visit to the port of Havana from June 12 to 17.<8> Reuters reported that a senior US official stated that the Russian vessels may also stop in Venezuela on an unspecified date in Summer 2024.<9> The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Russia’s objective is to ensure a Russian naval presence in "operationally important areas of the far ocean zone."<10> Russian media noted that the Admiral Gorshkov is carrying Zircon hypersonic missiles, which the Kremlin has touted as capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.<11> The Cuban Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces specifically claimed, however, that none of the vessels are carrying nuclear weapons, so the Russian port call "does not represent a threat to the region."<12> ISW is unable to verify this Cuban assertion. The Russian Navy's port calls in states in the Western hemisphere that have historically strained relationships with the US aim to highlight Russia's strong relations with these states and are likely part of Russia's reflexive control campaign to force the US to self-deter and not enact policies that offer further support to Ukraine. Putin has repeatedly used nuclear saber-rattling to push the West to self-deter during times when the West has faced key moments on critical policy decisions in how to best support Ukraine.<13> The Kremlin likely hopes that the clear allusion to the Cuban Missile Crisis and the inclusion of a reportedly nuclear weapons–capable ship will force the West to engage in self-deterrence. The Kremlin likely coordinated the announcement of the Russian navy's port calls in Cuba with Putin's threats to provide long-range strike capabilities to unspecified actors for strikes against the West, as both activities can instill fear in the West. Putin notably did not threaten escalation in Ukraine or direct confrontation between Russia and the West.

Putin inadvertently indicated on June 5 that Russian forces may be suffering roughly 20,000 monthly casualties in Ukraine, which, if accurate, would be roughly equal to or just below the number of new personnel that Russia reportedly generates per month. Putin inadvertently suggested that roughly 5,000 Russian personnel are killed in action in Ukraine each month, which further suggests that roughly 15,000 Russian personnel are wounded in action, assuming a standard three-to-one wounded-to-killed casualty ratio.<14> ISW cannot confirm Putin's suggested casualty rate and his apparent inadvertent admission does not serve as a clear claim about Russian casualties in Ukraine. Putin's suggested figure does align somewhat with the lower end of Ukrainian reporting about Russian casualty rates, however. Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated on May 2 that Russian forces suffer about 25,000 to 30,000 killed and wounded personnel per month.<15> Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on January 15, 2024, that Russia recruits around 30,000 personnel per month.<16> Ruslan Pukhov, the head of the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies and a member of a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) civilian advisory board, similarly claimed in mid-April 2024 that current Russian crypto-mobilization efforts are generating roughly 30,000 new personnel each month.<17> Russian officials are reportedly concerned about decreasing recruitment rates ahead of the expected Russian Summer 2024 offensive effort, and it is unclear if the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has maintained the roughly 30,000 recruitment rate it reportedly had in January and April of 2024.<18>

Russian forces have notably established a more sustainable force generation apparatus in recent months for ongoing offensive operations and have intensified efforts to establish operational- and strategic-level reserves.<19> Russian forces have leveraged their possession of the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine to dictate a tempo of fighting in recent months that would generate casualties roughly equal to or slightly less than the rate of newly generated forces.<20> This has allowed Russian forces to immediately replenish losses along the frontline and sustain their overall offensive tempo in Ukraine but has set limits on the extent to which Russian forces can intensify offensive operations in any given direction.<21> The marginal amount of additional newly generated forces not immediately committed to the front as reinforcements has allowed Russian forces to gradually establish operational reserves.<22> Pavlyuk stated in early May 2024 that Russian forces intended to generate about 100,000 more personnel for use in offensive operations this June and July and 300,000 more personnel by the end of 2024.<23> Russia will likely fall far short of this immediate and near-term goal, even at the lower limit of reported or suggested monthly Russian casualties and the upper limit of reported monthly Russian force generation. ISW continues to assess that likely poorly trained and equipped Russian operational- and strategic-level reserves are unlikely to be ready to act as a first-echelon penetration force or as a second-echelon exploitation force capable of conducting large-scale assaults in 2024 if Ukrainian forces have the wherewithal to resist them.<24>

Limitations on Western capabilities to train partner pilots on F-16 fighter jets are reportedly creating bottlenecks that will affect Ukraine's ability to effectively field F-16s in the future. Politico reported that Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium plan to send over 60 F-16 aircraft to Ukraine in Summer 2024.<25> Politico reported on June 5 that US, European, and Ukrainian officials and lawmakers stated that US, Danish, and Romanian F-16 pilot training facilities can only train a limited number of Ukrainian pilots, however. Politico reported that US Air Force Spokesperson Laurel Falls stated that the US National Guard is planning to train 12 Ukrainian pilots by the end of September 2024. The Danish training facility is reportedly training eight Ukrainian pilots, but this facility will reportedly close in November 2024, and the Romanian training facility is reportedly not yet operational. A full squadron of 20 aircraft requires 40 pilots. A former DoD official reportedly stated that if the current training constraints continue, Ukraine will only have enough pilots for a full squadron at the end of 2025. Ukraine will not be able to use all the Western-provided aircraft as effectively as possible until the necessary number of Ukrainian pilots complete training.

Select Western countries have indicated that Ukraine will be permitted to use F-16s for strikes within Russia but Ukraine's ability to operate F-16s near the international border is contingent on Ukraine's ability to destroy air defense assets in Russia.<26> Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 18 that Ukraine needs about 120–130 advanced fighter aircraft to achieve air parity with Russia but that Russia's biggest advantage is Western-imposed restrictions prohibiting Ukraine from using Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia.<27> Ukraine may be able to set conditions to have Ukrainian aviation operate in the air domain to support Ukrainian ground operations if Ukraine is able to sufficiently destroy Russian air defense assets within Russia using Western long-range strike capabilities, obtain a sufficient cadre of pilots capable of flying F-16s, and receive a timely delivery and a sufficient number of F-16 airframes.

French authorities are investigating multiple recent pro-Russian sabotage and societal influence operations in France amid continued Russian hybrid war measures against NATO states and France aimed at weakening support for Ukraine. French media reported on June 5 and 6 that French authorities detained a man with pro-Russian beliefs and dual Ukrainian-Russian citizenship at a hotel on the outskirts of Paris after the man sustained injuries from making explosives in his hotel room.<28> French media reported that French authorities assess that the man sought to attack French security assistance allocated to Ukraine and that authorities found additional explosives, materials to make explosives, small arms, money, and passports in the man's hotel room. The man reportedly fought with the Russian military for two years in an unspecified location (presumably in Ukraine) prior to this incident.<29> NBC reported that a source within the French National Anti-Terrorist Prosecutor’s Office stated that it is "too early for us to say" whether the incident is connected to a Russian sabotage campaign, though French and other European intelligence agencies have recently warned about a projected increase in Russian sabotage operations in the coming weeks.<30> Macron plans to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on June 7 in Paris and Reuters reported that French officials may use the visit to announce the transfer of French military trainers to Ukraine.<31> Russian actors may be attempting to use sabotage attacks to degrade French support for Ukraine or disrupt French efforts to prepare materiel and military trainers for deployment to Ukraine. French authorities are also investigating potential Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) involvement in recent incidents likely aimed at fomenting domestic unrest and distrust of Macron.<32>

The Russian Investigative Committee announced the arrest of a French citizen on June 6 following the early June arrest in France. The Russian Investigative Committee announced and published footage of Russian authorities detaining an unspecified French citizen under charges of failing to provide proper documentation required by law for legally designated "foreign agents." The Russian Investigative Committee claimed in its report that the French citizen also spent "several years" on multiple trips to Russia collecting information about the Russian military that "can be used against the security of the state" if "foreign sources" obtain this information, essentially accusing the man of espionage but not yet formally charging him with espionage-related offenses.<33> Reuters reported that Swiss-based nonprofit Center for Humanitarian Dialogue stated that Russian authorities arrested Laurent Vinatier, who worked as a Russia and Eurasia advisor for the center, and that French President Emmanuel Macron also confirmed Vinatier's arrest.<34>

Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Rostov Oblast and reportedly struck an oil depot in Belgorod Oblast on the night of June 5 to 6.<35> Rostov Oblast Governor Vasily Golubov acknowledged that a fire started at the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery after a drone strike.<36> Geolocated footage published on June 6 shows a fire at the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery in Rostov Oblast.<37> Radio Svoboda published satellite imagery on June 6 showing that the Ukrainian strike hit a liquified hydrocarbon gas production site.<38> Radio Svoboda reported that the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery has a capacity of five million tons per year, and a prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the facility is mostly export oriented.<39> Ukrainian forces previously struck the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery in June 2022 and March 2023.<40> Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov claimed on June 6 that a Ukrainian drone strike caused a fire at an oil depot in Starooskolsky Gorodskoy Okrug.<41> ISW has not observed visual confirmation of the reported Ukrainian strike on the oil depot in Starooskolsky Raion.

Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Committee on Human Rights, Deoccupation, and Reintegration Deputy Chairperson Ruslan Horbenko estimated that the Ukrainian military will recruit roughly 120,000 personnel in 2024, although the apparent slow arrival of Western security assistance will likely limit Ukraine's ability to sufficiently provision and equip these forces at scale in the near-term.<42> Horbenko stated in an interview with Ukrainian outlet Ukrinform published on June 6 that the Ukrainian military command and frontline commanders stated that the Ukrainian military needs 100,000 to 110,000 recruits in 2024. Western military aid to Ukraine is unlikely to provision and equip these forces with sufficient materiel given the current rate and limited scale at which Western military aid is arriving in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently acknowledged that the slow arrival of US security assistance is complicating Ukrainian efforts to commit reserves to ongoing Ukrainian defensive operations since the Ukrainian military is unable to sufficiently equip reserve brigades to conduct rotations for frontline units.<43> The arrival of US and Western military assistance to Ukrainian forces on the frontline at scale will likely aid Ukrainian efforts to bring reserves closer to their intended end strength and sufficiently provision new planned brigades.

Russian and Taliban officials expressed interest in bilateral cooperation, indicating that Russia will likely soon delist the Taliban as a prohibited organization in Russia. Taliban acting Minister of Labor and Social Relations Abdul Umari gave an interview to Kremlin newswire TASS at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 6 in which he expressed interest in expanding economic and energy ties with Russia and stated that the Taliban is "looking forward to Russia's decision to exclude from the list of banned organizations ."<44> Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed support for delisting the Taliban on May 28, ahead of the Taliban delegation's visit to Russia.<45> Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu stated at a meeting with the security council secretaries of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states that Russia is concerned about the situation in Afghanistan and claimed that there are unspecified "new militant training camps" in Afghanistan and unspecified terrorists are moving from Syria and Iraq to Afghanistan.<46> Shoigu's statement indicates that Russia is likely interested in cooperating with the Taliban to degrade the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP), an adversary of the Taliban and the perpetrators of the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow.<47>

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to repackage longstanding, tired threats about direct confrontation with the West by claiming that Russian will provide long-range strike capabilities to unspecified actors for strikes against the West. Putin's threat aims to influence Western decision-making about Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia using Western-provided weapons but notably does not threaten escalation in Ukraine or through direct confrontation, suggesting that the Kremlin may be adjusting to select Western perceptions about the credibility of such Russian threats.
Russian naval vessels will make a port call in Cuba on June 12–17, likely as part of a larger effort to invoke the historical memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis as part of Russia’s reflexive control campaign to encourage US self-deterrence.
Putin inadvertently indicated on June 5 that Russian forces may be suffering roughly 20,000 monthly casualties in Ukraine, which, if accurate, would be roughly equal to or just below the number of new personnel that Russia reportedly generates per month.
Limitations on Western capabilities to train partner pilots on F-16 fighter jets are reportedly creating bottlenecks that will affect Ukraine's ability to effectively field F-16s in the future.
French authorities are investigating multiple recent pro-Russian sabotage and societal influence operations in France amid continued Russian hybrid war measures against NATO states and France aimed at weakening support for Ukraine.
The Russian Investigative Committee announced the arrest of a French citizen on June 6 following the early June arrest in France.
Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Rostov Oblast and reportedly struck an oil depot in Belgorod Oblast on the night of June 5 to 6.
Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Committee on Human Rights, Deoccupation, and Reintegration Deputy Chairperson Ruslan Horbenko estimated that the Ukrainian military will recruit roughly 120,000 personnel in 2024, although the apparent slow arrival of Western security assistance will likely limit Ukraine's ability to sufficiently provision and equip these forces at scale in the near-term.
Russian and Taliban officials expressed interest in bilateral cooperation, indicating that Russia will likely soon delist the Taliban as a prohibited organization in Russia.
Russian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk, southeast of Kupyansk, northeast of Siversk, northwest of Avdiivka, south of Velyka Novosilka, and near Krynky.
Russia's continued demographic crisis will present long-term constraints on human capital within Russia.

Institute for the Study of War

  

Beitrag dem Admin melden | Urheberrechtsverletzung melden

Russian President Vladimir Putin articulated a theory of victory in Ukraine on June 7 that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces. Putin stated following his speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) that Russia does not need to conduct another call-up of reservists similar to Russia‘s September 2022 partial mobilization because Russia is not trying to rapidly achieve its military objectives in Ukraine.<1> Putin acknowledged that the current Russian military contingent committed to the war in Ukraine (reportedly the Russian military’s entire combat-capable ground force as of January 2024) would be insufficient for a rapid victory but suggested that Russian forces are instead pursuing a more gradual approach.<2> Putin stated that Russian forces aim to "squeeze" Ukrainian forces out "of those territories that should be under Russian control" and therefore Russia does not need to conduct another mobilization wave.<3> Putin asserted that Russian crypto-mobilization efforts are sufficient for this approach and that Russia has recruited 160,000 new personnel so far in 2024 (a figure consistent with reports that the Russian military recruits between 20,000-30,000 recruits per month).<4>

Putin's assessment that gradual Russian gains will allow Russia to achieve his goals in Ukraine is predicated on the assumption that Ukrainian forces will be unable to liberate any significant territory that Russian forces seize and that the Russian military will be able to sustain offensive operations that achieve gradual tactical gains regardless of heavy losses. Western intelligence has previously assessed that Putin assesses that US and Western support to Ukraine is “finite" and that Russian forces have blunted Ukrainian efforts to retake significant territory.<5> Putin's assessment has been reinforced by the recent months of delayed Western security assistance and corresponding Ukrainian materiel constraints, which allowed Russian forces to seize and maintain the theater-wide initiative and conduct consistent offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine that achieved gradual tactical gains.<6> Putin's June 7 comments support ISW's previous assessment that Putin's assessment of Ukrainian capabilities and how Putin’s perceived limits to Western support would incentivize Putin to pursue creeping offensive operations indefinitely if more rapid operations that lead to rapid decisive results seem unattainable.<7>

Putin's theory of victory rests on Russia's ability to outlast and overcome pledged Western security assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainian efforts to mobilize more of its economy and population for the war effort, indicating that Putin likely assesses that Russian forces will be able to leverage their advantages in manpower and materiel to overwhelm on Ukrainian forces. Putin's apparent assessment that Russia can "squeeze" Ukrainian forces out of all the lands it desires to occupy assumes that Ukraine will not acquire and sustain the manpower and materiel required to prevent indefinite Russian attempts to gradually advance along the front or needed to contest the initiative and conduct operationally significant counteroffensive operations. Ukrainian forces have previously shown that when they are well provisioned, they can prevent Russian forces from making even marginal tactical gains, force Russian offensive operations to culminate, and launch counteroffensive operations that liberate operationally significant territory.<8> Russian forces are currently leveraging the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine to dictate a tempo of fighting that generates casualties roughly equal to or slightly less than the rate of newly generated forces, which has allowed Russian forces to sustain their overall offensive tempo in Ukraine.<9> Russia is also further mobilizing its defense industrial base (DIB) and is generally far ahead of Ukraine and the West in this regard.<10> Putin and the Russian military command likely assess that Russian numerical manpower and materiel advantages will allow Russia to sustain this force generation replacement rate and field the required materiel needed to sustain indefinite creeping advances.

This strategy largely relies on Russia's ability to retain the theater-wide initiative, which Ukrainian forces can contest if Ukraine addresses its ongoing manpower challenges and receives sufficient, timely, and consistent Western security assistance.<11> Western security assistance pledges and Ukrainian force generation efforts will eventually allow Ukraine to accumulate the forces and materiel it needs to contest the initiative if ongoing Russian offensive operations are not successful in forcing Ukraine to divert manpower and materiel to defensive operations.<12>

Russian efforts to prevent Ukraine from accumulating the personnel and resources Ukraine needs to contest the initiative therefore are a part of an attritional war approach, in which the Russian military command believes that ongoing Russian offensive operations will inflict relatively more significant losses on Ukrainian forces and force Ukraine to divert manpower and materiel to stabilize the front instead of preparing for future counteroffensive efforts. This approach also requires that Russian forces avoid suffering outsized losses that would prevent Russia from sustaining offensive operations. There are limits to Russian force generation, as Putin himself admits with his continued aversion to another partial mobilization wave, and Russia's ability to expand its DIB has extensively relied on the refurbishment of extensive Soviet-era stocks, which are a finite resource.<13> Putin and the Russian military command likely calculate that these limits will not begin constraining Russia's ability to sustain its offensive tempo in Ukraine in the near-to-medium term, however. This approach requires that Ukraine is not able to inflict losses on Russian forces that decrease this offensive tempo or force Russian offensive efforts to culminate. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine should contest the initiative as soon as possible because Russian forces are reaping a variety of benefits from holding the initiative, including their ability to pursue a strategy of attritional warfare.<14>

Putin's theory of victory hinges on a critical assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine to Russian victory, either on its own accord or in response to Russian efforts to persuade the West to do so, and it is far from clear that the West will do so. Putin notably did not identify what specific goals he assesses gradual tactical Russian gains will achieve, although the Russian military command has likely previously believed that such gains would encourage Western debates about continued support for Ukraine and cause weakened Western support that exacerbates Ukrainian materiel constraints.<15> Putin also did not specify which territory "should" be under Russian control, part of continued Kremlin rhetoric that purposefully leaves open room for further territorial conquest in Ukraine.<16> The current rate of Russian advance suggests that Russian forces may pursue individual operationally significant objectives over the course of many months if not years, and efforts to not bound the Kremlin's territorial objectives likely intend to justify indefinite creeping offensive operations as long as it takes to achieve Western and Ukrainian capitulation.<17> Putin may believe that as long as Russia can prevent Ukraine from contesting the initiative he can lock in limited territorial conquests while encouraging Western debates about continued aid to Ukraine once current pledges of security assistance are expended.

The end of Western security assistance would eventually lead to the collapse of the frontline and total Russian victory in Ukraine, a reality that recent months of delayed Western security assistance has further highlighted.<18> The West must proactively provide Ukrainian forces with the necessary equipment and weapons at the scale, timing, and regularity that Ukrainian forces require for operations that liberate significant swaths of occupied Ukraine and challenge Putin's belief that he can gradually subsume Ukraine should rapid total victory appear unreachable. The West also maintains the ability to substantially disrupt Russian operations at scale by allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike Russia’s operational rear and deep rear areas in Russian territory.<19> The West must not surrender to Russia's strategic effort to destroy Western commitment to Ukrainian survival and must remember that Ukrainian victory has always been possible as long as the West remains committed to that goal.<20>

Putin indirectly indicated that Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory with Western-provided weapons do not cross a supposed Russian "red line" that would result in Russian nuclear escalation. Putin stated that Russia's nuclear doctrine calls for Russia to only use nuclear weapons in the event of "exceptional cases" of threats to Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.<21> Putin stated that he does not think such an "exceptional" case has arisen so "there is no such need" for Russia to use nuclear weapons. Ukrainian forces have struck military targets in Belgorod Oblast with US-provided HIMARS systems using GMLRS since early June 2024.<22> Putin’s June 7 statement is a significant rhetorical reversal given that Putin and other Kremlin officials have previously threatened Russian nuclear weapon use should Western states allow Ukraine to strike into Russian territory with Western-provided weapons.<23> Western and Ukrainian policies and actions have crossed Russia's supposed "red lines" several times throughout the war without drawing a significant Russian reaction, indicating that many of Russia's "red lines" are most likely information operations designed to push the West to self-deter.<24>

Putin heavily focused on proposals to solve Russia's labor shortage issues during his speech at SPIEF on June 7. Putin outlined a 10-point plan to grow the Russian economy and acknowledged that Russia is suffering from demographic challenges and labor shortages.<25> Putin called on the Russian government to enact multiple reforms to increase the labor supply and productivity, such as improving education and training, automating and digitalizing Russian industry, increasing the use of artificial intelligence (AI), and increasing spending on research and development. Putin highlighted the necessity of migrant labor to increase Russia's economic growth but stated that Russia has not yet developed a "meaningful" migration policy. Putin specified that Russia only needs skilled and educated migrant laborers with a knowledge of Russian language and culture and who will "not create any problems for local citizens in the workplace and in life." Putin ended his SPIEF appearance by stating that Russia "will treat the culture and traditions of peoples of the Russian Federation" with respect as "unity is strength." Putin has touted Russia as a unified multiethnic and multinational state, but his June 7 statements demonstrate the differing policies and perceptions towards the indigenous, federally recognized peoples of Russia and migrants.<26> Putin's migration policy proposals demonstrate how the Kremlin continues to struggle to balance Russia's need for migrants to compensate for labor shortages and wide-scale anti-migrant sentiments in Russia, particularly as the Kremlin tries to further mobilize the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).

Putin attempted to frame Russia's economic issues in a positive light, likely to prepare Russian citizens to make more personal sacrifices as Russia sustains a protracted war in Ukraine at the expense of Russian citizens’ standards of living. Putin framed Russia's labor shortages as resulting from Russia's alleged "record low" unemployment, not a consequence of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.<27> Putin stated that people who have reached retirement age have experience and knowledge that is useful to the Russian economy and that many pensioners have "aspirations" to continue working. Putin proposed that the Russian government annually increase pensions starting in February 2025 for pensioners who continue to work even after they reach retirement age. Putin met with St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov before his speech at SPIEF, during which Beglov presented the idea of increasing pensions as a direct request from working pensioners.<28> Large-scale protests erupted in Russia in 2018 when the Kremlin announced a raise in the retirement age, and Putin is likely trying to use monetary incentives to push pensioners to choose to work beyond the retirement age to help ease Russia's labor shortages.<29> Putin also highlighted the strength of Russia's DIB, claiming that Russia has increased its production of ammunition by more than 20 times in an unspecified time frame and that Russia has superior aviation and armored vehicle technology than the West.<30> Putin claimed that the Russian DIB has increased its production of civilian products by about five percent over the past two years, likely to justify Russia's increased defense spending and recent efforts to mobilize the DIB to civilians. Sberbank CEO Herman Gref, however, stated on June 7 at SPIEF that the alleged "unprecedented" growth of wages in Russia will last at most another year.<31>

Putin continued efforts to portray Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as an illegitimate president and identified the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) as a legitimate actor with which the Kremlin can negotiate instead of Zelensky. Putin’s recent statements are the latest in a series designed to obfuscate the legality of Zelensky's extended term by misrepresenting the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian laws.<32> Putin continued to claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate actor who has "usurped" power in Ukraine as the Ukrainian Constitution does not allow for a Ukrainian president to extend his term beyond the five-year fixed term.<33> Putin cherrypicked specific articles of the Ukrainian Constitution to make his argument, including articles he also recently grossly mischaracterized or took out of their legal context during a speech on May 28.<34> Putin claimed on June 7 that the Verkhovna Rada's power is extended under a period of martial law and that presidential powers should be "transferred to the speaker of the Rada" under articles 109, 110, and 111 of the Ukrainian Constitution now that Zelensky has "usurped" power.<35> Article 109 states that "the resignation of the President of Ukraine enters into force from the moment he or she personally announces the statement of resignation at a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine."<36> Article 110 states that "the inability of the President of Ukraine to exercise his or her powers for reasons of health shall be determined at a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and confirmed by a decision adopted by the majority of its constitutional composition."<37> Article 111 states that "the President of Ukraine may be removed from office by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by the procedure of impeachment, in the event that he or she commits state treason or other crime." Putin is invoking these articles to suggest that Zelensky's extended term is "illegal" and that the Verkhovna Rada is the single authority to assume power should Zelensky resign, be impeached, or otherwise leave office before the natural end of his term. Putin also invoked Article 83, which states that in the event of martial law, the Verkhovna Rada's powers are extended, and Article 103, which states that a Ukrainian president's term is five years - again claiming that presidential terms cannot be extended under martial law while the Verkhovna Rada's term can be extended.<38>

Putin claimed that the Ukrainian Constitution does not mention extending the Ukrainian presidential term, but this statement ignores the Ukrainian legal framework about martial law. Article 19 of the Ukrainian law "On the Legal Regime of Martial Law" states that presidential and Verkhovna Rada elections are prohibited under martial law and forbids the Ukrainian president from abolishing martial law as long as there exists a "threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity."<39> Article 64 of the Ukrainian constitution states that "under conditions of war or a state of emergency, specific restrictions on rights and freedoms may be established with the indication of the period of validity of these restrictions" except for the rights and freedoms stipulated by certain articles, none of which are mentioned above.<40>

Putin's recent focus on legitimizing the Verkhovna Rada and its speaker in lieu of Zelensky highlights a target for Russian destabilization operations.<41> ISW has repeatedly assessed that recent Russian information operations aim to sow multiple divisions between the Ukrainian people, military, military leadership, and political leadership to undermine domestic and international support for Zelensky and Ukraine's decision to defend against the Russian invasion.<42> Ukrainian intelligence has identified a Russian information campaign called "Maidan-3" that specifically aims to spread doubt about Zelensky's legitimacy and has projected that these information operations will peak from late May to July 2024.<43> These information operations may intend to set informational conditions to eventually declare a Kremlin-backed actor as Ukrainian president, Verkhovna Rada speaker, or another title with whom the Kremlin claims it can "legally" negotiate with instead of Zelensky.<44> Two figures previously floated as possible replacements for Zelensky have since emerged in the wake of these information operations.<45> Former pro-Russia Ukrainian MP Viktor Medvedchuk recently participated in the information operation to discredit Zelensky.<46> Former pro-Russia Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych traveled to Minsk on May 24 for an unspecified reason, and Ukrainian intelligence described Yanukovych's last trip to Minsk in 2022 as a Kremlin effort to prepare Yanukovych for a "special operation" to be reinstated as president of Ukraine.<47>

Putin attempted to introduce his children and the children of other senior Russian officials to the public sphere at SPIEF, likely to set conditions for them to eventually assume high-profile and powerful roles in the Russian government. Independent Belarusian outlet Vot Tak reported that Putin's youngest daughter Katerina Tikhonova spoke virtually on a June 6 panel about the role of defense industrial organizations and discussed Russian technological development and import substitution.<48> Vot Tak also reported that Putin's eldest daughter Maria Vorontsova spoke on a panel about biotechnology on June 7.<49> Vot Tak reported that Tikhonova spoke at SPIEF in 2021 in a panel about BRICS and that Vorontsova has only previously attended SPIEF as a guest where she did two interviews on the sidelines.<50> Kremlin newswire TASS characterized Tikhonova as Innopraktika Company General Director and notably went out of its way to promote Vorontsova’s professional titles and accolades by highlighting her position as Deputy Head of the Russian Faculty of Fundamental Medicine at Moscow State University and a member of the Russian Association for the Promotion of Science, and a Candidate of Medical Science (equivalent to a PhD of Medical Science).<51> TASS did not mention their familial connection to Putin. TASS is likely attempting to portray Tikhonova and Vorontsova as authoritative figures and to introduce them as trustworthy and knowledgeable individuals to the Russian public.

A Russian insider source claimed that the children of other senior Russian officials participated in SPIEF including: both sons of former Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head and current Russian Institute for Strategic Studies Director Mikhail Fradkov - First Deputy Administrator of the Presidential Administration Pavel Fradkov and CEO and Chairperson of Russian state-owned bank Promsvyazbank Pyotr Fradkov; Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov's daughter Yelizaveta Peskova; Presidential Aide Nikolai Patrushev's son Russian Agriculture Minister Dmitry Patrushev; Presidental Administration Head Anton Vaino's son the Kremlin's Agency for Strategic Initiatives' youth work head Alexander Vaino; Russian oligarch Boris Rotenberg's son Vice President of Gazprombank Roman Rotenberg; Presidental Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko's son Alexander Kiriyenko; Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu's daughter Ksenia Shoigu; and Putin's first cousin once removed ("niece") and Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation Chairperson Anna Tsivileva.<52>

US National Security Council Senior Director for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Pranay Vaddi stated that the US has prepared a new nuclear weapons policy specifically to deter Russia, the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran.<53> Vaddi stated at the 2024 Arms Control Association meeting that the US may have to deploy more strategic nuclear weapons in the coming years and that the US should be prepared if the US president makes such a decision.<54> Vaddi stated that the US remains committed to international arms control and non-proliferation values and agreements. Vaddi stated that Russia has repeatedly rejected talks with the US to negotiate a successor to the New START strategic arms limitation pact, which expires in 2026, and that the PRC has refused to discuss expanding its nuclear arsenal with the US.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a $225 million security assistance package for Ukraine on June 7.<55> The package includes missiles for HAWK air defense systems; Stinger anti-aircraft missiles; ammunition for HIMARS; 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds; M113 armored personnel carriers; Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; and other materiel.<56>

French President Emmanuel Macron announced on June 6 that France will provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets and equip and train a brigade of 4,500 Ukrainian soldiers.<57> Macron stated that Ukrainian pilots will likely train between five and six months on Mirage-2000-5 aircraft in France and stated that Ukraine will have Mirage-2000-5 pilots by the end of 2024.<58>

The Russian Supreme Court declared an organization that does not exist as "extremist" on June 7, consistent with previous ISW assessments that Russia seeks to expand the legal definition of "extremism" to increasingly prosecute domestic anti-war sentiment. The Russian Supreme Court declared the "Anti-Russian Separatist Movement" and its "structural divisions" as extremist in accordance with a Russian Ministry of Justice request to this effect submitted on April 26.<59> Russian opposition media has noted that no such organization exists, and Russian authorities have previously designated other non-existent organizations meant to encompass broader “social movements” as “extremist.”<60> Russian authorities likely intend to use this new extremist designation to further prosecute anti-war sentiment among Russians and within occupied Ukraine, particularly movements opposing Russia’s occupation of Ukraine and movements within ethnic minority communities advocating for better treatment of Russian military personnel and mobilized personnel from these communities.<61>

The Kremlin continues efforts to destabilize the Balkans and dismantle the 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, likely as part of a larger strategic effort that seeks to divide and distract Europe. Russian President Vladimir Putin and President of Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) Milorad Dodik met on June 6 in St. Petersburg, and Dodik attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF).<62> Dodik announced in a June 7 interview with Kremlin newswire TASS that Republika Srpska will adopt a Russia-style "foreign agents" bill, which would restrict the activities of non-profit organizations that receive foreign funding, that the government had previously withdrawn.<63> Dodik also stated Republika Srpska's intention to hold a referendum on its independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina at an unspecified date.<64> The Kremlin has previously leveraged its relationship with Republika Srpska to further influence the Balkans, sow divisions in the West, and undermine the Dayton Accords to throw the Balkans into turmoil.<65>

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin articulated a theory of victory in Ukraine on June 7 that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.
Putin's theory of victory rests on Russia's ability to outlast and overcome pledged Western security assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainian efforts to mobilize more of its economy and population for the war effort, indicating that Putin likely assesses that Russian forces will be able to leverage their advantages in manpower and materiel to overwhelm on Ukrainian forces.
Putin's theory of victory hinges on a critical assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine to Russian victory, either on its own accord or in response to Russian efforts to persuade the West to do so, and it is far from clear that the West will do so.
Putin indirectly indicated that Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory with Western-provided weapons do not cross a supposed Russian "red line" that would result in Russian nuclear escalation.
Putin heavily focused on proposals to solve Russia's labor shortage issues during his speech at SPIEF on June 7.
Putin attempted to frame Russia's economic issues in a positive light, likely to prepare Russian citizens to make more personal sacrifices as Russia sustains a protracted war in Ukraine at the expense of Russian citizens’ standards of living.
Putin continued efforts to portray Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as an illegitimate president and identified the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) as a legitimate actor with which the Kremlin can negotiate instead of Zelensky. Putin’s recent statements are the latest in a series designed to obfuscate the legality of Zelensky's extended term by misrepresenting the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian laws.
Putin attempted to introduce his children and the children of other senior Russian officials to the public sphere at SPIEF, likely to set conditions for them to eventually assume high-profile and powerful roles in the Russian government.
US National Security Council Senior Director for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Pranay Vaddi stated that the US has prepared a new nuclear weapons policy specifically to deter Russia, the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran.
The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a $225 million security assistance package for Ukraine on June 7.
French President Emmanuel Macron announced on June 6 that France will provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets and equip and train a brigade of 4,500 Ukrainian soldiers.
The Russian Supreme Court declared an organization that does not exist as "extremist" on June 7, consistent with previous ISW assessments that Russia seeks to expand the legal definition of "extremism" to increasingly prosecute domestic anti-war sentiment.
The Kremlin continues efforts to destabilize the Balkans and dismantle the 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, likely as part of a larger strategic effort that seeks to divide and distract Europe.
Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, near Chasiv Yar, and northwest of Avdiivka.

Institute for the Study of War

  

Beitrag dem Admin melden | Urheberrechtsverletzung melden

The Russian military command is reportedly transferring an unspecified number of forces to the Ukrainian-Russian border area near Kharkiv Oblast, but it is unclear if the Russian military command plans to immediately commit these redeployed forces to combat or use them to reinforce the Northern Grouping of Forces to bring it closer to its reported planned end strength. Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov claimed in an interview with Russian state media outlet RT on June 8 that Russian authorities decided to transfer elements of the Akhmat Spetsnaz to the Kharkiv direction from unspecified areas at the end of May 2024.<1> Alaudinov claimed that the "Kashtan" detachment, formerly known as Akhmat "Kamerton" detachment and renamed after its new commander, is operating in the Kharkiv direction. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on June 8 that Akhmat forces are serving as blocking units – specialized disciplinary units that fire upon friendly forces if they engage in an unauthorized retreat – in the international border area, and it is possible that the Russian military command transferred Akhmat forces to the area solely for this purpose and not to conduct offensive operations.<2> Voloshyn also stated that the Russian military command is increasing the Russian force grouping near the border area by transferring elements of unspecified regiments and brigades from other sectors of the front, including from occupied Kherson Oblast. Voloshyn stated that the Russian military command intends to commit unspecified airborne (VDV) elements and additional elements of the 11th and 44th Army Corps (both of the Leningrad Military District ) to offensive operations in unspecified areas of the border area. Elements of the 11th and 44th Army Corps have been conducting offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and a battalion of the 98th VDV Division is reportedly operating in a border area in Kursk Oblast.<3> The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on June 8 that the Russian military command is redeploying unspecified units and drone operators from the Kherson direction to the Kharkiv direction.<4> Russian forces reportedly had roughly 35,000 personnel in the international border area as a part of the Northern Grouping of Forces when they started offensive operations on May 10, whereas Ukrainian sources have indicated that the Russian military initially sought to concentrate at least 50,000 to 70,000 personnel in the international border area as of early May.<5> It is unclear whether Russian forces have altered the planned end strength of the Northern Grouping of Forces since launching the offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast on May 10. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 6 that the Russian military command has only committed about 15,000 personnel to the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast.<6>

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted on June 8 that a fraction of the reported 30,000 personnel that Russia generates each month arrives at the front as combat force replacements and reinforcements and that Russian force generation efforts have allowed Russian forces to establish only limited operational and strategic reserves. Mashovets stated that on average each Russian operational grouping of forces receives between 1,000 to 1,500 combat personnel as replacements or reinforcements every month and may receive 2,000 if the grouping is responsible for intensified offensive operations.<7> There are six operational Russian grouping of forces operating within and near Ukraine, meaning that Mashovets is suggesting that Russian forces receive a total of 6,000 to 12,000 new combat personnel each month.<8> This figure is not incongruent with Ukrainian and Russian reports from January and April 2024 that Russia recruits 30,000 new personnel per month since a large number of these new personnel will fulfill combat support and combat service support roles or later assume combat arms roles following training.<9> Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on June 7 that Russia has recruited 160,000 new personnel so far in 2024, a figure fairly consistent with reports that the Russian military recruits about 30,000 personnel a month.<10> Russian forces have leveraged their possession of the theater-wide initiative to determine a tempo of fighting in Ukraine in recent months that appears to generate casualties roughly equal to or slightly less than the rate of newly generated forces.<11> This careful balance between Russian casualties and newly generated forces requires that Russian forces not significantly intensify offensive operations for a prolonged period of time, however. This balance becomes even more narrow when considering losses and new force generation for just Russian combat personnel.<12> ISW has observed a "pulsing" of Russian offensive operations along the front in recent months, wherein Russian forces alternate between intensified assaults and a lower operational tempo to replenish losses.<13> The availability of new combat personnel is likely one of several determining factors for when Russian forces decide to alternate between intensified offensive operations.

Mashovets stated that Russian forces have accumulated at most 60,000 personnel in operational and strategic reserves over the past six to eight months (roughly from October 2023 to June 2024).<14> Russian forces have likely not properly trained or equipped these reserves, which they have previously used largely as manpower pools for restaffing and reinforcing committed units conducting grinding, infantry-heavy assaults with occasional limited mechanized assaults.<15> ISW continues to assess that planned Russian operational- and strategic-level reserves are unlikely to be ready to act as a first-echelon penetration force or as a second-echelon exploitation force capable of conducting effective large-scale combined arms assaults.<16> These reported limited operational- and strategic-level Russian reserves likely will be insufficient to support simultaneous large-scale offensive efforts in several directions. The Russian military command will likely have to choose one main effort during its expected summer offensive effort, if it intends for these reserves to sustain a large-scale offensive operation.

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian military airfield in the North Ossetia-Alania Republic on the night of June 7 to 8. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on June 8 that its sources in the Ukrainian special services stated that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted a drone strike against an airfield in North Ossetia on the night of June 7 to 8.<17> Geolocated footage published on June 8 shows a drone targeting the Mozdok Airbase followed by a rising smoke plume.<18> North Ossetia-Alania Republic Head Sergei Menyaylo claimed that Russian forces shot down three drones targeting a military airfield in Mozdok and that unspecified objects sustained minor damage and caught fire.<19> The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed a drone over the North Ossetia-Alania Republic on the morning of June 8.<20> A Russian milblogger amplified footage of Russian forces reportedly shooting down a drone near oil infrastructure in Nogai Raion, Republic of Dagestan, but ISW has not observed further evidence of Ukrainian drone strikes in the area.<21> One Russian milblogger, however, claimed that a number of sources "erroneously" reported the strike near the Mozdok airfield as a strike against the oil field in Nogai Raion.<22>

Russian strikes have caused widespread damage to Ukraine's energy grid, and Ukraine will continue to face serious constraints on power generation capacity. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on June 7 that only 27 percent of large Ukrainian thermal power plants (TPPs) are operational and that Russian missile and drone strikes damaged or destroyed the other 73 percent.<23> Shmyhal stated that recent Russian strikes have knocked out 9.2 gigawatts of Ukrainian generation capacity and stated that this is half of the generation capacity that Ukraine used in Winter 2023-2024.<24> The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 5 that Russia has knocked out or captured over half of Ukraine's generation capacity, bringing Ukrainian energy production to below 20 gigawatts from 55 gigawatts before the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.<25> Shmyhal stated that Russian forces have destroyed 42 power generators and damaged 20 hydropower generators at Ukrainian energy generation facilities.<26> Shmyhal emphasized that Ukraine is taking steps to relieve pressure on Ukraine's energy grid and plans to restore as much energy generation capacity as possible before Winter 2024-2025.<27> Ukraine’s nuclear operator Energoatom stated on June 7 that it connected an additional reactor at an unspecified nuclear power plant to the energy grid.<28> The head of Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo, Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, stated that this will relieve Ukrainian power constraints for the next two weeks before increased summer consumption begins.<29> Shmyhal stated that Ukraine is currently importing 1.7 gigawatts from the European Union (EU) but that the EU is able to export a maximum of 2.2 gigawatts to Ukraine.<30>

US President Joe Biden met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris on June 7. Biden and Zelensky discussed the battlefield situation, Ukraine's defensive capabilities, preparations to finalize a US-Ukraine bilateral security agreement, and the upcoming Ukraine peace conference in Switzerland.<31> Biden apologized for the delay in US security assistance to Ukraine and reiterated US support for Ukraine against Russian aggression.<32> Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine needs more security assistance to strengthen its defense of Kharkiv Oblast and that Ukraine needs more opportunities to strike military targets in Russia to protect against Russian aggression from across the international border.<33> ISW continues to assess that the delays in US security assistance to Ukraine have severely constrained Ukrainian defensive capabilities in recent months and emboldened Russian forces to launch and make tactically significant gains in their new offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast and double down on operations elsewhere in the theater.<34>

Longtime Russian Central Bank Head Elvira Nabiullina is reportedly a balancing force among Russian President Vladimir Putin's economic advisors despite pressure for Russian officials to unequivocally support the long-term war effort in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on June 7 that former Russian Service for Financial Markets Head and former Central Bank Deputy Head Oleg Vyugin stated that Nabiullina has known Putin for years and has the "exclusive right" to tell Putin "what he doesn't like" because Putin views her as straightforward and uninfluenced by corruption.<35> Bloomberg reported that Nabiullina balances against Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, who advocates for Russia to shape its budget to ensure a victorious Russian war effort, and former economic aid and new Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Maxim Oreshkin, who portrays the Russian war as a global conflict against the West. Bloomberg cited a senior government official who stated that Nabiullina is raising concerns about the impacts of Russian labor shortages caused by the war and a "swollen" budget amid high defense spending. A leaked video published on March 2, 2022, showed Nabiullina speaking about her hyperfocus on the Russian economy after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and concern over greater domestic sacrifices.<36> Bloomberg reported that Putin has begun overruling Nabiullina in some cases but assessed that Putin is unlikely to remove her for the foreseeable future.<37> Bloomberg cited anonymous sources as saying that Putin wants to avoid dismissing personnel in a way that could be viewed as destabilizing or as being done under pressure.

Nabiullina is especially notable because she has previously mitigated the economic fallout of Putin's geopolitical ambitions and reportedly tried to resign from her position in May 2022 in opposition to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.<38> The Economist reported on May 31 that Nabiullina ensured the stability of the ruble after Putin's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and that in 2022 she feared that her resignation would lead to the arrests of her deputies at the Central Bank.<39> The Economist reported that Nabiullina has largely favored regulatory market reforms but that she learned early in her career in the late 1990s and early 2000s that the Russian economy can only take so much change. The Economist noted that she has navigated accordingly as she gained power under Putin, implementing some regulatory changes within the existing Russian economic system, and has shifted her focus to minimize the economic impact of the war in Ukraine on the Russian public since February 2022. Nabiullina's reported ability to speak candidly to Putin about the impact of the war on the Russian economy is especially significant given Putin's recent efforts to oust any officials who have lost Putin's favor or otherwise perceived as disloyal to Putin and his war effort.<40> Putin has recently been preoccupied with assuaging domestic concerns about Russia's economy and has attempted to portray Russia's economic issues positively, and he may be more willing to tolerate Nabiullina's candor or even appreciate her honesty given her track record for stability.<41>

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Russian opposition outlets reported that unspecified actors attempted to assassinate the former Russian occupation mayor of Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, Hennadiy Matsehora in Stary Oskol, Belgorod Oblast on June 7.<42> The GUR stated that Matsehora is in critical condition at a hospital in Moscow.<43> The Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on May 20 that Matsehora, who was originally lawfully elected as Mayor of Kupyansk in 2020, defected and helped Russian forces in February 2022 and that Ukrainian authorities will try Mateshora in absentia for treason.<44>

Key Takeaways:

The Russian military command is reportedly transferring an unspecified number of forces to the Ukrainian-Russian border area near Kharkiv Oblast, but it is unclear if the Russian military command plans to immediately commit these redeployed forces to combat or use them to reinforce the Northern Grouping of Forces to bring it closer to its reported planned end strength.
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted on June 8 that a fraction of the reported 30,000 personnel that Russia generates each month arrives at the front as combat force replacements and reinforcements and that Russian force generation efforts have allowed Russian forces to establish only limited operational and strategic reserves.
Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian military airfield in the North Ossetia-Alania Republic on the night of June 7 to 8.
Russian strikes have caused widespread damage to Ukraine's energy grid, and Ukraine will continue to face serious constraints on power generation capacity.
US President Joe Biden met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris on June 7.
Longtime Russian Central Bank Head Elvira Nabiullina is reportedly a balancing force among Russian President Vladimir Putin's economic advisors despite pressure for Russian officials to unequivocally support the long-term war effort in Ukraine.
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Russian opposition outlets reported that unspecified actors attempted to assassinate the former Russian occupation mayor of Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, Hennadiy Matsehora in Stary Oskol, Belgorod Oblast on June 7.
Russian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City, southeast of Kupyansk, within easternmost Chasiv Yar, northwest of Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City.
Russian actors are using video appeals from Russian servicemen to refute reports of high Russian losses in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

  

Beitrag dem Admin melden | Urheberrechtsverletzung melden

The Biden Administration’s limited policy change permitting Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike some Russian military targets in a small area within Russian territory has reduced the size of Russia’s ground sanctuary by only 16 percent at maximum. US policy still preserves at least 84 percent of Russia's ground sanctuary – territory within range of Ukrainian ATACMS. US policy restricting Ukraine’s usage of US-provided weapons has effectively created a vast sanctuary – territory in range of US-provided weapons but that Ukrainian forces are not allowed to strike with US-provided weapons – which Russia exploits to shield its combat forces, command and control, logistics, and rear area support services that the Russian military uses to conduct its military operations in Ukraine.<1> US policy still protects the vast majority of Russia’s operational rear and deep rear, and US policy forbids Ukraine from using ATACMS anywhere in Russia.<2> US President Joe Biden’s limited policy change in late May 2024 regarding the use of US-provided weapons against military targets in Russia removed a maximum of 16 percent of Russia's ground sanctuary, assuming that Ukrainian forces can strike all legitimate Russian military targets in range of Ukrainian HIMARS using GMLRS in Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts. It is far from clear that Ukrainian forces have permission to do so, however. Senior US officials have described Ukraine’s ability to strike into Russia with GMLRS as being for counterbattery fire and geographically bounded to the Kharkiv area, and have stated that Ukrainian forces may strike Russian military objects “deployed just across the border,” suggesting that Ukraine may be prohibited from striking Russian military targets further in the rear or in other areas in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts that are still in range of GMLRS.<3> US officials’ statements also indicate that Ukrainian forces may be constrained from striking Russian military targets that are not actively involved in ground attacks and strikes against Ukraine.<4> The reduction of the sanctuary space’s area may be less than 16 percent, therefore.

Key Takeaways:

The Biden Administration’s limited policy change permitting Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike some Russian military targets in a small area within Russian territory has reduced the size of Russia’s ground sanctuary by only 16 percent at maximum. US policy still preserves at least 84 percent of Russia's ground sanctuary – territory within range of Ukrainian ATACMS.
Likely Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Su-57 fighter aircraft at the Akhtubinsk Airfield in Astrakhan Oblast between June 7 and 8.
Ukrainian forces may have struck a Russian large landing ship or patrol boat in Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of June 8 to 9.
The Kremlin's concerted effort to remove and arrest senior Russian defense officials may be extending to civilian regional administration officials.
The pro-Kremlin Moldovan Victory opposition electoral bloc held its second congress in Moscow on June 9 following a series of meetings between pro-Kremlin Moldovan opposition politicians and Russian officials from June 6 to 9.
Former pro-Russian Moldovan president and current head of the Moldovan Socialist Party Igor Dodon gave interviews to Russian state news agencies TASS and RIA Novosti on June 9 in which he promoted several known Kremlin narratives targeting the current Moldovan government – many of which Moldovan opposition politicians also promoted at the Victory bloc congress.
The Kremlin will likely try to exploit its ties to Dodon as part of its wider efforts to destabilize Moldovan democracy and influence the Moldovan government.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.
Russian officials continue efforts to coerce migrants into military service.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june- 9-2024

  

Beitrag dem Admin melden | Urheberrechtsverletzung melden

Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against Russian air defense assets in occupied Crimea overnight on June 9 to 10, likely with ATACMS. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-400 air defense battery near occupied Dzhankoi and two S-300 batteries near occupied Chornomorske and Yevpatoria.<1> The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian strikes hit the radar stations of each battery and caused secondary ammunition detonations and that Russian air defenses did not intercept any of the Ukrainian missiles. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces launched at least 10 ATACMS missiles and that each targeted air defense installation was an element of the Russian 31st Air Defense Division (4th Guards Air Force and Air Defense Army, Southern Military District and Russian Aerospace Forces ).<2> Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted multiple Ukrainian ATACMS missiles overnight but largely did not report that any of the missiles hit their targets, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has not commented on the strikes as of the time of this publication.<3> ISW has not observed visual confirmation of the extent of damages from the Ukrainian strikes. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Schemes project published satellite imagery of burn marks at a Russian military object near a railway junction in Dzhankoi but noted that the imagery’s resolution is too low to determine specific damage.<4> A Russian milblogger who focuses on Russian air and air defense and has been largely critical of the Russian MoD criticized the Russian MoD in response to the strikes, claiming that Russian officers are falsely reporting no losses to their superiors despite actually suffering heavy losses.<5>

Ukrainian strikes against Russian military and logistics assets in connection to the United States' partial removal of Russian sanctuary in Belgorod Oblast may have compelled Russian forces to change their deployment and transport patterns. The Crimea-based Atesh Ukrainian partisan movement reported on June 10 that Russian forces recently redeployed air defense systems from occupied Crimea to Belgorod Oblast and that Russian air defenses are not completely covering Crimea as a result.<6> Footage dated June 8 shows that Russia has begun transporting fuel across the Kerch Strait across the railway bridge.<7> Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on April 29 that Russian authorities have not transported fuel across the Kerch Strait railway bridge since March 2024 due to the threat of a Ukrainian strike against the bridge as a fuel transport crossed, which could ignite and possibly destroy the bridge.<8> Ukrainian military–focused news outlet Militarnyi assessed on June 10 that Ukrainian strikes against railway barges across the Kerch Strait on May 30 prompted Russian authorities to begin transporting fuel across the railway bridge again.<9> It is unclear whether Russian authorities will continue to use the Kerch Strait railway bridge for fuel and logistics transport to occupied Crimea in the near to medium term. Doing so would likely alleviate some logistics constraints as Russia struggles to compensate for lost ferries across the strait but would leave the Kerch Strait bridge increasingly vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes, particularly if Russian air defense coverage of Crimea is degraded as Atesh reported.

Ukraine's Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk denied on June 10 a Sky News report that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Ropucha-class landing ship in the Sea of Azov on the night of June 8 to 9.<10> Pletenchuk also stated that there are three large Russian amphibious assault ships and three Buyan-M-class corvettes in the Sea of Azov as of May 10.<11> Sky News reported on June 9, citing a Ukrainian military source, that Ukrainian forces sunk or damaged a Russian Ropucha-class landing ship that Russian forces had recently moved from the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov, which ISW amplified.<12>

New Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with a select group of Russian milbloggers and military commentators on June 10, suggesting that the Kremlin seeks to partially use Belousov's replacement of widely unpopular former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to build bridges and cultivate ties with a broader milblogger community via a cadre of coopted and loyal military commentators. Russian state news agencies TASS and RIA Novosti reported on June 10 that Belousov met with several military correspondents (also known as voyenkory or milbloggers) covering the war in Ukraine and claimed that the conversation was "frank and constructive."<13> TASS and RIA noted that Belousov hopes to hold such meetings regularly. Russian insider sources and milbloggers claimed in late May and early June that Belousov was planning to meet with select milbloggers, and some of the more critical milbloggers criticized Belousov for reportedly not inviting them to the meeting.<14> Russian media confirmed on June 10 that several prominent and generally Kremlin-aligned milbloggers attended Belousov's meeting, including head of the WarGonzo social media military project Semyon Pegov, Komsomolskaya Pravda military correspondent and Kremlin-appointed member of the Human Rights Council Alexander Kots; Zvezda military correspondent Anatoly Brodkin; Russia Today (RT) military correspondent Murad Gazdiev, Readovka correspondent Maxim Dolgov, and others.<15> Gazdiev claimed on his personal Telegram channel on June 10 that the milbloggers delivered good and bad news from the front to Belousov and promised unspecified "huge changes."<16>

The Kremlin likely attempted to falsely portray Belousov as more attentive to milbloggers' criticisms than his predecessor in an effort to co-opt a larger non-Kremlin affiliated milblogger community. The Kremlin and Shoigu previously appeared at odds over milblogger reproachment—Russian President Vladimir Putin met with select milbloggers in July 2022 and June 2023 to discuss the situation on the frontline in Ukraine, while the Russian MoD continuously tried to crack down against critical milbloggers, who often used Shoigu as an informational scapegoat for Russian operational failures in Ukraine.<17> The Kremlin has long endeavored to coopt milbloggers, especially those critical of the Russian military leadership, in an effort to control the information space, as ISW previously assessed.<18> Belousov's meeting represents MoD outreach to several milbloggers who have had the Kremlin's favor for some time now and likely intended to court this group of commentators and ensure their continued loyalty to a new MoD under Belousov. Belousov's milblogger outreach is more likely to be a performative attempt to secure their loyalty than introduce systemic changes within the Russian MoD, as several Russian milbloggers who were not invited to the meeting previously noted.<19> Both the Kremlin and the Russian MoD have a vested interest in appearing open to dialogue with milbloggers, who represent a major pro-war constituency, and the Kremlin is likely aiming to portray Belousov as more cognizant of this fact than his predecessor.

Officials from Russia, Iran, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) held bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the BRICS foreign ministers meeting in Nizhny Novgorod on June 10. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke at the BRICS meeting and highlighted the organization's recent expansion.<20> Lavrov reiterated standard Kremlin narratives about how the Western rules-based order is detrimental to other states and about the supposed merits of the creation of a multipolar world. Lavrov claimed that the "winds of change" are driving BRICS forward. Lavrov met with officials from Brazil, South Africa, Ethiopia, Laos, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt during the BRICS event as well.<21>

Lavrov met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the BRICS meeting on June 10. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Chinese MFA both stated that Lavrov and Wang discussed diplomatic coordination in international organizations such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).<22> The Chinese MFA stated that developing Russo-Chinese relations are a "strategic choice" by both parties and that Lavrov and Wang "exchanged views" on the war in Ukrainian war."<23> The Russian MFA labeled the Russo-Chinese relationship as a "strategic partnership" and stated that Lavrov thanked Wang for the PRC's "balanced" line on the war in Ukraine and for not sending a representative to the June 15-16 Ukrainian peace summit in Switzerland.<24> The Russian MFA also stated that Lavrov and Wang discussed stability in the Asia-Pacific region, where they accused the US of allegedly creating anti-Russian and anti-Chinese military-political structures.<25> Lavrov also met with acting Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani on June 10 and discussed efforts to form a Russo-Iranian "strategic partnership" and create a new comprehensive intergovernmental agreement.<26> Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Kani stated that Iran "sees enormous potential for expanding and strengthening interaction."<27> Kani and Wang also met on June 10 and reportedly discussed increasing cooperation.<28> Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on June 9 that Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit North Korea, and an unspecified diplomatic source reportedly stated that the visit will occur in the coming weeks after Putin visits Vietnam.<29> ISW continues to assess that Russia, the PRC, Iran, North Korea, and Belarus are deepening their multilateral partnerships in order to confront the West.<30>

The Armenian National Assembly will likely hold an emergency session by June 17 during which the Armenian opposition parties will demand Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's and his cabinet's resignation. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Armenian Service Radio Azatutyun reported on June 10 that 33 members of the Armenian opposition factions "Armenian Alliance" and "I Have Honor" supported convening an emergency session of the National Assembly to discuss passing a resolution calling for Pashinyan's and his cabinet's resignation and the formation of a new government.<31> The opposition factions blame Pashinyan for what they see as failures to defend and secure the territorial integrity and borders of Armenia.<32> Radio Azatutyun noted that Armenian law stipulates that the National Assembly needs the support of 27 members of the 107-seat National Assembly to call an emergency session.<33> Pashinyan's Civil Contract Party's National Assembly leader Hayk Konjoryan stated that Civil Contract National Assembly members will not participate in the June 17 emergency session.<34>

The US Department of State announced on June 10 that the US and Poland jointly launched the Ukraine Communications Group (UCG) in Warsaw to counter Russian disinformation by offering fact-based reporting about the war in Ukraine.<35> Representatives of unspecified countries will reportedly collaborate with the UCG. The US Department of State emphasized that Russia often uses false narratives to obfuscate its war aims and try to fracture worldwide solidarity with Ukraine.

Finnish authorities reported that a Russian military aircraft temporarily violated Finnish airspace on June 10 amid continued Russian efforts to undermine Finnish sovereignty. The Finnish Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that it is investigating an incident in which an unspecified Russian military aircraft flew roughly 2.5 kilometers deep into Finnish airspace over the Gulf of Finland for two minutes on the morning of June 10.<36> The Russian MoD has not responded to the Finnish report as of this publication but claimed on June 10 that Russian Tu-95MS missile carriers and Tu-22M3 bombers conducted flights over neutral waters of the Baltic, Barents, and Norwegian seas.<37> This reported incursion likely forwards the ongoing Kremlin effort to undermine Finnish sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Russian MoD proposed on May 21 that the Russian government should reassess Russia's maritime borders in the Gulf of Finland, which some Western officials have warned may be part of an effort to revise maritime zones in the Baltic Sea.<38> The Kremlin has also been running a number of information operations aimed at portraying Finland as an enemy to Russia and Russians, ultimately setting information conditions to justify potential future aggression against Finland.<39>

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against Russian air defense assets in occupied Crimea overnight on June 9 to 10, likely with ATACMS.
Ukraine's Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk denied on June 10 a Sky News report that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Ropucha-class landing ship in the Sea of Azov on the night of June 8 to 9.
New Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with a select group of Russian milbloggers and military commentators on June 10, suggesting that the Kremlin seeks to partially use Belousov's replacement of widely unpopular former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to build bridges and cultivate ties with a broader milblogger community via a cadre of coopted and loyal military commentators.
Officials from Russia, Iran, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) held bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the BRICS foreign ministers meeting in Nizhny Novgorod on June 10.
The Armenian National Assembly will likely hold an emergency session by June 17 during which the Armenian opposition parties will demand Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's and his cabinet's resignation.
The US Department of State announced on June 10 that the US and Poland jointly launched the Ukraine Communications Group (UCG) in Warsaw to counter Russian disinformation by offering fact-based reporting about the war in Ukraine.
Finnish authorities reported that a Russian military aircraft temporarily violated Finnish airspace on June 10 amid continued Russian efforts to undermine Finnish sovereignty.
Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov appears to be focusing on healthcare programs for Russian servicemembers in his new role.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june- 10-2024

  

Beitrag dem Admin melden | Urheberrechtsverletzung melden

Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide monetary and military assistance to Ukraine, including air defense systems. The Estonian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 11 that Estonia will provide an undisclosed number of Mistral man-portable short-range air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine as part of a new military assistance package.<1> European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced during the Ukrainian Recovery Conference in Berlin on June 11 that the European Union (EU) will transfer roughly 1.5 billion euros ($1.6 billion) worth of profits from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine in July, of which Ukraine will allocate 90 percent to defense spending and 10 percent to reconstruction.<2> Von der Leyen stated that the EU will also transfer an additional 1.9 billion euros ($2 billion) to Ukraine from the EU's Ukraine Facility mechanism, which is a separate fund that provides for the EU to transfer up to 50 billion euros ($53.7 billion) to Ukraine between 2024 and 2027.<3> German Chancellor Olaf Scholz reiterated during the Ukrainian Recovery Conference that Germany will deliver a Patriot air defense system to Ukraine in the coming weeks and announced that Germany will also deliver an IRIS-T air defense system, an unspecified number of Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, and an unspecified number and type of missiles and ammunition to Ukraine in the coming weeks and months.<4> The German MoD initially announced the transfer of this third Patriot system in April 2024.<5> The New York Times, citing senior US administration and military officials, reported on June 11 that US President Joe Biden recently approved the transfer of another Patriot system to Ukraine following a series of high-level meetings and internal debates regarding the best ways to meet Ukraine's need for additional air defenses.<6> Unnamed US officials stated that the new system could be deployed to the frontline within several days depending on any maintenance or modifications that the system may need, as the system is currently stationed in Poland.

The Kremlin continues efforts to codify legal instruments and repressive measures intended to broadly censor foreigners and foreign organizations in Russia. The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading on June 11 that seeks to codify the Russian government's ability to recognize "any" foreign organization as "undesirable."<7> The Duma first approved the draft version of this bill on May 27.<8> The Duma also adopted an additional bill in its first reading that introduces criminal penalties including fines and imprisonment for someone's participation in "any" organization classified as "undesirable."<9> Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin noted that this new bill will fill a gap in the existing legislation, which only has provisions to class foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as "undesirable."<10> The new bill will extend the undesirable classification to any foreign and international organizations, thereby broadening the Kremlin's discretion to target and censor a wide range of foreign organizations operating within Russia. The Kremlin has previously used the "undesirable" designation to block opposition media outlets, civil society organizations, and human rights-focused organizations from entering or operating within Russia, as ISW has previously reported.<11> Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner for Human Rights Tatiana Moskalkova also notably called on June 11 for the establishment of a legal mechanism that would allow the Russian government to prosecute foreigners for "Russophobia as a manifestation of extremism."<12> Russian authorities widely use accusations of "Russophobia" in an attempt to undermine any undesirable policy or rhetoric they deem to be "anti-Russian," and have similarly used charges of extremism with broad discretion to suppress and discourage domestic opposition.<13>

A prominent Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger channel announced that it opened a second "media school" in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, likely to support Kremlin efforts to expand its influence in the international information space, particularly in Central Asia. The Rybar Telegram channel claimed on June 11 that it is opening the "Rybar Media School" in Bishkek because Kyrgyzstan lacks military-political and industry expertise as well as a "blogosphere" and opinion journalism.<14> Rybar framed its establishment of a "media school" in Bishkek as an effort to coordinate and assert Russia's position in Central Asia and warned that Russia could be "expelled" from Central Asia in three to five years if Russia fails to assert itself and manage its informational influence in the region. Rybar's founder and manager Mikhail Zvinchuk gave a lecture to students at the Kyrgyz National University about the benefits of using Telegram to "solve problems" in the current information environment. Rybar claimed that Zvinchuk's lecture was only the first in a series of lectures and trainings for Kyrgyz media workers, students, public relations professionals, and press services to learn how to use multimedia to develop local Kyrgyz journalism. Rybar claimed that journalists from the Kyrgyz-branch of the official Russian government outlet Rossiyskaya Gazeta, "complained" about the lack of Russian journalistic work in Central Asia and claimed that the West outbalances Russia in its support for Kyrgyz journalism. Zvinchuk gave a masterclass in December 2023 on the importance of Telegram and other social media to press heads at Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec likely in an effort to normalize the war without directly involving the Kremlin or other official state bodies. Rybar announced that it opened a media school in an unspecified location in the Balkans in April 2024.<15> Rybar claimed that multiple Serbian and Republika Srpska (the Serbian entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) outlets highlighted Rybar's "debut" in the Balkans, while notably no Kyrgyz Russian- or Kyrgyz-language news outlets reported on the new "media school" in Bishkek as of this publication.<16> Rybar will likely attempt to expand its media influence in other foreign countries, and the Kremlin will likely seek to use coopted milbloggers like Rybar to expand Russian influence in international media.

Danish authorities arrested a Danish-Russian dual citizen accused of having connections to Russian intelligence services, which is likely part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to re-intensify its hybrid campaign against Western countries. The Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR) reported on June 11 that Danish authorities arrested an unidentified woman with dual Danish-Russian citizenship related to a recent investigation into the woman's connections to Russian foreign intelligence.<17> DR reported on June 3, citing leaked documents from Western intelligence services, that the women's legal aid clinic for Russian speakers received at least 338,000 Danish kroner (about $49,000) from the Russian Fund for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (Pravfond), which DR describes as closely linked to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).<18> The Guardian, which saw the same leaked documents, reported that Pravfond's leadership has multiple Russian intelligence agents, including longtime SVR officers Vladimir Pozdorovkin and Anatoly Sorokin.<19> The Guardian reported that Pravfond operates throughout Europe and that Pozdorovkin specifically oversees Pravfond's operations in Nordic and Baltic countries while Sorokin oversees operations in the Middle East, Moldova, and Transnistria.<20> DR reported and that the woman is a "central figure" in Denmark's Russian-speaking community and noted she has traveled to Russia and elsewhere for conferences with Pravfond participation or sponsorship.<21> The Kremlin has recently intensified its hybrid campaigns in Europe, and the Kremlin has been leaning into a narrative about protecting Russians and Russian-speakers outside of Russia — often called "compatriots abroad" — as part of its wider toolkit of hybrid manipulations.<22> The "compatriots abroad" narrative sets informational conditions for the Kremlin to justify hybrid operations or even direct interference against countries it claims do not adequately protect so-called Russian "compatriots" should these countries take actions unfavorable to the Kremlin. DR noted that several European intelligence sources stated that the Kremlin aims to use counseling and assistance centers — of which Pravfond funds at least 34 in 21 countries — to justify direct interference in other countries.<23>

Kremlin newswire TASS reported on June 11 that the former Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Military Academy, Grigory Molchanov, was appointed Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council.<24> Russian outlet RBK stated that Molchanov has served in the Russian military since 1973 and noted that the Security Council's first new appointment since former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu became Security Council Secretary on May 13.<25> Russian outlet RTVI noted that there are currently eight deputy secretaries and one first deputy secretary in addition to Shoigu.<26>

Key Takeaways:

Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide monetary and military assistance to Ukraine, including air defense systems.
The Kremlin continues efforts to codify legal instruments and repressive measures intended to broadly censor foreigners and foreign organizations in Russia.
A prominent Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger channel announced that it opened a second "media school" in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, likely to support Kremlin efforts to expand its influence in the international information space, particularly in Central Asia.
Danish authorities arrested a Danish-Russian dual citizen accused of having connections to Russian intelligence services, which is likely part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to re-intensify its hybrid campaign against Western countries.
Kremlin newswire TASS reported on June 11 that the former Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Military Academy, Grigory Molchanov, was appointed Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council.
Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk and northwest of Avdiivka.
Russia may have suffered a damaged or destroyed military naval vessel in the Barents Sea.
Belarusian officials continue to implicate themselves in the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Belarus and their re-education in Belarusian programs.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june- 11-2024

  

Beitrag dem Admin melden | Urheberrechtsverletzung melden

Krieg Rußland - Ukraine [Alle anzeigen] , Rang: Warren Buffett(3422), 09.5.24 08:42
 
Subject Auszeichnungen Author Message Date ID
RE: Krieg Rußland - Ukraine
09.5.24 08:45
1
ISW - Russian forces conducted large-scale missile and ...
09.5.24 08:53
2
ISW - Putin used his May 9 Victory Day speech to relit...
10.5.24 08:11
3
      RE: ISW - Putin used his May 9 Victory Day speech to r...
10.5.24 20:52
4
      ISW - Russian forces began an offensive operation along...
11.5.24 09:26
5
      ISW - Russian forces are conducting relatively limited ...
12.5.24 12:04
6
      ISW - Putin replaced Sergei Shoigu
13.5.24 08:10
7
      ISW - Putin's Safe Space: Defeating Russia's Kharkiv Op...
13.5.24 19:30
8
      ISW - Russian forces continued to make tactically signi...
14.5.24 10:41
9
      ISW - The pace of Russian offensive operations in north...
15.5.24 07:53
10
      ISW - The tempo of Russian offensive operations in nort...
16.5.24 11:39
11
      ISW - Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian force...
17.5.24 08:16
12
      ISW - Ptin framed Russian offensive operations in north...
18.5.24 10:05
13
      ISW - ussian forces have recently intensified their eff...
19.5.24 09:19
14
      ISW - Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful ...
20.5.24 09:37
15
      ISW - Russian forces are concentrating limited, underst...
21.5.24 10:04
16
      ISW - he Kremlin continues to time its nuclear saber-ra...
22.5.24 07:57
17
      ISW - The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed on...
23.5.24 08:31
18
      ISW - From the Ukrainian Counteroffensive to Kharkiv
23.5.24 17:01
19
      ISW - The Kremlin is pursuing a concerted effort to rem...
24.5.24 08:42
20
      ISW - estern media continues to report that Russian Pre...
25.5.24 11:20
21
      ISW - Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukraini...
26.5.24 09:59
22
      ISW - Russian forces are reportedly concentrating force...
27.5.24 09:14
23
      ISW - The NATO Parliamentary Assembly called on member ...
28.5.24 07:42
24
      ISW - Putin grossly misrepresented the Ukrainian Const...
29.5.24 07:52
25
      ISW - US-provided military aid has started arriving on...
30.5.24 09:16
26
      ISW - Zelensky met with US and Singaporean officials
03.6.24 08:01
27
     ISW - Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-300/400 air ...
04.6.24 09:42
28
      ISW - Russian military commentators continue to compla...
05.6.24 08:24
29
      ISW - US officials continue to attempt to clarify US po...
06.6.24 09:54
30
      ISW - Putin sought to repackage long-standing, tired th...
07.6.24 08:26
31
      ISW - Putin articulated a theory of victory in Ukraine
08.6.24 11:37
32
      ISW - Russian military command is reportedly transferri...
09.6.24 07:20
33
      ISW - size of Russia’s ground sanctuary by only 16 per...
10.6.24 11:18
34
      ISW - Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against Russ...
11.6.24 09:24
35
      ISW - Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide mon...
12.6.24 08:13
36
      ISW - Ukrainian forces may be conducting an effort ai...
13.6.24 09:47
37
      ISW - outlined his uncompromising demands for Ukraine...
15.6.24 10:59
38
      ISW - Putin’s June 14 information operation about Russi...
16.6.24 15:05
39
      ISW - Global Peace Summit in Switzerland
17.6.24 08:02
40
      ISW - Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un signe...
20.6.24 08:38
41
      ISW - Putin launched a major information operation duri...
21.6.24 08:19
42
      ISW - Putin continues to invoke nuclear threats
22.6.24 10:17
43
      ISW - US policy continues to prohibit Ukrainian forces...
23.6.24 08:54
44
      ISW - Islamic State (IS)'s Northern Caucasus branch, W...
24.6.24 07:47
45
      ISW - Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate ...
25.6.24 09:19
46
      ISW - confirming Russia's long-term perpetration of war...
26.6.24 07:55
47
      ISW - Islamic State (IS) affiliate Wilayat Kavkaz terro...
27.6.24 09:00
48
      ISW - Russian forces have sustained the tempo of their ...
28.6.24 08:24
49
      ISW - Putin directed on June 28 the production and depl...
29.6.24 11:38
50
      ISW - addressing religious extremism in Russia
30.6.24 12:53
51
      ISW - Putin's theory of victory that Russia will be abl...
01.7.24 08:01
52
      RE: ISW - Russian mistreatment of wounded and disabled ...
02.7.24 09:07
53
      ISW - he interplay between ongoing Russian offensive op...
03.7.24 07:41
54
      ISW - Ukraine is addressing its manpower challenges and...
04.7.24 09:17
55
      ISW - Putin explicitly rejected Russian participation i...
05.7.24 07:43
56
      ISW - Putin used a meeting with Hungarian Prime Ministe...
06.7.24 09:40
57
      ISW - Viktor Orban continues to posture himself as a po...
07.7.24 09:54
58
      ISW - Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against...
08.7.24 07:53
59
      ISW - A Russian Kh-101 cruise missile hit the Okhmatdyt...
09.7.24 09:00
60
      ISW - Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is...
10.7.24 07:59
61
      ISW - Western security assistance will be crucial for ...
11.7.24 09:44
62
      ISW - Russian authorities reportedly attempted to assa...
12.7.24 07:41
63
      ISW - Ukrainian forces will continue to be on the defe...
13.7.24 09:31
64
      ISW - Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reportedly cond...
14.7.24 09:35
65
      ATTENTAT BEI AUFTRITT
14.7.24 11:59
66
      RE: ATTENTAT BEI AUFTRITT
14.7.24 12:10
67
      ISW - Russian officials and milbloggers reiterated com...
15.7.24 07:52
68
      ISW - Ukrainian drone strikes deep within Russia conti...
17.7.24 08:00
69
      ISW - Russian state news outlets editorialized comment...
18.7.24 09:13
70
      ISW - Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian coa...
19.7.24 08:22
71
      ISW - Zelensky reiterated the importance of developing...
20.7.24 10:13
72
      ISW - Zelensky spoke with former US President and Repu...
21.7.24 09:06
73
      ISW - Volodin recently visited Nicaragua and Cuba
22.7.24 08:22
74
      ISW - Russia and North Korea are pursuing increased coo...
23.7.24 08:52
75
      ISW - Duma proposed an amendment that would allow comma...
24.7.24 08:43
76
      ISW - General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that the Russian...
25.7.24 08:21
77
      ISW - Ukrainian forces blunted one of the largest Russi...
26.7.24 07:51
78
      ISW - Russian military has recently expanded the Russia...
27.7.24 09:42
79
      ISW - Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful ...
28.7.24 10:04
80
      ISW - Putin continues to use nuclear saber-rattling to ...
29.7.24 09:14
81
      ISW - The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on J...
30.7.24 08:54
82
      ISW - Russian forces conducted five platoon- to battali...
31.7.24 08:02
83
      ISW - Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that ...
01.8.24 09:17
84
      ISW - Russian forces continue to make slow, steady adv...
02.8.24 08:33
85
      ISW - Russia is pursuing an effort to force Ukraine to...
03.8.24 10:20
86
      ISW - krainian forces reportedly struck four Russian S...
04.8.24 07:31
87
      ISW - krainian forces reportedly conducted drone strik...
05.8.24 08:03
88
      ISW - Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces co...
07.8.24 09:24
89
      ISW - Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advances up...
08.8.24 08:58
90
      RE: ISW - Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advance...
08.8.24 09:02
91
      RE: ISW - Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advance...
08.8.24 10:14
92
      RE: ISW - Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advance...
08.8.24 10:23
93
      RE: ISW - Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advance...
08.8.24 10:49
94
      RE: ISW - Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advance...
08.8.24 11:00
95
      ISW - Russian sources claimed on August 9 that Ukraini...
10.8.24 11:19
96
      ISW -
11.8.24 10:12
97
      ISW - Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast has allowed ...
12.8.24 08:17
98
      RE: ISW - Ukraine's operation in Kursk Oblast has allo...
13.8.24 08:16
99
      ISW - Ukrainian cross-border mechanized offensive oper...
09.8.24 08:36
100
      ISW - Zelensky and other senior Ukrainian officials pr...
14.8.24 09:22
101
      ISW - Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian force...
15.8.24 09:31
102
      ISW - Russia has vulnerabilities that the West has sim...
15.8.24 16:02
103
      ISW - Ukrainian officials are taking steps to consolid...
16.8.24 08:26
104
      ISW - Ukrainian forces continued to marginally advance...
17.8.24 10:10
105
      ISW - The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and Ru...
18.8.24 09:18
106
      ISW - Ukrainian forces continued assaults throughout t...
19.8.24 07:34
107
      ISW - Ukrainian forces continued to marginally advance...
20.8.24 10:07
108
      ISW - Ukrainian forces continued attacking throughout ...
21.8.24 09:09
109
      ISW - The Kremlin appears to have launched an intricat...
22.8.24 10:59
110
      ISW - Russian military command recently redeployed elem...
23.8.24 07:49
111
      ISW - Ukrainian forces continued to marginally advance ...
24.8.24 08:06
112
      ISW - Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian mili...
25.8.24 09:55
113
      ISW - Russian forces recently regained lost positions ...
26.8.24 07:47
114
      ISW - Russia conducted one of the largest combined seri...
27.8.24 08:27
115
      ISW - Russian forces have made significant tactical adv...
28.8.24 08:01
116
      ISW - US government is prohibiting the United Kingdom (...
29.8.24 09:13
117
      ISW - ussian forces are currently pursuing two immediat...
30.8.24 07:51
118
      ISW - (EU) member state officials continue to express d...
31.8.24 08:04
119
      ISW - Russian military command may have redeployed limi...
01.9.24 10:40
120
      ISW - Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted the largest...
02.9.24 08:45
121
      ISW - Iran is expected to “imminently” deliver ballisti...
03.9.24 08:54
122
      ISW - Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure and...
04.9.24 08:36
123
      ISW - Russia appears to be relying on several countries...
05.9.24 09:10
124
      ISW - Russian forces have recently intensified their lo...
06.9.24 08:24
125
      ISW - US and European officials reported that Iran deli...
07.9.24 09:36
126
      ISW - Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast is having t...
08.9.24 08:45
127
      ISW - (CIA) William Burns cautioned the West against co...
09.9.24 08:07
128
      ISW - Lavrov attended the Russia–Gulf Cooperation Counc...
10.9.24 08:56
129
      Biden stated on September 10 that the presidential admi...
11.9.24 08:11
130
      ISW: Russian forces began counterattacks along the west...
12.9.24 11:01
131
      ISW: Russian forces continued counterattacking through...
13.9.24 09:02
132
      ISW: The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has repo...
14.9.24 10:12
133
      ISW: Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has prompted...
15.9.24 09:26
134
      ISW: Russia reportedly aims to achieve a decisive victo...
16.9.24 07:37
135
      ISW: Ukraine has taken steps to address its manpower sh...
17.9.24 08:13
136
      ISW: Shoigu arrived in Iran for an unannounced visit on...
18.9.24 07:55
137
      ISW: Ukrainian forces conducted a successful drone stri...
19.9.24 07:56
138
      ISW: Putin reportedly declined a request from the Russi...
20.9.24 07:47
139
      ISW: s (roughly $50 billion) and 35 billion euros (roug...
21.9.24 09:53
140
      ISW: Ukrainian forces conducted another successful dron...
22.9.24 08:51
141
      ISW: Ukraine's September 18 strike against a Russian mi...
23.9.24 08:19
142
      ISW: Zelensky arrived in the United States on September...
24.9.24 09:07
143
      ISW: Russian forces have reached the outskirts of Vuhle...
25.9.24 07:54
144
      ISW: Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to thre...
26.9.24 09:36
145
      ISW: Germany, France, and the US announced several imme...
27.9.24 08:01
146
      ISW: Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced battalion-s...
28.9.24 09:43
147
      ISW: Western officials continue to highlight efforts by...
29.9.24 11:33
148
      ISW: Western countries continue to invest in the growth...
30.9.24 08:38
149
      ISW: The Russian government plans to spend 17 trillion ...
01.10.24 09:22
150
      ISW: Russian forces likely seized Vuhledar as of Octobe...
02.10.24 07:52
151
      ISW: Ukraine continues efforts to expand domestic produ...
03.10.24 08:21
152
      RE: ISW: Ukraine continues efforts to expand domestic p...
04.10.24 07:55
153
      ISW: Ukrainian forces struck a fuel storage facility in...
05.10.24 11:46
154
      ISW: The Russian Government plans to allocate 90 billio...
06.10.24 09:55
155
      ISW: Russian forces have reportedly lost at least five ...
07.10.24 09:14
156
      ISW: Ukrainian forces struck an oil terminal in occupie...
08.10.24 08:43
157
      ISW: Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Shahed drone ...
11.10.24 08:27
158
      ISW: Russian forces intensified their ongoing effort to...
12.10.24 09:54
159
      ISW: Russian forces are reportedly relying on illicitly...
13.10.24 09:29
160
      ISW: Russian forces have recently resumed tactical offe...
14.10.24 08:19
161
      RE: ISW: Russian forces have recently resumed tactical ...
14.10.24 08:20
162
      ISW: ussian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov arrived in...
15.10.24 09:53
163
      ISW: The Kremlin is likely leveraging the recent June 2...
16.10.24 09:06
164
      ISW: Zelensky presented Ukraine's five-part Victory Pla...
17.10.24 08:15
165
      ISW: Russian sources reported on October 16 that unspec...
18.10.24 08:09
166
      ISW: South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) ...
19.10.24 12:01
167
      ISW: Ukrainian drones reportedly struck the
20.10.24 09:17
168
      ISW: Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against t...
21.10.24 08:38
169
      ISW: Moldova's October 20 European Union (EU) referendu...
22.10.24 09:22
170
      ISW: Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strik...
23.10.24 09:26
171
      ISW: The adoption of the Kazan Declaration on the secon...
24.10.24 08:43
172
      ISW: Putin failed to deny the presence of North Korean ...
25.10.24 08:36
173
      ISW: Zelensky warned that Russia will imminently deploy...
26.10.24 13:11
174
      ISW: Bloomberg reported on October 25, citing South Kor...
27.10.24 09:48
175
      RE: ISW: Bloomberg reported on October 25, citing South...gut analysiertgut analysiertgut analysiert
27.10.24 10:06
176
      RE: ISW: Bloomberg reported on October 25, citing South...
27.10.24 14:20
177
      ISW: Russia's economy and war effort is coming under in...
28.10.24 08:12
178
      ISW: South Korean intelligence officials shared evidenc...
29.10.24 09:30
179
      ISW: he rate of Russian advances in Ukraine has increas...
30.10.24 09:35
180
      ISW: North Korean troops are in an unspecified area in ...
31.10.24 08:19
181
      ISW: orth Korea and Russia signed an agreement on Octob...
01.11.24 08:43
182
      ISW: North Korea Joins Russia's War Against Ukraine: Op...
01.11.24 17:17
183
      ISW: Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC M...
02.11.24 08:13
184
      ISW: Ukrainian forces have reportedly struck seven Russ...
03.11.24 09:47
185
      ISW: Incumbent Moldova President Maia Sandu has claimed...
04.11.24 08:21
186
      ISW: Russian and pro-Kremlin actors launched an informa...
05.11.24 07:55
187
      ISW: North Korean forces have likely officially engaged...
06.11.24 09:11
188
      ISW: Putin is attempting to shape US President-elect Do...
08.11.24 08:56
189
      ISW: utin appears to be assuming that US President-elec...
09.11.24 10:27
190
      ISW: Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian naval...
09.11.24 13:42
191
      ISW: Russian forces reportedly lost almost 200 tanks, o...
10.11.24 09:42
192
      ISW: Ukrainian forces struck Russian ammunition warehou...
11.11.24 07:57
193
      ISW: Russian forces are successfully leveraging their r...
12.11.24 07:45
194
      ISW: Russian forces recently advanced during two compan...
13.11.24 08:46
195
      ISW: The Kremlin is attempting to dictate the terms of ...
14.11.24 08:53
196
      ISW: The Kremlin's recent economic policies indicate t...
15.11.24 08:06
197
      ISW: The Kremlin is intensifying its reflexive control...
16.11.24 12:15
198
      ISW: Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a cri...
17.11.24 09:38
199
      ISW: US President Joe Biden has authorized Ukrainian f...
18.11.24 08:11
200
      ISW: Russian officials continued to use threatening rh...
19.11.24 08:18
201
      ISW: Ukrainian forces have defended against Russia's fu...
20.11.24 08:02
202
      ISW: Ukraine conducted a successful combined strike aga...
21.11.24 10:09
203
      ISW: Putin intensified his reflexive control campaign
22.11.24 08:33
204
      ISW: Putin and Russian military leadership continue to ...
23.11.24 10:52
205
      ISW: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely atte...
24.11.24 11:36
206
      ISW: Russian forces’ recent confirmed battlefield gains...
25.11.24 08:55
207
      ISW: Russian forces continue to make significant tactic...
26.11.24 09:36
208
      ISW: Russian officials continue to demonstrate that the...
27.11.24 07:56
209
      ISW: Ukrainian forces continue to leverage Western-prov...
28.11.24 09:24
210
      ISW: Putin continues to laud the technical specificatio...
30.11.24 09:51
211
      ISW: Kremlin officials responded to Syrian opposition f...
01.12.24 10:12
212
      ISW: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly r...
02.12.24 08:00
213
      ISW: utin is uninterested in a negotiated settlement to...
03.12.24 10:07
214
      ISW: ussia is evacuating naval assets from its base in ...
04.12.24 08:26
215
      ISW: Mounting evidence continues to personally implicat...
05.12.24 09:00
216
      ISW: Kremlin is continuing to suffer significant manpow...
06.12.24 08:04
217
      ISW: Russian forces have not yet evacuated the Russian ...
07.12.24 10:56
218
      ISW: Russian forces have resumed their offensive operat...
08.12.24 11:37
219
      ISW: The rapid collapse of the Assad regime in Syria is...
09.12.24 09:00
220
      RE: ISW: The rapid collapse of the Assad regime in Syri...
09.12.24 11:12
221
      ISW: The Kremlin continues to cautiously signal that it...
10.12.24 09:15
222
      ISW: ussia's force posture around Syria continues to re...
11.12.24 08:59
223
      ISW: Russian forces continue to make tactical gains sou...
12.12.24 07:27
224
      ISW: Russia has reportedly reached an agreement with se...
13.12.24 09:16
225
      ISW: Russian forces conducted their largest series of m...
14.12.24 10:50
226
      ISW: elensky stated on December 14 that the Russian mil...
15.12.24 12:01
227
      ISW: Russian forces conducted a roughly battalion-sized...
16.12.24 07:57
228
      ISW: Putin's continued fixation on the Russian
17.12.24 08:43
229
      Syrskyj: Große russische Gegenoffensive in Kursk
18.12.24 06:27
230
      ISW: The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) killed Russi...
18.12.24 08:13
231
      ISW: Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a chemical pla...
19.12.24 08:18
232
      ISW: Putin said that he should have violated the cease...
20.12.24 07:53
233
      ISW: Russian ballistic missile strikes damaged several...
21.12.24 10:49
234
      ISW: Putin repeated his latest assertion that he shoul...
23.12.24 08:21
235
      ISW: Putin explicitly rejected a suggestion reportedly ...
27.12.24 08:29
236
      ISW: Russia has continued to expand its domestic produc...
28.12.24 11:13
237
      ISW: Putin appears to be trying to smooth over possible...
29.12.24 10:34
238
      ISW: Lavrov explicitly rejected two suggestions reporte...
30.12.24 10:35
239
      ISW: Lavrov reiterated Russia's demand that Ukraine ren...
31.12.24 10:34
240
      ISW: Russian forces gained 4,168 square kilometers
01.1.25 10:09
241
      ISW: Ukraine's decision to not renew its contract to tr...
03.1.25 08:17
242
      ISW: Zelensky outlined the conditions that must be met ...
04.1.25 18:48
243
      ISW: Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged o...
05.1.25 09:03
244
      ISW: Ukrainian forces resumed offensive operations in a...
06.1.25 09:31
245
      ISW: Ukrainian forces recently made tactical advances a...
07.1.25 08:49
246
      ISW: Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern T...
08.1.25 09:11
247
      ISW: Ukrainian forces struck Russia's state-owned Kombi...
09.1.25 08:46
248
      ISW: Ukraine's Western partners reiterated their suppor...
10.1.25 08:30
249
      ISW: Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition and d...
11.1.25 12:10
250
      ISW: Ukrainian forces reportedly captured the first Nor...
12.1.25 11:13
251
      ISW: Ukrainian forces conducted a high-precision airstr...
13.1.25 08:22
252
      ISW: Russian forces recently cut the T-0405 Pokrovsk-Ko...
14.1.25 08:57
253
      ISW: The Kremlin remains committed to achieving the ori...
15.1.25 08:03
254
      ISW: Russian forces conducted a large series of missile...
16.1.25 08:18
255
      RE: ISW: Russian forces conducted a large series of mis...
17.1.25 07:41
256
      ISW: Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian sign...
18.1.25 10:48
257
      ISW: Ukrainian forces struck two Russian oil depots in ...
19.1.25 10:14
258
      ISW: Russian forces used ammunition equipped with chemi...
20.1.25 07:38
259
      ISW: Syrskyi reported on January 20 that Russian forces...
21.1.25 08:54
260
      ISW: Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strik...
22.1.25 08:24
261
      ISW: The Kremlin has launched an information operation ...
23.1.25 09:39
262
      ISW: Russia is reportedly planning to deploy additional...
24.1.25 08:50
263
      ISW: Putin is once again attempting to obfuscate his un...
25.1.25 09:41
264
      ISW: kraine and Moldova continue to offer solutions to ...
26.1.25 13:34
265
      ISW: Russian forces recently made further advances with...
27.1.25 07:51
266
      ISW: Ukrainian forces struck Russian long-range drone s...
28.1.25 10:06
267
      ISW: The first official Russian delegation arrived in S...
29.1.25 08:13
268
      ISW: Putin stated that Western military assistance rema...
30.1.25 09:44
269
      ISW: Kremlin's ongoing efforts to shape domestic and gl...
31.1.25 08:22
270
      ISW: (UK), Finland, and Czechia announced several immed...
01.2.25 10:06
271
      ISW: Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of ...
02.2.25 11:33
272
      ISW: Russian forces reportedly struck a dormitory hold...
03.2.25 09:10
273
      ISW: Russian forces continued to suffer high losses in ...
04.2.25 09:44
274
      ISW: (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi vis...
05.2.25 08:06
275
      ISW: Zelensky continues to demonstrate his willingness ...
06.2.25 08:04
276
      ISW: Ukraine's Kursk Incursion: Six Month Assessment
07.2.25 07:00
277
      ISW: Ukrainian forces launched a new series of battalio...
07.2.25 08:42
278
      ISW: Ukrainian forces marginally advanced during mechan...
08.2.25 10:04
279
      ISW: Russia may be providing drone and missile technolo...
09.2.25 09:47
280
      ISW: Russia continues to leverage its partnerships with...
10.2.25 07:57
281
      ISW: Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced...
11.2.25 10:20
282
      ISW: Russian officials are reportedly attempting to con...
12.2.25 08:42
283
      ISW: Trump held bilateral phone calls with Russian Pre...
13.2.25 08:28
284
      ISW: Ukraine's European partners announced new military...
14.2.25 09:11
285
      ISW: Lessons of the Minsk Deal: Breaking the Cycle of R...
14.2.25 13:30
286
      ISW: Zelensky and US Vice President JD Vance met on the...
15.2.25 10:11
287
      ISW: Zelensky warned that Russian President Vladimir Pu...
16.2.25 10:09
288
      ISW: US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Fore...
17.2.25 09:21
289
      ISW: The Kremlin reiterated its demands that Ukraine ce...
18.2.25 09:09
290
      RE: ISW: The Kremlin reiterated its demands that Ukrain...
18.2.25 10:18
291
      gelöscht
17.5.24 00:58
292
Ukraine meldet nach Angriffen schwere Schäden am Stromn...
09.5.24 11:13
293
Russisches Geld für Aufrüstung von Ukraine
09.5.24 15:20
294
Russische Bodenoffensive in Region Charkiw
11.5.24 08:03
295
Russland bestätigt Offensive bei Charkiw
12.5.24 11:33
296
Putin wechselt Verteidigungsminister
13.5.24 06:21
297
Kiew sieht Stabilisierung bei Charkiw
14.5.24 18:43
298
Ukraine meldet Rückzug von Einheiten an Charkiw-Front
15.5.24 16:34
299
Russen jagen gezielt ukrainische Sanitäter
16.5.24 23:34
300
RE: Russen jagen gezielt ukrainische Sanitäter
17.5.24 06:57
301
      RE: Russen jagen gezielt ukrainische Sanitäter
17.5.24 08:50
302
      RE: Russen jagen gezielt ukrainische Sanitäter
18.5.24 11:54
303
wiiw-Studie: Großteil ausländischer Firmen weiter in Ru...
17.5.24 08:06
304
Nur 30% der Russen wollen Ende des Kriegs, falls Putin ...
18.5.24 12:14
305
RE: Nur 30% der Russen wollen Ende des Kriegs, falls Pu...
18.5.24 14:00
306
RE: Nur 30% der Russen wollen Ende des Kriegs, falls Pu...
18.5.24 14:06
307
RE: Nur 30% der Russen wollen Ende des Kriegs, falls Pu...
18.5.24 20:29
308
Moskau meldet weitere Eroberungen
19.5.24 08:13
309
Für Medwedew gibt es nur noch legitime Ziele
20.5.24 21:33
310
RE: Für Medwedew gibt es nur noch legitime Zielewitzig
21.5.24 00:13
311
      RE: Für Medwedew gibt es nur noch legitime Ziele
23.5.24 19:54
312
Ukraine: Lage im Gebiet Donezk extrem schwierig
22.5.24 06:50
313
Ukraine: Russische Bodenoffensive in Charkiw gestoppt
24.5.24 15:32
314
Putin besucht Usbekistan
26.5.24 23:23
315
Russland produziert 3x mehr Granaten als Alliierte der ...
26.5.24 23:48
316
Ukraine überschreitet rote Linien
26.5.24 23:55
317
USA und Deutschland wütend über Ukraine
28.5.24 22:34
318
RE: USA und Deutschland wütend über Ukraine
29.5.24 05:59
319
Scholz und Macron: Ukraine darf auch Ziele in Russland ...
29.5.24 05:54
320
Ukraine macht aus dem M1 Abrams einen Frankenstein-Panz...
01.6.24 09:12
321
Ukrainische Stromtarife drastisch erhöht
01.6.24 15:41
322
Russische Zentralbank lässt Leitzins erneut bei 16 Proz...
08.6.24 16:08
323
ISW: Ukraine signed bilateral ten-year security agreeme...
14.6.24 08:24
324
Vatikan stimmt Abschlusserklärung nicht zu
16.6.24 20:49
325
RE: Vatikan stimmt Abschlusserklärung nicht zu
17.6.24 06:37
326
Kiew: 15 russische Flugabwehrsysteme auf Krim zerstört
18.6.24 07:54
327
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that NAT...
18.6.24 08:29
328
Putin published an article in North Korean state-owned ...
19.6.24 08:08
329
Ukraine-Einmarsch wegen Lithium?
23.6.24 21:19
330
200 Milliarden Euro der russischen Nationalbank bunkern...
02.7.24 09:29
331
Sanktionen beeinträchtigen Russlands Kapazitäten zur Kr...
08.7.24 09:15
332
A recent Ukrainian poll indicates that Ukrainians widel...
16.7.24 08:50
333
Berichte über Rückzug ukrainischer Truppen im Südostenwitzig
17.7.24 13:39
334
Russische Truppen melden weiteren Vormarsch im Donbas
21.7.24 18:33
335
Russland: Über 80 ukrainische Drohnen abgefangen
22.7.24 11:48
336
Selenskyj: Ukrainische Truppen im Osten schwer unter Dr...
27.7.24 08:02
337
Russland meldet Einnahme von weiterem Dorf in Ostukrain...
28.7.24 08:38
338
„Einer der größten“ Angriffe auf Kiew
31.7.24 19:05
339
Bericht: Erste F-16-Kampfjets eingetroffen
31.7.24 19:06
340
RE: Bericht: Erste F-16-Kampfjets eingetroffen
31.7.24 22:08
341
      RE: Bericht: Erste F-16-Kampfjets eingetroffen
31.7.24 22:39
342
      RE: Bericht: Erste F-16-Kampfjets eingetroffen
01.8.24 02:55
343
      RE: Bericht: Erste F-16-Kampfjets eingetroffen
01.8.24 14:15
344
      RE: Bericht: Erste F-16-Kampfjets eingetroffen
04.8.24 19:22
345
      RE: Bericht: Erste F-16-Kampfjets eingetroffengut analysiert
01.8.24 05:10
346
London: Weiter hohe russische Verluste
03.8.24 12:20
347
Selenski stellt erste F-16-Kampfjets der Ukraine vor
04.8.24 18:38
348
RE: Selenski stellt erste F-16-Kampfjets der Ukraine vo...
04.8.24 20:25
349
      RE: Selenski stellt erste F-16-Kampfjets der Ukraine vo...
04.8.24 20:55
350
      RE: Selenski stellt erste F-16-Kampfjets der Ukraine vo...gut analysiertgut analysiert
04.8.24 21:02
351
      RE: Selenski stellt erste F-16-Kampfjets der Ukraine vo...
04.8.24 21:39
352
      RE: Selenski stellt erste F-16-Kampfjets der Ukraine vo...gut analysiert
04.8.24 21:59
353
      RE: Selenski stellt erste F-16-Kampfjets der Ukraine vo...
05.8.24 01:15
354
      RE: Selenski stellt erste F-16-Kampfjets der Ukraine vo...
05.8.24 06:38
355
      RE: Selenski stellt erste F-16-Kampfjets der Ukraine vo...
05.8.24 12:25
356
Russland setzt Psychologen ein
07.8.24 15:44
357
Militärisches Vabanquespiel der Ukraine mit psychologis...
09.8.24 11:36
358
Ukraine verschifft verstärkt Getreide
12.8.24 13:38
359
Evakuierung von Teilen der russischen Region Belgorod
12.8.24 13:59
360
Kiew berichtet von Gebietsgewinn in Kursk
13.8.24 06:53
361
Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contem...
13.8.24 08:30
362
Storm Shadows wurden kastriert
13.8.24 20:07
363
Russland ruft Ausnahmezustand in Belgorod aus
14.8.24 07:39
364
Kiew meldet weiteren Vorstoß bei Kursk, Moskau dementie...
14.8.24 16:50
365
Russland ordnet weitere Evakuierungen in Kursk an
15.8.24 08:28
366
schöne Hilfs-Lkws
16.8.24 19:56
367
USA halten GB zurück
17.8.24 22:01
368
RE: USA halten GB zurück
18.8.24 08:38
369
      RE: USA halten GB zurück
18.8.24 12:36
370
      RE: USA halten GB zurückgut analysiert
18.8.24 21:55
371
Kursk: Strategisch wichtige Brücken zerstört
18.8.24 09:10
372
Kreml dementiert Verhandlungspläne
18.8.24 19:33
373
RE: Krieg Rußland - Ukraine
19.8.24 15:03
374
RE: Krieg Rußland - Ukraine
19.8.24 15:07
375
Selenskyj meldet Einnahme weiterer Orte
20.8.24 05:39
376
Munitionsmangel an Donbass-Front
20.8.24 21:39
377
Ukrainische Armee im Osten unter Druck
22.8.24 05:12
378
Bau von Bunkern in Stadt Kursk angeordnet
23.8.24 08:04
379
Russischer Treibstofftanker nach Angriff gesunken
23.8.24 08:13
380
Goldschmuggel
26.8.24 21:22
381
Verheerende Luftattacken auf Ukraine
27.8.24 05:03
382
Berichte über Kämpfe an Grenze zu Belgorod
27.8.24 18:10
383
Selenskyj: Situation nahe Pokrowsk „extrem schwierig“
29.8.24 07:09
384
Ukraine weitet Stromabschaltungen aus
30.8.24 06:18
385
Medien: Mehr als 66.000 tote russische Soldaten identif...
01.9.24 10:25
386
Ukraine greift Raffinerie und Kraftwerke an
01.9.24 16:44
387
Drohnenangriffe in Russland sinnvoll
02.9.24 16:04
388
Raytheon verkaufte militärische Geheimnisse an Russland
05.9.24 19:53
389
London liefert Kiew hunderte Luftabwehr-Raketen
06.9.24 07:53
390
RE: London liefert Kiew hunderte Luftabwehr-Raketen
06.9.24 07:58
391
Deutschland sagt Ukraine weitere Panzerhaubitzen zu
06.9.24 12:47
392
Achse des Bösen tauscht Spieler aus?
08.9.24 20:21
393
RE: Achse des Bösen tauscht Spieler aus?
08.9.24 20:47
394
      RE: Achse des Bösen tauscht Spieler aus?
08.9.24 20:58
395
      RE: Achse des Bösen tauscht Spieler aus?witzig
08.9.24 21:26
396
      RE: Achse des Bösen tauscht Spieler aus?
09.9.24 00:02
397
Russland meldet zahlreiche Drohnenangriffe mit Ziel Mos...
10.9.24 08:02
398
Waffeneinsatz gegen Russland: USA „arbeiten“ an Freigab...
11.9.24 07:17
399
Russische Armee: Gegenoffensive in Kursk gestartet
11.9.24 15:16
400
Drohnenangriff in nordrussischem Murmansk gemeldet
12.9.24 05:22
401
Selenskyj: Russland hat Gegenoffensive in Kursk gestart...
12.9.24 15:37
402
Abweichende Angaben zu Abschuss von russischem Kampfjet
12.9.24 15:41
403
Erdogan fordert Rückgabe der Krim
12.9.24 22:07
404
Selenskyj sieht keine russischen Erfolge im Gebiet Kurs...
14.9.24 11:19
405
Einsatzpläne für F-16 laut Selenskyj fertiggestellt
18.9.24 09:26
406
Ukraine: Rumänien soll russische Drohnen abschießen
18.9.24 18:39
407
Kiew: Russische Kursk-Offensive gestoppt
19.9.24 06:44
408
Putin ordnet Truppenerhöhung auf 1,5 Mio. Soldaten an
19.9.24 08:05
409
Kursk-Vorstoß: Russland hatte womöglich Hinweise
21.9.24 08:49
410
Bericht: 70.000 gefallene russische Soldaten identifizi...
21.9.24 08:51
411
Welche Summen Putin seinen Soldaten zahlen muss, damit ...
22.9.24 08:36
412
Ukraine will Russland bei Drohnenproduktion übertreffen...
22.9.24 17:29
413
Ukrainische Armee im Osten weiter stark unter Druck
24.9.24 05:43
414
Selenskyj angeblich bereit zu Waffenstillstand
10.10.24 14:13
415
RE: Selenskyj angeblich bereit zu Waffenstillstand
10.10.24 16:44
416
      RE: Selenskyj angeblich bereit zu Waffenstillstand
10.10.24 21:20
417
Ukraine Verbot von Waffenexporten könnte fallen
13.10.24 08:51
418
Selenskyj: Armee hält Stellungen in Kursk
13.10.24 09:09
419
Kiew: Angriff mit knapp 30 Panzern abgewehrt
14.10.24 06:15
420
Nordkoreanische Soldaten verstärken russische Armee
14.10.24 07:58
421
Putin plant Schlag gegen US-Dollar
22.10.24 07:15
422
Laut Kiew erste nordkoreanische Truppen in Kursk
25.10.24 07:01
423
Laut Kiew hohe russische Verluste bei Kursk
02.11.24 07:21
424
Erste nordkoreanische Verluste
08.11.24 07:53
425
Ukraine wird Einsatz von US-Waffen erlaubt
18.11.24 07:42
426
RE: Krieg Rußland - Ukraine
19.11.24 10:26
427
RE: Krieg Rußland - Ukraine
19.11.24 10:55
428
Erstmals ATACMS-Raketen auf Russland
19.11.24 15:19
429
RE: Erstmals ATACMS-Raketen auf Russland
19.11.24 16:41
430
USA wollen Kiew Anti-Personen-Minen liefern
20.11.24 12:03
431
Kiew legt gegen Russland nach
21.11.24 05:27
432
Deutschland rüstet auf
25.11.24 14:37
433
Ukrainische Ostfront bröckelt
28.11.24 05:38
434
Keith Kellogg wird Trumps Sondergesandter für die Ukrai...
28.11.24 22:05
435
Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
29.11.24 14:10
436
RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
29.11.24 16:12
437
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
29.11.24 17:27
438
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
29.11.24 18:17
439
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
29.11.24 18:26
440
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
29.11.24 19:19
441
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
29.11.24 20:14
442
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
30.11.24 00:05
443
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
30.11.24 01:33
444
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
30.11.24 12:44
445
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
30.11.24 19:37
446
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
30.11.24 07:12
447
      RE: Flüchtlingsstrom nimmt zu.
30.11.24 11:22
448
Taurus werden ertüchtigt
02.12.24 14:26
449
Ukrainian war dead reaches 43,000, Zelensky says in rar...
08.12.24 18:47
450
RE: Ukrainian war dead reaches 43,000, Zelensky says in...
08.12.24 19:27
451
Laut Insidern vereinbarten Russland und Indien ihren bi...
13.12.24 08:22
452
Selenskyj: Viele Nordkoreaner bei russischen Angriffen ...
15.12.24 08:38
453
Tickende Zeitbombe: Warum die russische Bevölkerung nun...
19.12.24 07:31
454
Seoul: 1.100 nordkoreanische Soldaten getötet oder verl...
23.12.24 08:13
455
RE: Seoul: 1.100 nordkoreanische Soldaten getötet oder ...
23.12.24 11:31
456
Erster nordkoreanischer Soldat in Gefangenschaft
27.12.24 07:25
457
USA: Umfassende Verluste unter nordkoreanischen Truppen
28.12.24 10:26
458
ISW: Russland eroberte 2024 fast 4.000 Quadratkilometer
01.1.25 10:05
459
Ukraine spricht bei Kursk von russischen Verlusten
02.1.25 07:26
460
Ukraine startete Gegenoffensive in Kursk
06.1.25 08:37
461
Kreml schlägt Referendum in Grönland vor.
09.1.25 17:05
462
Russlands Öl- und Gaseinnahmen stiegen 2024 um ein Vier...
14.1.25 07:23
463
RE: Krieg Rußland - Ukraine
15.1.25 08:50
464
The Kremlin is in the endgame of a decades’ long strate...
16.1.25 08:27
465
Kanonenrohre made in Austriainteressant
20.1.25 10:34
466
RE: Kanonenrohre made in Austria
20.1.25 10:48
467
RE: Krieg Rußland - Ukraine
20.1.25 17:29
468
RE: Krieg Rußland - Ukraine
20.1.25 18:29
469
Kampfdrohnen treffen russische Raffinerie
24.1.25 13:43
470
Russische Truppen dringen in der Ostukraine vor
31.1.25 11:48
471
Kiew: Nordkoreanische Soldaten wurden wohl abgezogen
31.1.25 18:13
472
Ukrainian Drone Surge Highlights Russian Oil Refining R...
01.2.25 12:02
473
Russische Berichte über ukrainische Offensive in Kursk
06.2.25 15:54
474
'Trump peace plan for Ukraine' is 'leaked': Talks with ...
06.2.25 16:48
475
Moskau: Ukrainische Gegenoffensive in Kursk abgewehrt
07.2.25 13:35
476
USA setzen erste Schritte
08.2.25 08:52
477
Trump auf X:
12.2.25 20:00
478
RE: Trump auf X:
12.2.25 20:01
479
RE: Trump auf X:
12.2.25 22:00
480
RE: Trump auf X:
12.2.25 22:31
481
RE: Trump auf X:
13.2.25 00:30
482
RE: Trump auf X:gut analysiert
13.2.25 08:40
483
„Bild“: Berlin will Kiew 6.000 Hightech-Drohnen liefern
13.2.25 06:58
484

Thema #254592
  Vorheriges Thema | Nächstes Thema


Powered by DCForum+ Version 1.27
Copyright 1997-2003 DCScripts.com
1.36