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ForennameÖsterreichische Aktien im In- und Ausland
Betreff des ThemasLesenswert - Stellungnahme von BNP Paribas
URL des Themashttps://aktien-portal.at/forum/../forum/boerse-aktien.php?az=show_topic&forum=124&topic_id=129565&mesg_id=130329
130329, Lesenswert - Stellungnahme von BNP Paribas
Eingetragen von Warren Buffett, 07.9.11 23:34
Eine Stellungnahme von BNP Paribas - ich finde sie informativ:
(vieles betrifft nicht nur BNP Paribas)

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Euro, sovereign debt, liquidity and other issues:
questions and answers from BNP Paribas

After being asked a number of questions about the bank and the Eurozone,
we have decided to publish the answers to the most frequently asked
questions in the three categories below:

- Questions to the bank
- Questions about the Eurozone
- General market questions

Questions to the bank
1) Why does BNP Paribas hold one of the largest sovereign debt portfolios
among peers? How does BNP Paribas intend to manage its sovereign debt
portfolio in the short and medium term?

Our Eurozone Government bonds banking book portfolio has been brought down to
a total of €75bn (1) as at 30 June 2011. Its purpose is essentially two-fold:
a) To provide a liquidity buffer which can be used in situations of liquidity stress,
given that government securities are still considered by regulators as one of the
most liquid and non-risky assets available for such purpose;
b) As a structural hedge for our deposit base in our four domestic markets, in
particular against interest rate risk for non-interest bearing accounts such as
current accounts in France.

(1) The figure of €140 billion mentioned in the press was based on an erroneous interpretation of tables published by the
EBA and did not reflect Group’s risks on sovereign bonds.


2) Why is your exposure to Italy’s sovereign bonds so large?
Our banking book sovereign bond exposure to Italy is €21bn, 1.7% of BNP Paribas’
total commitments. This amount represents only 1% of the total value of Italian
bonds outstanding. The Italian debt market has been liquid and widely used as an
interest rate management tool by banks and investors, including BNP Paribas at a
time when government bonds were deemed risk free.

3) How likely is it that the current crisis could lead to a freezing up of money
markets and overnight interbank lending, similar to what we experienced
during the Lehman crisis? Are you well-equipped and sufficiently liquid to
deal with such an adverse scenario?

The situation today is very different. Among the large European banks, the fall in
activity in the interbank market is not mainly due to counterparty risk issues, but to
the banks pre-empting the impact of the future Basel liquidity regulation. The
interbank market is therefore likely to focus on instruments of one-month duration or
less, which is in line with what BNP Paribas had expected.

Regarding BNP Paribas’ funding position:

• BNP Paribas has access to substantial short-term euro funding from a
wide spread of sources. Conditions and maturities have not significantly
changed in recent weeks. There has been no shortage of funds and no
change in counterparties.

• In USD, we have an excess of short-term liquidity which the bank is
obliged to deposit at the Fed.

BNP Paribas has been taking steps since the start of 2011 to secure its
funding position by proactively increasing the duration of its short term
resources (one month to three months, three months to six months and so
on).

Despite the lower level of funding available to European banks from US
money market funds in August, BNP Paribas has been able to tap a wide
variety of funding sources. For example, US dollar funds have been sourced
from corporates, supras, institutionals, Central Banks, wealth management
clients, as well as money market funds across four geographic areas (USA,
Asia-Pacific, Gulf countries, Western Europe). The bank has also had
recourse to foreign exchange swaps to maintain access to US dollar funds.

The recourse to alternative US dollar funding sources has had cost implications
which have impacted pricing.

In addition, BNP Paribas has a sizeable liquidity buffer: BNP Paribas has around
€150bn of unencumbered assets eligible as collateral with central banks, of which
USD30bn eligible under US Federal Reserve criteria. These eligible assets are
made up of Government bonds, loans to United States or Eurozone corporates; selffunded
securitizations, and CDs (Certificates of Deposit).

The bank has already secured its long-term position: BNP Paribas 2011 medium
and long term funding programme of €35bn was completed in June. As of
today a total of €38bn has been raised with an average maturity of 6 years. The
USD part represents about 40%.

CDS spreads current levels for European Governments as well as for
European Banks do not reflect the bank’s true cost of funding, even senior
unsecured funding, which is considerably lower. Furthermore, even in troubled
times, BNP Paribas has benefited from “the flight to quality” and has been able to
raise funds through covered bonds or private placements at reasonable cost.

4) Is BNP Paribas actively reducing the size of its balance sheet and/or
changing its composition?

BNP Paribas is monitoring the size of its balance sheet pro-actively. The size of BNP
Paribas' balance sheet (€1.9 trillion as at 30 June 2011) is inflated by International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) which do not allow for netting of derivatives
and other trading items, which is authorized under US GAAP. The netting according
to the US GAAP rules would reduce the balance sheet by ~25%.

5) BNP Paribas is clearly a Global SIFI (Systemically Important Financial
Institutions), but its Common Equity Tier One Ratio is below 10%, which
regulators are increasingly viewing as a minimum requirement for Global SIFIs.
Is your Common Tier One Ratio sufficient in the current uncertain market
environment, or will you seek to bolster it?

BNP Paribas already has a Common Equity Tier One ratio of 9.6% as at 30 June
2011. The EBA stress tests showed the resilience of our capital base even in a
severe downturn scenario with a 7.9% result. BNP Paribas has constantly been
profitable through the 2007-2010 crisis and consistently reinforced its capital base
by retaining two-thirds of its profits. We have already doubled our capital base over
the past three years. Thanks to our high level of profitability (our H1 2011 annualized
13.8% ROE is the highest in our peer group) we should gradually reach the required
level for a Global SIFI without any need of capital injection.

6) How do you explain the discount of your bank share price?

While BNP Paribas’ shares have suffered severe falls along with the sector, it has
outperformed its peer group. The share price is down by 35% since the beginning of
the year, compared with 36.8% for the Eurozone banks index, 33.7% for the
European banks index, and 33.9 % for the main US banks in average (as of
05.09.2011).

We consider this impact of the crisis on the present valuation of BNP Paribas
by the market, as discounting unrealistically pessimistic scenarios. If we look
at the Net Book Value per Share of € 56.7 as of 30.06.2011, and at the current
share price which is around €33 as at 02.09.2011, the total market discount is
over €27bn. This seems unjustified by any measurement.

Questions on the Eurozone

1) How do you see the current situation and future perspectives for the
Eurozone? How would you be affected by a scenario of default of a major
Eurozone country, or by a worst-case scenario of a break-up of the Eurozone?

The Eurozone has a core of wealthy and stable countries, with a low level of private
debt, and governments who are taking the necessary measures to restore the
soundness of public finance. Those who write about the Euro break-up
underestimate both the political and economic reasons why the Euro is there to stay.

A- Proactive Policies show a commitment of the Eurozone governments

Eurozone countries have fixed clear targets in order to first stabilize and then reduce
public deficits as share of GDP:

2012: 4.6% in France, 2.8% in Belgium, 1.5% in Germany, 6% in Spain, 3% in Italy
2013: 3% in France, 1.8% in Belgium, 1% in Germany, 3% in Spain, 0.2% in Italy.

More importantly governments have demonstrated their clear political will in
Europe to reduce public deficits by taking further supplementary measures to
avoid undershooting as a result of deteriorating economic circumstances.

-France (€12 bn deficit reduction plan end-2011 and 2012).
-Italy (balanced budget in 2013, instead of 2014, the Chamber of Deputies passed
deficit reduction measures of €48 bn (even if some details are still under discussion)).
-Spain: additional €5bn savings before end-2011 to ensure targets are met.
-Portugal: new measures on 31 August targeting 0% deficit in 5 years: 7% of GDP
cut in spending, extension of public sector wage freeze, acceleration in payroll
reductions and welfare payments, increase in household and corporate taxes (all tax
increases = 3.5% GDP)
- Ireland: growth is reviving faster than expected.

B- European authorities and the ECB have shown their strong will to take the
necessary measures to support the governance and cohesion of the Eurozone.

The ECB and the European institutions have committed to support the financial
strength of the Eurozone through an increase of resources (European Financial
Stability Facility, European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism) and to improve the
governance of the Eurozone. These commitments are based on a common interest
to protect and uphold growth in Europe.

C- Key economic indicators in the Eurozone are resilient

Growth figures:
H1 2011: 1%. The outlook for 2011 and 2012 is between 1 and 1.5%

Public finance data
:
The fiscal deficit in 2010 (including local government) represented 6% of GDP in the
Eurozone. In 2011, the outlook is 4.3% in the Eurozone.

Private debt ratio to GDP is at 135% in the Eurozone despite Spain + Ireland’s high
level of private debt.

Since the private domestic savings pool is large enough in the Eurozone to finance
the fiscal deficit, the current account is close to balance (-0.6% of the GDP in 2010.

The figures for the US economy are roughly on par with those in the
Eurozone:

Growth H1 2011: +0.35% – Outlook for 2011 and 2012 is between 1 and 1.5%.
The fiscal deficit in 2010 was 10.6% of GDP. The outlook for 2011 is at 9.5%.
The private debt ratio to GDP is at 162% in the US. And the US has a current
account deficit around 3% because of its relatively low savings ratio.

3) After the recent downgrade of the United States by S&P, are you worried
that France could be next on the list, and how would this affect BNP Paribas?

Rating agencies have all reaffirmed the AAA with a stable outlook for France. The
government’s commitment is clear, there is a well-defined path to be followed, and
the policies in place are adjusted to offset the possible negative consequences.
There is a strong commitment to reduce the public deficit over time: 5.7% of GDP in
2011, 4.6% in 2012, 3% in 2013. In our opinion, two measures are essential to
create an improved base effect for the coming years:

- reforming pensions,
- being at an all-time low, in volume, in terms of increase of expenditure (resulting
to some extent to the “one out of two” replacement policy for civil servants and a
freeze in their basic wages)

According to our estimates, the effect of these measures will cut expenditure by
0.5% of the GDP each year. An additional element of comfort is that there is a growing consensus among political parties that public deficits should be reduced,
despite the divergence on the ways to achieve this.

Finally, France is one of the Eurozone countries which benefits from healthy
demographics, with a birth rate of two children per woman. This “demographic
dividend” has positive consequences:

�� As estimated by the OECD, the increase in health and pension expenditure
as a proportion of the GDP between 2010 and 2015 puts France in a
relatively favourable position with a forecasted increase of 1.9% versus 2.1%
for the UK and 2.6% for Germany for example.

�� Potential growth is necessary for governments to generate revenues in the
future. The OECD estimates put France in a relatively good position thanks to
the dynamics of its working age population with OECD potential growth
forecasted at 1.5% over the 2010-2015 period and at 1.7% over the 2016-
2026 period.

For all these reasons, we do not consider France at specific risk of a sovereign debt
downgrade.

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