Ukrainian sources indicated that Russian forces are concentrating limited, understaffed, and incohesive forces in the Sumy direction, but even such a Russian grouping of forces will be able to achieve the likely desired effect of drawing and fixing Ukrainian forces in the international border area. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on May 20 that Russian forces, including Chechen forces, are accumulating in the Sumy direction but that the limited number of Russian personnel suggests that the Russian objective is to draw and fix Ukrainian forces to the international border area. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on May 20 that the Russian grouping in Kursk Oblast consists of 9,000–10,000 personnel. Mashovets stated that this grouping consists of up to three under-strength motorized rifle regiments (each lacking one to two battalions); eight motorized rifle, tank, and infantry battalions; and one airborne (VDV) battalion all redeployed from various units, formations, and military districts; and at least two assault detachments at the echelon of a reinforced company or an under-strength battalion. Mashovets also reported on May 5 that an unspecified VDV battalion is part of the Russian grouping in Kursk Oblast, and a Russian milblogger (who has an avowed bias against the VDV and "Dnepr" Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky) claimed that the Russian 3rd VDV Battalion of the 104th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) is in Kursk Oblast. ISW continues to assess that even limited Russian activity in other areas of the international border below the threshold of Russian offensive operations could have the effect of stretching Ukrainian forces along a wider front and that Russian forces will be able to draw and fix Ukrainian forces to this area as long as Russia threatens penetrations of other border areas beyond northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian sources indicated that Russian forces are concentrating limited, understaffed, and incohesive forces in the Sumy direction, but even such a Russian grouping of forces will be able to achieve the likely desired effect of drawing and fixing Ukrainian forces in the international border area.

• Kremlin officials expressed their condolences to senior Iranian officials following the announcement of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi's and Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian's deaths on May 20.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin fired Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yury Sadovenko on May 20, replacing him with former Deputy Economic Minister and current Federation Council Accounts Chamber Auditor Oleg Savelyev.

• Putin also dismissed Presidential Advisor Alexandra Levitskaya on May 20, but the reason for Levitskaya’s dismissal is unclear.

• US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin reiterated the White House's unwillingness to approve Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons in strikes against military targets in Russia following a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (also known as the Ramstein format) on May 20.

• Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas stated that some unspecified countries, presumably NATO member states, have already sent personnel to train Ukrainian soldiers "on the ground."

• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev amplified a known Russian information operation aimed at directly undermining Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy as president.

• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Vovchansk, Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and the Dnipro River Delta.

• Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories) reported that Russian military authorities and Kazakh law enforcement acting on Russian orders detained at least two more servicemen in Kazakhstan who had deserted from the Russian military.

Institute for the Study of War

The Kremlin continues to time its nuclear saber-rattling to coincide with major policy discussions in the West as part of a Kremlin reflexive control campaign to influence Western decision-makers. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on May 21 that missile elements of the Southern Military District (SMD) began the first stage of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons exercises. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian Aerospace Forces will also exercise with Iskander ballistic missiles and Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles. The Russian MoD announced the preparations for these exercises on May 6. A prominent Kremlin-awarded milblogger explicitly tied Russian tactical nuclear weapons exercises to Kremlin efforts to influence Western decision-making — particularly targeting the recent discussions about the restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia — echoing ISW's assessment that Russia's tactical nuclear weapons tests are part of a Kremlin reflexive control campaign that often uses nuclear saber-rattling to influence Western decision-makers to engage in self-deterrence. Reflexive control is a key element of Russia’s hybrid warfare toolkit — it is a tactic that relies on shaping an adversary with targeted rhetoric and information operations in such a way that the adversary voluntarily takes actions that are advantageous to Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated to the New York Times (NYT) on May 20 that Russia currently enjoys a sanctuary in Russian territory from which Russian forces can conduct missile and glide bomb strikes against Ukraine and launch offensive operations with forces amassed in the international border area, as is the case with the ongoing limited Russian offensive in northern Kharkiv Oblast. ISW continues to assess that US and Western policies limiting Ukraine's ability to strike military targets in Russia are severely compromising Ukraine's ability to defend itself against current Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast or any area along the international border where Russian forces may choose to conduct offensive operations in the future.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky indicated that the limited Russian offensive in northern Ukraine is achieving its goal of drawing attention away from intense Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine. Zelensky stated in an interview with Reuters published on May 20 that the situation in northern Kharkiv Oblast is now stable but that “no one” is paying attention to the wave of Russian offensive operations in Donbas in the Chasiv Yar (Bakhmut), Pokrovsk (Avdiivka), and Kurakhove (west of Donetsk City) directions. Zelensky stated that the situation in northern Kharkiv Oblast has been stable for about a week, which is consistent with the slowing pace of Russian advances in the Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) and Vovchansk directions following the initial few days of relatively rapid tactical advances. Russian forces recently intensified their efforts to seize the operationally-significant town of Chasiv Yar west of Bakhmut as the tempo of operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast decreased, highlighting how the northern Kharkiv Oblast effort aims to draw and fix Ukrainian forces and create opportunities for Russian forces elsewhere in the theater. As ISW has consistently reported, Russian forces' most immediate prospect for operationally-significant gains remains the Chasiv Yar direction, as seizing Chasiv Yar would enable Russian forces to set conditions to attack part of a "fortress belt" of cities forming the backbone of Ukraine's Donetsk Oblast defenses, and Russian forces likely seek to exploit unfavorable situations for Ukrainian forces defending near Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka before US military assistance arrives at the frontlines at scale. The Ukrainian General Staff has reported for the past week that Russian forces maintain a higher tempo of offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction even as the situation in northern Kharkiv Oblast has stabilized.

The Russian military command reportedly initially planned that Russian forces would quickly make significant advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast, but the limited force grouping deployed to the area suggests that the Russian military command likely changed these plans in the lead up to offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast. The Economist reported on May 20 that it viewed Russian military plans from an unspecified date about a planned Russian offensive in the Kharkiv City and Vovchansk directions. The Russian plans reportedly called for Russian forces to advance to Borshchova (about 20 kilometers northeast of Kharkiv City and about 16 kilometers from the international border) within 72 hours in order to place Russian forces within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City. The Russian plans also reportedly called for Russian forces to advance to Pechenihy (south of Vovchansk and about 50 kilometers from the international border) in an unspecified time frame. The Russian offensive was reportedly initially planned to begin May 15 to 16, and the Economist stated that it is unknown why Russian forces pushed forward their offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast to May 10 instead. ISW assesses that Russian forces have advanced a maximum of about 10 kilometers deep in the Kharkiv City direction and a maximum of about seven kilometers deep in the Vovchansk direction since May 10. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on May 2 that Russian forces had concentrated about 35,000 personnel in the international border area and planned to concentrate a total of 50,000 to 70,000 personnel. Russian forces reportedly launched offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast when the Northern Grouping of Forces was understrength and have only committed a limited amount of combat power to the area thus far.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin continues to time its nuclear saber-rattling to coincide with major policy discussions in the West as part of a Kremlin reflexive control campaign to influence Western decision-makers.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky indicated that the limited Russian offensive in northern Ukraine is achieving its goal of drawing attention away from intense Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine.

• The Russian military command reportedly initially planned that Russian forces would quickly make significant advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast, but the limited force grouping deployed to the area suggests that the Russian military command likely changed these plans in the lead up to offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast.

• Russian authorities recently arrested the former commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA), Major General Ivan Popov, on fraud charges.

• The Kremlin is likely using the pattern of recent arrests of high-ranking officials on corruption charges in the Russian MoD to conceal the real reasons for Popov's punishment almost 10 months after his conflict with the Russian military command and subsequent dismissal from his command position.

• Satellite imagery indicates that Ukrainian forces likely damaged the Russian Black Sea Fleet's (BSF) Tsyklon small missile ship in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea on May 19.

• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Vovchansk, Kreminna, Chasiv Yar, and Donetsk City.

• A Russian milblogger claimed that frequent Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian vehicles that lack electronic warfare (EW) systems along the frontline have created an "urgent" shortage of off-road vehicles.

• Russian authorities continue to illegally and forcibly deport Ukrainian citizens, including children, to Russia and to forcibly remove Ukrainian citizens deeper into occupied Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed on May 21 that the Russian government reassess Russia’s maritime borders in the Baltic Sea so that these borders “correspond to the modern geographical situation.” The Russian MoD produced a since-deleted document, which appeared on the Russian government’s legal portal on May 21, proposing that the Russian government should reassess the 1985 maritime borders in the Gulf of Finland because these borders were based on outdated “small-scale nautical navigation maps” developed in the mid-20th century. The document proposed to partially recognize the 1985 resolution as “defunct.” The document suggested that the Russian government should adjust the maritime border coordinates in the Gulf of Finland in the zone of Jähi, Sommers, Gogland, Rodsher, Malyy Tyuters, and Vigrund islands and near the northern delta of the Narva River. The document also proposed that the Russian government revise the area of the Curonian Spit, Cape Taran, a cape south of Cape Taran, and the Vistula Spit in the Baltic Sea. Sommers, Gogland, Rodsher, Malyy Tyuters, and Vigrund island are under Russian control, while Russia and Finland split control over the Jähi island. The northern delta of the Narva River is located between Russia and Estonia, while the Curonian Spit leads to the international border between Russia and Lithuania. The Vistula Spit (also known as the Baltic Spit in Russia) is split between Kaliningrad Oblast, Russia and Poland, and Cape Taran is just northwest of Kaliningrad City. The document stated that these proposed changes would establish a system of baselines for maritime borders on the southern part of the Russian islands in the eastern part of Gulf of Finland as well as in the areas of Baltiysk and Zelenogradsk, both in Kaliningrad Oblast. The document also noted that these changes will allow Russia to use corresponding water areas as Russian internal sea waters, and that the line of the Russian state border will shift due to the changes in the position of the external border of the territorial sea.

Kremlin and Russian MoD officials denied on May 22 that Russia is planning to change the Russian maritime border, but invertedly implied that the Russian government is considering undertaking some “security” measures in the Baltic Sea. Russian state news agencies Ria Novosti and TASS published statements from unnamed military-diplomatic sources, who claimed that “Russia did not have and does not have any intentions of revising the state border line, economic zone, and continental shelf in the Baltic .” Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that the Russian MoD’s proposal is not politically motivated, despite the fact that the “political situation has changed significantly” since 1985. Peskov added that the escalation of tensions and the increased level of confrontation in the Baltic region “requires appropriate steps” from relevant Russian agencies to “ensure security.” Russian officials did not explain why the MoD proposal was removed from the government’s legal portal.

Western officials noted that Russia may be reassessing the basis for maritime borders in order to revise maritime zones in the Baltic Sea. Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen stated on May 22 that the Finnish Foreign Ministry (MFA) is reviewing the reports about Russia's reassessment and that Finland expects Russia to act according to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea. Finnish Prime Minister stated that Russia's review of maritime borders will likely be routine and that Finland is not worried about the reassessment. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis announced that Lithuania summoned the Russian charge d'affaires in connection with the reassessment. The Lithuanian MFA told Politico that Lithuania sees Russia’s actions as “deliberate, targeted, escalatory provocations to intimidate neighboring countries and their societies.” The Lithuanian MFA added that the Russian MoD’s proposal is “further proof that Russia’s aggressive and revisionist policy is a threat to the security of neighboring countries and Europe as a whole.” Swedish Commander-in-Chief Mikael Byden expressed concern about Russian ambitions in the Baltic Sea and warned that Russian President Vladimir Putin aims to control the Baltic Sea and that Putin “has his eyes” on the island of Gotland. Byden did not rule out the possibility that Russia is already using oil tankers to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage in the Baltic Sea and near Gotland.


Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed on May 21 that the Russian government reassess Russia’s maritime borders in the Baltic Sea so that these borders “correspond to the modern geographical situation.”

• Kremlin and Russian MoD officials denied on May 22 that Russia is planning to change the Russian maritime border, but invertedly implied that the Russian government is considering undertaking some “security” measures in the Baltic Sea.

• Western officials noted that Russia may be reassessing the basis for maritime borders in order to revise maritime zones in the Baltic Sea.

• The Kremlin appears to be developing a system to legalize the status of Russia's so-called “compatriots abroad,” likely as part of its efforts to set information conditions to justify further aggression and hybrid operations abroad as “protecting” Russia's compatriots.

• United Kingdom (UK) Defense Minister Grant Shapps stated on May 22 that US and UK intelligence have evidence that the People's Republic of China (PRC) “is now or will be” providing lethal military assistance to Russia, a statement that US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan questioned.

• Western officials warned that Russian intelligence services intend to increase sabotage activities and other hybrid operations against NATO member countries.

• US Space Command reported on May 21 that Russia recently launched an anti-satellite weapon, the most recent report that Russia intends to field disruptive anti-satellite capabilities.

• Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan indirectly accused Russia and directly accused Belarus of helping Azerbaijan to prepare for the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, against the backdrop of deteriorating Armenian-Russian relations.

• Ukrainian forces recently recaptured territory near Vovchansk and Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Vovchansk, Avdiivka, Donetsk City, and Velyka Novosilka.

• Russian courts reportedly began forcibly hospitalizing Russians charged with political crimes such as spreading “fake” information about the Russian military, in psychiatric hospitals.

Institute for the Study of War

How Delays in Western Aid Gave Russia the Initiative: From the Ukrainian Counteroffensive to Kharkiv

Ukraine and the West have defeated a months-long Russian effort to persuade the West to abandon Ukraine and set conditions to collapse Ukrainian defenses. Russian forces have conducted offensive operations since Fall 2023 that aimed to convince the West to abandon its commitment to Ukraine, and prolonged US debates about security assistance likely convinced the Kremlin that its efforts had partially succeeded. The effects of continued delays in US and Western security assistance set conditions for Russian forces to make more significant gains on the battlefield than they had previously been able to make, and the Russian military command likely concluded that Russian forces would be able to collapse the Ukrainian frontline at some point in the near to medium term. Ukrainian forces nevertheless prevented Russian forces from making operationally significant advances and limited the areas where Russian forces managed to make tactically significant gains even as Western supplies dwindled. The US decision to resume aid in late April 2024 and Europe's increasing efforts to mobilize support for Ukraine marked the failure of Russia's effort to convince the West to accept Russian victory. The course of operations over the past seven months has likely convinced Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military command that continuous Russian offensive operations will let Russia gradually subsume Ukraine and destroy Ukrainian statehood piece by piece, however. Putin has likely concluded that weakening Western support for Ukraine over time is a valid theory of victory for him and will likely continue efforts to convince the West to surrender and allow Russia to destroy Ukrainian statehood. Putin and the Russian military also appear to have concluded that Ukraine will be unable to regain territories the Russians can seize and that creeping Russian advances even at high cost will therefore ultimately lead to overall Russian success. These apparent Russian assessments will encourage Putin to continue the war in pursuit of ultimate total victory.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiati ve-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv

The Kremlin is pursuing a concerted effort to remove senior Russian defense officials and has likely expanded this effort to senior officers commanding Russian combat operations in Ukraine. The Russian Investigative Committee announced on May 23 the arrests of Russian Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Head of its Main Communications Directorate Lieutenant General Vadim Shamarin and Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Department for State Procurement, Vladimir Verteletsky. Shamarin is accused of accepting a bribe of at least 36 million rubles (about $392,000), and two defendants in the Russian telecommunications industry have agreed to testify against him. Verteletsky is accused of corruption and accepting a large bribe with total damages of 70 million rubles (about $763,000). Five senior Russian MoD officials and former military commanders have been arrested on corruption charges since the arrest of Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov on April 24, and a Russian insider source previously claimed that six more MoD officials plan to resign following former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu's removal from the MoD. The Kremlin is likely using the guise of corruption charges as an excuse to hide the real reasons for ousting specific individuals from the MoD who have fallen from favor, as ISW has recently assessed.

Russian ultranationalist milbloggers also claimed that the Russian MoD dismissed the commander of the 20th Combined Arms Army (Moscow Military District , formerly Western Military District ), Lieutenant General Sukhrab Akhmedov. ISW is unable to confirm Akhmedov's removal, but claims of his removal are notable as this would be the first removal of an officer actively commanding Russian forces in Ukraine as a part of the most recent round of dismissals. The 20th CAA is currently heavily committed to offensive operations in the Lyman direction and failed to achieve significant tactical gains in the area during the Winter-Spring 2024 offensive on the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis. The milbloggers also directly connected Akhmedov's arrest with significant command issues in Ukraine, referencing their prior complaints about Akhmedov by name for his role in commanding attritional Russian assaults near Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast in winter 2022–2023 when he commanded the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade or his role in Russian forces suffering significant casualties due to a Ukrainian rear area strike in summer 2023.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is pursuing a concerted effort to remove senior Russian defense officials and has likely expanded this effort to senior officers commanding Russian combat operations in Ukraine.

• Russian border guards removed buoys in Estonian waters of the Narva River, which demarcates the Estonian-Russian international border, likely to set conditions to further question maritime borders and test NATO resolve.

• Select US officials are reportedly pressing for a reconsideration of the White House's current policy prohibiting Ukraine from using US-provided weapons to strike within Russia.

• Polish Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Pawel Wronski stated on May 23 that Poland is considering using its air defense to protect Ukrainian airspace against Russian strikes.

• Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian defense industrial facilities in the Republic of Tatarstan on May 23.

• Iranian leaders have used the occasion of President Ebrahim Raisi's funeral events to emphasize close ties with Armenia even as tensions between Yerevan and Moscow continue to increase.

• Ukrainian forces advanced near Lukyantsi and Kreminna, and Russian forces advanced near Berestove, Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, Donetsk City, and Velyka Novosilka.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed applying regular military punishments to volunteers, likely as part of the MoD's continued formalization efforts.

Institute for the Study of War

Western media continues to report that Russian President Vladimir Putin is interested in a negotiated ceasefire in Ukraine, although Kremlin rhetoric and Russian military actions illustrate that Putin remains uninterested in meaningful negotiations and any settlement that would prevent him from pursuing the destruction of an independent Ukrainian state. Reuters reported on May 24 that four Russian sources who currently work or have worked with Putin stated that Putin is ready to negotiate a ceasefire that recognizes the current frontlines and that Putin is prepared to present the current amount of occupied Ukrainian territory as a Russian military victory to the Russian public. Western media reported similar interest from Putin in a negotiated ceasefire or settlement based on statements from unspecified Russian sources with some level of alleged connection to Putin or the Kremlin in December 2023 and January and February 2024. Western media has cited limited unspecified US and international officials as confirming that Putin has expressed interest in a ceasefire, although other Western media has reported that US sources have denied that there has been any official Russian outreach to the US on the matter.

The Kremlin routinely feigns interest in meaningful negotiations as part of a longstanding information operation that aims to persuade the West to make concessions on Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty, and it is unclear if the unspecified Russian sources talking to Western media are advancing these efforts or accurately portraying Putin's interests and viewpoints. ISW cannot determine the veracity of the Russian sources' claims about Putin's intentions, and these private anonymous statements contrast sharply with Russian official public rhetoric and action. Putin and the Kremlin have notably intensified their expansionist rhetoric about Ukraine since December 2023 and have increasingly indicated that Russia intends to conquer more territory in Ukraine and is committed to destroying Ukrainian statehood and identity completely. Russian forces have conducted offensive operations in recent months that aim to make operationally significant advances and collapse the frontline, have opened a new front in Kharkiv Oblast (which Russia has not claimed through illegal annexation), and have sought to cause long-term damage to Ukrainian warfighting capabilities and economic potential in regular large-scale missile and drone strikes. These military operations suggest that the Kremlin is more interested in achieving its long-term goal of maximalist victory in Ukraine than in any settlement that would immediately freeze the frontline where it is currently located.

Key Takeaways:

• Western media continues to report that Russian President Vladimir Putin is interested in a negotiated ceasefire in Ukraine, although Kremlin rhetoric and Russian military actions illustrate that Putin remains uninterested in meaningful negotiations and any settlement that would prevent him from pursuing the destruction of an independent Ukrainian state.

• Russian sources that have spoken to Western media have also offered mutually contradictory characterizations of Putin's stance on negotiations.

• These Russian sources notably highlighted territorial concessions as part of Putin's alleged envisioned ceasefire but have sparsely addressed the wider strategic objectives of Putin's war in Ukraine.

• A ceasefire does not preclude Russia from resuming its offensive campaign to destroy Ukrainian statehood, and Russia would use any ceasefire to prepare for future offensive operations within Ukraine.

• Russia is currently preparing for the possibility of a conventional war with NATO, and the Kremlin will likely view anything short of Ukrainian capitulation as an existential threat to Russia's ability to fight such a war.

• The Kremlin will continue to feign interest in negotiations at critical moments in the war to influence Western decision-making on support for Ukraine and to continue efforts to extract preemptive concessions from the West.

• Putin directly rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy as president on May 24, the latest in a series of efforts to dismiss Zelensky's authority to engage in or reject negotiations with Russia and undermine Ukrainians' trust in Zelensky.

• Unnamed Russian government officials and sources within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Kremlin told the independent Russian outlet The Moscow Times that the ongoing effort to remove senior Russian defense officials and uniformed commanding officers will likely continue in the coming weeks and months.

• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of successful missile strikes against military targets in Russian-occupied Ukraine on May 23 and 24.

• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a drone strike against a Russian early warning radar system in Krasnodar Krai, Russia on the morning of May 23.

• The Ukrainian military command continues to address Ukraine's manpower challenges.

• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a military assistance package worth $275 million on May 24 to help Ukrainian forces repel Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

• NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated on May 24 that NATO member states should consider lifting restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Svatove, Kreminna, and Donetsk City.

• The Financial Times (FT) reported on May 23 that Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksandr Lytvynenko stated that Russia recruited more than 385,000 military personnel in 2023.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces are increasingly contesting the tactical initiative in northern Kharkiv Oblast and characterized Russian operations in the area as defensive, although Russian forces are likely attempting to bring the Northern Grouping of Forces up closer to its reported planned end strength before possibly intensifying offensive operations in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 24 that Ukrainian forces are pushing Russian forces back from Ukrainian defenses in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces established "combat control" over an unspecified section of the border where Russian forces had initially crossed into northern Kharkiv Oblast following the start of Russian offensive operations on May 10. A Ukrainian commander operating in the Lyptsi direction (north of Kharkiv City) stated that Ukrainian forces have completely stopped Russian offensive operations in the Strilecha-Hlyboke direction (north of Lyptsi) and that Ukrainian forces are now focused on regaining territory in the area. The commander stated that Ukrainian forces are successfully pushing Russian forces out of captured positions but that Russian forces are saturating the area with manpower and equipment to prevent Ukrainian forces from seizing the tactical initiative. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces have partially transitioned to the defensive in northern Kharkiv Oblast after consolidating captured positions and are currently focused on destroying reserves that Ukrainian forces have concentrated near Kharkiv City. The milblogger assessed that Ukrainian forces would have to launch counterattacks in the area at the end of May 2024 to push Russian forces out of northern Kharkiv Oblast and that future Russian plans on this axis likely depend on the outcome of Ukrainian counterattacks. Russian forces launched their offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast with limited manpower and have yet to commit significant reserves to the area, leading to a decreasing tempo of Russian advances and offensive operations. This decreasing tempo is likely presenting Ukrainian forces with tactical opportunities to counterattack, although Ukrainian forces are not yet conducting a limited counteroffensive operation that aims to push Russian forces completely out of northern Kharkiv Oblast.

The disparate Russian elements currently operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Russian military's apparent hesitance to commit available reserves to fight suggests that Russian forces are likely attempting to bring the Northern Grouping of Forces up to its reported planned end strength before intensifying offensive operations and pursuing subsequent phases of the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces reportedly had roughly 35,000 personnel in the international border area as a part of the Northern Grouping of Forces when they started offensive operations on May 10, whereas Ukrainian sources had been indicating that the Russian military intends to concentrate a total of 50,000 to 70,000 personnel in the international border area. Russian forces likely launched the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast earlier than intended with an understrength force hoping to establish a foothold before the arrival of resumed US military aid to the front made that task more difficult. Ukrainian sources have identified elements of the 11th Army Corps , 44th AC, and 6th Combined Arms Army as the main elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces, and limited elements of these formations have participated in the offensive operation and have reportedly suffered significant casualties. Zelensky stated in an interview published on May 25 that Russian forces have suffered an eight-to-one casualty ratio in northern Kharkiv Oblast in the past two weeks, although these losses do not appear to have forced the Russian military to commit significant reserves from the 11th AC, 44th AC, or 6th CAA to sustain Russian offensive operations in the area.

Instead, Russian forces appear to be relying on limited elements of units that are part of various different force groupings in eastern Ukraine. Limited elements of the 47th Tank Division's 153rd Tank Regiment and 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st Guards Tank Army , Moscow Military District ) and limited elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division's 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st GTA, MMD) are reportedly operating near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City). Elements of the 47th Tank Division and the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division are currently heavily committed to intensified Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets previously reported that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces is "leasing" limited elements to the Northern Grouping of Forces. Elements of a battalion of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division's 217th VDV Regiment are reportedly operating in a border area in Kursk Oblast, even though elements of the 217th VDV Regiment and other elements of the 98th VDV Division are participating in intensified assaults on Chasiv Yar's eastern outskirts. Russian forces have either been attacking with an understrength 217th VDV Regiment in the Chasiv Yar area for some time or have recently transferred a battalion of the regiment to the Northern Grouping of Forces.

Russian forces are likely holding back reserves of the 11th AC, 44th AC, and 6th CAA in order to establish the Northern Grouping at closer to its intended end strength. The Russian military command may be waiting to intensify offensive operations and pursue a second phase of the operation because its plans require a grouping of 50,000 to 70,000 personnel strong. Russian forces likely intend to launch the second phase of their offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast following their intended seizure of Vovchansk, although positional fighting and possible Ukrainian counterattacks could require Russian forces to conduct another wave of intensified assaults in the area to complete the seizure of the settlement. Russian forces currently aim to establish a "buffer zone" in northern Kharkiv Oblast and advance to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City, and it is unclear which goal a second phase of the operation will support or if Russian forces have a more ambitious operational objective in mind. The Northern Grouping of Forces, even at the upper limit of its reported end strength, will lack the necessary manpower needed to conduct a successful operation to envelop, encircle, or seize Kharkiv City.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces are increasingly contesting the tactical initiative in northern Kharkiv Oblast and characterized Russian operations in the area as defensive, although Russian forces are likely attempting to bring the Northern Grouping of Forces up closer to its reported planned end strength before possibly intensifying offensive operations in the area.

• The likely premature start of Russian offensive operations appears to have undermined Russian success in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

• Russian forces continue to leverage their sanctuary in Russian airspace to strike Kharkiv City to devastating effect, likely as part of efforts to depopulate the city and demoralize Ukrainians.

• Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities reportedly impacted the effectiveness of select Western weapon systems in Ukraine in 2023 as Ukraine and Russia continue to compete in a technical offense-defense race.

• Russian Ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov categorically rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy and outlined Russia's maximalist conditions for peace negotiations during an interview with Newsweek on May 25.

• Russia is likely helping North Korea develop its defense industrial base (DIB) in exchange for North Korean munitions supplies, and US officials reportedly assess that Russia may also be supplying North Korea with military equipment, weapons, or technology.

• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Donetsk City.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has canceled its annual "Army Games" international competition for the second year in a row, prompting celebration among critical Russian ultranationalist milbloggers.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces are reportedly concentrating forces of unspecified size in western Belgorod Oblast near the border with Ukraine, likely to fix and draw Ukrainian forces to the area and prepare for offensive operations that aim to expand the Russian foothold in the international border area in northeastern Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 26 that Russian forces are preparing for new offensive actions and are concentrating a grouping of an unspecified size near the Ukrainian border 90 kilometers northwest of Kharkiv City. Zelensky appears to be referring to the Grayvoron-Borisovka-Proletarskiy area in western Belgorod Oblast, and ISW has observed satellite imagery of the area that suggests that Russian forces have expanded activities at depots and warehouses in settlements in the area in recent weeks. The current size of the possible Russian force concentration in the Grayvoron-Borisovka-Proletarskiy area remains unclear, however. Ukrainian State Border Service Representative Andrei Demchenko stated on May 26 that Russian forces may launch offensive operations into Sumy Oblast or areas of Kharkiv Oblast bordering Sumy Oblast in order to stretch and fix Ukrainian forces further along the international border area in northeastern Ukraine.

The Grayvoron-Borisovka-Proletarskiy area would notably offer Russian forces opportunities to launch offensive operations to the south in the direction of Zolochiv and Bohodukhiv, two Ukrainian towns northwest of Kharkiv City within 25 kilometers of the international border, or to the west in the direction of settlements along the P-45 highway that connects Bohodukhiv with Sumy City. Russian forces could pursue offensive operations in either one or both directions, and the Russian concentration here could be intended to cause Ukrainian forces to commit manpower and materiel to a wider section of the border in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts. Russian forces are also concentrating limited forces in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts close to the border with Sumy Oblast, and even limited concentrations in the areas could aim to achieve the likely desired effect of further drawing and fixing Ukrainian forces in the international border area. Russian forces are currently bringing the Northern Grouping of Forces in the international border area up to its reported planned end strength and will likely launch only limited offensive operations along the Sumy-Kharkiv axis until the Northern Grouping of Forces is closer to its end strength. Even limited Russian offensive operations in these areas will add pressure that stretches Ukrainian manpower and materiel along a wider front and possibly allow Russian forces to establish tactical footholds to support subsequent operations either northwest of Kharkiv City or in the direction of Sumy City. The Northern Grouping of Forces, even at the upper limit of its reported end strength, will lack the necessary manpower needed to conduct a successful operation to envelop, encircle, or seize Kharkiv or Sumy cities, however.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are reportedly concentrating forces of unspecified size in western Belgorod Oblast near the border with Ukraine, likely to fix and draw Ukrainian forces to the area and prepare for offensive operations that aim to expand the Russian foothold in the international border area in northeastern Ukraine.

• Western officials continue to publicly debate Ukraine's right to use Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia amid Russian efforts to persuade the West to continue its self-imposed limitations and divide the NATO alliance.

• Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) will reportedly manufacture and refurbish three times as many artillery shells as the West will produce in 2024, although Russian shells reportedly suffer from quality-control issues and Ukrainian artillery is reportedly more precise than Russian artillery.

• Kremlin officials continue to indicate that Russia is not interested in meaningful negotiations with Ukraine and promote Kremlin information operations that aim to push the West to make concessions on Ukraine's sovereign territory and people.

• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Svatove, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.

• Former Wagner Group fighters reportedly continue to form new units under Rosgvardia and Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz.

Institute for the Study of War

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly called on member states to lift their prohibitions against Ukraine using Western-provided weapons to strike within Russian territory. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly adopted a declaration on May 27 calling for NATO states to support Ukraine's "international right" to defend itself by lifting "some restrictions" on Ukraine's use of Western weapons to strike Russian territory. The declaration also calls for member states to accelerate their deliveries of critical weapons to Ukraine, and more than 200 representatives of NATO member states supported the declaration. Some NATO states, including the UK, have already lifted such restrictions on weapons they provide to Ukraine, but not enough Western states have done so to allow Ukraine to challenge Russia's sanctuary from which it can freely conduct airstrikes or stage ground operations against Ukraine. Swedish Defense Minister Pal Jonson told Swedish outlet Hallandsposten on May 26 in response to a question about Ukraine using Swedish-provided weapons against Russian territory that Sweden supports Ukraine's right under international law to defend itself through combat operations against Russian territory so long as these operations comply with international laws on combat.

Key Takeaways:

• The NATO Parliamentary Assembly called on member states to lift their prohibitions against Ukraine using Western-provided weapons to strike within Russian territory.

• Spain signed a 10-year bilateral security agreement with Ukraine on May 27.

• Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian long-range early warning radar systems and oil and gas infrastructure within Russia on May 26 and 27.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly told German Chancellor Olaf Scholz before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine that Ukraine is not an independent state and that Russia can unilaterally and forcibly change Ukraine's borders.

• The New York Times (NYT) reported on May 26 that Western intelligence officials stated that the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) are behind a series of low-level sabotage operations throughout Europe that aim to disrupt Western arms supplies to Ukraine and create the appearance of a European movement opposing support for Ukraine.

• Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on May 27 that he signed documents that will allow French military instructors to visit training centers in Ukraine.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) offered to help Armenia mitigate the effects of flooding in northern Armenia, although Armenia has not publicly requested help from Russia.

• Russian officials are considering delisting the Taliban as a prohibited organization in Russia and will likely do so in the near term.

• Russia may sign an agreement with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) exchanging weapons for a Russian logistics hub at Port Sudan on the Red Sea.

• Ukrainian forces recently made confirmed advances near Lyptsi and Russian forces advanced near Svatove and northwest of Avdiivka.

• Russian forces continue formalization efforts for irregular units.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin grossly misrepresented the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian domestic law on May 28 in order to further promote the Kremlin information operation claiming that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is no longer the legitimate president of Ukraine. Putin claimed on May 28 during a press conference in Tashkent, Uzbekistan that the Ukrainian Constitution provides for the extension of the powers of the Verkhovna Rada but "does not say anything about the extension of the powers of the president." Putin claimed that although the Ukrainian law on martial law prohibits presidential elections during martial law, which Ukraine was under for one month in 2018 and has been under since Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, "this does not mean that are prolonged." Putin cited Article 111 of the Ukrainian Constitution, which he alleged provides that "in this case...presidential powers are transferred to the speaker of the parliament." Putin claimed that "the only legitimate authority" remaining in Ukraine is the Verkhovna Rada and the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada. Putin claimed that "if wanted to hold presidential elections, then the law on martial law would have been abolished...and elections would be held."

Russian allegations about Zelensky's lack of legitimacy are a known Kremlin information operation that Kremlin officials have been promoting extensively in recent weeks, in part targeted at foreign audiences. Putin made similar claims rejecting Zelensky as the president of Ukraine during a press conference in Minsk, Belarus on May 24. Russian Ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov also denied Zelensky's legitimacy in an interview with Newsweek on May 25. Putin's May 28 allegations contain specific legal jargon and references - largely incorrect or taken out of their legal context - to the text of the Ukrainian Constitution and laws. Putin is likely purposely inflating his statements with such nuanced legalese language to make it seem that he is highly educated in Ukrainian legal matters and is a definitive voice on the matter. The use of such language is likely also meant to cause listeners to believe Putin's false narratives without fact-checking, as legal jargon is inherently dense and opaque. The Ukrainian Constitution and the law relating to martial law, however, are not so opaque that a normal reader cannot understand them. The fact that Kremlin officials have recently promoted these narratives in detail at events in foreign countries and major Western publications suggests that this Kremlin information operation is largely aimed at foreign – predominantly Western – audiences.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin grossly misrepresented the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian domestic law on May 28 in order to further promote the Kremlin information operation claiming that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is no longer the legitimate president of Ukraine.

• Ukrainian Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada Ruslan Stefanchuk directly responded to Putin's deliberate misinterpretation of Ukrainian law and explicitly stated that the Ukrainian Constitution and laws stipulate that Zelensky remain in office until the end of martial law in Ukraine.

• Russian allegations about Zelensky's lack of legitimacy are a known Kremlin information operation that Kremlin officials have been promoting extensively in recent weeks, in part targeted at foreign audiences.

• The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)'s Committee on Culture supported a resolution that recognizes Russia's deliberate erasure of Ukrainian culture as an element of Russia's genocidal campaign in occupied Ukraine, consistent with ISW's longstanding assessment that Russia is pursuing a broad occupation strategy premised on eradicating Ukraine's national identity and independence.

• Russian authorities are preparing to intensify the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia throughout Summer 2024, further consolidating another component of Russia's genocidal campaign in Ukraine.

• Iran's continued support for Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) and provision of lethal aid to Russia is bolstering Russia's technological output and military capabilities on the battlefield in Ukraine.

• The Georgian Parliament overrode Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili's veto of Georgia's Russian-style "foreign agents" law in an 84-to-4 vote on May 28.

• A limited segment of the Russian ultranationalist information space has resumed its standard public criticisms of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and warned that new Defense Minister Andrei Belousov may not solve certain systemic issues within the Russian MoD and military.

• Portugal and Belgium both signed long-term bilateral security agreements with Ukraine on May 28.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed support on May 28 for delisting the Taliban as a prohibited organization in Russia, indicating that Russia will likely do so soon.

• Ukrainian forces recently made confirmed advances near Lyptsi, and Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.

• The Russian military is reportedly intensifying efforts to recruit citizens from Central African countries to fight in Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

Advisor to the Head of the Ukrainian President's Office Mykhaylo Podolyak stated that US-provided military aid has started arriving on the frontline but that it will take "weeks" for the gradual increase in US-provided military aid to reach "critical volumes." Podolyak told Bloomberg in an article published on May 29 that Russian forces currently have the "absolute advantage" in shells and missiles and that Russian forces will continue to try to advance along the frontline presumably to take advantage of the time before US military assistance arrives in sufficient quantities at the front. Podolyak warned that Russia may be trying to force Ukraine and its allies to freeze the current frontline — a situation that ISW has long assessed would be advantageous to Russia by giving the Russian military time to reconstitute and prepare for renewed aggression against Ukraine. Additional Western military assistance will also likely take time to reach the frontlines and to be properly integrated into Ukrainian frontline troop formations. Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala stated on May 28 that the first "tens of thousands" of 155mm artillery ammunition sourced through the Czech-led initiative for Ukraine will arrive in Ukraine within "days."

Sweden announced its 16th and largest military aid package to Ukraine, worth 13.3 billion kronor (about $1.25 billion), on May 29. The Swedish Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that the package includes ASC 890 Airborne Surveillance and Control aircraft (the Swedish version of an airborne early warning and control airborne radar system) and RB 99-AMRAAM medium-range air-to-air missiles (that are also modified to be ground-to-air) to strengthen Ukrainian air defense capabilities, additional 155mm artillery ammunition, and "the entire Swedish stock" of Pansarbandvagn 302 armored vehicles among other provisions.

Western officials are increasingly suggesting that they support Ukraine's right to use Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia. French President Emmanuel Macron stated on May 28 at a joint press conference with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz that France supports Ukraine's use of French-provided weapons to strike Russian "military sites from which missiles are fired" and other Russian "military sites from which Ukraine is attacked" in Russian territory. Macron noted that Ukraine should not strike "other military" or civilian targets in Russia, likely referring to Russian sites that are not actively involved in attacks on Ukraine. Scholz stated at the May 28 press conference that Germany recognizes Ukraine's right to defend itself against Russian strikes under international law as long as "regulations" on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons are "within the framework of international law." Scholz's recognition of Ukraine's right to strike military targets on Russian territory is notable as it defines the issue in terms of international legal norms but ultimately does not reflect a change in Germany's position against providing Ukraine with long-range Taurus missiles or allowing Ukraine to strike military targets in Russia with German-provided weapons.

Key Takeaways:

• Advisor to the Head of the Ukrainian President's Office Mykhaylo Podolyak stated that US-provided military aid has started arriving on the frontline but that it will take "weeks" for the gradual increase in US-provided military aid to reach "critical volumes.

• Sweden announced its 16th and largest military aid package to Ukraine, worth 13.3 billion kronor (about $1.25 billion), on May 29.

• Western officials are increasingly suggesting that they support Ukraine's right to use Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Russian Presidential Aide Alexei Dyumin as Secretary of Russia's State Council on May 29.

• Russia blamed Ukraine for the recent several-month-long suspension of prisoner of war (POW) exchanges over the backdrop of reports of pervasive Russian abuses against Ukrainian POWs.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues his efforts to prepare the Russian population for a protracted war effort.

• Belarus suspended its participation in the Cold War-era Conventional Armed Forces (CFE) in Europe Treaty on May 28.

• Russian forces recently advanced north and northeast of Kharkiv City, near Kreminna, Chasiv Yar, and Avdiivka.

• Russia continues efforts to expand social benefits for Russian military personnel, veterans of the war in Ukraine, and their families.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US and Singaporean officials and highlighted the upcoming Global Peace Summit during the International Institute for Strategic Studies' (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June 2. Zelensky met with US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to discuss the battlefield situation, Ukraine's need for additional air defense systems, and the importance of Ukraine's ability to strike Russian military targets near Kharkiv Oblast.<1> Zelensky also met with Singaporean President Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, and Singaporean businessmen and emphasized Ukraine's interest in increasing its cooperation with Singapore and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).<2> Zelensky announced during the conference that 106 countries have confirmed their participation in the upcoming June 15-16 Global Peace Summit in Switzerland and noted that Ukraine invited every country to the upcoming summit except for Russia, which is the aggressor in this conflict.<3> Zelensky warned that Russian officials are attempting to disrupt the peace summit and discourage countries from attending the summit by threatening to "block" the import and export of food, agricultural, and chemical products. Zelensky also noted that the summit is an important step towards the resolution of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.<4> Ukrainian and Western media reported on June 2 that diplomatic sources in Saudi Arabia stated that Saudi Arabia will not participate in the Global Peace Summit following the May 31 announcement that the People's Republic of China (PRC) will not send a representative to the summit.<5>

The provision of Western air defense systems and the lifting of Western restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets in Russian territory with Western-provided weapons remain crucial for Ukraine to repel Russian glide bomb and missile strikes against Kharkiv City. A dozen Western countries have recently partially or completely lifted restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russian territory.<6> These policy changes will allow Ukrainian forces to use Western-provided systems to strike Russian firing and staging areas in Russia's border areas and airspace. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces downed a number of Russian military aircraft in February 2024, many of which were conducting glide bomb strikes in the Avdiivka direction.<7> Ukrainian forces' ability to down Russian military aircraft in a frontline area indicates that Ukrainian forces will likely be able to replicate the same effects with both Ukrainian and Western-provided systems to protect northern Kharkiv Oblast and Kharkiv City from Russian glide bomb strikes launched from Russian airspace. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has previously stated that Russian forces would not be able to seize Kharkiv City if Ukrainian forces received two Patriot air defense systems to deploy to the region.<8> Russian forces have targeted Kharkiv City with glide bombs and various missile strikes in the past several weeks, although two Patriot batteries in northern Kharkiv Oblast would have limited effectiveness in defending against Russian airstrikes without the ability to fire on Russian aircraft in Russian airspace.<9>

Ukrainian field commanders are reportedly compensating for training difficulties that mobilization has exacerbated by training new personnel on the frontline. Ukrainian field commanders told the Washington Post that they have devoted significant time to teaching basic skills to newly-redeployed personnel because they do not learn these skills at training centers.<10> The Washington Post reported on June 2 that Ukrainian soldiers who had served in the rear also lack adequate skills upon arrival at the front even though many had been serving in the military prior to the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022. The problems the Washington Post identified are not surprising in these circumstances. Most of the Ukrainian forces on the frontline have been fighting for more than two years and are exhausted, so Ukraine is under pressure to speedily rotate them with fresh forces and replace losses to maintain its defense.<11> There is a difficult tradeoff to make between pulling experienced soldiers from the frontline to train new personnel or accepting bottlenecks in training the new personnel. One Ukrainian officer reportedly told the Washington Post that Ukraine needs NATO instructors to train new personnel and to halve training times to one month.<12> Russian rear-area strike campaigns against even the westernmost regions of Ukraine have ensured that Ukraine has effectively no safe rear area in which it can safely train personnel, and sending personnel to train in NATO states – such as the ongoing UK-led Operation Interflex training program – both removes Ukrainian field commanders from the training process and increases the delay in deploying soldiers as Ukraine must transport these personnel to and from NATO states. Ukraine will not resolve these issues quickly, and the average overall quality of Ukrainian forces on the frontline will likely decrease as experienced personnel rotate out and newly-deployed personnel reach the frontline even as the number of available soldiers increases. New soldiers will likely learn rapidly as they fight alongside experienced veterans, however.

Ukrainian field commanders' decisions to train newly-deployed personnel on the front before committing them to combat indicates that the overall quality of Ukrainian forces will likely remain higher than that of Russian forces in the near- to mid-term. Russian forces have consistently used newly-deployed mobilized personnel, penal convicts, and fresh contract and volunteer soldiers without adequate training to conduct mass, infantry-led "meat assaults" to make marginal gains in Ukraine and have proven willing to continue suffering extensive casualties for these gains.<13> The Russian force generation mechanism has largely met the replacement rate of casualties in Ukraine, however, incentivizing fast redeployments of new personnel for additional "meat" assaults over effective training. Russian milbloggers have consistently complained about ineffective Russian training since partial mobilization in September 2022, and a former Russian Storm-Z instructor recently claimed that Russian "strategic" reserves are "doing nothing for months" due to training bottlenecks resulting from an inadequate number of instructors.<14> Further Ukrainian cooperation with NATO instructors, particularly if those NATO instructors assist training in rear areas in Ukraine, provides further opportunities for Ukraine to improve its basic training mechanisms and improve the quality of newly deployed personnel.

The New York Times (NYT) published an investigation on June 2 into the forced relocation and deportation of 46 Ukrainian children from a foster home in occupied Kherson Oblast during 2022.<15> The NYT analyzed photos, social media posts, and official government documents and concluded that Russian government officials participated in the forced relocation of these children and that occupation officials are withholding the children from their parents and relatives as part of a wider effort to strip Ukrainian children of their identities. The NYT reported that a Russian federal adoption site listed 22 of these Ukrainian children for adoption in Russia and placed at least two children with Russian families. The NYT consulted legal experts who determined that the Russian intent to strip children of their Ukrainian identity is a violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and may amount to a war crime. ISW analysts assisted with the preparation of this report by reviewing some of its findings and sources.

The Telegraph reported on June 1 in a since-removed article that British officials ordered the United Kingdom's (UK) Security Service (MI5) to refocus its counterintelligence efforts towards Russian, People's Republic of China (PRC), and Iranian agents operating in the UK.<16> Unnamed government sources told The Telegraph that the growing number of PRC agents and Iranian organized criminal groups in the UK have shifted MI5's recruiting targets and that the UK's support for Ukraine had led to increased Russian spying in the UK. ISW is refraining from publishing additional details from the article until The Telegraph provides further details about the article's removal.

Russian war commentator Alexander Artamonov drew backlash from Kremlin-affiliated Russian propagandists for claiming that Ukrainians are "second-class citizens." contradicting the Kremlin’s false efforts to portray Ukrainian and Russian people as one nation. Artamonov reportedly stated on a live broadcast on a Russian state television channel on June 1 that he "does not have a very high opinion of Ukrainians" and that he "insists Ukrainians are second-class citizens."<17> Russian State Duma Deputy and convicted unregistered Russian foreign agent Maria Butina, Russian ultranationalist and former State Duma Deputy Zakhar Prilepin, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milbloggers, and other pro-war Russian commentators heavily criticized Artamonov and reiterated the false narrative that Russians and Ukrainians are actually the same.<18> Artamonov notably received backlash for contradicting the Kremlin's established false narrative that claims that Ukrainians are Russians in an attempt to delegitimize and erase Ukrainian identity and justify Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian occupation officials and Russian forces in occupied Ukraine have subjugated Ukrainian civilians in occupied territory to violence, property theft, religious persecution, forced deportation, and impressment into the Russian military — all as part of an ongoing campaign to eradicate an independent Ukrainian national and cultural identity.<19>

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US and Singaporean officials and highlighted the upcoming Global Peace Summit during the International Institute for Strategic Studies' (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June 2.
The provision of Western air defense systems and the lifting of Western restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets Russian territory with Western-provided weapons remain crucial for Ukraine to repel Russian glide bomb and missile strikes against Kharkiv City.
Ukrainian field commanders are reportedly compensating for training difficulties that mobilization has exacerbated by training new personnel on the frontline.
Ukrainian field commanders' decisions to train newly-deployed personnel on the front before committing them to combat indicates that the overall quality of Ukrainian forces will likely remain higher than that of Russian forces in the near- to mid-term.
The New York Times (NYT) published an investigation on June 2 into the forced relocation and deportation of 46 Ukrainian children from a foster home in occupied Kherson Oblast during 2022.
The Telegraph reported on June 1 in a since-removed article that British officials ordered the United Kingdom's (UK) Security Service (MI5) to refocus its counterintelligence efforts towards Russian, People's Republic of China (PRC), and Iranian agents operating in the UK.
Russian war commentator Alexander Artamonov drew backlash from Kremlin-affiliated Russian propagandists for claiming that Ukrainians are "second-class citizens." contradicting the Kremlin’s false efforts to portray Ukrainian and Russian people as one nation.
Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Avdiivka, Donetsk City, and Krynky.
Russia continues to indoctrinate Russian minors into military-political thinking to set conditions for long-term force generation.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-300/400 air defense battery in Belgorod Oblast likely with HIMARS on June 1 or 2. Geolocated imagery published on June 3 shows two destroyed launchers and a damaged command post of a Russian S-300/400 air defense system in a field east of Kiselyovo (just north of Belgorod City).<1> Russian sources widely speculated that Ukrainian forces used US-provided HIMARS, but Ukrainian officials have yet to comment on the strike.<2> The S-300/400 air defense system was located roughly 60 kilometers from the current frontline in northern Kharkiv Oblast and over 80 kilometers from Kharkiv City, which is within the range of HIMARS but exceeds the range of other MLRS systems that Ukrainian forces reportedly use to conduct strikes into Belgorod Oblast.<3> Russian sources have increasingly claimed that Ukrainian forces are using HIMARS to strike Belgorod Oblast since the US partially lifted its restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use US-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russian border areas with Kharkiv Oblast.<4> Russian sources will likely continue to characterize any successful strike in Belgorod Oblast as a HIMARS strike regardless of the system used.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are reportedly in disagreement about economic issues such as the proposed Power of Siberia 2 (PS-2) pipeline despite publicly portraying themselves as diplomatically aligned. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 2 that three unspecified sources familiar with the matter stated that the PRC and Russia disagree about the details of the PS-2 gas pipeline, with the PRC wanting to pay prices near Russia's subsidized domestic gas prices and to only commit to buying a small part of the pipeline's planned capacity.<5> Gazprom Head Alexei Miller reportedly did not accompany Russian President Vladimir Putin on his recent visit to the PRC due to these disagreements over the pipeline. FT reported that Putin asked PRC President Xi Jinping during their May 2024 meetings to come to an agreement on the pipeline, but FT reported that sources said that a pipeline agreement "remains distant." FT noted that Russia needs the pipeline to launch as expected more than the PRC. FT reported that it gained access to an unreleased report by an unspecified major Russian bank that stated that if the PS-2 pipeline does not launch in 2029, Gazprom's profits are forecasted to drop by almost 15 percent, which is especially significant following Gazprom's $6.9 billion loss in 2023, its largest loss in more than 25 years. FT, citing a recent report by Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy, also stated that the PRC will mostly or entirely be able to meet its projected increased demand for imported gas with existing supply contracts until 2030, but that the PRC's demand for imported gas will exceed the capacity of its existing contracts by about 150 billion cubic meters by 2040.<6> The PRC is likely aware of Russia's more immediate need for the pipeline and is using Beijing's upper hand in the energy sphere to extract concessions from Russia on the issue.

Putin also reportedly asked Xi in May 2024 to "snub" the upcoming Ukrainian peace conference in Switzerland amid continued Russian efforts to discredit and otherwise undermine the peace conference.<7> Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated on June 3 that Russia is trying to discredit the upcoming Ukrainian peace summit by convincing other states that the summit is insignificant, that they should not participate, and that if they do they should participate at the lowest possible level.<8> Other Ukrainian officials have recently emphasized that it is imperative for both the United States and the PRC to attend the June 2024 peace summit as their participation is "decisive" in compelling Russia to participate in the process of restoring peace and security.<9> The PRC announced on May 31 that it would not be joining the peace summit, and Saudi Arabia has reportedly decided not to attend.<10>

Russian forces continue to abuse Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of the Geneva Convention on POWs. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lyubinets amplified footage on June 2 showing a group of three Russian servicemen beating, threatening, and harassing a group of four Ukrainian POWs.<11> The footage shows one Russian serviceman shooting the ground immediately next to a POW's head and the Russian servicemen forcing the POWs to sing the Russian national anthem. Lyubinets stated the preliminary information suggests that the incident was filmed in the Kharkiv direction, where Russian forces recently began offensive operations. The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office reported on June 3 that it opened an investigation into the incident.<12> Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii identified the Russian serviceman who filmed the video as Alexei Kirpin, a former soldier in the far-right "Rusich" assault formation.<13> Ukraine-based ZMINA Human Rights Center reported that Russian authorities are also mistreating and beating Ukrainian POWs in pre-trial detention centers in Russia.<14> ISW has observed evidence of widespread violations of the Geneva Convention on POWs committed by the Russian military in recent months, including Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs and using POWs as human shields on the battlefield.<15>

Russian military and political leadership continues to pursue increased military, political, and economic cooperation with several African states. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov traveled to Benghazi, Libya on May 31 and met with Libyan National Army (LNA) Commander-in-Chief Khalifa Haftar at the Ar Rajma military base in eastern Libya.<16> Yevkurov promised to enhance LNA capabilities in eastern Libya.<17> Russia has recently reinforced its military presence in eastern Libya and increased deployments of Russian military personnel and supplies to the area since at least March 2024.<18> The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project (CTP) previously assessed that the intensified Russian military efforts in Libya are likely partially contributing to the wider Kremlin effort to secure a naval base in Tobruk, Libya, and that Yevkurov has been particularly involved in negotiations with LNA officials over Russian naval basing in Libya since August 2023.<19> Yevkurov also traveled to Niger on June 3 to meet with Nigerien junta head Abdirahmane Tiani, Nigerien junta defense minister Salifou Modi, and Nigerian junta interior minister Mohamed Toumba, reportedly signing a "multi-sectoral cooperation" memorandum of understanding.<20> Russia has recently increased its military presence in Niger—the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s Africa Corps deployed to Niger in April 2023 and stated its intentions to replace US forces in northern Niger, then entered a base housing US military personnel in the country in May 2024.<21> The US notably intends to remove all American troops from Niger by September 15, 2024.<22> Alongside increased Russian military presence in Niger and efforts to supplant US forces, Russia is also reportedly seeking to take over uranium assets in Niger currently held by French state-controlled company Orano SA, and the "multi-sectoral cooperation" agreement signed by Yevkurov and his Nigerien counterparts may support this Russian effort.<23>

While Yevkurov primarily pursues military cooperation with African states, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is also visiting Africa to discuss Russian political and economic engagement with various African partners. Lavrov met with Guinean junta officials in Conarky, Guinea, on June 3 to discuss Russian-Guinean relations.<24> The Guinean junta's relationship with Russia is complicated, but the Kremlin maintains substantial economic and resource-based interests in Guinea. Russia depends on Guinea for a significant share of its bauxite, a refined-mineral-based material that is used in the production of spark plug insulators and other circuit and furnace related industrial goods.<25> The Kremlin may desire to maintain access to bauxite to support the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). Lavrov also met Congolese officials in Ollombo, Congo on the evening of June 3, to discuss the situation in Libya, as Congolese President Denis Sassou-Nguesso’s is the head of the African Union High-Level Committee on the Crisis in Libya.<26> Russian officials have attempted to maintain firm relations with Congo over the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, with Lavrov visiting Congo in 2022 and Russian President Vladimir Putin calling Neguesso in March 2024.<27> Lavrov is also expected to travel to Chad on June 5 and Burkina Faso sometime in the coming days as well.<28> Lavrov's visit to Chad in particular continues Russian efforts to grow ties with the Chadian regime since Putin met with Chadian President Mahamat Déby in Moscow in January 2024, and Russia likely aims to establish itself as the primary security partner across the Sahel to advance Russia’s economic and military interests in the region.<29> CTP previously forecast that aligning with Russia and the Russia-backed Sahelian juntas could pave the way for the Chadian junta to expand its defense and economic ties with Russia to address its own regime security needs and internal pressure to distance itself from the West.<30>

The Russian military is reportedly forcibly sending Russian servicemembers who refused to fight to the front in Ukraine from Russia instead of standing trial for their refusal to participate in combat. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on June 3 that Russian military authorities began forcibly sending hundreds of Russian servicemembers who refused to take part in Russian combat operations to the front in Ukraine, including to northern Kharkiv Oblast and Donetsk Oblast, in May 2024.<31> Verstka stated that the Russian military holds the servicemembers at military unit basepoints in Russia as they await trial for crimes related to their refusal to fight before suddenly cancelling their trials and immediately sending them to Ukraine. Verstka reported that Russian authorities used physical abuse to coerce some soldiers into volunteering to go to Ukraine before forcing others from their holding cells at gunpoint and transporting them to the frontlines. Verstka reported that Sverdlovsk Oblast Commissioner for Human Rights Tatyana Merzlyankova claimed on May 6 that she visited a collection point for servicemembers who refused to fight but that management stated that there were no violations of the servicemembers' civil rights. Verstka reported that Russian authorities cancelled the trials of at least 170 servicemembers who refused to fight and deployed them to Ukraine and that investigators, prosecutors, and lawyers were all unaware of this. Verstka reported that several sources, including one source from the Russian presidential administration, stated that the Russian military sends conscripts and "incompetent" reservists, who have signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), to noncombat roles in Russia's border forces to free up experienced military personnel for the Russian offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast, but that the Russian military is also sending deserters to fight. A Russian lawyer, who specializes in cases related to servicemembers refusing to fight, reportedly stated that the Russian MoD may be stopping criminal cases to send such servicemembers to the front due to a shortage of forces needed to fight in northern Kharkiv Oblast. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces likely launched the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast when the Northern Grouping of Forces was understrength, and the Russian MoD may be sending servicemembers awaiting their trials to the front in Kharkiv Oblast to strengthen the limited forces in the area.<32>

Georgian Parliament Speaker Shalva Papuashvili signed the Russian-style "foreign agents" bill into law on June 3 amid continued protests.<33> The Georgian Parliament overwhelmingly overrode Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili's veto of the law on May 28, and Georgian Dream Secretary General Kakha Kaladze stated on June 3 that Georgian officials will fine and seize the property of any organizations that refuse to register under the law.<34>

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-300/400 air defense battery in Belgorod Oblast likely with HIMARS on June 1 or 2.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are reportedly in disagreement about economic issues such as the proposed Power of Siberia 2 (PS-2) pipeline despite publicly portraying themselves as diplomatically aligned.
Putin also reportedly asked Xi in May 2024 to "snub" the upcoming Ukrainian peace conference in Switzerland amid continued Russian efforts to discredit and otherwise undermine the peace conference.
Russian forces continue to abuse Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in violation of the Geneva Convention on POWs.
Russian military and political leadership continues to pursue increased military, political, and economic cooperation with several African states.
The Russian military is reportedly forcibly sending Russian servicemembers who refused to fight to the front in Ukraine from Russia instead of standing trial for their refusal to participate in combat.
Georgian Parliament Speaker Shalva Papuashvili signed the Russian-style "foreign agents" bill into law on June 3 amid continued protests.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyptsi, Avdiivka, and Velyka Novoslika and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
The family members of mobilized Russian personnel continue to protest for the demobilization of their relatives.

Institute for the Study of War

Select Russian military commentators continue to complain about superior Ukrainian drone and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities on the battlefield, continuing to highlight the rapid and constant tactical and technological innovation cycles that are shaping the battlespace in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger who formerly served as a "Storm-Z" unit instructor posted a list of complaints on June 4 detailing the challenges that Russian forces face in repelling Ukrainian drones and claimed that effective and pervasive Ukrainian drone use is now the "leading factor" in Ukraine's ability to repel Russian offensive actions.<1> The milblogger made six points about the Russian-Ukrainian drone disparity, claiming first and foremost that Ukrainian troops have a large numerical advantage in first person view (FPV) drones and FPV drone operators. The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian assault groups have a 3-4:1 FPV drone advantage over Russian assault units, while Ukrainian mechanized groups have a 6-10:1 FPV drone advantage over comparable Russian units. The milblogger noted that Ukraine also has specialized and centralized drone units within existing Ukrainian ground units, which allows Ukrainian forces to better integrate reconnaissance and attack drone capabilities into basic tactical maneuvers. Russian forces, by contrast, lack the centralized and organized drone-unit system and adequate EW and electronic reconnaissance (ER) capabilities to counter Ukrainian drones.<2> Another milblogger, whose initial post from May 31 spurred the former Storm-Z instructor to weigh in on the issue, noted that specialized Ukrainian drone units have heavily targeted and destroyed unprotected Russian armored equipment in the Avdiivka direction, inhibiting Russian offensive prospects in the area.<3> The milblogger emphasized that the provision of FPV drones and required EW and ER systems to Russian forces is done on an ad hoc volunteer basis, as there is no centralized supply mechanism from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). These remarks on Russia's need to centralize its drone warfare capabilities echo recent calls made by a cadre of Russian commentators, including former Russian Space Agency (Roscosmos) head Dmitry Rogozin.<4> As Ukrainian forces adapt and better integrate new technologies into their force, Russian forces will likely feel pressured to do the same in order to retain technological and tactical parity on the battlefield. This offense-defense and capability scaling race is central to the development of combat means in a contemporary war.

Ukraine and its partners have reportedly drafted a document for the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland on June 15 that calls for future engagement with Russia on a limited number of issues connected to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, although the Kremlin remains unlikely to engage in meaningful negotiations on the proposal or any wider settlement to the war in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on June 4 that the draft document aims to generate consensus among summit participants on nuclear safety, food security, and the return of abducted Ukrainian civilians and children.<5> The document reportedly states that this consensus will serve as a "confidence building measure" for future engagement with Russian officials on these issues.<6> The reported document specifically deems nuclear threats as "inadmissible" and calls for the return of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to Ukrainian control, and freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov so that Ukrainian agricultural products can reach third parties and the return of all deported and unlawfully displaced Ukrainian children and civilians to Ukraine.<7>

Russian officials have routinely been explicitly hostile to engagement with Ukraine on many of these issues, however. The Kremlin frequently threatens Ukraine and the West with nuclear weapons in order to promote Western self-deterrence. The Kremlin also uses nuclear rhetoric as a common tool of its reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing Western decision-making.<8> Russian officials have repeatedly attempted to use Russia’s physical control over the ZNPP to try to force international organizations to legitimize Russia's occupation of the ZNPP and by extension Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory.<9> Russia withdrew from the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which facilitated limited agricultural exports from Ukrainian ports, in July 2023 and has since routinely targeted Ukrainian ports and agricultural infrastructure in southern Ukraine in an effort to constrain Ukraine's ability to provide grain and other agricultural products to its partners.<10> Russian officials have shown very limited openness to the return of Ukrainian children from Russia and occupied Ukraine to Ukraine through mediation with third parties.<11> The Kremlin and Russian occupation officials continue to deport Ukrainian civilians and children from occupied Ukraine, however, and there is no indication that Russia is willing to stop this campaign or return deported and unlawfully displaced Ukrainians back to Ukraine at scale.<12> The Kremlin continues to feign interest in meaningful negotiations with Ukraine in an effort to push the West to make concessions on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and the Kremlin may use engagement on these more limited issues to pursue similar concessions.<13>

Russia is conducting a wide-scale hybrid warfare campaign targeting NATO states in tandem with Russian efforts to augment its conventional military capabilities in preparation for a potential conflict with NATO. Bloomberg reported on June 3 that Norwegian Chief of Defense Eirik Kristoffersen stated that NATO has a window of two to three years to rebuild its forces and stocks before Russia has rebuilt its own ability to conduct a conventional attack, presumably against NATO.<14> Kristoffersen stated that this expedited time frame is due to Russia's current elevated defense industrial base (DIB) output. Western officials also continue to highlight Russia's current engagement in hybrid warfare activities across Europe. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 4 that Western governments are trying to formulate a response to the growing series of Russian-backed sabotage attempts on military bases and civilian infrastructure in Europe.<15> FT reported that an unspecified Western defense advisor stated that Russia has a "highly developed lexicon" for hybrid warfare, including information and psychological operations and sabotage. The defense advisor noted that Russia is learning from and adapting its hybrid warfare operations, stating that Russia is "constantly observing" the West's reactions to these hybrid warfare operations and "testing to see which of actions work." FT reported that Russia has resorted to using proxies, such as operatives from criminal gangs, to conduct the sabotage attacks after European governments expelled hundreds of Russian diplomats and spies. NATO and its member states have repeatedly warned about intensifying Russian hybrid operations on NATO member territory.<16>

A joint investigation by Russian opposition student journal DOXA and open-source outlet Kidmapping highlights the role of the Kremlin-backed Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Russifying Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have deported to Russia.<17> DOXA found that from the early days of Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian officials deported children from orphanages and boarding schools in occupied Donetsk Oblast to Russia's Rostov Oblast, where they were visited by Metropolitan Mercury (Igor Ivanov) of Rostov and Novocherkassk, who spoke to them about the ROC and seemingly enticed them to consider baptism into the ROC.<18> ROC clergy have also called for the baptism of deported Ukrainian children into the ROC and reportedly encouraged them to join various "military-patriotic" youth organizations in Russia.<19> DOXA and Kidmapping also found that deported children from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts stayed at shelters run by the ROC in Voronezh Oblast, where ROC clergy and affiliated officials hold "military-patriotic" events for the deported children in order to encourage pro-Russian and pro-ROC sentiment and cut the children off from their Ukrainian identities.<20> ISW has previously assessed that the ROC is instrumental in enacting the Kremlin's occupation plan for Ukraine, and this appears to extend to Russian efforts to Russify deported Ukrainian children living in Russia.<21> Kremlin-appointed Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, against whom the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant due to her role in facilitating the deportation of Ukrainian children, is notably married to an ROC priest.<22> Lvova-Belova and her husband have themselves adopted a deported Ukrainian child from Mariupol, highlighting the personal involvement of the ROC and other Kremlin officials in the deportation of Ukrainian children.<23> ISW continues to assess that the deportation of Ukrainian children, with the intent to destroy their Ukrainian identities via such Russification projects, amounts to a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which prohibits "forcibly transferring children of a group to another group" on grounds that it is an act of genocide.<24>

Russian President Vladimir Putin named First Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council and United Russia Secretary Andrei Turchak the acting governor of the Altai Republic on June 4.<25> Turchak chaired the Russian State Duma "Special Military Operation" Working Group dedicated to resolving issues with Russia's war effort in Ukraine and reported on the working group's efforts directly to Putin.<26> Former Altai Republic Head Oleg Khorokhordin resigned on June 4 reportedly to transition to a new, unspecified position.<27> Putin met with Turchak via videoconference to discuss Turchak's new position and stated that the Altai Republic is a "promising but difficult" multinational republic where the Russian government wants to develop the tourism industry.<28> Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on June 3 that three sources close to the Russian presidential administration stated that the Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative in the Ural Federal District Vladimir Yakushev may replace Turchak as United Russia Secretary.<29>

Russian sources speculated on the meaning behind Turchak's appointment. Russian opposition outlet Meduza stated that sources close to the presidential administration noted that Putin offered Turchak the position during a videoconference, not during a personal meeting as Putin usually does.<30> Meduza's sources reportedly stated that Turchak's new position is a demotion, comparing it to an "execution" and "deportation to a colony settlement." A source reportedly stated that Turchak lost his position in the "power vertical" and that Turchak must have "seriously screwed up." Meduza reported that a source close to the St. Petersburg government claimed that Putin moved Turchak because Turchak was "too active" in St. Petersburg and St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov complained to Putin — a version with which other Meduza sources reportedly disagreed. A Russian milblogger refuted claims that Turchak's appointment is "political exile" and claimed that the Altai Republic is geographically important given its position near Central Asia and Xinjiang, China.<31> The milblogger claimed that the West is active in Central Asia and that Russia will need logistics hubs and a strong executive power in the area if there are "serious showdowns" in Central Asia between the West and Russia. A Russian insider source claimed that the Russian government may launch a new association of federal subjects that Turchak will supervise.<32> The insider source claimed that the Russian government may hold a referendum, which Turchak will also oversee, to unify the Altai Republic and neighboring Altai Krai. There are multiple defense industrial enterprises in Altai Krai, and if the insider source's claim about plans to unify Altai Republic and Altai Krai are true, the Kremlin may have appointed Turchak to oversee Russian defense industrial efforts in the region as part of a wider Kremlin effort to increase Russia's defense industrial production.<33> Putin may have also moved Turchak in an effort to sideline and demote him without having to make a public show of the demotion, especially if Putin was displeased with Turchak's advocacy for Russian servicemembers fighting in Ukraine.

Newly appointed Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov reportedly invited select Russian war correspondents and milbloggers to meet with him to coopt several Russian information space actors, prompting limited criticism from a prominent Russian milblogger. A Russian insider source claimed on May 26 that Belousov planned to meet with milbloggers and military correspondents to demonstrate that he has "nothing in common with his predecessor Sergei Shoigu."<34> The Russian information space largely celebrated Belousov's appointment as Defense Minister and expressed hope that his appointment would foster positive changes to the endemic problems that persisted under Shoigu's MoD, such as the Shoigu MoD’s tendency to lie about Russia’s military performance in Ukraine and failures to adequately supply frontline forces.<35> ISW has previously observed that the Kremlin began efforts to coopt Russian milbloggers critical of the Russian military's poor performance in the war in Ukraine by offering them state awards and government positions starting in November 2022 in an effort to regain control over the Russian information space.<36> A prominent Russian milblogger, who has previously criticized the Russian MoD and routinely posts complaints on his Telegram channel from Russian servicemen on the frontlines, claimed that Belousov invited a limited number of already-respected military correspondents, whom the Kremlin has coopted and likely deemed to be "safe," and milbloggers to meet with him.<37> The milblogger further claimed that he would not be surprised if Russian MoD employees from the "old team," likely referring to Shoigu's affiliates at the Russian MoD, organized the meeting and expressed doubt that the Russian MoD would listen to milblogger suggestions. Russian milbloggers appear to be experimenting with different ways to express critical opinions of the Russian MoD following Belousov's appointment, and Belousov may be meeting with military correspondents to constrain this criticism.<38>

Key Takeaways:

Select Russian military commentators continue to complain about superior Ukrainian drone and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities on the battlefield, continuing to highlight the rapid and constant tactical and technological innovation cycles that are shaping the battlespace in Ukraine.
Ukraine and its partners have reportedly drafted a document for the Global Peace Summit in Switzerland on June 15 that calls for future engagement with Russia on a limited number of issues connected to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, although the Kremlin remains unlikely to engage in meaningful negotiations on the proposal or any wider settlement to the war in Ukraine.
Russia is conducting a wide-scale hybrid warfare campaign targeting NATO states in tandem with Russian efforts to augment its conventional military capabilities in preparation for a potential conflict with NATO
A joint investigation by Russian opposition student journal DOXA and open-source outlet Kidmapping highlights the role of the Kremlin-backed Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Russifying Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have deported to Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin named First Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council and United Russia Secretary Andrei Turchak the acting governor of the Altai Republic on June 4.
Newly appointed Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov reportedly invited select Russian war correspondents and milbloggers to meet with him to coopt several Russian information space actors, prompting limited criticism from a prominent Russian milblogger.
Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Siversk, and Donetsk City.
The Russian military reportedly continues to forcibly send Russian military personnel, including those with serious medical issues, to fight in Ukraine.
Russia continues efforts to militarize deported Ukrainian youth and prepare them for future service in the Russian armed forces.

Institute for the Study of War

US officials continue to attempt to clarify US policy regarding Ukraine's ability to strike a limited subset of Russian military targets within Russia with US-provided weapons, but public communications about US policy remain unclear. US National Security Spokesperson John Kirby stated during a press conference on June 4 that "there's never been a restriction on the Ukrainians shooting down hostile aircraft, even if those aircraft are not necessarily in Ukrainian airspace."<1> Kirby made this statement in response to a question about whether America's recent partial lifting of restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike targets within Russia with US-provided weapons pertains to strikes against Russian aircraft operating in Russian airspace. Kirby suggested that Ukrainian forces can shoot down Russian aircraft within Russian airspace if they "pose an impending threat" to Ukraine and stated that Ukrainian forces already have done so since the beginning of the war. It remains unclear what the official US policy on what Russian aircraft constitute "an impending threat" to Ukraine, and Kirby's statements did not elucidate how the US administration views this issue. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's ability to defend itself against devastating Russian glide bomb strikes is heavily contingent on Ukraine's ability to target Russian aircraft within Russian airspace using US-provided air defense systems before Russian aircraft can launch strikes at Ukrainian cities, critical infrastructure, and frontline positions.<2> The current lack of clarity in US restrictions on Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons to strike Russian military assets within Russia has routinely missed the opportunity to force Russia to self-deter against conducting such strikes on Ukrainian territory from Russian airspace.<3> Russian forces continued to conduct intense glide bomb attacks against Ukraine on June 5, likely largely from Russian airspace.<4>|

Kirby also stated during the press conference that the US cannot confirm if Ukraine has already used US-provided weapons in strikes on Russia since the US partially loosened its restrictions on May 30, but the Associated Press (AP) reported on June 5, citing an unnamed US senator and Western official, that Ukraine has used US-provided weapons to strike Russia "in recent days."<5> ISW has observed geolocated footage from June 1 or 2 that shows a likely Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian S-300/400 air defense system in Belgorod Oblast.<6>

Western-provided artillery ammunition has reportedly started arriving to Ukrainian forces on the frontline, although not at a scale that would allow Ukrainian forces to fully challenge the Russian military's current artillery shell advantage. Ukrainian soldiers operating near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) told the Telegraph in an article published on June 5 that Western-provided ammunition started to reach their sector of the frontline, but that Russian forces in the area still maintain a munitions advantage.<7> One Ukrainian soldier told the Telegraph that Russian forces still maintain a five-to-one artillery advantage. A Ukrainian soldier operating in an unspecified area of the frontline told Estonian outlet ERR that Western-provided ammunition began to "trickle" to the frontline but has not arrived at scale.<8> The Ukrainian soldier stated that Russian forces continue to have a "significant advantage" in munitions. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are attempting to make tactically and operationally significant gains before US military assistance arrives to Ukrainian forces at the frontline at scale, and that the initial arrival of Western-provided weaponry will take some time to have tactical to operational effect on the frontline.<9>

Russian missile and drone strikes have caused significant long-term damage to Ukraine's energy grid, and Ukraine will reportedly face even greater energy constraints in summer 2024. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 5 that Russia has knocked out or captured over half of Ukraine's power generation capacity, bringing Ukrainian energy production to below 20 gigawatts (likely meaning per year) from 55 gigawatts per year before the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.<10> European Union (EU) Ambassador to Ukraine Katarina Matherovna told FT that Russia has destroyed 9.2 gigawatts of annual Ukrainian generation capacity since resuming large scale missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in late March 2024.<11> A Ukrainian official told FT that Russian forces damaged 1.2 gigawatts of annual Ukrainian generation capacity alone during strikes against energy infrastructure on the night of May 31 to June 1.<12> Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo stated on June 5 that it expects the Ukrainian energy system to face its most difficult period in the middle of summer 2024 as energy consumption increases due to the heat.<13> The Russian military has attempted to exploit degraded Ukrainian air defense capabilities in spring 2024 to collapse Ukraine's energy grid and constrain Ukraine's defense industrial capacity.<14> Russia will likely continue periodic large-scale strikes against energy infrastructure to cause significant long-term damage that degrades Ukrainian war fighting capabilities while setting conditions for pronounced humanitarian pressures in winter 2024–2025.

Ukrainian outlet Liga reported on June 4 that a source in Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that there are roughly 550,000 Russian military and paramilitary personnel concentrated in occupied Ukraine and near the international border.<15> The GUR source reportedly stated that there are about 32,000 Rosgvardia, Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), and other law enforcement personnel operating in occupied Ukraine, in addition to about 520,000 Russian military personnel in and around Ukraine. ISW cannot independently confirm these figures, and the numbers likely encompass combat and other non-combat military personnel who perform support functions and do not represent Russia's immediate combat power. Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated that as of May 3 there were roughly 510,000 to 515,000 Russian personnel deployed in Ukraine.<16> Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in December 2023 that there were 617,000 Russian personnel in the “combat zone,” likely referring to all Russian military personnel in the zone of the “special military operation,” which includes staging areas in border areas within Russia.<17> GUR Spokesperson Andriy Yusov reported in January 2024 that there are 35,000 Rosgvardia personnel in occupied Ukraine and that Russian authorities are considering deploying more Rosgvardia personnel to occupied areas.<18>

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on June 4 that former Russian Defense Minister and Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu will coordinate efforts to increase Russian defense industrial capacity alongside former Tula Oblast Governor and Presidential Aide Alexei Dyumin and Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev.<19> Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov stated that Shoigu, Dyumin, and Medvedev will each oversee an unspecified aspect of the effort to increase Russian defense industrial capacity.<20> Shoigu's roughly equivalent position with Dyumin and Medvedev further indicates that the Kremlin has demoted Shoigu following his removal from defense minister and suggests that he is a secondary figure in newly appointed Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov's task to significantly mobilize the Russian economy and DIB for a protracted war in Ukraine.<21> Putin routinely rotates Kremlin officials in and out of his personal favor with the aim of incentivizing them to strive to regain his support, and Putin may have tasked Dyumin and Shoigu with DIB efforts in order to maintain their devotion following Shoigu's demotion from his prior long-term role as defense minister and rebukes against Dyumin's possible effort to become defense minister in the aftermath of the Wagner Group's rebellion in June 2023.<22> Shoigu is currently working with the Presidential Administration's Military-Industrial Complex Commission and the Federal Service for Cooperation with Foreign Countries, suggesting that Shoigu is likely involved in the Kremlin's efforts to leverage relationships with Iran, North Korea, Belarus, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) to help Russia procure the components and materiel it needs for increasing military industrial capacity.<23> Putin recently appointed Dyumin to the board of state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec and specifically tasked Dyumin with assisting Russian efforts to provide the Russian military with necessary weapons and equipment.<24> It remains to be seen how involved Shoigu, Dyumin, and Medvedev will be in efforts to expand Russia's DIB, however, and their roles may be at most nominal.

The apparent demotion of former First Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council and United Russia Secretary Andrei Turchak on June 4 is likely part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ongoing effort to remove from power the political and military figures that violated his trust in 2023. The Russian Federal Council terminated Turchak’s powers on June 5 after Putin appointed Turchak to become the governor of Altai Republic on June 4.<25> Chairperson of the Russian Federation Council Valentina Matviyenko wryly stated in a farewell message that Turchak will turn Altai Republic into a “tourist Mecca.”<26> Russian insider sources and political bloggers widely claimed that Putin most likely removed Turchak from his position in Moscow for his allegedly close relationship with deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and conflict with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) over the control of occupied Ukrainian territories.<27> Some Russian insider sources and political bloggers also claimed that Putin may have also been dissatisfied with Turchak’s execution of a Kremlin effort to have Russian veterans participate in the Russian primaries in his role as the Chairperson of the Russian State Duma "Special Military Operation" Working Group, although some Russian sources pointed out that this failure was unlikely to have warranted Turchak’s exile to one of the most economically depressed regions in Russia over 4,000 kilometers from the Kremlin.<28> Some Russian sources also speculated that Turchak was demoted for his excessive involvement in local St. Petersburg political drama, and many sources cited Turchak’s tendency to intervene in Kremlin intrigues in an effort to improve his own political standing including by partnering up with former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.<29>

Putin had likely exiled Turchak from the Kremlin because he perceived Turchak to be disloyal to the regime. ISW previously observed Russian insider reports that Prigozhin used Turchak to directly deliver Wagner Group complaints about the Russian military failures in winter 2023 to Putin in hopes that this information would prompt Putin to reappoint Wagner-affiliated commanders.<30> Turchak reportedly delivered a blunt briefing about Russian military failures in February 2023 but did not convince Putin to initiate military command changes, likely because Putin perceived Turchak’s briefing as an act of disloyalty. ISW continues to assess that Putin values loyalty over competence and had previously interpreted Prigozhin’s complaints about supply shortages and military failures as acts of disloyalty.<31> A former Russian intelligence source notably revealed that Putin began to distance himself from Wagner after Prigozhin scolded him in October 2022.<32> One Russian political commentator connected Turchak’s demotion to the recent arrest of the former commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Major General Ivan Popov.<33> Popov published an audio recording in July 2023 in which he stated that he was fired after raising concerns over the need for troop rotations among Russian forces receiving the summer 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive.<34> Russian State Duma Deputy and former Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD) Lieutenant General Andrei Gurulev leaked Popov’s audio message, and Turchak notably implied that Popov was not involved in the leak.<35> ISW assessed that Popov likely deliberately recorded this message to appeal to the Kremlin to trigger a military command change within the Russian General Staff.<36> Popov also equated himself with a rebellion leader less than a month after the Wagner mutiny, and Turchak’s expressed support for Popov may have further convinced Putin of Turchak’s disloyalty.<37>

A recent meeting of the Kremlin-appointed Russian Human Rights Council (HRC) on Russia's migration policy reflects Russia's competing imperatives of attracting migrants to offset Russian labor shortages while also catering to its ultranationalist anti-migrant constituency. The HRC held a meeting on June 4 on "ensuring the rights of Russian citizens in the implementation of migration policy" and discussed several initiatives to strengthen Russian federal control over migrant communities living within Russia.<38> The HRC discussed making Russian language tests mandatory for all children of migrants hoping to enroll in schools and kindergartens; creating "social adaptation centers" for migrants to learn the Russian language; and recognizing children who do not speak Russian at the legally mandated level as having "special educational needs," all of which would require federal oversight and funding in order to ease the integration of migrants into the Russian social sphere.<39> Some participants of the HRC meeting proposed much harsher policy changes. For example, Kaluga Oblast Minster of Internal Policy Oleg Kalugin called for a rule prohibiting labor migrants from bringing their families to Russia in the first place, suggesting that the cost of helping integrate the families of migrants into Russian society is not worth the social burden on Russian society.<40> Russian business-focused outlet Kommersant noted that these policies are mainly targeted at migrant communities from Armenia and Central Asia, predominantly Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.<41> The meeting’s focus on migrant policy as a means to protect Russian citizens (mostly insinuated to be ethnic Russians or naturalized foreign citizens) rhetorically sets a strong wedge between "Russians" and "migrants" as opposing camps, and specifically identifies Central Asian migrants as potentially threatening the rights of Russian citizens. Russian domestic policy is increasingly trying to balance a heavy reliance on migrant labor, particularly from Central Asia, to maintain its domestic economy as it continues to compensate for economic shortfalls resulting from its war in Ukraine, while also disenfranchising migrant communities to cater to its vocal and influential ultranationalist constituency.<42> The HRC will similarly have to balance fostering a policy that encourages and attracts migrants to move to Russia in the hopes of obtaining economic benefit while also appeasing the cadre of commentators that espouse anti-migrant and xenophobic views that hold that migration policy is a threat to ethnic Russians.

Chechen Republic Rosgvardia Head and Russian State Duma Deputy Adam Delimkhanov accused State Duma Deputy Chairman and New People Party Head Vladislav Davankov of contradicting the Russian Constitution and attempting to divide Russian society, exposing continued tension between Chechen efforts to operate autonomously and the Russian state’s efforts to regulate perceived Islamic extremist threats from migrant and indigenous Muslim communities. Davankov submitted a bill to the State Duma on May 28 that would allow educational institutions and regional authorities to ban religious clothing that "partially or completely hides the face" from municipal and public spaces.<43> Delimkhanov responded to Davankov's proposal by claiming that the Russian Constitution guarantees religious freedom and noting that the hijab, which he claims is a religious obligation for Muslim women, does not cover the face.<44> Delimkhanov claimed that Chechens are against niqab, which covers the face, however. Delimkhanov further asserted that Davankov's bill could cause a rift in Russian society since he raised "one of the most sensitive topics" without "proper consideration of the subject." Delimkhanov also observed that Russian Orthodox Christianity expects women to wear headscarves for piety and humility. Davankov defended himself against Delimkhanov's criticisms citing Russia's secular education system and claimed that parents demanded the ban in schools given that migrant children "have difficulty speaking Russian, let alone wearing religious clothing."<45> Davankov also noted that the Russian Supreme Court upheld a ban against wearing religious garments in schools in the Mordovia Republic in 2015.<46> Delimkhanov's immediate criticism of Davankov highlights continued tension between the Chechen Republic and the Russian government's long-term efforts to subjugate Chechnya, likely exacerbated by intensified Kremlin crackdowns against indigenous and migrant Muslim communities following the March 22 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack.<47> The renewed debate on restrictions against Islamic religious clothing will likely continue to foster division along ethnic and religious lines, despite the Kremlin's efforts to portray Russia as a harmonious and united multiethnic and multi-confessional country.<48>

Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom reportedly assesses that it is unlikely to recover gas sales it lost following the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, illustrating how Western sanctions are achieving some long-term impacts against Russian revenue streams supporting Russia's war effort. The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 5 that Gazprom's leadership commissioned a report at the end of 2023 on the long-term prospects for gas sales, which found that Gazprom's annual exports to Europe by 2035 will average 50 billion to 75 billion cubic meters — roughly a third of its annual exports to Europe before the full-scale invasion.<49> Gazprom reportedly noted that a new pipeline to the People's Republic of China (PRC) aims to offset lost export volume to Europe but will only have the capacity to transport 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year.<50> Russia has relied on oil revenues to buoy federal budgets amid increased spending on its war in Ukraine, and long-term constraints on other energy exports will likely limit additional significant sources of funding for the Kremlin.<51> Russia has managed to rely on oil revenues to support a record level of defense spending in 2024 by engaging in a concerted effort to circumvent the G7's price cap on Russian oil and petroleum products.<52> The West is expanding sanctions to curtail Russian efforts to skirt the G7 price cap, and significant constraints on Russian oil exports could also achieve substantial impacts on Russian state revenue.<53>

Russian investigative outlet the Insider and Moldovan outlet Little Country published an investigation on June 5 detailing how former Moldovan Chief of the General Staff Igor Gorgan operated as an agent on behalf of the Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU). The Insider and Little Country reported that they obtained access to Telegram correspondence between Gorgan and his GRU handler Colonel Alexei Makarov which shows that Gorgan regularly reported on internal Moldovan matters and the visits of Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) representatives to Moldova since 2019.<54> The Insider reported that an unspecified military intelligence source stated that GRU's active contact with Gorgan began when Gorgan served on a NATO mission in 2004.<55> Gorgan served as Moldovan Chief of the General Staff in 2013 and from 2019 to 2021 and reportedly offered GRU information on Moldovan military capabilities and activities, requests from the Ukrainian MoD, and information about internal Moldovan politics.<56> Gorgan reportedly assured the GRU that he still has contacts in the Moldovan MoD who can continue to supply him with information.<57>Gorgan also reportedly routinely told Makarov that Moldova was ready for the arrival of Russian forces and that he would keep "the whole situation in the army under control" and help Russia "deal with politicians."<58> The GRU's response to Gorgan's offers is currently unclear. The Kremlin is engaged in efforts to destabilize Moldova and prevent Moldova's European Union accession, and Gorgan's relationship with the GRU illustrates how Russia is leveraging pro-Russian Moldovan actors in these efforts and how Russia could rely on such actors to conduct future hybrid operations or support conventional military aggression against Moldova.<59>

Key Takeaways:

US officials continue to attempt to clarify US policy regarding Ukraine's ability to strike a limited subset of Russian military targets within Russia with US-provided weapons, but public communications about US policy remain unclear.
Western-provided artillery ammunition has reportedly started arriving to Ukrainian forces on the frontline, although not at a scale that would allow Ukrainian forces to fully challenge the Russian military's current artillery shell advantage.
Russian missile and drone strikes have caused significant long-term damage to Ukraine's energy grid, and Ukraine will reportedly face even greater energy constraints in summer 2024.
Ukrainian outlet Liga reported on June 4 that a source in Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that there are roughly 550,000 Russian military and paramilitary personnel concentrated in occupied Ukraine and near the international border.
Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on June 4 that former Russian Defense Minister and Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu will coordinate efforts to increase Russian defense industrial capacity alongside former Tula Oblast Governor and Presidential Aide Alexei Dyumin and Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev.
The apparent demotion of former First Deputy Speaker of the Federation Council and United Russia Secretary Andrei Turchak on June 4 is likely part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ongoing effort to remove from power the political and military figures that violated his trust in 2023.
A recent meeting of the Kremlin-appointed Russian Human Rights Council (HRC) on Russia's migration policy reflects Russia's competing imperatives of attracting migrants to offset Russian labor shortages while also catering to its ultranationalist anti-migrant constituency.
Chechen Republic Rosgvardia Head and Russian State Duma Deputy Adam Delimkhanov accused State Duma Deputy Chairman and New People Party Head Vladislav Davankov of contradicting the Russian Constitution and attempting to divide Russian society, exposing continued tension between Chechen efforts to operate autonomously and the Russian state’s efforts to regulate perceived Islamic extremist threats from migrant and indigenous Muslim communities.
Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom reportedly assesses that it is unlikely to recover gas sales it lost following the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, illustrating how Western sanctions are achieving some long-term impacts against Russian revenue streams supporting Russia's war effort.
Russian investigative outlet the Insider and Moldovan outlet Little Country published an investigation on June 5 detailing how former Moldovan Chief of the General Staff Igor Gorgan operated as an agent on behalf of the Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU).
Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk, near Chasiv Yar, west of Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City.
The Kremlin likely authorized the Crimean branch of the Kremlin-created "Defenders of Fatherland" state fund to help grant combatants in Russian private military companies (PMCs) legal veteran statuses, possibly as part of an ongoing state effort to centralize control over irregular formations operating in Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to repackage long-standing, tired threats about direct confrontation with the West by claiming that Russia will provide long-range strike capabilities to unspecified actors for strikes against the West. Putin's threat aims to influence Western decision-making about Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia using Western-provided weapons but notably does not threaten escalation in Ukraine or through direct confrontation, suggesting that the Kremlin may be adjusting to select Western perceptions about the credibility of such Russian threats. Putin stated during a meeting with the heads of foreign press organizations on the sidelines of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 5 that Russia could begin supplying long-range weapons to unspecified adversaries of the West as a "symmetrical response" to the lifting of some Western restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets within Russia.<1> Putin rhetorically asked why Russia should not have the right to supply weapons of a similar class (compared to those the West has allowed Ukraine to use for strikes on Russian territory) to unspecified actors that will conduct strikes on Western "sensitive targets."<2> Kremlin actors routinely threaten to directly strike Western targets in an effort to use Western fears of escalation with Russia to encourage the West to self-deter its support for Ukraine, and Putin's June 5 threat is not a notable inflection in this regard.<3>

Putin may assess that select Western actors will be more concerned about Russia providing long-range strike capabilities to actors willing to attack the West than the Kremlin's tired rhetoric about direct confrontation between the West and Russia. Russia is very unlikely to directly provide scarce high-end long-range strike capabilities to other actors, however, since it uses many of these systems for large-scale strikes against Ukraine. It is also unclear what systems Putin means by weapons of a "similar class." The United Kingdom lifted restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use Storm Shadow cruise missiles with a range of over 250 kilometers for strikes against military targets within Russia, which is the Western system with the longest range that Ukrainian forces are currently permitted to use for such strikes.<4> The kinds of long-range strike systems Russia could ostensibly give other actors would be limited if Putin's "proportional" threat is credible. Russia's likely unwillingness to provide long-range systems does not preclude Russian efforts to help the West's adversaries acquire long-range strike capabilities, however. Russia is reportedly providing North Korea with ballistic missile technology in return for North Korea's provision of artillery munition to Russia, for example.<5> Putin and the Kremlin have threatened escalation at every critical juncture in Western debates about support for Ukraine, and this latest threat aims to constrain the easing of remaining Western restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia using Western weapons.<6> Lifting remaining restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western weapons can allow Ukrainian forces to substantially degrade Russian operations by eliminating Russia's ability to use Russian territory as a sanctuary space to optimize its rear areas to support Russia’s campaign to destroy Ukrainian statehood.<7>

Russian naval vessels will make a port call in Cuba on June 12–17, likely as part of a larger effort to invoke the historical memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis as part of Russia’s reflexive control campaign to encourage US self-deterrence. The Cuban Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces announced on June 6 that four Russian vessels from the Northern Fleet – the Admiral Gorshkov frigate, the Kazan nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine, the Academic Pashin replenishment oiler, and the Nikolai Chiker rescue tug – will make an official visit to the port of Havana from June 12 to 17.<8> Reuters reported that a senior US official stated that the Russian vessels may also stop in Venezuela on an unspecified date in Summer 2024.<9> The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Russia’s objective is to ensure a Russian naval presence in "operationally important areas of the far ocean zone."<10> Russian media noted that the Admiral Gorshkov is carrying Zircon hypersonic missiles, which the Kremlin has touted as capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.<11> The Cuban Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces specifically claimed, however, that none of the vessels are carrying nuclear weapons, so the Russian port call "does not represent a threat to the region."<12> ISW is unable to verify this Cuban assertion. The Russian Navy's port calls in states in the Western hemisphere that have historically strained relationships with the US aim to highlight Russia's strong relations with these states and are likely part of Russia's reflexive control campaign to force the US to self-deter and not enact policies that offer further support to Ukraine. Putin has repeatedly used nuclear saber-rattling to push the West to self-deter during times when the West has faced key moments on critical policy decisions in how to best support Ukraine.<13> The Kremlin likely hopes that the clear allusion to the Cuban Missile Crisis and the inclusion of a reportedly nuclear weapons–capable ship will force the West to engage in self-deterrence. The Kremlin likely coordinated the announcement of the Russian navy's port calls in Cuba with Putin's threats to provide long-range strike capabilities to unspecified actors for strikes against the West, as both activities can instill fear in the West. Putin notably did not threaten escalation in Ukraine or direct confrontation between Russia and the West.

Putin inadvertently indicated on June 5 that Russian forces may be suffering roughly 20,000 monthly casualties in Ukraine, which, if accurate, would be roughly equal to or just below the number of new personnel that Russia reportedly generates per month. Putin inadvertently suggested that roughly 5,000 Russian personnel are killed in action in Ukraine each month, which further suggests that roughly 15,000 Russian personnel are wounded in action, assuming a standard three-to-one wounded-to-killed casualty ratio.<14> ISW cannot confirm Putin's suggested casualty rate and his apparent inadvertent admission does not serve as a clear claim about Russian casualties in Ukraine. Putin's suggested figure does align somewhat with the lower end of Ukrainian reporting about Russian casualty rates, however. Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated on May 2 that Russian forces suffer about 25,000 to 30,000 killed and wounded personnel per month.<15> Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi reported on January 15, 2024, that Russia recruits around 30,000 personnel per month.<16> Ruslan Pukhov, the head of the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies and a member of a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) civilian advisory board, similarly claimed in mid-April 2024 that current Russian crypto-mobilization efforts are generating roughly 30,000 new personnel each month.<17> Russian officials are reportedly concerned about decreasing recruitment rates ahead of the expected Russian Summer 2024 offensive effort, and it is unclear if the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has maintained the roughly 30,000 recruitment rate it reportedly had in January and April of 2024.<18>

Russian forces have notably established a more sustainable force generation apparatus in recent months for ongoing offensive operations and have intensified efforts to establish operational- and strategic-level reserves.<19> Russian forces have leveraged their possession of the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine to dictate a tempo of fighting in recent months that would generate casualties roughly equal to or slightly less than the rate of newly generated forces.<20> This has allowed Russian forces to immediately replenish losses along the frontline and sustain their overall offensive tempo in Ukraine but has set limits on the extent to which Russian forces can intensify offensive operations in any given direction.<21> The marginal amount of additional newly generated forces not immediately committed to the front as reinforcements has allowed Russian forces to gradually establish operational reserves.<22> Pavlyuk stated in early May 2024 that Russian forces intended to generate about 100,000 more personnel for use in offensive operations this June and July and 300,000 more personnel by the end of 2024.<23> Russia will likely fall far short of this immediate and near-term goal, even at the lower limit of reported or suggested monthly Russian casualties and the upper limit of reported monthly Russian force generation. ISW continues to assess that likely poorly trained and equipped Russian operational- and strategic-level reserves are unlikely to be ready to act as a first-echelon penetration force or as a second-echelon exploitation force capable of conducting large-scale assaults in 2024 if Ukrainian forces have the wherewithal to resist them.<24>

Limitations on Western capabilities to train partner pilots on F-16 fighter jets are reportedly creating bottlenecks that will affect Ukraine's ability to effectively field F-16s in the future. Politico reported that Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium plan to send over 60 F-16 aircraft to Ukraine in Summer 2024.<25> Politico reported on June 5 that US, European, and Ukrainian officials and lawmakers stated that US, Danish, and Romanian F-16 pilot training facilities can only train a limited number of Ukrainian pilots, however. Politico reported that US Air Force Spokesperson Laurel Falls stated that the US National Guard is planning to train 12 Ukrainian pilots by the end of September 2024. The Danish training facility is reportedly training eight Ukrainian pilots, but this facility will reportedly close in November 2024, and the Romanian training facility is reportedly not yet operational. A full squadron of 20 aircraft requires 40 pilots. A former DoD official reportedly stated that if the current training constraints continue, Ukraine will only have enough pilots for a full squadron at the end of 2025. Ukraine will not be able to use all the Western-provided aircraft as effectively as possible until the necessary number of Ukrainian pilots complete training.

Select Western countries have indicated that Ukraine will be permitted to use F-16s for strikes within Russia but Ukraine's ability to operate F-16s near the international border is contingent on Ukraine's ability to destroy air defense assets in Russia.<26> Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 18 that Ukraine needs about 120–130 advanced fighter aircraft to achieve air parity with Russia but that Russia's biggest advantage is Western-imposed restrictions prohibiting Ukraine from using Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia.<27> Ukraine may be able to set conditions to have Ukrainian aviation operate in the air domain to support Ukrainian ground operations if Ukraine is able to sufficiently destroy Russian air defense assets within Russia using Western long-range strike capabilities, obtain a sufficient cadre of pilots capable of flying F-16s, and receive a timely delivery and a sufficient number of F-16 airframes.

French authorities are investigating multiple recent pro-Russian sabotage and societal influence operations in France amid continued Russian hybrid war measures against NATO states and France aimed at weakening support for Ukraine. French media reported on June 5 and 6 that French authorities detained a man with pro-Russian beliefs and dual Ukrainian-Russian citizenship at a hotel on the outskirts of Paris after the man sustained injuries from making explosives in his hotel room.<28> French media reported that French authorities assess that the man sought to attack French security assistance allocated to Ukraine and that authorities found additional explosives, materials to make explosives, small arms, money, and passports in the man's hotel room. The man reportedly fought with the Russian military for two years in an unspecified location (presumably in Ukraine) prior to this incident.<29> NBC reported that a source within the French National Anti-Terrorist Prosecutor’s Office stated that it is "too early for us to say" whether the incident is connected to a Russian sabotage campaign, though French and other European intelligence agencies have recently warned about a projected increase in Russian sabotage operations in the coming weeks.<30> Macron plans to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on June 7 in Paris and Reuters reported that French officials may use the visit to announce the transfer of French military trainers to Ukraine.<31> Russian actors may be attempting to use sabotage attacks to degrade French support for Ukraine or disrupt French efforts to prepare materiel and military trainers for deployment to Ukraine. French authorities are also investigating potential Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) involvement in recent incidents likely aimed at fomenting domestic unrest and distrust of Macron.<32>

The Russian Investigative Committee announced the arrest of a French citizen on June 6 following the early June arrest in France. The Russian Investigative Committee announced and published footage of Russian authorities detaining an unspecified French citizen under charges of failing to provide proper documentation required by law for legally designated "foreign agents." The Russian Investigative Committee claimed in its report that the French citizen also spent "several years" on multiple trips to Russia collecting information about the Russian military that "can be used against the security of the state" if "foreign sources" obtain this information, essentially accusing the man of espionage but not yet formally charging him with espionage-related offenses.<33> Reuters reported that Swiss-based nonprofit Center for Humanitarian Dialogue stated that Russian authorities arrested Laurent Vinatier, who worked as a Russia and Eurasia advisor for the center, and that French President Emmanuel Macron also confirmed Vinatier's arrest.<34>

Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Rostov Oblast and reportedly struck an oil depot in Belgorod Oblast on the night of June 5 to 6.<35> Rostov Oblast Governor Vasily Golubov acknowledged that a fire started at the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery after a drone strike.<36> Geolocated footage published on June 6 shows a fire at the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery in Rostov Oblast.<37> Radio Svoboda published satellite imagery on June 6 showing that the Ukrainian strike hit a liquified hydrocarbon gas production site.<38> Radio Svoboda reported that the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery has a capacity of five million tons per year, and a prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the facility is mostly export oriented.<39> Ukrainian forces previously struck the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery in June 2022 and March 2023.<40> Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov claimed on June 6 that a Ukrainian drone strike caused a fire at an oil depot in Starooskolsky Gorodskoy Okrug.<41> ISW has not observed visual confirmation of the reported Ukrainian strike on the oil depot in Starooskolsky Raion.

Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Committee on Human Rights, Deoccupation, and Reintegration Deputy Chairperson Ruslan Horbenko estimated that the Ukrainian military will recruit roughly 120,000 personnel in 2024, although the apparent slow arrival of Western security assistance will likely limit Ukraine's ability to sufficiently provision and equip these forces at scale in the near-term.<42> Horbenko stated in an interview with Ukrainian outlet Ukrinform published on June 6 that the Ukrainian military command and frontline commanders stated that the Ukrainian military needs 100,000 to 110,000 recruits in 2024. Western military aid to Ukraine is unlikely to provision and equip these forces with sufficient materiel given the current rate and limited scale at which Western military aid is arriving in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently acknowledged that the slow arrival of US security assistance is complicating Ukrainian efforts to commit reserves to ongoing Ukrainian defensive operations since the Ukrainian military is unable to sufficiently equip reserve brigades to conduct rotations for frontline units.<43> The arrival of US and Western military assistance to Ukrainian forces on the frontline at scale will likely aid Ukrainian efforts to bring reserves closer to their intended end strength and sufficiently provision new planned brigades.

Russian and Taliban officials expressed interest in bilateral cooperation, indicating that Russia will likely soon delist the Taliban as a prohibited organization in Russia. Taliban acting Minister of Labor and Social Relations Abdul Umari gave an interview to Kremlin newswire TASS at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum (SPIEF) on June 6 in which he expressed interest in expanding economic and energy ties with Russia and stated that the Taliban is "looking forward to Russia's decision to exclude from the list of banned organizations ."<44> Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed support for delisting the Taliban on May 28, ahead of the Taliban delegation's visit to Russia.<45> Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu stated at a meeting with the security council secretaries of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states that Russia is concerned about the situation in Afghanistan and claimed that there are unspecified "new militant training camps" in Afghanistan and unspecified terrorists are moving from Syria and Iraq to Afghanistan.<46> Shoigu's statement indicates that Russia is likely interested in cooperating with the Taliban to degrade the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP), an adversary of the Taliban and the perpetrators of the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow.<47>

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to repackage longstanding, tired threats about direct confrontation with the West by claiming that Russian will provide long-range strike capabilities to unspecified actors for strikes against the West. Putin's threat aims to influence Western decision-making about Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia using Western-provided weapons but notably does not threaten escalation in Ukraine or through direct confrontation, suggesting that the Kremlin may be adjusting to select Western perceptions about the credibility of such Russian threats.
Russian naval vessels will make a port call in Cuba on June 12–17, likely as part of a larger effort to invoke the historical memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis as part of Russia’s reflexive control campaign to encourage US self-deterrence.
Putin inadvertently indicated on June 5 that Russian forces may be suffering roughly 20,000 monthly casualties in Ukraine, which, if accurate, would be roughly equal to or just below the number of new personnel that Russia reportedly generates per month.
Limitations on Western capabilities to train partner pilots on F-16 fighter jets are reportedly creating bottlenecks that will affect Ukraine's ability to effectively field F-16s in the future.
French authorities are investigating multiple recent pro-Russian sabotage and societal influence operations in France amid continued Russian hybrid war measures against NATO states and France aimed at weakening support for Ukraine.
The Russian Investigative Committee announced the arrest of a French citizen on June 6 following the early June arrest in France.
Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Rostov Oblast and reportedly struck an oil depot in Belgorod Oblast on the night of June 5 to 6.
Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Committee on Human Rights, Deoccupation, and Reintegration Deputy Chairperson Ruslan Horbenko estimated that the Ukrainian military will recruit roughly 120,000 personnel in 2024, although the apparent slow arrival of Western security assistance will likely limit Ukraine's ability to sufficiently provision and equip these forces at scale in the near-term.
Russian and Taliban officials expressed interest in bilateral cooperation, indicating that Russia will likely soon delist the Taliban as a prohibited organization in Russia.
Russian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk, southeast of Kupyansk, northeast of Siversk, northwest of Avdiivka, south of Velyka Novosilka, and near Krynky.
Russia's continued demographic crisis will present long-term constraints on human capital within Russia.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin articulated a theory of victory in Ukraine on June 7 that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces. Putin stated following his speech at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) that Russia does not need to conduct another call-up of reservists similar to Russia‘s September 2022 partial mobilization because Russia is not trying to rapidly achieve its military objectives in Ukraine.<1> Putin acknowledged that the current Russian military contingent committed to the war in Ukraine (reportedly the Russian military’s entire combat-capable ground force as of January 2024) would be insufficient for a rapid victory but suggested that Russian forces are instead pursuing a more gradual approach.<2> Putin stated that Russian forces aim to "squeeze" Ukrainian forces out "of those territories that should be under Russian control" and therefore Russia does not need to conduct another mobilization wave.<3> Putin asserted that Russian crypto-mobilization efforts are sufficient for this approach and that Russia has recruited 160,000 new personnel so far in 2024 (a figure consistent with reports that the Russian military recruits between 20,000-30,000 recruits per month).<4>

Putin's assessment that gradual Russian gains will allow Russia to achieve his goals in Ukraine is predicated on the assumption that Ukrainian forces will be unable to liberate any significant territory that Russian forces seize and that the Russian military will be able to sustain offensive operations that achieve gradual tactical gains regardless of heavy losses. Western intelligence has previously assessed that Putin assesses that US and Western support to Ukraine is “finite" and that Russian forces have blunted Ukrainian efforts to retake significant territory.<5> Putin's assessment has been reinforced by the recent months of delayed Western security assistance and corresponding Ukrainian materiel constraints, which allowed Russian forces to seize and maintain the theater-wide initiative and conduct consistent offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine that achieved gradual tactical gains.<6> Putin's June 7 comments support ISW's previous assessment that Putin's assessment of Ukrainian capabilities and how Putin’s perceived limits to Western support would incentivize Putin to pursue creeping offensive operations indefinitely if more rapid operations that lead to rapid decisive results seem unattainable.<7>

Putin's theory of victory rests on Russia's ability to outlast and overcome pledged Western security assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainian efforts to mobilize more of its economy and population for the war effort, indicating that Putin likely assesses that Russian forces will be able to leverage their advantages in manpower and materiel to overwhelm on Ukrainian forces. Putin's apparent assessment that Russia can "squeeze" Ukrainian forces out of all the lands it desires to occupy assumes that Ukraine will not acquire and sustain the manpower and materiel required to prevent indefinite Russian attempts to gradually advance along the front or needed to contest the initiative and conduct operationally significant counteroffensive operations. Ukrainian forces have previously shown that when they are well provisioned, they can prevent Russian forces from making even marginal tactical gains, force Russian offensive operations to culminate, and launch counteroffensive operations that liberate operationally significant territory.<8> Russian forces are currently leveraging the theater-wide initiative in Ukraine to dictate a tempo of fighting that generates casualties roughly equal to or slightly less than the rate of newly generated forces, which has allowed Russian forces to sustain their overall offensive tempo in Ukraine.<9> Russia is also further mobilizing its defense industrial base (DIB) and is generally far ahead of Ukraine and the West in this regard.<10> Putin and the Russian military command likely assess that Russian numerical manpower and materiel advantages will allow Russia to sustain this force generation replacement rate and field the required materiel needed to sustain indefinite creeping advances.

This strategy largely relies on Russia's ability to retain the theater-wide initiative, which Ukrainian forces can contest if Ukraine addresses its ongoing manpower challenges and receives sufficient, timely, and consistent Western security assistance.<11> Western security assistance pledges and Ukrainian force generation efforts will eventually allow Ukraine to accumulate the forces and materiel it needs to contest the initiative if ongoing Russian offensive operations are not successful in forcing Ukraine to divert manpower and materiel to defensive operations.<12>

Russian efforts to prevent Ukraine from accumulating the personnel and resources Ukraine needs to contest the initiative therefore are a part of an attritional war approach, in which the Russian military command believes that ongoing Russian offensive operations will inflict relatively more significant losses on Ukrainian forces and force Ukraine to divert manpower and materiel to stabilize the front instead of preparing for future counteroffensive efforts. This approach also requires that Russian forces avoid suffering outsized losses that would prevent Russia from sustaining offensive operations. There are limits to Russian force generation, as Putin himself admits with his continued aversion to another partial mobilization wave, and Russia's ability to expand its DIB has extensively relied on the refurbishment of extensive Soviet-era stocks, which are a finite resource.<13> Putin and the Russian military command likely calculate that these limits will not begin constraining Russia's ability to sustain its offensive tempo in Ukraine in the near-to-medium term, however. This approach requires that Ukraine is not able to inflict losses on Russian forces that decrease this offensive tempo or force Russian offensive efforts to culminate. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine should contest the initiative as soon as possible because Russian forces are reaping a variety of benefits from holding the initiative, including their ability to pursue a strategy of attritional warfare.<14>

Putin's theory of victory hinges on a critical assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine to Russian victory, either on its own accord or in response to Russian efforts to persuade the West to do so, and it is far from clear that the West will do so. Putin notably did not identify what specific goals he assesses gradual tactical Russian gains will achieve, although the Russian military command has likely previously believed that such gains would encourage Western debates about continued support for Ukraine and cause weakened Western support that exacerbates Ukrainian materiel constraints.<15> Putin also did not specify which territory "should" be under Russian control, part of continued Kremlin rhetoric that purposefully leaves open room for further territorial conquest in Ukraine.<16> The current rate of Russian advance suggests that Russian forces may pursue individual operationally significant objectives over the course of many months if not years, and efforts to not bound the Kremlin's territorial objectives likely intend to justify indefinite creeping offensive operations as long as it takes to achieve Western and Ukrainian capitulation.<17> Putin may believe that as long as Russia can prevent Ukraine from contesting the initiative he can lock in limited territorial conquests while encouraging Western debates about continued aid to Ukraine once current pledges of security assistance are expended.

The end of Western security assistance would eventually lead to the collapse of the frontline and total Russian victory in Ukraine, a reality that recent months of delayed Western security assistance has further highlighted.<18> The West must proactively provide Ukrainian forces with the necessary equipment and weapons at the scale, timing, and regularity that Ukrainian forces require for operations that liberate significant swaths of occupied Ukraine and challenge Putin's belief that he can gradually subsume Ukraine should rapid total victory appear unreachable. The West also maintains the ability to substantially disrupt Russian operations at scale by allowing Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike Russia’s operational rear and deep rear areas in Russian territory.<19> The West must not surrender to Russia's strategic effort to destroy Western commitment to Ukrainian survival and must remember that Ukrainian victory has always been possible as long as the West remains committed to that goal.<20>

Putin indirectly indicated that Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory with Western-provided weapons do not cross a supposed Russian "red line" that would result in Russian nuclear escalation. Putin stated that Russia's nuclear doctrine calls for Russia to only use nuclear weapons in the event of "exceptional cases" of threats to Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.<21> Putin stated that he does not think such an "exceptional" case has arisen so "there is no such need" for Russia to use nuclear weapons. Ukrainian forces have struck military targets in Belgorod Oblast with US-provided HIMARS systems using GMLRS since early June 2024.<22> Putin’s June 7 statement is a significant rhetorical reversal given that Putin and other Kremlin officials have previously threatened Russian nuclear weapon use should Western states allow Ukraine to strike into Russian territory with Western-provided weapons.<23> Western and Ukrainian policies and actions have crossed Russia's supposed "red lines" several times throughout the war without drawing a significant Russian reaction, indicating that many of Russia's "red lines" are most likely information operations designed to push the West to self-deter.<24>

Putin heavily focused on proposals to solve Russia's labor shortage issues during his speech at SPIEF on June 7. Putin outlined a 10-point plan to grow the Russian economy and acknowledged that Russia is suffering from demographic challenges and labor shortages.<25> Putin called on the Russian government to enact multiple reforms to increase the labor supply and productivity, such as improving education and training, automating and digitalizing Russian industry, increasing the use of artificial intelligence (AI), and increasing spending on research and development. Putin highlighted the necessity of migrant labor to increase Russia's economic growth but stated that Russia has not yet developed a "meaningful" migration policy. Putin specified that Russia only needs skilled and educated migrant laborers with a knowledge of Russian language and culture and who will "not create any problems for local citizens in the workplace and in life." Putin ended his SPIEF appearance by stating that Russia "will treat the culture and traditions of peoples of the Russian Federation" with respect as "unity is strength." Putin has touted Russia as a unified multiethnic and multinational state, but his June 7 statements demonstrate the differing policies and perceptions towards the indigenous, federally recognized peoples of Russia and migrants.<26> Putin's migration policy proposals demonstrate how the Kremlin continues to struggle to balance Russia's need for migrants to compensate for labor shortages and wide-scale anti-migrant sentiments in Russia, particularly as the Kremlin tries to further mobilize the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).

Putin attempted to frame Russia's economic issues in a positive light, likely to prepare Russian citizens to make more personal sacrifices as Russia sustains a protracted war in Ukraine at the expense of Russian citizens’ standards of living. Putin framed Russia's labor shortages as resulting from Russia's alleged "record low" unemployment, not a consequence of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.<27> Putin stated that people who have reached retirement age have experience and knowledge that is useful to the Russian economy and that many pensioners have "aspirations" to continue working. Putin proposed that the Russian government annually increase pensions starting in February 2025 for pensioners who continue to work even after they reach retirement age. Putin met with St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov before his speech at SPIEF, during which Beglov presented the idea of increasing pensions as a direct request from working pensioners.<28> Large-scale protests erupted in Russia in 2018 when the Kremlin announced a raise in the retirement age, and Putin is likely trying to use monetary incentives to push pensioners to choose to work beyond the retirement age to help ease Russia's labor shortages.<29> Putin also highlighted the strength of Russia's DIB, claiming that Russia has increased its production of ammunition by more than 20 times in an unspecified time frame and that Russia has superior aviation and armored vehicle technology than the West.<30> Putin claimed that the Russian DIB has increased its production of civilian products by about five percent over the past two years, likely to justify Russia's increased defense spending and recent efforts to mobilize the DIB to civilians. Sberbank CEO Herman Gref, however, stated on June 7 at SPIEF that the alleged "unprecedented" growth of wages in Russia will last at most another year.<31>

Putin continued efforts to portray Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as an illegitimate president and identified the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) as a legitimate actor with which the Kremlin can negotiate instead of Zelensky. Putin’s recent statements are the latest in a series designed to obfuscate the legality of Zelensky's extended term by misrepresenting the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian laws.<32> Putin continued to claim that Zelensky is an illegitimate actor who has "usurped" power in Ukraine as the Ukrainian Constitution does not allow for a Ukrainian president to extend his term beyond the five-year fixed term.<33> Putin cherrypicked specific articles of the Ukrainian Constitution to make his argument, including articles he also recently grossly mischaracterized or took out of their legal context during a speech on May 28.<34> Putin claimed on June 7 that the Verkhovna Rada's power is extended under a period of martial law and that presidential powers should be "transferred to the speaker of the Rada" under articles 109, 110, and 111 of the Ukrainian Constitution now that Zelensky has "usurped" power.<35> Article 109 states that "the resignation of the President of Ukraine enters into force from the moment he or she personally announces the statement of resignation at a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine."<36> Article 110 states that "the inability of the President of Ukraine to exercise his or her powers for reasons of health shall be determined at a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and confirmed by a decision adopted by the majority of its constitutional composition."<37> Article 111 states that "the President of Ukraine may be removed from office by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by the procedure of impeachment, in the event that he or she commits state treason or other crime." Putin is invoking these articles to suggest that Zelensky's extended term is "illegal" and that the Verkhovna Rada is the single authority to assume power should Zelensky resign, be impeached, or otherwise leave office before the natural end of his term. Putin also invoked Article 83, which states that in the event of martial law, the Verkhovna Rada's powers are extended, and Article 103, which states that a Ukrainian president's term is five years - again claiming that presidential terms cannot be extended under martial law while the Verkhovna Rada's term can be extended.<38>

Putin claimed that the Ukrainian Constitution does not mention extending the Ukrainian presidential term, but this statement ignores the Ukrainian legal framework about martial law. Article 19 of the Ukrainian law "On the Legal Regime of Martial Law" states that presidential and Verkhovna Rada elections are prohibited under martial law and forbids the Ukrainian president from abolishing martial law as long as there exists a "threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity."<39> Article 64 of the Ukrainian constitution states that "under conditions of war or a state of emergency, specific restrictions on rights and freedoms may be established with the indication of the period of validity of these restrictions" except for the rights and freedoms stipulated by certain articles, none of which are mentioned above.<40>

Putin's recent focus on legitimizing the Verkhovna Rada and its speaker in lieu of Zelensky highlights a target for Russian destabilization operations.<41> ISW has repeatedly assessed that recent Russian information operations aim to sow multiple divisions between the Ukrainian people, military, military leadership, and political leadership to undermine domestic and international support for Zelensky and Ukraine's decision to defend against the Russian invasion.<42> Ukrainian intelligence has identified a Russian information campaign called "Maidan-3" that specifically aims to spread doubt about Zelensky's legitimacy and has projected that these information operations will peak from late May to July 2024.<43> These information operations may intend to set informational conditions to eventually declare a Kremlin-backed actor as Ukrainian president, Verkhovna Rada speaker, or another title with whom the Kremlin claims it can "legally" negotiate with instead of Zelensky.<44> Two figures previously floated as possible replacements for Zelensky have since emerged in the wake of these information operations.<45> Former pro-Russia Ukrainian MP Viktor Medvedchuk recently participated in the information operation to discredit Zelensky.<46> Former pro-Russia Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych traveled to Minsk on May 24 for an unspecified reason, and Ukrainian intelligence described Yanukovych's last trip to Minsk in 2022 as a Kremlin effort to prepare Yanukovych for a "special operation" to be reinstated as president of Ukraine.<47>

Putin attempted to introduce his children and the children of other senior Russian officials to the public sphere at SPIEF, likely to set conditions for them to eventually assume high-profile and powerful roles in the Russian government. Independent Belarusian outlet Vot Tak reported that Putin's youngest daughter Katerina Tikhonova spoke virtually on a June 6 panel about the role of defense industrial organizations and discussed Russian technological development and import substitution.<48> Vot Tak also reported that Putin's eldest daughter Maria Vorontsova spoke on a panel about biotechnology on June 7.<49> Vot Tak reported that Tikhonova spoke at SPIEF in 2021 in a panel about BRICS and that Vorontsova has only previously attended SPIEF as a guest where she did two interviews on the sidelines.<50> Kremlin newswire TASS characterized Tikhonova as Innopraktika Company General Director and notably went out of its way to promote Vorontsova’s professional titles and accolades by highlighting her position as Deputy Head of the Russian Faculty of Fundamental Medicine at Moscow State University and a member of the Russian Association for the Promotion of Science, and a Candidate of Medical Science (equivalent to a PhD of Medical Science).<51> TASS did not mention their familial connection to Putin. TASS is likely attempting to portray Tikhonova and Vorontsova as authoritative figures and to introduce them as trustworthy and knowledgeable individuals to the Russian public.

A Russian insider source claimed that the children of other senior Russian officials participated in SPIEF including: both sons of former Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head and current Russian Institute for Strategic Studies Director Mikhail Fradkov - First Deputy Administrator of the Presidential Administration Pavel Fradkov and CEO and Chairperson of Russian state-owned bank Promsvyazbank Pyotr Fradkov; Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov's daughter Yelizaveta Peskova; Presidential Aide Nikolai Patrushev's son Russian Agriculture Minister Dmitry Patrushev; Presidental Administration Head Anton Vaino's son the Kremlin's Agency for Strategic Initiatives' youth work head Alexander Vaino; Russian oligarch Boris Rotenberg's son Vice President of Gazprombank Roman Rotenberg; Presidental Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko's son Alexander Kiriyenko; Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu's daughter Ksenia Shoigu; and Putin's first cousin once removed ("niece") and Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation Chairperson Anna Tsivileva.<52>

US National Security Council Senior Director for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Pranay Vaddi stated that the US has prepared a new nuclear weapons policy specifically to deter Russia, the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran.<53> Vaddi stated at the 2024 Arms Control Association meeting that the US may have to deploy more strategic nuclear weapons in the coming years and that the US should be prepared if the US president makes such a decision.<54> Vaddi stated that the US remains committed to international arms control and non-proliferation values and agreements. Vaddi stated that Russia has repeatedly rejected talks with the US to negotiate a successor to the New START strategic arms limitation pact, which expires in 2026, and that the PRC has refused to discuss expanding its nuclear arsenal with the US.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a $225 million security assistance package for Ukraine on June 7.<55> The package includes missiles for HAWK air defense systems; Stinger anti-aircraft missiles; ammunition for HIMARS; 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds; M113 armored personnel carriers; Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; and other materiel.<56>

French President Emmanuel Macron announced on June 6 that France will provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets and equip and train a brigade of 4,500 Ukrainian soldiers.<57> Macron stated that Ukrainian pilots will likely train between five and six months on Mirage-2000-5 aircraft in France and stated that Ukraine will have Mirage-2000-5 pilots by the end of 2024.<58>

The Russian Supreme Court declared an organization that does not exist as "extremist" on June 7, consistent with previous ISW assessments that Russia seeks to expand the legal definition of "extremism" to increasingly prosecute domestic anti-war sentiment. The Russian Supreme Court declared the "Anti-Russian Separatist Movement" and its "structural divisions" as extremist in accordance with a Russian Ministry of Justice request to this effect submitted on April 26.<59> Russian opposition media has noted that no such organization exists, and Russian authorities have previously designated other non-existent organizations meant to encompass broader “social movements” as “extremist.”<60> Russian authorities likely intend to use this new extremist designation to further prosecute anti-war sentiment among Russians and within occupied Ukraine, particularly movements opposing Russia’s occupation of Ukraine and movements within ethnic minority communities advocating for better treatment of Russian military personnel and mobilized personnel from these communities.<61>

The Kremlin continues efforts to destabilize the Balkans and dismantle the 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, likely as part of a larger strategic effort that seeks to divide and distract Europe. Russian President Vladimir Putin and President of Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) Milorad Dodik met on June 6 in St. Petersburg, and Dodik attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF).<62> Dodik announced in a June 7 interview with Kremlin newswire TASS that Republika Srpska will adopt a Russia-style "foreign agents" bill, which would restrict the activities of non-profit organizations that receive foreign funding, that the government had previously withdrawn.<63> Dodik also stated Republika Srpska's intention to hold a referendum on its independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina at an unspecified date.<64> The Kremlin has previously leveraged its relationship with Republika Srpska to further influence the Balkans, sow divisions in the West, and undermine the Dayton Accords to throw the Balkans into turmoil.<65>

Key Takeaways:

Russian President Vladimir Putin articulated a theory of victory in Ukraine on June 7 that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.
Putin's theory of victory rests on Russia's ability to outlast and overcome pledged Western security assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainian efforts to mobilize more of its economy and population for the war effort, indicating that Putin likely assesses that Russian forces will be able to leverage their advantages in manpower and materiel to overwhelm on Ukrainian forces.
Putin's theory of victory hinges on a critical assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine to Russian victory, either on its own accord or in response to Russian efforts to persuade the West to do so, and it is far from clear that the West will do so.
Putin indirectly indicated that Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory with Western-provided weapons do not cross a supposed Russian "red line" that would result in Russian nuclear escalation.
Putin heavily focused on proposals to solve Russia's labor shortage issues during his speech at SPIEF on June 7.
Putin attempted to frame Russia's economic issues in a positive light, likely to prepare Russian citizens to make more personal sacrifices as Russia sustains a protracted war in Ukraine at the expense of Russian citizens’ standards of living.
Putin continued efforts to portray Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as an illegitimate president and identified the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) as a legitimate actor with which the Kremlin can negotiate instead of Zelensky. Putin’s recent statements are the latest in a series designed to obfuscate the legality of Zelensky's extended term by misrepresenting the Ukrainian Constitution and Ukrainian laws.
Putin attempted to introduce his children and the children of other senior Russian officials to the public sphere at SPIEF, likely to set conditions for them to eventually assume high-profile and powerful roles in the Russian government.
US National Security Council Senior Director for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Pranay Vaddi stated that the US has prepared a new nuclear weapons policy specifically to deter Russia, the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Iran.
The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a $225 million security assistance package for Ukraine on June 7.
French President Emmanuel Macron announced on June 6 that France will provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets and equip and train a brigade of 4,500 Ukrainian soldiers.
The Russian Supreme Court declared an organization that does not exist as "extremist" on June 7, consistent with previous ISW assessments that Russia seeks to expand the legal definition of "extremism" to increasingly prosecute domestic anti-war sentiment.
The Kremlin continues efforts to destabilize the Balkans and dismantle the 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, likely as part of a larger strategic effort that seeks to divide and distract Europe.
Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, near Chasiv Yar, and northwest of Avdiivka.

Institute for the Study of War

The Russian military command is reportedly transferring an unspecified number of forces to the Ukrainian-Russian border area near Kharkiv Oblast, but it is unclear if the Russian military command plans to immediately commit these redeployed forces to combat or use them to reinforce the Northern Grouping of Forces to bring it closer to its reported planned end strength. Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov claimed in an interview with Russian state media outlet RT on June 8 that Russian authorities decided to transfer elements of the Akhmat Spetsnaz to the Kharkiv direction from unspecified areas at the end of May 2024.<1> Alaudinov claimed that the "Kashtan" detachment, formerly known as Akhmat "Kamerton" detachment and renamed after its new commander, is operating in the Kharkiv direction. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on June 8 that Akhmat forces are serving as blocking units – specialized disciplinary units that fire upon friendly forces if they engage in an unauthorized retreat – in the international border area, and it is possible that the Russian military command transferred Akhmat forces to the area solely for this purpose and not to conduct offensive operations.<2> Voloshyn also stated that the Russian military command is increasing the Russian force grouping near the border area by transferring elements of unspecified regiments and brigades from other sectors of the front, including from occupied Kherson Oblast. Voloshyn stated that the Russian military command intends to commit unspecified airborne (VDV) elements and additional elements of the 11th and 44th Army Corps (both of the Leningrad Military District ) to offensive operations in unspecified areas of the border area. Elements of the 11th and 44th Army Corps have been conducting offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and a battalion of the 98th VDV Division is reportedly operating in a border area in Kursk Oblast.<3> The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on June 8 that the Russian military command is redeploying unspecified units and drone operators from the Kherson direction to the Kharkiv direction.<4> Russian forces reportedly had roughly 35,000 personnel in the international border area as a part of the Northern Grouping of Forces when they started offensive operations on May 10, whereas Ukrainian sources have indicated that the Russian military initially sought to concentrate at least 50,000 to 70,000 personnel in the international border area as of early May.<5> It is unclear whether Russian forces have altered the planned end strength of the Northern Grouping of Forces since launching the offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast on May 10. A Russian milblogger claimed on June 6 that the Russian military command has only committed about 15,000 personnel to the offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast.<6>

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted on June 8 that a fraction of the reported 30,000 personnel that Russia generates each month arrives at the front as combat force replacements and reinforcements and that Russian force generation efforts have allowed Russian forces to establish only limited operational and strategic reserves. Mashovets stated that on average each Russian operational grouping of forces receives between 1,000 to 1,500 combat personnel as replacements or reinforcements every month and may receive 2,000 if the grouping is responsible for intensified offensive operations.<7> There are six operational Russian grouping of forces operating within and near Ukraine, meaning that Mashovets is suggesting that Russian forces receive a total of 6,000 to 12,000 new combat personnel each month.<8> This figure is not incongruent with Ukrainian and Russian reports from January and April 2024 that Russia recruits 30,000 new personnel per month since a large number of these new personnel will fulfill combat support and combat service support roles or later assume combat arms roles following training.<9> Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on June 7 that Russia has recruited 160,000 new personnel so far in 2024, a figure fairly consistent with reports that the Russian military recruits about 30,000 personnel a month.<10> Russian forces have leveraged their possession of the theater-wide initiative to determine a tempo of fighting in Ukraine in recent months that appears to generate casualties roughly equal to or slightly less than the rate of newly generated forces.<11> This careful balance between Russian casualties and newly generated forces requires that Russian forces not significantly intensify offensive operations for a prolonged period of time, however. This balance becomes even more narrow when considering losses and new force generation for just Russian combat personnel.<12> ISW has observed a "pulsing" of Russian offensive operations along the front in recent months, wherein Russian forces alternate between intensified assaults and a lower operational tempo to replenish losses.<13> The availability of new combat personnel is likely one of several determining factors for when Russian forces decide to alternate between intensified offensive operations.

Mashovets stated that Russian forces have accumulated at most 60,000 personnel in operational and strategic reserves over the past six to eight months (roughly from October 2023 to June 2024).<14> Russian forces have likely not properly trained or equipped these reserves, which they have previously used largely as manpower pools for restaffing and reinforcing committed units conducting grinding, infantry-heavy assaults with occasional limited mechanized assaults.<15> ISW continues to assess that planned Russian operational- and strategic-level reserves are unlikely to be ready to act as a first-echelon penetration force or as a second-echelon exploitation force capable of conducting effective large-scale combined arms assaults.<16> These reported limited operational- and strategic-level Russian reserves likely will be insufficient to support simultaneous large-scale offensive efforts in several directions. The Russian military command will likely have to choose one main effort during its expected summer offensive effort, if it intends for these reserves to sustain a large-scale offensive operation.

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian military airfield in the North Ossetia-Alania Republic on the night of June 7 to 8. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on June 8 that its sources in the Ukrainian special services stated that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) conducted a drone strike against an airfield in North Ossetia on the night of June 7 to 8.<17> Geolocated footage published on June 8 shows a drone targeting the Mozdok Airbase followed by a rising smoke plume.<18> North Ossetia-Alania Republic Head Sergei Menyaylo claimed that Russian forces shot down three drones targeting a military airfield in Mozdok and that unspecified objects sustained minor damage and caught fire.<19> The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed a drone over the North Ossetia-Alania Republic on the morning of June 8.<20> A Russian milblogger amplified footage of Russian forces reportedly shooting down a drone near oil infrastructure in Nogai Raion, Republic of Dagestan, but ISW has not observed further evidence of Ukrainian drone strikes in the area.<21> One Russian milblogger, however, claimed that a number of sources "erroneously" reported the strike near the Mozdok airfield as a strike against the oil field in Nogai Raion.<22>

Russian strikes have caused widespread damage to Ukraine's energy grid, and Ukraine will continue to face serious constraints on power generation capacity. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on June 7 that only 27 percent of large Ukrainian thermal power plants (TPPs) are operational and that Russian missile and drone strikes damaged or destroyed the other 73 percent.<23> Shmyhal stated that recent Russian strikes have knocked out 9.2 gigawatts of Ukrainian generation capacity and stated that this is half of the generation capacity that Ukraine used in Winter 2023-2024.<24> The Financial Times (FT) reported on June 5 that Russia has knocked out or captured over half of Ukraine's generation capacity, bringing Ukrainian energy production to below 20 gigawatts from 55 gigawatts before the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.<25> Shmyhal stated that Russian forces have destroyed 42 power generators and damaged 20 hydropower generators at Ukrainian energy generation facilities.<26> Shmyhal emphasized that Ukraine is taking steps to relieve pressure on Ukraine's energy grid and plans to restore as much energy generation capacity as possible before Winter 2024-2025.<27> Ukraine’s nuclear operator Energoatom stated on June 7 that it connected an additional reactor at an unspecified nuclear power plant to the energy grid.<28> The head of Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo, Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, stated that this will relieve Ukrainian power constraints for the next two weeks before increased summer consumption begins.<29> Shmyhal stated that Ukraine is currently importing 1.7 gigawatts from the European Union (EU) but that the EU is able to export a maximum of 2.2 gigawatts to Ukraine.<30>

US President Joe Biden met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris on June 7. Biden and Zelensky discussed the battlefield situation, Ukraine's defensive capabilities, preparations to finalize a US-Ukraine bilateral security agreement, and the upcoming Ukraine peace conference in Switzerland.<31> Biden apologized for the delay in US security assistance to Ukraine and reiterated US support for Ukraine against Russian aggression.<32> Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine needs more security assistance to strengthen its defense of Kharkiv Oblast and that Ukraine needs more opportunities to strike military targets in Russia to protect against Russian aggression from across the international border.<33> ISW continues to assess that the delays in US security assistance to Ukraine have severely constrained Ukrainian defensive capabilities in recent months and emboldened Russian forces to launch and make tactically significant gains in their new offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast and double down on operations elsewhere in the theater.<34>

Longtime Russian Central Bank Head Elvira Nabiullina is reportedly a balancing force among Russian President Vladimir Putin's economic advisors despite pressure for Russian officials to unequivocally support the long-term war effort in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on June 7 that former Russian Service for Financial Markets Head and former Central Bank Deputy Head Oleg Vyugin stated that Nabiullina has known Putin for years and has the "exclusive right" to tell Putin "what he doesn't like" because Putin views her as straightforward and uninfluenced by corruption.<35> Bloomberg reported that Nabiullina balances against Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, who advocates for Russia to shape its budget to ensure a victorious Russian war effort, and former economic aid and new Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Maxim Oreshkin, who portrays the Russian war as a global conflict against the West. Bloomberg cited a senior government official who stated that Nabiullina is raising concerns about the impacts of Russian labor shortages caused by the war and a "swollen" budget amid high defense spending. A leaked video published on March 2, 2022, showed Nabiullina speaking about her hyperfocus on the Russian economy after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and concern over greater domestic sacrifices.<36> Bloomberg reported that Putin has begun overruling Nabiullina in some cases but assessed that Putin is unlikely to remove her for the foreseeable future.<37> Bloomberg cited anonymous sources as saying that Putin wants to avoid dismissing personnel in a way that could be viewed as destabilizing or as being done under pressure.

Nabiullina is especially notable because she has previously mitigated the economic fallout of Putin's geopolitical ambitions and reportedly tried to resign from her position in May 2022 in opposition to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.<38> The Economist reported on May 31 that Nabiullina ensured the stability of the ruble after Putin's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and that in 2022 she feared that her resignation would lead to the arrests of her deputies at the Central Bank.<39> The Economist reported that Nabiullina has largely favored regulatory market reforms but that she learned early in her career in the late 1990s and early 2000s that the Russian economy can only take so much change. The Economist noted that she has navigated accordingly as she gained power under Putin, implementing some regulatory changes within the existing Russian economic system, and has shifted her focus to minimize the economic impact of the war in Ukraine on the Russian public since February 2022. Nabiullina's reported ability to speak candidly to Putin about the impact of the war on the Russian economy is especially significant given Putin's recent efforts to oust any officials who have lost Putin's favor or otherwise perceived as disloyal to Putin and his war effort.<40> Putin has recently been preoccupied with assuaging domestic concerns about Russia's economy and has attempted to portray Russia's economic issues positively, and he may be more willing to tolerate Nabiullina's candor or even appreciate her honesty given her track record for stability.<41>

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Russian opposition outlets reported that unspecified actors attempted to assassinate the former Russian occupation mayor of Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, Hennadiy Matsehora in Stary Oskol, Belgorod Oblast on June 7.<42> The GUR stated that Matsehora is in critical condition at a hospital in Moscow.<43> The Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on May 20 that Matsehora, who was originally lawfully elected as Mayor of Kupyansk in 2020, defected and helped Russian forces in February 2022 and that Ukrainian authorities will try Mateshora in absentia for treason.<44>

Key Takeaways:

The Russian military command is reportedly transferring an unspecified number of forces to the Ukrainian-Russian border area near Kharkiv Oblast, but it is unclear if the Russian military command plans to immediately commit these redeployed forces to combat or use them to reinforce the Northern Grouping of Forces to bring it closer to its reported planned end strength.
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted on June 8 that a fraction of the reported 30,000 personnel that Russia generates each month arrives at the front as combat force replacements and reinforcements and that Russian force generation efforts have allowed Russian forces to establish only limited operational and strategic reserves.
Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian military airfield in the North Ossetia-Alania Republic on the night of June 7 to 8.
Russian strikes have caused widespread damage to Ukraine's energy grid, and Ukraine will continue to face serious constraints on power generation capacity.
US President Joe Biden met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Paris on June 7.
Longtime Russian Central Bank Head Elvira Nabiullina is reportedly a balancing force among Russian President Vladimir Putin's economic advisors despite pressure for Russian officials to unequivocally support the long-term war effort in Ukraine.
Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Russian opposition outlets reported that unspecified actors attempted to assassinate the former Russian occupation mayor of Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, Hennadiy Matsehora in Stary Oskol, Belgorod Oblast on June 7.
Russian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City, southeast of Kupyansk, within easternmost Chasiv Yar, northwest of Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City.
Russian actors are using video appeals from Russian servicemen to refute reports of high Russian losses in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Institute for the Study of War

The Biden Administration’s limited policy change permitting Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike some Russian military targets in a small area within Russian territory has reduced the size of Russia’s ground sanctuary by only 16 percent at maximum. US policy still preserves at least 84 percent of Russia's ground sanctuary – territory within range of Ukrainian ATACMS. US policy restricting Ukraine’s usage of US-provided weapons has effectively created a vast sanctuary – territory in range of US-provided weapons but that Ukrainian forces are not allowed to strike with US-provided weapons – which Russia exploits to shield its combat forces, command and control, logistics, and rear area support services that the Russian military uses to conduct its military operations in Ukraine.<1> US policy still protects the vast majority of Russia’s operational rear and deep rear, and US policy forbids Ukraine from using ATACMS anywhere in Russia.<2> US President Joe Biden’s limited policy change in late May 2024 regarding the use of US-provided weapons against military targets in Russia removed a maximum of 16 percent of Russia's ground sanctuary, assuming that Ukrainian forces can strike all legitimate Russian military targets in range of Ukrainian HIMARS using GMLRS in Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk oblasts. It is far from clear that Ukrainian forces have permission to do so, however. Senior US officials have described Ukraine’s ability to strike into Russia with GMLRS as being for counterbattery fire and geographically bounded to the Kharkiv area, and have stated that Ukrainian forces may strike Russian military objects “deployed just across the border,” suggesting that Ukraine may be prohibited from striking Russian military targets further in the rear or in other areas in Kursk and Bryansk oblasts that are still in range of GMLRS.<3> US officials’ statements also indicate that Ukrainian forces may be constrained from striking Russian military targets that are not actively involved in ground attacks and strikes against Ukraine.<4> The reduction of the sanctuary space’s area may be less than 16 percent, therefore.

Key Takeaways:

The Biden Administration’s limited policy change permitting Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike some Russian military targets in a small area within Russian territory has reduced the size of Russia’s ground sanctuary by only 16 percent at maximum. US policy still preserves at least 84 percent of Russia's ground sanctuary – territory within range of Ukrainian ATACMS.
Likely Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Su-57 fighter aircraft at the Akhtubinsk Airfield in Astrakhan Oblast between June 7 and 8.
Ukrainian forces may have struck a Russian large landing ship or patrol boat in Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of June 8 to 9.
The Kremlin's concerted effort to remove and arrest senior Russian defense officials may be extending to civilian regional administration officials.
The pro-Kremlin Moldovan Victory opposition electoral bloc held its second congress in Moscow on June 9 following a series of meetings between pro-Kremlin Moldovan opposition politicians and Russian officials from June 6 to 9.
Former pro-Russian Moldovan president and current head of the Moldovan Socialist Party Igor Dodon gave interviews to Russian state news agencies TASS and RIA Novosti on June 9 in which he promoted several known Kremlin narratives targeting the current Moldovan government – many of which Moldovan opposition politicians also promoted at the Victory bloc congress.
The Kremlin will likely try to exploit its ties to Dodon as part of its wider efforts to destabilize Moldovan democracy and influence the Moldovan government.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.
Russian officials continue efforts to coerce migrants into military service.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june- 9-2024

Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against Russian air defense assets in occupied Crimea overnight on June 9 to 10, likely with ATACMS. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 10 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-400 air defense battery near occupied Dzhankoi and two S-300 batteries near occupied Chornomorske and Yevpatoria.<1> The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian strikes hit the radar stations of each battery and caused secondary ammunition detonations and that Russian air defenses did not intercept any of the Ukrainian missiles. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces launched at least 10 ATACMS missiles and that each targeted air defense installation was an element of the Russian 31st Air Defense Division (4th Guards Air Force and Air Defense Army, Southern Military District and Russian Aerospace Forces ).<2> Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted multiple Ukrainian ATACMS missiles overnight but largely did not report that any of the missiles hit their targets, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has not commented on the strikes as of the time of this publication.<3> ISW has not observed visual confirmation of the extent of damages from the Ukrainian strikes. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Schemes project published satellite imagery of burn marks at a Russian military object near a railway junction in Dzhankoi but noted that the imagery’s resolution is too low to determine specific damage.<4> A Russian milblogger who focuses on Russian air and air defense and has been largely critical of the Russian MoD criticized the Russian MoD in response to the strikes, claiming that Russian officers are falsely reporting no losses to their superiors despite actually suffering heavy losses.<5>

Ukrainian strikes against Russian military and logistics assets in connection to the United States' partial removal of Russian sanctuary in Belgorod Oblast may have compelled Russian forces to change their deployment and transport patterns. The Crimea-based Atesh Ukrainian partisan movement reported on June 10 that Russian forces recently redeployed air defense systems from occupied Crimea to Belgorod Oblast and that Russian air defenses are not completely covering Crimea as a result.<6> Footage dated June 8 shows that Russia has begun transporting fuel across the Kerch Strait across the railway bridge.<7> Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on April 29 that Russian authorities have not transported fuel across the Kerch Strait railway bridge since March 2024 due to the threat of a Ukrainian strike against the bridge as a fuel transport crossed, which could ignite and possibly destroy the bridge.<8> Ukrainian military–focused news outlet Militarnyi assessed on June 10 that Ukrainian strikes against railway barges across the Kerch Strait on May 30 prompted Russian authorities to begin transporting fuel across the railway bridge again.<9> It is unclear whether Russian authorities will continue to use the Kerch Strait railway bridge for fuel and logistics transport to occupied Crimea in the near to medium term. Doing so would likely alleviate some logistics constraints as Russia struggles to compensate for lost ferries across the strait but would leave the Kerch Strait bridge increasingly vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes, particularly if Russian air defense coverage of Crimea is degraded as Atesh reported.

Ukraine's Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk denied on June 10 a Sky News report that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Ropucha-class landing ship in the Sea of Azov on the night of June 8 to 9.<10> Pletenchuk also stated that there are three large Russian amphibious assault ships and three Buyan-M-class corvettes in the Sea of Azov as of May 10.<11> Sky News reported on June 9, citing a Ukrainian military source, that Ukrainian forces sunk or damaged a Russian Ropucha-class landing ship that Russian forces had recently moved from the Black Sea to the Sea of Azov, which ISW amplified.<12>

New Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with a select group of Russian milbloggers and military commentators on June 10, suggesting that the Kremlin seeks to partially use Belousov's replacement of widely unpopular former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to build bridges and cultivate ties with a broader milblogger community via a cadre of coopted and loyal military commentators. Russian state news agencies TASS and RIA Novosti reported on June 10 that Belousov met with several military correspondents (also known as voyenkory or milbloggers) covering the war in Ukraine and claimed that the conversation was "frank and constructive."<13> TASS and RIA noted that Belousov hopes to hold such meetings regularly. Russian insider sources and milbloggers claimed in late May and early June that Belousov was planning to meet with select milbloggers, and some of the more critical milbloggers criticized Belousov for reportedly not inviting them to the meeting.<14> Russian media confirmed on June 10 that several prominent and generally Kremlin-aligned milbloggers attended Belousov's meeting, including head of the WarGonzo social media military project Semyon Pegov, Komsomolskaya Pravda military correspondent and Kremlin-appointed member of the Human Rights Council Alexander Kots; Zvezda military correspondent Anatoly Brodkin; Russia Today (RT) military correspondent Murad Gazdiev, Readovka correspondent Maxim Dolgov, and others.<15> Gazdiev claimed on his personal Telegram channel on June 10 that the milbloggers delivered good and bad news from the front to Belousov and promised unspecified "huge changes."<16>

The Kremlin likely attempted to falsely portray Belousov as more attentive to milbloggers' criticisms than his predecessor in an effort to co-opt a larger non-Kremlin affiliated milblogger community. The Kremlin and Shoigu previously appeared at odds over milblogger reproachment—Russian President Vladimir Putin met with select milbloggers in July 2022 and June 2023 to discuss the situation on the frontline in Ukraine, while the Russian MoD continuously tried to crack down against critical milbloggers, who often used Shoigu as an informational scapegoat for Russian operational failures in Ukraine.<17> The Kremlin has long endeavored to coopt milbloggers, especially those critical of the Russian military leadership, in an effort to control the information space, as ISW previously assessed.<18> Belousov's meeting represents MoD outreach to several milbloggers who have had the Kremlin's favor for some time now and likely intended to court this group of commentators and ensure their continued loyalty to a new MoD under Belousov. Belousov's milblogger outreach is more likely to be a performative attempt to secure their loyalty than introduce systemic changes within the Russian MoD, as several Russian milbloggers who were not invited to the meeting previously noted.<19> Both the Kremlin and the Russian MoD have a vested interest in appearing open to dialogue with milbloggers, who represent a major pro-war constituency, and the Kremlin is likely aiming to portray Belousov as more cognizant of this fact than his predecessor.

Officials from Russia, Iran, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) held bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the BRICS foreign ministers meeting in Nizhny Novgorod on June 10. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke at the BRICS meeting and highlighted the organization's recent expansion.<20> Lavrov reiterated standard Kremlin narratives about how the Western rules-based order is detrimental to other states and about the supposed merits of the creation of a multipolar world. Lavrov claimed that the "winds of change" are driving BRICS forward. Lavrov met with officials from Brazil, South Africa, Ethiopia, Laos, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt during the BRICS event as well.<21>

Lavrov met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the BRICS meeting on June 10. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Chinese MFA both stated that Lavrov and Wang discussed diplomatic coordination in international organizations such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).<22> The Chinese MFA stated that developing Russo-Chinese relations are a "strategic choice" by both parties and that Lavrov and Wang "exchanged views" on the war in Ukrainian war."<23> The Russian MFA labeled the Russo-Chinese relationship as a "strategic partnership" and stated that Lavrov thanked Wang for the PRC's "balanced" line on the war in Ukraine and for not sending a representative to the June 15-16 Ukrainian peace summit in Switzerland.<24> The Russian MFA also stated that Lavrov and Wang discussed stability in the Asia-Pacific region, where they accused the US of allegedly creating anti-Russian and anti-Chinese military-political structures.<25> Lavrov also met with acting Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani on June 10 and discussed efforts to form a Russo-Iranian "strategic partnership" and create a new comprehensive intergovernmental agreement.<26> Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Kani stated that Iran "sees enormous potential for expanding and strengthening interaction."<27> Kani and Wang also met on June 10 and reportedly discussed increasing cooperation.<28> Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on June 9 that Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin will visit North Korea, and an unspecified diplomatic source reportedly stated that the visit will occur in the coming weeks after Putin visits Vietnam.<29> ISW continues to assess that Russia, the PRC, Iran, North Korea, and Belarus are deepening their multilateral partnerships in order to confront the West.<30>

The Armenian National Assembly will likely hold an emergency session by June 17 during which the Armenian opposition parties will demand Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's and his cabinet's resignation. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Armenian Service Radio Azatutyun reported on June 10 that 33 members of the Armenian opposition factions "Armenian Alliance" and "I Have Honor" supported convening an emergency session of the National Assembly to discuss passing a resolution calling for Pashinyan's and his cabinet's resignation and the formation of a new government.<31> The opposition factions blame Pashinyan for what they see as failures to defend and secure the territorial integrity and borders of Armenia.<32> Radio Azatutyun noted that Armenian law stipulates that the National Assembly needs the support of 27 members of the 107-seat National Assembly to call an emergency session.<33> Pashinyan's Civil Contract Party's National Assembly leader Hayk Konjoryan stated that Civil Contract National Assembly members will not participate in the June 17 emergency session.<34>

The US Department of State announced on June 10 that the US and Poland jointly launched the Ukraine Communications Group (UCG) in Warsaw to counter Russian disinformation by offering fact-based reporting about the war in Ukraine.<35> Representatives of unspecified countries will reportedly collaborate with the UCG. The US Department of State emphasized that Russia often uses false narratives to obfuscate its war aims and try to fracture worldwide solidarity with Ukraine.

Finnish authorities reported that a Russian military aircraft temporarily violated Finnish airspace on June 10 amid continued Russian efforts to undermine Finnish sovereignty. The Finnish Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that it is investigating an incident in which an unspecified Russian military aircraft flew roughly 2.5 kilometers deep into Finnish airspace over the Gulf of Finland for two minutes on the morning of June 10.<36> The Russian MoD has not responded to the Finnish report as of this publication but claimed on June 10 that Russian Tu-95MS missile carriers and Tu-22M3 bombers conducted flights over neutral waters of the Baltic, Barents, and Norwegian seas.<37> This reported incursion likely forwards the ongoing Kremlin effort to undermine Finnish sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Russian MoD proposed on May 21 that the Russian government should reassess Russia's maritime borders in the Gulf of Finland, which some Western officials have warned may be part of an effort to revise maritime zones in the Baltic Sea.<38> The Kremlin has also been running a number of information operations aimed at portraying Finland as an enemy to Russia and Russians, ultimately setting information conditions to justify potential future aggression against Finland.<39>

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against Russian air defense assets in occupied Crimea overnight on June 9 to 10, likely with ATACMS.
Ukraine's Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk denied on June 10 a Sky News report that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Ropucha-class landing ship in the Sea of Azov on the night of June 8 to 9.
New Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with a select group of Russian milbloggers and military commentators on June 10, suggesting that the Kremlin seeks to partially use Belousov's replacement of widely unpopular former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to build bridges and cultivate ties with a broader milblogger community via a cadre of coopted and loyal military commentators.
Officials from Russia, Iran, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) held bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the BRICS foreign ministers meeting in Nizhny Novgorod on June 10.
The Armenian National Assembly will likely hold an emergency session by June 17 during which the Armenian opposition parties will demand Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's and his cabinet's resignation.
The US Department of State announced on June 10 that the US and Poland jointly launched the Ukraine Communications Group (UCG) in Warsaw to counter Russian disinformation by offering fact-based reporting about the war in Ukraine.
Finnish authorities reported that a Russian military aircraft temporarily violated Finnish airspace on June 10 amid continued Russian efforts to undermine Finnish sovereignty.
Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov appears to be focusing on healthcare programs for Russian servicemembers in his new role.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june- 10-2024

Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide monetary and military assistance to Ukraine, including air defense systems. The Estonian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 11 that Estonia will provide an undisclosed number of Mistral man-portable short-range air defense systems and missiles to Ukraine as part of a new military assistance package.<1> European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced during the Ukrainian Recovery Conference in Berlin on June 11 that the European Union (EU) will transfer roughly 1.5 billion euros ($1.6 billion) worth of profits from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine in July, of which Ukraine will allocate 90 percent to defense spending and 10 percent to reconstruction.<2> Von der Leyen stated that the EU will also transfer an additional 1.9 billion euros ($2 billion) to Ukraine from the EU's Ukraine Facility mechanism, which is a separate fund that provides for the EU to transfer up to 50 billion euros ($53.7 billion) to Ukraine between 2024 and 2027.<3> German Chancellor Olaf Scholz reiterated during the Ukrainian Recovery Conference that Germany will deliver a Patriot air defense system to Ukraine in the coming weeks and announced that Germany will also deliver an IRIS-T air defense system, an unspecified number of Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, and an unspecified number and type of missiles and ammunition to Ukraine in the coming weeks and months.<4> The German MoD initially announced the transfer of this third Patriot system in April 2024.<5> The New York Times, citing senior US administration and military officials, reported on June 11 that US President Joe Biden recently approved the transfer of another Patriot system to Ukraine following a series of high-level meetings and internal debates regarding the best ways to meet Ukraine's need for additional air defenses.<6> Unnamed US officials stated that the new system could be deployed to the frontline within several days depending on any maintenance or modifications that the system may need, as the system is currently stationed in Poland.

The Kremlin continues efforts to codify legal instruments and repressive measures intended to broadly censor foreigners and foreign organizations in Russia. The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading on June 11 that seeks to codify the Russian government's ability to recognize "any" foreign organization as "undesirable."<7> The Duma first approved the draft version of this bill on May 27.<8> The Duma also adopted an additional bill in its first reading that introduces criminal penalties including fines and imprisonment for someone's participation in "any" organization classified as "undesirable."<9> Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin noted that this new bill will fill a gap in the existing legislation, which only has provisions to class foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as "undesirable."<10> The new bill will extend the undesirable classification to any foreign and international organizations, thereby broadening the Kremlin's discretion to target and censor a wide range of foreign organizations operating within Russia. The Kremlin has previously used the "undesirable" designation to block opposition media outlets, civil society organizations, and human rights-focused organizations from entering or operating within Russia, as ISW has previously reported.<11> Kremlin-appointed Russian Commissioner for Human Rights Tatiana Moskalkova also notably called on June 11 for the establishment of a legal mechanism that would allow the Russian government to prosecute foreigners for "Russophobia as a manifestation of extremism."<12> Russian authorities widely use accusations of "Russophobia" in an attempt to undermine any undesirable policy or rhetoric they deem to be "anti-Russian," and have similarly used charges of extremism with broad discretion to suppress and discourage domestic opposition.<13>

A prominent Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger channel announced that it opened a second "media school" in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, likely to support Kremlin efforts to expand its influence in the international information space, particularly in Central Asia. The Rybar Telegram channel claimed on June 11 that it is opening the "Rybar Media School" in Bishkek because Kyrgyzstan lacks military-political and industry expertise as well as a "blogosphere" and opinion journalism.<14> Rybar framed its establishment of a "media school" in Bishkek as an effort to coordinate and assert Russia's position in Central Asia and warned that Russia could be "expelled" from Central Asia in three to five years if Russia fails to assert itself and manage its informational influence in the region. Rybar's founder and manager Mikhail Zvinchuk gave a lecture to students at the Kyrgyz National University about the benefits of using Telegram to "solve problems" in the current information environment. Rybar claimed that Zvinchuk's lecture was only the first in a series of lectures and trainings for Kyrgyz media workers, students, public relations professionals, and press services to learn how to use multimedia to develop local Kyrgyz journalism. Rybar claimed that journalists from the Kyrgyz-branch of the official Russian government outlet Rossiyskaya Gazeta, "complained" about the lack of Russian journalistic work in Central Asia and claimed that the West outbalances Russia in its support for Kyrgyz journalism. Zvinchuk gave a masterclass in December 2023 on the importance of Telegram and other social media to press heads at Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec likely in an effort to normalize the war without directly involving the Kremlin or other official state bodies. Rybar announced that it opened a media school in an unspecified location in the Balkans in April 2024.<15> Rybar claimed that multiple Serbian and Republika Srpska (the Serbian entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) outlets highlighted Rybar's "debut" in the Balkans, while notably no Kyrgyz Russian- or Kyrgyz-language news outlets reported on the new "media school" in Bishkek as of this publication.<16> Rybar will likely attempt to expand its media influence in other foreign countries, and the Kremlin will likely seek to use coopted milbloggers like Rybar to expand Russian influence in international media.

Danish authorities arrested a Danish-Russian dual citizen accused of having connections to Russian intelligence services, which is likely part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to re-intensify its hybrid campaign against Western countries. The Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR) reported on June 11 that Danish authorities arrested an unidentified woman with dual Danish-Russian citizenship related to a recent investigation into the woman's connections to Russian foreign intelligence.<17> DR reported on June 3, citing leaked documents from Western intelligence services, that the women's legal aid clinic for Russian speakers received at least 338,000 Danish kroner (about $49,000) from the Russian Fund for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (Pravfond), which DR describes as closely linked to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).<18> The Guardian, which saw the same leaked documents, reported that Pravfond's leadership has multiple Russian intelligence agents, including longtime SVR officers Vladimir Pozdorovkin and Anatoly Sorokin.<19> The Guardian reported that Pravfond operates throughout Europe and that Pozdorovkin specifically oversees Pravfond's operations in Nordic and Baltic countries while Sorokin oversees operations in the Middle East, Moldova, and Transnistria.<20> DR reported and that the woman is a "central figure" in Denmark's Russian-speaking community and noted she has traveled to Russia and elsewhere for conferences with Pravfond participation or sponsorship.<21> The Kremlin has recently intensified its hybrid campaigns in Europe, and the Kremlin has been leaning into a narrative about protecting Russians and Russian-speakers outside of Russia — often called "compatriots abroad" — as part of its wider toolkit of hybrid manipulations.<22> The "compatriots abroad" narrative sets informational conditions for the Kremlin to justify hybrid operations or even direct interference against countries it claims do not adequately protect so-called Russian "compatriots" should these countries take actions unfavorable to the Kremlin. DR noted that several European intelligence sources stated that the Kremlin aims to use counseling and assistance centers — of which Pravfond funds at least 34 in 21 countries — to justify direct interference in other countries.<23>

Kremlin newswire TASS reported on June 11 that the former Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Military Academy, Grigory Molchanov, was appointed Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council.<24> Russian outlet RBK stated that Molchanov has served in the Russian military since 1973 and noted that the Security Council's first new appointment since former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu became Security Council Secretary on May 13.<25> Russian outlet RTVI noted that there are currently eight deputy secretaries and one first deputy secretary in addition to Shoigu.<26>

Key Takeaways:

Ukraine's Western allies continue to provide monetary and military assistance to Ukraine, including air defense systems.
The Kremlin continues efforts to codify legal instruments and repressive measures intended to broadly censor foreigners and foreign organizations in Russia.
A prominent Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger channel announced that it opened a second "media school" in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, likely to support Kremlin efforts to expand its influence in the international information space, particularly in Central Asia.
Danish authorities arrested a Danish-Russian dual citizen accused of having connections to Russian intelligence services, which is likely part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to re-intensify its hybrid campaign against Western countries.
Kremlin newswire TASS reported on June 11 that the former Head of the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Military Academy, Grigory Molchanov, was appointed Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council.
Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk and northwest of Avdiivka.
Russia may have suffered a damaged or destroyed military naval vessel in the Barents Sea.
Belarusian officials continue to implicate themselves in the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Belarus and their re-education in Belarusian programs.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june- 11-2024

Ukrainian forces may be conducting an effort aimed at degrading Russian air defenses, which, if successful, could enable Ukraine to more effectively leverage manned fixed-wing airpower in the long run. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 12 that Ukrainian forces targeted one S-300 air defense battery and two S-400 air defense batteries near occupied Belbek and Sevastopol, Crimea overnight on June 11 to 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strikes destroyed at least two S-300/S-400 Russian air defense radar systems and caused secondary ammunition detonations, and that the Ukrainian military is clarifying battle damage. Geolocated imagery published on June 12 shows damaged and destroyed Russian S-300 assets north of occupied Yevpatoria and a destroyed Russian S-400 radar system south of occupied Dzhankoy, supporting the Ukrainian General Staff's June 10 report about strikes against Russian air defense assets in these areas. Some Russian sources speculated that Ukrainian forces used ATACMS in the June 11 to 12 strike, although ISW is unable to confirm which systems Ukrainian forces used. Founder of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) "Kraken" Regiment Kostyantyn Nemichev confirmed on June 12 that Ukrainian forces used HIMARS to destroy four Russian S-300 systems in Belgorod Oblast on an unspecified date, and Ukrainian outlet Suspilne referred to Nemichev's statements as the first official Ukrainian confirmation of strikes against a Russian S-300 battery in Belgorod Oblast on June 1 or 2. Ukrainian forces’ destruction of the Russian air defense systems in Belgorod Oblast reportedly prompted the Russian command to deploy air defense assets from Crimea to Belgorod Oblast in early June 2024, reportedly degrading Russian air defense coverage around Crimea. GUR Spokesperson Andriy Yusov also clarified on June 12 that Ukrainian drone strikes against the Akhtubinsk Airfield in Astrakhan Oblast between June 7 and 8 damaged two Russian Su-57 fighter aircraft instead of just one aircraft as previously reported. S-300/S-400 air defense systems and Su-57 fighters are significant Russian air defense and aviation assets that deny Ukraine the ability to fly aircraft near the front and support Russian offensive operations in Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces may seek to actively degrade Russian air defenses before Ukraine receives a significant number of aircraft in order to set conditions for Ukraine’s future use of manned fixed-wing airpower closer to frontline areas. Ukrainian forces may be attempting to degrade Russian air defenses ahead of anticipated F-16 fighter jet deliveries to Ukraine, which reportedly will begin in small quantities in summer and fall 2024. Ukrainian forces may be able to eventually work towards a concept of operations that combines fixed-wing airpower to support ground operations if the Ukrainian military receives a sufficient number of fighter jets, Western partners train enough trained pilots, and if Ukraine succeeds in degrading Russian air defense capabilities.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces may be conducting an effort aimed at degrading Russian air defenses, which, if successful, could enable Ukraine to more effectively leverage manned fixed-wing airpower in the long run.

• Russian Northern Fleet naval vessels arrived at Havana Harbor, Cuba, on June 12 for their planned five-day long port call.

• Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that Armenia "will leave" and "will decide when to leave" the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in a question-and-answer session with the Armenian National Assembly on June 12 amid Armenia's continued efforts to distance itself from security and political relations with Russia.

• Georgian opposition-leaning outlet Mtavari reported that the Georgian government is planning to resume diplomatic relations with Russia.

• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Vovchansk, Siversk, and Avdiivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin highlighted Russian defense company officials in a list of recent recipients of labor awards during a "Russia Day" speech on June 11, indicating Putin's continued emphasis on strengthening the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin outlined his uncompromising demands for Ukraine’s capitulation as a prerequisite for "peace" negotiations in Ukraine, including the recognition of Russia’s illegal annexation of occupied and Ukrainian-controlled territory in eastern and southern Ukraine, in an attempt to undermine the June 15-16 Global Peace Summit in Switzerland. Putin stated during a speech at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on June 14 that Ukrainian forces must begin to "completely withdraw" from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts (which the Kremlin illegally declared as annexed in September 2022) and that Ukraine officially abandons its goal to join NATO before Russia can agree to a ceasefire and peace negotiations. Putin stated that Russia is prepared to begin negotiations with Ukraine as soon as Ukraine agrees to withdraw from the entirety of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts (which is in total 18 percent of Ukraine’s territory). Russian forces currently occupy 75 percent of the total area of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, and Putin is effectively demanding that Ukraine cede 40 percent of Donetsk Oblast, 25 percent of Kherson Oblast, 25 percent of Zaporizhia oblasts, and one percent of Luhansk Oblast that Russian forces do not control, including the provincial capitals Zaporizhia City and Kherson City. Putin's demands require Ukraine to surrender the strategic provincial capitals of Zaporizhia City and Kherson City for no good reason. Russian forces fled Kherson City in November 2022. Putin unconvincingly claimed that Russian forces will "immediately" enforce the ceasefire and will guarantee the "unhindered and safe" withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the four oblasts, a promise that rings particularly hollow following months of Russian war crimes against Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of war (POWs), and numerous Russian violations of the Minsk Accords ceasefire between 2015 and 2022. Putin demanded that the international community recognize the four illegally annexed and occupied oblasts as part of Russia and lift all Western sanctions against Russia in the event of a peaceful resolution to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a demand which will irrevocably damage the principle of state sovereignty and the inviolability of international borders.

Putin also reiterated his previous conditions for "peace," namely that Ukraine must agree to full demilitarization and "denazification" (the toppling of the current Ukrainian government and its replacement with pro-Russian proxies) and abandon its aspirations to join any external security blocs. Putin claimed that Ukraine must come to these decisions independently and not on the orders of its "Western masters" and reiterated a series of claims insinuating that the West controls Ukraine and that Ukraine is not a sovereign country. Putin claimed that it would be "impossible" for any peace format without Russian participation to resolve the war in Ukraine and that the Western and Ukrainian policies against negotiating with Russia are "idiotic."

Putin's demands continue to reflect his long-demanded ultimatums that are based on presuppositions that deny the existence of an independent and sovereign Ukraine and that seek to seduce the West to preemptively compromise on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 14 that Putin has put forth similar ultimatums and that Putin has no intention to stop attacking Ukraine. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that Russia, not Ukraine, must withdraw its forces from Ukrainian territory and that Putin's ultimatums are a signal that Russia has not abandoned its military objectives in Ukraine. Several prominent Russian milbloggers also stated that Putin’s demands are unachievable and resemble an ultimatum to the West, and this speech rings similar to the absurd ultimatums Putin delivered to the US and NATO in December 2021 as part of a diplomatic rouse to buy time as Putin prepared to invade Ukraine and seize Kyiv. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied interpretations that Putin’s June 14 speech was another ultimatum. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is not interested in good faith negotiations with Ukraine and only feigns its interest in negotiations as part of a wider informational effort intended to convince the West to preemptively make concessions that violate Ukraine's sovereignty.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin outlined his uncompromising demands for Ukraine’s capitulation as a prerequisite for "peace" negotiations in Ukraine, including the recognition of Russia’s illegal annexation of occupied and Ukrainian-controlled territory in eastern and southern Ukraine, in an attempt to undermine the June 15-16 Global Peace Summit in Switzerland.

• Putin proposed to establish an alternative Eurasian and world security system with support from People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping, likely to undermine NATO.

• The Kremlin has frequently timed the intensification of its information operations, including negotiations, to coincide with major policy debates in the West in order to influence Western decision-making.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev continued to rail against Western colonialism while ignoring Russia's imperial history and contemporary Russian imperialist aspirations to dominate Russia’s neighbors in eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

• Medvedev also promoted Kremlin information operations that aim to exploit Moldovan identity politics in order to disrupt Moldova's European Union (EU) accession by destabilizing Moldovan society.

• Medvedev also threatened Armenia on the eve of Armenian Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan's attendance at the June 15-16 Global Peace Summit in Switzerland.

• An unnamed senior US Department of Defense official reportedly said that the Biden Administration has no imminent plans to lift restrictions prohibiting Ukrainian forces from striking military targets in Russia’s operational and deep rear areas in Russian territory with US-provided weapons.

• Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes against Russia on the night of June 13 to 14.

• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and Donetsk City.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on June 14 that there are currently almost 700,000 Russian personnel in the "special military operation zone," which includes both occupied Ukraine and areas within Russia bordering Ukraine, during the meeting with participants of the "Time of Heroes" program.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 14 information operation about Russia's supposed “willingness to negotiate” on extreme terms tantamount to Ukraine's capitulation is succeeding in confusing the purpose of the Ukrainian-initiated Global Peace Summit in Switzerland on June 15. The purpose of the summit, according to the Ukrainian President's Office, was to facilitate a multilateral dialogue to achieve "fair peace ... based on the United Nations (UN) Charter and international law." Putin‘s information operation on June 14 sought to and partially succeeded in sabotaging the summit by refocusing the international conversation to Russia's absence at the summit, instead of allowing the summit's participants to proceed with the intended purpose of garnering international support for Ukraine and Ukraine's efforts to involve the broader international community in ending the war. Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak stated before the summit opened on June 15 that Ukraine and its international partners can give a joint peace plan to a Russian representative at a second peace summit if a Russian representative attends.

Putin specifically outlined his demands for "peace" negotiations in Ukraine a day before the start of the Global Peace Summit to undermine Western support for legitimate Ukrainian demands from Russia and divert attention away from the task of building an international consensus around how to ensure that Russia’s illegal war of aggression does not result in an unjust Russian victory. Putin's restated prerequisites for "peace" negotiations included the recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of occupied and Ukrainian-controlled territory and Ukraine's agreement to demilitarization, "denazification" (the toppling of the current Ukrainian government and its replacement with pro-Russian proxies), and Ukraine's agreement to abandon efforts to join any external security blocs — the same demands that he made prior to the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022 and that he has consistently reiterated throughout the war. Putin‘s overture that he is open to any kind of “negotiations“ not predicated on what is effectively Ukraine’s unconditional surrender is therefore inherently misleading. Putin’s duplicitous statements about his supposed “willingness to negotiate” thus reoriented international discourse to highlight how Putin — who is not interested in upholding the principles of the UN Charter in his war of conquest in Ukraine — was not invited to the conference, and how Putin’s absence at the summit presented some kind of intrinsic paradox. It did not.

Key Takeaways:

• Several senior Western officials made statements at the Ukraine-initiated Global Peace Summit in Switzerland that inadvertently play into ongoing Russian information operations falsely portraying Russia as interested in legitimate and good faith negotiations, likely in part due to Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to undermine the summit through his carefully planned restatement of his uncompromising demands for Ukraine's capitulation on June 14.

• Kremlin mouthpieces amplified ongoing Russian information operations intended to discredit and disrupt the Global Peace Summit.

• Ukrainian First Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk reported that Western military assistance has begun to arrive in Ukraine, but that Western military assistance will likely not arrive at scale and significantly impact the frontline situation for several more weeks to months.

• Chairperson of the ruling United Russia Party Dmitry Medvedev officially replaced United Russia Secretary Andrey Turchak with acting Russian Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Ural Federal District Vladimir Yakushev.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is preparing a group of trusted and Kremlin-affiliated “veterans” to assume government roles likely in an attempt to appease Russian servicemen and domestic supporters of the war in Ukraine.

• The Swedish military announced on June 15 that a Russian Su-24 tactical fighter-bomber plane temporarily violated Swedish airspace east of the southern tip of Gotland on June 14, likely as part of an effort to discourage European states from participating in NATO and other international institutions supporting Ukraine.

• Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Kupyansk and Avdiivka.

• Elements of the Russian Baltic and Pacific fleets are participating separate naval exercises.

• A Financial Times (FT) investigation published on June 12 found that Russian officials have put Ukrainian children up for adoption whom Russia had forcibly deported from occupied Ukraine to Russia in 2022.

Institute for the Study of War

The vast majority of the countries and international organizations that participated in the Ukraine-initiated Global Peace Summit in Switzerland on June 15-16 signed a joint communique on June 16 reaffirming support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The communique also reaffirmed support for Ukrainian operation and control over the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to ensure the safety of nuclear energy and installations, "free full, and safe" commercial navigation in the Black Sea to ensure global food security, the exchange of all prisoners of war (POWs), and the return of all "deported and unlawfully displaced Ukrainian children" and other unlawfully detained Ukrainian civilians. Over 80 countries and international organizations signed the communique, although Saudi Arabia, India, South Africa, Armenia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Brazil (which attended the summit as an "observer") were among the countries that did not endorse the communique. The Ukrainian President's Office emphasized that the purpose of the summit was to facilitate "fair peace ... based on the United Nations (UN) Charter and international law," highlighting Ukraine's effort to garner support from the international community in ending the war on terms that do not violate international law by compromising Ukraine’s territory integrity or sovereignty. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte stated on June 16 at the summit that "Russia should not be at the table now" and that there will only be peace in Ukraine "when Russia agrees to international principles and the UN Charter." ISW continues to assess that Russian President Vladimir Putin is not interested in good-faith negotiations and only feigns interest in negotiations in specific instances as part of a wider informational effort to seduce the West to preemptively make concessions that would violate Ukraine's sovereignty. Putin is unlikely to be interested in good faith negotiations for the foreseeable future given that he recently outlined a theory of Russian victory in Ukraine based on the assumption that Russian forces are capable of indefinite creeping advances on the battlefield to outlast Western support for Ukraine.

A limited prison break and hostage situation at a Russian pretrial detention center in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast, prompted Russian ultranationalist complaints highlighting Russia's failure to crack down against domestic Islamic extremism following the March 22 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack. Russian state media reported on June 16 that around six prisoners at Pretrial Detention Center No. 1 in Rostov-on-Don broke out of their cells and took two employees of the pretrial detention center hostage in the central courtyard. Rosgvardia and Russian Federal Penitentiary Service forces later stormed the pretrial detention center and reportedly killed the detainees, freeing the hostages. Russian state media claimed that the prisoners had links to the Islamic State (IS) or had been convicted of terrorism-related charges prior to the June 16 incident. ISW is unable to verify the identities or affiliations of these prisoners or the extent of IS involvement in the prison break at the time of this publication.

Key Takeaways:

• The vast majority of the countries and international organizations that participated in the Ukraine-initiated Global Peace Summit in Switzerland on June 15-16 signed a joint communique on June 16 reaffirming support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

• A limited prison break and hostage situation at a Russian pretrial detention center in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast, prompted Russian ultranationalist complaints highlighting Russia's failure to crack down against domestic Islamic extremism following the March 22 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack.

• The Kremlin and Kremlin affiliates continue efforts to use Russia's relationship with Republika Srpska (the Serbian political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina) to destabilize the Balkans.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk and Donetsk City.

• The Russian military reportedly continues to coerce Russian conscripts into signing military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), likely as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in Pyongyang on June 19, likely aimed in part to use military-technical cooperation with North Korea as a threat against the West to discourage further support for Ukraine. Putin arrived with a delegation of Russian ministers in Pyongyang on June 19 and signed the agreement with Kim, but neither Russian nor North Korean officials have published the official text of this agreement as of the time of this publication. Putin and Kim each spoke about the agreement, claiming that it broadly covers goals and guidelines for deepening Russian–North Korean long-term relations in the political, economic, trade, cultural, humanitarian, and security fields. Putin specified that the strategic partnership agreement also provides for "mutual assistance in the event of aggression" against either Russia or North Korea, then immediately criticized conversations in the West about allowing Ukraine to strike areas in Russia with Western-provided long-range weapons and F-16 jets. Putin then concluded that "in this regard," Russia does "not rule out the development of military-technical cooperation" with North Korea. Putin likely intended to signal that should the US lift its restrictions against Ukrainian using US-provided ATACMS to strike Russian territory or other restrictions against using F-16s for the same purposes, Russia will likely deepen cooperation with North Korea in the sphere of military technologies such as missiles, other arms, and satellites through the legal framework provided in this new agreement. Putin and other Kremlin officials will likely continue to leverage this threat as debates about permitting Ukraine to use Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russian territory continue and may also expand this threat to other issues that the Kremlin has historically framed as "escalatory" or "provocations" against Russia. Russia will likely continue to deepen its cooperation with North Korea, regardless of Western self-imposed restrictions on military aid provisions to Ukraine and policies restricting Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian sanctuary, as Russia had been doing throughout its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The Russian and North Korean governments largely framed the agreement as evidence of their mutual support as part of a common struggle against the West and signaled that Russia and North Korea share a goal to challenge the West and the current world order. Putin claimed that Russia and North Korea both aim to create "a more just and democratic multipolar world order" and that both countries pursue "independent foreign policy" — setting them apart from Western states. Putin also credited Kim with holding an "objective and balanced view" about the war in Ukraine. Kim and Putin also emphasized the "traditionally friendly and good" relations between Russia and North Korea "based on the glorious traditions of common history" — continuing to invoke the historical memory of the Soviet Union's support of North Korea to appeal to the propaganda of the Kim regime and the North Korean people. North Korean state media published readouts similarly emphasizing Russia's and North Korea's common cause, emphasizing that North Korea stands in solidarity with "the sacred cause of the Russian army and people who are proudly advancing towards justice and truth." The Kremlin published extensive images of Putin's visit to Pyongyang, including a lavish military-patriotic parade, North Korean civilians holding flowers and celebrating Putin's arrival, and Kim personally escorting Putin to and from his plane on the tarmac — all underscoring the two regimes' emphasis on friendship and their determination to support each other. Putin's visit and the Russian–North Korean strategic cooperation agreement help legitimize Kim's regime domestically and abroad, as ISW has previously noted, and Putin also discussed increasing trade between Russia and North Korea, posturing that improving trade and infrastructure also benefits their shared partner, the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in Pyongyang on June 19, likely aimed in part to use military-technical cooperation with North Korea as a threat against the West to discourage further support for Ukraine. Russian and North Korea largely framed the agreement as evidence of their mutual support as part of a common struggle against the West and signaled that they share a goal to challenge the West and current world order.

• Putin is pursuing a coalition of friendly states with historically warm ties to the Soviet Union to act as an alternative to the West and current world order.

• Russian government officials announced their intention on June 19 to suspend Russia's participation in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA).

• The Russian military command continues to endorse a culture of permissiveness towards war crimes perpetrated by subordinates on the battlefield in Ukraine.

• The Russian government is attempting to deflect responsibility for well-documented Russian violations of international law regarding Russia's treatment of Ukrainian children by accusing the Ukrainian Armed Forces and other security structures of committing "crimes" against children.

• Air traffic control (ATC) communications from international airspace over the northeastern Atlantic Ocean appear to show the first confirmed instance of GPS jamming on commercial trans-Atlantic routes.

• Ukrainian forces recaptured positions near Starytsya and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and Donetsk City and in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.

• Finnish outlet Yle, citing satellite imagery and Finnish intelligence sources, reported on June 19 that the Russian military has deployed roughly 80 percent of its equipment and personnel based near the Russian-Finnish border to support its invasion of Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a major information operation during his recent visit to North Korea and Vietnam on June 18 and 19 aimed at sabotaging efforts by Ukraine's partners to clearly define a common strategic objective and strategy to decisively defeat Russia’s illegal war of conquest in Ukraine. Ukraine’s partners undertook several important steps in mid-June to cohere a common strategy and define the desired strategic outcome of the war. Over 80 Western and international officials recently established a principled position on supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as the foundation of lasting peace in Ukraine in a communique adopted during the Ukraine-led Global Peace Summit on June 16. Ukraine also signed security agreements with the United States and Japan for 10 years on June 13, and numerous partner states reaffirmed their long-term support for Ukraine within the Group of 7 (G7) and the Ramstein formats. US President Joe Biden stated that the United States will continue supporting Ukraine so that Ukraine “has victory and that Russia does not prevail” when discussing the US-Ukraine security agreement. Putin’s strategy for winning the war relies on the Kremlin’s ability to mislead the United States, the European Union, and Ukraine’s international allies into ceasing support for Ukraine and abandoning key principles of international law – respect for state sovereignty and the inviolability of territorial integrity. Allied strategic clarity and commitment to enabling Ukraine to decisively defeat Russia on the battlefield in Ukraine greatly undermines Putin’s center of gravity – and his ability to shape the will and decisions of allied decision makers.

Putin also met with Vietnamese President Tô Lâm, Vietnamese Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính, and General Secretary of the Central Committee of Vietnam’s Community Party Nguyễn Phú Trọng during his visit and discussed bilateral relations and the Soviet Union's and Russia's support of Vietnam during the 20th and 21st centuries. ISW noted on June 19 that Putin appears to be pursuing a coalition of friendly states with historically warm ties to the Soviet Union that could form the basis of an alternative to the West and the current world order.

The United States made a policy change to prioritize delivering Patriot air defense interceptors to Ukraine against the backdrop of the increasing threat of Russian guided glide bomb use in Ukraine. US National Security Spokesperson John Kirby stated on June 20 that the US is going to "reprioritize" the export of Patriot missiles so that the missiles "rolling off the production line" will go straight to Ukraine. Kirby characterized the decision as "difficult but necessary" to ensure that hundreds of Patriot and NASAM munitions produced for the next 16 months would go to Ukraine, regardless of which country ordered them. Kirby stated that Ukraine will receive the first shipments of Patriot missiles by the end of Summer 2024 and that other countries that ordered Patriot missiles will receive them on a "delayed timeline." Kirby stated that other countries impacted by the delay were ”broadly supportive” of the decision to prioritize Ukraine’s air defense needs. The Romanian Supreme National Defense Council announced on June 20 that Romania will donate one Patriot system to Ukraine due to Russia's large-scale strikes on Ukrainian energy and civil infrastructure. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba have recently emphasized Ukraine's need for more Patriot systems. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's ability to defend itself against devastating Russian glide bomb strikes is heavily contingent on Ukraine's ability to target Russian aircraft within Russian airspace using US-provided air defense systems before Russian aircraft can launch strikes at Ukrainian cities, critical infrastructure, and frontline positions.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a major information operation during his recent visit to North Korea and Vietnam on June 18 and 19 aimed at sabotaging efforts by Ukraine's partners to clearly define a common strategic objective and strategy to decisively defeat Russia’s illegal war of conquest in Ukraine.

• Putin implicitly threatened to use nuclear weapons if the West enables Ukraine to decisively defeat Russia in order to undermine the international community's cohering strategic vision of support for Ukraine.

• Putin’s nuclear threat is part of an ongoing Kremlin nuclear blackmail campaign aimed at dissuading Ukraine’s allies from decisively committing to defeating Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and is therefore highly unlikely to result in actual nuclear escalation.

• South Korea responded to the Russian-North Korean comprehensive strategic partnership agreement on June 20 and stated that it will reconsider its previous ban on sending lethal military assistance to Ukraine.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin simultaneously attempted to downplay aspects of the Russia-North Korea agreement potentially in response to South Korea's concerns during a June 20 press conference in Vietnam.

• Putin also met with Vietnamese President Tô Lâm, Vietnamese Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính, and General Secretary of the Central Committee of Vietnam’s Community Party Nguyễn Phú Trọng during his visit and discussed bilateral relations and the Soviet Union's and Russia's support of Vietnam during the 20th and 21st centuries.

• Russian forces used the new FAB-3000 M-54 bomb with a unified planning and correction module (UMPC) to strike Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast for the first time, representing a new Russian capability with a high potential for destruction if Russian forces continue to be able to use such weapons uninhibited.

• The United States made a policy change to prioritize delivering Patriot air defense interceptors to Ukraine against the backdrop of the increasing threat of Russian guided glide bomb use in Ukraine.

• US policy still prohibits Ukrainian forces from striking military targets with US-provided weapons in the operational and deep rear of Russian territory.

• The Russian military's increased over-reliance on infantry-heavy frontal assault tactics has greatly degraded the distinctions between various Russian combat services on the battlefield in Ukraine, minimizing the operational efficacy of frontline troops.

• Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov used a working visit to the Eastern Military District in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai to create the appearance of a strict but engaged defense minister.

• Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against at least two oil facilities in Russia on the night of June 19 to 20.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.

• Russian milbloggers complained that the Russian military command is failing to properly incentivize Russian servicemen to fight and explain the purpose of the Russian full-scale invasion to its troops.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to invoke nuclear threats as part of his ongoing information campaign to discourage further Western support for Ukraine and undermine the international community's efforts to cohere its strategic vision for defeating Russia’s war of conquest against Ukraine. Putin claimed during a speech to graduating Russian officers on June 21 that Russia plans to further develop its nuclear triad as a "guarantee of strategic deterrence" and to maintain the balance of power in the world. Putin noted that Russia is also working to increase its conventional combat capabilities and defense industrial production. Putin claimed during a press conference in Vietnam on June 20 that Russia is considering "lowering the threshold" for nuclear use in Russia's nuclear doctrine and that a possible future strategic defeat of Russian forces on the battlefield in Ukraine would result in the "end of statehood." ISW noted that Putin may have falsely equated a Russian defeat in Ukraine with an existential threat to the Russian state in order to invoke an "exceptional case" in which existing Russian nuclear doctrine would allow for the use of nuclear weapons. Putin's June 21 statement appears to be the continuation of his recent information operation intended to sabotage the West's efforts to develop a common strategic objective of decisively defeating Russia’s invasion as the West’s envisioned end state for the war in Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that the threat of nuclear escalation is a core aspect of Russia's ability to manipulate foreign decision-makers and is highly unlikely to result in actual nuclear escalation due to nuclear and conventional deterrence.

Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov continued to emphasize Russia's initiative to create an alternative "Eurasian security architecture," likely as part of ongoing efforts to establish a coalition of friendly states to act as an alternative to the West and undermine NATO. Putin reiterated on June 21 his intention to create "equal and indivisible security in Eurasia." Putin claimed that Russia is ready to discuss Eurasian security issues with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and BRICS and claimed that Russia is ready to have discussions with European and NATO countries "when they are ready." Lavrov similarly emphasized Russia's effort to form a "Eurasian security architecture to replace... the Euro-Atlantic " at a June 21 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) foreign ministers meeting in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Lavrov further promoted the need for joint efforts to create a new Eurasian security architecture and coordination with other unspecified multilateral organizations on the Eurasian continent. Lavrov is likely referencing Russian efforts to increase cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as Putin signaled his interest in developing relations with ASEAN during his state visit to Vietnam on June 20. Putin notably included Vietnam - a country not typically included in political conceptions of Eurasia - in addition to North Korea in his proposed formation of a new Eurasian security system, suggesting that Putin seeks to include Southeast Asia into this alternative Eurasian security structure by leveraging select Southeast Asian countries' historically friendly ties with the Soviet Union. Putin first laid the informational groundwork for this Eurasian security structure during his visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC) in May 2024 before proposing it in a speech on June 14, in which he claimed that the "Euro-Atlantic security system" is collapsing and that Western "schemes for security and prosperity in Europe do not work." ISW continues to assess that Putin and other senior Russian officials will likely continue to amplify Russia's efforts to create a coalition of countries that Putin could use to posture as an alternative to NATO while also supporting ongoing Kremin information operations to falsely portray Western countries as Ukraine's only supporters.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to invoke nuclear threats as part of his ongoing information campaign to discourage further Western support for Ukraine and undermine the international community's efforts to cohere its strategic vision for defeating Russia’s war of conquest against Ukraine.

• Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov continued to emphasize Russia's initiative to create an alternative "Eurasian security architecture," likely as part of ongoing efforts to establish a coalition of friendly states to act as an alternative to the West and undermine NATO.

• The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) criticized South Korean and Japanese objections to the Russian-North Korean strategic partnership agreement and directly tied the agreement to Russian President Vladimir Putin's "Eurasian security architecture" initiative.

• Ukrainian forces struck oil refineries and military targets in Bryansk and Astrakhan oblasts, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Crimea on the night of June 20 to 21.

• Moscow State University (MGU) announced on June 21 that it has opened enrollment for a master's program on "strategic communications, information, and hybrid wars" under the guidance of Russian ultranationalist and former State Duma Deputy Zakhar Prilepin and other select Duma deputies.

• Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk, southwest of Svatove, and west and southwest of Donetsk City.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to be taking steps to address known bureaucratic issues as part of its efforts to formalize irregular Russian formations.

• An investigation by Russian opposition outlet Verstka highlights how Russia is importing Russian judges to serve in courts in occupied Ukraine, supporting Russian efforts to control the judiciary while also providing a convenient cover for the resettlement of Russian citizens into occupied Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

US policy continues to prohibit Ukrainian forces from striking legitimate military targets in Russian territory in range of Ukrainian HIMARS. Recent reporting from the Associated Press and Washington Post indicates that US policy still prohibits Ukraine from striking Russian military targets that are not actively attacking or preparing to attack Ukraine. Pentagon spokesperson Major Charlie Dietz told the Washington Post in a report published on June 21 that the US allows Ukraine to fire US-provided HIMARS equipped with GMLRS into Russia where Russian forces are attacking into Ukraine and that the rules of engagement for US-provided weapons in Russian territory are “not about geography or a certain radius." US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan similarly stated on June 17 that “this is not about geography... If Russia is attacking or about to attack from its territory into Ukraine, it only makes sense to allow Ukraine to hit back against the forces that are hitting it from across the border.” These statements indicate that the US will only allow Ukrainian forces to strike Russian military targets if Russian targets first demonstrate that they are engaged in active combat operations or preparations for imminent combat operations. US restrictions likely force Ukrainian leadership to carefully determine whether or not a given target meets the aforementioned requirements before authorizing tactical fire missions. US policy still perseveres the majority of Russian sanctuary space by prohibiting Ukrainian forces from launching ATACMS missiles at any military targets in Russia. No major Russian military airbases are in range of GMLRS, but many are within range of ATACMS.

Russian forces are exploiting the sanctuary that US policy still protects to support Russian combat operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and elsewhere in Ukraine. The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces is leveraging the sanctuary to protect Russian brigade command posts and other assets outside of the range of HIMARS equipped with GLMRS north of Kharkiv Oblast. The Associated Press quoted a Ukrainian artillery commander on June 22 who stated that Ukrainian forces could target Russian brigade command points and the entire Russian Northern Grouping of Forces if the US approved Ukraine's use of ATACMS to strike Russian territory but currently cannot because Russia has deployed such command and control elements in an area 100 to 150 kilometers away from the front line. US policy still prohibits Ukraine from using ATACMS anywhere in Russia.

Russian air defenses will reduce the effectiveness of Ukrainian F-16s if the US does not allow Ukrainian forces to use ATACMS to destroy Russian air defense systems in Russian territory. Ukrainian F-16 pilots will have to operate in a dangerous air space if US policy continues to provide a sanctuary in Russia that protects Russian forces from ATACMS. Russian air defenses will be able to cover up to 48 percent of Ukraine’s air space if Russia deploys S-400 air defense launchers within Russia outside of the range of HIMARS armed with GMLRS rockets. Such Russian air defense deployments would complicate Ukraine's ability to use manned fixed-wing airpower closer to frontline areas or against areas from which Russian aircraft, drone, and missile threats emanate. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces may be able to combine fixed-wing airpower in support of ground operations if the Ukrainian military receives a sufficient number of fighter jets, if Western partners train enough skilled pilots, and if Ukraine succeeds in degrading Russian air defense capabilities.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces appear to be intensifying the tempo of their offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast while decreasing the rate of attacks in northern Kharkiv Oblast — consistent with ISW's assessment that Russian offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast are primarily intended to fix and distract Ukrainian forces in order to allow Russian forces to intensify elsewhere in theater.

• US policy continues to prohibit Ukrainian forces from striking legitimate military targets in Russian territory in range of Ukrainian HIMARS.

• Russian forces are exploiting the sanctuary that US policy still protects to support Russian combat operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and elsewhere in Ukraine.

• Russian air defenses will reduce the effectiveness of Ukrainian F-16s if the US does not allow Ukrainian forces to use ATACMS to destroy Russian air defense systems in Russian territory.

• The partial removal of the Russian sanctuary has already had a net positive effect, underscoring the powerful latent potential a larger policy change could achieve.

• Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren announced on June 21 that the Netherlands and another unspecified country will supply Ukraine with a Patriot air defense system.

• Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on a series of leadership changes within the Russian Federal Security Service's (FSB) Fifth Service, which reportedly specializes in collecting intelligence within Russia and the former Soviet Union.

• Western countries have reportedly provided Ukraine with roughly 800 million euros ($855.4 million) worth of Serbian-produced ammunition despite Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić's ongoing efforts to balance favor between Russia and the West.

• Satellite imagery confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck at least one Russian air defense training center in Krasnodar Krai during recent strikes on June 20 to 21.

• Select Russian milbloggers claimed that unnamed actors, implied to be Ukrainians, conducted a strike using ATACMS against Rostov Oblast, although ISW cannot independently confirm these reports.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Chasiv Yar, and Avdiivka.

• Russian law enforcement and security agencies continue working with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to recruit those accused of criminal offenses into the Russian military, likely as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.

Institute for the Study of War

The Islamic State (IS)'s Northern Caucasus branch, Wilayat Kavkaz, likely conducted a complex and coordinated attack against churches, synagogues, and law enforcement structures in the Republic of Dagestan on June 23. Dagestan's Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that unknown actors opened fire on a Russian Orthodox church and a synagogue in Derbent at approximately 1800 local time and then reported within the same hour that another group of unknown actors opened fire on a traffic police post in Makhachkala (120 kilometers north of Derbent). There are also reports of a fire at a synagogue in Makhachkala, although Russian official sources have not confirmed a second synagogue attack. Dagestan announced a counter-terrorism regime following the start of the attacks, and Russian law enforcement killed five of the assailants and wounded six. Social media footage shows Russian law enforcement detaining two suspects on a public beach in Makhachkala after they seemingly fled the scene of the shooting. Russian media reported that seven law enforcement officials, a priest, and a church guard died in the attacks and 25 more individuals have been injured. The Russian National Anti-Terrorism Committee announced the end of the counterterrorism operation in Derbent after the deaths of two suspects but small arms fire exchanges continued in Makhachkala as of 2300 local time on June 23. The Baza Telegram channel claimed that two of the Makhachkala attackers identified as Osman and Adil Omarov, both of whom Russian law enforcement killed, were the sons of Sergokalinsky district head Magomed Omarov. Russian Telegram channels are circulating footage reportedly filmed by Osman Omarov of the Makhachkala synagogue attack. Baza reported that Russian law enforcement has also detained Magomed Omarov and are searching his home. Russian news agency Interfax claimed that Omarov's nephew also took part in the attack and Russian law enforcement killed him.

South Korea has adopted a firm approach against Russia in the wake of recently intensified Russo-North Korean cooperation, suggesting that Russian efforts to threaten Seoul into withholding aid from Ukraine have failed. South Korean National Security Director Chang Ho-jin reiterated on June 23 that the type of military support that South Korea will provide to Ukraine is contingent on the depth and evolution of Russian military cooperation with North Korea. Chang previously stated on June 20 that the June 19 Russia-North Korea strategic partnership agreement had encouraged South Korea to change its long-standing policy prohibiting the transfer of arms to Ukraine, and South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on June 21 that South Korea is now considering sending 155mm artillery shells and unspecified air defense systems to Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin notably attempted to threaten South Korea on June 20, stating that Seoul would be making “a very big mistake” if it decided to supply arms to Ukraine. Russian diplomatic officials have tried to retaliate against Seoul's statement about providing aid to Ukraine and claimed that it is "blackmail" against Russia. The Washington Post reported on June 22, citing data obtained by US think tank Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), that North Korea delivered over 74,000 metric tons of explosives to Russia — equivalent to about 1.6 million artillery shells — between August 2023 and January 2024. The Washington Post reported that these North Korean shipments arrived at 16 sites in Russia, 12 of which were close to known ammunition storage facilities.

Key Takeaways:
• The Islamic State (IS)'s Northern Caucasus branch Wilayat Kavkaz likely conducted a complex and coordinated attack against churches, synagogues, and law enforcement structures in the Republic of Dagestan on June 23.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukrainian forces of conducting a short-range ATACMS strike against occupied Sevastopol on June 23. Russian milbloggers widely criticized the Russian MoD and Russia’s occupation authorities in Crimea for failing to prevent the strike and sufficiently protect Russian civilians.

• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian motorized rifle regiment command post in Nekhoteevka, Belgorod Oblast.

• Recent drone footage showing a Russian soldier executing a wounded fellow servicemember exemplifies the brutal culture that is pervasive within the Russian Armed Forces.

• South Korea has adopted a firm approach against Russia in the wake of recently intensified Russo-North Korean cooperation, suggesting that Russian efforts to threaten Seoul into withholding aid from Ukraine have failed.

• The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) detained two former senior employees of the Wagner Group-affiliated Patriot media holding on the eve of the one-year anniversary of the Wagner mutiny.

• Russian forces recently seized Shumy and advanced near Donetsk City and Robotyne.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on June 22 officially transferring the Cossack Cadet Corps and the Russian Naval Cadet Corps to the jurisdiction of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated that Western military assistance is arriving in Ukraine, but that it will likely not arrive at a scale that will significantly impact the frontline situation until at least mid to late July 2024. Budanov stated in an interview with the Philadelphia Inquirer conducted on June 12 or 13 and published on June 23 that US and European weapons deliveries, including artillery ammunition, are arriving in Ukraine at a faster pace than several months ago but noted that Ukrainian forces need a high volume of weapons and "there is a question of volume." Budanov stated that "no Armageddon will emerge " but that the frontline situation will remain difficult for at least one month. Ukrainian First Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk also recently stated on June 15 that Ukrainian forces are still waiting for most of the military assistance that the United States passed in late April 2024 to arrive in Ukraine, but that limited amounts of US security assistance arrivals have reduced Russia's artillery shell advantage from seven-to-one to five-to-one. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are attempting to make tactically and operationally significant gains before US military assistance arrives to Ukrainian forces at the frontline at scale, and that the initial arrival of Western-provided weaponry will take some time to have tactical to operational effect on the frontline.

Budanov stated that a sufficient quantity of US-provided long-range ATACMS missiles could allow Ukrainian forces to strike the Russian-built Kerch Strait Bridge in occupied Crimea and sever an important Russian ground line of communication (GLOC) between occupied Crimea and Russia. Budanov stated that Ukraine could isolate occupied Crimea, which the Russian military uses as a rear staging area, by conducting long-range ATACMS missile strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge. The Russian military continues to use Crimea's GLOCs to transport military personnel, weapons, materiel, and fuel from Russia to the frontlines in Ukraine and reinforced its air defense umbrella to cover occupied southern Ukraine from Crimea. Ukrainian officials have recently stated that Russian forces have reduced their military logistics transport across the Kerch Strait Bridge, presumably due to efforts to establish logistics lines connecting mainland Russia and occupied Crimea through occupied southern Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, but the Kerch Strait Bridge likely remains essential to maintaining Russia's occupation of Crimea. Ukrainian long-range strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge would sever an important GLOC for Russian forces based in occupied Crimea and likely complicate their ability to maintain their occupation of and basing within the peninsula. The destruction of the bridge would force Russian military to rely on the long route along northern coast of the Sea of Azov and exacerbate vulnerabilities for Ukrainian forces to exploit along the Russian main GLOC.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated that Western military assistance is arriving in Ukraine, but that it will likely not arrive at a scale that will significantly impact the frontline situation until at least mid to late July 2024.

• Budanov stated that a sufficient quantity of US-provided long-range ATACMS missiles could allow Ukrainian forces to strike the Russian-built Kerch Strait Bridge in occupied Crimea and sever an important Russian ground line of communication (GLOC) between occupied Crimea and Russia.

• Current US policy regarding Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons allows Ukraine to strike anywhere within Russian-occupied Ukraine, which presumably includes using long-range ATACMS to strike the portion of the Kerch Strait Bridge within Ukraine's internationally recognized land and maritime borders.

• Kremlin officials absurdly attempted to link the June 23 Ukrainian strikes on legitimate military targets in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea and the likely Islamic State (IS) affiliate Wilayat Kavkaz terrorist attack in the Republic of Dagestan.
• The Kremlin is attempting to maintain a veneer of stability and normalcy in response to the Dagestan terror attack.

• The European Union (EU) adopted its 14th package of sanctions against Russia on June 24, including new restrictions against Russian funding to political parties and other "opinion-forming" organizations and Russian state media broadcasts within the EU.

• The EU approved a first tranche of up to 1.4 billion euros (about $1.5 billion) in military assistance for Ukraine from the proceeds of frozen Russian assets.

• The Kremlin continued efforts to coopt former Wagner Group personnel by introducing a new bill that would exempt much of the Wagner force from criminal responsibility for their participation in the Wagner armed rebellion on June 23 and 24, 2023.

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant General Yuriy Sodol with Brigadier General Andriy Hnatov on June 24.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Vovchansk and Starysta, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Toretsk.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed depriving all Russian military districts of their status as joint headquarters.

Institute for the Study of War

Two major international bodies—the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) — announced decisions on June 25 confirming Russia's long-term perpetration of war crimes and human rights violations in Ukraine. The ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber II (the chamber in charge of the ICC's Ukraine-related investigations and prosecutions) announced on June 25 that it had issued arrest warrants for former Russian Defense Minister and current Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov for "the war crime of directing attacks at civilian objects" in Ukraine. The ICC noted that there is reasonable evidence to believe that both Shoigu and Gerasimov bear individual responsibility for the war crimes of causing incidental harm to civilians and damage to civilian objects and the crime of inhumane acts, both of which are violations of the Rome Statute. The ICC also emphasized that even in the case of Russian forces targeting "installations that may have qualified as military objectives at the relevant time," the incidental civilian harm was excessively weighed against the expected military advantage—contrary to the international legal principle of proportionality. The ICC concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Shoigu's and Gerasimov's military decision-making intentionally inflicted serious bodily harm and suffering on Ukraine's civilian population.

Russia and Venezuela signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) aimed at countering "coercive measures," likely to demonstrate to the West that the Kremlin holds influence in the Western hemisphere. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Venezuelan Foreign Minister Yvan Gil met on June 11 during the BRICS summit and signed the MOU, which the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) described as an intent to develop a joint strategy combating "unilateral coercive measures" through informational channels and diplomatic means. Both Venezuela and Russia offered oddly limited details regarding the specifics of the MOU. The Venezuelan MFA announced the MOU on its social media accounts on June 11 but deleted the announcement from its official website, and the Russian MFA reported on the original Lavrov-Gil meeting on June 11 but did not announce the MOU until June 25. The MOU itself is also vague; the Russian MFA's readout of the MOU does not define "unilateral coercive measures." This Russian-Venezuelan MOU and Russian posturing in South America follows a Russian naval port call to and military exercises near Havana, Cuba on June 12-17, after which the Russian navy was rumored to stop in Venezuela. The Kremlin has recently indicated its interest in expanding cooperation with Venezuela, and the Kremlin likely intends for this new MOU to forward Russian narratives about a new multipolar world in a country that does not identify with the Russian World (Russkiy Mir) or alternative "Eurasian security architecture" rhetorical lines.

The European Union (EU) officially started accession negotiations for Ukraine and Moldova on June 25. Belgian Foreign Minister Hadja Lahbib also noted that the EU Council has approved the draft for a joint EU-Ukraine security agreement in addition to opening accession negotiations.

Key Takeaways:
• Two major international bodies—the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) — announced decisions on June 25 confirming Russia's long-term perpetration of war crimes and human rights violations in Ukraine.

• Russia and Venezuela signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) aimed at countering "coercive measures," likely to demonstrate to the West that the Kremlin holds influence in the Western hemisphere.

• Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike on a Russian ammunition depot in Voronezh Oblast on June 25 and recently conducted strikes on Pantsir-S1 air defense systems in Belgorod Oblast with unspecified weapons.

• Russia imposed countersanctions against 81 European Union (EU)-based news outlets on June 25 following EU sanctions against four Russian state-affiliated news outlets on June 24.

• Dagestan Republic Head Sergei Melikov ordered investigations into the personal records of senior Dagestani officials following the June 23 likely Wilayat Kavkaz terrorist attacks in Dagestan, indicating that the Kremlin may be intensifying efforts to address Islamist extremist threats in the North Caucasus as it attempts to maintain a veneer of stability and normalcy.

• Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan met with Lithuania-based Belarusian opposition leader Svitlana Tsikhanouskaya on June 20 in Vilnius amid deteriorating Armenian-Belarusian relations.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in Vovchansk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Avdiivka.

• A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF) will begin training unspecified Russian military personnel on October 1, 2024.

Institute for the Study of War

The likely Islamic State (IS) affiliate Wilayat Kavkaz terrorist attacks in the Republic of Dagestan on June 23 have increased fears within the Russian information space about further attacks and instability in the North Caucasus. Russian sources, including prominent Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers and Russian opposition media, amplified reports of two armed men firing on police in Makhachkala on the evening of June 25 and amplified footage of the alleged gunmen and gunfire in the area. Kremlin newswire TASS reported that police deployed to central Makhachkala and cordoned off select areas, but Dagestan's Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) stated that it did not introduce an "interception" plan to apprehend the alleged gunmen. Dagestan's MVD reported on June 25 that police received reports about an armed man in central Makhachkala but that the reports were false and that there were no violations of public order in the city. Many Russian sources amended their earlier reports to label the shooting as fake and claimed that the footage was from the June 23 terrorist attacks and not the evening of June 25. The apparent widespread misreporting of the shooting and the relatively heavy police response to the false reports suggests heightened fear and expectations in the Russian information space that there will be further terrorist attacks in the North Caucasus.

The Kremlin is attempting to maintain a veneer of stability and normalcy in response to the Dagestan terror attack and posture Russia's alleged multiethnic and multi-religious unity but is likely so far failing to reassure the public that there will not be further attacks. The March 2024 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack in Moscow and increasingly frequent Russian counterterrorism operations in the North Caucasus have previously prompted tensions within the Russian information space, exacerbated by calls for increased controls on migration to Russia, appeals to Russia's multiethnic and multi-religious makeup, and outright xenophobia and racism. The Kremlin has struggled to balance its appeals to anti-migrant Russian ultranationalists, its reliance on recruiting migrants for its war effort in Ukraine, and its need for migration to address labor shortages within Russia. Heightened fears about religious extremism will further complicate the Kremlin's efforts to balance between these competing priorities. A Russian insider source directly commented on this nexus in response to the Dagestan attacks and claimed that Dagestan's force generation efforts caused practitioners at a government-friendly mosque to turn to a more radical mosque with alleged Wahhabi connections. ISW has previously assessed that Russian force generation efforts and Russian ultranationalist rhetoric are alienating minority and Muslim-majority communities and generating animosities that Salafi-Jihadi groups can exploit in recruitment efforts.

The June 23 terrorist attacks in Dagestan also prompted Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov to double down on his image as a ruthless autocratic strongman capable of protecting the North Caucasus from religious extremism. Kadyrov held a meeting with Chechen law enforcement agencies on June 25 in connection with the Dagestan attacks and called on Chechens to be especially vigilant and prevent their relatives from succumbing to religious extremism. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s North Caucasus service Kavkaz Realii reported that Kadyrov stated in Chechen that Chechen authorities would kill the relatives of those suspected of Wahhabism in a "blood feud." Kadyrov has routinely threatened the family members of those he deems a threat to his control over Chechnya. Kadyrov appears to be attuned to heightened Russian fears about further attacks and is posturing himself as an attentive and ruthless strongman who can prevent instability in the North Caucasus. Kadyrov invoked the memory of the Chechen wars of the 1990s and 2000s and claimed that his father, Akhmad, and Russian President Vladimir Putin prevented "international" efforts to use Chechnya to destroy Russia. Akhmad Kadyrov supported Russian forces in the Second Chechen War (1999–2002), in which the Russian military brought Chechen separatism to heel through excessive force including the almost complete destruction of Chechnya's capital, Grozny. Kadyrov has long modeled himself in the image of his father, a strongman loyal to the Kremlin and whom the Kremlin can rely on to ensure stability in the region. Kadyrov consistently appeals to Putin's favor and is likely aware that further terrorist activity in the North Caucasus may threaten his standing with the Kremlin. Kadyrov also claimed that religious extremism is emanating from Europe and suggested that outside actors aided the Dagestan attackers, supporting Kremlin efforts to tie the attacks to the war in Ukraine while also downplaying the threat of an endogenous religious extremism threat in the North Caucasus.

Key Takeaways:

• The likely Islamic State (IS) affiliate Wilayat Kavkaz terrorist attacks in the Republic of Dagestan on June 23 have increased fears within the Russian information space about further attacks and instability in the North Caucasus.

• The June 23 terrorist attacks in Dagestan also prompted Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov to double down on his image as a ruthless autocratic strongman capable of protecting the North Caucasus from religious extremism.

• North Korea will reportedly send military construction and engineering forces to participate in "reconstruction work" in occupied Donetsk Oblast as early as July 2024.

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that Russia is not interested in any negotiations that do not result in Ukrainian territorial concessions beyond the parts of Ukraine Russian forces already occupy.

• New Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov used his first phone call with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on June 26 to reiterate standard Russian threats meant to coerce the US out of supporting Ukraine as part of the wider Russian reflexive control campaign targeting Western decision-making.

• Russia and Ukraine exchanged 90 prisoners of war (POWs) each in a one-to-one POW exchange on June 25 amid United Nations (UN) reports of Russia's continued abuse of POWs.

• Russia and Iran signed a memorandum on June 26 regarding the supply of Russian gas to Iran, following reported disagreements between Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the Russian supply of gas to the PRC.

• Ukraine’s pervasive shortage of critical air defense missiles is inhibiting Ukraine’s ability to protect its critical infrastructure against Russian strikes.

• Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Kupyansk.

• Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) published a report on June 26 detailing a significant increase in Russia's military equipment and weapons production in 2023.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces have sustained the tempo of their offensive operations in the Toretsk direction since activating in the area on June 18 and likely aim to reduce a Ukrainian salient in the area, but there is little current likelihood of rapid Russian gains near Toretsk. Russian forces have committed only limited forces to this operation so far, which suggests that Russian forces continue to prioritize gradual advances through consistent grinding assaults over operationally significant gains through rapid maneuver. Russian forces increased the intensity of their assaults in the Toretsk direction (southwest of Chasiv Yar and northeast of Avdiivka) on the night of June 18 after being generally inactive on this sector of the front so far in 2024. Russian forces have so far conducted mainly frontal infantry-heavy assaults on small settlements south and east of Toretsk and have yet to conduct any significant mechanized assaults in the area. Russian forces have yet to make any notable tactical gains in the area. Russian forces have sought to exploit how renewed Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast have drawn and fixed Ukrainian forces from other sectors of the frontline to pursue gains in critical frontline areas, particularly in Donetsk Oblast. It is noteworthy, however, that Russian forces have recently intensified operations in a previously inactive sector of the front instead of their efforts to advance in the Pokrovsk direction (west of Avdiivka) or to seize the operationally significant town of Chasiv Yar. The further Russian forces advance in the Chasiv Yar area and northwest of Avdiivka without making similar gains in the Toretsk direction, the deeper the Ukrainian salient in the Toretsk direction would become, offering Ukrainian forces an area from which to conduct routine fire against immediate rear areas of the Russian advance in the Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka directions. A deeper salient in the Toretsk area would also leave Russian forces more vulnerable to significant Ukrainian counterattacks on the southern front of the Chasiv Yar direction and the northern front of the Avdiivka salient. Russian offensive operations near Toretsk likely aim to reduce the threat posed by this Ukrainian salient while Russian forces continue to pursue gains in the Avdiivka and Chasiv Yar directions.

Russian offensive operations in the Toretsk direction suggest that the Russian military command does not consider a large-scale operation to advance towards Kostyantynivka from multiple operational directions feasible. Kostyantynivka is the southern edge of a belt of four major Ukrainian cities that forms the backbone of Ukraine's defense of Donetsk Oblast, and Russian forces have long sought to seize cities within this Ukrainian fortress belt. Russian forces made relatively rapid tactical gains northwest of Avdiivka in April 2024, and ISW assessed at that time that Russian forces may have intended to advance northward along the H-20 (Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka) highway towards Kostyantynivka from the south to support future offensive operations from Chasiv Yar towards Kostyantynivka from the east. Russian forces have not succeeded in seizing Chasiv Yar or making further significant tactical gains into the town in recent months, however, and the rate of Russian advance northwest of Avdiivka has since slowed significantly. A Russian operation to advance north along the H-20 highway and westward from Chasiv Yar would also have pursued the operational envelopment and encirclement of the Ukrainian grouping in the Toretsk area, a considerable undertaking that Russian forces have routinely failed to achieve against other Ukrainian force groupings throughout the full-scale invasion. Continued Russian offensive operations west and southwest of Avdiivka and the continued Russian focus on advancing northwest of Avdiivka towards the T0504 (Kostyantynivka-Pokrovsk) highway instead of further north of the Avdiivka salient suggests that Russian forces currently aim to advance westward towards Pokrovsk instead of pursuing operations that could support a wider operation to seize Kostyantynivka from the south and east. The Russian military command may intend for operations in the Toretsk direction to support an envisioned push from Chasiv Yar towards Kostyantynivka in a narrower offensive operation to seize the city. Russian forces may alternatively have no intention of making significant tactical gains in the Toretsk direction and may hope that offensive operations in the area will apply pressure on Ukrainian forces along a wider front in Donetsk Oblast and facilitate gains in the Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka directions.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces have sustained the tempo of their offensive operations in the Toretsk direction since activating in the area on June 18 and likely aim to reduce a Ukrainian salient in the area, but there is little current likelihood of rapid Russian gains near Toretsk. Russian forces have committed only limited forces to this operation so far, which suggests that Russian forces continue to prioritize gradual advances through consistent grinding assaults over operationally significant gains through rapid maneuver.

• Slow grinding Russian offensive operations in the Toretsk direction are in line with Russian President Vladimir Putin's articulated theory of victory that posits that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.

• Ukraine signed long-term security agreements with the European Union (EU), Lithuania, and Estonia on June 27.

• Russian officials and information space actors continue to frame migrants as a threat to Russian society amid ongoing efforts to utilize migrant communities to address Russia's force generation needs.

• The Kremlin may be using indirect means to bypass Russian law and codify a state ideology that emphasizes Russia's "traditional" social values while attempting to increase Russia's birth rate.

• There is currently no evidence supporting recent reports that North Korea may be sending engineering forces to rear areas of occupied Ukraine, and ISW has been unable to locate the North Korean confirmation that some Western amplifications allege has been made.

• Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Siversk, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting on the long-term future of the Russian Navy and Russian shipbuilding on June 26 and noted that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) plans to introduce more than 40 new ships and vessels to the Russian Navy in 2024.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin directed on June 28 the production and deployment of nuclear-capable short- and intermediate-range missiles following the American withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 2019, likely as part of the Kremlin's ongoing reflexive control campaign to influence Western decision making in Russia's favor. Putin attended a Russian Security Council meeting in which he claimed that Russia had vowed to uphold the INF's provisions against producing or deploying intermediate-range ground-based missiles until the United States violated these provisions and that Russia must now also produce and deploy such systems. The United States suspended participation in the INF on February 1, 2019, and withdrew from the treaty on August 2, 2019, due to Russian violations of the treaty with its development, testing, and deployment of intermediate-range 9M729 (SSC-8) missiles, and Russia suspended its participation in the INF in response on February 2, 2019. Putin specifically cited two 2024 US bilateral military exercises; one with the Philippines in Northern Luzon, Philippines on April 11 and a second with Denmark near Bornholm Island, Denmark on May 3-5. Both of these bilateral US exercises involved a Typhon Medium Range Capability (MRC) launcher, which US readouts specified can launch SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles. The SM-6 missiles have a maximum range of 370 kilometers, while the Tomahawks have a maximum range of about 2,500 kilometers. US officials did not specify which missiles, if any, may have been involved in either exercise.

Putin is more likely using these exercises as a scapegoat for his broader reflexive control campaign aimed at discouraging Western military assistance to Ukraine. These US and partner exercises involved launchers capable of launching missiles that could pose variable threats to Russia from the exercise locations. Bornholm Island is roughly 300 kilometers from the westernmost shore of Kaliningrad Oblast and roughly 1,400 kilometers from Moscow. The US Sixth Fleet specified that the Bornholm Island exercise involved transporting the Typhon launcher from land to shore as part of convoy protection rehearsals, suggesting that these exercises likely involved shorter-range weapons. The Russian border area closest to the Philippines – the area southwest of Vladivostok – is roughly 2,800 kilometers from Northern Luzon, out of range of the Tomahawk missiles. Putin's June 27 condemnation follows the People's Republic of China (PRC) delayed condemnation of the US exercise in Northern Luzon on May 30. Putin likely invoked the Philippines exercise in part to posture favorably to the PRC, North Korea, and Vietnam as he attempts to create a coalition of states in support of a new "Eurasian security architecture." The Kremlin has invoked the fear of a nuclear confrontation between Russia and the West throughout its full-scale invasion to push the West to self-deter from providing Ukraine the weapons it needs to sustain its defense against Russian forces, and the Kremlin notably employs this effort during key moments in Western political discussions about further military assistance to Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin directed on June 28 the production and deployment of nuclear-capable short- and intermediate-range missiles following the American withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 2019, likely as part of the Kremlin's ongoing reflexive control campaign to influence Western decision making in Russia's favor.

• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck an oil depot in Russia on June 28 and reportedly struck a microelectronics plant and a military unit on the night of June 27 to 28.

• The Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) reported on June 28 that Ukrainian forces have damaged or destroyed more than 30 Russian military aircraft in the first six months of 2024, although ISW cannot confirm this report fully.

• Many Russian elites have reportedly shifted from criticizing Russia's war effort in Ukraine to supporting it because they assess that Russia is prevailing.

• Russian officials called for harsher punishments in Russia's criminal system, likely in response to the recent terrorist attacks in Dagestan.

• Russia may be creating a shadow fleet to transport Russian liquified natural gas (LNG) and circumvent Western sanctions.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Vovchansk and Kreminna, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar.

• Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii used Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) data to estimate that over 71,000 Russian men died in the war in Ukraine in 2022 and 2023.

Institute for the Study of War

Two prominent Russian officials appear to be spearheading divergent paths for addressing religious extremism in Russia as ethnic and religious tension in Russia continues to rise. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin commented on the June 23 terrorist attacks in the Republic of Dagestan and claimed on June 29 that Islamic terrorists were "able to carry their banner of Islamic terror" into Russia and that the State Duma must respond to the threat of Islamic terrorists in Russia. Bastrykin's indictment of Islamists prompted backlash from Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, who urged Bastrykin and other Russian officials to choose their words carefully and avoid characterizing all Muslims as terrorists. Kadyrov warned that such statements threaten the unity and stability of Russia's socio-political situation. Russian milbloggers and lower-level Russian officials have previously participated in similar debates, and it is significant that Kadyrov was willing to openly criticize another high-level Kremlin official on this issue. Bastrykin has previously positioned himself as a prominent figure in Russia's ultranationalist movement and is placing himself at odds with Kadyrov, who often presents himself as a representative of Russia's Muslim minority. Putin previously attempted to quell concerns within the Russian information space about the threat posed by migrant and Muslim communities following the Crocus City Hall attack on March 22 by simultaneously calling for unspecified changes to Russia's migration policy and denouncing Islamophobia and xenophobia.<5> Putin may weigh in on Bastrykin's and Kadyrov's debate in the coming days in hopes of similarly quelling concern among Russians and a possible future conflict between Bastrykin and Kadyrov.

Ten Ukrainian civilians whom Russian and Belarusian authorities arrested and held in captivity or prison, including individuals detained before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, returned to Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 29 that 10 Ukrainian civilians returned to Ukraine from Russian and Belarusian captivity as part of the 53rd prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange that Ukrainian officials initially announced on June 25. Ukrainian officials stated that among the returned civilians were First Deputy Head of the Crimean Tatar Majlis Nariman Dzhelyal, whom Russian authorities arrested in 2021; two Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church priests, whom Russian authorities arrested in occupied Berdyansk in 2022; five Ukrainian citizens, whom Belarusian authorities arrested in Belarus; and two Ukrainian civilians, whom Russian authorities detained in occupied Donetsk Oblast in 2017. Zelensky stated that the Vatican mediated the return of the 10 Ukrainian civilians. Ukrainian and Russian officials have not commented on whether Russia received civilians or POWs in exchange for these 10 Ukrainian civilians.

Key Takeaways:

• Two prominent Russian officials appear to be spearheading divergent paths for addressing religious extremism in Russia as ethnic and religious tension in Russia continues to rise.

• Russian ultranationalists continue to express growing doubt in Russian authorities' ability to prevent another terrorist attack and to address ethnic and religious tensions within Russia following the June 23 terrorist attacks in the Republic of Dagestan.

• Ten Ukrainian civilians whom Russian and Belarusian authorities arrested and held in captivity or prison, including individuals detained before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, returned to Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kreminna, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Donetsk City.

• Some new Russian military personnel are reportedly receiving insufficient training before deploying to Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory that Russia will be able to make creeping advances in Ukraine indefinitely will incentivize Putin to protract the war and harden Putin's commitment to destroying Ukrainian statehood. The West must hasten to provide Ukraine the support it needs to conduct counteroffensive operations to invalidate Putin's theory of victory and avoid protracting the war more than necessary to secure a peace acceptable to Ukraine and its partners. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with the Philadelphia Inquirer published on June 30 that he fears that the West is afraid of pushing for full Ukrainian victory due to Western concerns about Russian stability and that this fear has allowed Putin to pursue the seizure of as much Ukrainian territory as possible. Zelensky warned that every Russian advance strengthens Russia's bargaining power and that Putin can choose to try to leverage this bargaining power at opportune moments to pursue a ceasefire that would allow Russia to prepare for future aggression against Ukraine.

Putin has articulated a theory of victory that assumes that Russian forces will be able to continue gradual creeping advances indefinitely, prevent Ukraine from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations, and win a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces. The Russian military command is currently prioritizing consistent offensive operations that achieve gradual tactical gains over conducting a large-scale discrete offensive operation that aims to make operationally significant gains through rapid maneuver. Putin and the Russian military command likely view creeping offensive operations as a more guaranteed approach to making gains in Ukraine than larger mobile offensives and appear to be accepting the reality that Russian forces may have to pursue individual operationally significant objectives over the course of many months if not years. Putin has recently demanded that Ukraine cede all of occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts as well as the parts of those four oblasts that Ukraine currently controls. A protracted war favors Putin's calculus since he likely assesses that Russia will be able to hold any ground it takes and that Russian forces will be more likely to achieve his current stated territorial objectives the longer the war progresses. Putin and the Kremlin have intentionally set no limits to their objectives of conquest in Ukraine and have suggested repeatedly that areas outside of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts are part of Russia. Protracted war will likely incentivize Putin to explicitly set new territorial objectives as long as he assesses that Ukrainian forces can neither stop his advances nor conduct meaningful counteroffensives.

Putin retains his objective of entirely destroying Ukrainian statehood and identity, and all his objectives for territorial conquest in Ukraine are a means to this end. Putin likely hopes that creeping Russian advances in Ukraine will convince the West that Ukrainian victory is unattainable and that concessions on Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty are preferable to Ukrainian defeat. Putin is currently unwilling to accept anything short of full Ukrainian capitulation, however, as his remarks and demands consistently show, and he will see any negotiated ceasefire agreement as a mechanism for Russia to prepare for renewed offensive operations in the future to achieve his overall aims. A negotiated ceasefire that further establishes a precedent for violating Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty beyond the precedent already established by the Minsk Accords following Russia's seizure of Crimea and parts of Luhansk and Donetsk in 2014 will strengthen Russia's position to pursue the full eradication of Ukrainian statehood at a later date. This ceasefire would provide Russia a respite in the war to reconstitute and expand its forces and to further mobilize its defense industrial base (DIB) for future aggression. Putin and the Russian military command likely hope that a ceasefire will allow Russia to launch a future stage of the war with a military more capable of pursuing operationally significant advances. Putin is not yet interested in a ceasefire, however, as he appears to continue to assess that he can achieve his aims by force. He might become more open to a ceasefire if that condition changes, but a negotiated ceasefire on Putin's terms would amount to Ukrainian and Western capitulation. Neither of these courses of action are consistent with the survival of an independent Ukrainian state or the Ukrainian people, nor are they compatible with NATO's vital security interests.

Ukraine's partners can help Ukraine reduce Putin's willingness to continue to wage endless war in pursuit of Ukraine's destruction by helping Ukraine conduct significant counteroffensive operations that liberate Ukrainian territory and invalidate Putin's assumptions about what Russia can achieve in Ukraine by force. Putin's current theory of victory rests on Russia's ability to outlast and overcome pledged Western security assistance to Ukraine and Ukrainian efforts to mobilize more of its economy and population for the war effort. Putin and the Russian military command are increasingly viewing the retention of the theater-wide initiative as a strategic imperative and will continue to leverage the initiative to try to force Ukraine to commit manpower and materiel to current defensive operations and to prevent Ukraine from accumulating the personnel and resources Ukraine needs to contest the initiative. Putin's theory of victory rests on the assessment that Ukraine lacks the capability to liberate operationally significant territory — Russia's creeping advances hold no operational significance if Ukraine can undo those gains more rapidly when Ukraine regains the battlefield- or theater-wide initiative. Western security assistance and Ukrainian force generation efforts that allow Ukraine to contest the initiative are thus crucial to changing Putin's calculus, and it is unlikely that Putin will change his assessment regarding the feasibility of destroying Ukraine without further significant Russian defeats. Western security assistance that provides Ukrainian forces with the necessary equipment and weapons at the scale, timing, and regularity that Ukrainian forces require for operations that liberate significant swaths of occupied Ukraine remains the only likely path for reducing Putin's current commitment to destroying Ukrainian statehood and identity regardless of time or cost.

Ukraine is also pursuing diplomatic conditions to support an end-state to the war that would prevent Russia from inflicting a defeat that could set conditions for future aggression. Switzerland hosted the Ukrainian-initiated Global Peace Summit on June 15, which aimed to create a global consensus on negotiations about the war in Ukraine so that Ukraine and its international partners can give a joint peace plan to a Russian representative at a subsequent peace summit once Putin is willing to negotiate on terms other than total Ukrainian capitulation. Ukraine aims to establish a basis for negotiations that will prevent Russia from convincing other countries to support concessions that would allow Russia to pursue Ukraine's destruction at a later date.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory that Russia will be able to make creeping advances in Ukraine indefinitely will incentivize Putin to protract the war and harden Putin's commitment to destroying Ukrainian statehood. The West must hasten to provide Ukraine the support it needs to conduct counteroffensive operations to invalidate Putin's theory of victory and avoid protracting the war more than necessary to secure a peace acceptable to Ukraine and its partners.

• Putin retains his objective of entirely destroying Ukrainian statehood and identity, and all his objectives for territorial conquest in Ukraine are a means to this end.

• The Russian military command appears to be separating some limited elements of airborne (VDV) units and formations into smaller components across different sectors of the front, and the Russian military command may still view VDV units as relatively elite, at least compared with other Russian units and formations.

• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant (NLMK) in Lipetsk Oblast on June 30.

• Dagestan Republic Head Sergei Melikov publicly sided with Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov in a recent debate between Kadyrov and Russian Investigative Commitee Head Alexander Bastrykin about responses to religious extremism in Russia amid growing ethnic and religious tension in Russia.

• Military and civilian flights continue to experience GPS interference over Europe and the Middle East, highlighting the role of long-term GPS jamming in ongoing and future conflicts.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kreminna, and Russian forces recently advanced near Lyptsi, Vovchansk, Kupyansk, and Avdiivka.

• A Russian milblogger claimed on June 29 that Russian military commanders sent about 50 wounded soldiers of the 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District ), who are on leave awaiting medical treatments, to the front against doctors' instructions.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Head Vladimir Kolokoltsev boasted that Russian authorities have increased detentions and prosecutions related to illegal migration into Russia while calling for intensified Russian government crackdowns against illegal migration. Kolokoltsev claimed on July 1 at a Russian government meeting on crime prevention that the MVD has detected over double the number of crimes related to organizing illegal migration and have prosecuted roughly a quarter more individuals who were illegally in Russia, presumably in comparison with 2023. Kolokoltsev also claimed that the number of "serious" and "especially serious" crimes committed by foreigners in Russia decreased by 7.6 percent in 2024 in comparison to 2023. Kolokoltsev also noted that select crimes that foreigners have committed in Russia have increased interethnic tension in Russia. Kolokoltsev characterized Russia's fight against illegal migration as "strategically important" and called for joint efforts to resolve migration issues, likely referring to coordinated efforts between multiple Russian state security organs.

Russian milbloggers criticized Kolokoltsev's statistics and claimed that the reported reduction in crimes committed by foreign citizens in Russia is a result of Russian authorities' decision to grant Russian citizenship to migrants — not actual decreases in migrant crime. One milblogger insinuated that Kolokoltsev was directly attempting to defy Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin, who claimed on July 27 that migrant crime is spreading across Russia and that migrants committed an increased percentage of "especially serious" and "extremist" crimes in Russia in 2023. Russian ultranationalists have routinely criticized the Russian government's policy of giving migrants Russian citizenship, although some Russian milbloggers and some State Duma members have previously justified Russia’s ongoing coercive crypto-mobilization efforts, which disproportionally target migrants, by claiming that migrants who receive Russian citizenship must fight in Ukraine to “earn” their Russian citizenship and that migrants who fight in Ukraine will receive Russian citizenship. Significant Russian ultranationalist efforts to stop the Russian government from giving Russian citizenship to migrants and other "compatriots abroad" (which Russia loosely defines as ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers living outside of Russia) may hinder Russia's ongoing weaponization of passportization to generate military manpower, offset domestic labor shortages, and set informational conditions to justify potential hybrid operations against other countries with Russian and Russian-speaking populations.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Head Vladimir Kolokoltsev boasted that Russian authorities have increased detentions and prosecutions related to illegal migration into Russia while calling for intensified Russian government crackdowns against illegal migration.

• Russia assumed its one-month-long rotating presidency of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on July 1 for the first time since April 2023 and will likely use this position as a power projection base within the international system as it historically has.

• South Korea's Ministry of Unification announced on July 1 that North Korean state TV channel Korean Central TV switched to transmitting broadcasts via Russian satellites instead of Chinese satellites, reportedly affecting South Korea's ability to monitor North Korean state TV.

• Hungary assumed the six-month rotating presidency of the European Union (EU) Council on July 1.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, and Russian forces recently advanced near Avdiivka.

• The Russian information space continues to discuss the mistreatment of wounded and disabled Russian servicemembers in Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

The interplay between ongoing Russian offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Avdiivka directions indicates that the Russian military command may intend to leverage the ongoing Toretsk push to create operational opportunities for advances in either the Chasiv Yar or Avdiivka areas. Russian preparations that can support multiple future branch plans suggest a more developed level of operational planning and foresight than the Russian command has proven capable of executing thus far in the war since early 2022. The ability of this operational planning to come to fruition, however, will be bounded by the overall poor tactical-level capabilities of Russian forces currently fighting in these areas. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated in an interview with Ukrainian outlet Suspilne Donbas on July 2 that Russian forces are beginning to storm Chasiv Yar from the Toretsk direction (south of Chasiv Yar) and have been attacking in the direction of Toretsk-Chasiv Yar using mainly small infantry groups and occasional mechanized assaults. Voloshyn's suggestion that Russian forces are trying to attack towards the southern flank of Chasiv Yar from the Toretsk area is noteworthy. If Russian forces are able to develop a larger salient in the general Shumy-Pivdenne-Pivniche-Toretsk area, then they may be able to more credibly threaten Chasiv Yar from the south, complementing ongoing offensive Russian efforts north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka. Russian forces have continued attacks in the area south and southeast of Chasiv Yar, particularly near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Kurdyumivka, suggesting that the Russian command remains interested, at least in principle, in maintaining access to the southern flank of the Chasiv Yar area. Recent Russian advances in Mayorske (east of Toretsk) affords Russian forces positions on the east (left) bank of the Siversky Donets-Donbas Canal, allowing them to advance towards Chasiv Yar from the south along one bank of the canal as opposed to trying to cross the canalizing terrain in northern and eastern Chasiv Yar.

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets, however, linked Russian efforts in the Toretsk direction with efforts to break through to the Pokrovsk direction (also referred to as the Avdiivka direction or the area west/southwest of Toretsk). Mashovets noted on July 2 that Russian forces have intensified attacks on Toretsk in the past 24 hours and that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces (the command of which is also notably responsible for Russian troops attacking west of Avdiivka) has deployed additional battalions and assault companies near Toretsk to support ongoing offensive operations. Mashovets noted that operational factors in the Toretsk direction "are directly related" to the Avdiivka direction and assessed that Russian troops of the Central Grouping of Forces are trying to interdict Ukrainian positions along the H-32 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka road (a major Ukrainian ground line of communication that supplies Ukrainian forces in Toretsk).

Mashovets' and Voloshyn's separate observations on the prospects of Russian offensive operations near Toretsk reflect a noteworthy battlefield dynamic — the Russian command may have chosen to escalate offensive operations near Toretsk in mid-June exactly because this area offers Russian forces a flexible point of departure from which they can either attack north towards Chasiv Yar or west/southwest in the Avdiivka direction, depending on whatever route of attack the Russian command deems the most immediately promising. The apparent decision to attack near Toretsk emphasizes that the Russian command may be planning operations with more foresight and understanding of the operational situation than previously, when the Russian command pushed for incoherent offensive operations on unrelated parts of the front. The ability of the Russian command to actually bring these operational plans to bear, however, is contingent on the tactical-level performance of the troops in the Toretsk area and their ability to exploit tactical successes into operationally-significant breakthroughs. As ISW previously noted, the main Russian forces concentration in the Toretsk area is formed of lower-quality forces of the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and Territorial Troops, which will likely struggle to properly execute attacks, especially as Ukraine receives additional military aid over the coming weeks and months.

Key Takeaways:

• The interplay between ongoing Russian offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Avdiivka directions indicates that the Russian military command may intend to leverage the ongoing Toretsk push to create operational opportunities for advances in either the Chasiv Yar or Avdiivka areas. Russian preparations that can support multiple future branch plans suggest a more developed level of operational planning and foresight than the Russian command has proven capable of executing thus far in the war since early 2022. The ability of this operational planning to come to fruition, however, will be bounded by the overall poor tactical-level capabilities of Russian forces currently fighting in these areas.

• Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban likely used his unannounced visit to Kyiv on July 2 to posture himself as a peacemaker following Hungary's accession to the European Union (EU) Council presidency on July 1, but Orban’s efforts are very unlikely to bring about any robust peace in Ukraine.

• The Kremlin is waging an intensified information campaign aimed at pushing Ukraine to negotiate with Russia on Russian terms, and any Russian, Western, or other efforts to cajole Ukraine to prematurely negotiate with Russia would only weaken Ukraine and embolden further Russian aggression inside and beyond Ukraine.

• Several Russian State Duma deputies proposed a bill that would exclude a significant number of ethnicities from Russia's "compatriots" resettlement program, undermining the Kremlin's efforts to leverage its "compatriots abroad" to offset Russian labor shortages and set informational conditions to justify potential hybrid operations against other countries with Russian and Russian-speaking populations.

• Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot at a Russian military base in occupied Crimea on July 1 that reportedly housed Shahed drones.

• Russia may be intensifying its efforts to conduct reconnaissance and disrupt communications in the underwater and air space near NATO states.

• Russian authorities appear to be publicly fixating on crackdowns against fight clubs and restricting the niqab to signal that Russian authorities are adequately combatting terrorist threats in the North Caucasus instead of addressing systemic issues of Islamist extremism in the region.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on July 2 assigning the Russian 999th Air Base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan the "guards" honorific for "mass heroism and bravery.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.

• Russia is reportedly recruiting women from Russian penal colonies to fight in Ukraine, and some of these recruits are reportedly fighting on the frontline.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukraine is addressing its manpower challenges and is forming several new brigades, but delayed and insufficient Western weapons deliveries will likely prevent Ukraine from equipping all these new brigades. Timely and appropriate Western security assistance continues to be a crucial determinant of when and at what scale Ukrainian forces can contest the battlefield initiative and conduct operationally significant counteroffensive operations in the future. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with Bloomberg published on July 3 that Ukrainian forces are better positioned in terms of manpower than they were a few months ago and that Ukraine's ability to conduct a future counteroffensive operation depends on equipping brigades with heavy equipment, such as mechanized fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, tanks, and heavy artillery (likely referencing at least 10 planned new Ukrainian brigades.) The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating near Chasiv Yar provided a similar assessment at the tactical level on July 3, stating that Ukrainian forces in his area of operations are more in need of ammunition than manpower. Zelensky stated that military equipment is taking too long to arrive at the front, however, echoing his comments from early June 2024 about how the slow arrival of US security assistance was complicating Ukrainian efforts to equip reserve brigades sufficiently to commit them to defensive operations. Ukrainian media has routinely highlighted in recent months the lack of sufficient materiel for equipping all the new Ukrainian brigades currently being formed, and current reporting suggests that Ukraine will not be able to fully equip all their upcoming brigades without the arrival of additional Western security assistance. The months-long delay of Western security assistance exacerbated challenges with Ukraine’s force mobilization efforts.

Ukraine conducted a naval drone strike against Russian naval infrastructure in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai on the night July 3 and reportedly damaged energy infrastructure during an aerial drone strike on Belgorod Oblast on the night of July 1. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) forces destroyed three Ukrainian naval drones en route to Novorossiysk, and the Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers later amplified footage reportedly showing BSF elements repelling naval drones that were reportedly targeting the Russian naval base in Novorossiysk. Novorossiysk Mayor Andrey Kravchenko confirmed the attack and announced the closure of beaches. Ukrainian Naval Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk noted on July 3 that the Ukrainian Navy is not yet ready to confirm details of the attack, however. ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of the attack damaging Russian naval targets.

Unspecified People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russian companies are reportedly working together to develop a drone similar to the Iranian-designed Shahed loitering munition for Russia to use in Ukraine. Two unspecified European officials told Bloomberg in a July 2 article that unspecified Russian and PRC companies held talks in 2023 about collaborating to "replicate" Shahed drones and started developing and testing a prototype in 2024. The officials stated the companies are preparing to ship the drones to Russia but that Russian forces have yet to use the drones against Ukraine. Bloomberg reported that, according to another official familiar with the matter, the United States assesses that the PRC is not currently providing lethal aid to Russia but is sending kits to Russia that Russia can convert into attack drones, while continuing to consider whether to send fully built drones to Russia. ISW cannot independently verify any of these reported officials' statements. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview with Bloomberg published on July 3 that Ukraine does not have evidence that the PRC is providing Russia with weapons but noted that Russia has acquired dual-use goods from the PRC. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated on May 1 that the PRC's export of dual-use goods to Russia have helped Russia significantly increase its defense production and that Russia is acquiring 70 percent of its machine tools and 90 percent of its microelectronics from the PRC. The provision of jointly PRC- and Russian-made loitering munitions to Russia to use in Ukraine would be a significant inflection in PRC-Russian relations and would suggest that Russian President Vladimir Putin had secured a notable concession from PRC President Xi Jinping given that ISW continues to assess that the PRC is attempting to portray itself as a neutral mediator and retains the upper hand in PRC-Russian relations.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine is addressing its manpower challenges and is forming several new brigades, but delayed and insufficient Western weapons deliveries will likely prevent Ukraine from equipping all these new brigades. Timely and appropriate Western security assistance continues to be crucial determinant of when and at what scale Ukrainian forces can contest the battlefield initiative and conduct operationally significant counteroffensive operations in the future.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is leveraging existing Eurasian-focused and Russian-led international organizations as the cornerstone for his new proposed alternative "Eurasian security architecture."

• Ukraine conducted a naval drone strike against Russian naval infrastructure in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai on the night July 3 and reportedly damaged energy infrastructure during an aerial drone strike on Belgorod Oblast on the night of July 1.

• Unspecified People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russian companies are reportedly working together to develop a drone similar to the Iranian-designed Shahed loitering munition for Russia to use in Ukraine.

• Russian forces recently advanced within easternmost Chasiv Yar, in the Toretsk direction, and near Avdiivka, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Vovchansk, near Kreminna, and southeast of Chasiv Yar.

• The Kremlin continues efforts to position Russian veterans that have fought in Ukraine in official roles in Russian domestic politics.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly rejected Russian participation in any meaningful negotiations on a ceasefire agreement, instead demanding Ukraine's "irreversible" "demilitarization" as a precondition for any ceasefire agreement. Putin is thus demanding that Ukraine effectively surrender in advance of any ceasefire. Putin commented on the prospects of a negotiated ceasefire in Ukraine at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 4, but instead of offering his typical feigned interest in such negotiations he outright rejected any ceasefire negotiation process. Putin has repeatedly portrayed the West as his envisioned negotiating partner in a ceasefire agreement in order to prompt Western concessions on Ukrainian sovereignty, but Putin notably dismissed all intermediary parties as possible mediators for an agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Putin also dismissed the Verkhovna Rada as a possible point of contact for negotiations despite previously claiming that the body was the only legitimate Ukrainian entity that Russia could negotiate with. Putin has now labeled all Ukrainian governing institutions illegitimate or unsuitable for negotiations and has dismissed the idea of third parties participating in negotiations — de facto rejecting any realistic process for meaningfully negotiating a ceasefire agreement.

Putin instead highlighted his demand for Ukraine's "demilitarization" as a primary prerequisite for any ceasefire agreement, demanding that Ukraine agree to "demilitarization" measures that would be irreversible. Putin argued that Russia cannot allow the Ukrainian military to take advantage of a ceasefire to reconstitute its forces. Putin notably did not address the near-certainty that Russian forces would take advantage of a potential ceasefire in exactly such a way, and ISW continues to assess that Russia would use the respite of a ceasefire to reconstitute and expand its forces and to further mobilize its defense industrial base (DIB) for future aggression aiming to destroy the Ukrainian state. Putin's rejection of any ceasefire agreement short of Ukrainian capitulation further illustrates that he is confident in his assessment that Russia can pursue victory by continuing creeping advances in Ukraine, outlasting Western support for Ukraine, and winning a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly rejected Russian participation in any meaningful negotiations on a ceasefire agreement, instead demanding Ukraine's "irreversible" "demilitarization" as a precondition for any ceasefire agreement. Putin is thus demanding that Ukraine effectively surrender in advance of any ceasefire.

• Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers reportedly detained the commander of the Russian 83rd Guards Airborne Assault (VDV) Brigade, Colonel Artyom Gorodilov, on fraud charges on July 3 following reports of the brigade suffering heavy losses in the Kharkiv direction in June 2024.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin supported the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) efforts to expand its presence in Central Asia and will likely use an increased SCO presence as one of its levers to expand Russian influence in the region.

• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced the purchase of $2.2 billion worth of US-produced air defense interceptors and an aid package worth $150 million for Ukraine on July 3.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.

• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on July 4 that around 190,000 Russians signed military service contracts during the first six months of 2024 during a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) meeting about staffing the Russian military with contract soldiers.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin used a meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban on July 5 to oppose a negotiated ceasefire altogether and expressed his commitment to pursuing a "final" end to the war that would achieve his goal of destroying Ukrainian statehood. Putin met with Orban in Moscow and reportedly discussed Ukraine and the possibility of a negotiated ceasefire agreement. Putin explicitly rejected Russian participation in any meaningful negotiations on a ceasefire agreement on July 4 in a departure from his usual feigned interest in negotiations, and Putin notably outright rejected any negotiated ceasefire in a press conference with Orban on July 5. Putin stated that an agreement between Russia and Ukraine should not result in a temporary ceasefire since this would allow Ukraine to regroup and rearm and that Russia instead favors a "complete" and "final" end to the conflict. Putin is currently unwilling to accept anything short of the destruction of Ukrainian statehood and identity, however, as his remarks and demands have consistently illustrated.

Putin is demanding both the surrender of a significant portion of Ukraine's territory and people to Russian occupation and Ukrainian military capitulation in advance of any negotiations on an end-state to the war. Putin called for the complete Ukrainian withdrawal from "Donbas and Novorossiya" as a prerequisite for ending the war during his press conference with Orban — a reference to Putin's June 14 demand for Ukraine to recognize the Russian occupation of occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts and for Ukraine to surrender all territory that Russia does not currently hold in the four oblasts. The imagined borders of "Novorossiya" are disputed among Russian ultranationalists, however, and Putin and the Kremlin have routinely indicated that they hold aims of territorial conquest beyond the administrative boundaries of the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed. Putin also invoked concerns on July 4 about Ukrainian military reconstitution and expansion during a potential ceasefire to call for Ukraine's "irreversible" "demilitarization" as a prerequisite to negotiations. Putin has long called for Ukraine's "demilitarization" — a demand that Ukraine abandon its ability to resist Russian aggression so that Putin can freely impose his will upon Ukraine. Putin would almost certainly use Ukraine's capitulation to achieve his other goal of deposing Ukraine's democratically elected government and replacing it with a pro-Russian government and a political system to his liking.

Ukrainian counteroffensive operations that liberate operationally significant territory remain the soundest course of action for degrading Putin's confidence in and commitment to his desired end state for his war of aggression against Ukraine. Putin's rejection of any ceasefire indicates that he is increasingly confident in his assessment that Russia can pursue victory by continuing creeping advances in Ukraine, outlasting Western support for Ukraine, and winning a war of attrition against Ukrainian forces. Putin's demands, achieved through either Ukraine's capitulation or the protracted war he assesses Russian forces can successfully wage, are not consistent with the survival of an independent Ukrainian state or the Ukrainian people, nor are they compatible with NATO's vital security interests. Putin's confidence in Russia's ability to encourage capitulation or win a protracted war of attrition is based on the assessment that Ukraine will not be able to conduct operationally significant counteroffensive operations. The West must hasten to provide Ukraine the support it needs to conduct counteroffensive operations to invalidate Putin's calculus and avoid protracting the war more than necessary to secure a peace acceptable to Ukraine and its partners.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin used a meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban on July 5 to oppose a negotiated ceasefire altogether and expressed his commitment to pursuing a "final" end to the war that would achieve his goal of destroying Ukrainian statehood.

• Putin is demanding both the surrender of a significant portion of Ukraine's territory and people to Russian occupation and Ukrainian military capitulation in advance of any negotiations on an end-state to the war.

• Ukrainian counteroffensive operations that liberate operationally significant territory remain the soundest course of action for degrading Putin's confidence in and commitment to his desired end state for his war of aggression against Ukraine.

• Putin's rejection of any ceasefire agreement contradicts the Kremlin's previous effort to place the onus for negotiations on the West and Ukraine.

• Putin attempted to portray Orban as an EU representative who can speak on the EU's behalf – a claim that EU officials explicitly denied.

• Recent Russian domestic polls suggest that Kremlin information operations are influencing domestic Russian support of the war in Ukraine.

• These Russian polls indicate that Russians who criticize the conduct of the war in Ukraine still support the war due to patriotism and disenfranchisement.

• Many of Russia's "non-opponents" to the war have criticisms that parallel those of Russian ultranationalist milbloggers, yet they lack the ultranationalists' close attention to the war and desire for political change in support of Russian war aims.

• Ukrainian forces conducted successful drone and missile strikes against targets in Tambov and Rostov oblasts and Krasnodar Krai on July 4 and 5.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Toretsk, and Donetsk City.

• Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials continue to portray themselves as providing adequate medical care and other support for Russian soldiers who fought in Ukraine amid ongoing criticisms that the Russian military command sends injured soldiers to fight on the frontline.



Institute for the Study of War

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban continues to posture himself as a potential mediator to end the war in Ukraine despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's rejection of mediation or serious negotiations. Orban is likely aiming to shift Western focus towards possible peace negotiations as part of his overarching effort to undermine European support for Ukraine. Orban published an op-ed in Newsweek on July 5 in which Orban accused NATO of choosing conflict over peace and stated that NATO was established to maintain peace. Orban's op-ed follows his visits to Kyiv on July 2 and Moscow on July 5 to advocate for Russia and Ukraine to start negotiations. Orban's efforts to push for negotiations are likely part of his ongoing effort to shift European focus to discussions about peace negotiations and away from discussions about military support for Ukraine. Orban has consistently opposed and undermined the European Union (EU)'s efforts to provide military assistance to Ukraine, and shifting Europe's focus away from military assistance supports this broader aim now that Hungary has assumed the EU Council presidency. Bulgarian Prime Minister Dimitar Glavchev offered on July 5 for Bulgaria to mediate peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia and emphasized that negotiations must comply with the UN charter and international law. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan similarly pushed for Ukraine to widen and accelerate Ukraine's ongoing peace process on July 6 to prevent "deepening polarization" and "prioritize diplomacy."

Ukrainian forces struck energy infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai with drones on the night of July 5 to 6. The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters stated that Russian forces shot down Ukrainian drones near Leningradskaya, Yeysk and Pavlovskaya, Krasnodar Krai on the night of July 5 to 6 and that falling drone debris damaged a cell phone tower in Yeysk and caused a fire at an oil depot in Pavlovskaya. The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters also stated that Ukrainian drones struck a fuel tank in Leningradskaya, Krasnodar Krai. Russian opposition outlet Astra posted footage on July 6 of fires at fuel tanks in Leningradskaya and the Lukoil oil depot in Pavlovskaya.

Key Takeaways:

• Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban continues to posture himself as a potential mediator to end the war in Ukraine despite Putin's rejection of mediation or serious negotiations. Orban is likely aiming to shift Western focus towards possible peace negotiations as part of his overarching effort to undermine European support for Ukraine.

• Orban's and others' calls for negotiations and Ukraine's peace formula, are distinct efforts with different aims, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has demonstrated he is not interested in any negotiated agreements short of Ukraine's capitulation.

• Ukrainian forces struck energy infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai with drones on the night of July 5 to 6.

• Iran announced on July 6 that Iran and Russia signed a bank agreement on July 4 enabling Russia and Iran to trade in the Russian ruble and Iranian rial.

• The Russian government continues efforts to isolate the Russian people from material it considers antithetical to state interests and ideology.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, and Avdiivka.

• Russian federal subjects (regions) continue to increase monetary incentives to recruit contract soldiers (kontraktniki).

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian ammunition depot in Sergeevka, Voronezh Oblast on the night of July 6 to 7. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that its sources stated that the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) conducted the strike and reported that the ammunition depot contained surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles, ammunition for tanks and artillery, and small arms rounds. Geolocated footage published on July 7 taken near Morozovka, Voronezh Oblast (just northeast of Sergeevka along the M2 highway) shows a smoke plume and explosions with visible secondary detonations in the distance. Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on July 7 that Russian air defense systems destroyed several Ukrainian drones over Voronezh Oblast and that drone debris fell on a warehouse in Podgorensky Raion, causing a fire and secondary explosions. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data from July 7 detected anomalous heat signatures near Sergeevka.

Satellite imagery confirms that the Ukrainian Air Force conducted a successful strike against a reported Russian regimental command post in Belgorod Oblast in late June 2024, likely with Western-provided weapons – further demonstrating how Ukraine could disrupt Russian offensive operations should the West continue to lift restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 23 that the Ukrainian Air Force struck the command post of an unspecified Russian motorized rifle regiment in Nekhoteevka, Belgorod Oblast on an unspecified date. Geolocated footage of the strike shows that the command post was less than one kilometer from the Russian-Ukrainian border. Satellite imagery collected on April 1 and June 28 shows significant damage to the building that reportedly housed the command post in Nekhoteevka. Ukrainian forces likely used a French-made Armement Air-Sol Modulaire Hammer precision-guided bomb. The command post's location close to the frontline in northern Kharkiv Oblast suggests that it was involved with ongoing Russian offensive operations north of Kharkiv City. The Nekhoteevka strike demonstrates Ukraine's ability to conduct successful strikes on Russian military targets within Russia using Western-provided weapons to degrade Russian forces' ability to conduct offensive operations in Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine should be able to use Western-provided weapons, including ATACMS missiles, to strike Russian military targets within Russia's operational rear and deep rear areas to substantially disrupt Russian operations at scale.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian ammunition depot in Sergeevka, Voronezh Oblast on the night of July 6 to 7.

• Satellite imagery confirms that the Ukrainian Air Force conducted a successful strike against a reported Russian regimental command post in Belgorod Oblast in late June 2024, likely with Western-provided weapons – further demonstrating how Ukraine could disrupt Russian offensive operations should the West continue to lift restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia.

• Ukrainian drone operators appear to be improving their capabilities to interdict longer-range Russian drones in mid-air, and these technological innovations may allow Ukrainian forces to ease pressures on short-range and medium-range air defense assets if successfully fielded at scale.

• Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz forces likely coerced a Russian milblogger to issue a public apology after he criticized "Akhmat" forces – an illustrative example of unprofessionalism in the Russian military.

• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City.

• Open-source researchers analyzed satellite imagery and assessed that Russia has removed roughly 42 percent of Russian tanks from pre-war open-air storage since the start of the full-scale invasion.

Institute for the Study of War

A Russian Kh-101 cruise missile hit the Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital in central Kyiv during a wider series of missile strikes targeting critical Ukrainian infrastructure throughout the day on July 8. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk stated that Russian forces conducted two rounds of combined missile strikes on July 8—first launching four Kh-101 cruise missiles from Saratov Oblast and two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea and Kursk Oblast overnight on July 7 to 8, and then launching a second wave of missiles, including one Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missile, four Iskander-M ballistic missiles, one 3M22 Zircon cruise missile, 13 Kh-101 cruise missiles, 14 Kalibr cruise missiles, two Kh-22 cruise missiles, and three Kh-59/69 guided air missiles around 1000 local time on July 8. Ukrainian air defense shot down two Kh-101s in the first wave, and one Kh-47, three Iskanders, 11 Kh-101s, 12 Kalibrs, and three Kh-59/69s during the second wave. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces targeted residential and other civilian infrastructure in Kyiv, Dnipro, Kryvyi Rih, Slovyansk, and Kramatorsk cities.

Footage taken by a bystander in Kyiv City shows the second before a Russian missile struck the Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital—Ukraine's largest pediatric hospital that treats thousands of patients, including cancer cases, daily. The footage clearly shows a single missile flying at a sharp downward trajectory before making contact with the hospital building. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) conducted a preliminary investigation of the blast site at Okhmatdyt and concluded that Russian forces used a Kh-101 missile to strike the hospital. The Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital published footage showing extensive damage to medical facilities on the premises. Falling debris from Russian missiles also struck the Isida Maternity Hospital in western Kyiv City after the initial strike on the Okhmatdyt hospital, and Russian missile strikes also damaged residential infrastructure elsewhere both in Kyiv and Dnipro cities. The Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs has confirmed 22 deaths and 74 injured in Kyiv City and 11 deaths and 64 injured within Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as of the time of this publication. Zelensky announced that Ukraine is convening an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in response to these Russian strikes. Russia is currently the president of the UNSC.

The July 8 Russian missile strikes likely employed a new and noteworthy tactic to maximize the damage from such strike series. Former Ukrainian Air Forces Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated following the strikes on July 8 that Russian forces are constantly improving their reconnaissance and strike drone capabilities and the efficacy of both cruise and ballistic missiles, noting that during the July 8 strike Russian cruise missiles flew at "extremely low" altitudes. Ihnat noted that in some cases, Ukrainian air defense forces had to attempt to intercept cruise missiles flying as low as 50 meters above the ground. Ukrainian air defenses have historically had high shoot-down rates for certain types of cruise missiles, particularly the older Kh-101 variety, but Ihnat's suggestion of Russian forces launching cruise missile strikes at such low altitudes indicates that Russian forces may have innovated their tactics and/or technology somewhat to inflict maximum damage on Ukrainian infrastructure by giving Ukrainian air defense practically no time to respond until the missile is already within close range of the ground. Ihnat noted that Russian forces are reducing the electromagnetic signatures of the drones until the last possible moment to prevent their detection by Ukrainian forces, which Ihnat noted means that by the time Ukrainian forces detect the drone, the missile the drone was guiding could already be close to the target point. Russia has consistently adapted the strike packages it uses against Ukraine to take advantage of Ukraine's air defense shortages, and the July 8 strikes represent a new and adapted strike package that Ukraine will need to learn to respond to with requisite levels of Western-provided air defense systems.

Key Takeaways:

• A Russian Kh-101 cruise missile hit the Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital in central Kyiv during a wider series of missile strikes targeting critical Ukrainian infrastructure throughout the day on July 8.

• Russian officials and information space actors are attempting to deflect responsibility for the Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital strike by making false claims about the missiles involved and the state of the hospital — all contrary to available evidence.

• The July 8 Russian missile strikes likely employed a new and noteworthy tactic to maximize the damage from such strike series.

• Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping continued to posture themselves as potential mediators to an end to the war in Ukraine during a July 8 meeting in Beijing, despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's rejection of serious negotiations or any third-party mediation.

• Russian Vice Admiral Sergei Lipilin replaced Vice Admiral Vladimir Vorobyov as Russian Baltic Fleet Commander.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces recently advanced near Donetsk City and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

• Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin called on July 8 for Russia to increase its domestic production of drones fivefold by 2030.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a joint statement on July 9 about strengthening mutually beneficial political, economic, energy, and military-technical cooperation between Russia and India. Modi met with Putin in Moscow on July 8 and 9 to discuss furthering Russo-Indian relations, which Putin referred to as a "particularly privileged strategic partnership." The joint statement specifically pledged to increase joint production of spare components and parts for servicing Russian-made military equipment and weapons in India, agreed to establish a working group on technological cooperation, and planned to reorient the existing Russo-Indian Intergovernmental Commission on Military and Military-Technical Cooperation on joint research, development, and production of advanced defense technologies and systems. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak stated that India and Russia are considering entering a long-term agreement on oil supplies and that Russia is considering allowing Indian companies to participate in Russian gas projects.<3> Head of the Russian state nuclear energy operator Rosatom Alexei Likhachev stated during a tour that Putin and Modi took at a Rosatom exhibition that Russia is offering to assist India in constructing low-power tropical nuclear power plants. Modi credited Russo-Indian energy, economic, and food security cooperation for helping to control Indian inflation and ensure economic stability.

Putin has been intensifying efforts to strengthen Russian relations with non-Western countries through individualized appeals, although he is likely emphasizing Russo-Indian cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS as part of a wider Russian effort to create an alternative "Eurasian security architecture" leveraging existing Eurasian multilateral organizations. Putin stated that Russia and India will continue to closely cooperate in multilateral organizations such as the United Nations (UN), SCO, and BRICS. Putin and Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov have both explicitly identified the SCO and BRICS as the pillars of this "Eurasian security architecture." Putin also recently visited the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Vietnam to strengthen bilateral cooperation with these countries and attempt to build a coalition of support for Russia from non-Western countries.

Some unnamed US government officials appear to believe that Ukraine does not need to liberate its occupied lands and people to win the war, despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent clear statements that Russia will not accept a negotiated ceasefire on any terms other than Ukrainian capitulation and will not abandon its goals of the total destruction of the entire Ukrainian state--not just the lands it currently occupies. The New York Times (NYT) reported on July 9 that anonymous US officials think that "even without formally winning back its land, Ukraine could still emerge a victor in the war by moving closer to NATO and Europe." This US assessment is premised on several faulty assumptions—first and foremost on the assumption that Ukraine's NATO or European Union (EU) membership is guaranteed. Ukraine’s NATO and EU membership should not be taken as a given in discussions of the future of Ukrainian security. This assessment also rests on the assumption that losing the lands Russia currently occupies and its civilians under Russian occupation will not severely compromise Ukraine's future economic viability and ability to defend itself against future Russian attacks, which, as ISW has frequently emphasized, is not the case. The lands Russia currently occupies are both economically and strategically necessary for Ukraine, and their continued occupation will deprive Ukraine of economic resources and strategically critical land. Putin himself has stated that Russia will not be content with ending the war on the lines it currently holds and has explicitly called for the Ukrainian withdrawal from the non-occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts as a prerequisite for any sort of "peace" negotiations with Ukraine. The areas Putin is currently demanding include the large cities of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, among other things. Putin has, furthermore, continually framed the war as a struggle against NATO and repeated his insistence that Ukraine change its constitution to formally abandon any aspirations of joining the alliance. There is no basis for assessing that Putin would agree to a ceasefire that leaves Ukraine closer to NATO. Finally, this suggestion is contingent on the faulty assumption that Russian aggression will "end" with the conclusion of the war on Russia's terms. ISW, on the contrary, has assessed that a negotiated ceasefire on Russian terms will afford the Russian military time to rest and reconstitute, likely before conducting a future attack on Ukraine from a much more advanced and fortified frontline. Putin has been firm and consistent in his ultimate goal of destroying the Ukrainian state and will not give up that goal until he feels that he has achieved it.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a joint statement on July 9 about strengthening mutually beneficial political, economic, energy, and military-technical cooperation between Russia and India.

• Putin has been intensifying efforts to strengthen Russian relations with non-Western countries through individualized appeals, although he is likely emphasizing Russo-Indian cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS as part of a wider Russian effort to create an alternative "Eurasian security architecture" leveraging existing Eurasian multilateral organizations.

• Modi tacitly supported the Kremlin's false narrative that Russia is interested in a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the war in Ukraine, likely in exchange for deepening economic, energy, and technological cooperation with Russia.

• Putin may have pledged to return Indian volunteers fighting in Ukraine during a private dinner with Modi in Novo-Ogaryovo, Moscow Oblast on July 8.

• Some unnamed US government officials appear to believe that Ukraine does not need to liberate its occupied lands and people to win the war, despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent clear statements that Russia will not accept a negotiated ceasefire on any terms other than Ukrainian capitulation and will not abandon its goals of the total destruction of the entire Ukrainian state--not just the lands it currently occupies.

• Several independent investigations, including one conducted by the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), concluded that a Russian missile struck the Kyiv City Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital on July 8 amid continued official Russian denials and deflections.

• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Russian energy and military infrastructure in Belgorod, Kursk, Rostov, Astrakhan, and Volgograd oblasts overnight on July 8 to 9.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed new military prosecutors on July 8, likely in support of ongoing, long-term Russian military reforms.

• Newly-elected Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated Iran's continued willingness to enter a comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia, emphasizing the continuity in Iran's support for Russia even under a new presidential administration.

• The US Department of Justice (DoJ) released affidavits on July 9 for several hundred X (formerly Twitter) accounts and domain names used by Russian state media and security services to operate a bot farm aimed at spreading disinformation in the US and abroad.

• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances southeast of Chasiv Yar, near Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City.

• Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree ordering the reestablishment of the Saratov Higher Artillery Command School on July 8, likely as part of ongoing efforts to build out a cadre of Russian officers.

• Russian authorities continue to deploy Rosgvardia contingents to occupied Ukraine to serve law enforcement functions.

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Ukrainian First Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk stressed that robust Western security assistance will be crucial for Ukraine's ability to contest and seize the battlefield initiative. Havrylyuk also challenged the notion that Russian forces will be able to indefinitely sustain the consistent gradual creeping advances that support Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory for winning a war of attrition in Ukraine. Havrylyuk published an article entitled "What Factors Will Allow Ukraine to Conduct a Counteroffensive" on July 9 wherein he states that Ukraine must contest the initiative and conduct counteroffensive operations in order to neutralize the Kremlin's efforts to protract the war and to increase costs on Russia that will force it towards a just peace aligned with Ukraine's terms. Havrylyuk stated that Ukraine can contest the initiative if Ukraine strengthens combat brigades with personnel, ammunition, and equipment and specifically staffs and equips new brigades. Havrylyuk also noted that it will be critical for Ukraine to create and consistently replenish reserves and sufficiently train new personnel. Havrylyuk emphasized that Western security assistance will be critically important in determining at what scale Ukraine can achieve these tasks and called for more air defense systems, artillery shells, and long-range strike capabilities to strengthen Ukrainian combat effectiveness and operational capabilities. Ukraine is addressing its manpower challenges and is already forming several new brigades, but Ukraine's ability to equip these brigades will be the determining factor for how, when, and at what scale Ukraine can commit new brigades to support potential counteroffensive operations. Current reporting suggests that Ukraine will not be able to fully equip all new planned brigades without the arrival of additional Western security assistance. Western security assistance that provides Ukrainian forces with the necessary equipment and weapons at the scale, timing, and regularity required for operations that liberate significant swaths of occupied Ukraine remains the only likely path for reducing Putin's current commitment to destroying Ukrainian statehood and identity.

Ukrainian forces are already attempting to contest the battlefield initiative in limited and localized counterattacks at the tactical level — emphasizing that the current state of grinding positional warfare along the frontline is not an indefinitely stable one. The arrival of Western-provided aid to the frontlines has allowed Ukrainian forces to stabilize critical areas of the front, and Ukrainian forces have conducted tactically significant and successful localized counterattacks in northern Kharkiv Oblast and towards Kreminna (in the Donetsk-Luhansk Oblast border area) starting in mid-May 2024. Ukrainian forces are not yet conducting counterattacks at the scale necessary to seize the battlefield initiative, but these tactical Ukrainian counterattacks are increasing the costs imposed on Russian forces for continuing to pursue their slow, grinding theory of advance. For example, Ukrainian counterattacks in northern Kharkiv Oblast have forced Russian troops to redeploy select Russian elements away from where their centralized command formation should hypothetically be — ISW observed that Russia moved elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and a battalion tactical group of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps) to northern Kharkiv Oblast in mid-June while other elements of the 810th Infantry and 9th Motorized Rifle brigades remained near Krynky, Kherson Oblast, and Toretsk, Donetsk Oblast respectively, where they had been fighting for some time. ISW also recently assessed that the Russian military command was separating and deploying elements of Russian Airborne (VDV) formations across the frontline — elements of the 106th VDV Division's 137th VDV Regiment are reportedly fighting in Kherson Oblast, while other elements of the regiment are fighting near Siversk, Donetsk Oblast.<10> The disparate deployment of elements of the same wider formation is a strong indicator that Russian forces are beginning to feel the pressure of Ukrainian counterattacks — emphasizing that the frontline is not as static as Putin assesses it to be. Ukraine's ability to launch more powerful and organized counterattacks, however, continues to be contingent on sustained Western military support.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian First Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk stressed that robust Western security assistance will be crucial for Ukraine's ability to contest and seize the battlefield initiative. Havrylyuk also challenged the notion that Russian forces will be able to indefinitely sustain the consistent gradual creeping advances that support Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory for winning a war of attrition in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces are already attempting to contest the battlefield initiative in limited and localized counterattacks at the tactical level — emphasizing that the current state of grinding positional warfare along the frontline is not an indefinitely stable one.

• Havrylyuk assessed that Russia will face medium- to long-term economic and equipment challenges that will impede the Russian military's ability to indefinitely retain the theater-wide initiative, sustain consistent offensive pressure that results in gradual creeping advances, and win a war of attrition.

• Putin's articulated theory of a slow, grinding victory in Ukraine is notably premised on accepting continuously high casualty rates, as exemplified by reported Russian losses accrued during two recent offensive efforts.

• NATO allies reaffirmed their commitment to supporting Ukraine and announced new security assistance packages for the Ukrainian war effort at the NATO summit in Washington, DC on July 9 and 10.

• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev reaffirmed that Russia would not accept or uphold any negotiated peace settlements with Kyiv short of Ukrainian capitulation, the destruction of the entire Ukrainian state, and the full occupation of Ukraine.

• Servicemembers of a Russian motorized rifle regiment that was previously implicated in the execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in late May 2024 reportedly executed two Ukrainian POWs in the same area in western Zaporizhia Oblast in June 2024.

• Select US military bases in Europe have instituted increased alert levels in response to intensified Russian sabotage and hybrid operations against NATO allies over the past several months.

• Russian forces recently advanced in Vovchansk, near Kreminna, and near Toretsk.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 10 that the Russian military trained the first batch of Moscow Military District (MMD) counter-drone instructors at the Alabino training ground in Moscow Oblast.

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Russian authorities reportedly attempted to assassinate leading figures in the European defense industrial base (DIB), likely as part of Russian efforts to disrupt and deter Western aid to Ukraine and Russia's wider efforts to destabilize NATO members. CNN reported on July 11 that five US and Western officials stated that US intelligence uncovered a Kremlin plan in early 2024 to assassinate German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger. US intelligence reportedly informed the German government, which was able to foil the plot. CNN reported that the planned assassination against Papperger was one of multiple plans to kill European defense industry executives, but that the plot against Papperger was the "most mature." European authorities have reported that Russian actors and proxies have conducted sabotage and other hybrid warfare operations aimed at deterring and disrupting Western aid to Ukraine, and NATO and its member states have repeatedly warned about intensifying Russian hybrid operations on NATO member territory.

Finnish authorities reported an increase in GPS "malfunctions" in the past week and that most disruptions to aviation and maritime GPS and radar originate from within Russia. Finnish federal transport and communications agency Traficom told Finnish outlet Iltalehti on July 11 that GPS "malfunctions" have increased in the past week in reference to a specific incident in the Gulf of Finland overnight on July 10-11. A Finnish maritime pilot reported on X (formerly Twitter) that he experienced severe GPS and radar malfunctions overnight while guiding other boats near Kotka and Hamina on Finland's southern coast. The pilot published footage of his radar malfunctioning and reported that GPS was unavailable for 90 percent of the route between the Orrengrund pilot substation and Hamina harbor. Reports of increased GPS and radar disruptions in the Gulf of Finland cohere with reports of Russian GPS jamming affecting Baltic states and other areas of Europe. Likely Russian jamming from Kaliningrad has previously jammed the GPS of a plane carrying then–UK Defense Minister Grant Shapps and forced Finnish aircraft carrier Finnair to ground multiple flights out of Finland. The GPS interference in the Baltics forced Finnair to cancel flights to Tartu, Estonia until the Tartu airport implemented an approach solution for planes flying into the airport that does not rely on GPS. Russia's apparent GPS jamming is likely part of Russia's intensifying hybrid campaign directly targeting NATO states likely aimed at undermining support for Ukraine and NATO unity.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian authorities reportedly attempted to assassinate leading figures in the European defense industrial base (DIB), likely as part of Russian efforts to disrupt and deter Western aid to Ukraine and Russia's wider efforts to destabilize NATO members.

• Finnish authorities reported an increase in GPS "malfunctions" in the past week and that most disruptions to aviation and maritime GPS and radar originate from within Russia.

• Ukraine intends to hold a second meeting of the Global Peace Summit by the end of 2024 and reportedly plans to invite Russia to participate.

• European Union (EU) leadership is reportedly considering restricting Hungary's power as EU Council president following Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin in Moscow and his efforts to present himself as a potential mediator between Russia and Ukraine.

• The Russian government continued efforts to root out critical voices and consolidate control over the Russian information space.

• The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed that it prevented a terrorist attack against an Orthodox church in Maykop, Republic of Adygea on July 11.

• Ukrainian forces advanced north of Kharkiv City; and Russian forces recently advanced south of Siversk, northwest of Avdiivka, and west of Donetsk City.

• Russian federal subjects (regions) continue to use monetary incentives as part of Russia's crypto-mobilization recruitment efforts.

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Western and US officials reportedly assess that Ukrainian forces will continue to be on the defensive for the next six months and will not be able to conduct a large-scale counteroffensive operation until 2025. Ukrainian forces are already attempting to contest the tactical initiative in limited counterattacks in select sectors of the front, however, and Ukrainian forces may be able to conduct limited counteroffensive operations even while largely on the defensive depending on the arrival of Western aid. The New York Times (NYT) reported on July 11 that a senior NATO official stated that Ukraine would have to wait for more Western security assistance and deploy more of its forces to the frontline before conducting counteroffensive operations and that Ukraine would likely not be able to conduct these operations until 2025. A senior US defense official stated that Ukrainian forces would remain on the defensive for the next six months (until January 2025) and that Russian forces will be unlikely to gain significant ground during this time. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces currently remain unlikely to achieve operationally significant gains in Ukraine, and Russian President Vladimir Putin's articulated theory of victory aims for Russian forces to make consistent gradual creeping advances instead of pursuing rapid operationally significant maneuver.

Ukraine is currently addressing its manpower challenges and forming several new brigades that Ukraine could commit to support contesting the initiative, and the provision of Western security assistance needed for equipping these brigades will determine when and at what scale Ukraine can contest the initiative. The arrival of Western-provided aid to the frontlines has allowed Ukrainian forces to stabilize critical areas of the front, and Ukrainian forces have conducted tactically significant and successful localized counterattacks in northern Kharkiv Oblast and towards Kreminna (in the Donetsk-Luhansk Oblast border area) starting in mid-May 2024. Ukrainian forces will likely be able to intensify both the scale and regularity of counterattacks over the coming months as further Western security assistance arrives at the frontline and as Ukraine continues to build out reserves and new brigades. Russian forces are currently attempting to maintain consistent offensive pressure on Ukraine to force Ukrainian forces to commit manpower and materiel to defensive operations instead of accumulating these resources for counteroffensive operations. Russian forces are attempting to achieve this effect through consistent offensive operations throughout eastern and northeastern Ukraine that stretch Ukrainian forces, but nevertheless, Ukrainian forces are leveraging their capabilities and exploiting Russian vulnerabilities to conduct tactical counterattacks.

Ukrainian forces have so far conducted several large-scale counteroffensive operations that have been operationally successful throughout the full-scale invasion, but this approach to liberating territory is not the only possible approach for Ukrainian forces. Breaking out of the current positional warfare in Ukraine is a challenging task for both Russian and Ukrainian forces, and smaller-scale Ukrainian counteroffensive operations present opportunities for pursuing operationally significant objectives without the challenges associated with conducting larger-scale counteroffensive operations. Smaller-scale counteroffensive operations would likely allow Ukraine to start degrading Russia's ability to leverage the theater-wide initiative sooner and more quickly reduce some of the theater-wide pressures on Ukrainian forces. Western security assistance that provides Ukrainian forces with the necessary equipment and weapons at the scale, timing, and regularity that Ukrainian forces require for operations that liberate significant swaths of occupied Ukraine remains the only likely path for reducing Putin's current commitment to destroying Ukrainian statehood and identity regardless of time or cost. These Ukrainian operations do not need to be individual, distinct large-scale endeavors, however, and instead can be a series of compounding counteroffensive operations over the course of late 2024 and throughout 2025.

Key Takeaways:

• Western and US officials reportedly assess that Ukrainian forces will continue to be on the defensive for the next six months and will not be able to conduct a large-scale counteroffensive operation until 2025. Ukrainian forces are already attempting to contest the tactical initiative in limited counterattacks in select sectors of the front, however, and Ukrainian forces may be able to conduct limited counteroffensive operations even while largely on the defensive depending on the arrival of Western aid.

• The Kremlin continues to signal its unwillingness to participate in peace negotiations that do not result in complete Ukrainian and Western capitulation to the Kremlin's demands amid ongoing Ukrainian efforts to form an international consensus for future negotiations.

• Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov used a phone call with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on July 12, his second in three weeks, to reiterate standard Russian threats intended to coerce the US out of supporting Ukraine as part of an ongoing reflexive control campaign targeting Western decision-makers.

• The United Kingdom (UK) government has reportedly not permitted Ukraine to use UK-supplied Storm Shadow missiles to strike military targets within Russia, despite previous Western reporting and UK official statements to the contrary.

• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on July 11 a military aid package for Ukraine worth $225 million.

• Indian state-run oil refineries are reportedly negotiating an oil import deal with Russia, likely as a result of the recent meetings between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin and improving Russo-Indian energy relations in recent months.

• The Kremlin continues to intensify efforts to encourage self-censorship among information space voices and consolidate physical control over internet infrastructure.

• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.

• Russian infantry units are reportedly assaulting Ukrainian trench positions in single-file columns due to pervasive Ukrainian minefields and poor assault training.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration head Yevgeny Balitsky on July 12 and discussed social and infrastructure projects in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

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Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reportedly conducted successful drone strikes against an oil depot near Tsimlyansk, Rostov Oblast on the morning of July 13. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that its sources stated that SBU drones struck the oil depot, which stored various grades of gas and diesel fuel. Russian sources amplified footage showing the fire at an oil depot near Tsimlyansk, Rostov Oblast (156km northeast of Rostov-on-Don), and Rostov Oblast Head Vasily Golubev confirmed that a drone strike caused the fire. A Ukrainian military observer told Ukrainian media that Ukrainian forces are targeting Russian military logistics, including oil depots, and that Rostov Oblast is one of Russia's most important military logistics hubs.

Russia and Iran continue to signal their commitment to deepening bilateral relations and multilateral cooperation. Iranian President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian published an article in the Tehran Times on July 12 in which Pezeshkian praised the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia for standing by Iran during "challenging times." Pezeshkian stated that Russia is a "valued strategic ally and neighbor" to Iran and that his government will remain committed to expanding and prioritizing bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Russia, including through BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Pezeshkian claimed that Iran "strives for peace" between Russia and Ukraine and is prepared to support initiatives aimed at peace. Russian Ambassador to Iran Alexei Dedov stated during an interview with Russian state news agency RIA Novosti published on July 13 that Russia will pursue the same strategic course with Iran under Pezeshkian as Russia pursued under deceased Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. Dedov claimed that Russia is prepared to consider peace mediation proposals from Iran, although Russian President Vladimir Putin recently rejected the possibility of any third-party mediation efforts between Russia and Ukraine. Dedov stated that Russia and Iran will sign a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in the "foreseeable future," but did not provide a concrete timeline for this agreement.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reportedly conducted successful drone strikes against an oil depot near Tsimlyansk, Rostov Oblast on the morning of July 13.

• Russia and Iran continue to signal their commitment to deepening bilateral relations and multilateral cooperation.

• A detained Russian businessman and a Russian military official who were reportedly connected to detained former Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov recently died on the same day.

• Armenian border guards, cooperating with Russian authorities, reportedly detained a Russian citizen in Yerevan, likely as part of a continued Kremlin effort to assert political power over Armenia and challenge Armenia's sovereignty amid deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kupyansk and Svatove, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Toretsk and Avdiivka and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.

• The Russian military continues efforts to improve training capacity.

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https://www.krone.at/3457598

"Nach dem Mordversuch auf ihn bei der letzten Wahlkampfveranstaltung vor dem Parteitag, bei dem er offiziell zum Präsidentschaftskandidaten gekürt werden soll, gibt sich Donald Trump kämpferisch. Er wandte sich bereits kurz nach dem Attentat auf seiner Social-Media-Plattform an seine Anhänger und schilderte die blutigen Momente."

Eine große Mitschuld gebe ich der medialen Verrohung im politischen Diskurs. Braucht man ja nur in unsere Zeitungen schauen welche Schlammschlachten da ausgetragen werden...

Spätestens jetzt ist klar, dass er die Wahlen gewinnen wird. Wahrscheinlich noch dazu haushoch.

Russian officials and milbloggers reiterated complaints about poor security around critical infrastructure in rear areas of Russia in response to a July 13 Ukrainian drone strike against an oil depot near Tsimlyansk, Rostov Oblast. Russian sources circulated footage on July 13 and 14 of two security guards armed with anti-drone guns seemingly watching a Ukrainian drone strike the oil depot without attempting to shoot down the drone and criticized the security guards for not defending the depot. Russian sources alleged that Russian authorities have attempted to absolve themselves of responsibility for Ukrainian drone strikes by ordering Russian facilities to hire their own security and questioned why the Russian government has not organized mobile fire groups similar to Ukraine's mobile fire groups that defend against Russian Shahed-136/131 drone strikes. Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin responded to milblogger criticism on July 14 and claimed that Rosgvardia - a security agency tasked with protecting Russian President Vladimir Putin‘s regime from internal threats and some critical infrastructure - does not have the necessary manpower to set up defense posts at every critical facility in Russia. Rogozin suggested that Russia should form, train, and equip specialized BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) volunteer units to provide technical and armed protection of critical energy and transport infrastructure facilities and called on the Russian government and Russian President Vladimir Putin to consider his proposal. Rogozin supervises several BARS units including the Russian BARS-10 Battalion of the "Tsarskiye Volki" Brigade, and owners of Russian irregular formations have previously attempted to use threats to Russian territory in order to advocate for their forces to move from frontline areas in Ukraine to defend Russia's rear and border areas. Russian milbloggers have routinely complained about the Russian government's inability to address and repel Ukrainian strikes against Russian infrastructure.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials and milbloggers reiterated complaints about poor security around critical infrastructure in rear areas of Russia in response to a July 13 Ukrainian drone strike against an oil depot near Tsimlyansk, Rostov Oblast.

• The Russian military command may have committed under-equipped units initially intended to act as an operational reserve to combat operations, possibly due to constraints on the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) or efforts to reinforce ongoing Russian grinding assaults in Ukraine.

• Ukraine signed a series of security agreements and received several aid packages amid and following the July 9-11 NATO summit.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Vovchansk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Avdiivka.

• Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrei Kartapolov reiterated on July 14 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is not planning to demobilize servicemembers that Russia mobilized in Fall 2022 before the end of the war.

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Ukrainian drone strikes deep within Russia continue to pressure Russia's air defense umbrella and force the Russian military command to prioritize allocating limited air defense assets to cover what it deems to be high-value targets. Satellite imagery collected on May 6 indicates that Russian forces have concentrated at least seven Pantsir-1 medium-range air defense systems around Russian President Vladimir Putin's residence in Valdai, Leningrad Oblast. Ruslan Pukhov, the head of the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies and a member of a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) civilian advisory board, stated on July 16 that such "focal" air defense coverage (static coverage of a singular target) is meaningless at scale because it allows Ukrainian drones to bypass Russian air defense coverage and strike from uncovered directions. The Russian military apparently lacks the required conventional air defense systems to protect all critical facilities within western Russia and has even struggled to cover important potential targets in reportedly well-defended areas within Russia. Pukhov called on the Russian military to introduce an innovative decentralized approach to protect facilities in Russia from Ukrainian drones and warned that Ukrainian drones will likely reach deeper within Russia. The Russian military began forming mobile fire groups — decentralized groups that Ukraine successfully deployed to defend against Russian Shahed-136/131 drone strikes — in March 2024 but have yet to field these groups at the required scale to sufficiently protect critical facilities in western Russia. Continued pressures on Russia's air defense umbrella have led select regional authorities to explicitly state that Russian companies and local authorities cannot rely on federal-level Russian air defenses and need to provide for their own anti-drone capabilities. Pukhov suggested that the Russian military field a fleet of light aircraft to intercept Ukrainian drones but noted that Russia’s low level of light aircraft production would complicate such an effort.

Ukrainian forces continue targeting Russian air defense systems in occupied Ukraine and in Russia’s border areas to set conditions to field F-16 fighter jets following their anticipated Summer-Fall 2024 arrival to Ukraine. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on July 16 that Ukrainian forces struck an S-300 position in occupied Donetsk Oblast and that Ukrainian forces have destroyed 20 S-300 launchers and 15 radar stations total in an unspecified time period. Syrskyi published geolocated footage showing Ukrainian forces using cluster munitions to strike Russian air defense systems located east of occupied Manhush, Donetsk Oblast (west of Mariupol). The Council of Deputies of Krasninskoye, Volgograd Oblast also claimed on July 15 that the commander of a Russian S-300 battery originally from the area was killed in a Ukrainian ATACMS strike against a S-300 position in the Kharkiv direction at 1300 local time on July 12. The Russian S-300 commander more likely died in a Ukrainian strike against occupied Mariupol, as the commander's reported time of death is within 15 minutes of a reported strike against a Russian S-300 system near Mariupol on July 12. ISW has not observed indications of a Ukrainian strike against Russian air defense assets in Belgorod Oblast on July 12. ISW is unable to confirm the location of the July 12 strike.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian drone strikes deep within Russia continue to pressure Russia's air defense umbrella and force the Russian military command to prioritize allocating limited air defense assets to cover what it deems to be high-value targets.

• Ukrainian forces continue targeting Russian air defense systems in occupied Ukraine and in Russia’s border areas to set conditions to field F-16 fighter jets following their anticipated Summer-Fall 2024 arrival to Ukraine.

• The Russian 235th Garrison Military Court released former 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Major General Ivan Popov from pre-detention on July 15 center and placed him under house arrest until October 11.

• Armenian police detained another Russian citizen in Armenia, likely at the request of Russian authorities, amid deteriorating Armenian-Russian political and security relations.

• An investigation by Russian opposition outlet The Bell found that approximately 650,000 people left Russia following the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and have not returned.

• Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Avdiivka.

• The Russian government is continuing to improve Russia's bureaucratic mobilization and conscription systems.

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Russian state news outlets editorialized comments by Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev and claimed that he said that the Ukrainian state will no longer exist by 2034, likely to support the Kremlin's efforts to prepare the Russian public for a long war in Ukraine while promising that Russia will complete its objective to destroy Ukrainian statehood within a decade. Russian media editorialized comments made by Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev in an interview with Russian outlet Argumenty i Fakty (AIF) on July 17. Medvedev claimed that "it is not for nothing" that NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg suggested that Ukraine could be able to join the alliance within the next ten years, concluding that Ukraine will "never" join NATO because NATO leadership will have changed by 2034 and because "it is quite possible that the notorious country 404 (a derogative use of the 404 computer 'error' code meant to suggest that Ukraine is not a real state) will not exist either." Medvedev notably did not explicitly say that Ukraine will cease to exist by 2034 — rather it was a tangential implication of his statements — but Russian news outlets, including Kremlin newswire TASS, immediately began publishing stories with headlines such as "Medvedev Admitted that Ukraine Will No Longer Exist in 2034" and, "Medvedev Predicted the Disappearance of Ukraine by 2034."

There are several implications to the way that Russian media is currently editorializing Medvedev's statements. First and foremost, the explicit suggestion that Russia will be able to "destroy Ukraine" by 2034 is a promise to the Russian public that Russia will be able to win the war and achieve its objective to destroy Ukrainian statehood within a decade. This sets careful information conditions and societal expectations for a war that will last another decade, but one that will end with Russia's desired "victory." This Russian narrative also directly and strongly undermines select Kremlin officials' separate attempts to suggest that Russia is willing to "negotiate" for "peace" with Ukraine and further emphasizes that the Kremlin's only desired end-state for the war is the complete destruction of the Ukrainian state and people. Russian President Vladimir Putin has carefully articulated his goals for the war as such and has demanded that Ukrainian forces withdraw from territory that Russian forces do not control as a precondition for any kind of "peace" negotiations, as ISW has previously assessed. Neither Ukraine nor the West can expect to negotiate with Russia on Russia's terms if Russia's terms are premised on the eradication of Ukraine and its people in the next ten years.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian state news outlets editorialized comments by Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev and claimed that he said that the Ukrainian state will no longer exist by 2034, likely to support the Kremlin's efforts to prepare the Russian public for a long war in Ukraine while promising that Russia will complete its objective to destroy Ukrainian statehood within a decade.

• Russian officials continue to seize on diplomatic meetings with European states to create the impression that Russia is normalizing its relations with the West and claim that there is limited Western support for Russia.

• Russia and India continue to strengthen their bilateral relationship amid reports of ongoing Russian weapons exports to India.

• Russia and Ukraine exchanged 95 prisoners of war (POWs) each in a one-to-one POW exchange on July 17.

• Kremlin officials continue attempts to curry favor with Russian ultranationalists by appealing to anti-migrant animus despite such appeals generating tensions with the Russian government’s efforts to execute the Kremlin's wider migration policy.

• Ukrainian forces regained positions south of Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City and near Kupyansk, Svatove, Avdiivka, and Vuhledar.

• Russia's crypto-mobilization campaign continues to generate increasing financial costs for the Russian government.


Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian coast guard base in occupied Crimea on the night of July 17 to 18. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on July 18 that sources in Ukrainian law enforcement stated that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) conducted a naval and aerial drone strike during a Russian military exercise at a Russian coast guard base near occupied Lake Donuzlav, Crimea on the night of July 17 to 18 and damaged and disabled a headquarters with a control point, a warehouse with ammunition and equipment, an electric substation, technical facilities, and Russian firing positions. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 31st Air Force and Air Defense Division (4th Air Force and Air Defense Army) shot down at least 33 aerial drones but that debris from falling drones caused insignificant damage near occupied Yevpatoria. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 18 that elements of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) destroyed 10 naval drones in the Black Sea.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian coast guard base in occupied Crimea on the night of July 17 to 18.

• European countries continue to display their commitment to Ukraine and unity in the face of Russian aggression.

• Rosgvardia made an unprecedented proposal on July 17 to grant Russian Central Bank leadership the right to carry automatic weapons and handguns.

• Kremlin officials continue to expand the geographic scope of Russia's proposed alternative "Eurasian security architecture."

• The US continues efforts to build out a partnership with Armenia, sparking critical reactions from Kremlin officials.

• Russian forces recently marginally advanced along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and near Kharkiv City, Toretsk, Avdiivka, and Hulyaipole.

• Russian officials continue efforts to expand the Russian Armed Forces' training capacity and address force generation issues.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated the importance of developing an international consensus for pursuing peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Zelensky stated during an interview with the BBC published on July 18 that the world needs to develop a united consensus on a possible end state for the war in Ukraine and present this consensus to Russia in order to encourage Russia to come to the negotiating table. Zelensky added that diplomacy will be an important element of restoring Ukraine's territorial integrity and that Ukraine does not necessarily need to liberate all of its territory "by force" but must significantly weaken Russia's battlefield position in order to develop a stronger negotiating position for future peace negotiations. Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials have consistently presented their vision for a negotiated settlement for the war in Ukraine, which includes the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity and long-term security guarantees for Ukraine's sovereignty and national security against future aggression. Ukrainian officials have not articulated a willingness to concede territory to Russia in exchange for peace, and Zelensky's statements are consistent with this position. Ukrainian officials continue to signal their willingness to participate in good faith peace negotiations with Russian representatives based on Ukrainian sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international law, and Kremlin officials continue to frame such negotiations as outlandish and an "ultimatum" and call for a settlement tantamount to Ukrainian surrender.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban appears to be augmenting several Russian information operations amid continued efforts to present himself as a possible future mediator between Russia and Ukraine. Orban published a report on July 18 detailing his recent "peacekeeping mission" and visits to Ukraine, Russia, China, Turkey, and the United States. Orban notably conceded that Russia, as a belligerent, is uninterested in a ceasefire or peace negotiations with Ukraine, an admission at odds with Kremlin officials’ efforts to pose Russia as amenable to peace negotiations. Kremlin officials have also undermined their efforts to sue for peace by repeatedly signaling an unwillingness to participate in negotiations based on anything less than complete Ukrainian capitulation. Orban may have acknowledged Russia's resistance to negotiations in order to appear impartial as he tries to present himself as a possible mediator. Orban simultaneously attempted to place the onus for negotiations on Ukraine and questioned the longevity of US and European support for Ukraine, both of which are consistent with ongoing Russian information operations intended to discourage Western support for Ukraine and absolve Russia of responsibility for an invasion that Russia started. Orban also called for the European Union (EU) to normalize diplomatic relations and reopen lines of communication with Russia. The Kremlin is attempting to use diplomatic meetings, including meetings with Hungary, to create the impression that Russia is normalizing relations with the West and claim that there is limited Western support for Russia, and Orban's recommendation would support this Kremlin effort and undermine several years of EU policy to address Russian war crimes and aggression towards Ukraine. Orban stated on July 19 that his "peace mission" will continue despite recent criticism from EU leadership and efforts to demonstrate the EU's non-alignment with Orban's positions on Ukraine and peace negotiations.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated the importance of developing an international consensus for pursuing peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.

• Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban appears to be augmenting several Russian information operations amid continued efforts to present himself as a possible future mediator between Russia and Ukraine.

• New United Kingdom (UK) Defense Secretary John Healey stated on July 19 that Ukraine can use UK-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia, despite previous reports that the UK had not permitted Ukraine to use UK-supplied Storm Shadow missiles to strike military targets within Russia.

• The Kremlin is reportedly concerned about the long-term social and political implications of Russian veterans returning from the war in Ukraine.

• The Russian government is reportedly considering stricter measures to directly censor critical voices on Russian social media.

• Russian authorities continue to propose stricter migration legislation as Russia's ultranationalists continue to espouse xenophobic rhetoric and complain about the Russian government's perceived lenient migration policy.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, and Avdiivka.

• Disorganization continues to plague Russian efforts to integrate personnel who served in Russian proxy forces in occupied Ukraine into the Russian military bureaucracy.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky spoke with former US President and Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump on July 19 and discussed an end-state to the war in Ukraine. Zelensky stated that he agreed to talk with Trump about steps that will produce a fair and truly lasting peace at a future personal meeting. Trump stated that both Russia and Ukraine will be able to come together and negotiate a deal that ends the war. The Kremlin continues to indicate that it is only interested in a negotiated settlement that results in Ukrainian capitulation and paves the way for Russia to destroy Ukrainian statehood, however. Zelensky has recently stressed that Ukraine must significantly weaken Russia's battlefield position in order to develop a stronger negotiating position for future peace negotiations, and Ukrainian leadership continues to call for the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity and long-term security guarantees for Ukraine as part of any lasting peace. Western security assistance that provides Ukrainian forces with the necessary equipment and weapons at the scale, timing, and regularity required for counteroffensive operations that liberate significant swaths of occupied Ukraine remains the only likely path for degrading Russia's battlefield position and reducing Russian President Vladimir Putin's current commitment to destroying Ukrainian statehood and identity.

Ukrainian drones struck a Russian airfield in Rostov Oblast on the night of July 19 to 20. Russian sources claimed on July 20 that Ukrainian forces launched 30 drones against the Millerovo airfield in Rostov Oblast and that the strike caused damage to infrastructure and a fuel tank. Geolocated footage shows a fire at the Millerovo airfield. Rostov Oblast Governor Vasily Golubev claimed that Russian forces intercepted and destroyed 26 drones over Rostov Oblast on the night of July 19 to 20. The Russian 31st Fighter Aviation Regiment (1st Composite Aviation Division) is reportedly based at the Millerovo airfield and has SU-30SM aircraft deployed to the airfield.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky spoke with former US President and Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump on July 19 and discussed an end-state to the war in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian drones struck a Russian airfield in Rostov Oblast on the night of July 19 to 20.

• Russian Minister of Defense Andrei Belousov and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continue to use meetings with Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers to attempt to rehabilitate the MoD's image among pro-war Russian ultranationalists and portray Belousov as an effective manager of the MoD.

• Russian authorities are likely trying to strengthen coercive measures aimed at impressing migrants facing deportation into military service.

• Spanish authorities arrested three individuals accused of conducting cyberattacks as part of a prominent pro-Russian hacking group that consistently targets Ukraine and NATO states supporting Ukraine.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Svatove, and Donetsk City.

• Kremlin-affiliated business-focused outlet Kommersant reported on July 19 that low quality machine parts grounded five Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Il-76MD-90A transport aircraft.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin recently visited Nicaragua and Cuba, likely as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to project its influence in the Western hemisphere and rally states against the US and the West. Volodin met with Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega and Vice President Rosario Murillo in Managua, Nicaragua on July 20 and relayed a message from Russian President Vladimir Putin stating that Russo-Nicaraguan relations are "developing dynamically" and that the two states' coordination efforts in international affairs are "yielding good results." Ortega condemned Western sanctions against Russia and reiterated Kremlin narratives claiming that NATO support for Ukraine is aggravating the war. Volodin met with Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel in Havana, Cuba on July 21 and relayed a similar message from Putin that Russo-Cuban relations are "developing dynamically." Diaz-Canel thanked Russia for its support to end the US blockade against Cuba. Volodin told journalists on July 21 that the Russian State Duma will send observers to the Venezuelan presidential election on July 28. Russia has increasingly been trying to demonstrate its influence in the Western hemisphere, including by signing a memorandum of understanding with Venezuela aimed at countering "coercive measures" and conducting naval exercises near and port calls to Cuba and Venezuela in June 2024. Cuba and Nicaragua were also notably among the eight Russian "ally" states that voted against a recent United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution demanding that Russia withdraw its forces from the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and return the plant to full Ukrainian control. Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have recently expressed interest in joining BRICS, and Putin has recently identified BRICS as a pillar of his envisioned "Eurasian security architecture" that is aimed at undermining NATO.

Volodin's visits to Nicaragua and Cuba immediately followed Belarusian Prime Minister Roman Golovchenko's visits to Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, during which Golovchenko signed multiple bilateral economic and trade agreements, possibly as part of Russian schemes that use Belarus to help Russia evade Western sanctions. Golovchenko visited Venezuela from July 14 to 16 and met with Venezuelan officials, including Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. Golovchenko stated that his visit aimed to discuss trade and the economic sphere and expressed Belarus' unwavering support for Maduro. Golovechenko also visited Cuba from July 16 to 17, during which he signed contracts worth "millions of dollars" to supply unspecified Belarusian goods to Cuba in exchange for Cuban exports to Belarus. Golovchenko visited Nicaragua from July 18 to 19 and signed contracts worth $85 million aimed at bilateral economic cooperation, including the Belarusian Development Bank's agreement to finance the delivery of more than 700 pieces of unspecified equipment to Nicaragua. Belarus may provide goods, equipment, or technology to Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Cuba in exchange for goods that Belarus and/or Russia cannot themselves acquire due to Western sanctions.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin recently visited Nicaragua and Cuba, likely as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to project its influence in the Western hemisphere and rally states against the US and the West.

• The Georgian State Security Service (SUS or SSSG) reportedly recently summoned several Georgian citizens, who had served as volunteers alongside Ukrainian forces, for questioning on charges of "conspiracy to overthrow the government" and "terrorism."

• Geolocated imagery confirms that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged infrastructure at the Millerovo Airbase in Rostov Oblast overnight on July 19 to 20.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Avdiivka.

• Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 20 to 21.

• Russian federal subjects are intensifying non-standard monetary incentives for contract service with the Russian military.

Institute for the Study of War

Russia and North Korea are pursuing increased cooperation in the judicial sphere. Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov arrived in Pyongyang, North Korea and met with his North Korean counterpart Kim Chol Won on July 22, marking the first time that a Russian Prosecutor General has visited North Korea. Krasnov and Kim reportedly discussed avenues for continued cooperation and signed an agreement for joint work between the Russian and North Korean prosecutor generals' offices for 2024–2026. The Russian and North Korean prosecutor general's offices have notably maintained dialogue since 2010 through a separate cooperation agreement, but the new agreement will likely be much more focused in scope, reflecting intensified Russo–North Korean cooperation over the past year. Krasnov emphasized the importance of "establishing a regular exchange of legislative acts" between Russia and North Korea and noted that Russia is ready to share its own experience in developing judicial practice with North Korea while also learning about North Korean judicial practice, particularly in the spheres of communication and information technology. Both countries have pursued increased military, political, diplomatic, and economic cooperation over the past year, as ISW has reported, but the apparent desire to align judicial and prosecutorial agendas is particularly noteworthy. ISW previously noted that the Russian Prosecutor General's Office weaponizes administrative laws to strengthen the judicial system's control over Russian society, and Krasnov's recent foreign engagements (including with Iraqi and Central African Republic officials) likely aim in part to share such judicial control and law enforcement tactics with friendly states in exchange for increasing Russia's own arsenal of domestic control methods. Russia's interest in North Korean judicial expertise in communications and information technologies is likely a reflection of the Kremlin's desire to consolidate control over the Russian information space, including via messaging platforms and virtual private network (VPN) services.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia and North Korea are pursuing increased cooperation in the judicial sphere.

• Russia is taking steps to codify terms broadly expanding the Russian official definition of prosecutable extremism as part of its ongoing effort to criminally prosecute and stymie domestic opposition to the Kremlin and its war in Ukraine.

• Kursk Oblast officials appointed a critical Russian milblogger to an advisory role within the regional government, likely as part of wider Kremlin efforts to appease critical commentators by granting them certain reputational concessions in exchange for their increased informational loyalty.

• Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against Russian oil infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai and a military air base in Rostov Oblast on July 22.

• Georgian authorities reportedly placed roughly 300 Georgian citizens who have served as volunteers in the Georgian Legion alongside Ukrainian forces on Georgia's wanted list.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Donetsk City.

Institute for the Study of War

The Russian State Duma proposed an amendment that would allow commanders to punish subordinates for using personal communications and navigation devices at the frontline, prompting significant milblogger backlash and highlighting how Russian forces continue to struggle with command and control (C2) issues and overreliance on insecure technologies to conduct combat operations in Ukraine. The Russian State Duma Defense Committee announced its support on July 23 for an amendment that will make wearing "gadgets" (personal phones and electronic devices) in the combat zone a "gross disciplinary offense" and will allow Russian commanders to arrest servicemembers in violation of such offenses without a court order and detain violating servicemembers for up to 10 days. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrei Kartapolov claimed that punishments would not be applicable to servicemembers using devices for combat operations and noted that the amendment is based on a previous bill that generally banned the use of private devices in Ukraine. Kartapolov claimed that the main goal of this amendment is to protect Russian servicemembers against security risks associated with improper cell phone usage.

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against a ferry crossing in Kavkaz, Krasnodar Krai on the night of July 22 to 23. Krasnodar Krai officials claimed that Ukrainian drones struck a ferry in the port of Kavkaz, causing a temporary fire. The ferry crossing in Kavkaz is roughly 15 kilometers from occupied Kerch, Crimea across the Kerch Strait, and Russian forces routinely use ferries in the area to relieve pressures on the Russian ground line of communication (GLOC) connecting Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea across the Kerch Strait Bridge.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian State Duma proposed an amendment that would allow commanders to punish subordinates for using personal communications and navigation devices at the frontline, prompting significant milblogger backlash and highlighting how Russian forces continue to struggle with command and control (C2) issues and overreliance on insecure technologies to conduct combat operations in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against a ferry crossing in Kavkaz, Krasnodar Krai on the night of July 22 to 23.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed a new Deputy Head of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Services on July 22, and there were several personnel changes within the Russian State Duma on July 23.

• Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Siversk, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.

• Russian regional officials are continuing to increase financial incentives to entice more men to fight in Ukraine.

• Russian occupation officials continue to rely on Russian security organs for law enforcement and filtration functions in occupied Ukraine aimed at degrading pro-Ukrainian sentiment.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that the Russian military has significantly increased its manpower and materiel commitments to the war in Ukraine over the last two and a half years, but Syrskyi's statement is not indicative of a sudden increase in the Russian military's presence in Ukraine and is instead representative of the manpower and material disadvantage that Ukrainian forces have faced for over two years. Syrskyi told UK outlet The Guardian in an interview published on July 24 that Russian forces currently have 520,000 personnel committed to the war in Ukraine and that the Russian military aims to have 690,000 personnel committed to the war by the end of 2024. Syrskyi noted that fighting is ongoing along 977 kilometers of the 3,700-kilometer-long frontline and reiterated that the Russian military command continues to pursue tactical gains regardless of significant manpower losses, while Ukrainian forces are attempting to safeguard the lives of Ukrainian troops. Syrskyi stated that Russian forces currently have a two-to-one or three-to-one equipment advantage over Ukrainian forces and that Russian forces have doubled the number of Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers and tripled the number of artillery systems in Ukraine since 2022. Syrskyi's comparison of the current Russian military contingent committed to Ukraine with the initial invasion force underscores the difference between the military force that Russia has gradually staffed and supplied over two and half years for a long war effort and the initial and ill-prepared invasion force that the Kremlin wrongly assessed could quickly depose the Ukrainian government in February 2022. Syrskyi noted that the Ukrainian military command is focused on addressing supply challenges in order to defend against ongoing Russian offensive operations and highlighted the fact that Ukrainian forces are successfully conducting defensive operations despite the materiel disparity between Russian and Ukrainian forces.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba met with People's Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Guangzhou on July 24 and discussed the war in Ukraine and the PRC's potential role in a future negotiated settlement of the war.

• The Russian State Duma adopted an amendment on July 24 that will allow Russian commanders to punish subordinates for using personal communication and navigation devices at the frontline, drawing continued backlash from Russian ultranationalists as well as other Duma deputies.

• The Georgian State Security Service (SUS or SSSG) reiterated standard Kremlin information operations targeting former Georgian opposition figures and former Ukrainian law enforcement officials.

• An assassination attempt injured a reported senior Russian military intelligence officer in Moscow City on July 24.

• Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Kharkiv City and near Avdiivka and Donetsk City.

• Russian officials continue efforts to entice Russians into military service with monetary incentives.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces blunted one of the largest Russian mechanized assaults in Ukraine since October 2023 in western Donetsk Oblast on July 24. Geolocated footage published on July 24 shows that Ukrainian forces stopped a reinforced battalion size Russian mechanized assault near Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City) after Russian forces advanced up to the southeastern outskirts of the settlement. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction reported that Russian forces attacked simultaneously with 11 tanks, 45 armored combat vehicles, a rare "Terminator" armored fighting vehicle (of which Russia has reportedly manufactured only 23 as of December 2023), 12 motorcycles, and roughly 200 personnel from several tactical directions at dawn on July 24. The brigade reported that Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance identified the mechanized columns from a distance and that Ukrainian forces used artillery, drones, and minefields to blunt the Russian assault. The brigade reported that Ukrainian forces damaged or destroyed six Russian tanks, seven armored combat vehicles, and all 12 motorcycles and that Russian forces retreated after Ukrainian forces destroyed the first wave of vehicles. ISW last observed Russian forces conduct a battalion-sized mechanized attack in Donetsk Oblast in March 2024. Russian forces have not conducted larger mechanized assaults in Ukraine since the first days of Russia's four-month long operation to seize Avdiivka in October 2023. Russian forces likely intended to advance further into Kostyantynivka as part of their efforts to seize the settlement and cut the Vuhledar-Kostyantynivka T-0524 highway. Russian sources have long identified interdicting the T-0524 highway and disrupting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Vuhledar as a primary tactical objective in this direction. Russian milblogger recently suggested that Russian forces would intensify operations south of Kostyantynivka in support of this objective and force Ukrainian forces to retreat from positions in and around Vuhledar. Russian forces likely will not make operationally significant advances in this area of the frontline in the near term even if they achieve tactically significant advances and prompt Ukrainian forces to retreat from nearby positions, as the surrounding area has no operationally significant objectives and is largely comprised of fields and isolated, small settlements and no significant nearby tactical heights.

The Russian military command's willingness to expend a large number of armored vehicles on limited tactical objectives reflects poor longer-term operational foresight, and constraints on Russian equipment in the medium- to long-term will make such failed mechanized assaults costlier with time. The Russian military has extensively relied on refurbishing stocks of Soviet-era weapons and military equipment, particularly armored vehicles, to sustain the tempo of its offensive operations in Ukraine. The Russian government will likely have to further mobilize the Russian economy and defense industry if the Russian military intends to sustain its current tempo of operations in the medium- to long-term as Russia depletes its finite Soviet stockpiles, but it is unclear if the Russian defense industry will be able to produce enough vehicles to sustain a high level of equipment losses even with further economic mobilization. Ukraine-based open-source organization Frontelligence Insight stated on July 25 that it observed Russian forces moving hundreds of pieces of equipment, primarily restored old, armored vehicles such as T-62 and T-55 tanks, to the front in June and early July 2024. Frontelligence Insight noted that these restored vehicles have yet to appear on the battlefield and assessed that Russia may be preparing to use them in later 2024. Frontelligence Insight reported that internal Russia documents show that Russian tanks damaged within the past six months (since about January 2024) are widely waiting for replacement parts and that widespread engine shortages have led to the increasing cannibalization of more modern T-80 tanks to conduct repairs. Russia currently has enough armored vehicles to conduct periodic company-sized and larger mechanized assaults throughout the frontline for the foreseeable future, however. The Russian military command's continued willingness to suffer high armored vehicle losses for minor tactical gains instead of conserving armored vehicles for operations that pursue operationally significant objectives will impose increasingly significant costs on Russian forces as the Russian military's equipment constraints worsen over the coming years. The Russian military may be attempting to restore maneuver to the battlefield and pursue rapid gains through mechanized maneuver, although continued large scale frontal mechanized assaults indicate that the Russian military command has not fully internalized lessons about the difficulties of mechanized maneuver in the nearly transparent battlespace in Ukraine.

Syrian President Bashar al Assad met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on July 24. Assad and Putin discussed escalating tensions in the Middle East, including in Syria. The leaders also discussed improving bilateral economic relations. Assad last met with Putin in Russia in March 2023 during which they reached over 40 agreements on promoting economic cooperation. It remains unclear if Syria and Russia have advanced the 2023 agreements since then.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces blunted one of the largest Russian mechanized assaults in Ukraine since October 2023 in western Donetsk Oblast on July 24.

• The Russian military command's willingness to expend a large number of armored vehicles on limited tactical objectives reflects poor longer-term operational foresight, and constraints on Russian equipment in the medium- to long-term will make such failed mechanized assaults costlier with time.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) indicated that Lieutenant General Sergey Kobylash has become Deputy Commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS).

• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov attempted to frame Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate, while demonstrating the Kremlin's own unwillingness to engage in good faith negotiations by reinvigorating Russian information operations falsely portraying Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as an "illegitimate" leader of Ukraine.

• The Kremlin continues to strengthen its ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states.

• The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and National Police announced that they neutralized a group connected to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) that had been preparing to commit arson against civilian objects in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe.

• Select Russian officials continue to call for measures targeting diaspora groups while the Russian government continues efforts to extend its control over migrants in Russia.

• Syrian President Bashar al Assad met with Russian President Vladmir Putin in Moscow on July 24.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Robotyne, and Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Kharkiv City and near Toretsk, Donetsk City, and Robotyne.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on July 24 granting deferments from military conscription to employees of the Russian Prosecutor General's Office and Investigative Committee who have higher education and special ranks starting in September 2024.

Institute for the Study of War

The Russian military has recently expanded the Russian Central Grouping of Forces' area of responsibility (AOR) in Donetsk Oblast, suggesting that the Russian military command has deprioritized the grouping's previous task to act solely as an operational maneuver force in the Avdiivka direction. The Russian military command may instead be tasking the Central Grouping of Forces with overseeing the bulk of Russia's main offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces transferred the Central Grouping of Forces from the Kreminna area to the Avdiivka direction ahead of the Russian offensive operation to seize Avdiivka from October 2023 to February 2024 and proceeded to concentrate almost all Central Military District (CMD) elements deployed to Ukraine in the area during the offensive operation. The Russian military command established the Central Grouping of Forces as an operational maneuver force along a narrow front in the Avdiivka area following the seizure of Avdiivka in February 2024 and tasked CMD elements with exploiting Russian tactical advances and pushing as far west as possible before Ukrainian forces established more cohesive and harder-to-penetrate defensive lines in the area. The Russian Central Grouping of Forces made a notable tactical breakthrough northwest of Avdiivka in mid-April 2024 and achieved significant tactical gains in the area, largely due to Ukrainian materiel constraints caused by delays in Western security assistance. Ukrainian forces have since stabilized the front in the area and slowed the rate of Russian advance, and the Russian Central Grouping of Forces is now advancing at a relatively similar pace as Russian forces elsewhere in Ukraine.

The expansion of the Central Grouping of Forces' AOR indicates that the Russian military command may assess that rapid tactical gains in the Avdiivka area are unlikely. Whether this possible assessment is based on waning Ukrainian materiel and manpower constraints or specifically based on an assessment of the Central Grouping of Forces' failure to achieve its assigned tasks is unclear. An AOR that stretches from southwest of Donetsk City to Toretsk will draw available Russian manpower and materiel away from the existing effort to make tactically significant advances northwest and west of Avdiivka. The Central Grouping of Forces likely lacks the reserves necessary to intensify operations in the Avdiivka area to the degree that would facilitate relatively rapid gains while maintaining offensive pressure in the Toretsk and Donetsk City directions. The Russian military command is currently attempting to maintain consistent offensive pressure throughout the front to prevent Ukraine from contesting the battlefield initiative, and tasking the Central Grouping of Forces with grinding offensive operations along a longer front is more in line with this effort than tasking the grouping with achieving tactically significant gains through relatively rapid maneuver.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian military has recently expanded the Russian Central Grouping of Forces' area of responsibility (AOR) in Donetsk Oblast, suggesting that the Russian military command has deprioritized the grouping's previous task to act solely as an operational maneuver force in the Avdiivka direction. The Russian military command may instead be tasking the Central Grouping of Forces with overseeing the bulk of Russia's main offensive efforts in Donetsk Oblast.

• The expansion of the Central Grouping of Forces' AOR indicates that the Russian military command may assess that rapid tactical gains in the Avdiivka area are unlikely.

• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted an ATACMS strike against Saky Airbase in occupied Crimea on the night of July 25 to 26.

• The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested former Russian Deputy Defense Minister Army General Dmitri Bulgakov on corruption charges on July 26 – the latest in a concerted Kremlin effort to remove senior Russian defense officials since April 2024.

• The European Union (EU) transferred the first tranche of proceeds from frozen Russian assets to Ukraine.

• The Kremlin continues intensifying efforts to control Russians' internet activities and to create a culture of self-censorship within Russia.

• Russian security forces reportedly detained several unknown actors threatening to blow up an apartment building in the Republic of Dagestan on July 25.

• Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Svatove, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.

• The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) reported on July 22 that the Russian intelligence services appear to have further integrated Russian forces' cyber and conventional capabilities.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful drone strikes against an oil refinery and Russian military airfields in Saratov, Ryazan, and Murmansk oblasts on the night of July 26 to 27. Sources with Ukrainian special services told Ukrainian media that Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) struck Russian military airfields in Engles, Saratov Oblast; the Dyaghilev Airfield and an oil refinery in Ryazan Oblast; and the Olenya Airfield in Murmansk Oblast with drones. Suspilne's sources reported that Russian forces base an unspecified number of Tu-95, Tu-22, Tu-134, and Il-78 (tanker) aircraft at the Dyaghilev Airfield and that the GUR drones damaged a TU-22M3 strategic bomber at the Olenya Airfield. Russian officials, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian air defenses destroyed an unspecified number of drones over Saratov and Ryazan oblasts, although Russian sources published footage of Ukrainian drones operating over Ryazan City. Additional sources told Suspilne that GUR "sabotage activities" damaged an Mi-28 and a Ka-226 helicopter at an aircraft construction enterprise in Moscow Oblast on July 21 and destroyed another Mi-8 helicopter at the Kryazh Airfield in Samara Oblast on July 24. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated during an interview with UK outlet The Guardian published on July 24 that Ukrainian drones had targeted around 200 critical infrastructure sites connected to military logistics in rear areas of Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted successful drone strikes against an oil refinery and Russian military airfields in Saratov, Ryazan, and Murmansk oblasts on the night of July 26 to 27.

• Russia continues to deepen bilateral relations with Iran and North Korea in exchange for the provision of lethal aid to the Russian military for use in Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained positions near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced west and southwest of Donetsk City, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Vovchansk.

• The Russian government continues efforts to use the "Time of Heroes" program to integrate Russian veterans into society.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to use nuclear saber-rattling to target Western decision-making and promote Western self-deterrence. Putin spoke at the Main Naval Parade in St. Petersburg on July 28 and claimed that if the US deploys long-range missile systems in Germany in 2026, the flight time to Russian industrial and defense targets will be about 10 minutes. Putin also commented on US deployments of Typhon Mid-Range Capability (MRC) missile systems to Denmark and the Philippines for joint exercises. Putin threatened that if the US implements plans to deploy missile systems to these countries, Russia will no longer be bound by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and will take "mirror measures" to deploy unspecified systems that are currently in the final stages of development to unspecified locations. Putin claimed that Russian strategic missile carriers stopped conducting air patrols after the end of the Cold War but resumed these flights in 2007 in response to increased US strategic and reconnaissance aviation activity in areas of the world that are "sensitive to Russia" and in order to "ensure security in the Asia-Pacific region." The US and Germany announced in June 2024 that the US will begin "episodic deployments" of long-range fire capabilities, including Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) and Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles, in Germany starting in 2026 in order to demonstrate US commitment to NATO. The US Army Pacific stated in April 2024 that it deployed the MRC missile system that can fire SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles to the Philippines as part of exercises, and the US Navy announced in May 2024 that it conducted containerized missile launcher rehearsals with the Danish military on Bornholm Island, Denmark. The current location of the MRC systems is unclear, but the US has not announced that it is deploying the systems to Denmark and the Philippines for purposes beyond the previous exercises. Putin officially suspended Russia's participation in the INF Treaty that banned ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, in March 2019, but Russia has already permanently deployed nuclear capable Iskander-M ballistic missiles, with a reported range of up to 500 kilometers, in Kaliningrad Oblast since 2018. Putin is falsely trying to present the Russian deployment of missiles previously banned under the INF Treaty as an inflection, likely as part of his repeated efforts to use nuclear saber-rattling to push the West to self-deter.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to use nuclear saber-rattling to target Western decision-making and promote Western self-deterrence.

• Russia used Navy Day celebrations to showcase Russia's relations with a number of non-Western states as part of efforts to create a supposed Russian-led group of states to rally against the West.

• Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian oil depot in Polevaya, Kursk Oblast on the night of July 27 to 28.

• A rebel coalition in Mali reportedly killed and wounded dozens of Russian servicemen and Wagner Group mercenaries as well as a prominent Wagner-affiliated milblogger on the Mali-Algeria border on July 27.

• Primorsky Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako recently announced the creation of an independent volunteer unit to police migrants as the Russian government continues efforts to expand its control over migrants in Russia.

• Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Avdiivka, west of Donetsk City, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in the Siversk direction.

• Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets assessed that the Russian military may need to accumulate up to 320,000 additional personnel in Ukraine in order to achieve its reported plans to deploy 690,000 troops in Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on July 29 the provision of security assistance to Ukraine worth $200 million from the authorization of a Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) package and an additional package worth $1.5 billion in Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) funds. The DoD stated that the PDA package will include air defense interceptors, munitions for rocket and artillery systems, and anti-tank weapons. The DoD reported that the USAI package includes munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), short- and medium-range air defense munitions, RIM-7 air defense missiles, ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles, Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems, 155mm and 105mm shells, 120mm mortar rounds, and other munitions and equipment. The DoD noted that this is the Biden administration's 20th USAI package and 62nd tranche of equipment provided to Ukraine since August 2021.

Key Takeaways:

• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on July 29 the provision of security assistance to Ukraine worth $200 million from the authorization of a Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) package and an additional package worth $1.5 billion in Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) funds.

• The Kremlin is intensifying its efforts to codify desired behavioral norms within Russia by cracking down against undesirable behavior in the Russian information space and within migrant communities.

• The Kremlin is likely attempting to establish prominent standards of acceptable and unacceptable behavior among populations within Russia whose behavior has recently threatened the Kremlin.

• Much of the Russian information space response to the recent Tuareg insurgent ambush of a Wagner Group in northern Mali coalesced around the suggestion that the Russian MoD will seek to benefit from Wagner losses, highlighting the continued distrust between the Russian MoD and both the Wagner Group in the Sahel and pro-Wagner commentators.

• Ukrainian drones struck Russian energy and utility infrastructure in Oryol, Voronezh, and Belgorod oblasts on the night of July 28 to 29.

• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances northeast of Kharkiv City, in Vovchansk, near Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City.

• The Russian government continues to take legislative steps to use migrants and newly naturalized citizens to fulfill Russian military personnel needs.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces conducted five platoon- to battalion-sized mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast on July 29 and 30. Such localized mechanized pushes are likely the manifestation of Russia's forecasted summer offensive—Russian forces likely lack the wider operational capacity to mount a separate renewed offensive operation in Donetsk Oblast or elsewhere on the front this summer. Geolocated footage published on July 29 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced on the southwestern outskirts of Kostyantynivka (southwest of Donetsk City) during a reinforced-battalion sized mechanized assault. The same Ukrainian brigade that repelled the July 24 reinforced-battalion sized mechanized assault near Kostyantynivka reported that Russian forces committed 10 tanks, 47 armored fighting vehicles, 10 motorcycles, and a "buggy" to the July 29 assault and that Ukrainian forces struck eight tanks, 12 armored fighting vehicles, nine motorcycles, and the buggy. Additional geolocated footage and Ukrainian reporting indicate that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful reduced-company sized mechanized assault southwest of Pobieda (southwest of Donetsk City) on the morning of July 29 and that Russian forces marginally advanced southwest of the settlement during a separate reinforced-platoon sized mechanized assault on July 30. Ukrainian sources published footage and reported on July 29 that Russian forces also conducted an unsuccessful reinforced-company sized mechanized assault in an unspecified area of the Kurakhove direction (west of Marinka) and an unsuccessful reinforced-platoon sized mechanized assault near Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City). Ukrainian forces previously blunted a reinforced-battalion sized Russian mechanized assault near Kostyantynivka on July 24 and a reinforced-company sized assault near the settlement on July 25. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are likely attempting to seize Kostyantynivka and cut the Vuhledar-Kostyantynivka T-0524 highway, forcing Ukrainians to retreat from the area.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted five platoon- to battalion-sized mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast on July 29 and 30. Such localized mechanized pushes are likely the manifestation of Russia's forecasted summer offensive—Russian forces likely lack the wider operational capacity to mount a separate renewed offensive operation in Donetsk Oblast or elsewhere on the front this summer.

• The Russian military command's willingness to accept costly armored vehicle losses without conducting a large-scale, multi-directional offensive operation or making operationally significant advances in western Donetsk Oblast will likely burden the Russian military in the long-term. The ongoing Russian offensive operations are also costly for Ukrainian defenders and are likely meant to degrade Ukrainian capabilities through attrition whether or not they gain much ground.

• North Korea may be expanding the volume and variety of weapons it is providing to Russia.

• The Kremlin is likely attempting to corral Russian information space actors onto social media sites that the Kremlin can more directly influence to directly control their rhetoric, prompting some backlash from Russian ultranationalist milbloggers and opposition journalists.

• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot in Vozy, Kursk Oblast on the night of July 29 to 30.

• The Russian government continues to support educational programs on "information and hybrid warfare" aimed at training Russians to conduct and counter information operations, use open-source research methodology, and to effectively analyze and counter hybrid threats for the Kremlin.

• Russian officials and Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) representatives are advocating for the Kremlin to codify a state ideology premised on the idea that the sovereign Ukrainian state should not exist, into Russian federal law.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar and southwest of Donetsk City.

• Authorities in St. Petersburg have joined other Russian regional authorities in increasing financial incentives for recruits to sign military service contracts.

• UK newspaper The Times published a story on July 29 detailing how Russian authorities are indoctrinating deported Ukrainian children through military-patriotic education programs.

Institute for the Study of War

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Israel conducted an airstrike killing Hamas Political Bureau Chairperson Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Iran to derail attempts to establish peace in the Middle East. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) also responded to Haniyeh's death, stating that it "strongly condemned" Haniyeh's assassination and emphasized that Haniyeh's assassination occurred during his visit to Tehran for Masoud Pezeshkian's presidential inauguration. The Russian MFA did not explicitly implicate Israel but claimed that the "organizers of this political assassination" were aware of the "dangerous consequences" Haniyeh's death would have on the entire region. Russia's decision to publicly blame Israel for destabilizing peace prospects in the Middle East and indirectly threaten Israel with "dangerous consequences" demonstrates Russia's increasing willingness to publicly align with Iran amid deepening Russian-Iranian military cooperation. Russian President Vladimir Putin has increasingly expressed anti-Israel positions since the start of the Israel–Hamas war in October 2023 and notably amplified information operations designed to justify Iranian aggression against Israel, including the April 13 large-scale missile and drone strikes against Israel.

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Israel conducted an airstrike killing Hamas Political Bureau Chairperson Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Iran to derail attempts to establish peace in the Middle East.

• The Russian State Duma revised some aspects of a recent bill criminalizing Russian soldiers' use of personal devices on the battlefield following outcry in the Russian ultranationalist community.

• Russian officials may be taking steps to address domestic security issues following the March 2024 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack and June 2024 shootings in the Republic of Dagestan.

• Ukrainian forces struck a weapons and equipment warehouse in Kursk City on the night of July 30 to 31.

• Russian border guards withdrew from Armenia’s main international airport.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Svatove, Chasiv Yar, Torestsk, and Donetsk City and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on July 31 increasing financial incentives for signing a Russian military service contract, likely to support ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian forces continue to make slow, steady advances in the Pokrovsk direction (west of Avdiivka), largely enabled by Ukrainian manpower shortages and the terrain in the area immediately northwest of Avdiivka. Russian advances will likely slow further as Russian forces advance into a line of larger and more urban settlements. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky identified the Pokrovsk direction as the Russian military's current priority on August 1 and noted that Russian forces are currently able to advance in certain areas of the front because Ukraine is still struggling with manpower shortages and challenges in properly staffing and equipping new brigades. Zelensky observed that some Ukrainian brigades are unable to conduct rotations because their replacement brigades are not yet staffed or equipped, which creates exploitable weaknesses that Russian forces can attack. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted that Ukrainian defenders in the Pokrovsk direction have inferior equipment and defensive means and are therefore currently unable to slow Russian advances. Delays in the provision of Western and especially US military assistance have contributed to delays in equipping newly raised Ukrainian units and re-equipping those that have been fighting.

Russian forces appear to be exploiting such weakness to make gradual tactical gains northwest of Avdiivka, where ISW recently assessed that Russian forces are attempting to achieve a limited tactical encirclement of Ukrainian forces east of the T0511 (O0544) Ocheretyne-Hrodivka-Myrnohrad highway, particularly on the left bank of the Vovcha River. Geolocated footage published on August 1 shows that Russian forces have advanced further within Vesele towards the T0511 road, placing the current furthest confirmed Russian advance about 3.5 kilometers from the outskirts of Hrodivka. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attacking south of Vesele along the railway line and windbreaks towards Serhiivka and Zhelanne (just south of Vesele), which could further efforts to tactically encircle Ukrainian forces in this area if Russian forces properly exploit it. Ukrainian and Russian sources also reported that Russian forces seized Tymofiivka (north of the O0544 road and the Vesele area). Mashovets characterized recent Russian advances in the area southeast of the O0544 road as a tactical penetration of Ukrainian lines and stated that Russian forces have advanced 6.5 kilometers deep and 7.5 kilometers wide from Sokil to Serhiivka, crossing both the Vovcha and Kazennyi Torets rivers (running through Prohres-Vovche and Lozuvatske, respectively) in recent weeks. Mashovets warned that Russian forces are close to achieving an operationally significant breakthrough in the Pokrovsk direction by the end of August.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian Joint Forces and Khortytsia Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Andriy Hnatov stressed that Russia is pursuing an effort to force Ukraine to commit its available manpower to ongoing defensive operations in order to prevent the accumulation of Ukrainian resources for future counteroffensive operations. Hnatov stated in an interview with Ukrainian outlet Glavcom published on August 2 that the Russian military command launched the offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast in early May 2024 because it was concerned that Ukraine's recent efforts to strengthen its force generation apparatus would allow Ukrainian forces to leverage newly generated manpower to stabilize the frontline and conduct counteroffensive operations. Hnatov stated that Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast aimed to prevent Ukraine from building out reserves and addressing personnel shortages in already committed combat brigades by drawing Ukrainian forces to Kharkiv Oblast from elsewhere along the front, complicating rotations, and forcing Ukraine to commit newly generated forces to defensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast instead of offensive or defensive operations elsewhere in the theater. Hnatov stated that Russia continues efforts to prevent Ukraine from accumulating the manpower necessary to conduct counteroffensive operations, consistent with ISW's assessment that ongoing Russian offensive operations throughout eastern and northeastern Ukraine aim to degrade Ukraine's ability to accumulate the manpower and materiel Ukraine requires to contest the battlefield initiative. The Russian military command likely views retaining the theater-wide initiative as a strategic imperative and will continue efforts to sustain Russia's current offensive tempo in Ukraine in order to constrain Ukraine's ability to seize the initiative on select sectors of the frontline.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian Joint Forces and Khortytsia Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Andriy Hnatov stressed that Russia is pursuing an effort to force Ukraine to commit its available manpower to ongoing defensive operations in order to prevent the accumulation of Ukrainian resources for future counteroffensive operations.

• Russian Airborne (VDV) and "Dnepr" Group of Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky addressed VDV forces in an article and recorded video on the 94th anniversary of the VDV's formation on August 2, attempting to highlight the VDV's performance in Ukraine as an elite professional force despite the fact that VDV elements are fighting essentially as understrength motorized rifle units in Ukraine.

• Russian authorities arrested the former deputy rear commander of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army , Moscow Military District ) Colonel Dmitry Peshkov on August 2.

• The Russian Federation Council passed an updated version of an amendment that will allow commanders to punish subordinates for "gross disciplinary offenses," including the use of personal electronic devices, in frontline areas following significant backlash from Russian milbloggers.

• The Russian Federation Council also passed a series of bills strengthening the Russian government's control over the Russian information space and further restricting the rights of migrants in Russia.

• The pro-Kremlin Moldovan Victory opposition electoral bloc announced its candidate for the October 2024 Moldovan presidential election on August 2.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.

• A Russian government official weighed in on ongoing milblogger criticism of Russia's drone production industry.

• A delegation of Kremlin officials visited occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts on August 2 to highlight Russian efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into the Russian Federation.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck four Russian S-400 air defense missile launchers, an S-500 air defense system, and the Russian Black Sea Fleet's (BSF) Rostov-on-Don Kilo-class submarine in occupied Crimea on August 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 3 that the strikes significantly damaged four Russian S-400 missile launchers in unspecified areas in occupied Crimea. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated on August 3 that Ukrainian forces successfully destroyed a Russian S-400 and S-500 air defense system that the Russian military had deployed to protect the Kerch Strait Bridge. ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of Ukrainian forces striking Russian air defense systems in occupied Crimea on August 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ukrainian strike sank the Rostov-on-Don at the Sevastopol port. Ukrainian forces previously struck and significantly damaged the submarine at the Sevastopol port in September 2023, after which it underwent repairs at the port. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian MGM-140 ATACMS strike against occupied Sevastopol on August 2. Satellite imagery captured on August 2 shows some damage to a structure purportedly protecting the Rostov-on-Don in the Sevastopol port, but ISW cannot yet independently verify reports that the Ukrainian strike destroyed the submarine.

Ukrainian forces also conducted a series of successful drone strikes against likely military targets in Rostov, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts on August 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) and Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) struck the Morozovsk Airfield and nearby ammunition and glide bomb storage facilities with an unspecified number of drones and that Ukrainian forces are conducting a battle damage assessment. Footage published on August 3 shows secondary explosions near the Morozovsk Airfield consistent with strikes against an ammunition depot, and Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched roughly 55 drones at targets in Rostov Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the SBU and GUR also targeted a number of oil depots and fuel and lubricant storage facilities in Rostov, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that sources within Ukrainian special services stated that the GUR struck the Atlas oil refinery in Rostov Oblast with 15 drones and that Russian forces were using the Atlas oil refinery to fuel military equipment in occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov claimed that Ukrainian drones also struck the Gubkinsky oil depot in Belgorod Oblast, which reportedly supplies motor fuels to the Russian military. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed 75 drones over Russia and the Sea of Azov on the night of August 2 to 3.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck four Russian S-400 air defense missile launchers, an S-500 air defense system, and the Russian Black Sea Fleet's (BSF) Rostov-on-Don Kilo-class submarine in occupied Crimea on August 2.

• Ukrainian forces also conducted a series of successful drone strikes against likely military targets in Rostov, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts on August 3.

• The Kremlin reportedly planned to transfer unspecified missiles and other military equipment to the Houthis in Yemen but did not transfer the materiel following diplomatic pressure. Russia's reported plan highlights its growing military partnership with Iran and suggests that Russia likely aims to leverage Iranian proxies to indirectly confront the West and shape Western decision making.

• Putin's willingness to consider supporting the Houthis as they attack Israel and international shipping is part of deepening Russian-Iranian military cooperation and Russia's increasing reliance on Iran for high-precision weapons and components.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Siversk, and Chasiv Yar.

• Russian authorities continue efforts to financially incentivize Russian military service in Ukraine.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against an oil depot in Rostov Oblast and missile strikes against fuel storage warehouses in occupied Luhansk City on August 4. Russian opposition outlet Astra published footage and reported on August 4 that Ukrainian drones struck an oil depot in Azov, Rostov Oblast. Rostov Oblast Governor Vasily Golubev announced on August 4 that fire fighters were extinguishing a large fire at a warehouse in Azov, but specifically noted that Russian authorities would establish the cause after extinguishing the fire. Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on August 4 that Ukrainian forces launched eight ATACMS missiles and four Storm Shadow missiles at Luhansk City. Pasechnik claimed that Russian air defense shot down four missiles, that some missiles struck warehouses containing fuel storage, and that some falling missile debris caused dry grass to catch fire. Footage published on August 4 purportedly shows two smoke plumes over Luhansk City. Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor reported fires at the Luhansk machine-building plant in Luhansk City, where Russian forces reportedly repair and store military equipment. ISW cannot confirm what type of missiles Ukrainian forces used in the Luhansk City strike at this time.

Ukraine confirmed that it has received the first batch of US-made F-16 fighter jets. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on August 4 that Ukraine received an unspecified number of F-16s from unspecified Western countries and specifically thanked Denmark, the Netherlands, and the US. The Economist reported on August 4 that Ukraine has so far received 10 of the promised 79 jets and that Ukrainian forces should be able to fly 20 F-16s by the end of 2024. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine will need a substantial number of F-16 jets in order to field them at the scale necessary for Ukraine to succeed in integrating fixed wing aircraft into its wider air defense umbrella. Ukraine will also notably need to continue efforts to target Russian air defense assets within the Russian rear and in occupied Ukraine with Western-provided long-range weapons to enable its use of F-16 jets.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted drone strikes against an oil depot in Rostov Oblast and missile strikes against fuel storage warehouses in occupied Luhansk City on August 4.

• Ukraine confirmed that it has received the first batch of US-made F-16 fighter jets.

• Russian milbloggers responded to the arrival of F-16s by trying to downplay their potential battlefield effects—directly undermining Russian information operations intended to frame the delivery of F-16s and other Western weapons systems as an uncrossable "red line."

• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances east of Pokrovsk, west of Donetsk City, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.

• The Russian defense industry reportedly continues to produce missiles using Western-sourced components.

Institute for the Study of War

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of cross border raids into Kursk Oblast on August 6. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed on August 6 that Russian border troops and FSB personnel repelled several raids by Ukrainian forces equipped with roughly a battalion's worth of tanks and armored vehicles against Russian positions near Nikolayevo-Darino and Oleshnya, Kursk Oblast (northwest of Sumy City and along the Russia-Ukraine international border). Geolocated footage published on August 6 shows damaged and abandoned armored vehicles roughly seven kilometers north of the international border west of Lyubimovka, Kursk Oblast; Russian sources claimed that the footage shows Ukrainian vehicles, but ISW cannot confirm whether these armored vehicles are Russian, Ukrainian, or both. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked from two directions: from the Sudzha checkpoint (on the border northeast of Sumy City along the H-07/R-200 highways) in the direction of Sudzha and Oleshnya; and from Novehke, Sumy Oblast (northeast of the Sudzha checkpoint and Sumy City) towards Nikolayevo-Darino, Kursk Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian reserve forces also responded to the supposed Ukrainian raids, and a Russian insider source claimed that elements of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz also responded to the raids, but ISW cannot verify these claims. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces destroyed 16 Ukrainian armored vehicles during the supposed raids and that Russian forces conducted retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast. Russian milbloggers posted footage claiming to show the aftermath of the supposed Ukrainian raids, although most of the damage shown in the footage appears to be the result of routine Ukrainian shelling and does not indicate that there was ground activity in the area. Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov and several Russian milbloggers warned that fighting is ongoing in the border areas of Kursk Oblast's Sudzhansky and Korenevsky raions, contrary to the Russian MoD's and FSB's reporting.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of cross border raids into Kursk Oblast on August 6.

• Russian milbloggers largely dismissed the supposed Ukrainian raids into Kursk Oblast, and Ukrainian officials have largely yet to comment on the raids.

• Russian Security Council Secretary and former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu heavily overexaggerated Russian advances in Ukraine since mid-June 2024.

• Russian officials continue coordination and military cooperation with Iran ahead of the Iranian retaliatory strike against Israel out of concern for Russian interests in the region. NOTE: a version of this text appears in ISW-CTP's August 6 Iran Update.

• Armenia continues to abstain from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

• Russian forces advanced east of Toretsk.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly issued a formal reply denying a request from the wives of the mobilized Russian personnel to meet with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov.

Institute for the Study of War

Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advances up to 10 kilometers into Russia's Kursk Oblast amid continued mechanized offensive operations on Russian territory on August 7. Geolocated footage published on August 6 and 7 shows that Ukrainian armored vehicles have advanced to positions along the 38K-030 route about 10 kilometers from the international border. The current confirmed extent and location of Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast indicate that Ukrainian forces have penetrated at least two Russian defensive lines and a stronghold. A Russian insider source claimed that Ukrainian forces have seized 45 square kilometers of territory within Kursk Oblast since they launched the operation on August 6, and other Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces have captured 11 total settlements, including Nikolaevo-Daryino (1.5 kilometers north of the Sumy Oblast border), Darino (three kilometers north of the Sumy Oblast border), and Sverdlikovo (east of the Nikolaevo-Darino-Darino area), and are operating within Lyubimovka (eight kilometers north of the Sumy Oblast border). Russian sources indicated that Ukrainian forces are trying to advance along the 38K-030 Sudzha-Korenovo highway, and a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that by 1800 local time on August 7 Ukrainian forces had advanced both northwest and southeast along the highway and are now fighting on the outskirts of Korenovo (in the northwest direction) and Sudzha (in the southeast direction). The Russian insider source and several other Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces fought for and seized the Sudzha checkpoint and the Sudzha gas distribution station (southwest of Sudzha along the 38K-004 highway, 500 meters from the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border). Geolocated imagery posted on August 7 shows that Ukrainian forces captured over 40 Russian prisoners of war (POWs) at the Sudzha checkpoint, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Russia service posted satellite imagery that shows heavy damage to buildings at the Sudzha checkpoint. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 7 that an unspecified unit of the Chechyna-based 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (58th Combined Arms Army , Southern Military District ) has deployed directly to the Sudzhenskyi Raion—generally consistent with some reports from Ukrainian and Russian sources that social media footage shows Chechen "Akhmat" units in the Sudzha area since over a week ago. Chechen units reportedly suffered very heavy losses in Ukrainian attacks in the Korenovo Raion on August 7.

The Kremlin's response to Ukrainian offensive activities in Kursk Oblast has so far been contradictory, as Russian officials are attempting to balance presenting the effort as a notable Ukrainian escalation with avoiding overstating its potential implications and risking domestic discontent. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with members of the Russian government on August 7, accusing Ukrainian forces of a "large-scale provocation" in Kursk Oblast and instructing First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov and regional authorities to coordinate assistance in Kursk Oblast. Putin also met with Defense Minister Andrey Belousov, Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Alexander Bortnikov, and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov on August 7 about the Kursk Oblast attack. Gerasimov portrayed the situation as largely under control, however, claiming that Ukrainian forces attacked with about 1,000 personnel and that Russian FSB and the Northern Grouping of Forces have stopped Ukraine's advance and inflicted significant casualties. Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces will complete their operation when they have defeated Ukrainian forces and reached the Kursk Oblast-Ukraine border. Other Russian officials doubled down on these contradictory points, often seeking to strike a balance between the alarmism of a Ukrainian mechanized assault and penetration into Russian territory and the status quo reassurances that the Kremlin "has the situation under control." The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) notably edited a post on August 6 to remove claims that the attacking Ukrainian forces were just a sabotage and reconnaissance group and that the Ukrainian forces retreated, likely to avoid backlash from making demonstrably false claims about the scale and tactics of the ongoing Ukrainian penetration. Kursk Oblast Acting Head Alexey Smirnov claimed that the situation is "under personal control" and stated that several thousand Kursk Oblast civilians have already evacuated the area. Manturov instructed the Russian Ministry of Finance to allocate a first tranche of 1.8 billion rubles (about $20.9 million) to assist Kursk Oblast residents in resettling. Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin announced that the Investigative Committee has opened an investigation into the Ukrainian "provocation." The Kremlin likely seeks to balance its messaging against two contradictory objectives to both discredit Ukraine internationally for conducting this attack into Russian territory and avoid inciting domestic panic about the scale, impacts, and potential outcomes of the Ukrainian operation. The Kremlin risks, however, discrediting itself among certain communities by seemingly dismissing the significance of the attack by framing it only as a "provocation."

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advances up to 10 kilometers into Russia's Kursk Oblast amid continued mechanized offensive operations on Russian territory on August 7.

• The Kremlin's response to Ukrainian offensive activities in Kursk Oblast has so far been contradictory, as Russian officials are attempting to balance presenting the effort as a notable Ukrainian escalation with avoiding overstating its potential implications and risking domestic discontent.

• Select Russian milbloggers heavily criticized the Russian military command for not detecting preparations for or preventing Ukrainian offensive operations into Kursk Oblast.

• Ukrainian forces reportedly used a first-person view (FPV) drone to down a Russian Mi-28 helicopter over Kursk Oblast, indicating that Ukrainian forces continue to successfully adapt their drone capabilities.

• Select Russian milbloggers heavily criticized the Russian military command for not detecting preparations for or preventing Ukrainian offensive operations into Kursk Oblast.

• Ukrainian forces reportedly used a first-person view (FPV) drone to down a Russian Mi-28 helicopter over Kursk Oblast, indicating that Ukrainian forces continue to successfully adapt their drone capabilities.

• Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov assessed on August 7 that Russian offensive potential will culminate within one and a half to two months, generally consistent with ISW's assessment on current Russia's offensive capabilities.

• Head of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), Danielle Bell, stated that Russia has tortured 95 percent of Ukrainian prisoners-of-war (POWs) in Russian detention.

• The Moldovan Central Electoral Commission (CEC) announced on August 7 that it would not register the pro-Kremlin Victory electoral bloc in the October 2024 Moldovan presidential election and referendum.

• A Russian court sentenced Andrey Kurshin, administrator of the "Moscow Calling" Russian ultranationalist milblogger Telegram channel, to six and a half years in prison on August 7 for publishing "fake" information about the Russian military.

• Ukrainian forces recently regained positions south of Chasiv Yar, and Russian forces advanced northeast of Siversk, southwest of Donetsk City, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.

• Russian Army Combat Reserve (BARS) units continue recruitment efforts.

Institute for the Study of War

>Ukrainian forces have made confirmed advances up to 10
>kilometers into Russia's Kursk Oblast amid continued
>mechanized offensive operations on Russian territory on August
>7. Geolocated footage published on August 6 and 7 shows that
>Ukrainian armored vehicles have advanced to positions along
>the 38K-030 route about 10 kilometers from the international
>border.


Hm. Strategie? Anstatt an befestigte Fronten anzurennen Gegenangriff auf schwach verteidigtes Gebiet das der Kreml aus Prestigegründen verteidigen muß und so die Russen zum Abzug von Kräften aus der Ukraine zwingen? Militärisch wahrscheinlich sinnvoll, aber vermutlich mit erheblichen politischen Kosten.

>
>Hm. Strategie? Anstatt an befestigte Fronten anzurennen
>Gegenangriff auf schwach verteidigtes Gebiet das der Kreml aus
>Prestigegründen verteidigen muß und so die Russen zum Abzug
>von Kräften aus der Ukraine zwingen? Militärisch
>wahrscheinlich sinnvoll, aber vermutlich mit erheblichen
>politischen Kosten.

Welche polit. Kosten würdest du da erwarten?

Die Israelis agieren diesbzgl. deutlich radikaler, siehe tägl. Angriffe im Südlibanon.

>
>>
>>Hm. Strategie? Anstatt an befestigte Fronten anzurennen
>>Gegenangriff auf schwach verteidigtes Gebiet das der Kreml
>aus
>>Prestigegründen verteidigen muß und so die Russen zum
>Abzug
>>von Kräften aus der Ukraine zwingen? Militärisch
>>wahrscheinlich sinnvoll, aber vermutlich mit erheblichen
>>politischen Kosten.
>
>Welche polit. Kosten würdest du da erwarten?


Steilvorlage für die russische Propaganda und deren Mitläufer im Westen.

>>Welche polit. Kosten würdest du da erwarten?
>
>
>Steilvorlage für die russische Propaganda und deren Mitläufer
>im Westen.
>

Verstehe, aber die Propaganda läuft ja auch unabhängig von der Offensive. Und abseits der Propaganda kann man ihnen wirklich nicht übel nehmen, dass sie sich eine Pufferzone schaffen wollen.

Ich finde den Schachzug schlau, und er zeigt, dass abseits der Fronten, die Russen schlecht aufgestellt sind.

Was man auch liest, dass der Vorstoß relativ gut ausgestattet und professionell durchgeführt wird.

Sprich es besteht die Chance damit deutlich mehr Druck (und Material) von der Front zu nehmen, als mit dem Stellungskrieg.

>Verstehe, aber die Propaganda läuft ja auch unabhängig von der
>Offensive. Und abseits der Propaganda kann man ihnen wirklich
>nicht übel nehmen, dass sie sich eine Pufferzone schaffen
>wollen.

Nein,ich meine jetzt können die Russen trommeln wir müssen uns verteidigen, wir sind ihnen 2022 nur zuvorgekommen etc.

>Ich finde den Schachzug schlau, und er zeigt, dass abseits der
>Fronten, die Russen schlecht aufgestellt sind.
>
>Was man auch liest, dass der Vorstoß relativ gut ausgestattet
>und professionell durchgeführt wird.
>
>Sprich es besteht die Chance damit deutlich mehr Druck (und
>Material) von der Front zu nehmen, als mit dem
>Stellungskrieg.


Militärisch schon schon gut, finde ich auch. Jetzt können die Russen mal ihre eigenen Siedlungen zusammenhauen.

Russian sources claimed on August 9 that Ukrainian forces advanced further east in Kursk Oblast but are likely no longer operating as far north or as far west as Russian sources previously claimed on August 8. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 9 that Ukrainian forces conducted another cross-border incursion northeast of Sumy City and advanced towards Kucherov (roughly one kilometer from the international border) but have not entered the settlement. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast advanced as far east as Plekhovo (southeast of Sudzha) on the left bank of the Psyol River. ISW is recessing the claimed limit of Ukrainian advances up to Snagost (south of Korenevo), given that a Russian milblogger claimed on August 8 that Russian forces began clearing the settlement. ISW is also recessing the claimed limit of Ukrainian advances to the northern outskirts of Malaya Loknya (northwest of Sudzha and roughly 13 kilometers from the international border) as Russian milbloggers claimed on August 9 that Russian forces counterattacked near the settlement.

Geolocated footage published on August 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces were recently operating west of Sudzha, within the settlement, north of Sudzha near Kazachya Loknya, and northeast of Leonidovo (northwest of Sudzha and roughly 10 kilometers from the international border) and in Dmitriukov. Russian milbloggers continued to issue contradictory statements about Ukrainian positions in Sudzha (northeast of Sumy City and roughly 10 kilometers from the international border), however. A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are not operating within Sudzha, whereas another source claimed that Ukrainian forces are located in the settlement but cannot operate freely. Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces partially control Sudzha and that the town is a contested "gray zone." Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are also operating northeast of Sudzha near Martynovka; north of Sudzha near Vtoroy Knyazhiy, Ivnitsa, Zaoleshenka, Russkoye Porechnoye (16 kilometers from the international border); and west of Sudzha near Goncharovka. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control the area near Korenevo (north of Sumy City and roughly 23 kilometers north of the international border) and denied reports of fighting on the settlement's outskirts. The Russian milblogger claimed on August 8 that Ukrainian forces control Novoivanovka (southeast of Korenevo) and Lyubimovka (southeast of Korenevo). Another Russian source claimed on August 9, however, that Russian forces regained lost positions in Novoivanovka and Leonidovo. A Russian source claimed that there is no confirmation of Ukrainian forces operating in Kromskiy Byki (30 kilometers from the international border and 13 kilometers south of Lgov), and the vast majority of Russian reporting about Kursk Oblast on August 9 is not consistent with previous claims that mobile Ukrainian groups were operating beyond 20 kilometers into Kursk Oblast.

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian military convoy east of Rylsk near Oktyabrskoye, Kursk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on August 9 shows the aftermath of the strike and destroyed Russian trucks along the 38K-017 highway. Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that there were 14 Ural and KAMAZ covered trucks carrying Russian reserves intended to reinforce Russian forces in Kursk Oblast and that the strike likely killed several Russian personnel traveling in the trucks. Russian sources suggested that the column may have been transporting personnel from the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces' 44th Army Corps (Leningrad Military District) or the "Pyatnashka" Brigade. Russian milbloggers theorized about which weapons system Ukraine may have used to conduct this strike, although ISW is not prepared to comment on which system Ukraine may have used during the strike.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian sources claimed on August 9 that Ukrainian forces advanced further east in Kursk Oblast but are likely no longer operating as far north or as far west as Russian sources previously claimed on August 8.

• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian military convoy east of Rylsk near Oktyabrskoye, Kursk Oblast.

• The Russian military command appears to be relying on existing units deployed to the international border area and readily available forces in the rear, most of which are units staffed with conscripts and irregular forces, to address the ongoing Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.

• These units would likely be the first to respond even if the Russian military command has decided to transfer additional, more experienced units from elsewhere in the theater.

• The Russian military command may currently be resisting operational pressures to redeploy forces from other operational directions to prevent the Ukrainian incursion from disrupting Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine.

• The Russian military command may currently be transferring more experienced and better-provisioned frontline units from eastern or southern Ukraine to Kursk Oblast, but it would likely take additional time for such units to arrive in Kursk Oblast.

• Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against a Russian military airfield in Lipetsk Oblast and other Russian military targets in occupied Crimea and Donetsk Oblast on August 9.

• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to posture itself as providing sufficient medical care to Russian servicemembers.

Institute for the Study of War

The Russian National Antiterrorism Committee announced a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts on August 9 in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. The Federal Security Service (FSB) Head and National Antiterrorism Committee Chairperson Alexander Bortnikov announced counterterrorism operations in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts in response to "sabotage and reconnaissance units" conducting "terrorist acts" in Russia and "units of the Ukrainian armed forces" conducting a "terrorist attack" in Kursk Oblast. The counterterrorism operation allows Russian authorities to take a number of measures, including suspending or restricting communications services, monitoring telecommunication channels, confiscating vehicles, and entering private property. Russian authorities previously announced a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod Oblast for one day in May 2023 in response to raids by all-Russian pro-Ukrainian elements. The Kremlin notably did not elect to declare a formal state of war against Ukraine or martial law — more serious responses that would marshal greater Russian state resources through wider, and more domestically disruptive, mobilization.

The Kremlin likely decided to declare a counterterrorism operation — as opposed to a state of war or martial law — to downplay the scale of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and prevent domestic panic or backlash — demonstrating the Kremlin's reluctance to take more drastic measures to respond to the situation. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on August 8 that a source close to the Russian Federation Council's defense committee stated that the Russian Presidential Administration recommended that Russian deputies and senators not comment on the events in Kursk Oblast "until further notice" or discuss it as briefly as possible and refer only to official statements. Russian milbloggers have been suggesting that the Kremlin formally declare war against Ukraine and criticized the Kremlin for failing to declare martial law instead of the counterterrorism operation. The declaration of martial law notably would have allowed Russian authorities to take more drastic measures, such as prohibiting rallies and demonstrations, enacting curfews, and organizing the production of defense articles for the military. Russian President Vladimir Putin has refrained from officially declaring a state of war, has repeatedly demonstrated his unwillingness to transfer Russian society fully to a war-time footing, and has forgone declaring general mobilization as part of wider efforts to prevent domestic discontent that could threaten the stability of Putin's regime.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian National Antiterrorism Committee announced a counterterrorism operation in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts on August 9 in response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.

• The Kremlin likely decided to declare a counterterrorism operation - as opposed to a state of war or martial law - to downplay the scale of the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and prevent domestic panic or backlash - demonstrating the Kremlin's reluctance to take more drastic measures to respond to the situation.

• Putin likely appointed Bortnikov as the head of the counterterrorist operation because Bortnikov has previously proven himself to be an effective manager during crises that threatened Russian domestic stability and the Kremlin regime.

• A complicated command and control (C2) arrangement for the FSB-led counterterrorism operation under Bortnikov may degrade the effectiveness of the Russian response to Ukraine’s operation.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to be relying on a combination of Russian conscripts already operating in Kursk Oblast, elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces, and elements redeployed from lower-priority frontline areas in Ukraine to defend against the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast, likely exacerbating the disorganization of Russia’s chosen response.

• Russian forces' usage of conscripts and forces already in Kursk Oblast, nearby forces fighting in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and lateral redeployments across the theater to defend against the Ukrainian incursion is consistent with a number of likely Russian courses of action (COAs) that ISW forecasted.

• The Russian MoD appears to be relying on select, battle-hardened units to conduct offensive and defensive operations in its most critical sectors of the front.

• Russian forces appear to be more adequately defending against Ukrainian assaults following the arrival of additional conscripts and more combat effective personnel from frontline areas in Ukraine.

• Geolocated footage and Russian reporting from August 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces largely maintain previously reported positions in Kursk Oblast and have advanced slightly further than their previously confirmed positions.

• Ukraine’s cross-border operation into Kursk Oblast threatens the Kremlin with a potential political crisis regarding causalities among Russian conscripts, whom the Kremlin has increasingly relied upon to defend the Russian state border with Ukraine.

• Ukrainian forces recently struck a Russian ship and a gas platform in the western Black Sea.

• Iran will reportedly deliver "hundreds" of ballistic missiles to Russia in the near future.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.

• A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has begun to form the "Black Raven" strike drone volunteer unit and asked readers to donate to the 16-million-ruble (about $184,324) goal to supply the unit with drones and equipment.

Institute for the Study of War