Lessons of the Minsk Deal: Breaking the Cycle of Russia's War in Ukraine

Some peace deals lead to peace, others to more war. The Minsk II deal aimed to end Russia’s limited invasion of Ukraine in 2015 but instead laid the groundwork for the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022. The United States must learn from the Minsk deal or risk a direct Russia-NATO conflict that puts American lives at risk.

Minsk II was a weak deal. It demanded nothing of the invader— Russia. It strengthened the Kremlin’s aggressive worldview that had driven the conflict to begin with. It masked Russian military weakness. It gave the Kremlin time and space to prepare for a larger invasion. The West could have helped Ukraine reach a stronger deal in 2015.

Minsk II gave Russian President Vladimir Putin hope that he could win in Ukraine without war. Russia sought and failed to control Ukraine in 2014 by military means. Minsk II gave Putin a way to demand that Ukraine — an independent state —give Russia control over its internal policies. Putin failed at that too and turned to the full-scale invasion in 2022.

Minsk II helped Putin mask his demands for Ukraine’s surrender behind false calls for peace. The West has repeatedly failed to call out and counter the real Russian demands since 2014. Minsk II reinforced Western delusions that Putin might simply settle if he received some land or if the West metered support to Ukraine or tried harder to negotiate with Putin. The deal also gave an excuse to those who understood the Kremlin’s goals but sought to restore ties with Russia anyway.

Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s close adviser in 2014, said in 2024 that Minsk II “legitimized the first partition of Ukraine.” Surkov’s words confirm Russia’s goal to destroy Ukraine as a state and to use the Minsk deal to do so. He added that “peace is nothing more than the continuation of war by other means.”

Another weak deal today would validate Putin’s 2022 full-scale invasion and give Putin hope to gain more over time. Hope for Putin means more war. More war means a larger war: An absolved Russia that bears little or no cost for its invasion will want more and will rebuild its capability to do more. A larger war would mean a higher cost for the United States, risk to American lives, and risk of a catastrophic escalation.

The Trump Administration has a historic opportunity to break Russia’s cycle of overt war and war through “peace” in Ukraine. To do so, the United States must learn the lessons from the Minsk deal:

• Russia will seek to transfer the responsibility and cost for its war onto someone else’s balance sheet.

• Putin’s demands are stand-ins for his goals – controlling Ukraine and making the United States bend to Putin’s demands to create a world order that favors Russia.

• Putin will fight as long as he believes he can outlast the West and Ukraine. Ending the war requires stripping Putin of hope that he can destroy Ukraine as a state in his lifetime — militarily or through a “peace deal.”

• Russia can accept failure.

Institute for the Study of War